antonius c. g. m. robben_combat motivation, fear and terror in twentieth-century argentinian warfare

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Combat Motivation, Fear and Terror in Twentieth-Century Argentinian Warfare Author(s): Antonius C. G. M. Robben Source: Journal of Contemporary History, Vol. 41, No. 2 (Apr., 2006), pp. 357-377Published by: Sage Publications, Ltd.Stable URL: http://www.jstor.org/stable/30036390Accessed: 13-10-2015 02:24 UTC

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Journal of Contemporary History Copyright @ 2006 SAGE Publications, London, Thousand Oaks, CA and New Delhi, Vol 41(2), 357-377. ISSN 0022-0094. DOI: 10.1 177/0022009406062073

Antonius C.G.M. Robben

Combat Motivation, Fear and Terror in Twentieth-century Argentinian Warfare

This article focuses on combat motivation in two Argentinian wars: one domestic against a guerrilla insurgency and the other international against foreign troops. The willingness to fight one's fellow citizens in face-to-face combat with small fire arms is quite different from battling foreign profes- sional forces on unfamiliar terrain with high-tech armament.' Despite these

differences, the two wars were historically, politically and culturally related. Both wars were waged by largely the same field officers and started by a military regime with intense convictions about the integrity of Argentinian culture, territory and nation, a strong sense of martial honour, and an exaggerated belief in its historical mission.

The Falklands war had all the characteristics of a classic confrontation between two military forces, but the brutal assault by the Argentinian military on guerrilla insurgents and the country's political opposition is harder to

qualify as war. The disappearance of around 10,000 citizens, the forced

adoption of over 200 babies, and the torture of tens of thousands of unarmed civilians can more appropriately be called state terrorism. Most deaths were not caused by combat but by execution. Be this as it may, there were many armed confrontations between military personnel and guerrilla combatants, even though the odds were often uneven. Counter-insurgency warfare and state terrorism are distinct ways of using military force, although in Argentina they partly overlapped. Torture and terror were considered the most effective ways to combat insurgents as well as unarmed political opponents. Here, I will focus exclusively on the 1975-80 counter-insurgency war between the Argentinian military and the guerrilla insurgents for the sake of a better

This article was made possible thanks to a research fellowship in 2004 from the David Rockefeller Center for Latin American Studies at Harvard University. I am grateful to Catherine Merridale for

inviting me to the Culture and Combat Motivation workshop at King's College, Cambridge, and would like to thank Inga Huld Markan, William O'Reilly and Emma Rothschild for the hospital- ity offered by the Centre for History and Economics. I am indebted to Catherine Merridale, the

participants, and two anonymous reviewers for their helpful editorial suggestions.

1 This article does not discuss the British side of the Falklands war. For accounts by British com-

batants, see Max Arthur, Above All, Courage: The Falklands Front Line: First-Hand Accounts

(London 1985); Iain Dale, Memories of the Falklands (London 2002); John Lawrence and Robert Lawrence MC, When the Fighting is Over. A Personal Story of the Battle for Tumbledown Mountain and its Aftermath (London 1988); Nick Vaux, Take That Hill! Royal Marines in the Falklands War (Washington, DC 1986).



358 Journal of Contemporary History Vol 41 No 2

comparison with the 1982 Falklands war, while leaving aside the state terrorism against civilians which I have analysed extensively elsewhere.2

An analysis of the combat motivation of the Argentinian military in the counter-insurgency and Falklands war needs to pay some attention to the adversary's willingness to fight. The revolutionary objectives of the guerrillas and their hatred towards the Argentinian military affected the combat motivation of the military and turned revenge into an important motivating force. With respect to the Falklands war, the Argentinians feared the professionalism of the British forces, and made them emphasize valour and honour in combat.

A comparison of these two wars makes it possible to disentangle context from combat so that the willingness of Argentinian troops to enter into war is distinguished analytically from their motivation to actually fire and fight. Combat and context are, of course, related because troops need to be properly inspired, trained and equipped to be able to fight. However, such preparation quickly loses its motivational force in actual combat when other factors take over. The context resurfaces again in between battles when combatants have time to reflect on their harrowing ordeal and ponder whether they are still motivated enough to get up and fight another round.

The context of the two wars consisted of the cause of war, ideology, civilian support, type of warfare, training, weaponry and the enemy definition. These factors framed the actual combat, understood here as 'a threatening situation of extreme stress and uncertainty (the chaos or "fog" of battle) in which units (combinations of soldiers, lethal equipment, and drills) under the command of officers perform their assigned tasks by mastering their emotions'.3 Actual combat was influenced by fear, revenge, self- and overconfidence, valour, honour, loyalty, as well as camaraderie, unit cohesion and esprit de corps.

One strong indication of combat motivation is the soldier's willingness to shoot at the enemy. There is no information about the firing rates of Argentinian guerrillas and military during the counter-insurgency war. British surveys about the Falklands war suggest that the modern trained British forces had considerably higher firing rates than the traditionally trained Argentinian infantrymen, while Argentinian snipers, machine-gunners, and the well- trained special forces did much better than regular soldiers.' Superior military training and conditioning are, of course, essential to combat motivation, but cannot explain why inferior forces still win wars, how motivation fluctuates from one battle to the next, or what makes troops willing to enter into combat in the first place. Firing rates need to be supplemented with qualitative evidence about combat motivation.

The qualitative data have been extracted from interviews, diaries, letters, reports, communications and combatant accounts. How reliable are these

2 Antonius C.G.M. Robben, Political Violence and Trauma in Argentina (Philadelphia, PA 2005). 3 Eyal Ben-Ari, Mastering Soldiers. Conflict, Emotions, and the Enemy in an Israeli Military Unit (New York 1998), 47. 4 Dave Grossman, On Killing. The Psychological Cost of Learning to Kill in War and Society (Boston, MA 1996), 258.



Robben: Combat Motivation, Fear and Terror in Argentina 359

sources? They cannot be taken at face value because most of them were written between 1982 and 1986 at a time of trials against the deposed junta commanders, hundreds of indictments against military officers accused of human rights violations, the exhumation of mass graves and the testimonies of torture victims. Public opinion had turned against the military, deriding them for only being capable of torturing defenceless civilians in a dirty war, while not being man enough to fight a real war.' Still, the preparation for both wars can be distilled reliably from contemporary newspapers, public speeches, and secret documents and coded communications made public during the trials. Combat accounts are always written after the fighting has died down and are therefore the most problematic source. They suffer inevitably from the bias of

hindsight, the suppression of shameful moments, the limitation of translating experience into narrative, and an unbridgeable gap between the stressful chaos of war and the tranquillity of peacetime contemplation. The consulted

Argentinian sources, including a few diaries and several interviews, were varied enough to provide a good-enough impression about combat motivation in both wars.

