INT. REV, APP. PSYCHOL. VOL. 28, NO. 2

Applied social psychology: problems and prospects EDWIN P. HOLLANDER

Stale University of New York at Buffalo*

Social psychology may be the first authentically new social science discipline developed in the twentieth century. It represents an advanced stage ofsocial science analysis, which goes beneath social phenomena to understand less obvious linkages between the social and psychological conditions of life. Social psychology is also a field ofpractice, where concepts and data are used, or newly generated to deal with problems of a more applied kind. Indeed, for many people, applied social psychology means a conscious as well as a conscientious effort to gain and use knowledge about social behaviour to deal with pressing social problems.

Although there has been a tendency to see basic and applied work as separate, my inclination is to hold a view which is not ‘either-or’ but ‘both-and’, in John Dewey’s phrase. There is no absolute necessity to choose sides, because in fact basic and applied work can contribute to one another. This is despite the fact that some of those with a basic orientation are impatient with applied colleagues who allegedly think they are the only ones who ‘care’, and some applied workers become impatient with the finer and finer slices they contend are being cut in basic research.

In practice, the distinction is not that clear. For instance, theories originating from so-called ‘basic’ work are likely to be extremely useful in guiding applied work and in giving structure to the data it generates. As our past-President, Gunnar Westerlund ( l ) , said in 1971, in his welcoming address to our Congress in Li‘ege, ‘A researcher without a theory is a helpless victim of his data’. Furthermore, the benefit is reciprocated by having theories or concepts put to the test in applied settings, even though this may not be so readily appreciated.

Social psychology also must be seen as a field of enormous diversity. There is no one social psychology, nor one applied social psychology. As I look at the table in my study at home, I see a pile of new books. Their titles tell something about that diversity, including studies of work groups, sex roles, consumer behaviour, organizational power, and tolerance for nonconformity, to indicate only some of those areas. The world of investigation, conception, and application in social psychology seems limitless.

Indeed, I believe we have only had a glimpse of the possibilities in the field of social psychology. As with most disciplines, the range ofwhat we don’t know is greater than what we do know. There is much yet to be done to penetrate further the basis for what we observe around us. That is a large order, of course, but I believe that social psychology has much to offer from the central place it occupies in the social sciences. To the extent that these sciences draw from it, they can be enriched and advanced. Among these fields, I am thinking of political science, sociology, anthropology, and even economics, despite their uneasiness about psychological reductionism. In very practical terms, we can and indeed have made contributions to interdisciplinary problems of automation, environmental planning, and population control, to name a few.

While I hold this quite affirmative view of what social psychology can offer and has already offered, I am well aware of the criticisms of the field which have become fashionable over the past decade or more, both from inside and outside of it. Many of these criticisms have enough legitimacy to create a healthy ferment regarding the scope and direction of social psychology. On the other hand, some criticisms are greatly overdrawn with respect to the nature of the field.

I t is unreasonable, for example, to fault social psychology for not coming up with ‘answers’ to social problems when it is primarily an empirical and not a prescriptive science. Generally

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speaking, social psychology is not social engineering, though it has increasing possibilities in that direction because it certainly holds implications for action. However, as with other social science disciplines, these implications are not so easily acted on in the light of other considerations which also have value, among them political and economic ones. Indeed, even economics, which seems closest to being an action-oriented social science discipline, is only partially successful in offering workable answers to perplexing social problems. Speaking at a national economics meeting, one leading economist pointedly said that, ‘If you are going to make predictions about the economy, you had better do it often’.

Therefore, it may be asking too much for social psychology to be readily applicable in a clear and direct way to the issues which motivate widespread social concern. This is sometimes stated as seeking answers to a pressing question, but that attempt alone fails to cover a number of activities. For instance, the research of Zimbardo and his associates (Z), called the Stanford Prison Study, demonstrated the powerful effects of role. Its results do not respond directly to a single question but rather add further understanding of institutional roles. Such demonstrations can be thought of as contributing to raising awareness. They are ‘experimental’, but not necessarily in the vigorously scientiJic way that is usually suggested by the term ‘experimentation’. A prototype of this kind of work is the Sherifs’ (3) research many years ago with inter-group tension and its reduction in a boys’ summer camp.

