appeals to justice in the environmental debate

Journal of Social Issues, VoL. 50, No. 3, 1994, pp. 13-27

Appeals to Justice in the Environmental Debate

Susan Clayton The College of Wooster

Arguments over issues with environmental implications are increasingly salient in the public arena, and appeals to justice are made by both those who favor and those who oppose environmental regulations. But can justice really be claimed by each side with equal plausibility? The concept of justice can be defined in diferent ways, which may tend to favor one side or the other. Although there is a high degree of variability among the arguments presented, the environmental crisis seems most generally to pit justice for the individual, or microjustice, against justice for a larger group, or macrojustice. The present article examines the evidence for this, and reports the results of a study examining appeals to di$erent principles of justice. Subjects were asked to evaluate arguments based on microjustice principles, such as procedural justice, or macrojustice principles, such as equality and responsibility, by each side of the environmental debate. Although pro-environmental arguments received stronger ratings overall, it was also found, as expected, that appeals based on procedural justice were relatively stronger when phrased in terms of an anti-environmental stance, and other arguments were relatively stronger for the pro-environmental position.

Public discourse by both environmentalists and those opposed to the goals of the environmental movement has begun to use the language of justice. (I have labeled the latter anti-environmentalists for convenience, although many of them would choose a different label for themselves. I note that it is possible to distin- guish between opposition to the goals of the environmental movement and opposition to the environment.) One anti-environmentalist group, for example, is called the Fairness to Landowners Committee (Schneider, 1992); many anti- environmentalist groups frame their opposition in terms of property rights. Meanwhile, the environmental movement has begun to speak widely of the need for an environmental ethic or environmental justice (e.g., Seligman, 1989;

Correspondence regarding this article should be addressed to Susan Clayton, Rychology De- partment, The College of Wooster, Wooster, OH 44691.

13

0022-4537194/0900-0013$03.00/1 0 1994 The Society for the Rychological Study of Social lssues

14 Clayton

Stone, 1987; Wenz, 1988). There are of course a variety of ways of defining justice (Clayton & Lerner, 1991; Deutsch, 1975), and thus a variety of positions that can be described as fair for any given issue, including environmental ones. These different definitions of justice can lead to different policy or action pre- scriptions, and thus come into conflict. Those who believe that resources should be distributed equally will see different solutions as just than will those who believe resources should be distributed according to need; those who think we should consider future generations will disagree with those who limit the moral community to people currently alive.

Bearing in mind that different models of justice can be invoked, a number of questions arise. A first question concerns whether particular models are preferred. Research tends to show, for example, more support for a principle that makes reference to the characteristics of an individual than for a principle that stipulates the type of overall distribution that will be obtained for the group as a whole (Sinclair & Mark, 1991). Tyler (e.g., 1987) has shown that procedural justice-in practice, often defined as equal opportunity to be heard-is often given more importance than distributive justice. Other researchers make the distinction between the language of rights and entitlements, on the one hand, and the language of responsibility and obligation, on the other, with the former representing the more typical view of morality (Gilligan, 1982). Finally, one’s conception of the just course of action depends on what entities are included in one’s scope of justice (Opotow, 1990), and it may be more common to limit one’s moral universe to other humans than to extend it to include other species.

A second question is whether, if a particular type of justice is agreed upon, any one particular position-say the pro-environmental position-emerges as clearly superior. In other words, are certain models of justice more compatible with certain positions regarding environmental issues, while other models of justice favor other positions? There are reasons to suspect this may be true.

Opposition to environmentalist positions, on the one hand, is often couched in terms of economic concerns; research suggests that equity is more important in settings that stress economic goals, while settings that stress concerns of social relations, or nurturant concerns such as caring for the environment, may evoke more considerations of equality or need (Deutsch, 1975; Prentice & Crosby, 1987). Opposition to environmentalist initiatives also tends to stress group divi- sions and competitions: “environmental elitists” and “spotted owls VS. jobs”. The head of a group opposed to logging restrictions, for example, stated that “most of these environmental laws are pushed by professional environmentalists. They are power-hungry people who put plants and animals above middle America” (Lang, quoted in Schneider, 1992, p. A4). Such a breakdown into opposing subgroups may lessen the extent to which people think in terms of the welfare of the larger society or ecosystem, and increase the degree to which people define themselves

Appeals to Justice 15

in a competing or at least nonunit relationship with other members of the ecosystem, thus making individual entitlements and rights more salient (Lerner, 1981).

