antiindividualism and scepticism

Anti-Individualism and Scepticism

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PhilosophersPastandPresent:SelectedEssaysBarryStroud

Printpublicationdate:2011PrintISBN-13:9780199608591PublishedtoOxfordScholarshipOnline:September2011DOI:10.1093/acprof:oso/9780199608591.001.0001

Anti-IndividualismandScepticism

BarryStroud

DOI:10.1093/acprof:oso/9780199608591.003.0014

AbstractandKeywords

Thischapterexploresthewaysthatapowerfulideaistobedevelopedintoaguaranteeagainstphilosophicalscepticismabouttheworld.TylerBurgeseeksnotonlywhathecallsa‘general’or‘transcendental’guarantee,butsomethingthatwouldjustifyperceptualknowledgeclaimsinthefaceofscepticismeveninparticularcases.Hethinksthatisachievableeventhough,inanygivencase,allofaperson'sperceptualcapacitiescouldbemistakenabouthowthingsare.Thechapterraisesquestionsaboutthatgoalandhowitistobeachieved.Isthegoaltoshowthatthegeneralpossibilityoferrorisnothreattoaperson'sknowingsomethingabouttheworldbyperceptioninaparticularcase?Orisitrathertoshownotjustthatthereisnogeneralthreatbutthatphilosophicalscepticismisactuallyfalse,sincethepersoninthecaseconsidereddoesknowbyperceptionthatthingsarethusandso?Andisthisstrongerconclusiontobereachedbyphilosophicalargument?


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Keywords:philosophicalscepticism,TylerBurge,idea,perception,philosophicalargument

Itakeanti-individualisminthiscontexttobetheviewthatwhatthoughtapersonisthinkingataparticulartimedependsinpartonthatperson'spresentandpastrelationstowhatissointheworldaroundhim.Ithinkthatideaisimmenselyimportantinunderstandingwithoutconfusionorparadoxhowhumanthoughtandexperienceasweknowthemarepossible.Thereisnotelling,sofar,justhowrichtheconsequencesofthatideawillturnouttobe.InthisessayIconsidersomeofitsapparentimplications.Whattheviewimpliesobviouslydependsonwhatitdoesanddoesnotsay,andthatinturndependsonexactlyhowitisformulatedanddefended.HereIwillenterintothosecrucialquestionsofformulationonlyasfarasIthinkIneedinordertoexaminesomeoftheverygeneralepistemologicalimplicationsofthekindofviewofperception,thought,andbeliefdefendedbyTylerBurge.IwillhaveinmindaswelltheverycloselyrelatedideasofDonaldDavidson.

Theviewthatcertainrelationsmustholdbetweenathinkerandtheworldaroundhiminorderforanythinghedoesorwhateverhappenstohimtocountashisthinkingaparticularthoughtfindsaparallelintheperhapsmorefamiliarpointthatcertainrelationsmustholdbetweenaperceiverandtheworldaroundherinorderforwhathappenstoheronaparticularoccasiontocountasherperceivingaparticularthing,orherhavingaperceptionofaparticularkind.Inthebasiccases—thosewithoutwhichwecouldnotunderstandpeopletobehavingperceptionsofcertainkindsatall—theperceptionsthatareattributedtoperceiversareperceptionsofsomethingthatissointheirperceptibleenvironment.Thisdoesnotmean,ofcourse,thateveryonealwaysperceiveswhatisthereandonlywhatisthere.Butevenwhenwemisperceiveorperceivesomeobjectorstateofaffairsthatisnotthere,ourhavingaperceptionofjustthetypewearehavingonthatoccasion(whichisinfactfalseorillusory)alsodependsonourpasthistoryandtheworldinwhichtheveryperceptualcapacitieswe(p.257) areexercisingatthemomenthavebeendevelopedandexercised.Adifferentworld,oradifferentpastforus,couldhavemeantthatwewerehavingdifferentperceptionsfromwhatwearehavingrightnow,evenifallthestimulationsatoursensorysurfacesremainedjustwhattheyareatthemoment.AsBurgeputsit,“mostperceptualrepresentations…representwhat,insomecomplexsenseof‘normally’,theynormallystemfromandareappliedto”.1

Itisnoteasytostateinsimpleandadequatetermsexactlywhatthisimpliesaboutthereliabilityofhumanperception.ButattheveryleastIthinkwecanseethatthereis,andismeanttobe,areassuringpointhere.Itisnotthatnoneofusiseverwrongorevermisperceivesanything.Itisnoteventhatnoonepersoncouldbemorewrongthanrightinperceptionoveralongperiodoftime.Buttheviewdoesrequirethatforsomeonetomisperceive,ortoperceivethingsastheyarenot,itmustbepossibleforhimorotherstoperceivethingsastheyare.Things’beingthewaytheyareperceivedasbeingisinthatsenseaconditionoftherebeingperceptionsofthingsbeingonewayratherthananotheratall.Withoutenough“normal,”thatis,veridical,perceptionsofcertainkinds,noonecouldbeunderstoodtohaveanyperceptionsofthoseoranyotherkinds,andsonoonecouldevenbeunderstoodtohavenon-veridicalorillusoryperceptions.Thereisacertainreassuranceinthethoughtthatifweask“Couldallormostoftheperceptionswe


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actuallyhavemisrepresentormisleadusaboutwhattheyinfactstemfrom?”wemustonanti-individualistgroundsanswer“No,theycouldnot.”