The experimental tradition in social psychology is a benefit, but it can also be a limitation when pursued to the exclusion of other approaches. Indeed, there are detractors who see it as somehow antagonistic to applicability. I believe this is not so and, indeed, there are many experiments which prove to be useful in an applied way. A relatively recent example is the Income Maintenance Experiment. Also known as the ‘Negative Income Tax Experiment’, this experiment by Kershaw (4) and others was done under U.S. Government support and found in general that receiving a minimum income did not serve as a deterrent to seeking a job. This research illustrates the fact that the experimental method can be intensely practical and therefore is probably better seen as a dimension orthogonal to application. Some experimentation-whether in the laboratory or in the field-has applicability, or generalizability, to the wider world, while some of the research done in so-called ‘real world settings’ is quite confined in applicability. For instance, an experiment which helps to understand the relationship of variables contributing to group problem-solving may be more generally useful than a case study of the problems arising from conflicts between executives in a particular corporation. This is not an absolute judgement of merit, of course.

Applied Social Psychology in Practice The expanse of applied social psychology is very wide-far wider, I believe, than its practitioners usually recognize-for it is not merely, as has been suggested, ‘whatever applied social psychologists do’. There are many people doing work which applies social psychology, by inducing and studying effects on people, who are not social psychologists. For example, a good deal of evaluation research involves studies which examine the social and psychological effects of a programme of social action. By its nature, this is highly pragmatic research, but it may still be conducted within a theoretical framework.

In the fields of childhood socialization and of educational practices, there also is evidence of social psychology being applied. Studies of moral development illustrate an intersection of social psychology and child psychology in which investigators, such as Urie Bronfenbrenner ( 5 ) and Roger Burton (6), can be seen to be contributors in both fields.

Even more in the direction of application, is the research on the modelling effects of television on aggression and other social behaviour, as exemplified by the work of Albert Bandura (7) and of Hilde Himmelweit (8 ) , and their colleagues. Another example is the broad field of ‘substance abuse’, which includes drugs and alcohol; it is quite clearly infused with social psychological variables. Indeed, much of the research conducted under the heading of ‘mental

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EDWIN P. HOLLANDER 95

health’ is linked to social-psychological considerations. In this respect, the field of ‘community mental health’ has lived under the mixed auspices of clinical psychology and psychiatry, as well as social psychology, for some time.

Arguments about where the community mental health field properly belongs seem side issues to the major point that it cannot do without proper attention to social psychological variables. There is, in fact, no theory of ‘community mental health’ which does not draw upon social psychology in some significant way. For example, the idea of ‘social networks’, which are seen as sustaining people in their milieu, is a follow-up on Jacob Moreno’s (9) early work in Sociometry. Indeed, ‘milieu therapy’, which was pioneered by the Tavistock Group in England, is an outgrowth of an essentially social psychological study in a psychiatric context by Maxwell Jones and his colleagues (10).

Still, the conventional wisdom suggests that social psychology somehow is too concerned with scientific rigour and is correspondingly less concerned with social problems. Although that could be true for some who are called social psychologists, the conclusion that social psychology is not a field with an applied thrust is mistaken and, worse yet, misleading.

Traditions and Trends in Social Psychology Basic research in social psychology goes back to the turn of the century and even before. I t has provided a range of findings about the dynamics of human social behaviour, and the motivations and perceptions underlying it. On balance, this research has contributed to an enlightened view of the nature of the human condition. The findings of basic research are by no means consistent, and progress is not linear in any particular area of study within social psychology. Nevertheless, there has been an accretion ofknowledge that can be drawn upon as a basis for dealing with applied problems.