The 1975-80 counter-insurgency war of the Argentinian armed forces against the guerrilla insurgency was preceded by 30 years of political conflict and occasional violent clashes within Argentinian society. The rise to national

power of the populist leader Juan Domingo Per6n in 1945 heralded a political emancipation of the Argentinian working class which worried the middle classes. Per6n mobilized the workers for his political movement by giving them

dignity and power, and improving labour conditions and social services, but he alienated the middle classes through a bitter conflict with the Catholic Church and his growing authoritarianism. The opposition gathered strength when numerous military officers became disenchanted with Per6n and finally overthrew him in 1955 in a military coup. The working class responded with sabotage, while officers loyal to Per6n attempted a military rebellion in 1956 that was quickly repressed. Worker resistance continued through the late 1950s but petered out when the military handed power to a civilian government in 1958, and pragmatic Peronist union leaders struck deals with business and government during the first half of the 1960s.6

The political climate deteriorated in 1966 after a military coup d'etat was

staged to prevent Peronist politicians from gaining too much power after several electoral victories in 1965 and 1966. Two tiny guerrilla insurgencies tried to capitalize on this unrest but quickly ended in failure. Their timing was not right because the Peronists were still pursuing a political rather than an

5 CJE (Comando en Jefe del Ejercito), Directiva del Comandante en Jefe del Ejercito no. 704/83

(Operaciones del Ejercito en el Marco Interno), 21 March 1983, 5(anexo), 2-3. 6 Daniel James, Resistance and Integration. Peronism and the Argentine Working Class. 1946- 1976 (Cambridge 1988).




armed strategy to gain power. This all changed in 1969. The Peronists had now exhausted all means (negotiations, elections, sabotage, strikes, protest marches) to participate in the country's political process. The political dis- enfranchisement of the Peronist movement, worsening labour conditions, the curtailment of cultural expression and free speech, together with a world-wide spirit of rebellion, resulted in a series of violent mass mobilizations and the rise of guerrilla organizations whose members believed that a maturing class consciousness had made Argentina ripe for a social revolution.

The Argentinian military had been preparing themselves for this dreaded moment. The 1959 Cuban revolution, Ernesto Guevara's ill-fated 1966-67 Bolivian adventure, the two small guerrilla insurgencies in Argentina and the covert guerrilla training of Argentinians in Cuba during the mid-1960s had made the Argentinian military wary about the chances of a revolutionary insurgency. About a dozen Marxist and Peronist guerrilla organizations carried out more than 1500 armed actions between 1969 and 1972. The protest crowds and guerrilla insurgents forced the military junta to call for free elections and allow Per6n's return to power in 1973. The escalating violence of the 1970s was thus not caused only by a violent confrontation of armed forces and guerrilla organizations, but emerged from a deteriorating political struggle within Argentinian society as a whole.

The Marxist and Peronist guerrilla organizations refused to demobilize after the 1973 elections, trying to force President Per6n to take a more radical political direction. Per6n's death in July 1974 and the rise to the presidency of his widow Maria Estela Martinez de Per6n were the start of an increasingly violent confrontation between right-wing Peronist death squads and left-wing Peronist guerrilla organizations as well as armed operations against the military by the Marxist guerrilla forces. By 1975 the Argentinian military and the guerrilla commanders were convinced that the country was on the brink of civil war. The armed forces decided to go on the offensive after receiving the green light from the Argentinian government. This counter-insurgency war received little open public support, even though the 1976 coup d'etat was approved by broad layers of a population worn down by years of political chaos and violence.

The junta that took power on 24 March 1976 regarded a victory over the guerrilla insurgency as only one step in a process of national reconstruction and cultural salvation. Determined to stamp out all nationalist political thought and end the economic protectionism that in their eyes had thwarted Argentina's progress, they combined a liberal free-market ideology with an authoritarian political model and a conservative cultural agenda. The preser- vation of what they saw as a national cultural heritage was of considerable ideological importance. This legacy was manifested in paternal authority, private property, a catholic tradition and the nuclear family as a cornerstone of society, the very characteristics of Argentinian society which the guerrillas were allegedly wanting to abolish. According to the military, the nation was under attack from a guerrilla force with an atheist communist ideology and




supported by foreign interests intent on taking control of Argentina's vast human and natural resources. The commanders mirrored themselves in the achievements of their nineteenth-century military predecessors who shaped the

Republic, wrote a national constitution, founded Congress, and stimulated the export economy, while self-servingly ignoring the fact that the nation-

building process had been the accomplishment of Argentinian society as a whole, civilian as well as military. This foundational period of Argentinian history is known as the National Organization and the military junta named its own project, therefore, the Process of National Reorganization.7 President Videla saw himself as a national saviour who demanded the full support of his

troops for a ruthless war in which 'nothing more and nothing less than the national being was at stake'.8

Religious faith was believed to be essential in motivating troops to fight a

counter-insurgency war, according to General Acdel Vilas:

The conventional Army must be adapted to the fight against subversion, not just its

techniques and procedures, but also the morale and spirit of the troops engaged or soon to come into action. As a result, a 'winning mystique' must be created that makes them feel that

they are participating in a real war impregnated with national feeling, in defence of

Argentinian principles that we inherited from our ancestors; this will stimulate their courage until reaching the precise share of sacrifice that will be demanded of them.'

In 1976, the conservative Catholic Major Mohamed Ali Seineldin was asked to instil such a fighting spirit in the Federal Police and army personnel. A more conscious awareness of personal faith and a collective religious identity were assumed to strengthen the willingness to sacrifice one's life in combat.

The guerrilla commanders had their own concerns about motivating their combatants. What was religion for the military was ideology for the guerrillas. The Marxist guerrilla commanders urged their cadres to study Marx, Engels, Lenin, Mao and Giap to improve their ideological formation.'0 They also recommended romanticized accounts from the second world war, the Cuban revolution and the Algerian and Vietnam wars to instil a spirit of sacrifice, unwavering belief in one's ability, fearlessness in sight of the enemy and a love of battle. Whereas the Marxist guerrillas spoke of combat motivation in the service of a social revolution that would lead to an inevitable victory of the proletariat, the Peronist guerrilla commanders appealed to past glories and a

mystique of invincibility. The latter referred to the worker resistance against

7 Juan E. Corradi, The Fitful Republic. Economy, Society, and Politics in Argentina (Boulder, CO 1985), 24-30; John Lynch, 'From Independence to National Organization' in Leslie Bethell

(ed.), Argentina since Independence (Cambridge 1993), 38-46; Oscar Oszlak, La formacion del estado argentino (Buenos Aires 1990), 45-84; David Rock, Argentina, 1516-1987. From Spanish Colonization to Alfonsin (Berkeley, CA 1987), 120-6. 8 Cited in La Nacion, 14 December 1976. 9 Acdel Edgardo Vilas, 'Reflexiones sobre la guerra subversiva', Revista de la Escuela Superior de Guerra, 54, 427 (1976), 10. 10 Boletin Interno, 72 (December 1974), 1.




the military who ousted Per6n in 1955, and ended in Per6n's return to power in 1973. The Peronist guerrillas tried to instil this legacy to 'achieve a revolutionary mystique', which meant to understand 'the need for this fight and the justice of its objectives, the faith in the final triumph, and the sacrifice for an ideal'."

