applying market-oriented programming to product routing christopher j. hazard april 9 th, 2007 north...
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April 9, 2007Christopher J. Hazard North Carolina State University3 Outline Alphabet Soup Representing MOP Economies Implications of Market Segmentation Effective Valuation FunctionsTRANSCRIPT
Applying Market-Oriented Programming to Product Routing
Christopher J. HazardApril 9th, 2007
North Carolina State University
April 9, 2007
Christopher J. Hazard North Carolina State University 2
Motivation from Warehouses
• Buffer and regroup• Methodologies
– People gather items– Conveyers and Carrousels– Items bundled on movable shelves
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Outline
• Alphabet Soup• Representing MOP Economies• Implications of Market Segmentation• Effective Valuation Functions
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What is Alphabet Soup?
LetterStation Word
Station
LetterStation
WordStation
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Alphabet Soup Testbed Mechanics
• Speed & acceleration clamped • Collisions bad• “Perfect sensing”• Throughput & utilization
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Demo
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Alphabet Soup Research Challenges
• Which letters in which buckets?• Bucket specializations?• Which buckets to fulfill words?• Which stations to assign words and
letters?• Which bucketbots for which buckets?
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Market-Oriented Programming
• Resource allocation– Agents– Markets/Auctions– Resources– Valuations
• Transform optimization problems• Interface: price & resource• Sometimes altruistic or honest agents
[Wellman ‘96]
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Representing an Economy
Item Type I
Agent Type A Agent Type
Item Type
Item Can Be Sold By
Auction
Auction with Multiple Item or Agent Types
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Representing an Economy (2)
arrow anonymous price? linear price? representationno yes {A+, I}no no {A+, I*}yes yes {A, I}yes no {A, I*}
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Economy 1
Word
Letter Bundle
Letter
Bucket
Letter Station
Transportation
Bucketbot
Storage Right
StorageLetter Bundle
Letter Builder
Word Station
Word Queue
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Economy 2
Letter Bundle
Storage RightLetter Bundle
Letter
Bucket
Letter Station
Letter Builder
Transportation
Storage
Bucketbot
Word Station
Word Word Queue
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Economy 3
Letter BundleBundle Slot
Letter
Word
Bucket
Letter Builder
Transportation
Word Queue
Bucketbot
Storage Right
Storage
Letter Station
Word Station
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TAC SCM Example
PC
Agent & Factory
Motherboard
MotherboardSupplier
RFQ (Customer)
CPU
CPUSupplier
Memory
MemorySupplier
Hard Disk
Hard DiskSupplier
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Segmenting the Market
A X
B X'
C
X
A
B
X'
C
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Communicating Price Information Between Market Segments
• Information channel– Auctioneers– “Middleman” agents
• Information timing– Tâtonnement-like– Reactive
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Auctioneer Communication
• Tâtonnement-like [Cheng & Wellman ’98]
– DCOP [Modi et al. ’03 and Petcu & Faltings ’05]
– Artificially harder problem?• Inefficient “discovery” of valuations• Constraints between agents on both sides
• Reactive– Exposure problem
• No free disposal– Sub-problems unaccounted for (e.g. TSP)
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“Middleman” Agents as Information Channel
• Exposure problem– No free disposal
• Learning market prices– Speculators– Specialization
• Propagate demand for goods not in market• Leverage uncertainty models• Tâtonnement issues
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Valuation Functions
• Time, energy, external costs• Opportunity cost• Balancing & utilization• Agency assignment• Challenge of mapping to global optimum
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Conclusions
• Market-Oriented Programming:– Distributed– Subsystem Performance– Heuristics (valuations)– (Some) Protection from self-interested agents
• Many design choices– Uncertainty