One of the major gains from this research has been the creation of theoretical conceptions- such as ‘definition of the situation’, ‘social facilitation’, ‘reference group’, ‘role’, and ‘self- fulfilling prophecy’, among others-which are helpful as intermediate-range orienting concepts. They are not full-blown ‘theories’, in the widest sense, but they do have practical value. There are newer theories, which are wider, including the ‘cognitive balance and consistency’ (1 l ) , and ‘social exchange and equity’ (12) theories, that are well-represented in contemporary work.

Discussions of the historical tradition in social psychology often begin with consideration of the role played by Kurt Lewin. A common view is that Lewin was the primary figure in trying to integrate experimental and applied work in the field, but that a split developed after his untimely death ( 13). Although much has been made of this split in orientations, it is not entirely new nor so marked as might appear.

Unquestionably, Lewin deserves his special place as a great figure in social psychology, especially for his emphasis on studying group processes. However, it is regrettable that the numerous contributions of others, before and during Lewin’s time, are given much less attention. The work on group effects on individuals goes back to Miinsterberg (14), Moede (1 5 ) , and Floyd Allport (16) in the first quarter of this century. Sherif s (1 7) experiment on the development of social norms, and Newcomb’s (18) Bennington Study were done in the 1930s. This research was experimental in varying degrees, and oriented toward social issues. The Clarks’ (19) research on identification in black children, and Klineberg’s (20) research on race and intelligence, were highly applied in their concern with pressing social problems. Asch’s (2 1) experiment, done in the 194Os, started out as a study of independence from group opinion. Milgram’s (22) more recent work in this last tradition is built around the problem ofobedience to authority.

These and other efforts represent a line ofwork begun near the turn of the century and still with us, which did not rely upon Lewinian conceptions or empirical work. To rectify the C

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balance, it is important therefore to recognize that much of contemporary social psychology was shaped by factors which were in play prior to Lewin’s significant contributions.

There are still other earlier traditions deserving to be mentioned. For example, the work of Bartlett (23) on social factors in memory, of Cantril and associates (24) on social movements and panic, of Hovland and his colleagues (25) on factors affecting influence and attitude change, and of Katz and Braly (26) on prejudice. Indeed, the classic work of the 1930s, Experimental Social Pvchology, by Murphy, Murphy, and Newcomb (27) , is at least as weighted with social concerns as with issues of experimental methodology.

How and by whom Social Psychology is Applied Despite the tendency to see an applied problem as an impetus for further research, a fund of knowledge already exists as a basis for evaluation and even action. Indeed, the decision-maker usually needs to be able to move without having the luxury of being able to wait for further findings. There are other ways to get needed information, not least recourse to archival data, including readily calculable trends, and to consultation with those who know about and can summarize and integrate relevant available findings and concepts. At the very least, such people know where to locate these in the literature.

In fact, the published literature is full of findings which have implications for possible action when brought together in an appropriate framework. Those making the application need not be social psychologists, and indeed often are not. Published findings are quite literally ‘public’, and are not possessed only by those originating them. Anyone with the least interest can draw inferences from these findings and can apply them if they wish. However, we know very little about how much of this application occurs since it can often be done covertly. Furthermore, a good deal of ‘applied social psychology’ research is not published but closely held by its sponsors in fields such as advertising, marketing, media analysis, and organizational development.

There are of course valid reasons for gathering more data on applied problems and publishing the results more widely. Among these reasons are to study changing conditions and timeliness. The necessity to gain specialized knowledge about a particular setting and the people within it would be still another reason. Therefore, applied research quite obviously has a particular justification and urgency. While basic research can take its time, applied research typically demands more promptness to be timely and useful. Not to be timely may mean that findings are useless with regard to application.

The aim of much of the work in applied social psychology is to provide information about ongoing institutions, and in the context of the many elements of power and politics they possess. A case in point is in the sphere oforganizational consulting. In such a relationship, an extremely important matter is the source of entry, and relatedly to whose ends the work is being directed. Several types of relationship, each with pitfalls, can be identified.