Burgeputsthisreassuranceatonepointbysayingthatinthecaseofperception“wearenearlyimmunefromerrorinassertingtheexistenceofourperceptualkinds,andofotherkindsthataretaughtbymoreorlessimmediateassociationwithperceptuallybasedapplications”.2Thereisaquestionhereofhow“nearlyimmunefromerror”weare,andevenwhatdifferentdegreesofimmunityamountto.ThesearesomeofthequestionsofadequateformulationImentionedatthebeginning.Theprecisecharacterandmeasureofthisimmunitydonotmatteratthispoint.Ithinkwegettheidea,anditisenoughtobegoingonwith.Letussaythat,giventheconditions(p.258) ofidentificationofperceptualexperiencesasbeingofthisorthattype,orashavingthisorthatcontent,wecouldnotbelargelywronginperception.Ourperceptionsareinlargepartperceptionsofthingsastheyare.Evenwiththescopeofpossibleerrorleftvagueinthisway,wecangoontoaskaboutthestatusofthisconclusionandaboutitsimplicationsforcertainvarietiesofscepticismaboutthesensesandabouttheempiricalworld.

Isthereassurancethisviewprovidesanadequatereassuranceagainstscepticismaboutperception?Thatwilldependonwhatscepticismis,andonwhatittakestoopposeitortoprovidereassuranceagainstit.Butifthiskindofviewdoeshaveanti-scepticalconsequencesinthecaseofperception,whatevertheymightbe,canthoseconsequencesbecarriedoverdirectly,oratleastdevelopedalongsimilarlines,toapplytobeliefandknowledgeingeneral,andsotoopposeepistemologicalscepticismeverywhere?

IamnotsurewhatBurge'sanswerstothesequestionswouldbe.HecertainlyseemstoacceptwhatIhavejustsaidaboutperception.Hethinkstheanti-individualistviewinthatcaseprovideswhathecallsa“qualifiedbasisfortheoft-repeatedsloganthaterrorpresupposesabackgroundofveridicality”.3Healsodrawsaparallelbetweentheexternalconditionsofperceptualexperiencesofcertainkindsandtheconditionsofthoughtsandbeliefsmoregenerally.Infacthethinksthepointaboutperceptioncanhelpexplainandmakeplausiblehisanti-individualisttheoryofthought;itcanbringoutthewayinwhichentertainingacertainthoughtalsohasitsconditionsinthewiderworld.Heholdsthatinbothcasesthoseexternalconditions’holdingisnotsomethingtheperceiverorthethinkerhimselfmustknow(oratleastmustknowempirically)inordertohavetheperceptionorthoughtinquestion,oreventoknowthathehasit.Thislastpointisthekeytohisaccountofself-knowledgeingeneral,orknowledgeofone'sownpsychologicalstates.

Despitethisparallel,andthefactthathethinksweare“nearlyimmunefromerror”inassertingtheexistenceofthethingsweperceive,Burgethinks,asheputsit,that“wearenotimmunefromfairlydramaticandwholesaleerrorincharacterizingthenatureoftheempiricalworld”.4Healsothinksthe“oft-repeatedsloganthat(p.259) errorpresupposesabackgroundofveridicality”is“sometimesmisused”.5Sinceheappearstocontrastthescopeofthepossibilityof“fairlydramaticandwholesaleerror”aboutthe


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empiricalworldwithournearimmunityfromerrorinthecaseofperception,thismightsuggestthathethinksthatsloganis“misused”intryingtoshowthatwecannotbelargelywronginourbeliefsabouttheworldingeneral.HeisinclinedtobelievethatQuineandDavidsoninparticular“sometimesusethisimportantidea[asexpressedintheslogan]withinsufficientdiscrimination”.6Burgeusesthatsameideahimselftoshowthatweare“nearlyimmunefromerror”inthecaseofperception.DoeshethinkthatQuineandDavidsonareindiscriminateinapplyingitmoregenerallytoallourbeliefsabouteverything,evenwellbeyondthelimitsofperception?Oristheresomeotherwayinwhichtheyarenotsufficientlydiscriminatingintheiruseofit?

Davidsondoesconcludefromwhatlookslikethesamegeneralconceptionoftheidentificationofthoughtsandbeliefs,aswellasperceptions,that,asheputsit,“mostofourbeliefsaretrue,”7eventhat“mostofourbeliefsmustbetrue”.8Hethinkstheanti-individualismthatguaranteesthetruthofmostofourbeliefs“servestorescueusfromastandardformofskepticism”9or,morecautiously,thatithaswithinit“themakingsofacogentargumentagainstsomeformsofskepticism”.10PerhapsBurgethinksthatdrawingthatoptimistic-soundingconclusiondirectlyinthatwayisaninsufficientlydiscriminatinguseoftheimportantidea.Hehimselfholds,tothecontrary,that“thereisnoeasyargumentagainstskepticismfromanti-individualismandauthoritativeself-knowledge”.11What,then,arewetomakeofBurge'sownreassuring-soundingconclusionaboutperception—thatweare“nearlyimmunefromerror”inthatcase?Ifthatcountsasanappropriatelycarefulanddiscrim-atinguseoftheideathaterrorpresupposesveridicality,doesitnot(p.260) rescueusorsaveusfromsomeformsofscepticism,atleastaboutthesensesorthethingsweperceive?Ifitisnotpossibleforallormostoftheperceptionsweunderstandourselvestohavetomisrepresentormisleadusaboutwhattheyinfactstemfrom,isthatnotanargumentagainstscepticism?