A strong contextual influence on the combat motivation of military and guerrillas came from reprisal killings, kidnappings and assassinations. The Marxist guerrilla organization People's Revolutionary Army or ERP (Ejercito Revolucionario del Pueblo) accused the military in 1974 of the summary execution of captured combatants, and announced that it would carry out reprisal killings to force the military to abide by the Geneva Conventions.12 However, the vengeance killings rebounded on the combatants by making the military more eager to fight them. The incarceration of abducted officers in people's prisons did the rest. The appearance of the emaciated body of an army officer in August 1975 affected the military deeply, and made them eager to root out the guerrilla insurgency, by whatever means necessary.

An even greater motivating force to enter into combat was the threat to family and home. The flyers distributed to teach military families preventive measures raised rather than diminished the general anxiety. The assassination of an army captain and his three-year-old daughter in December 1974 sent shivers through all officer ranks and strengthened their combat motivation.

The families of Argentinian insurgents were also in danger. The guerrilla commanders had no way of foreseeing the disappearance of more than 10,000 people, but they were aware of the risks to relatives and friends. This was the price of a social revolution they were willing to pay to save many more from hunger and exploitation. Individuals were dispensable in the tragedy of revolution, even if those persons were one's father, son and wife.

All parties were eager to enter into operations by 1975. The increased guerrilla attacks on military installations and officers, noted a 1975 battle plan, 'have created strong aggressive feelings among the troops which translate into a desire to operate against the enemy'.13 The guerrilla organizations were equally motivated. 'Glorious days are awaiting us', so wrote Commander Mario Roberto Santucho jubilantly in late March 1975. 'The Argentinian revolutionaries are willing happily to shed the last drop of their blood to win the happiness which our people need and deserve. This is the road to victory.'14 Whether these two quotes reflect the combat motivation of ordinary soldiers and combatants remains to be seen, but both guerrilla and military commanders had effectively convinced their troops that the cause of war was just, the historical situation ripe, and the political and military necessity urgent.

This battle readiness was tested in February 1975 when the Argentinian

11 Evita Montonera, 3 (1975), 25. 12 Estrella Roja, 40 (1974), 2; El Combatiente, 137 (1974), 2. 13 CGE (Comandante General del Ejercito), Plan de Acci6n Sicol6gica No. 1/75 (Apoyo Problema Independencia), 5 February 1975, 2. 14 El Combatiente, 160 (1975), 2.




military began a counter-insurgency campaign against a rural front of around 100 Marxist guerrillas. The army isolated the insurgents from their support structure in the villages and towns of Tucuman province, while slowly increasing their counter-offensive with ambushes and rapid forays into enemy territory. As many officers and NCOs as possible were given a tour of duty to initiate the troops in counter-insurgency warfare.

A similar rotation system was used among the military assigned to cities and industrial zones. Officers and NCOs were assigned to task groups which

operated in demarcated areas. About half a dozen areas made up one subzone, while four to five subzones comprised one defence zone. Argentina had been divided into five defence zones with an army corps commander at the helm of each zone. This grid pattern gave great operational freedom to the task

groups, allowing them to act on the spur of the moment without having to wait for orders from higher up. The combat motivation was therefore high, also because the physical risks were small. Operations against suspected armed combatants were backed by regular army troops, air support surveyed the

target or dropped explosive devices, while the task groups entered with a

superiority of men and fire power. The determination to stamp out the threat to family, property and Argentinian national culture was great among the

military. The first battle between army troops and guerrilla forces took place on 14

February 1975. A combat unit of ten was suddenly shot at from behind by a

group of 15-20 guerrillas. The corporal fell to the ground seriously wounded. A first lieutenant ran to his aid and was mortally wounded. An account

published to motivate the troops described how the remaining lieutenant, 'paralysed and stretched out on the ground, manages in a desperate move - which proves his combative capacity, will and valour - to throw a hand

grenade and succeed in knocking down one [guerrilla] who was escaping'.15 The wounded corporal joined his lieutenant in returning fire before helicopter support arrived to disperse the guerrillas. This baptism of fire was regarded as the army's first experience with 'a new war. Different. Strange. Maybe the

military instruction that was received did not prepare the troops for all these new demands.''6

The combat situation enhanced group cohesion, which was an important motivating force in the counter-insurgency war. The combat platoons combed the bush in Tucuman, slept in makeshift shelters and could only rely on each other when trapped in an ambush. Likewise, the task groups hunting urban

guerrillas were close-knit units of a dozen men who were together day and night, abducted combatants and civilians, engaged in psychologically dis- turbing but socially bonding torture practices, and expanded the counter- insurgency warfare into state terrorism.

Revenge was a great motivating force for the Argentinian military and

15 CJE (Comando en Jefe del Ej6rcito), El Eje'rcito de Hoy (Buenos Aires 1976), 43. 16 Ibid., 44.




police because the enemies were not foreign soldiers carrying out their profes- sional duties, but fellow-Argentinians believed to endanger their comrades, families and whole way of life. One officer told a captured guerrilla in late 1977: 'And what were you thinking, that we were going to do nothing while almost every year of graduates of the Military Academy suffered casualties?'" One police officer was determined to find the four guerrillas who had assassi- nated his wife by booby-trapping her car. He volunteered for particularly dangerous missions, willing to risk his life in pursuit of revenge.18

There was also a more diffuse level of revenge contributing to combat motivation. This was revenge for the violence inflicted on Argentinian society. The guerrilla organizations were held responsible for destroying the Argentina of the Sunday afternoons with family and friends, the barbecues, evening strolls and holiday outings. There was revenge for the permanent threat to their loved ones, for the 'dirty work' they were forced to carry out, such as torturing and executing captives. Several officers told me that they had resented carrying out the tasks ordered by their superiors. Trained in conventional warfare, they had been obliged to fight an intelligence war against an invisible enemy.

Taking into consideration the ideological and historical motivation, the physical and mental preparation, the patriotic and religious fervour, the cohesion, esprit de corps and comradeship, and finally the strong feelings of revenge, how did the Argentinian military and guerrillas hold up under enemy fire in the counter-insurgency war of 1975-80?

The counter-insurgency war was waged by platoons, special forces and intelligence units from the armed and security forces against Argentinian guerrilla combatants organized in cell-type structures. Guerrilla combatants were hunted down in search-and-destroy missions by small units using rifles, machine guns and hand grenades, either in the sparsely populated Andean foothills of Tucumain province or in major cities and industrial belts. The weaponry played a minor role in affecting combat motivation, although the superior firepower of the Argentinian military was decisive in armed confrontations with guerrilla combatants. In 1976, the Argentinian guerrilla organizations were expecting the army to seal off entire neighbourhoods in search of combatants, as had happened in Chile in 1973. 'But what did they do?' asks former Peronist guerrilla Ernesto Jauretche.