As a starting place, consider the reality of organizational power. Who is able to bring in the consultant? Obviously, the person or persons with the greatest status or power, and usually with access to monetary resources. What motivates the consulting relationship by such a client? All too often, in one type of relationship, the consultant is used to provide ammunition for what is already pre-set as a course of action by those who control the resources. In the most benign form, this can sometimes take on the appearance of gaining ‘another view’ which will inform the concerned parties about the need for a change-but very often one which is fore-ordained. A case in point occurs when a programme evaluation is done with the understanding that only recommendations about improving the programme can be made. The issue of whether the programme is worthwhile to have at all cannot be raised since this is often a ‘political’ matter.

Another type of relationship is the use of the consultant as a means to prevent or at least delay an outburst of dissatisfaction by those who are aggrieved and want a change. Whether through a systematic evaluation study, or a review of prevailing practices, this kind of applied work becomes a tactic for those in power to delay decisions, and perhaps scatter opposition.

EDWIN P. HOLLANDER 97

Those in authority can legitimately say ‘we have a study of this going on now’, or ‘our consultant is looking into that’. Although the tactic may be a transparent one, it works enough to be effective, and it does not deter consultants who, after all, need not be committed to seeing that their recommendations are accepted and implemented-r, indeed, even made known in the organization. Obviously, this situation raises value issues, which at some point must be faced.

Let us be clear that no ethical breach is involved in a consultant doing research, or preparing a set ofrecommendations, even ifhe or she knows that they will be closely held by those in power and probably never be implemented. The nature of most contracts-explicit or implicit- ordinarily does not challenge either element by requiring openness and implementation. Applied work in organizations also carries with it the real possibility of being the subject of controversy because its outcomes are virtually certain to challenge someone’s vested interests. The results ofsuch research may very well not be positively received, even by those who initially sponsored the work, as in the case of an evaluation research project. There may be valid reasons for a negative reaction, but these can be too ‘political’ to deal with outright. Instead, there is likely to be a recourse to criticism of methodology. In fact, a prevailing reality seems to be that only a rare study can avoid being faulted for some feature of its methodology. That element is especially present if the study is of an applied nature aimed at providing answers regarding controversial social issues.

Values in Applied Social Psychology Social psychology is not social work, which is a distinct profession in its own right. But some of the same values which had an appeal in bringing many of us into social psychology could have directed us into various service professions, including social work, or clinical psychology. In fact, it was true, and is still true to some degree, that many people who have contributed to social psychology have training or experience in clinical practice, some in psychoanalysis, and others in the ministry.

There is a basic resonance of interest in social conditions which motivates similar concerns among practitioners in these and related fields. That is not to say that such concerns are necessarily very evident. Part of the difficulty has to do with the hurdles to gaining access and a ready ear from those in positions of authority. Associated with this process is the issue of what social psychology as a field, and what social psychologists as individuals, have to say and are willing to say, of pragmatic value. We are not very inclined to feel comfortable with the belief that something is worthwhile ‘because it works’, and this may limit applications.

There are other crucial value issues involved in applied social psychology. For the moment, I am leaving out applications of such knowledge by those who are not social psychologists. However, as I said earlier, there is virtually no control over publicly available knowledge. Questions arise when such knowledge is held privately by sponsors of research, or applied in what may be a socially destructive fashion. Such considerations beg the issue of what ought to be the basis for applying social psychology. My strong preference is to adopt a humanistic view which invokes the broader good, with adequate concern for individuals and their rights and well-being. In short, I prefer to think that social psychologists will be on the humanistic side. But the presence of other considerations, including the nature of consulting relationships already noted, continue to operate as a counter-force.

There is also the weight of power. An applied social psychologist enters a world in which, paradoxically, he or she has less power and more power. The reduced power comes from constraints on what professionals may be able to do as consultants, at their own initiative. The increased power may result from at least the sense that their views and recommendations may be implemented by those in power, whom they serve.

Implications for Training and Future Directions The people being trained in social psychology now will be leading at least half of their

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professional lives beyond the year 2000. We cannot hope to foresee what they will be doing and need to know then and after. Today social psychologists with rather traditional training, but with diverse interests, generate a kaleidoscope of different applied activities. For instance, Michael Argyle (28) has applied his painstaking research on the elements ofsocial interaction to the teaching of social skills-especially to people who in conventional terms have been seen as disturbed. Irving Janis (29) has directed his long-time work on processes of decision-making to policy-making in his conception of ‘groupthink‘. Philip Zimbardo (30) has recently done a book on his investigations of ‘shyness’, with an emphasis on how to overcome it.