Environmentalism, on the other hand, has tended to focus on the community as a whole (Leopold, 1949/1987), and on enlarging the boundaries of that community. “Eco-warrior” Dave Foreman, founder of the Earth First! movement, has argued that “all living beings have the same right to be here” (1991), putting all the individual organisms in one category (Sinclair & Mark, 1991), while Roderick Nash (1989) has drawn a parallel between the liberation of nature and the liberation of slaves, suggesting that each reflects a widening of the moral community. Similarly, environmentalism is often described as explicitly egalitarian and nonhierarchical (especially by ecofeminists; cf. Warren, 1990), thus avoiding the tendency to make discriminations of deservingness between individuals. The “environmental justice” movement is concerned with ensuring the equal treatment of the relatively less powerful members of society with regard to environmental hazards (e.g., Hays, 1990). Dake (1992) has hypothesized that support for preservation will be associated with a high level of group identifica- tion, while individualism will be associated with a preference for deregulation as an environmental policy. One would also expect a greater discussion of respon- sibilities on the part of environmentalists-for example, Wendell Berry’s (1987) focus on stewardship and “the persistent obligations of the human condition” (p. 67)-given that their prevailing ideology concerns the changes in human behavior that are required to bring about a sustainable society. Anti- environmentalists, meanwhile, reject talk of responsibility: a key speaker at an anti-environmentalist conference stated “I do not support that damage to the earth is being done and that man is responsible” (Ray, cited in Poole, 1992, p. 91). Instead, they tend to talk about rights, particularly property rights, and the need to protect individual behavior from societal control and the Big Brother-like forces of the state.

Many of these distinctions revolve around the difference between macrojustice principles, concerned with the welfare of the group, and microjustice principles, concerned with the welfare of the individual (Brickman, Folger, Goode, & Schul, 1981). Equity, or merit-based resource allocation, and procedural justice are the most popular microjustice principles. Equality is the most obvious form of distributive justice designed with the overall distribution of resources in mind. Finally, it has been argued (Gilligan, 1982) that a concern with responsibility is more group-oriented in taking into account social relation- ships, while a focus on rights and entitlements is more centered on the individual.

It would seem more natural for environmentalists to focus on the larger system; most advocates of biodiversity are not concerned with the survival of an individual plant or fish unless the species as a whole is threatened (Stone, 1987).

16 Clayton

Brickman et al. (1981) suggested that macrojustice principles will be more salient under conditions of scarcity, because of a heightened level of collec- tive awareness; environmentalists believe we are facing or at least approaching a condition of scarcity when it comes to natural resources, while anti- environmentalists have faith for the most part in the continued abundance of these resources. Thus, overall it is expected that macrojustice principles, and specifically an emphasis on responsibility, equality, or shared sacrifice, will be more convincing when used to represent an environmentalist position, while microjustice principles such as procedural justice and rights will be seen as stronger when argued in the cause of an anti-environmentalist position.

Some empirical support may be found for this hypothesis. McKnight (1990) found that business students agreed, while environmental studies students dis- agreed, with a statement that humans have the right to use plants and animals as they saw fit. Syme and Nancarrow (1992) defined 11 1 philosophical statements, based on the application of different justice principles to a water allocation decision, and asked Perth residents to rate their agreement with each statement. Overall, there was more support for egalitarian principles than for propor- tionality, with the most agreement for statements oriented towards the group, such as “The overall welfare of the community is the most important concern for water planning”, and the least agreement for market-oriented statements such as “All water should be put on the market and allocated to those who will pay most, regardless of what it is used for.” In this issue, Cvetkovich and Earle report that supporters of a wildlife protection ordinance were more likely than opponents to make reference to themes of equality or communal sharing. Finally, in an earlier study, I (Clayton, 199 1) manipulated fundraising appeals for an environmental organization and a medical organization so that they focused either on a deserv- ing individual, in one condition, or on the needs of society as a whole, in the other condition. The appeal for the medical cause was rated as more effective, received a greater donation of money, and led subjects to express more interest, in the individual-focus condition; however, the ratings on all three variables for the environmental appeal were higher in the societal-focus condition. (Only the variable of rated effectiveness showed a significant effect of condition.)

