appendix 7 railway thriassio kiato in...

March 2011 | Frontier Economics, Atkins, ITS 1

Appendix 7 – Railway Thriassio – Kiato in

Greece


Greece

7.1 Introduction

7.1.1 Project overview

This evaluation presents the results of the ex post cost-benefit analysis for the

construction of a new double-track standard-gauge railway between Thriasio and

Kiato in Greece. The line has replaced a former single track metric line passing

through a number of urban areas, including Megara and Korinthos. The

improvements (funded by 4 applications for cohesion funding) form part of

longer term proposals to upgrade the Piraeus – Athens – Patra line. Three of the

sub-projects related to the section of track running from Thriasio to Korinthos.

An additional funding application was made for the section of track between

Korinthos and Kiato. Details of each funding application are shown below in

Table 1.

Table 1. Details of Funding Applications

Project Ref. Description Total

(€’000s)

C.F

(€’000s)

Date of

Decision

Thriasio – Korinthos

94.09.65.010

(A)

Project name: Construction of new

Thriasio-Pedio-Elefsis-Corinth

railway line (Phase A)

120,000 60,000 23/07/99

1994GR16

CPT110 (B)

Project name: Construction of

Thriasio-Elefsina-Corinth section

(Phase B)

165,000 82,500 22/03/01

2003GR16

CPT001 (C)

New Railway Track Thriasio–

Elefsina–Korinthos (Phase C) 92,000 46,000 15/12/03

Korinthos - Kiato

2000GR16CPT

003 (D) New Railway Korinthos-Kiato 99,800 49,900 29/12/00

*The extension of the modern line from Kiato to Patra will not be assisted by the EU Cohesion Fund.

Technical information supporting all applications is provided in a feasibility study

(TRADEMCO on behalf of ERGOSE) dated 20th November 2000. This study

provides a combined analysis of the forecast costs and benefits for improvements

along the entire Thriasio-Patras railway, including a section not yet opened

2 Frontier Economics, Atkins, ITS | March 2011


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between Kiato and Patras. However, it does not include a sequential economic

analysis for each section of the route. As such this ex post evaluation also

considers the cumulative impacts of the four projects and attempts to qualify the

differences caused by a shorter route being constructed compared to forecast.

Location

The 220km-long rail line linking Athens to Patra forms part of the European

TEN-T network, which runs parallel to the Priority Motorway Axis 7

(Igoumenitsa/Patras-Athens–Sofia-Budapest). Athens is situated on Rail Priority

Axis 22 (Athens-Sofia-Budapest-Vienna-Prague-Nuremburg/Dresden). Patras is

on rail priority axis 29 (Ionian/Adriatic international corridor). An overview of

the project is shown below in Figure 1.

Figure 1. Project Location and Overview

Source: Openstreetmap.org

Description

The new fully grade-separated 112km1 double-track railway replacement line

follows a more direct alignment, bypassing a number of urban areas between

1 91km Thriasio-Korinthos + 21km Korinthos-Kiato



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Thraisio and Korinthos. The line is no longer disrupted by the presence of a

large number of level crossings that characterised the old line, which has now

been discontinued. The new alignment, following the main highway, has resulted

in new stations being less centrally located than their predecessors. Figure 2

below shows the old and new track alignments passing through Megara, and

highlights some of the above features. Figure 3 gives a visual comparison of the

old and new tracks.

Figure 2. Old and New Rail Alignment through Megara

Source: Openstreetmap.org



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Figure 3. Old Metric Line (left) and New Standard Gauge double line (right)

Source: Site Photographs

The first three sub sections relate to the Thriasio-Korinthos section which

opened in September 2005. In addition to the new station in Korinthos, four new

stations became operational at this time, namely; Nea Peramor, Megara, Kinetta

and Agioi Theodori. Three additional new stations were incorporated from July

2006 being; Ano Liosia, Aspropyrgos and Magoula. The line terminated in

Athens until June 2007 when it was extended to Piraeus including the three

intermediate stops at Lefka, Rentis and Rouf. The fourth sub-project relates to

the section between Korinthos-Kiato, this became operational in July 2007.

The new line, including more than 5km of tunnels, is a modern double-track

standard gauge railway, and is compatible with the wider rail network in northern

and central Greece. The top speed on the improved line is 160km/h. The old line

consisted of outdated infrastructure with the general line speed of 90km/h falling

to 25km/h in places. The initial assessment considered that the project would a

vital intervention to prevent the decline of the railway, and to allow the line to be

compatible with the remainder of the standard gauge rail network in central and

northern Greece.

7.1.2 Context

Socio-economic context

Table 2 presents summary data showing Greece‟s economic position compared

to the EU as a whole over the period 2000-2009. The GDP per capita of Greece

is presently 88% of the EU average. Growth in GDP has been particularly strong

over the previous decade growing by 37% in real terms compared to 16% for the

EU as a whole between 2000 and 2010. Despite this substantial growth, it is

worth considering this against a backdrop of more recent trends where year-on

year-growth in GDP has declined from a peak of 4.5% in 2006 to -2.3% in 2009

and -4.6% in 2010 (Business Monitor International, Q3 2010). This economic



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decline is important in the process of ex post evaluation as it will result in lower

than expected travel demand when compared to ex ante forecasts.

The overall mode share of rail in Greece is generally low. Moreover, in recent

years the mode share of rail and bus passenger travel in Greece has fallen

considerably, against a background trend of increasing passenger travel as a

whole and of increasing car ownership.

The project appraisal noted that the poor state of the rail network in Greece was

one of the main problems with the nation‟s transport sector. In particular, the

different gauge in the Peloponnese compared to the rest of Greece necessitated

interchanges. Large sections of the track had low-capacity lines and safety issues.

In addition a large part of the network did not have modern electrical signalling,

and there was a requirement for a large number of staff increasing operating

costs. It was noted that the Hellenic Railways Organisation‟s (OSEs) total

revenue only accounted for 51% of the total operating costs, and consequently

the rail network was operating at a loss.

Over the past decade there has been significant investment in the modernisation

of both the rail and highway networks within Greece. However, recent data

shows that the overall financial position of the railway has not improved. In

2008, OSE reported losses of €937m on revenues of €174m. During the same

period the subsidiary operating trains on the network reported a turnover of

€108m against costs of €312m2. From 2000 to 2009 the companies staffing costs

increased by 50 percent even though personnel decreased by 30 percent.

With regards to the financial status of the railway, OSE‟s 2009 annual report

notes that a reorganisation of the Greek railways is proposed for 2010. This will

attempt to address the profitability of the network through:

a rationalisation of personnel necessary for the operation of the OSE

network;

a review of the OSE network to minimise the loss from parts of the

network with low demand; and,

managing the real objectives of investments both in terms of feasibility

and in terms of economic profitability.

2 Source: Hellenic Railways Organisation S.A, Annual Financial Statements 2009



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Table 2. Details of Funding Applications

2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008 2009

GDP/capita (market prices, €)

European Union (27 countries) 19100 19800 20500 20700 21700 22500 23700 25000 25100 23600

Greece 12600 13400 14300 15600 16700 p 17500 p 18800 p 20200 p 21000 p 20700 p

Real GDP/capita growth (% p.a.)

European Union (27 countries) 3.9 2 1.3 1.3 2.5 2 3.2 3 0.5 -4.2

Greece 4.5 4.2 3.4 5.9 4.4p 2.3

p 4.5

p 4.3

p 1.3

p -2.3

p

Model Split of Passenger Transport (%)

Greece

Rail 2.2e 1.9

e 1.9

e 1.6

e 1.6

e 1.7

e 1.6

e 1.6

e 1.3

e -

Car 72.8e 74.3

e 75.1

e 76.4

e 77.5

e 78.3

e 79.2

e 79.9

e 80.8

e -

Bus 25.1e 23.8

e 23.0

e 22.1

e 20.9

e 20.0

e 19.2

e 18.5

e 17.9

e -

Rail (mpkm) 1,583 1,783 1,836 1,574 1,668 1,854 1,811 1,954 2,003 -

Cars (per 1000 people) - - 331 348 368 388 409 429 - -

Notes: e = estimate, p = preliminary, - = no data available

Source: Eurostat http://epp.eurostat.ec.europa.eu/portal/page/portal/eurostat/home & The World Bank http://data.worldbank.org/indicator/IS.RRS.PASG.KM

(accessed 27nd September 2010)

http://epp.eurostat.ec.europa.eu/portal/page/portal/eurostat/home

http://data.worldbank.org/indicator/IS.RRS.PASG.KM



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Strategic policy context

The old line between Thriasio and Kiato had poor geometric features, an old

infrastructure, different gauge from the rest of Greece, and a lack of modern

telecommunications and signalling. The line also passed through a number of

built up areas and contained a number of level crossings in these locations. As a

result, although track speed was generally 90km/h, it dropped to as low as

25km/h in places. Consequently the line, along with the wider Peloponnesian

network, was in an unfavourable situation in terms of demand and financial

results. This section of the network was stated as comprising 34% of all OSEs

operating costs but only 6% of total revenue.

The stated objectives of providing a standard gauge double line track with a

design speed of 160km/h were to:

reduce travel times between Athens and Korinthos by 40 minutes from

an original time of 1 hour 40 minutes. (And by 1 hour 20 minutes from

Athens to Patra with the final project3);

increase revenue and decrease operating costs on the railway;

improve safety by installing modern automatic signalling and eliminating

level crossings;

allow the Athens – Patra railway to connect into the wider network of

central and northern Greece removing the need for interchange (the

incompatibility of the Athens-Patra metric line was regarded as a major

problem with the countries rail network);

provide socio-economic benefits through mode shift from road to rail;

improve working conditions and the movement of trains by increasing

line capacity and improving reliability; and,

provide employment during construction.

In its entirety the line is the only available rail link from Greece to Western

Europe connecting through a port (Patra). The old line was of a low standard

with decreasing demand. Ultimately the construction of a new standard gauge

line, in conjunction with the rebuild of the port of Patra, was intended to increase

the potential for rail freight between Patra and Athens with positive effects to the

railway and the national economy. Patra in itself is the fourth largest city in

Greece and also provides good connections to ports in Italy such as Bari,

Brindisi, and Ancona. Whilst the current extent of the project does not provide

3 The CBA noted that the potential future electrification of the line would reduce travel times by an

additional 15 minutes over the whole length of the track.



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these benefits, the costs have contributed to the final extent of the project which

will release these benefits.

7.1.3 Data Sources and Evaluation Constraints

In July 2010 we undertook a stakeholder workshop where representatives from

the following organisations were present:

The Ministry of National Economy;

The Ministry of Public Works;

TRAINOSE

ERGOSE

TRADEMCO4

The stakeholder meeting was an opportunity to clarify understanding of the

assumptions underpinning the ex ante CBA, and to discuss any data relating to

this and the outturn evaluation. Additionally, the meeting provided the chance to

discuss the stakeholder‟s perception of the overall usefulness of the CBA in the

decision-making process.

In addition to this workshop, we met separately with the Deputy Head of West

Attica, the prefecture containing the majority of the new railway, to discuss the

local and regional impacts of the project.

Project Documentation

To carry out the ex post evaluation we have relied on a number of sources of

information as summarised in Table 3 and Table 4 as provided by stakeholders

involved in the evaluation process.