They launched a war technology that was totally unknown to us. They launched those famous pickup trucks in the street, the ones that had six soldiers in the back, one of whom

operated a MAG, a MAG-30 machine gun which is something terrifying; the other five with a FAL rifle; in front an NCO with a machine gun and grenades, and a driver. Every contact of one of our vehicles with one of theirs was four deaths for us .... We disappeared from the street very soon because the combat was totally uneven."'9

17 Cited in Juan Gasparini, Montoneros: Final de Cuentas (Buenos Aires 1988), 125. 18 El Diario del Juicio, 14 (1985), 304. 19 Interview with Ernesto Jauretche, 20 April 1991.




Terror rather than superior firepower was the crucial weapon in Argentinian counter-insurgency warfare and disappearance the preferred means. Terror was regarded as a rational military strategy.

The first victory is achieved by instilling fear in the adversary. Thus, one task of the forces of order consists of instilling such fear among the guerrillas. Fear leads to mistrust and mistrust leads to uncertainty .... One loses fear when one knows its cause. This cause must therefore always remain hidden, must constantly change if possible, and must in all cases be part of

reality.20

The inability to discover how, when and why comrades had disappeared, and whether or not they were collaborating voluntarily with or had been forced to talk to the military during brutal interrogations, was highly demotivating to guerrilla combatants.

How motivated in combat did the military remain after they began Opera- tion Independence in Tucuman province in February 1975? By October 1975 the guerrillas were permanently on the move. One army source stated that the soldiers were hunting them with an intense desire for combat. 'Life hardly counts anymore. It matters little to lose or preserve it. One wants to enter into combat. One longs for combat. But one wants it now and once and for all, because the hope and nervousness do as much damage as what could be inflicted by the bullets of the others.'2' There were 15 confrontations in October 1975 in which 40 guerrillas died.

The Revolutionary People's Army (ERP) tried to encourage its combatants to continue fighting by arguing after the March 1976 coup d'etat: 'A stage of generalized civil war will open up, allowing for the massive flow of the people to the armed resistance.'22 In the meantime, the number of new recruits dwindled rapidly and the armed forces abducted ERP sympathizers in large numbers. The ERP commanders continued to try to boost morale by declaring that imaginary troops were coming to the rescue: 'Thousands and thousands of men and women throughout our fatherland will march to swell the revolutionary ranks, reinforcing and creating new guerrilla units .... '23

The Peronist Montoneros, the other main Argentinian guerrilla organization, did not fare much better. They had not tried to set up a liberated rural zone but had dedicated themselves to urban guerrilla warfare. Their ruthless persecution by task groups forced them to move from shelter to shelter, while trying to maintain contact with their organization. The guerrillas continued to inflict casualties on the Argentinian military, more as revenge for their dead comrades than as a way to win the war. Fighting a losing battle could lead to total passiveness and profound disillusionment, as was to be the case among

20 Juan Jose Masi, 'Lucha contra la subversi6n', Revista de la Escuela Superior de Guerra, 45, 373 (1967), 80. 21 CJE, El Ejercito de Hoy, op. cit., 69. 22 Estrella Roja, 73 (1976), 2. 23 Ibid., 3.




Argentinian soldiers in the Falklands war, but it could also lead to seething anger, hatred and a dogged determination to continue fighting.

Still, the tireless task groups gave no quarter to the hunted guerrillas. Surviving Montoneros became completely disheartened by the abductions.

'Everything produced an impressive demoralization in the heart of the organization. One couldn't walk in the street, nobody knew where it was safe because even your own comrades were informers.'24 The Marxist guerrillas had the same experience: 'Survivors search one another out, they meet in the street, check certain bars and cross certain squares and specific streets at specific hours; everyone has his reference points and resorts to them driven by the need to know, to meet each other, and talk with others about the disaster.'25

Combat in the 1975-80 counter-insurgency war did not end with capture or surrender because of the strategic decision to use terror and torture as short cuts to victory. The zeal to annihilate the guerrillas caused the counter-

insurgency war to deteriorate into a ruthless repression that dovetailed with the state terrorism inflicted on the civilian political opposition. The inhuman treatment of captives was glaring and has been analysed by me elsewhere, 26

but its effect on the combat motivation of the military has never been studied. I suspect that morale becomes difficult to maintain under such extreme con-

ditions, if not shored up by strong Manichean convictions, continuous demonization and dehumanizing practices.27

Surprisingly enough, both the guerrilla organizations and the Argentinian military regarded torture as the continuation of combat in another theatre of

operations. Intelligence, rather than the conquest of territory, was the crux of this counter-insurgency war. Torture was seen as necessary to extract information and as a means to break the enemy's will to fight. Aware of the brutal interrogation practices, Argentinian guerrilla commanders tried to motivate their members to resist torture. Silence was regarded as a victory over the enemy, and a boost to morale. An article of June 1975 entitled 'Torture is a Combat and It Can be Won', stated: 'Torture hurts, but it is not the pain that is unbearable but the situation and conditions in which we find ourselves.' Suggestions were made as to how to deceive interrogators with convincing story lines. 'One has to lie to and mislead the enemy; that is the way to fight them.' Guerrillas were also told to feign a cardiac arrest and exaggerate their pain to win a victory in the heart of the repressive apparatus. 'The enemy may kill, torture and abduct us, we may see comrades fall into their hands, but that doesn't mean that we lose the unbreakable will to win.'28

Tragically enough, such victory in the torture chambers for many captives entailed death rather than life. Death was a liberation from suffering rather

24 Interview with Ernesto Jauretche, 20 April 1991. 25 Rolo Diez, Los compaheros (Mexico City 1987), 102. 26 Robben, op. cit., chap. 11. 27 See Peter Watson, War on the Mind. The Military Uses and Abuses of Psychology (New York 1978), 36-9. 28 Evita Montonera, 3 (1975), 20, 23, 27.




than the end of life. 'One had to endure the suffering before an enemy who didn't give death away. The victory was to earn one's death.'29 By 1976, the torture in the military's secret detention centres had become so ferocious that resistance was impossible, and the Montonero commanders ordered their combatants to die fighting or swallow a cyanide capsule. However, the Marxist guerrillas continued to believe that resistance to torture was the mark of a true revolutionary and that the following 1974 directive was still valid: 'The high proletarian combat morale has to be demonstrated as much in the mass struggle as on the battlefield, in the torture chamber and in prison.'30

Torture, captivity and disappearances broke the morale of the guerrilla organizations or what was left of them. A 1979 internal report from the Montoneros stated that about 6000 comrades had been imprisoned between 1976 and 1978: 'Only 5 per cent of this figure fell through intelligence or by accident, the other 95 per cent were the result of direct or indirect collabora- tion.' The report attributed the general inability to withstand torture to the low combat morale and lack of faith in the success of the revolutionary war. 'This low morale before the enemy is a common denominator, not just of the Montoneros but of the members of all armed organizations in the country, because they all have one thing in common: defeat.'3'

The Marxist ERP admitted defeat in mid-1977 after the death of its princi- pal military commanders in 1976 and the flight abroad of others thereafter. The Montoneros split between February 1979 and April 1980 when two large groups broke with the Montonero leadership in exile.32 The 1982 Falklands war dealt the death blow, as the tiny organization split in two over the offer by the Montonero National Leadership to supply troops to fight the British, even

though in reality they were unable to supply even one company of combatants. The opponents argued that the military were trying to make amends for the state terrorism and regain lost support among the Argentinian people. Patriotism and betrayal stood diametrically opposed, leaving permanent scars on what remained of the Montoneros.