My own experience indicates that even someone identified with experimental social psychology can roam far afield. Among other things, I have been involved in a UNESCO- sponsored cross-national survey of young people’s attitudes toward the uses of atomic power, studies of the long-term predictability of performance through the use of peer nominations, a project on attitudes toward political leaders as a function of perceived economic well-being and party identification, and a report on factors in the potential effectiveness of groups on long- duration space flights.

Regarding the training of applied social psychologists, a great deal has already been said on the topic. I find much of it impractical, even if well-intentioned. For instance, I have long shared the view that more interdisciplinary training in anthropology, economics, sociology, and political science--to name several fields-would be helpful. However, I think it is quite unrealistic when put in terms of having people take dual doctorates. More helpful would be to have students further exposed to real world problems outside of the university setting, and to become more alert to applications of concepts to problems. There is also much to be said for developing wider skills in research methods, including observational techniques.

Perhaps most relevant in training applied social psychologists is to have them learn not to reify the terms, concepts, and paradigms of social psychology, as if they were firm, fixed forms. Such forms are not the best means for describing the world of social processes, which involves reciprocal feedback and bidirectionality more than linearity. Clearly, the linear model of dependent and independent variable linkages is often purely arbitrary regarding which is labelled which, as a systems approach to organizational functioning in the mode of Katz and Kahn (31) or Miller and Rice (32) surely indicates.

In this vein, Lewin’s great emphasis on change as a dynamic process in groups was of supreme importance. The failure to follow up this harder route may be a shortcoming in advancing our application of social psychology. Yet, there are signs that more attention is being given to systems conceptions, and to other newer models of social relations.

Perhaps most prominent in the group dynamics tradition is the development of various exercises, and other experiences in the nature of encounter groups, assertiveness workshops, and similar forms of training, to acquaint people with group processes and their interpersonal components. In the right hands, these activities can be helpful. However, the level of professionalism in their direction is critical and has not always been of a high order (33). Yet, for many people these group exercises, and interventions, have represented the only ‘applied social psychology’ they have come to know. There has also been the danger of exaggerating claims of success, and the favourability of outcomes, on the basis of testimonials instead of good follow-up research (34). Another problem which must be faced is that in many instances participants in such activities are involved by an organizational demand, rather than by volunteering.

My views on this topic are mixed in so far as I see the desirability of learning about group processes through a directed experience. But I have qualms about the ‘who’ and ‘what’ of the direction, and the nature of the outcomes. Not least, I am concerned about the manipulative aspect of getting people to go along with these group exercises when they have no choice in the matter. This seems to oppose the emerging importance of creating the basis for self-expression in line with positive forms of social behaviour.

There is a great deal which could be said about the interest now in the factors affecting this

EDWIN P. HOLLANDER 99

positive aspect of social behaviour. Research on ‘prosocial’ behaviour is a case in point. Attention to the reciprocal influence which followers are able to exert on leaders ( 3 5 ) is another. Resistance to persuasion and to manipulation (36) is yet another part of this positive trend. The use of ‘survey feedback’ techniques is an example of a positive step in opposing pluralistic ignorance and thereby reducing individual vulnerability.

I hope this trend continues and will encourage greater attention to ‘pro-action’, as Gordon Allport called it, rather than tojust reaction. Our conceptions of the human condition would be far richer if we were to be more aware of things which people can do affirmatively-as, for instance, in Platt’s notions about getting out of ‘social traps’ (37), and my own work on ‘overcoming hurdles to independence’ (38). In this way, social psychology can be a force for developing more positive forms of self-expression.