4 TRAINOSE and ERGOSE are both subsidiaries of OSE. OSE is the Greek national railway company

which owns and operates all railway lines in Greece TRAINOSE are responsible for running the trains on

the OSE network. ERGOSE undertake the management of the organisations investment programmes.

TRADEMCO was the consultant responsible for preparing the ex-ante CBA document.



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Table 3. Project documents

Document Obtained

From

CBA for Thriasio – Patra

Financial and Socio-Economic Assessment : Thriasio – Patras

(November 2000)

Ministry of

Economy

Funding Applications ERGOSE

Environmental Approvals ERGOSE

CBA for intermodal freight centre in Thriasio ERGOSE

CBA for major rail projects in Greece ERGOSE

Final reports for the Projects ERGOSE

Table 4 below shows a list of sources for the primary and secondary data. It can

be seen from the table that the extent of the primary data supplied by

TRAINOSE has been limited. This is despite discussing data availability at the

stakeholder meeting and with an agreement for data to be provided.

Additional data supplied following the initial submission of this report has been

limited and has not allowed for additional analysis of the scheme. TRAINOSE is

currently under organisational restructuring and have had difficulties supplying

and extracting data. As a result of limited primary data provision, this evaluation

has relied to an extent on published secondary sources to analyse operating costs,

and to approximate passenger-kms travelled on the line.

No additional surveys or counts have been undertaken as part of this evaluation.



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Evaluation Constraints

The CBA underpinning the funding applications forecast that an extension of a

modern line as far as Korinthos would result in significant increases in passenger

demand to the west (towards Patra), due to the faster overall journey time

achieved through new line. Such demand was forecast to represent a significant

proportion of the overall total demand between Patra and Athens. Observed

patronage data collected before project implementation showed that over two-

thirds of demand on the line to Athens originated from beyond Korinthos. The

old line between Patra and Kiato is presently not in operation, as construction

has commenced on wider improvements to Aigio6. Consequently increased

demand from beyond Korinthos has not yet been realised and hence is offsetting

some of the anticipated benefits of the Athens to Kiato section subject to this

evaluation. The approach to dealing with this is described later in this section.

Additionally the applications for funding for each of the subprojects have

presented the benefits as a result of the construction of the entire Thriasio-Patra

railway. There is no separate CBA for the project at its present extent. The full

project to Patra, as presented in the ex ante CBA, (although still proposed) is

5 Handbook on estimation of external costs in the transport sector, INFRAS, 2008

6 Shown in Error! Reference source not found.

Table 4. Other data sources

Data Pre-project opening Post-project opening

Project

CAPEX n\a

Outturn project costs obtained from

ERGOSE

Project

OPEX

Line OPEX is derived using a calculated operating cost per train km (taken

from secondary sources) and train km calculated from pre- and post-

project timetables.

Line

Revenues

Line revenues are taken from the

CBA referenced in the Application

for Assistance Forms.

Line revenues were obtained from

TRAINOSE following project opening.

Rail

demand

Pre-project rail demand was taken

from the CBA referenced in the

Application for Assistance Forms.

Passenger km are derived from

revenues using an average fare per

passenger km

Accidents The number personal injury accidents at level crossings on the Piraeus-

Athens-Patra line have been supplied by TRAINOSE.

Parameter

values

Updated values of time have been taken from HEATCO. Updated values

for external costs have been taken from the INFRAS study5.



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significantly behind schedule. The appraisal considered the full project would be

open by 2011; current forecast opening dates are unclear but are thought to be

2017. Consequently there is no directly comparable ex ante appraisal for the ex

post evaluation presented below.

7.2 Ex post cost-benefit analysis

This section of the report presents the findings of the ex post cost benefit

analysis for the Thriasio to Kiato railway line improvement, using historic data

from 2000 to 2009 (before and after project implementation). The project has

been evaluated over a 36 year appraisal period (2000-2035). Full operations on

the line began in 2006.

The evaluation has concentrated on passenger benefits as freight demand on the

line was considered negligible both before and after project implementation.

As previously discussed, ERGOSE did not carry out separate ex ante CBAs for

each funding application, and refer to the benefits as a result of the entire

Thriasio-Patra improvement. The findings of this evaluation should therefore be

considered within the context of the following:

the section of line between Kiato and Patra has not yet been completed

and as such the ex post evaluation of the project life benefits does not

include the benefits likely to emerge once the remaining part of the line

between Kiato and Patra is completed; and,

the estimated date of completion for the Kiato to Patra line is uncertain;

although was suggested at the workshop to be between 2015 and 2020

by an OSE representative. This is behind the originally assumed

opening date of 2011.

Given that this evaluation does not include the potential benefits or costs of the

Kiato to Patra line replacement, the ex post monetary benefits of the project

should not be expected to be of the same order of magnitude as reported in the

ex ante CBA.

7.2.1 Headline results from the analysis

This section presents the headline results from the ex post analysis which will be

explored in more detail in the following section of the report. The main headline

results relate to findings from the economic, financial and wider impact analysis.

The headline figures for the economic and financial analysis include low and high

growth scenarios. The low and high growth scenarios consider the levels of

demand which could be expected on the line originating beyond Kiato if the

remaining network had remained open. Presently the old metric line is closed

beyond Kiato to allow further modernisation of the line to Aigio. The extension

to Kiato has been evaluated on a stand alone basis, not considering the future



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extension to Patra or the resulting line closure beyond Kiato. Demand

assumptions are summarised as follows:

low growth scenario assumes that demand on the line beyond Kiato

would remain at observed pre-project levels

high growth scenario assumes that rail growth from beyond Kiato

would have increased as forecast in the ex ante appraisal.

Economic Analysis

The purpose of the ex ante economic analysis is to appraise a projects

contribution to the economic welfare of the region or country. Our ex post

evaluation has captured the following categories of project costs and benefits:

Consumer Surplus;

Producer Surplus;

Ongoing Costs (Operational and Maintenance);

Investment Costs; and

External Benefits.

Table 5 over the page summarises findings of our economic analysis for the ex

post evaluation. Consistent with the ex ante forecasts, all values are reported in

2000 prices, discounted to 2000 and at a rate of 5.5% and include costs and

benefits accrued over the period 2000-2035.

Detail regarding how these figures were derived and the assumptions used is

provided in subsequent sections of this report.

Key points to note from Table 5 are summarised as follows:

Table 5. Economic Results (2000 Prices discounted to 2000, Discount Rate 5.5%,

2000-2035)

€millions

Low case High case

Net Present Value (NPV) 31.90 257.83

Internal Rate of Return (IRR) 6.05% 9.30%

Benefit Cost Ratio (BCR) 1.10 1.79

Source: Own calculation



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Even in the low growth scenario the project offers a positive (albeit low)

benefit cost ratio. The completion of the line to Patra is likely to release

further benefits along this section as passengers originating from stations

west of the route will be able take advantage of improved journey times

between Korinthos and Athens.

Collectively rail users previously travelling along the old route have

experienced an increase in fares, hence an overall economic cost.

Proportionately, a majority of the project benefits come from producer

surplus components including revenue from passengers; maintenance and

operating cost savings for both rail and road.

There is a positive revenue income benefit brought about by increasing fares

and new passengers transferring from road to rail modes.

The NPV is substantially higher (€257.8m) in the high growth scenario

compared to the low growth scenario (€31.9m) due to the substantial

increase in PVB in the former scenario.

The internal rate of return (IRR) is relatively low (less than 10%) indicating

that it will take a relatively long period of time for the project to deliver a

positive NPV. This is a conservative estimate of the IRR given that journey

time benefits to the highway have not been included in the ex post analysis.

As a rule of thumb an IRR higher than the discount rate used (5.5%) is a

further indicator that the project offers a positive return on investment in

economic terms.

Financial analysis

Table 6 summarises the ex post results from the financial analysis for the same

low and high growth scenarios. As with the economic analysis, to be consistent

with the ex ante forecasts, all values are reported in 2000 prices, discounted to

2000 and at a rate of 5.0% and include costs and benefits accrued over the period

2000-2035. Discount rates are inline with those presented in the European

Commissions „Guide to Cost-Benefit Analysis of Investment Projects 2008‟.

Financial Net Present Value (FNPV) and the Financial Internal Rate of Return

(FRR) are two indicators that illustrate the financial strength of the project. The

financial analysis differs from the economic analysis in that it focuses purely on

financial costs and revenues, rather than the wider social benefits offered through

improved journey times and safety.

Key points to note from the financial results in Table 6 are as follows:



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The Return on Investment FRR is relatively low (less than 5% in the low growth

scenario) indicating that it will take a relatively long period of time for the project

to recover its investment and operating costs;

The Return on National Capital FRR is more attractive than the above

in that it exceeds the 5% discount factor used however is still relative

poor in terms of financial performance;

The project has not produced a financial benefit (Return on

Investment) with an outturn NPV of ranging from -€184.1m to -

€100.9m.

Table 6. Financial Results (2000 Prices discounted to 2000, Discount Rate 5.0%,

2000-2035)

Low case High case

Net Present Value – Investment (€m) -184.1 -100.9

Financial IRR – Investment (%) 1.84% 3.40%

Net Present Value – Capital (€m) 10.2 93.5

Financial IRR – Capital (%) 5.27% 7.30%


Wider socio-economic impacts

The Athens-Kiato line is only approximately three years into its expected

economic life, whilst economic and social impacts often take many years to

materialise. Clearly the effect of the economic downturn in Greece is likely to

be offsetting some of the potential of the project. Whilst the wider impacts of

the project are considered in greater detail in latter sections of the report, the

following headline messages can be drawn from our ex post analysis.

The peripheral location of the stations relative to the towns they serve

means that they are poorly accessible compared to the stations located on

the old routes.

The out of town stations do offer a focal point for development and have

been integrated into local town master planning exercises.

The removal of trains from the built up areas has offered local congestion

benefits and associated benefits in terms of noise, poor air quality and

congestion caused by traffic disruption at level crossings.



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The true wider socio-economic impacts of the project are unlikely to

materialise until the line completes the rail link between Patra port with

Athens.

7.2.2 Key aspects of the ex post evaluation

The remainder of this section presents in more detail the outputs from the ex

post evaluation and includes further detail regarding the assumptions made in our

analysis. Each of the following is now discussed in turn below.

Initial Investment Costs;

Consumer Surplus;

Producer Surplus; and

External Benefits.

7.2.3 Costs

Initial Investment Costs

Table 7 provides the forecast and outturn investment costs of the four sub-

projects comprising the project between Athens and Kiato. ERGOSE have

provided outturn costs for the section of the track running to Korinthos with

outturn costs being taken from the Final Report for the section Korinthos-

Kiato7. The outturn expenditure was provided in „as spent‟ costs by year. This

enabled a conversion into 2000 prices to allow a direct comparison between

forecast and outturn costs. It is worth noting that the forecasts given above,

relate to those reported in the project funding applications and differ to those

reported in the Financial and Socio-economic Assessment for Thriasio to Patra

(November, 2000).