The Falkland Islands were seized in 1833 by the UK at a time when Argentina was embroiled in a protracted civil war. The sovereignty over the islands has been disputed ever since. The United Nations partially acknowledged Argentina's claim in 1966 with Resolution 2065, urging the two countries to enter into bilateral negotiations. These talks led to the 1968 Memorandum of

Understanding in which Great Britain accepted Argentina's sovereignty over

29 Gasparini, op. cit., 149. 30 Boletin Interno, 66 (1974), 2. 31 Cited in Gasparini, op. cit., 147, 146. The figure of 6000 comrades is deceptive because the

majority consisted of political members, not combatants. Emphasis in the original. 32 Marcelo Larraquy and Roberto Caballero, Galimberti. De Per6n a Susana (Buenos Aires 2001), 316-25; Richard Gillespie, Soldiers of Per6n. Argentina's Montoneros (Oxford 1982), 266-8.




the islands but broke off further negotiations after strong opposition from the Conservative Party, the Falkland Islands Company, and the kelpers (residents of the Falklands). A second UN resolution was passed in 1973 and in 1976 the Organisation of American States ruled in favour of Argentina. However, the British government continued to stall the talks, ending in a stalemate in February 1981 when British diplomats proposed to postpone a decision on Argentinian sovereignty over the Falkland Islands for ten years.33

The military junta felt frustrated by the failed diplomacy, especially because it was facing growing labour unrest, a faltering economy, and rising human rights protests at home. It hoped to draw public attention away from these problems and reap public support by recovering the Falkland Islands through a bold invasion. Just as the military junta intended to rebuild Argentina's foundation after the counter-insurgency war, so it sought to restore the national territory and the nation's spiritual unity through the Falklands war. The junta drew inspiration from the generals who had liberated Argentina from Spain, as their second communique on the day of the Falklands invasion made clear: 'Possessed by the same spirit and value as those who made our great Fatherland, we have to make our utmost sacrifices to attain the objective we have taken upon ourselves.'34 President Galtieri saw himself as Argentina's new liberator, on a par with 'the Liberator' Jose de San Martin who had stood up against Spanish colonial rule.

Like President Videla before him, President Galtieri regarded this war as a redemptive, if not divine, mission. And like Videla, Galtieri spoke on 2 April 1982 of the need to save the Fatherland: 'We have recovered, while protecting the national honour . . . the southern islands that form part of the legitimate right of the national patrimony. . . . The entire spiritual and material Argentinian Nation is raising itself..." Country and Nation were indivisible and one could not achieve its full potential without the other. Did the Argentinian people, the troops, and maybe even the guerrillas in exile share these motives for going to war?

The officers and conscripts needed little encouragement to join the expedi- tionary force to the Falklands. The historical claim had been inculcated since grade school, while many believed that the British government would seek a diplomatic rather than a military solution to the crisis in a South Atlantic about to enter an inhospitable winter. The feeling that Argentina would be whole again was a powerful motivating force. One pilot wrote that many comrades thought they might not return alive from their first mission, 'but we didn't doubt at all, because we knew what we were fighting for and we

33 Informe Rattenbach, El drama de Malvinas (Buenos Aires 1988), 23-36; Maria Laura San Martino de Dromi, Historia politica argentina (1955-1988) (Buenos Aires 1988), vol. 1, 400, vol. 2, 80-2, 275-80. 34 Cited in Latin American Newsletters, Guerra de las Malvinas. Partes oficiales comparativos Argentina - Gran Bretafia (Buenos Aires 1983), 14. 35 Cronica Documental de las Malvinas, 22 (1982), 526.




intended to give our life for something very great; for love of what is ours, for serving the Fatherland, for being faithful to our oath and to our principles'.36

The Falklands war was greeted with an enthusiasm which had never been displayed about the counter-insurgency war. Large crowds populated the Plaza de Mayo in Buenos Aires to cheer President Galtieri and convince US envoy Alexander Haig and Pope John Paul II of the just cause. Telethons were held at which national celebrities donated their jewellery. Politicians from left and right spoke about a historical vindication, and the slogan 'The Malvinas [Falklands] are Argentinian' was shouted throughout the country, echoing nostalgic sentiments not only about the reconquest of lost territory but also about restoring a deeply divided nation and recuperating a prosperous past.37

Similar nationalist sentiments moved the Argentinian guerrillas. In 1966 one prominent guerrilla had already hijacked a plane to the Falkland Islands where he had raised the Argentinian flag. Several commanders in exile offered to supply troops and initiate contacts with the IRA to carry out attacks in Great Britain.38 Even though one faction of the Montoneros opposed such assistance to a brutal regime that had killed and tortured their comrades, they neverthe- less embraced the historical claim over the islands.

How was the nation-wide support translated into combat motivation once the Argentinian troops landed on the Falklands? Officers began to recall the glorious victories of their regiments in the nineteenth century in an attempt to convert the patriotism of the young recruits into a heightened esprit de corps, namely the 'feelings of pride, unity of purpose, and adherence to an ideal represented by the unit'.39 The troops were encouraged to operate as an organic whole with a respect for discipline, obedience and the chain of command. It is understandable that morale dropped rapidly after British forces secured their first bridgehead because the Argentinian conscript soldiers were poorly trained and had not been under arms long enough to develop a strong esprit de corps. As one conscript observed: 'All the English soldiers had received at least three years' training. And however much patriotism you put in, you can't fight that.'40

The combat motivation of the two Argentinian commando companies, which received wide acclaim for their excellent performance, provides an interesting contrast to that of the conventional forces. The commandos were

36 Cited in Pablo Marcos Carballo, Dios y los halcones (Buenos Aires 1983), 29-30. 37 See Rosana Guber, ^Por que Malvinas? De la causa nacional a la guerra absurda (Buenos Aires 2001) for an excellent cultural analysis of the Falkland Islands in Argentinian national iden-

tity. 38 Interviews with Ernesto Jauretche, 4 May 1991, and Fernando Vaca Narvaja, 27 November 1990. 39 Anthony Kellett, 'Combat Motivation' in Gregory Belenky (ed.), Contemporary Studies in Combat Psychiatry (New York 1987), 208; Isidoro J. Ruiz Moreno, Comandos en acci6n. El