A third question regarding the type of justice used in the public debate on environmental issues concerns whether the appeal of a particular type of justice position is associated with preexisting personality or attitudinal positions, specifically position on environmental issues. Previous research has already shown that, for example, women, Democrats, social science majors, people in a good mood, and people from a collectivist culture favor macrojustice principles more than do men, Republicans, natural science majors, people in a bad mood, and people from an individualistic culture (Brickman et al., 1981; Murphy-Berman et al., 1984; Sinclair & Mark, 1991). If environmentalistism is more congenial to


macrojustice principles, one might expect that such principles would be given higher ratings by those high in environmental awareness.

The present study examined the effectiveness of arguments based on different conceptions of justice. It looked for an interaction between the type of justice invoked and the content of the argument-whether pro- or anti-environmental. Finally, it explored the effect of sex, environmental attitudes, and belief in a just world on agreement with different justice principles.

Method

This study presented subjects with five different justice-based arguments, which made reference to different models of justice. Each argument was presented either in support of or in opposition to an environmentalist position. It was expected that, although there might be a main effect for position, there would also be an interaction effect such that some arguments would be perceived to be stronger in the environmentalist cause while other arguments would be stronger in opposition to the environmentalist cause. Other questions of interest were, whether some types of justice would be preferred overall (a main effect for argument) and whether agreement with a particular argument could be predicted from some subject characteristics: sex, belief in a just world, and score on an environmental attitudes scale.

Subjects and Procedure

One hundred and two undergraduate students (45 male, 52 female, and 5 who left their sex unspecified) participated in two testing sessions; 37 subjects received course credit and 65 were paid $5 for their participation. Each received a packet containing the experimental questionnaires. Upon completing the experimental materials, subjects were thanked and debriefed.

Materials

The materials contained five justice arguments, briefly presented: equal voice in decisions (procedural justice), equal access to resources, equal suffering or sacrifice, responsibility, and rights. These arguments were designed to represent both microjustice and macrojustice approaches, and to reflect as closely as possible the range of arguments that have been seen in the public debate over environmental issues. The arguments are summarized in Table 1. Whether the arguments were pro- or anti-environment was a between-subjects variable. Each argument was rated on two 1-7 scales, one evaluating the strength of the argument and one asking the extent to which subjects agreed with the argument.

18 Clayton

Table 1. Pro- and Anti-Environmental Arguments

Procedure

Pro: Environmental problems are made worse by the violation of fair procedures, which occurs because large timber and oil companies have a more powerful voice than the average citizen and dictate Ameri- ca’s energy policy. The ordinary individual’s voice should be heard, and decisions about our natural resources should reflect the input of all concerned parties.

Anti: Current environmental policy in the U.S. does not represent the position of the general public. Environmentalists, who are largely white and middle-class, advance their own agenda through the money they donate to environmental organizations at the expense of those who are not so well- connected politically. Decisions about our natural resources should reflect the positions of all citizens.

Equal access

Pro: Environmental resources-such as air, water, and timber-should be shared equally by all individuals. Americans are currently using far more than their share of the world’s resources; there are not enough resources available for everyone in the world to use them up at the rate that Americans do. We need to learn to use less, so all individuals have an equal opportunity to benefit from the natural environment.

Anti: Environmental resources, such as public lands and national parks, should be shared equally by all individuals. Some environmental groups try to ban certain uses of these resources, life off-road vehi- cles or snowmobiles in the parks and des- erts, or cattle grazing on public lands. We need to come up with an environmental policy that allows all individuals an equal opportunity to use and enjoy the natural environment.

Rights

Pro: We have a right to a clean, safe and Anti: For generations, ranchers have grazed healthy environment. So do our children. their sheep and cattle on public lands. Pro-

posed new environmental regulations would make it almost impossible for them to continue their traditional grazing practices, and threaten their entire liveli- hood. Ranchers have a right to protect their way of life and live the way they always have, and their children have the right to carry on their traditional ways of life.

Responsibility

Pro: Human activity is responsible for the current level of global warming, which most scientists agree will cause environmental catastrophe. It is our profound obligation as global citizens to reverse this trend.

Anti: The first responsibility of people is to other people. If environmental regulations will eliminate jobs or harm communities, we have an obligation as humanitarians to relax those regulations.

(continued)


Table 1. (Continued)

Equal sucrijice

Pro: Again and again, statistics show that Anti: The implementation of the Endangered Species Act is no sacrifice for most of the nation. Many people overlook the impact on loggers and others who work in the timber industry, who may lose their jobs and their livelihoods. No one group should have to pay the price for the lifestyle of the majority.

predominantly minority communities are more likely to live in areas contaminated by environmental pollutants than are predominantly white communities. No one group should have to pay the price for the lifestyle of the majority.

