appsec is eating security

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AppSec is Eating Security PRESENTED BY Alex Stamos AppSec Cali | January 27, 2015

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AppSec is Eating Security

P R E S E N T E D B Y A l e x S t a m o s| A p p S e c C a l i | J a n u a r y 2 7 , 2 0 1 5

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Most enterprises are not safe

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Most enterprises are not safe

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• Big Banks + other FIs• Defense Industr ial Base• Oil and Gas• Crit ical Infrastructure• Big Tech• Some Retai l

“SECURE 100”

Most enterprises are not safe

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• Big Banks + other FIs• Defense Industr ial Base• Oil and Gas• Crit ical Infrastructure• Big Tech• Some Retai l

Everybody Else

“SECURE 100”

“TOASTED 400”

Most enterprises are not safe

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• Big Banks + other FIs• Defense Industr ial Base• Oil and Gas• Crit ical Infrastructure• Big Tech• Some Retai l

Everybody Else

“SECURE 100”

What are they missing? • Secure software engineering • Engineering focused IR • Ability to create, not buy, solutions

“TOASTED 400”

Almost no users are safe

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Arista 7508E 1152 x 10GbE

30Tbps backplane 5kW

Security hardware is becoming un-buyable

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Arista 7508E 1152 x 10GbE

30Tbps backplane 5kW

Palo Alto 7050 120Gbps throughput

2.4kW

Security hardware is becoming un-buyable

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6

6

5kW

600kW

Containerization collapses the security perimeter

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Diagrams from docker.com

Containerization collapses the security perimeter

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No: • Virtual soundcard • Guest OS patching • VT-x enforcement • Network controls • Stable naming • 1:1 service relationshipsDiagrams from docker.com

Containerization collapses the security perimeter

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In the long run, this is a good thing! In the short term, it’s a mess to deal with!

No: • Virtual soundcard • Guest OS patching • VT-x enforcement • Network controls • Stable naming • 1:1 service relationshipsDiagrams from docker.com

The Internet of Unpatchable Crap Things

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store.idevices.com

What AppSec Needs to Accomplish

Apps have to be secure by default

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https://code.google.com/p/mustache-security/ by cure53.de

Apps have to be secure by default

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How many developersunderstand the securityrisk they imported?

https://code.google.com/p/mustache-security/ by cure53.de

App Sec doesn’t have to be realtime or inline

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▪ 10Gb Ethernet = 67ns between frames

App Sec doesn’t have to be realtime or inline

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▪ 10Gb Ethernet = 67ns between frames

▪ 100Gb Ethernet = 6.7ns between frames

App Sec doesn’t have to be realtime or inline

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▪ 10Gb Ethernet = 67ns between frames

▪ 100Gb Ethernet = 6.7ns between frames

App Sec doesn’t have to be realtime or inline

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▪ 10Gb Ethernet = 67ns between frames

▪ 100Gb Ethernet = 6.7ns between frames

Is this actually necessary? No.Is it a good idea? Probably not.

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by Flickr user Keith Allison CC-BY-SA

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by Flickr user Keith Allison CC-BY-SAby Warren Sharp

www.sharpfootballanalysis.com

Bug bounty communities need to reform to grow

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Accept that the browser is the new OS

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I hate it when good points get twisted to prevent progress

Network security must be transparent to applications

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▪ DNSSEC is dead. Several reasons why….

Network security must be transparent to applications

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▪ DNSSEC is dead. Several reasons why….› Complexity:

dnsviz.net via @jpmens

Network security must be transparent to applications

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▪ DNSSEC is dead. Several reasons why….› Complexity:

› Not end-to-end. How much do you trust your DNS provider?

dnsviz.net via @jpmens

Network security must be transparent to applications

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▪ DNSSEC is dead. Several reasons why….› Complexity:

› Not end-to-end. How much do you trust your DNS provider?› Invisible to user applications!

dnsviz.net via @jpmens

Build apps that are safe, not just secure

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▪ Way too little focus on user experience ▪ Classic difficult example is cert info (see APF tonight)

What is a safe app?

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▪ Safest mode is the default

What is a safe app?

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▪ Safest mode is the default▪ Automatically fixes itself

What is a safe app?

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▪ Safest mode is the default▪ Automatically fixes itself▪ Fails gracefully instead of failing insecurely and immediately ▪ Including client-side failures

What is a safe app?

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▪ Safest mode is the default▪ Automatically fixes itself▪ Fails gracefully instead of failing insecurely and immediately ▪ Including client-side failures

▪ Recognizes the difficulties it’s users face

What is a safe app?

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▪ Safest mode is the default▪ Automatically fixes itself▪ Fails gracefully instead of failing insecurely and immediately ▪ Including client-side failures

▪ Recognizes the difficulties it’s users face▪ Takes into account the entire lifecycle of the user

What is a safe app?

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▪ Safest mode is the default▪ Automatically fixes itself▪ Fails gracefully instead of failing insecurely and immediately ▪ Including client-side failures

▪ Recognizes the difficulties it’s users face▪ Takes into account the entire lifecycle of the user

Yes, I’m a security paternalist

Passwords are dead

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Every big password dump has 10-20% matches

Passwords are dead

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Every big password dump has 10-20% matches

▪ SMS › Lowest common denominator › Surprisingly expensive › Unreliable › Insecure in many countries

Passwords are dead

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Every big password dump has 10-20% matches

▪ SMS › Lowest common denominator › Surprisingly expensive › Unreliable › Insecure in many countries

▪ TOTP › Bad user experience › Many apps means no control over seeds

Passwords are dead

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Every big password dump has 10-20% matches

▪ SMS › Lowest common denominator › Surprisingly expensive › Unreliable › Insecure in many countries

▪ Push notifications › Much more secure › Require more user interaction

▪ TOTP › Bad user experience › Many apps means no control over seeds

Passwords are dead

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Every big password dump has 10-20% matches

▪ SMS › Lowest common denominator › Surprisingly expensive › Unreliable › Insecure in many countries

▪ Push notifications › Much more secure › Require more user interaction

▪ TOTP › Bad user experience › Many apps means no control over seeds

None solve the account lifecycle management problem This is the #1 issue for user safety

So…

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Looks like we all have a lot of work to do to:

So…

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Looks like we all have a lot of work to do to:• Build apps with no L3 protections

So…

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Looks like we all have a lot of work to do to:• Build apps with no L3 protections• Patch in our CI/CD pipelines

So…

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Looks like we all have a lot of work to do to:• Build apps with no L3 protections• Patch in our CI/CD pipelines• Provide end-to-end and transformable encryption

So…

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Looks like we all have a lot of work to do to:• Build apps with no L3 protections• Patch in our CI/CD pipelines• Provide end-to-end and transformable encryption• Make browsers more trustworthy than the OS

So…

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Looks like we all have a lot of work to do to:• Build apps with no L3 protections• Patch in our CI/CD pipelines• Provide end-to-end and transformable encryption• Make browsers more trustworthy than the OS

• More work for AppSec, less for the rest of security • Can we solve some of these problems without selling product

Shameless Pitch

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At Yahoo, our security goal is for all users to be safe using any of our products from any country on any platform.

I’m currently looking for a Director of Product Security to reinvent how we build safe products and meet this goal for 1.3B users

Thank you

[email protected] @alexstamos