Ejercito en Malvinas (Buenos Aires 1986), 126; Hector Ruben Simeoni, Malvinas. Contrahistoria (Buenos Aires 1989), 139. 40 Daniel Kon (trans.), David Bolt Associates, Los chicos de la guerra. The Boys of the War

(London 1983), 39.




not motivated by a regimental tradition, because the Argentinian special forces

only came into being in 1964, but by their camaraderie and cohesion, namely the 'feelings of belonging and solidarity that largely occur at the primary group level (usually the section or platoon) and result from sustained inter- actions, both formal and informal, among group members on the basis of common experiences, interdependence, and shared goals and values'.41 A number of the commandos operating in the Falklands had participated in the

counter-insurgency campaign against the rural Marxist guerrillas in Tucumin province. This combat experience was acquired against an enemy of no com-

parison to the British paras, but similar tactics of surprise and mobility were needed, while group cohesion was equally important. As one commando observed: 'One only fights because one has confidence in one's own ability and that of one's comrades.'42

Special forces demand much from their men: initiative, mobility, dexterity, improvisation and endurance. Mental preparation is crucial to maximize those

qualities. One Argentinian Falklands veteran remarked that his men were motivated in combat by three sources: 'a profound faith in God, and a clear awareness of ... the values worthy of giving one's life for. But, basically, one needs dexterity, the self-confidence that allows one not just to survive but also to triumph in combat.'43 According to this officer, physical preparation is

important but mental preparation by training under duress is paramount. Religion was also significant in maintaining combat motivation, albeit only

when it enhanced group cohesion and not when it was just a manifestation of

religiosity. Routinely, soldiers expressed faith in God for a good outcome and hung rosaries around their neck for protection, leading one commando to comment that 'experience shows that the rosary is the most used weapon before entering combat'.44 The same Mohamed Ali Seineldin who had boosted the combat motivation of counter-insurgency task groups in the mid-1970s, now a lieutenant colonel and the doyen of the Argentinian special forces, was flown in to raise the combat spirit in the Falklands. He told the men to confide in the Virgin Mary and fight with faith for this just, noble and holy cause. More significant for combat motivation was the practice of one commando

company saying the rosary together daily. This collective ritual enhanced the

solidarity of the group and replenished its cohesion by expressing its sense of

community and deeply shared religious identity.4s The 1982 attack on the Falkland Islands was an exclusively military affair

with a naval invasion force, a large army battle group, and missile-equipped

41 Kellett, op. cit., 208. 42 Cited in Simeoni, op. cit., 55; see also Frederick J. Manning, 'Morale, Cohesion, and Esprit de Corps' in Reuven Gal and A. David Mangelsdorff (eds), Handbook of Military Psychology (Chichester 1991), 468. 43 Cited in Simeoni, op. cit., 55. 44 Ibid. 45 Cr6nica Documental de las Malvinas, 44 (1983), 892; Ruiz Moreno, op. cit., 307-11; Simeoni, op. cit., 139; Carlos M. Turolo, Asilucharon (Buenos Aires 1982), 286.



Robben: Combat Motivation, Fear and Terror in Argentina 37 1

fighter planes against a prominent NATO member with experienced armed forces. This armed conflict was about the conquest of an archipelago surrounded by high seas in which military technology, strategic insight and tactical skill were crucial.

The type of military hardware used by the warring parties was a crucial factor for combat motivation. A counter-insurgency war is an intelligence war in which information about the location, organization, and mobility of enemy combatants carrying small firearms is decisive. In a conventional war, strategy, tactics, movement, and especially superior weaponry are more important. The

Argentinian military were keenly aware of these differences because numerous officers had fought in both wars, facing rifles in one while sustaining artillery shells and missiles in the other. One commando observed: 'I believe that in Tucumdin we felt the way the Englishmen in the Falklands may have felt: they had at their disposal the American intelligence satellites, their base in

Ascension, and amounts of ships and helicopters.'46 Superior armament and gear, great firepower, abundant supplies, and well-

functioning logistics are important material circumstances for winning a war and increasing the combat confidence of the fighting men. The official postwar report of the Argentinian army stated that the troops were not properly equipped to wage war on the UK, lacking sufficient and suitable food, clothing and tents for the climatic circumstances. Superior communications and night vision equipment, better means of transportation and armaments as well as the

high-tech Royal Navy and Air Force prevented the Argentinians from supply- ing their troops.47 According to General Jeremy Moore, the Argentinian air force, the commandos, the artillery, and the machine-gun posts were excellent, but the infantry was poorly prepared for combat and fought without enthusiasm.48 The Argentinian command had stationed more than 10,000 conscripts in the Falklands, expecting the Thatcher government to accept this seemingly irreversible fact and initiate diplomatic negotiations.

The technical superiority of the British resulted in an effective blockade around the islands and the jamming of communications. This isolation from the mainland produced serious logistic problems and demoralized the Argentinians. After a month-long reunion, the Falkland Islands were again cut loose from a nation that had for 150 years endured its partition, and delivered the isolated troops to a forbidding climate and indecisive field commanders.49

The conscript soldiers, many coming from subtropical interior provinces, complained in their letters home about the terrible circumstances on the wind-

swept South Atlantic islands. Several officers noted that these conditions were

lowering morale. The conscripts were physically and mentally exhausted, not

following orders, and even sneaked away from their positions to steal food

46 Cited in Ruiz Moreno, op. cit., 24. 47 Comisi6n de Redacci6n, Informe Oficial del Ejercito Argentino Conflicto Malvinas. Tomo I: Desarrollo de los Acontecimientos (Buenos Aires 1983), vol. 1, 14-20. 48 Cronica Documental de las Malvinas, 45 (1982), 920. 49 Simeoni, op. cit., 89.




from the depots. Upon their return home, they had lost between six and fifteen kilos and suffered from pyorrhoea, bronchitis, eczema, diarrhoea and anaemia because of poor nutrition and hygiene, and the cold and humidity.o

The mental exhaustion of the conscripts was due to their limited training and young age, according to Argentinian army sources: 'The English soldiers counted on an extended period of operational training .... Their average age, considerably higher than that of the Argentinian soldier, put them in better condition to confront the mental pressures and physical efforts of the operations'.s1 The army report failed to mention that the Argentinian junta had left

many of its best-trained professionals on the mainland in fear of a Chilean attack. If the lack of troop rotation, the poor equipment and the immobility of most Argentinian troops are taken into consideration, then the drop in combat motivation and the physical and mental exhaustion of the conscripts become

easy to understand. Next to weaponry, the type of combat is the major difference between

conventional and counter-insurgency warfare. Much of the Falklands war consisted of long-range attacks with missiles, bombs and artillery while close-

range combat occurred only in several major infantry assaults after the Argentinian military capabilities had been severely damaged. The effects on the combat motivation of the warring parties were the downing of planes, the sinking of ships and the destruction of defensive positions.