It was not possible, of course, to make the arguments identical for the two positions. Thus it is possible that a “responsibility” argument, for example, could be more convincing from the pro-environmental than the anti-environmental point of view. Unfortunately, it is impossible to separate this out from the effect being looked for: that some types of justice are intrinsically more compatible with each position. For this reason, no attempt was made to equate the strength of the pro-environmental argument and the corresponding anti-environmental argument through pilot testing. However, the justice appeals were, as far as possible, phrased in comparable ways in the two versions of each argument. In addition, appeals were largely taken from arguments that have actually been used by each side.

Subjects were also asked to complete two personality measures, the Just World scale and the Environmental Attitudes scale, and to indicate their sex. The Just World scale was developed by Rubin and Peplau (1975) to measure the Belief in a Just World, the tendency to believe that the world is a fair place. The Environmental Attitudes Scale (EAS) was developed by Thompson and Barton (1992). It generates three subscales: ecocentric attitudes (a valuation of nature for its own sake), anthropocentric attitudes (a valuing of nature for the ways in which it can benefit humanity), and environmental apathy. The EAS has been shown to have good internal reliability and to do a better job of predicting environmental behaviors than the older Environmental Concern Scale (Thompson & Barton, 1992).

Results and Discussion

As initial analyses showed no differences on any of the dependent variables or subject variables due to testing session and method of payment, the groups were combined for all the main analyses. A multivariate analysis of variance was then conducted to examine the effects of experimental condition (pro- or anti- environment), type of justice argument (procedural justice, equal access, equal sacrifice, rights, or responsibility), and type of rating (strength of argument or

20

al c

Clayton

Pro-environment

" Procedure Eq. Access Rights Respons. Eq. Sacrifice

Type of Justice Argument

FIG. I . Rated strength of different justice appeals in pro- and anti-environmental conditions

agreement with the argument) on the dependent variables. Results are illustrated in Figures 1 and 2.

An overall effect of experimental condition was found: the pro-environmental arguments were generally given higher ratings than the anti-environmental arguments ( F [ 1,981 = 36.04, p < .OOl). Univariate tests showed that this was true for both dependent variables. This may indicate agreement with an environmen-

I Pro-environment 6 c

C al

5 5

g 3

p 8

z4 .- 5 iz

E

1

n v Procedure Eq. Access Rights Respons. Eq. Sacrifice

Type of Justice Argument

FIG. 2. Rated agreement with different justice appeals in pro- and anti-environmental conditions.


talist position, or perhaps simply that the position is socially desirable; a recent Roper poll found that 85% of respondents thought environmentalism was “in” and only 7% thought that it was “out” (‘‘What’s out. . .”, 1991). There was also an interaction between condition and type of rating, with the condition effect similar but stronger when subjects were indicating their agreement compared to when they were evaluating the strength of the argument (F[ 1,981 = 63.48, p < .001). This may show that subjects were trying to be objective and overcome their conscious biases in evaluating argument strength, but felt that their opinions were more relevant when evaluating their agreement with the arguments.

An overall effect of type of argument was found: procedural justice was rated highest, followed by rights. Equal access, equal sacrifice, and responsibility were all rated lower (F[4,392] = 6.36, p < ,001). The high rating for procedure accords with results previously found (e.g., Tyler, 1987).

The interaction between experimental condition and argument type was not found overall. There was, however, a three-way interaction between condition, argument, and dependent variable (F[4,392] = 8 . 7 3 , ~ < .001). Univariate tests showed that the expected condition X argument effect was found only for agreement with the argument (F[4,364] = 6.16, p < .001). Pro-environmental arguments always generated higher agreement than the anti-environmental arguments, but the difference due to condition was smaller for procedural justice and equal access. Responsibility and equal sacrifice elicited a fairly high level of agreement for the pro-environmental cause, and a relatively low level of agreement for the anti-environmental cause. These principles of justice were expected to tap into a macrojustice orientation and thus to be more compelling when used to advocate the environmental position. The reverse finding, that microjustice principles would be more convincing when used in an anti-environmental argument, was overwhelmed by the main effect of preference for the pro- environmental position; but the difference between conditions was much smaller for the main microjustice principle, that of procedural justice.