Ithink(I’mnotsureaboutthis)thatBurge'sanswerwouldbe“No”—thatthegeneralconsideration,asitstands,isnotanargument,oratleastnotaneasyargument,againstscepticism.Whynot?Idonotthinkhemeansthatalthoughscepticismaboutourperceptualbeliefshasbeenruledout,scepticismaboutbeliefsthatgobeyondwhatwecanperceiveremainsapossibility.Foronething,thatwouldseemtorequiresomesharpandlastingandthereforedubiousdistinctionbetweenwhatwecanperceivetobesoandwhatwebelieveorhypothesizeorinfertobesoonthebasisofwhatweperceive.Itisdubiousbecausesuchadistinctionseemsonthecontrarypreciselytoencouragescepticism.Itisaccordinglymorerealistictoallowthatthelimitsofwhatwecanperceivecanbegraduallymovedfurtherandfurtheroutwardasthesophisticationofourknowledgeandofourperceptualcapacitiesincreases,sothattherewouldeventuallyremainvirtuallynothingthatasufficientlyinformedandperceptivepersoncouldnotbesaidtoperceivetobesoundersomecircumstancesorother.Thatwouldmeanthatwhateverimmunityfromerrorweenjoyinperceptionisatleasttheoreticallyextendabletoeverything,orvirtuallyeverything,webelieveabouttheworld.Second,thetraditionalsourceofscepticismaboutourknowledgeoftheworldingeneral,atleastintheso-calledmodernera,hasbeenthethreatofscepticismaboutperception.Ifscepticismhadsomehowbeenblockedthere,orhadnotevengotofftheground,itisnoteasytosee


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whatwouldbeleftofscepticismaboutourknowledgeoftheworldingeneral.

IthinkBurgemustmeanthatthereassuringconclusionaboutthereliabilityofperceptiondoesnotitselfamounttoanargument,oratleastaneasyargument,againstscepticism,evenwithrespecttoourperceptualbeliefs.Scepticisminthiscontextispresumablytheviewthatwedonotknowanythingabouttheworldaroundus,orthatwehavenoreasonstobelievethethingswebelieveaboutit.Ifanargument“againstscepticism”isanargumentforthenegationofthatdoctrine,itwouldhavetoshowthatwedoknoworhavereasontobelievethethingswebelieve.IfthatiswhatBurgemeansbyanargumentagainstscepticism,thenIagreethatwhatIhavebeencallingthe(p.261) reassuranceprovidedbyanti-individualismdoesnotamounttosuchanargument.Foronething,evenifitdoesimplythatmostofourbeliefsabouttheworldaretrue,orbyandlargetrue,itdoesnotfollowthatthosetruebeliefsamounttoknowledge.ThatisapointDavidsonconcedes,althoughhecontinuestoholdthatanti-individualismnevertheless“servestorescueusfromastandardformofscepticism”.12Ithinkthedistinctionisimportant.Providingthenegationofscepticismandsoknowingthatitisfalseisnottheonlywaytobesavedfromit.

WhenBurgesays“thereisnoeasyargumentagainstskepticismfromanti-individualismandauthoritativeself-knowledge”,heisspeakinginpartaboutwhathecalls“transcendental”responses,inparticular,HilaryPutnam'sattemptinthefirstchapterofReason,Truth,andHistorytoshowthat,givenananti-individualistaccountofmeaningandbelief,evenabraininavatcouldnotbelargelywrongaboutwhatishappeninginitsenvironment.Burgethinksthoseconsiderations“donotdomuchtoundermineskepticism”.13Ifhemeansthattheydonotshowthatweknowthatwearenotbrainsinavatandsoknowwhatishappeningnowinourenvironment,Iagree.Idonotthinkavalidargumentcanbefoundwhichapersonmightdeploy,startingfromanti-individualistpremises,totakehimtotheconclusionthatheknowsheisnotabraininavat,orthatheknowsmostofthethingsheknowsabouttheworld,inawaythatrefutesphilosophicalscepticism.Butagainthequestioniswhetheranti-individualismmustbeshowntohavethatimplicationinordertohaveanti-scepticalconsequences.

Burgethinksthatwhathecalls“transcendental”responseswouldatmostprovideonly“‘general’guaranteesagainstskepticism”.14Perhapsthatiswhyhethinkstheydonotamounttoagoodargumentagainstit.Hedoesnotsaywhata“generalguaranteeagainstskepticism”isorwouldbe,orwhyitwouldnotbejustwhatwewant.Itisprettyclearlynotwhathewants.Hecontraststranscendentalresponseswithwhatheregardsasamorepromisingline,whichhesayswouldactually“justifyparticularperceptualknowledgeclaimsinthefaceofskepticism”.15Thissuggeststhatacompletelygeneral(p.262) anti-individualistreassuranceaboutthereliabilityofperceptionwouldnotbeenoughtocounterscepticismasBurgewantstocounterit.Ihaveagreedthatthereassuringgeneralpointdoesnotimplythatscepticismisfalse—thatwedoknoworhavereasontobelieveallormostofthethingswethinkweknow.ButitappearsthatBurgewouldliketoprove,forsomeoftheparticularthingsthatphilosophicalscepticismwouldsaywedon’tknow,thatwedoorcanknowthemafterall.Themerelygeneralreassuring-


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soundingconclusionimpliesnothingaboutanyparticularcase.IfBurgedoeswanttoprove,inparticularcases,thatweknow—ifthatisforhimaconditionofsuccessforanargumentagainstscepticism—thatwouldexplainwhyhethinks“thereisnoeasyargumentagainstskepticismfromanti-individualismandauthoritativeself-knowledge”.Thereisnoeasyargumentfromthosepremisesthatcanbeusedtoprove,inaparticularcase,thatweknowinthatcase.