7 Final Report: Construction of New Railway Line Corith-Kiato, November 2009.



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Table 7. Summary of ex post financial analysis (2000 prices, undiscounted)

Project Costs (Million €) 94.09.65.010

(A)

1994GR16

CPT110

&

2003GR16

CPT0 (B and C)

2000GR16

CPT003 (D) Total

Forecast

TOTAL Works (2000 prices)- Thriasio to Patra CBA, November 2000

424.0

TOTAL works (2000 prices) – CF Project Applications

120.0 257.0 99.8 476.8

Outturn

TOTAL works (actual prices) 116.3 283.4 108.4 508.0

TOTAL works (2000 prices) 116.3 253.8 93.2 463.3

Source: Own calculations from data provided by ERGOSE

When outturn expenditure is converted to 2000 values (using the Greek

Harmonised Indices of Consumer Prices) it is slightly lower (3%) than the

amount predicted at the time applications were submitted. However it is apparent

that compared to the initial like for like costs (Thriasio to Kiato) prepared in the

initial feasibility study for the Thriasio to Patra line, out-turn costs were higher

than expected. Clearly, these costs were updated at the time of application for

funding however ERGOSE provided a number of reasons for the increase in

forecast costs (although this is not apparent when allowing for increased costs

since forecasts were undertaken). The key points are summarised below:

the costs for the construction of Megara Rail station were removed

from the original contract due to requirements for alternative

construction methods;

final costs for expropriation overran due to requirements for additional

expropriation of 27,000m2;

there was a need to increase the seismic coefficient of the tunnels due to

the 1999 earthquake;

there were changes to the EUs directives for H&S between cost

estimates and construction; and

there were alterations to the final designs for environmental and

ecological reasons.



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Table 8 provides the outturn unit costs of the two projects contained in the 2000

to 2006 funding application for the upgrade between Thriasio and Korinthos.

This level of detail is not available for the other two project sub sections. It

should be noted the outturn costs are below are shown according to the year of

spend, whilst original estimates are in 2000 prices. Outturn costs have not been

provided with an annual profile of spend and consequently can not be converted

back to 2000 prices.

Table 8. Summary of ex post financial analysis (Original Costs, 2000 prices,

Outturn Costs in year of spend)

Total Cost (MEURO) Unit Cost (MEURO)

Original

Cost

Final

Cost

Original

Cost

Final

Cost

Units

Land 2.3 5.2 0.4 0.1 €m/Strema

Track (excluding tunnels) 72.7 65.1 4.9 4.4 €m/km

Tunnels (including M&E) 71.2 73.6 13.8 14.3 €m/km

Stations/ Stops 20.5 26.0 3.4 4.3 €m/ station

Trackwork, signaling, telecom 83.2 109.1 1.3 1.7 €m/km

Other 0.00 1.0

Technical Consultant Services 7.0 3.3

TOTAL 256.9 283.3

Source: ERGOSE

Residual Value

The ex ante CBA derived the economic life of the project (line, infrastructure,

signals) is 50 years. Therefore a residual value of the capital investment was

included in the analysis and was valued at approximately 42% of the initial

investment. This assumed a linear devaluation of the initial investment over a 50

year period. The same residual valuation, being 42% of the investment cost, has

been carried through to the ex post evaluation.

7.2.4 Direct benefits

Consumer Surplus

Consumer Surplus is the benefit a consumer experiences, in excess of the costs

which he or she perceived. This includes the value placed on time savings to a

rail or highway user and changes in fares implemented as a result of the project.



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The absence of detailed passenger demand data has been a constraint the

evaluation, as such as series of assumptions has been made to calculate consumer

surplus, these are listed below:

Value of Time - Using HEATCO values and the journey purpose split

from the ex ante appraisal the average values-of-time for this evaluation

have been calculated at €6.21/hour. The future values of time have been

adjusted from this base value using an adjusted capital growth rate of

GDP (elasticity = 0.7) as recommended by HEATCO.

Accurate outturn Passenger Demand data has not been provided for

this project. However passenger km has be calculated using pre- and

post project revenues and average fares per km;

Fares - Dividing TRAINOSEs total 2008 national network turnover by

total rail passenger km gives an average fare of €0.0539 per passenger

km. This would give an average fare of €4.85 between Athens and

Korinthos and thus compares well to actual fares between Athens and

Korinthos which presently cost €6 for a full fare single; €10 for a full

fare return; and €3 for concessions.

Based on a current average journey time between Korinthos and Athens of 1

hour 10 minutes, the project has resulted in an average 30 minute rail journey

time saving outturn average journey time saving of 30 minutes between Athens

and Korinthos. This equates to a saving of 0.33 minutes per passenger km. This

saving equates to between €80.6m and €122.45 in monetary terms. This

evaluation represents a conservative estimate of the total journey time savings, as

the removal of delays to highway traffic at the former level crossings no longer

exist. The ex post evaluation does not capture these time savings.

Fares for passengers have increased as a result of the project from approximately

€0.0409 per passenger km (2000 prices) from €0.0382 per passenger km in pre-

project scenario. This equates to a consumer surplus negative benefit of between

€4.96m and €7.43m over the appraisal period and hence results in a small

reduction of consumer surplus contribution to the overall PVB.

Due to the modernised line being a double track the project is likely to have

resulted in reliability benefits, as previously trains had to pass each other at

designated loops on the single track. It was confirmed by TRAINOSE that the

new track has resulted in reliability benefits although no data has been provided

to support this. This benefit is not quantified in either the ex ante or the ex post

analysis.

Overall consumer surplus accounts for between 21% and 20% of total PVB

depending on the demand scenario. This accounts for €75.7m of benefits over

the 30 year appraisal period in the low scenario and for €115.02m in the high

case.



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Producer Surplus

Producer surplus for the project is the difference between producer net

revenues (revenues minus operating costs) with and without the project. It also

includes changes to highway vehicle operating cost, which change as a result of

the project but are „unperceived‟ by users.

Revenue from Fares

TRENOSE have provided outturn line revenue for the years from 2005 to 2009.

This data allocates revenue to stations on the line regardless of destination. 2000-

2005 revenues are taken from the ex ante appraisal. Revenues are dependent on

the demand scenario and are discussed in more detail below.

Maintenance and Operating Costs (Rail)

The line incurs the ongoing costs of maintenance of the track and infrastructure

and also the costs of operating the trains on the network. In the ex ante

evaluation, both of these costs have been adjusted as necessary to reflect the do

minimum and do something scenarios. In absence of basic observed pre or post

opening information being provided by ERGOSE or TREGOSE, we have made

a number of assumptions in our ex post analysis, these are summarised as

follows:

national average operating costs per train km in Greece have been

derived using data relating to the total operating costs incurred by OSE

Organisation and the total number of train kilometres operated. (Table

9);

the average operating and maintenance costs per train km are assumed

equal before and after the projects implementation (€15.78 per train km

in 2000 prices);

the current rail provision would be implemented throughout the

appraisal period and would be sufficient to accommodate background

growth in rail demand;

in contrast to the ex ante appraisal cost assumptions (cost per passenger

km travelled), we have considered operating costs on a cost per train km

basis. This assumption was largely driven by lack of other suitable data

to calculate operation cost savings. The methodology is considered to

be more appropriate than considering costs on a per passenger km

basis; given that a drop in passenger numbers could actually initiate an

increase in operating costs per passenger km travelled.



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Table 9. Derivation of the Operating Costs per Train km Per Annum based on

National Greek Rail Data

€

Maintenance and Operating Costs 311,815,000

Train km 15,000,000

Cost/train km (2008 Prices) 20.79

Cost/train km (2000 Prices) 15.78

Source: Rail Research in the EU, ERRAC, April 2005 & Hellenic Railways Organisation S.A, Annual

Financial Statements 2009

Table 10 summarises the re-forecast impact of the improvement on rail

operating and maintenance costs. The absence of detailed timetabling; rolling

stock and line maintenance cost information provided to the evaluation team

means that this estimate should be treated as a conservative estimate only. Given

that it is not possible to accurately determine with confidence whether operating

costs per train km have increased or decreased we have included a sensitivity test

showing the effect of a 10% variance in costs.

Table 10. NPV of Benefits from Reduced Operating Costs (2000 Prices discounted

to 2000, Discount Rate 5.0%, 2000-2035)

€NPV

Base Operating Costs 118.83

+10% per train km DM 173.28

+10% per train km DS 76.27

Source: Own Calculations

Given that the post opening vehicle operating cost per train km is an average

across the national network and encompasses the performance of both old and

new track, we would expect the pre-opening operating costs for the old

infrastructure between Kiato and Athens to be greater than the €15.78 per train

km reported above (as the line is now operating more efficiently). As such the

operating cost savings of the new line are likely to be in the range of €118.83m to

€173.28m.

An alternative evaluation method considered by our evaluation team was the use

of down time per timetable minute or hour (time the train is not carrying

passengers) in the pre- and post-opening as an indicator of operating cost



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efficiency. This would have given an indication of the overall efficiency with

which train units were being used on the old and new route. A given percentage

improvement in train efficiency would equate to a proportionate reduction in

operating costs. Unfortunately, there was insufficient pre-opening time table

available to undertake this type of analysis hence the assumptions listed above

have been assumed.

Highway Vehicle Operating Cost Savings

Vehicle operating costs have been carried through from the ex ante evaluation in

the absence of a local alternative source. This valuation includes „unperceived‟

costs of the costs of capital investment and maintenance. The savings in the CBA

from reduced highway travel were valued at:

0.0367€/car passenger km (assuming 2 passengers per car)

0.0117€/bus passenger km (assuming 24 passenger per bus)

In summary, producer surplus accounts for 59% of benefits in the low demand

scenario (PVB = €210.61m) in the high case (€335.17m). The composite parts of

producer surplus change in magnitude depending on the demand scenario. With

low demand; 56% of producer surplus comes from reduced rail operating costs,

27% comes from increased revenues and 16% comes from reduced vehicle

operating costs. With high demand additional rail revenues account for 40% of

the producer surplus, reduced rail operating costs account for 35% and reduced

vehicle operating costs account for 25%.

7.2.5 Externalities

Most rail projects have an effect on the use of other modes which will result in

the external costs of these modes. As illustrated in Table 11, external costs of

road transport, such as congestion, noise, air pollution and accident costs are

higher per passenger km than the external costs of rail. Updated values of

externalities have been taken from the Ministry of Transportation and

Telecommunications – Transport Intermediate Managing Authority‟s document

for the „Execution of CBA Analysis of Major Railway Projects‟ to be included in

4th Programming Period 2007-2013. These values are sourced from the

INFRAS/IWW study published in 2004 and updated in 2008.



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Table 11. Unit of External Benefits (2000 prices)

External Costs Passenger Transportation

Car

(€/1000pkm)

Bus

(€/1000pkm)

Rail

(€/1000pkm)

Accidents 17.6 0.7 0.8

Air Pollution 6.4 15.2 4.4

Noise 2.0 0.9 2.4

Climate Change 16.2 10.9 6.2

Nature and Landscape 2.1 0.9 0.6

Other 3.9 3.1 3.4

TOTAL 48.2 31.7 17.8

Source: Execution of CBA Analysis of Major Railway Projects’ – Ministry of Transportation and

Telecommunications, Transport Intermediate Managing Authority

The values of externalities per passenger km have been used to calculate benefits

for the project. These are reliant on the change in passenger km from each mode.