The rights argument received the highest level of agreement in the pro- environmental condition but only a moderate level in the anti-environmental condition. This suggests that it was not behaving, as expected, like a microjustice principle-in other words, it was not a more congenial argument to an anti- environmentalist position. In a public hearing on a wildlife protection ordinance, Cvetkovich and Earle (this issue) found that both opponents and proponents of the ordinance frequently made reference to property rights. Thus rights seem to be a generally popular basis for constructing an argument.

There were no effects of sex or of belief in a just world on any of the dependent variables. Men (mean = 19.3) did score significantly higher than women (mean = 15.3) on the apathy subscale of the EAS, and the sex difference on the ecocentric subscale approached significance (men = 48.3, women = 50.5; p < .06). Sex differences are not consistently found, but when they are,

22 Clayton

they tend to show a higher level of environmental concern among women (cf. Stem & Dietz, this issue). Thus these results are probably fairly representative. Belief in a just world was positively correlated with the anthropocentrism subscale of the EAS ( r = .25, p < .05), suggesting that this particular faith in justice is restricted to justice for humans.

Rating of the strength of the procedural argument was positively correlated with the ecocentrism subscale of the EAS and negatively correlated with the apathy subscale, regardless of experimental condition (although the correlations were only significant in the anti-environmental condition). Agreement with the procedural argument was also positive correlated with ecocentrism, but the cor- relation with apathy was significantly more negative in the pro-environmental condition than in the anti-environmental condition. Rated strength of the rights argument was negatively correlated with apathy regardless of condition. Thus, unexpectedly, an environmental attitude was related to a concern with procedural justice, and not being apathetic about the environment was related to concern for both procedural justice and rights.

Rated agreement with the equal opportunity, rights, responsibility, and equal sacrifice arguments was positively correlated with ecocentrism and negatively correlated with apathy in the pro-environmental condition, while the reverse was true in the anti-environmental condition. Significant correlations are shown in Table 2. In addition, agreement with the equal opportunity, responsibility, and equal sacrifice arguments was positively correlated with anthropocentrism in the anti-environmental condition and negatively correlated in the pro- environmental condition. The difference between the correlations in the two conditions was significant.

These differences between conditions suggest that environmental attitudes typically are more predictive of response to an argument on a particular position than of overall response to that argument-that equal opportunity will be a more compelling argument to environmentalists when argued in favor of environmental protection than when framed in opposition to such protection. Although it was expected that macrojustice principles would be more congenial to ecocentric individuals than to anthropocentric or apathetic ones, the effect of EAS mostly seemed to be limited to guiding pro- or anti-environmental position rather than preference for type of argument. The mean for the ecocentric subscale was, however, quite high. It may be that a greater range of scores is necessary to illustrate the relationship between EAS and agreement with different types of justice.

Concluding Comments

Three questions were raised in the introduction in regard to how individuals respond to justice appeals in the environmental debate: did type of justice matter;

6

Table 2. Correlations Between EAS and Dependent Variables

Pro-environmental condition Anti-environmental condition

Ecocentrism Apathy Anthropocentrism Ecocentrism Apathy Anthropocentrism

Procedure .25 -.I6 .08

Procedure .40* -.43*+ - .04 (strength)

(agreement) Rights (strength) .21 - .25 - .05 Rights .31*+ -.41*+ - .01

(agreement)

(agreement)

(agreement)

(agreement)

Equal opportunity .19+ - .40* + -.13+

Responsibility .34*+ -.51*+ -.28+

Equal sacrifice .lo+ - .05 + -.11+

.34* -.34*

.14 -.06+

.11 -.28* -.11+ .06+

-.28+ .25+

-.20+ .22+

-.37*+ .30*+

.01

.I1

-.I6 .05

.26+

.32*+

.35*+

Note. Only dependent variables for which some of the correlations with the EAS were significant are shown. +Difference between correlations in the two conditions is significant. *p < .05.

24 Clayton

did type of justice interact with position; and did type of justice interact with individual differences. In this study, it seems as if the following factors affect subjects’ endorsement of justice-related appeals, in descending order of importance. First, what position is being advocated; hence the preference for pro- environmental arguments. Second, how intrinsically appealing is the type of justice described. The study did show a main effect for preference for different models of justice, with procedural justice and rights-based appeals tending to receive higher ratings than equal access, responsibility, or equal sacrifice. This may be due to exposure to this type of argument. It could be argued, also, that responsibility and equal sacrifice receive poor ratings because they are more unpleasant, with the potential of negative implications for the subject’s own way of life; however, the negative implications are stronger in the pro-environmental condition, and the arguments were actually rated higher in this condition than in the anti-environmental condition.