Still other trends can be discerned, including the development of ‘environmental psychology’ as an applied area emerging out of social psychology. The work of Altman (39) and of Proshansky (40) and Sommer (41), and their colleagues, has been of seminal importance regarding the way spatial factors relate to human activity. There is also the promising work on factors affecting the way people perceive the quality of the environment, by Angus Campbell (42) among others.

All in all, I see increasing promise and vigour in the area of applied social psychology. There is evidence of more attention to the importance of social processes and of the perception of the context of action. The elements of interaction also are being studied more closely, within this context. These considerations lead me to hope that, more than ever, we will follow the principle enunciated by Frank Lloyd Wright, the architectural genius, who said: ‘See into life; don’t just look at it.’

1.

2.

3.

4. 5. 6. 7.

8.

9. 10. 11.

12.

13.

14. 15. 16.

17. 18. 19.

20.

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ZIMBARDO, P., BANKS, W. C., HANEY, C., andJAFFE, D. (1973). ‘A Pirandellian prison’, N e w York Times Magazine (8 April), pp. 38 ff.

SHERIF, M., and SHERIF, C. W. (1953). Groups in Harmony and Tenrion: An Integration of Studies on Intergroup Relations (New York: Harper).

KERSHAW, D. N. (1972). ‘A negative-income-tax experiment’, Scientzfic American, 227, 19-25. BRONFENBRENNER, U. (1970). Two Worldr of Childhood (New York: Russell Sage Foundation). BURTON, R. (1963). ‘Generality of honesty reconsidered’, Psychological Rev&, 70, 481-99. BANDURA, A. (1973). ‘Social learning theory of aggression’, in J. F. Knutson (ed.), The Control ofAggression, pp. 20 1-50 (Chicago: Aldine) . HIMMELWEIT, H. T., OPPENHEIM, A. N., and VINCE, P. (1958). Television and the Child (London: Oxford University Press).

MORENO, J. (ed.) (1960). The Sociometry Reader (Glencoe, Ill.: Free Press). See especially Part I on Foundations. JONES, M. (1953). The Therapeutic Community (New York: Basic Books). See for example: ABELSON, R. P., ARONSON, E., MCGUIRE, W. J., NEWCOMB, T. M., ROSENBERG, M. J., and TANNENBALIM, P. H. (eds) (1968). Theories of Cognitive Com’stoq: A Source Book (Chicago: Rand McNally). See for example: HOMANS, G. C. (1974). Social Behavior: Its Elementary Form (rev. ed) (New York: Harcourt, Brace,

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21. ASCH, S. E. (1951). ‘Effects ofgroup pressure upon the modification and distortion ofjudgments’, in H. Guetzkow

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PSYCHOLOGIE SOCIALE APPLIQUEE: PROBLEMES ET PERSPECTIVES

La psychologie sociale est peut-&tre la premi‘ere discipline authentique en science sociale qui se soit dtveloppte au 20tme si’ecle. I1 ne faut pas la confondre avec le travail social ou avec l’ingtnierie sociale bien qu’elle puisse avoir et qu’elle ait effectivement des implications au niveau de l’action. La psychologie sociale appliqute reprtsente un effort conscient et consciencieux pour dtvelopper et utiliser les connaissances au sujet du comportement social et des probltmes sociaux. La tradition exptrimentale en psychologie sociale n’est pas opposte h l’application, au contraire, elle peut la soutenir et la dtvelopper. De nombreuses manifestations de la psychologie sociale appliqute surviennent en dehors des frontitres conventionnelles dans ce domaine,--c’est le cas des travaux sur la socialisation de l’enfant, sur l’tvaluation des programmes et sur la santt mentale. Dans la litttrature en psychologie sociale, les concepts et les rtsultats poss‘edent de nombreuses possibilitb d’application sans qu’il soit ntcessaire de poursuivre les recherches. I1 n’existe pas une seule psychologie appliqute, mais beaucoup de voies difftrentes qu’on peut emprunter. Quelques observations sont prtsenttes sur les probl‘emes de valeur en psychologie sociale appliqute, et la formation des psychologues dans ce domaine.

* (On lenue at the National Academy $Sciences, Washington, D.C. 20418, U.S .A. )