In the absence of more specific data the assumption from the ex ante assumption

that 93% of new rail trips will be diverted from other modes and 7% will be

generated has been carried through to the ex post evaluation.

The net present value of benefits emerging from the mode shift above (in 2000

prices, discounted to 2000 at 5.5%) is calculated at between €44.72m and

€106.79m.

Road and Rail Safety Impacts

Safety benefits from this project take two forms:

savings from modal shift from road to rail; and,

savings from reduced accidents at level crossings.

Savings from modal shift are included along with other externalities above.

Savings from reduced accidents at level crossings are project specific, as the new

line will has had a direct impact on the number of road-rail accidents. The old

line had a significant number of level crossings and an associated accident rate,

this risk is eliminated on the new line which is fully grade-separated.

TRENOSE have supplied an accident record for the whole Piraeus-Athens-Patra

line showing the observed number of fatalities and injuries at level crossings on



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the line in the period 2004 to 2009. The accident record is shown below in Table

12.

Based on only one year of pre-project accident data, the average accidents savings

per annum between pre and post project equate to 3.5 fatalities and 0.25 injuries

on the line between Athens and Patra (220km). This however represents an

overestimate of the benefits materialising from the Thriasio to Kiato (122km)

and as such we have made a pro-rata adjustment to these figures to obtain a

more accurate reflection of accident savings at level crossings. These adjusted

accident rates are summarised in brackets in Table 12.

Table 12. Summary of Fatalities and Injuries at Level Crossings between Athens and

Patra (Athens to Kiato)

Year Project Status Fatalities Injuries (Slight&Serious)

2004 Pre-Project 4 (2.2) 2 (1.1)

2005 Partial Opening 2 (1.1) 7 (0.6)

2006

Post Project

1 (0) 2 (0)

2007 0 1 (0)

2008 0 1 (0)

2009 1 (0) 3 (0)

Source: TRAINOSE

The project has resulted in a 100% reduction in the number of accidents at level

crossings between Thriasio and Kiato and is equivalent to an annual accident

saving of 2.2 fatalities and 1.1 injury accidents. This saving has been converted

to monetary values using accident valuations for Greece taken from HEATCO

as €0.836m per fatality and €0.110m per injury (major). The valuation of

accidents is assumed to grow in line with GDP per capita as in HEATCO

guidance. The present value of the accident benefits (in 2000 prices, discounted

to 2000 at 5.5%) emerging from the project are €26.94m.

Overall the total benefits produced from externalities and from the safety

benefits of removing level crossings equates to between €71.66m and €133.72m

in the low and high growth scenarios respectively. This is equivalent to between

20% and 23% of the total project PVB.



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7.2.6 Wider impacts

Introduction

This section sets out our general approach to the ex post evaluation and

summarises the impacts identified in discussions with key stakeholders with an

appreciation of the project and its social, environmental and economic impacts.

Approach to ex post evaluation

The effects of recent economic downturn have been particularly prevalent in

Greece with major austerity measures being implemented to prevent collapse of

the national economy. As such the impacts reported in this section need to be

considered within the context of such challenging economic conditions.

This ex post evaluation has drawn upon the following sources of information:

A semi structured interview with the Deputy Head of West Attica (July

2010); and

Focus Group discussion (July 2010) with representatives from:

ERGOSE;

TRENOSE; and

TRADEMCO

The structure of the interviews was in part based upon the guidance provided in

the Commission‟s “Impact Assessment Guidelines” published in January 2009.

Summary of Impacts

The modernised Athens – Kiato rail line has only been open in its entirety since

June 2007. It may take many years for significant social and environmental

impacts to materialise. It is probably still too early to understand the full impacts

which the project has delivered. Below we provide an indication of the perceived

wider impacts identified by project stakeholders. It should be noted that most of

these are of greatest relevance to economic and land use development, while

relatively few comments were received regarding the social and environmental

impacts of the project.

Access to and from the stations on the new line was regarded as problematic

due to their distance from the towns they serve. This had attracted much

adverse response from the general public. There were proposals to address

this issue through the provision of addition shuttle bus services between the

stations and urban settlements.



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The out-of-town stations offer the potential for new developments.

Currently, local development it still focused around town centres rather than

the new station locations. During discussions it was revealed that a number

of Municipalities within Western Attica have issued expansion plans, which

would bring the stations inside the town plan.

Anecdotally, the project has resulted in mode shift from highway to rail and

that the benefits of improved journey times are more than compensating for

the less convenient locations of the stations. The linkages between modal

shift impacts and congestion benefits were clearly recognised, particularly

around the former level crossing points.

Despite an upwards trend in the number of tourist establishments across

Greece as a whole since 2001 (Figure 4) this has not been mirrored in

Korinthia. There has been an upwards trend in the number of tourist

establishments since 2006 which is the first full year of the projects opening

indicating that better journey times has made it a more attractive location for

tourist activity.

The line gives direct access to Piraeus where most ferry services to the

Greek Islands depart from, and via interchange at Piraeus to Athens

International Airport. This offers improved accessibility for tourists visiting

Greece, and an alternative option to travelling by air.

Although unemployment (Figure 5) in Korinthia fell faster than for Greece

as a whole between 2005 and 2006 (the first full year of project

implementation) this was also the case in a number of the preceding years.

Unemployment increased in Korinthia between 2007 and 2008 despite

falling nationally. These differences are likely to be due to the specific

employment profile of Korinthos rather than as a result of the project under

consideration.

Once fully completed, between Athens and Patra, the rail link will connect to

the port of Patra, and create significant potential for the development of

increased trade throughput and economic gain into Greece. The port of

Patra is a gateway to EU markets and when linked into a strong rail network

will enhance the movement of freight goods.



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Figure 4. Change in the number of Hotels (Korinthia & Greece)

Source: Eurostat

Figure 5. Unemployment Levels (Korinthia & Greece)

Source: Eurostat

Aside of the obvious noise and air quality impacts emanating from the project,

no other views were provided on social and environment impacts – largely as

none of the stakeholders had access to post-opening monitoring data. Our

evaluation of such impacts has been considered in section 7.2.4 of this document.



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Accompanying actions

As has been discussed above, the completed line to Kiato forms part of longer

term proposals to upgrade the entire Piraeus-Athens-Patra line. The extension to

Patra was considered in the ex-ante appraisal, and would be necessary to release

benefits associated with providing a rail link to Western Europe via the port of

Patra. Construction has started on an extension of the line to Aigio. Also, once

completed, there are plans for an inter-modal facility at Thriassio, such that

freight from Patra would travel by rail to Thriassio, and then onwards by road or

rail to other parts of Greece.

Unintended Effects

No unintended effects were identified as a result of the scheme, however it was

commented that there is potential for land use development around the out-of-

town stations along the route, although these have not come to fruition yet.

Utilisation rates

As requested by the TORs, we have considered the evolution of the utilisation

rate of the project since opening. We have calculated this by considering, for each

year, the ratio between the actual total number of passengers and the total

potential number of passengers that could have travelled on the line given the

current capacity. Due to lack of appropriate data there is an element of

uncertainty around these results as passenger numbers have been derived from

revenues using an average fare per passenger km.

We have considered the utilisation based on demand on the existing line and

considering the low and high growth scenarios in the event that the old metric

line had remained open beyond Kiato. Utilisation has been calculated based on

an average capacity of 500 passengers per train. Table 13 shows the results of

this analysis.



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Table 13. Utilisation rates on the Kiato-Piraeus Line

2007 2008 2009

Maximum number of

passengers (annual)

6,570,000 6,570,000 6,570,000

Estimated passengers

(annual - existing)

1,186,102 1,289,251 1,535,268


(annual - low)

1,886,116 1,998,364 2,253,599


(annual - high)

3,380,416 3,321,736 3,966,029

Utilisation rate (existing) 18% 20% 23%

Utilisation rate (low) 29% 30% 34%

Utilisation rate (high) 51% 51% 60%

Source: Own calculation based on TRAINOSE revenue data

Based on our calculations, we have found that utilisation rates are currently

estimated at 23% (assuming 500 seats per train). At part of future works the old

line beyond Kiato has been closed. Given low and high-growth scenarios, in the

event of this line having remained opened, the average train loading would have

risen to between 33%and 58% (assuming the same service frequency).

Meeting environmental requirements

As a separate process to the CBA full environmental approvals were granted for

the study.

7.2.7 Uncertainty and sensitivity analysis

The ex-post tables provided in Table 5 and Table 6 show the results of a high

and low outturn evaluation. The scenarios reflect varying levels of demand in the

Do-Something case depending on the demand assumed to be generated from

beyond Kiato under normal operating circumstances. As described above this

demand is currently not evident as the line is currently closed beyond Kiato. This

however is not in itself a result of the project under evaluation.

As stated previously, the ex ante CBA forecast that an extension as far as

Korinthos would result in significant increases in demand further down the line,

due to the faster overall journey time achieved through interchanging onto the



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new line. This was forecast to represent a significant proportion of the line‟s

demand, and observed data before project implementation showed that

approximately 69% of demand on the line to Athens originated from beyond

Korinthos.

Pre-project demand and revenues for the section from Korinthos to Piraeus

include all movements within that section regardless of origin or destination.

Approximately 69% of this revenue originated from beyond Korinthos.

Post-project revenues include revenues from each station on the new line,

however due to the closure of the line beyond Patra this does not include the

large section of demand originating from beyond this point. To allow for a direct

comparison to the pre-project data outturn revenues have been adjusted to

include demand forecast beyond Kiato. This considers the following two

scenarios:

low scenario - considers that revenues from beyond Kiato would remain

at observed pre-project levels (i.e the project would not increase these

revenues)

high scenario - assumes that rail growth from beyond Korinthos would

have increased as forecast in the ex ante appraisal.

Table 14 shows the pre- and post- project revenues on the Korinthos-Kiato

section of the line including revenues originating between different points.

Values in bold are observed/presented values, values in italics are adjusted post

opening demand and revenues from beyond Kiato as above.



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Table 14. Kiato-Piraeus Line Revenues

Year € millions

Piraeus - Kiato Piraeus - Patra Piraeus - Patra

Low High

2000 3.36

2001 3.41

2002 3.47

2003 3.52

2004 3.57

2005 3.62

2006 2.99 5.53 9.30

2007 4.37 6.95 12.45

2008 4.75 7.36 12.23

2009 5.66 8.30 14.60

Source: Ex ante Appraisal, TRAINOSE & Own Calculations

Forecast of impacts

Presently the project is approximately four years into its economic life while the

project is evaluated for 30 years following opening. The forecast rail demands for

future years are linked to GDP growth with a GDP elasticity of 1.5 being carried

through from the ex ante appraisal. GDP growth to 2015 is taken from

International Monetary Fund forecasts and from this point is set at 2.0% per

annum as in the ex ante appraisal.

It should be noted that revenues have been growing significantly faster than

would be forecast over recent years. This is because, although the Athens-

Korinthos line commenced operations in October 2005, the full project was not

implemented at this point. In July 2006 stations at A. Liosia, Aspropyrgos and

Magoula were added. In June 2007 operations extending to Piraeus stopping at

Piraeus, Lefka, Renti and Rouf were added. In July 2007 the station at Kiato was

also added. Consequently 2008 is the first year of full operation. Moreover,

public transport projects generally do not achieve 100% demand in their first year



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but have a build-up of demand over several years as commuter‟s travel patterns

respond to journey time changes.