Third, there was some evidence that the pro- and anti-environmentalist positions were best represented by different justice principles, showing that subjects attended to the content as well as the structure of the argument, and an argument that was generally given only a moderate rating for strength (such as responsibility) could nevertheless elicit a fairly high level of agreement when used to argue a pro-environmental position and a low level when used to argue an anti-environmental position. These findings cannot be taken as conclusive. Each type of justice was represented by only a single argument in each condition, and the results may indicate responses to these specific arguments rather than to the underlying abstract justice principles. However, it is suggestive that subjects responded to arguments modelled on those actually used by each side in a way that tended to correspond to the predicted pattern of macrojustice arguments for the environment and microjustice arguments against the environment.

Fourth, relevant preexisting attitudes, in the form of the Environmental Attitudes Scale, had a small effect on the evaluation of the arguments overall, with ecocentrism positively predicting agreement with and perceived strength of a procedural argument, and apathy negatively related to agreement with and perceived strength of a procedural argument and perceived strength of a rights argument. The EAS had a stronger effect on agreement with arguments within each condition than it did in general, with high ecocentrism and low apathy predicting agreement with several of the arguments in the pro-environmental condition, while high anthropomorphism and apathy and low ecocentrism predicted agreement with arguments in the anti-environmental condition. This suggests a limiting condition on the proposition that type of justice matters in responding to an appeal: type of justice may matter, but position argued will matter more, particularly to those who already have an opinion on the point being argued.

The findings with regard to the rights argument were unexpected. It seems that rights can be argued from both a pro-environmentalist and an anti-


environmentalist position, and are equally relevant to both individual and group levels. Certainly, although anti-environmental groups have been stressing the theme of property rights, pro-environmental groups have made rights claims of their own. Many have pushed for a consideration of the right to a healthful environment as a basic human right (see, e.g., Parker, 1991). Whether or not to rely on a rights argument may constitute a fundamental schism within the environmental movement; although Leopold, as stated above, articulated the group- oriented position by promoting the biotic community (1949/ 1987), animal rights advocate Tom Regan (1 983) has criticized this position as representing “environmental facism” because it denies the intrinsic value of the individual. Cvetkovich and Earle (this issue) have also pointed out the problematic nature of rights-based arguments, which tend to be absolute and do not lend themselves to finding a compromise position.

The implications for the arguments that should be used to advance an environmental agenda are mixed. On the one hand, those who write fundraising appeals seem to be aware, at least on an intuitive level, of the public preference for procedural justice arguments. I have found, in such letters, a great deal of stress on combatting procedural injustices (Clayton, 199 1): reference is made for the need to prevent the Forest Service from “defying the public trust” and the oil companies from “[creating] a giant loophole in the existing fuel efficiency law”, or ensuring “a fair trial for the Arctic” and allowing “citizens to have a day in court to protect [the environment]”.

On the other hand, many have argued that a radical re-thinking of our society is required in order to avoid environmental disaster. Continuing to seek only individual-level justice may lead us into a social trap similar to the Prison- er’s Dilemma, in which the ultimate outcome will be worse for everybody (Winter, 1992). Roszak (1992) has criticized the environmental movement for tactics such as portraying environmental issues as conflicts between “the good guys and the bad guys”. Certainly, current fundraising letters from environmental organizations often portray a battle between good and evil, using adjectives such as shameful, vicious, greedy, destructive, despicable, bloody, and brutal to de- scribe their opponents (see Clayton, 199 1). Instead, Roszak suggests, environmentalists need to move toward a positive vision of interconnectedness as a motivation for environmental action. The high level of support found in this study for macro-level principles in the service of environmentalist positions, even if it does not reach the support for procedural justice, suggests that people are beginning to recognize the legitimacy and necessity of alternative ways of defining justice.

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Paper presented at the annual meeting of the American Rychological Association, Washing- ton, DC.

146.

SUSAN CLAYTON is currently Assistant Professor of Psychology at the Col- lege of Wooster. She received her Ph.D in social psychology from Yale Univer- sity. Her research interests are injustice and in psychological reactions to specific social issues. Her recent book (with Faye Crosby), Justice, Gender, and Afirma- tive Action, won an Outstanding Book Award from the Gustavus Myers Center for the Study of Human Rights. She also co-edited, with Crosby, a previous issue of the Journal of Social Issues entitled “Social Issues and Personal Life: The Search for Connections” (1986).

appeals to justice in the environmental debate

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