Hehintsthatanon-easy,oratleastamorecomplicated,argumenttothateffectcouldeventuallybegiven.Hethinksitwouldshowthatwecanknow,presumablyinaparticularcase,thatnodemonisfoolingus,orthatwearenotbrainsinavat.Wecouldknowthat,hesuggests,“byinferringitfromourperceptualknowledge”.16Thissuggestionismadebriefly,andinafootnote,andisnotdevelopedfurther.Hesaystherethat“thisisacomplicatedmatterbestreservedforotheroccasions”.17Well,thisisanotheroccasion.

AsIunderstandit,theargumentwouldshow,ofparticularperceptualknowledgeclaimsmadeonparticularoccasions,thattheyaretrueorjustified.Thatiswhatwouldmakeitmorethana“generalguarantee”.ButitwouldhavetoreachthatconclusionwhileremainingconsistentwithanotherfeatureofperceptionthatBurgestresses,namely,that“inanygivencase,allofaperson'sperceptualcapacities…couldinprinciplebemistakenabouttheempiricallyperceivableproperty(object,relation)beingperceptuallypresented”.18This,heholds,isaconsequenceofthefactthatourperceptualexperienceasweunderstanditisofthingsorrelationsorpropertiesthatare“objective”—theyareastheyareindependentlyofanyone'sthoughtsorexperiencesofthem,orevenof(p.263) whetherthereareanymentalphenomenaatall.Ananti-individualistorexternalisttheoryofperceptionwouldpresumablyimplythat,eveninthefaceofthatgeneralpossibility,ifthingsareinfactacertainwayonaparticularoccasion,andtheperson'sperceivingthemtobethatwayisconnectedintherightwaywiththeirbeingthatway,thenthepersonisperceivingthingsastheyareonthatoccasion,andinthatwaytherebyknowsthattheyarethatway.Ifallofthatwereso,itseems,thengivenanti-individualism,scepticismwouldbefalse.Thepersonwouldknow.Butthatisstillacompletelygeneral,oronlyconditional,claim.Thestrongerornon-easycomplexargumentthatBurgeenvisageswouldpresumablyenablethepersontoprove,atthattime,thatwhatsheperceivestobesoatthattimeisso,andthatshethereforedoesknowthetruthofwhatsheperceivestobeso.Andshewouldhavetoproveitinthatparticularcaseeventhoughinanyparticularcaseaperceivercanbewrongabouthowthingsareeventhoughsheperceivesthemtobethatway.Iagreethatthatwouldbenoeasyargument.ThisisafascinatingsuggestionthatIhopeBurgewillpursue.

Iamstillfarfromcertainthatitisreallywhathehasinmind.Ratherthanspeculateaboutitfurther,Iwouldliketoraiseapriorquestion.Dowehavetoprovesuchathing,orinanyotherwayprovethatscepticismisfalse,inordertoopposeitonanti-individualistgrounds?Isthegeneralreassuranceprovidedbyanti-individualismnotenoughinitselftoblockanyseriousscepticalthreat?Attheriskofbeingthoughttoofriendlytoso-called“transcendental”responses,thisisthequestionIwouldliketoexplore.

Davidsonholdsonanti-individualistgroundsthatmostofourbeliefsaretrue,orthat


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theyarebyandlargeorforthemostparttrue.Theanti-individualistgroundshereliesonaretobefoundintheconditionsofwhathecallsinterpretation—oneperson'sunderstandingandcommunicatingwithanother—whichinvolvestheattributiontothatotherofthoughts,perceptions,beliefs,andotherpropositionalattitudes.Wecandothatonlybyconnectingtheattitudesweattributetopeoplewithcircumstancesorstatesofaffairsintheworldinwhichweasinterpretersandtheyasinterpretedinteract.Thisinevitablyproducesalargemeasureofagreementamongthosewhocanunderstandandcommunicatewithoneanother,accordingtoDavidson.Becauseaninterpreterreliesonwhathehimselfbelievestobetrueoftheworld,hewillfindthoseheinterpretstohavelargelytruebeliefs.

(p.264) Burge'santi-individualism,evenaboutperceptionalone,isalsoatheoryofourpracticesofattributingpsychologicalstatesandattitudeswithdeterminatecontentstopeopleintheworldweinhabit.Thethoughtexperimentsheappealstotosupporthisanti-individualismturnonandexploitourcapacitiesofbelief-andattitude-attributionastheyactuallyare.Weareconvincedbyhis“experiments”,ifweare,becausewefindthatinthesituationshedescribeshissubjectstobeinwethinkitcorrecttoattributetothemtheattitudesthathisanti-individualisttheoryimpliesthattheyhave.Whatwearetoldissointheworldsurroundingthesubjecthelpsdeterminewhatattitudewecorrectlyascribetohim,whetherheknowsitissoornot.Ifthethoughtexperimentssucceed,theyshowusthatourattitude-ascribingpractices,andsoourunderstandingofperception,thought,andothermentalattitudes,areanti-individualistic.Theworldandourthoughtsabouttheworldcannotcomecompletelyapart.Inthatsenseweunderstandthatweare“nearlyimmunefromerror”inourperceptualbeliefs.

Todeclare,asaconsequenceofthis,thatmostofourbeliefsmustbetrue,couldbejustawayofannouncing,onanti-individualistgrounds,whatoneholdstobetrueofone'sfellowhumanbeings.ThatisonewayofunderstandingDavidson'sconclusion.“GiventhattheyhavegottheparticularbeliefsIhaveascribedtothem”,hecouldbesaying,“thosebeliefsmustbebyandlargeorforthemostparttrue”.Thattoocouldbethekindof“immunityfromerror”thatBurgethinkswemustenjoyinperception.Wecouldnotunderstandpeopletoperceivethis,that,andtheotheraswedowithoutacknowledgingthatthoseperceptionsweascribetothemarebyandlargeveridical.Thatisaconditionofperception-attributionontheanti-individualisttheory.Thepeopleweunderstandtohaveperceptionsofthisorthatkinddonotjusthappentohaveavoidederrorforthemostpartintheirperceptualbeliefs;theyarelargely“immunefromerror”.Wefindthattheycouldnotbelargelywrong,giventhattheyhavegotthekindsofperceptionsweascribetothem.