Margin of Error

As the majority of scheme benefits are in the future there is clearly a level of

uncertainty associated with scheme costs and benefits these include:

Measurement errors in terms of pre- and post-scheme traffic volumes,

vehicle operating costs and revenues. The scope for measurement errors

in this scheme are quite high as the supply of primary data with relation

to outturn rail demand has been limited.

Modelling error – the scheme has calculated rail demand from beyond

Kiato if the old metric line had continued to operate as usual from

beyond this point. The high and low scenarios examine the impact of

different levels of demand associated with this section of the line.

Economic Growth – future year rail growth is based on economic

growth forecasts. There is a margin of error related to these growth

forecasts and with the relationship between economic growth and rail

demand.

Errors in marginal valuations. Parameter values for values-of-time,

externalities and vehicle operating costs are taken from published

sources, although there is still a margin of error associated with these

values.

The high scheme demand produces benefits that are 63% larger than in the low

scheme benefits arising from demand assumptions from beyond Kiato. This

uncertainty arises due to different passenger demand levels assumed to originate

from beyond Kiato in the event that the old metric line remained open.

Data does not exist to produce a full margin of error due to modelling and

forecasting and measurement errors although the cumulative effect of all these

errors would be likely to produce a large confidence interval

7.3 Review of ex ante cost-benefit analysis

7.3.1 Introduction

The section below presents a review of the ex ante cost benefit analysis, dated

from November 2000, which was referred to in the Applications for Funding.

This section includes an overview of the headline results and a commentary on

the approach from the ex ante cost benefit analysis. The CBA only considered

one route option (which was built), although a number of sensitivity tests were

undertaken, these are considered later in this section.



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The ex ante cost benefit analysis considered the costs and benefits for the

implementation of all improvements from Thriasio – Patra, although it was

considered that the final section of the project from Kiato – Patra would be

covered entirely by national funds. As such the CBA did not consider the

financial or economic viability of sections in isolation as therefore does not

provide a forecast benefit for the section of line considered in this study. This

means that a direct comparison of the ex ante and ex post evaluations is not

appropriate for providing an indication of the accuracy of ex ante evaluation

methods, however headline differences can be drawn out.

The projects were appraised over a 36 year appraisal period (2000-2035), this

included 29 years from the forecast start of operation (2007-2035). It was

assumed that the section to Korinthos would be completed by 2007 with the line

running to/from Patra in 2011. At the time of writing (September 2010) the

section of the project between Kiato and Aegio is under construction although

there is no present funding for the section to Patra8.

7.3.2 Headline results from the analysis

Economic Analysis

Table 15 below presents the results from the ex ante economic analysis. All

results (as with values used throughout the appraisal) are presented in prices from

the year 2000 and discounted to 2000 at 5.5%. Again, it is important to recognise

that the costs and benefits provided relate to the whole line between Thriasio and

Patra and not the smaller section between Thriasio and Kiato. Table 16 provides

a further breakdown of the PVB benefits projected in the ex ante CBA using

their central growth forecasts.

Table 15. Results of ex ante cost benefit analysis (2000 Prices discounted to 2000,

Discount Rate 5.0%, 2000-2035)

Investment

Costs (€

million, 2000

prices)

Net Present

Value (€

million, 2000

prices)

Economic

IRR (%)

PVB (€

million, 2000

prices)

BCR

TOTAL 798 396 7.3% 1194 1.5

Source: Ex ante CBA

8 Status as detailed anecdotally by TrainOSE during the stakeholder meeting in July 2010.



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Table 16. Breakdown of Forecast Project Benefits (2000 Prices discounted to 2000,

Discount Rate 5.0%, 2000-2035)

% of total PVB PVB (€ million, 2000 prices)

Revenue Surplus 38.2% 457

Fuel Savings 7.0% 84

Time Savings 6.0% 71

External Benefits 28.9% 346

Other Savings 19.8% 237

TOTAL 100% 1194

Source: Ex ante CBA

For comparison purposes, we will consider this result when considering the

differences between the ex post and ex ante analysis in Section 7.4 below. With

regards to passenger and freight traffic 96% of all benefits were expected to

come from passenger sources with freight only accounting for 4% of direct

benefits.

Financial Analysis

Table 17 below presents the results from the ex ante financial appraisal:

Table 17. Comparison of ex ante financial analysis (2000 prices)

Investment Costs (€

million, 2000 prices)

Net Present Value

(€ million, 2000

prices)

Financial IRR (%)

TOTAL 1045 -469 2.0%

Source: ex ante CBA (November 2000)

As with the economic analysis the results from the economic analysis are

considered in more detail alongside the results from the ex post analysis in

Section 7.4 below.

7.3.3 Key aspects of ex ante CBA

The CBA calculated benefits for the following categories:



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cost;

revenue surplus;

operating and maintenance costs; and

revenues

time saving;

consumer surplus;

fuel saving;

other savings; and

external benefits

Each of the costs/benefits are discussed in turn below, along with traffic

forecasts:

Traffic Forecast

For the purposes of traffic forecasting and appraisal the CBA split the line into

two sections running from;

Piraeus – Korinthos; and,

Korinthos – Patra.

For these sections the CBA considered the demand as the weighted average

annual load between the two points, including all movements that use part of, or

the entire section. This has allowed the average journey length to be taken as the

length of each section, being:

90km Piraeus – Korinthos; and

130km Korinthos - Patra

For each section the CBA provides a detailed year by year traffic forecast for

both the Do-Minimum and Do-Something scenarios. This includes forecasts for:

background growth - whereby demand for travel increases with GDP

per capita (with an elasticity of 1.5) in the Do Something case. In the

Do-Minimum scenario it was assumed that only a quarter of this growth

would be realised on the rail, as without improvements rail would

continue to lose mode share to the highway;

diverted journeys from car and bus; and,

generated journeys as a result of the rail improvements in the

investment scenario.



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Investment Costs

The financial cost of the project from the CBA is €1,207m (2000 prices) and was

broken down into the following phases:

€120m (1st CF 1994-1999)

€304 m (2nd CF 2000-2006 Thriasio - Kiato)

€373m (2nd CF 2000-2006 Kiato - Patras)

€410m (2002 - 2007, completion of Kiato - Patras)

The present extent of the project includes the expenditure of the first two stages,

was forecast to cost €424m at the time of the applications.

For use in the economic appraisal financial costs were adjusted for fiscal

components and were calculated as €1,045m, following reductions of customs

charges, taxes and duties (a derived conversion factor of 0.866.)

The CBA derived the economic life of the project (line, infrastructure, signals) as

57 years, based on the weighted economic line of the component parts of the

project. The evaluation period following project opening is 30 years, therefore a

residual value of the capital investment was included in the analysis and was

valued at approximately 42.7% of the initial investment, being equal to €588.08m.

Operating and maintenance costs

Operating costs (passenger km & tonne km) were calculated based on historical

data. The CBA forecasts that operating costs, per passenger km, would reduce

due to operational improvements – and would be comparable to those on the

existing standard gauge Greek railways. Assumptions from the CBA showing

operating costs per km are shown below in

Table 18. Ex ante CBA Operating Costs (2000 prices)

.



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Table 18. Ex ante CBA Operating Costs (2000 prices)

€\pax km €\tonne km

No Investment

2000-2035 0.0998 0.2183

With Investment

2000-2006 0.0998 0.2183

2007-2010 0.0678 0.1344

2011-2035 0.0452 0.0795

Source: ex ante CBA (November 2000)

Revenues

The CBA has calculated fares based on the weighted average fare/tariff per

passenger/tonne km. For the scenario with the investment in place it was

assumed that fares would rise by 50% following the first phase of investment in

2007 and by 100% following the second phase in 2011. Increases to fares in this

scenario were justified by:

comparison to European rail fare;

the scale of the improvements; and

the fact that over the last 20 years fare increases have been considerably

below inflation.

The fare structure used throughout the appraisal is shown below in Table 19.



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Table 19. Comparison of ex ante financial analysis (2000 prices)

€\pax km €\tonne km

No Investment

2000-2035 0.0382 0.0396

With Investment

2000-2006 0.0382 0.0396

2007-2010 0.0572 0.0470

2011-2035 0.0763 0.0587

Source: ex ante CBA (November 2000): Chapter 6

Time savings

Forecast time savings were 40 minutes between Piraeus and Korinthos from

2007 and an additional 40 minutes between Korinthos and Patra by 2011. It was

forecast that there would be a reduction of travel time between Athens and

Patras of 1 hour 20 minutes, down from an original time of 3 hours 40 minutes.

The value of time was taken as 90% of the average gross hourly wage for work

purposes and as 30% of the hourly wage for other purposes. The value of time

has been calculated on an average journey purpose of 30% journeys to work 70%

other journeys. This resulted in a value-of-time of €3.23 per hour (2000 prices).

Values of time throughout the appraisal have been held constant. Value of time

would usually be assumed to grow as real incomes increase. HEATCO guidance

recommends that values of time are grown with a default inter-temporal elasticity

of 0.7 for future years.

The CBA calculated time savings as follows:

full time savings are calculated for existing passengers (assigned as the

Do Minimum rail demand);

time savings for passengers switching modes from car and bus were

calculated by examining the journey time savings on these modes. This

has resulted in no user time benefits for those passengers transferring

from car. The conventional methodology in assigning user benefits to

new passengers is to attribute half the change in costs, assuming that

there is a linear relationship between cost and demand (this is known as

„the rule-of-half‟); and,

no time or consumer benefit has been applied to the additional „existing‟

passengers in the investment scenario.



Greece

Although the CBA assumed fare increases of +50% in 2007 and +100% in 2011

these have not been considered in terms of user benefits (as for consumer

surplus below). Fare increases should be considered alongside time savings when

calculating consumer surplus for transport user benefits.

Consumer surplus

Consumer surplus assigned benefits to generated passengers were set as half the

value of generalised cost savings for rail passenger. This was set at

0.0117€/passenger km from 2007-2010; and,

0.0220€/passenger km from 2011-2035.

Fuel savings

Fuel savings have been calculated based on savings made as a result of passengers

moving away from road to travel by the rail. Fuel cost savings have in the CBA

been set at:


0.0045€/car passenger km (assuming 24 passenger per bus)

0.0097€/tonne km (assuming 13 tonnes/truck)

It is noted that the consumer benefit of diverted passengers has been considered

by assigning a time saving for passengers transferring mode and an associated

fuel saving. The present methodology for applying consumer benefits to new rail

passengers both from generated demand and from mode switch is to apply the

„rule of half‟, described in Annexe 2

Vehicle operating costs

The CBA considered savings to other vehicle operating costs. These include the

cost of capital investment and maintenance and are valued as „unperceived‟ costs.