Superior enemy firepower was one of the major causes of fear in the Falklands war. On 1 May 1982, the British air force flew a Vulcan bomber from Ascension Island to the Falklands to attack the Port Stanley airfield before dawn. One shocked Argentinian commando witnessed the assault from afar: 'It was Dantesque. My heart started pounding. We thought that this was a general attack and that they had destroyed the city: we saw a horizon, white because of the explosions, and we heard the cannons of the anti-aircraft guns.'52 A secret communication by the military governor of the Falkland Islands General Mario Men6ndez complained on 16 May 1982 about the gradual deterioration of the troops: the harsh climate and difficult terrain, the inadequate gear and the 'feeling of impotence when one sees no reaction of one's own against the enemy attacks . . . erodes the morale of troops, despite ardent action from the commanders'." The troops were mentally exhausted by intense air strikes and shelling from naval gun ships.54 The Argentinian foxhole

50 Cr6nica Documental de las Malvinas, 44 (1982), 898; Italo Angel Piaggi, Ganso Verde (Goose Green) (Buenos Aires 1986), 35, 100; Ruiz Moreno, op. cit., 195; Kon, op. cit., 73; Dalmiro Manuel Bustos, El otro frente de la guerra. Los padres de las Malvinas (Buenos Aires 1982), 94-5. 51 Comisi6n de Redacci6n, op. cit., vol. 1, 18; see also Ruiz Moreno, op. cit., 37. 52 Cited in Ruiz Moreno, op. cit., 72. 53 Comisi6n de Redacci6n, Informe Oficial del Ejercito Argentino Conflicto Malvinas. Tomo II: Abreviaturas, Anexos y Fuentes Bibliograficas (Buenos Aires 1983), vol. 2, anexos. 54 Comisi6n de Redacci6n, op. cit., vol. 1, 19; about the psychological effects of artillery shelling, see Richard Holmes, Firing Line (London 1985), 209-11, 231-3.




strategy made the troops feel like sitting ducks. One soldier remarked: 'I didn't feel afraid but yes a total lack of control. At that moment I thought about

many things, as if they happened in a movie in which I was the lead actor.'" Another soldier spoke of a roller coaster between life and death: 'There was good morale among us. But nobody abandoned the notion of death. I was

frightened, hysterical.'"6 Fear and inferior equipment did not necessarily lead to low morale, because

many troops felt that it was their duty and honour to fight. One sergeant declared: 'Holy smoke, I'm very scared but the Englishman must also be afraid, and I'm going to face him!'57 One infantry officer remarked that he and his men were fighting the battle of Goose Green as if hypnotized: 'It is like a street fight, while one hits and receives hits, one isn't aware of the pain and seems blinded, delivering blows.'58 In the heat of battle, the men neither experienced a sense of pain nor were aware of the consequences.

Combat motivation and fear differed between the three armed forces because of their different commissions. One pilot was very anxious during his flight. He sensed a dry mouth, his arms were tense and his muscles stiff, but there was no time to be afraid because all attention was absorbed by flying his fighter jet and engaging enemy aircraft.59 The pilot was completely focused on his mission: 'There's no room for emotions. There's no room for fear, neither for hate nor for memories.'60 The mission was to destroy the target, irrespec- tive of the fate of other planes. 'That's what happened to me. I saw the target, steered towards it, saw the anti-aircraft flak, and saw the boiling water. I saw a comrade fall. I proceeded. I shot. I believe I shot well. I believe that I applied everything they had taught me and escaped.'6' Part of this concentration has to do with the technical and personal demands on a pilot facing single-handed combat. As one helicopter pilot wrote in his diary on 7 May 1982: 'Under these circumstances of repeated alarm and a few airplanes that dropped their explosives nearby, one comes to know each person well: his lack of control, his courage, his egoism and his heroism .... In the beginning one fears the pain of bone splinters, of disfigurement, of bleeding to death, but later one gets used to the explosions of the aggressors coming from behind the clouds.'62

Revenge was another motivating force in the Falklands war, although not as strong as in the counter-insurgency war. The sinking of the 'General Belgrano' cruiser on 2 May 1982, causing hundreds of deaths, raised much hatred among the Argentinian forces, and helped motivate the successful attack with Exocet missiles on the destroyer 'Sheffield' several days later. The Argentinians

55 Cronica Documental de las Malvinas, 44 (1982), 895. 56 Ibid., 896. 57 Cited in Ruiz Moreno, op. cit., 196. 58 Cr6nica Documental de las Malvinas, 45 (1982), 908. 59 Cronica Documental de las Malvinas, 46 (1982), 925-9. 60 Ibid., 929; see also Carballo, op. cit., 111. 61 Cronica Documental de las Malvinas, 46 (1982), 928. 62 Cited in Carballo, op. cit., 107.




were elated and considered this a turning point in their morale, indicating that the British could be successfully attacked if the determination existed.63

However, the euphoria wore off quickly. One corporal admitted in his diary: 'Today I behaved like a coward. I took too much, simply because of fear; I'm writing this so that I can never brag about myself and I promise that I'm not going to lie by saying that I did things which I didn't do, because I don't deserve the pride my father takes in me.'64 One marine stated that he was not afraid during combat but that fear settled in when he saw the effects of war: 'How not to be afraid when one sees a man completely blown to pieces into the air by a cannon shot.'65 An officer expressed a sense of dread at the recovery of his dead comrades: 'The sight becomes unbearable when one has to pick up the mutilated corpses, some scattered limbs, obviously hit by bombs or mortar shells.'66

The physical hardship, the constant fear of falling prisoner, the danger of freezing to death and the anxiety about walking into an ambush made soldiers lose their appetite and feel discouraged. Some cried, others prayed. Such physical and mental condition led to apathy. Orders were not followed. One commando found five conscripts at an air defence artillery post in complete apathy, entirely detached from the battle raging around them. He screamed at them and then hit one in the face, but there was no reaction. Looking for cover, the commando ran to a ditch but only one soldier followed him. Another stood up and began to walk slowly as if on a stroll in the countryside, until he was beheaded by an artillery shell.67

Argentinian troops had a considerable fear of being captured by British forces. This fear must be seen in conjunction with the counter-insurgency war and its practice of torturing captives. British procedures were therefore repeat- edly misinterpreted. When one second lieutenant stretched out on the ground in an act of surrender, he feared that the British would shoot him point blank. As he was being blindfolded, he heard his soldiers scream: 'My second lieutenant! . . . ay ... ay! . . . ay!'. The officer wondered if his men were being tortured but later discovered that they had interpreted their blindfolding as a sign of their upcoming execution.68

As the Falklands war was drawing to a close, General Menendez told Presi- dent Galtieri that the Argentinian troops were exhausted, without artillery and surrounded by superior British forces. Galtieri responded: 'The Englishmen are also exhausted, Menendez. We have to stand firm, we have to drive the troops forward. Don't take them out of the ditches to retreat, but take them from the ditches to go forward. We have to counter-attack with valour.'69

63 Ruiz Moreno, op. cit., 83-4; Tuirolo, op.cit., 169. 64 Cited in Carballo, op. cit., 155. 65 Cronica Documental de las Malvinas, 47 (1982), 944. 66 Cronica Documental de las Malvinas, 45 (1982), 910; see also Kon, op. cit., 156-7. 67 Simeoni, op. cit., 18-20, 121-2. 68 Ibid., 24. 69 Cited in Ruiz Moreno, op. cit., 396.