Butsayingthatmostofourbeliefsmustbetrue,orthatpeoplecouldn’tbelargelyinerrorintheirperceptualbeliefs,canalsosoundlikeastrongerthesistotheeffectthatbeliefsandperceptionssimplymustbelargelytrueorveridical—thatthatisaconditionofanyone'shavingbeliefsandperceptionsatall.ThisiscertainlysuggestedbyDavidson'ssaying“beliefisinitsnature(p.265) veridical”.19Thatmakesitsoundasifbeliefssimplycouldnotbefalse,thatnoreasonablyrichsetofbeliefscouldfailtobelargelytrue,thatif


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therearebeliefsatall,theymustbeforthemostparttrue.Thatthesis,itseemstome,wouldthreatentheobjectivityofwhatwebelievetobeso—theideathatthetruthorfalsityofwhatisbelievedtobesoisingeneral20independentofitsbeingbelievedtobesobythisorthatpersonorgroup,orevenbyallhumanbeingsuniversally.Thestrongerthesiscouldallowthatsuchindependenceholdsforeachparticularbelief,orperhapsevenforeachrelativelysmallsubclassofbeliefs,takenonitsown.Butitappearstoruleoutanysuchindependenceforallormostofalargesetofbeliefstakenasawhole.Thestrongerviewseemstoimplythattheworldwouldhavetobebyandlargethewaythatanygroupofbelieverswithasufficientlyrichandcomprehensivesetofbeliefsbelievedittobe.Notjustbecausehumanbeingscanreasonablybeexpectedtogetthingsmoreorlessright,butsimplybecausethatiswhatbeliefsare.Theyare,intheir“nature”,veridical.

Thatstrongerthesis,ifitwerecorrect,wouldbe,orwouldprovide,afoolproofantidotetoscepticism,itseemstome,eventhoughitwouldremain,inBurge'sterms,completely“general”.Itdoesnotdirectlyimplythenegationofscepticism—thatweknoworhavereasontobelievethetruthofthosethingswebelieve—butanyonewhocametorealizethat“beliefisinitsnatureveridical”inthestrongsensecouldeasilyconcludethathe,oratanyratehumanbeingsgenerally,couldnotgoforthemostpartwronginbelievingwhatevertheybelieve.ThiskindofreassuranceiswhatIthinkDavidsonhadinmindwhenhearguedin“ACoherenceTheoryofTruthandKnowledge”thatanyonewhocameonreflectiontoseethat“beliefisinitsnatureveridical”wouldhaveareasontobelievethatmostofourbeliefsaretrue,andthusthethreatofpervasivefailureordefectinthegroundsofourbeliefswouldthenhavebeendefused.Wecouldseebyreflectionthatifwhatweseekisthetruth,wecannotfail,atleastforthemostpart.Thisisveryreassuringnews.

(p.266) Butlikemuchgoodnews,thisstrategyalsohasitsnegativeside.Astheindependenceorobjectivityofwhatisbelievedfades,believingwhatisforthemostparttruebecomeslessandlessofanachievement.Itissomethinginwhich,onthisstrongerview,wecouldnotpossiblyfail.Sucharetheembarrassmentsofacoherencetheoryoftruth,andtheperennialdisappointmentsofidealism.

Idonotthinkthestrongerthesisthat“beliefisinitsnatureveridical”followsfromanti-individualismaboutthought,perception,andbelief.PerhapsthesuggestionsinsomeofDavidson'sformulationsthatheistakingthephraseinthatstrongersensearewhatinclinesBurgetobelievethatDavidsonsometimesusesthesloganthat“errorpresupposesabackgroundofveridicality”with“insufficientdiscrimination”.Idonotknowwhetherthatiswhathehasinmind,butIdothinkitwouldbeamisuseoraninsufficientlydiscriminatinguseofthatideatoderivefromthesloganwhatIhavebeencallingthestrongerthesis.21

Anti-individualismissupportedbyourpracticesofattributingthoughtsandattitudeswithdeterminatecontentstopeopleinourworld.Itisaconditionofourascribingthethoughtswedothatweunderstandthemtoberelatedinappropriatewaystotheobjectsorstatesofaffairsinthesurroundingworldwetakethemtobeabout.Without


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ourownknowledgeofandengagementwiththeworldwecouldmakenosenseofanyone'shavingthoughtsorexperiencesofthisorthatkindatall.Humanbeingsunderstandthemindanti-individualistically.Theycanidentifythecontentsofmindsonlyintermsofwhattheyalsotaketobetrueoftheindependentworld.Butnoneofthatimpliesthatwhatpeoplebelieveabouttheworldisinfacttrue,orthatthebeliefstheyinevitablyascribetotheirfellowhumanbeingsareinfactforthemostparttrueeither.