The savings in the CBA from reduced mileage were .calculated as follows:


0.0117€/bus passenger km (assuming 24 passenger per bus)

0.0205€/tonne km (assuming 13 tonnes/truck)

Externalities

The external costs of road transport are significantly higher than the external

costs of rail. Diverting traffic from road to rail results in overall savings in

„external costs‟ born to the national economy (for instance to accidents, noise,

and climate change). The ex ante appraisal used values set for the entire

European Union with the external benefit for the switch to rail stated as being:

car 0.051 €/passenger km



Greece

Buses 0.013 €/passenger km

Trucks 0.066 €/tonne km

The valuation of most external benefits has been held constant throughout the

appraisal period. For the majority of external benefits HEATCO currently

recommends growth with a default inter-temporal elasticity of 1.0 in line with

GDP.

Other

The discount rate throughout the appraisal period was set as 5%.

Sensitivity Testing

In order to test the robustness of the economic appraisal, the CBA examined a

number of sensitivity tests around the central case. Sensitivity tests included:

income from the operation of a scenario will be 10% lower or higher.

the cost of the new line would be 10% higher or lower; and,

the cost of the work remaining to be executed will be 10% or 20%

higher or lower than anticipated.

The lowest IRR as a result of sensitivity testing was 6.3% (compared to and using

a discounting rate of 5.0%) demonstrating a robustness of economic benefits for

the project.

7.4 Differences between ex ante and ex post analysis

Table 20 compares the results of the ex ante economic analysis with the results

from the ex post CBA.

Table 20. Comparison of ex ante and ex post economic CBA (2000 Prices

discounted to 2000, Ex ante Discount Rate 5.0% 2000-2035\ Ex post 5.5%)

Ex ante Ex post

Low case High case

Net Present Value (€m) 396 32 258

Economic IRR (%) 7.3% 6.05% 9.30%

Benefit-cost ratio 1.50 1.1 1.8

Source: Ex ante evaluation and own calculation for ex post analysis



Greece

The ex ante CBA estimated that the project would deliver a BCR of 1.50. The net

present value of €396m is a result of total benefits of €1194m and total costs of

€798m. The ex post CBA suggests that over its lifetime the current project would

deliver benefits of between €32m and €258m. Outturn benefits are clearly lower

than forecast reflecting the smaller extent of the project considered in the outturn

evaluation.

However there are also a number of other differences between the two

appraisals, namely:

issues with the ex ante analysis;

omissions in the ex ante analysis; and,

different assumptions/outturns between the ex ante and the ex post

analysis.

We discuss each in turn below.

Issues with the ex ante analysis

Consumer Benefits

The ex ante assessment did not calculate user benefits in-line with current

guidance. The current guidance is to calculate consumer benefits for existing

passengers and to apply the „rule-of-half‟ to new passengers, whereby new

passengers receive half the benefit of existing users.

The following differences in methodology were included in the ex ante appraisal:

the consumer benefit calculated for existing passengers only considered

the beneficial impact of reduced journey times, and not the negative

impact of forecast fare premiums;

consumer surplus for passengers diverted from road/bus was examined

by calculating the forecast journey time savings as a result of mode shift,

and the fuel cost saved as a result of switching to public transport;

the ex ante assumed a lower background growth in the Do-Minimum

scenario, assuming that the old rail network could not cater for the

background demand in growth. The ex ante appraisal did not calculate

any consumer benefits for the passengers who were classified as

„existing‟ in the Do-Something scenario but not in the Do-Minimum.

Scenario.

Omissions in the ex ante analysis

Station Locations

The ex ante appraisal does not appear to have considered the impact of changes

in station locations on the new line. A number of stations, such as Korinthos and



Greece

Megara, have moved to „out of town‟ locations. This could explain why outturn

passenger levels appear to be marginally lower than those originally forecast.

Level Crossings

The ex ante analysis did not quantify the safety benefits of removing the level

crossings from the line.

Different assumptions between the ex ante and ex post analysis

With regards to the benefits a number of valuations and assumptions have been

updated from the ex ante analysis. These changes have impacted on the ex post

evaluation in the following ways.

Journey Time Savings

The ex ante assessment forecast journey times of 1 hour between Athens and

Korinthos. The outturn journey time is 1 hour and 10 minutes. Consequently

journey time savings between the two are 30 minutes compared to the forecast

saving of 40 minutes.

Values of Time

The units of the values of time have been amended in the ex post evaluation. The

VOT of rail passengers in the ex ante appraisal was €3.24 per hour, an updated

value of €6.21 per hour was calculated from HEATCO valuations of time

assuming the same split in journey purpose. In addition the ex ante assumed that

the values of time remained fixed at 2000 values across the full evaluation period.

In the post opening evaluation, the values of time have been amended to increase

with GDP growth at elasticity of 0.7 in line with HEATCO guidance.

Externalities

The valuation of externalities have been amended in the ex post evaluation. The

net benefit of switching to rail from car was stated as being €0.052 per passenger

km, this was taken from valuations for the EU as a whole. The latest valuations,

being specific to Greece, only value this benefit at €0.033 per passenger km.

Fares

A fare premium was assumed in the ex ante assessment increasing fares from

€0.0396 to €0.0763 per passenger km by 2011. Outturn analysis suggests that a

fare premium of this magnitude has not been implemented with average fares

being equivalent to €0.0409 per passenger km.

Operating Costs

The Do-Minimum scenario calculated operating costs on a „per passenger km‟

basis. This assigned operating costs of €0.0998 per passenger km in the Do-

Minimum scenario and €0.0452 per passenger km in the Do-Something scenario.

This in itself assumed that the service would operate at a profit in the Do-

Something scenario with fares set at €0.0763 per passenger km.



Greece

The ex post evaluation has calculated operating costs using a derived operating

rate per train km and passenger timetables.

GDP

Background rail growth is linked to GDP. The ex ante appraisal forecast GDP

increases of:

4.0% from 2000 – 2006;

3.5% from 2006 – 2010; and

2.0% from 2011 – 2035

Outturn values, and forecasts from the IMF show that although GDP growth

rates were approximately as forecast between 2000 and 2006, due to the global

recession real GDP per capita in Greece was approximately the same in 2010 as

it was in 2006, due to negative growth forecast in 2010 this will remain the case

until growth of above 1% is forecast in 2014. Consequently future rail demand is

forecast to increase less than in the original appraisal.

Discount Rate

The ex ante appraisal used a discount rate of 5.5% for the economic evaluation a

rate of 5.0% for the financial evaluation.

7.5 Role of CBA in decision-making process

Our discussions with the Greek authorities were undertaken using a stakeholder

workshop format, with representatives from the Greek Ministry of Economy and

Public Works and stakeholders representing both the Agios Konstantinos project

and also the Thriasio to Korinthos Rail project. We summarise the main points

of the discussion below.

The CBA was recognised as being both a necessary procedure to complete

the funding application and a useful tool for prioritising options within

projects where alternative options can be tested. It was noted that smaller

local projects do not by definition have a CBA.

The CBAs were produced by external consultants with audits by the Ministry

of Economy consisting of logical and common sense checks.

In the case of both the Thriasio to Korinthos railway and the Agios

Konstantinos Bypass, the CBA was not used as a tool to compare alternative

options. For the bypass in particular, there was little potential for alternative

route options due to the difficult topography in the area.



Greece

The CBA process had not been used to prioritise between different projects

(e.g. the Agios Konstantinos Bypass as opposed to the Thriasio to

Korinthos railway). Decisions at this level had been based on the

requirements for improving the priority axes and the total funding allocated

to Greece.

CBA is considered a useful process because it provides estimations of the

main impacts. However, it is considered limited because CBA struggles to

capture the potential for regional benefits which take time to materialise. It

was noted that whilst the applications had stressed these benefits they, had

been unable to be quantified within the CBA.

Feedback relating to the EC‟s CBA guidance document was positive and the

guide was deemed helpful to standardise the CBA process.

There was a view that the level of effort required to complete a CBA is

proportional to the project being considered. It was noted that the majority

of the time input required is for the detailed project design and not the CBA.



Greece

Railway Thriassio – Kiato in Greece

Figure 6. Railway Thriassio-Pedio-Eleusina-Korinthos – Greece. Economic analysis

(€m, 2000 prices) – Low case

Source: Own calculations

2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008 2009 2010 2011 2012 2013 2014 2015 2016 2017

BENEFITS

Consumers Surplus

Passengers 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 4.4 5.2 5.5 5.9 5.6 5.5 5.5 5.6 5.6 5.8 6.0 6.2

Freight 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0

Producer Surplus

Passengers 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 10.0 13.0 15.3 15.9 17.6 17.2 16.6 16.6 16.7 16.8 17.0 17.3 17.7

Freight 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0

Government Surplus

Passengers 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0

Freight 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0

Externalities

Passengers 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 3.4 4.6 5.0 5.7 5.4 4.9 4.9 5.0 5.0 5.2 5.4 5.7

Freight 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0

TOTAL BENEFITS 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 10.0 20.7 25.1 26.5 29.2 28.2 26.9 27.0 27.3 27.4 27.9 28.8 29.6

COSTS

Investment Costs

Works 114.3 46.5 51.2 53.2 31.6 55.0 32.3 15.0 1.1 0.8 0.3 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0

Equipment 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0

General Expenses 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0

Other Expenses 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0

Total Investment costs 114.3 46.5 51.2 53.2 31.6 55.0 32.3 15.0 1.1 0.8 0.3 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0

Maintenance 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0

TOTAL COSTS 114.3 46.5 51.2 53.2 31.6 55.0 32.3 15.0 1.1 0.8 0.3 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0

NET BENEFITS -114.3 -46.5 -51.2 -53.2 -31.6 -45.0 -11.6 10.2 25.4 28.4 27.9 26.9 27.0 27.3 27.4 27.9 28.8 29.6

2018 2019 2020 2021 2022 2023 2024 2025 2026 2027 2028 2029 2030 2031 2032 2033 2034 2035

BENEFITS

Consumers Surplus

Passengers 6.5 6.7 7.0 7.3 7.6 7.9 8.2 8.5 8.8 9.2 9.6 9.9 10.4 10.8 11.2 11.7 12.1 12.6

Freight 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0

Producer Surplus

Passengers 18.0 18.4 18.8 19.2 19.6 20.0 20.4 20.9 21.3 21.8 22.3 22.8 23.3 23.8 24.3 24.9 25.5 26.1

Freight 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0

Government Surplus

Passengers 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0

Freight 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0

Externalities

Passengers 6.0 6.3 6.6 6.9 7.2 7.6 8.0 8.3 8.8 9.2 9.6 10.1 10.6 11.1 11.7 12.3 12.9 13.5

Freight 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0

TOTAL BENEFITS 30.5 31.4 32.4 33.3 34.4 35.4 36.6 37.7 38.9 40.2 41.5 42.8 44.2 45.7 47.2 48.8 50.5 52.2

COSTS

Investment Costs 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0

Works 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 -171.2

Equipment 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0


Other Expenses 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0

Total Investment costs 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 -171.2

Maintenance 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0

TOTAL COSTS 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 -171.2

NET BENEFITS 30.5 31.4 32.4 33.3 34.4 35.4 36.6 37.7 38.9 40.2 41.5 42.8 44.2 45.7 47.2 48.8 50.5 223.5

Discount Rate 5.5%

ENPV 31.9

ERR 6.05%

B/C Ratio 1.10


Figure 7. Railway Thriassio-Pedio-Eleusina-Korinthos – Greece. Financial return on

investment (€m, 2000 prices) – Low case


2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008 2009 2010 2011 2012 2013 2014 2015 2016 2017