Within hours, General Men6ndez surrendered to General Moore. And then, after 45 days of constant artillery shelling, the guns fell silent. 'It was some-

thing unreal . . . two hours of total silence seemed terrible to us, as if they weighed more. We later heard that we had surrendered.'70

The Argentinian people were baffled. Their government had told them that the Argentinian troops were standing firm and that the British forces were

incurring major losses. Collective violence erupted on 14 June 1982, and pro- testers converged on the presidential palace at the Plaza de Mayo to listen to President Galtieri's speech, scheduled for seven o'clock in the evening. Galtieri did not appear before the crowd who shouted slogans against the military. He

resigned from the presidency the next day, and was to face two trials: one for

starting the Falklands war and another for his conduct in a counter-insurgency war turned foul, thus personifying the historical, political, ideological and

operational connections between both military campaigns.

Argentinian officers, commandos and pilots want to leave the impression that they were professionally well-prepared and fought bravely in the Falklands but that the incompetent high command was responsible for the defeat. In contrast, conscript soldiers complain about their poor training, outdated weapons, in-

adequate supplies and indecisive officers, while stressing their patriotism and determination to make the best of a terrible situation.71 These contradictory renditions yield an interesting perspective on combat motivation when juxta- posed to those of the counter-insurgency war.

Military officers spoke with resentment about having had to carry out the dirty work to save the country from communism, only to receive the scorn of the Argentinian people and hear their commanders deny that they had given orders to torture and disappear the captives. A sense of betrayal runs through their accounts, leaving many veterans disillusioned about the wars they waged.

The combat motivation of the Falklands war cannot be understood in isolation from the counter-insurgency war. The Argentinian military by and large disliked the repressive measures and human rights violations of the counter- insurgency war. They regarded the Falklands war as a chance to rehabilitate their smeared reputation, and were determined to fight with valour and honour for a just historical cause. Now they could really show their worth in a clean, conventional war: a war in which they faced uniformed soldiers with their sophisticated weapons, unhampered by human rights protests, no longer burdened by the screams of hooded torture victims, away from the sordid secret detention centres, and out into the open fields of a longed-for land that they were promised would be theirs.

70 Cr6nica Documental de las Malvinas, 44 (1982), 896. 71 Kon, op. cit. and Turolo, op. cit. are representative of these opposite views. The former pre- sents the conscript soldiers as victims, while the latter depicts the officers as heroes. See Rosana Guber, De chicos a veteranos. Memorias argentinas de la guerra de Malvinas (Buenos Aires 2003) for the differences between officers and conscripts as war veterans.




The fact that many officers had fought in the counter-insurgency war is of relevance to the way they fought in the Falklands. There were repeated assur- ances that the kelpers would not be taken hostage, that captured British troops would be treated according to the Geneva Conventions, and that there was no personal hatred against the British personnel. Even the report by Lieutenant General Benjamin Rattenbach, which gave a devastating critique of President Galtieri and the Argentinian armed forces, emphasized that 'we must be proud of the nobility with which the Argentinian forces behaved . . . by not at any moment violating the norms of war . .. such as attacking non-combatants or ships and planes conducting rescue missions.'72 The contrast with a counter- insurgency war turned foul could not be greater. Whereas the British forces were fought with chivalry, 'the armed forces responded to the terrorists' crimes with a terrorism far worse than the one they were combating, and after 24 March 1976 they could count on the power and impunity of an absolute state, which they misused to abduct, torture and kill thousands of human beings.'73

The comparison of the Argentinian conventional and counter-insurgency wars yields four lessons about combat motivation. The first is that combat motivation is not purely a mental state that can be maximized through conditioning and realistic training exercises, but that it is as much a social process. This process consists of shifting motivations influenced by both contextual and combat-related factors which are experienced differently through time according to the predicament of the troops. Combat motivation fluctuates continuously according to the social, political and military circumstances of the war. The motivation of the military in 1975 was somewhat different from that in 1977 at the height of the military repression and supremacy. Likewise, the combat motivation of the Argentinian troops landing on the Falkland Islands on 2 April 1982 differed from that on 19 May 1982 when the British secured their first bridgehead at San Carlos Bay. The second lesson is that combat motivation is affected by the type of warfare. Counter-insurgency wars imply different responsibilities, combat situations and forms of engage- ment than conventional wars. The central importance of intelligence-gathering in the first and that of conquering territory in the second leads to different strategic objectives and tactical decisions. The combat motivation of the Argentinian troops in the Falklands war was more directly influenced by suc- cesses and failures on the battlefield than in the protracted counter-insurgency war whose development was much harder to gauge. The third lesson is that there is a difference between combat motivation and the motivation to go to war. The political and historical context made conscripts eager to fight for Argentinian sovereignty over the Falkland Islands but their combat motivation declined rapidly when the fighting began. This distinction between context

72 Informe Rattenbach, op. cit., 309-10. 73 CONADEP, trans. Writers and Scholars International Ltd, Nunca Mds. The Report of the

Argentine National Commission on the Disappeared (New York 1986), 1.




and combat is also relevant in explaining the discrepancies in motivation between high command and combatants. The eagerness with which the Argentinian military junta waged both wars did not run parallel to the combat motivation of their troops. Many officers felt betrayed by the junta commanders for sending them off to face the British forces without a solid battle plan and for fighting the guerrillas with unsavoury and demoralizing means, without written orders and without a proper legal framework. The final lesson is that combat motivation takes shape when the fighting dies down, when combatants try to give meaning to their intense experiences, think about the context of war and reassess their willingness to fight. In the heat of action, the combatant is so fully absorbed by the tasks at hand that the sense of it all escapes attention. Reflection only settles in after the fighting dies down and combatants determine whether combat is still meaningful enough to continue fighting for comrades, country or family.

Antonius C.G.M. Robben is Professor of Anthropology at the Department of Cultural

Anthropology, Utrecht University, the Netherlands. His most recent books are Death, Mourning, and Burial. A Cross-Cultural Reader

(Oxford 2004) and Political Violence and Trauma in Argentina (Philadelphia, PA 2005).



antonius c. g. m. robben_combat motivation, fear and terror in twentieth-century argentinian warfare

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