Thisisnotascepticalpoint.Idonotmeantobecastingdoubtonanyofourbeliefsabouttheworld.Thepointisonlythat,howeveroverwhelminglyunlikely,eveninsomesenseunthinkable,itmightbethatwearelargelyorevenslightlywronginourbeliefsabouttheworld,ournotbeingwrong,orourhavingforthemostpartbeliefsthataretrue,doesnotstrictlyfollowfromtheconjunctionofthe(p.267) fact,first,thatwehaveagreatmanybeliefsabouttheworld,second,thatweunderstandourfellowhumanbeingstohaveagreatmanydeterminatebeliefswiththisorthatcontent,andthird,thatwedoorevenmustascribethosebeliefsonanti-individualistgrounds.Ifthosethreethingsaretrue,noonecouldconsistentlyfindthathisfellowhumanbeingsbelievethis,that,andtheotherabouttheworld,butthatthosebeliefsareallorforthemostpartfalse.Theconditionsofhisascribingthosebeliefstothemrulesoutthatpossibility.Butitdoesnotfollowthatthebeliefsinquestion,orthereforeingeneralanybeliefsthatanypeoplecouldbeunderstoodashaving,areinfactlargelytrue.Thestrongerthesisaboutbeliefandtruthisnotsupportedbywhatsupportsanti-individualism.

Anyonewhothinksthatpeopledohavecertaindeterminatebeliefs,andwhothinkssoonanti-individualistgrounds,willofcourseregardthosebeliefsasforthemostparttrue.Shewillnotseethepeoplesheinterpretsasholdingthebeliefsshesaystheyhavegotunlessshealsoseesthemashavingmostlytruebeliefs.Butthatisnotsurprising,ifsheseesthoseothersassharingherbeliefstoalargeextent.Everybelieverregardsherownbeliefsastrue.Thattheyaretrue,eveniftheyare,isnotsomethingthatfollowsfromthatalone.Itdoesfollowfromwhatsuchapersonbelieves—notfromherbelievingit—thatthebeliefssheshareswiththoseothersaretrue.Shebelievesmanythingsabouttheworld,andshebelievesthatothersalsobelievemanyofthosethingsshebelieves.Sofromthetotalityofeverythingshebelievesitfollowsthatmostofthoseothers’beliefsaretrue.Butthatisnotaspecialconsequenceofanti-individualism.Itisaconsequenceofthefactthatfromanypropositionp,andthepropositionthatsomeonebelievesthatp,itfollowsthatthatpersonhasatruebelief.Ifyouwritedowneverythingabelief-attributorbelieves,itwillfollowfromeverythingyouwritedownthatthebeliefssheattributesareforthemostparttrue.

Thereisthenaweakersenseinwhich“mostofourbeliefsaretrue”and“errorpresupposesabackgroundofveridicality”arelegitimatelysupportedbywhatsupportsanti-individualism.Itsays:wecanunderstandourselvestohavefalsebeliefsorillusoryperceptionsonlyifweunderstandourselvestohaveasetofbeliefsorperceptionsthatarelargelyorforthemostparttrueorveridical.ThisstillleavesunspecifiedtheexactscopeandqualityofpossibleerrorinwaysImentionedearlier.Butitretainstheideaofakindofreassuranceprovidedbyanti-individualism.Tosaynotmerelythatweareforthe


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(p.268) mostpartnotinerrorinourperceptualbeliefs,butthatweare“nearlyimmunefromerror”inthosebeliefs,wouldthenbetosaythatwecannotconsistentlyfindourselvestohavecertaindeterminateperceptualbeliefswithoutalsofindingourselvesnottobelargelyinerroraboutthem.Findingthemlargelyerroneouswouldbesufficientforfindingthosebeliefsnottobepresentafterall.Theideathat“beliefisinitsnatureveridical”canaccordinglybetakeninthesensethat,aswemightputit,beliefattributionisinitsnaturetruth-ascribing(forthemostpart),orthatattributedbeliefsarenecessarilyregardedas,forthemostpart,true.

Scepticismistheoutcomeofanefforttoexamineourbeliefsabouttheworldallatonce.Thelineofthinkingthateventuallyleadstoitstartsfromwhatlooksliketheuncontroversialobservationthatallourbeliefscouldbefalse,consistentlywithourholdingthem.Thissofarisonlywhatmightbecalledalogicalpoint.Muchmoreisneededtogettoascepticalconclusion,butthisiswherethereasoningthattypicallyleadstoitstarts.Wearethenchallengedtosayhowweknowthatthatadmittedpossibilityisnotactual—thatitisnotthecasethatourbeliefsarenottrueeventhoughweallbelievethattheyare.Therestofthereasoningattemptstoshow,inonewayoranotherdependingonthecase,whythechallengecannotbemet.WhatIhavecalledthestrongerthesisaboutbeliefandtruthwouldimplythatthisveryfirststepiswrong.Onthatview,thereissimplynopossibilitythatalargeandreasonablycomprehensivesetofbeliefsisentirelyorforthemostpartfalse.Whatthescepticalreasoningwouldstartfromisthereforeonthisviewactuallyacontradiction.Therecouldbenoseriousquestionofhowweknowthatthatallegedpossibilityisnotactual.Itisnotapossibilityatall,sothereisnothingthatwehavetoshowisnotactual.

