anticipating toc wilson select
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Crime, Law & Social Change 37: 311355, 2002.
2002 Kluwer Academic Publishers. Printed in the Netherlands.311
Anticipating organized and transnational crime
PHIL WILLIAMS & ROY GODSONUniversity of Pittsburgh, The Matthew B. Ridway Center for International Security Studies,
4G23 Forbes Quadrangle, PA 15260, Pittsburgh, U.S.A.
Abstract. This paper seeks to identify ways in which governments and law enforcement
agencies might enhance the effectiveness of their efforts to anticipate organized crime. It
starts by defining what is meant by anticipation, and differentiating it from the much more
difficult task of prediction. The analysis then identifies some of the methods and models
that are generally accepted as part of the existing knowledge base on organized crime and
highlights how these can be used to anticipate future developments and to develop warnings
about how criminal organizations might evolve and behave in the future. The knowledge
base includes political, economic, sociological, strategic, and composite models and showshow they provide a foundation for anticipating future developments in organized crime. The
models are either models about the kind of environment in which organized crime flourishes or
models about the ways in which organized crime behaves. What we do, in effect, is to identify
and elucidate models in ways that provide propositions about the kinds of developments,
innovations or changes we might see in organized crime (both domestic and transnational)
in the future. Underlying indicators provide warning about future manifestations of organized
crime. Anticipating these manifestations provides a basis for appropriate preventive, defensive
or mitigating strategies. Finally, the article provides some examples of specific techniques of
information collection and intelligence analysis that might assist in this task of anticipation.
Introduction
Organized crime has reached levels in the post-Cold War world that have
surprised even close observers. Many criminal organizations have not only
become transnational in scope but also exhibit a degree of flexibility and
adaptability in methods and modes that poses considerable challenges for
intelligence, law enforcement agencies, and society at large. Unfortunately,
there is no quick and simple methodology for anticipating the major activities
of criminal organizations, operational methods for moving various forms of
contraband, innovations in money laundering, the development of new mar-
kets, or the measures taken by criminal organizations to counter law enforce-
ment. Many criminal organizations are adept at concealment and disguise, at
presenting a moving and evasive target for both law enforcement agenciesand rivals in the criminal world. This is hardly surprising; if they fail in these
areas then they often go out of business. What this means, however, is that
the task of anticipating organized crime is particularly difficult.
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312 PHIL WILLIAMS AND ROY GODSON
It is in this area that social science and academic analysis can provide
assistance to governments and the private sector, especially at the intelligence
and strategic planning levels but also at the operational level. There is a tend-
ency particularly among government officials to regard the term academic
as a synonym (or euphemism) for theoretical, abstract, irrelevant, or
impractical. The argument, here, however, is that social science theories,
concepts and models, if used judiciously and with an awareness of their lim-
itations, have significant utility. They can help to inform policy making and
facilitate the development of strategies that are also more pro-active than is
often the case in law enforcement. In effect, the earlier the warning the less the
policy and law enforcement response has to be a scramble to catch up, and the
greater the prospect that effective and coherent strategies can be developed.
Among the developments it is important to anticipate are the following:
The overall level and scope of organized crime within countries, within
particular regions, and at the global level. As a subset of this, it is ne-
cessary to be concerned with possible redistribution of criminal activity
from one region to another, perhaps because the opportunities are greater
and the risks are lower.
A continued increase in the level of transnational organized crime, i.e.
crimes that involve the crossing of border by the criminals themselves,
the products that they are supplying, or the proceeds of their activities.
The relationships between criminal organizations and government of-
ficials which can be instigated by either party but are established and
maintained for the benefit of both. Symbiotic relations of this kind
sometimes termed the political-criminal nexus have been important in
the rise of organized crime in a number of countries and are also one ofthe biggest obstacles to effective action against organized crime.
Changes in the pattern of criminal activities, both domestic and transna-
tional, including the development of new illicit market niches or the
supply of new products and services.
Strategies that transnational criminal organizations use in their efforts to
counter law enforcement and to manage the risks they face as a result of
law enforcement activities. These include efforts by organized crime to
infiltrate government and law enforcement both directly and through the
creation and cultivation of corruption networks.