Passenger trains 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 1.8 3.2 3.6 4.5 4.3 4.2 4.2 4.3 4.3 4.5 4.7 4.9

Goods trains 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0

TOTAL REVENUES 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 1.8 3.2 3.6 4.5 4.3 4.2 4.2 4.3 4.3 4.5 4.7 4.9

Works 132.0 53.7 59.1 61.5 36.5 63.5 37.3 17.3 1.2 0.9 0.4 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0

Equipments 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0


Other Expenses 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0

TOTAL INVESTMENT

COSTS 132.0 53.7 59.1 61.5 36.5 63.5 37.3 17.3 1.2 0.9 0.4 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0

Maintenance 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0

TOTAL OPERATING

COSTS0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 -10.0 -10.0 -10.0 -10.0 -10.0 -10.0 -10.0 -10.0 -10.0 -10.0 -10.0 -10.0 -10.0

TOTAL OUTFLOWS 132.0 53.7 59.1 61.5 36.5 53.5 27.3 7.3 -8.8 -9.1 -9.6 -10.0 -10.0 -10.0 -10.0 -10.0 -10.0 -10.0

CASH FLOW -132.0 -53.7 -59.1 -61.5 -36.5 -53.5 -25.5 -4.1 12.3 13.6 13.9 14.2 14.2 14.3 14.3 14.5 14.7 14.9

2018 2019 2020 2021 2022 2023 2024 2025 2026 2027 2028 2029 2030 2031 2032 2033 2034 2035


Goods trains 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0

TOTAL REVENUES 5.1 5.3 5.6 5.8 6.1 6.3 6.6 6.9 7.2 7.4 7.7 8.1 8.4 8.7 9.0 9.4 9.7 10.1

Works 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 -197.7

Equipments 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0


Other Expenses 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0

TOTAL INVESTMENT

COSTS 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 -197.7

Maintenance 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0

TOTAL OPERATING

COSTS-10.0 -10.0 -10.0 -10.0 -10.0 -10.0 -10.0 -10.0 -10.0 -10.0 -10.0 -10.0 -10.0 -10.0 -10.0 -10.0 -10.0 -10.0

TOTAL OUTFLOWS -10.0 -10.0 -10.0 -10.0 -10.0 -10.0 -10.0 -10.0 -10.0 -10.0 -10.0 -10.0 -10.0 -10.0 -10.0 -10.0 -10.0 -207.7

15.1 15.3 15.6 15.8 16.1 16.3 16.6 16.9 17.2 17.4 17.7 18.1 18.4 18.7 19.0 19.4 19.7 217.8

CASH FLOW 5.0%

FNPV (C) -184.1

FRR (C) 1.84%



Greece


capital (€m, 2000 prices) – Low case


2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008 2009 2010 2011 2012 2013 2014 2015 2016 2017


Goods trains 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0

TOTAL REVENUES 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 1.8 3.2 3.6 4.5 4.3 4.2 4.2 4.3 4.3 4.5 4.7 4.9

Works 64.9 29.2 32.3 33.5 19.9 34.6 20.3 9.3 0.7 0.5 0.2 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0

Equipments 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0


Other Expenses 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0

TOTAL INVESTMENT

COSTS 64.9 29.2 32.3 33.5 19.9 34.6 20.3 9.3 0.7 0.5 0.2 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0

Maintenance 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0

TOTAL OPERATING

COSTS0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 -10.0 -10.0 -10.0 -10.0 -10.0 -10.0 -10.0 -10.0 -10.0 -10.0 -10.0 -10.0 -10.0

TOTAL OUTFLOWS 64.9 29.2 32.3 33.5 19.9 24.6 10.3 -0.7 -9.3 -9.5 -9.8 -10.0 -10.0 -10.0 -10.0 -10.0 -10.0 -10.0

CASH FLOW -64.9 -29.2 -32.3 -33.5 -19.9 -24.6 -8.4 3.8 12.9 14.1 14.1 14.2 14.2 14.3 14.3 14.5 14.7 14.9

2018 2019 2020 2021 2022 2023 2024 2025 2026 2027 2028 2029 2030 2031 2032 2033 2034 2035


Goods trains 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0

TOTAL REVENUES 5.1 5.3 5.6 5.8 6.1 6.3 6.6 6.9 7.2 7.4 7.7 8.1 8.4 8.7 9.0 9.4 9.7 10.1

Works 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 -197.7

Equipments 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0


Other Expenses 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0

TOTAL INVESTMENT

COSTS 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 -197.7

Maintenance 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0

TOTAL OPERATING

COSTS-10.0 -10.0 -10.0 -10.0 -10.0 -10.0 -10.0 -10.0 -10.0 -10.0 -10.0 -10.0 -10.0 -10.0 -10.0 -10.0 -10.0 -10.0

TOTAL OUTFLOWS -10.0 -10.0 -10.0 -10.0 -10.0 -10.0 -10.0 -10.0 -10.0 -10.0 -10.0 -10.0 -10.0 -10.0 -10.0 -10.0 -10.0 -207.7

CASH FLOW 15.1 15.3 15.6 15.8 16.1 16.3 16.6 16.9 17.2 17.4 17.7 18.1 18.4 18.7 19.0 19.4 19.7 217.8

Discount rate 5.0%

FNPV (C) 10.2

FRR (C) 5.27%


Figure 9. Railway Thriassio-Pedio-Eleusina-Korinthos – Greece. Financial

sustainability (€m, 2000 prices) – Low case


2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008 2009 2010 2011 2012 2013 2014 2015 2016 2017

EU Grant 67.1 24.5 26.8 27.9 16.7 28.9 17.0 7.9 0.6 0.4 0.2 218.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0

Local Contribution 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0

Regional Contribution 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0

National Contribution 64.9 29.2 32.3 33.5 19.9 34.6 20.3 9.3 0.7 0.5 0.2 -218.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0

Total national public

contribution64.9 29.2 32.3 33.5 19.9 34.6 20.3 9.3 0.7 0.5 0.2 -218.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0

Operating subsidies 0.0 1.0 2.0 3.0 4.0 5.0 6.0 7.0 8.0 9.0 10.0 11.0 12.0 13.0 14.0 15.0 16.0 17.0

FINANCIAL RESOURCES 132.0 53.7 59.1 61.5 36.5 63.5 37.3 17.3 1.2 0.9 0.4 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0

Passenger vehicles 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.1 0.3 0.7 0.6 0.9 1.4 2.0 2.7 3.4 4.2 5.2 6.1 7.2 8.4 9.7

Goods vehicles 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.1 0.1 0.2 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.1 0.8

TOTAL REVENUES 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.2 0.4 0.8 0.6 0.9 1.4 2.0 2.7 3.4 4.2 5.2 6.1 7.2 8.6 10.6

TOTAL INFLOWS 132.0 53.7 59.1 61.5 36.5 63.5 37.3 17.3 1.2 0.9 0.4 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0

Land Purchase 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0

Construction 132.0 53.7 59.1 61.5 36.5 63.5 37.3 17.3 1.2 0.9 0.4 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0

Technical Support 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0

Publicity 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0

TOTAL INVESTMENTS

COSTS132.0 53.7 59.1 61.5 36.5 63.5 37.3 17.3 1.2 0.9 0.4 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0

Maintenance 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0

TOTAL OPERATING

COSTS0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 -10.0 -10.0 -10.0 -10.0 -10.0 -10.0 -10.0 -10.0 -10.0 -10.0 -10.0 -10.0 -10.0

TOTAL OUTFLOWS 132.0 53.7 59.1 61.5 36.5 53.5 27.3 7.3 -8.8 -9.1 -9.6 -10.0 -10.0 -10.0 -10.0 -10.0 -10.0 -10.0

NET CASH FLOW 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 10.0 10.0 10.0 10.0 10.0 10.0 10.0 10.0 10.0 10.0 10.0 10.0 10.0

CUMULATED CASH

FLOW0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 10.0 20.0 30.0 40.0 50.0 60.0 70.0 80.0 90.0 100.0 110.0 120.0 130.0

2018 2019 2020 2021 2022 2023 2024 2025 2026 2027 2028 2029 2030 2031 2032 2033 2034 2035

EU Grant 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0



National Contribution 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 -197.7


contribution0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 -197.7


FINANCIAL RESOURCES 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 -197.7


Goods vehicles 1.6 1.7 1.7 1.8 1.9 2.0 2.0 2.1 2.2 2.3 2.4 2.5 2.6 2.7 2.8 2.9 3.0 3.1

TOTAL REVENUES 12.8 13.3 13.7 14.2 14.7 15.2 15.8 16.4 17.0 17.6 18.2 18.9 19.6 20.3 21.0 21.7 22.5 23.2

TOTAL INFLOWS 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 -197.7

Land Purchase 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0

Construction 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 -197.7


Publicity 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0

TOTAL INVESTMENTS

COSTS0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 -197.7

Maintenance 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0

TOTAL OPERATING

COSTS-10.0 -10.0 -10.0 -10.0 -10.0 -10.0 -10.0 -10.0 -10.0 -10.0 -10.0 -10.0 -10.0 -10.0 -10.0 -10.0 -10.0 -10.0

TOTAL OUTFLOWS -10.0 -10.0 -10.0 -10.0 -10.0 -10.0 -10.0 -10.0 -10.0 -10.0 -10.0 -10.0 -10.0 -10.0 -10.0 -10.0 -10.0 -207.7

NET CASH FLOW 10.0 10.0 10.0 10.0 10.0 10.0 10.0 10.0 10.0 10.0 10.0 10.0 10.0 10.0 10.0 10.0 10.0 10.0

CUMULATED CASH

FLOW140.0 150.0 160.0 170.0 180.0 190.0 200.0 210.0 220.0 230.0 240.0 250.0 260.0 270.0 279.9 289.9 299.9 309.9



Greece

Figure 10. Railway Thriassio-Pedio-Eleusina-Korinthos – Greece. Economic analysis

(€m, 2000 prices) – High case


2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008 2009 2010 2011 2012 2013 2014 2015 2016 2017

BENEFITS

Consumers Surplus

Passengers 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 6.1 7.9 7.9 8.9 8.5 8.3 8.3 8.4 8.5 8.7 9.1 9.5

Freight 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0

Producer Surplus

Passengers 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 10.0 19.5 24.8 24.3 28.5 27.7 26.2 26.2 26.5 26.6 27.0 27.7 28.3

Freight 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0

Government Surplus

Passengers 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0

Freight 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0

Externalities

Passengers 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 6.3 9.1 9.0 10.8 10.2 9.0 9.0 9.2 9.3 9.6 10.0 10.5

Freight 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0

TOTAL BENEFITS 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 10.0 31.9 41.7 41.2 48.1 46.4 43.5 43.5 44.1 44.4 45.3 46.8 48.3

COSTS

Investment Costs

Works 114.3 46.5 51.2 53.2 31.6 55.0 32.3 15.0 1.1 0.8 0.3 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0

Equipment 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0


Other Expenses 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0

Total Investment costs 114.3 46.5 51.2 53.2 31.6 55.0 32.3 15.0 1.1 0.8 0.3 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0

Maintenance 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0

TOTAL COSTS 114.3 46.5 51.2 53.2 31.6 55.0 32.3 15.0 1.1 0.8 0.3 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0