Ihavesaidthatthisview,ifitweretrue,wouldstillnotrefutescepticisminthesenseofimplyingitsnegation.Butitwoulddecisivelystopthetypicalscepticalchallengefromgettingofftheground.Butitseemstometodenytoomuch,andsotobetoostrong,andtooquick.Idonotthinkitfollowsfromanti-individualistpremisesaboutbeliefattribution.Ithinkwemustgrantthecompletelygeneralandabstractpointthatthetruthofallormostorevenanyofasetofbeliefsdoesnotfollowsimplyfromtheirbeingheld.Giventhattheyareallbelieved,itisstillinthatsensepossibleforthemtobefalse.Thatisthelogicalpoint.Butwhatthesloganthat“errorpresupposesabackgroundofveridicality,”ortheideathat“wearenearlyimmune(p.269) fromerror”inourperceptualbeliefs,doimply,inthesenseinwhichIthinktheyaresupportedbyanti-individualism,isthatanyonewhounderstandspeopletohaveasetofdeterminatebeliefsmusttakethosebeliefstobeforthemostparttrue.Shecouldnotsay“thesearethebeliefstheyhold,andtheyarecompletelyorforthemostpartinerror”.Sotheabstractpossibilityfromwhichthescepticalreasoningtypicallystartscouldposenoseriousthreatasappliedtoanyparticularsetofbeliefsanyonemightconsider.Notbecauseitisinnosenseapossibilityatallthatthosebeliefsarefalse,butbecause,eventhoughitisintheweakestsenseapossibility,itisnotapossibilityanyonecouldeverconsistentlyfindtobeactualwhenspecific,determinatebeliefsareunderconsideration.

Theepistemologicalinvestigationofhumanknowledge,ofwhichscepticismisonepossible


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outcome,involvesscrutinyandassessmentoftheparticularbeliefswehumanbeingshaveactuallygot.Thepossibilityweareaskedtoconsideratthebeginningisapossibilitywithtwoparts,orconjuncts.Itisthepossibilitythatwehaveallthebeliefswenowhaveinthis,that,andtheotheraspectoftheworld,andthatthosebeliefsareallorforthemostpartfalse.Anti-individualismwithrespecttoourthoughtsaboutandattributionsofbeliefsmeansthatwecouldnotconsistentlyfindthefirsthalfofthepossibilitytoberealizedwithoutfindingitssecondhalfnottobeso.Andifwefoundthesecondconjuncttobetrue,wecouldnotconsistentlyfindthefirsthalfofthepossibilitytoberealized.Attributionofthebeliefsweattributerequiresfindingthemforthemostparttrue;findingacertainsetofpropositionsforthemostpartfalserulesoutassigningthemascontentsofthebeliefsofpeoplewithwhomonesharesacommonworld.

Ourpositionwithrespecttothatoriginalpossibilityisthereforesimilartoaperson'srelationtotheapparentlyparadoxicalsentence‘Ibelievethatitisraining,anditisnotraining’.Thatisnotsomethingonecouldconsistentlybelieveorassert—butnotbecausewhatitsaysissomethingthatcouldnotpossiblybetrue.ItispossiblethatIbelievethatitisrainingwhenitisnotraining.Thatisapossibilitywithtwoparts,orconjuncts.Thefirstdoesnotimplythatthesecondisfalse,andtheseconddoesnotimplythatthefirstisfalse.Itisinthatsenseagenuinepossibility.Butnoonecanconsistentlyholdinhisowncasethatthatpossibilityisactual,thatbothconjunctsaretrue.Thisbringsoutthedifferencebetweensomething'sbeingsimplyinconsistentorimpossible(whichmybelievingthatit'sraining,and(p.270) itsnotraining,isnot)andsomething'sbeingimpossibleforanyoneconsistentlytobelieveordiscover.Iamsuggestingthatthisdistinctionappliestothepossibilitythathumanbeingshaveallthebeliefstheynowhave,andthatthosebeliefsareallorforthemostpartfalse.ItistheimpossibilityofconsistentlyfindingorbelievingthatpossibilitytobeactualthatIthinkfollowsfromanti-individualismaboutourthoughts,perceptions,andbeliefs.

Ifthatisso,thenwecannottakeseriouslythepossibilitythatthebeliefswetakeourselvestohaveareforthemostpartnottrue.Thereisnoseriouschallengetoourbeliefsabouttheworldexpressedinthequestion“Giventhatthetruthofyourbeliefsandtheveridicalityofyourperceptionsdonotfollowsimplyfromyourhavingthem,howdoyouknowthat,takenalltogether,theyarenotallorforthemostpartfalseorillusory?”.Thatisthequestionthatthetraditionalepistemologicalchallengepresses.Failuretoansweritsatisfactorilyatanypointleavesuseventuallywithscepticism.Appliedtoaparticularcase,wefindinvariouswaysthatwecannotappealtoanythingwealreadybelieveortoanyperceptionswemightgetorseekinordertoanswerthequestion,sinceateverystepallofourbeliefsandperceptionsoftheworldareinquestionallatonce.Butgivenananti-individualistunderstandingofbeliefsandperceptions,foranyspecificsetofbeliefsandperceptionswetakeourselvestohave,thequestioncannotreallypresenttheseriouschallengeitmightotherwiseappeartoleadto.Notbecausethechallengecanbemetbyestablishingindependently—somehowwithoutrelyingonanyperceptionsorbeliefs—thatourperceptionsandbeliefsareveridicalortrueandamounttoknowledgeoftheworld.Notbecausewecouldnotpossiblyfailtobelargelyrightinwhateversetofperceptionsandbeliefswehappenedtohave.Butbecauseourconsideringtheparticular


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setofperceptionsandbeliefsthatweareaskingaboutinitselfguaranteesthatwefindthemtobeforthemostparttrue.