NET BENEFITS -114.3 -46.5 -51.2 -53.2 -31.6 -45.0 -0.4 26.7 40.2 47.4 46.1 43.5 43.5 44.1 44.4 45.3 46.8 48.3

2018 2019 2020 2021 2022 2023 2024 2025 2026 2027 2028 2029 2030 2031 2032 2033 2034 2035

BENEFITS

Consumers Surplus

Passengers 9.8 10.3 10.7 11.1 11.6 12.1 12.6 13.1 13.6 14.2 14.8 15.4 16.1 16.8 17.5 18.2 19.0 19.8

Freight 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0

Producer Surplus

Passengers 29.0 29.7 30.4 31.2 31.9 32.7 33.5 34.4 35.2 36.1 37.0 38.0 38.9 39.9 40.9 42.0 43.1 44.2

Freight 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0

Government Surplus

Passengers 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0

Freight 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0

Externalities

Passengers 11.1 11.6 12.2 12.8 13.4 14.1 14.8 15.6 16.3 17.1 18.0 18.9 19.9 20.8 21.9 23.0 24.1 25.3

Freight 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0

TOTAL BENEFITS 49.9 51.6 53.3 55.1 56.9 58.9 60.9 63.0 65.2 67.5 69.8 72.3 74.9 77.5 80.3 83.2 86.2 89.4

COSTS

Investment Costs 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0

Works 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 -171.2

Equipment 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0


Other Expenses 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0

Total Investment costs 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 -171.2

Maintenance 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0

TOTAL COSTS 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 -171.2

NET BENEFITS 49.9 51.6 53.3 55.1 56.9 58.9 60.9 63.0 65.2 67.5 69.8 72.3 74.9 77.5 80.3 83.2 86.2 260.6

Discount Rate 5.5%

ENPV 257.8

ERR 9.30%

B/C Ratio 1.79



investment (€m, 2000 prices) – High case


2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008 2009 2010 2011 2012 2013 2014 2015 2016 2017


Goods trains 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0

TOTAL REVENUES 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 5.6 8.7 8.4 10.8 10.4 10.2 10.2 10.4 10.4 10.7 11.1 11.5

Works 132.0 53.7 59.1 61.5 36.5 63.5 37.3 17.3 1.2 0.9 0.4 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0

Equipments 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0


Other Expenses 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0

TOTAL INVESTMENT

COSTS 132.0 53.7 59.1 61.5 36.5 63.5 37.3 17.3 1.2 0.9 0.4 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0

Maintenance 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0

TOTAL OPERATING

COSTS0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 -10.0 -10.0 -10.0 -10.0 -10.0 -10.0 -10.0 -10.0 -10.0 -10.0 -10.0 -10.0 -10.0

TOTAL OUTFLOWS 132.0 53.7 59.1 61.5 36.5 53.5 27.3 7.3 -8.8 -9.1 -9.6 -10.0 -10.0 -10.0 -10.0 -10.0 -10.0 -10.0

CASH FLOW -132.0 -53.7 -59.1 -61.5 -36.5 -53.5 -21.7 1.4 17.2 19.9 20.0 20.2 20.2 20.4 20.4 20.7 21.1 21.5

2018 2019 2020 2021 2022 2023 2024 2025 2026 2027 2028 2029 2030 2031 2032 2033 2034 2035


Goods trains 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0

TOTAL REVENUES 11.9 12.3 12.8 13.3 13.7 14.2 14.7 15.2 15.8 16.3 16.9 17.5 18.1 18.7 19.4 20.0 20.7 21.4

Works 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 -197.7

Equipments 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0


Other Expenses 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0

TOTAL INVESTMENT

COSTS 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 -197.7

Maintenance 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0

TOTAL OPERATING

COSTS-10.0 -10.0 -10.0 -10.0 -10.0 -10.0 -10.0 -10.0 -10.0 -10.0 -10.0 -10.0 -10.0 -10.0 -10.0 -10.0 -10.0 -10.0

TOTAL OUTFLOWS -10.0 -10.0 -10.0 -10.0 -10.0 -10.0 -10.0 -10.0 -10.0 -10.0 -10.0 -10.0 -10.0 -10.0 -10.0 -10.0 -10.0 -207.7

21.9 22.3 22.8 23.3 23.7 24.2 24.7 25.2 25.8 26.3 26.9 27.5 28.1 28.7 29.4 30.0 30.7 229.1

CASH FLOW 5.0%

FNPV (C) -100.9

FRR (C) 3.40%



Greece


capital (€m, 2000 prices) – High case


2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008 2009 2010 2011 2012 2013 2014 2015 2016 2017


Goods trains 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0

TOTAL REVENUES 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 5.6 8.7 8.4 10.8 10.4 10.2 10.2 10.4 10.4 10.7 11.1 11.5

Works 64.9 29.2 32.3 33.5 19.9 34.6 20.3 9.3 0.7 0.5 0.2 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0

Equipments 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0


Other Expenses 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0

TOTAL INVESTMENT

COSTS 64.9 29.2 32.3 33.5 19.9 34.6 20.3 9.3 0.7 0.5 0.2 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0

Maintenance 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0

TOTAL OPERATING

COSTS0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 -10.0 -10.0 -10.0 -10.0 -10.0 -10.0 -10.0 -10.0 -10.0 -10.0 -10.0 -10.0 -10.0

TOTAL OUTFLOWS 64.9 29.2 32.3 33.5 19.9 24.6 10.3 -0.7 -9.3 -9.5 -9.8 -10.0 -10.0 -10.0 -10.0 -10.0 -10.0 -10.0

CASH FLOW -64.9 -29.2 -32.3 -33.5 -19.9 -24.6 -4.7 9.3 17.8 20.4 20.2 20.2 20.2 20.4 20.4 20.7 21.1 21.5

2018 2019 2020 2021 2022 2023 2024 2025 2026 2027 2028 2029 2030 2031 2032 2033 2034 2035


Goods trains 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0

TOTAL REVENUES 11.9 12.3 12.8 13.3 13.7 14.2 14.7 15.2 15.8 16.3 16.9 17.5 18.1 18.7 19.4 20.0 20.7 21.4

Works 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 -197.7

Equipments 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0


Other Expenses 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0

TOTAL INVESTMENT

COSTS 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 -197.7

Maintenance 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0

TOTAL OPERATING

COSTS-10.0 -10.0 -10.0 -10.0 -10.0 -10.0 -10.0 -10.0 -10.0 -10.0 -10.0 -10.0 -10.0 -10.0 -10.0 -10.0 -10.0 -10.0

TOTAL OUTFLOWS -10.0 -10.0 -10.0 -10.0 -10.0 -10.0 -10.0 -10.0 -10.0 -10.0 -10.0 -10.0 -10.0 -10.0 -10.0 -10.0 -10.0 -207.7

CASH FLOW 21.9 22.3 22.8 23.3 23.7 24.2 24.7 25.2 25.8 26.3 26.9 27.5 28.1 28.7 29.4 30.0 30.7 229.1

Discount rate 5.0%

FNPV (C) 93.5

FRR (C) 7.30%


Figure 13. Railway Thriassio-Pedio-Eleusina-Korinthos – Greece. Financial

sustainability (€m, 2000 prices) – High case


2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008 2009 2010 2011 2012 2013 2014 2015 2016 2017

EU Grant 67.1 24.5 26.8 27.9 16.7 28.9 17.0 7.9 0.6 0.4 0.2 218.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0



National Contribution 64.9 29.2 32.3 33.5 19.9 34.6 20.3 9.3 0.7 0.5 0.2 -218.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0


contribution64.9 29.2 32.3 33.5 19.9 34.6 20.3 9.3 0.7 0.5 0.2 -218.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0


FINANCIAL RESOURCES 132.0 53.7 59.1 61.5 36.5 63.5 37.3 17.3 1.2 0.9 0.4 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0


Goods vehicles 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.1 0.1 0.2 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.1 0.8

TOTAL REVENUES 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.2 0.4 0.8 0.6 0.9 1.4 2.0 2.7 3.4 4.2 5.2 6.1 7.2 8.6 10.6

TOTAL INFLOWS 132.0 53.7 59.1 61.5 36.5 63.5 37.3 17.3 1.2 0.9 0.4 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0

Land Purchase 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0

Construction 132.0 53.7 59.1 61.5 36.5 63.5 37.3 17.3 1.2 0.9 0.4 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0


Publicity 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0

TOTAL INVESTMENTS

COSTS132.0 53.7 59.1 61.5 36.5 63.5 37.3 17.3 1.2 0.9 0.4 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0

Maintenance 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0

TOTAL OPERATING

COSTS0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 -10.0 -10.0 -10.0 -10.0 -10.0 -10.0 -10.0 -10.0 -10.0 -10.0 -10.0 -10.0 -10.0

TOTAL OUTFLOWS 132.0 53.7 59.1 61.5 36.5 53.5 27.3 7.3 -8.8 -9.1 -9.6 -10.0 -10.0 -10.0 -10.0 -10.0 -10.0 -10.0

NET CASH FLOW 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 10.0 10.0 10.0 10.0 10.0 10.0 10.0 10.0 10.0 10.0 10.0 10.0 10.0

CUMULATED CASH

FLOW0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 10.0 20.0 30.0 40.0 50.0 60.0 70.0 80.0 90.0 100.0 110.0 120.0 130.0

2018 2019 2020 2021 2022 2023 2024 2025 2026 2027 2028 2029 2030 2031 2032 2033 2034 2035

EU Grant 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0



National Contribution 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 -197.7


contribution0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 -197.7


FINANCIAL RESOURCES 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 -197.7


Goods vehicles 1.6 1.7 1.7 1.8 1.9 2.0 2.0 2.1 2.2 2.3 2.4 2.5 2.6 2.7 2.8 2.9 3.0 3.1

TOTAL REVENUES 12.8 13.3 13.7 14.2 14.7 15.2 15.8 16.4 17.0 17.6 18.2 18.9 19.6 20.3 21.0 21.7 22.5 23.2

TOTAL INFLOWS 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 -197.7

Land Purchase 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0

Construction 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 -197.7


Publicity 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0

TOTAL INVESTMENTS

COSTS0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 -197.7

Maintenance 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0

TOTAL OPERATING

COSTS-10.0 -10.0 -10.0 -10.0 -10.0 -10.0 -10.0 -10.0 -10.0 -10.0 -10.0 -10.0 -10.0 -10.0 -10.0 -10.0 -10.0 -10.0

TOTAL OUTFLOWS -10.0 -10.0 -10.0 -10.0 -10.0 -10.0 -10.0 -10.0 -10.0 -10.0 -10.0 -10.0 -10.0 -10.0 -10.0 -10.0 -10.0 -207.7

NET CASH FLOW 10.0 10.0 10.0 10.0 10.0 10.0 10.0 10.0 10.0 10.0 10.0 10.0 10.0 10.0 10.0 10.0 10.0 10.0

CUMULATED CASH

FLOW140.0 150.0 160.0 170.0 180.0 190.0 200.0 210.0 220.0 230.0 240.0 250.0 260.0 270.0 279.9 289.9 299.9 309.9

appendix 7 railway thriassio kiato in...

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