Doesitfollowfromthatthatweknowthosebeliefsaretrue?No,itdoesnot.Doesitfollowfromthatthatthebeliefsinquestionareevenlargelytrue,whetherweknowitornot?Again,Ithinkitdoesnot.Wemustalwaysadmitthatourbeliefscouldbefalse.Askedrightnowaboutthethingswebelieve,wewillofcoursesaytheyaretrue.Askedwhetherweknowthemtobetrue,wewillsay,ofmanyofthem,perhapsonreflection,thatYes,wedoknowthemtobetrue.Butwearefalliblehumanbeingswithbeliefsaboutanindependentworld,anditisalwaysanopenquestionwhetherwhatwethinkweknowisreally(p.271) somethingthatweknow,orisevensomethingtrue.WhatIhavedescribedasthereassurancederivedfromanti-individualismdoesnotconflictwiththat.AlthoughIcannotconsistentlybelieveboththatIbelievethatitisraining,andthatitisnotraining,Icanstillaskmyselfwhetheritisrainingornot,orwhetherIamrightinbelievingthatitisraining.So,inthemoregeneralcase,Icanstillask,“ArethosebeliefsthatIthinkpeoplehavetrue,orforthemostparttrue,ornot?”.AndjustasIanswerthefirstquestionbygoingoutsideandfindingoutwhetheritisraining,sothewaytoanswerthemoregeneralquestionistoputmyselfinthebestpositionIcanforfindingoutwhetherthethingsIandothersbelieveabouttheworldaretrue.IfIhavenotalreadydonethat,orevenifIhave,ImightfindonfurtherinvestigationthatsomeorevenmanyofthethingsIbelievearenottrue.Iwillthenabandonthosebeliefs.ButImightequallyfindthatalloragreatmanyofthemareindeedtrue,andinfactsowellsupportedthatIdonothesitatetosaythatIknowtheyaretrue.Theopenquestionhasbeen,tothebestofmyknowledgeandatleastfornow,answered.

IfIansweredthequestioninthatway,wouldphilosophicalscepticismaboutourknowledgeoftheworldhavebeenrefuted?Iwouldsay“No”.WouldwhatIsayneverthelessconflictwithscepticism,evenifitdoesnotrefuteit?Thisquestionishardertoanswer.Wouldwestillfaceachallengetoourallegedknowledgestartingfromthethoughtthatallormostofourbeliefsandperceptionscouldbefalse,andsodemandingsomereasontothinkthatthatpossibilityisnotactual?HereIaminclinedtoanswer,onanti-individualistgrounds,“No,thatisnotapossibilitywecantakeseriously;itisnotawaywecouldfindthingstobe.”Evenifthatisright,andreassuring,itdoesnotamounttothenegationofphilosophicalscepticism.ButstillIsay,fortheverybestreasonswecanfind,thatweknowagreatmanythingsabouttheworldaroundus.

Philosophicalscepticismisanegativeoutcomeofanefforttoassessallofourknowledgeoftheworldallatonce,andperforcefromapositioninsomesenseoutsideit.Thedenialornegationofthatassessment,althoughperhapsreassuringifreachable,wouldpresumablyhavetobemadefromthatsameoutside-of-all-of-our-knowledge-of-the-worldposition.ThatiswhyIthinkweshouldnotaspiretodenythethesisofscepticism,anymorethanwewanttoacceptit.Thegreatpromiseofanti-individualismasIunderstanditisthatitwouldrevealhowandwhyitisimpossibleforuseventoget(p.272) intothatpositionwithrespecttoanycomprehensivesetofbeliefsorexperienceswecanrecognizeourselvestohave.Weunderstandourselvestohave


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beliefsonlybyforthemostpartendorsingthem.Wecouldthenconsistentlyarriveatneithertheassertionnorthedenialofphilosophicalscepticism.Ifwecouldacceptthefactthatourbeliefsabouttheworldarenonetheworseforallthat,perhapsfinalsatisfactionwouldbeathand.

Notes:

(1)Burge,Tyler.1986.CartesianErrorandtheObjectivityofPerception.InSubject,Thought,andContext.McDowellandPettit(eds.).Oxford:OxfordUniversityPress.p.131.

(2)Ibid.

(3)Burge,Tyler.1986.CartesianErrorandtheObjectivityofPerception.InSubject,Thought,andContext.McDowellandPettit(eds.).Oxford:OxfordUniversityPress.,pp.130–131.

(4)Ibid.,p.131.

(5)Ibid.

(6)Ibid.,p.131n.

(7)Davidson,Donald.1983.ACoherenceTheoryofTruthandKnowledge.InKantoderHegel?D.Henrich(ed.).Stuttgart:Khitt-Cotta.p.435.Alsoin1986,TruthandInterpretation,Lepore(ed.),Oxford:Blackwell.

(8)Ibid.,p.431.

(9)Ibid.,p.438.

(10)Davidson,Donald.1988.ReplytoBurge.JournalofPhilosophy8511:664–665.

(11)Burge,Tyler.1988.IndividualismandSelf-Knowledge.JournalofPhilosophy85(11):655.

(12)D.Davidson,1983,op.cit.,p.438.

(13)T.Burge,1988,op.cit.,p.655n.

(14)Ibid.,p.655.

(15)Ibid.,pp.655–656.

(16)T.Burge,1988,op.cit.,p.655n.

(17)Ibid.

(18)T.Burge,1986,op.cit.,p.125.


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(19)D.Davidson,1983,op.cit.,p.432.

(20)Isay“ingeneral”becausetherearesomethingsthatmustbesoifanyonebelievesanything,e.g.,thatsomeonebelievessomething.Butforwhatdoesnotfallintothatspecialclassofbeliefs,thetruthorfalsityofwhatisbelievedisindependentofitsbeingbelieved.

(21)IhavearguedthisatgreaterlengthinapplicationtoDavidson'stheoryinHahn,LewisE.(ed.).1999.ThePhilosophyofDonaldDavidson.Chicago:OpenCourt.Foritsconnectionwiththe“transcendental”strategyoncepursuedbyP.F.Strawson,seemy“KantianArgument,ConceptualCapacities,andInvulnerability”,inParrini,P.(ed.).1994.KantandContemporaryEpistemology.Dordrecht:Kluwer.

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