Efforts by organized crime to infiltrate businesses and financial insti-tutions. Which businesses are particularly vulnerable and what are the
characteristics that make them so? What are the critical entry points into
business that need to be protected?1
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ANTICIPATING ORGANIZED AND TRANSNATIONAL CRIME 313
Cooperative relationships among local, regional, and global criminal or-
ganizations that provide multiplier effects for criminals and make the
task of law enforcement even more formidable.
The rise and fall of criminal organizations. There is a constant dynamic
to the criminal world with some groups in decline and others emer-
ging. This can have important implications for the kind of expertise that
law enforcement needs in terms of languages, cultural understanding,
diversity of recruits etc.
The results of success. What might be the unintended results of success-
ful counter strategies? Are there ways in which we might be worse off
as a result of our successes, keeping in mind the pillow or balloon
effect increasingly familiar in the drug trafficking business?
This is not intended as an exhaustive list; it serves merely to identify some
of the dynamics of organized crime, operating both domestically and at a
transnational level, that require greater illumination and, where possible, an-
ticipation.This paper starts by defining what is meant by anticipation, and differen-
tiating it from the more difficult task of prediction. The paper then identifies
some of the methods and models that are generally accepted as part of
the existing knowledge base on organized crime and highlights how these
can be used to anticipate future developments and to develop warnings about
how criminal organizations might evolve and behave in the future. The know-
ledge base includes political, economic, sociological, strategic, and compos-
ite models and shows how they provide a foundation for anticipating future
developments in organized crime. The paper identifies and elucidates under-
lying conditions that provide propositions about developments, innovations,
or changes in organized crime, and future manifestations of organized crime.Anticipating these manifestations provides a basis for appropriate preventive,
defensive or mitigating strategies. Finally, the paper provides some examples
of specific techniques of collecting information and intelligence that might
assist in this task of anticipation.
What is meant by anticipation
The Oxford English Dictionary defines the verb anticipate as: to seize or take
possession of beforehand; to use in advance; to spend (money) before it is at
ones disposal; to take up or deal with (a thing) or perform (an action) before
another person or agent has had time to act, so as to gain an advantage; to
deal with beforehand, forestall (an action); to be before (another) in acting, toforestall; to observe or practise in advance of the due date; to cause to happen
earlier, accelerate; to occur earlier, to advance in time; to take into consid-
eration before the appropriate or due time; to realize beforehand (a certain
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314 PHIL WILLIAMS AND ROY GODSON
future event). Anticipation is, of course, related to these various meanings of
anticipate, but is also defined as intuitive preconception, a priori knowledge,
precognition, and presentiment.
The notion of anticipation that we are emphasizing here involves develop-
ing information and analysis that enables governments and non-state agencies
to be prepared for new directions in organized crime, and in so doing to have
an enhanced capacity to take precautionary or defensive measures in order to
gain an advantage and in some cases to forestall or pre-empt these new dir-
ections or initiatives. Effective anticipation requires an effective knowledge
base, makes good use of underlying warning indicators, and requires intelli-
gence that is both timely and actionable. While this might seem obvious, what
is striking about strategy to counter organized crime in the past is that it has
rarely succeeded in moving beyond the reactive. Usually, it has been running
to catch up with the criminals. There are good reasons for this including the
reluctance in law to take action until a crime is committed and the difficulty
of justifying action against future challenges when there are already manyexisting problems, challenges and cases to deal with. Nevertheless, there
are also some less positive reasons, including the focus on individual cases
rather than the overall phenomenon under investigation, a clear disdain for
strategy in some government circles, and a reluctance to blur or cross the
traditional distinctions between social science research, intelligence, and law
enforcement.
Difficulties of anticipating organized crime
Anticipation, whether of nature, or man-made initiatives is inherently prob-
lematic. When trying to anticipate organized crime and transnational organ-
ized crime, the problems are compounded by the capacity of criminal organ-
izations to conceal their activities within a variety of licit transactions, to act
rapidly in order to exploit new opportunities, and to reconfigure and recon-
stitute organizational structures in response to law enforcement successes.
Consequently, our propositions about future behavior are conditional or con-
tingent rather than scientific laws. We are not offering a crystal ball that can be
used for predicting new criminal organizations, new modalities of organized
crime, or new strategies implemented by criminal enterprises. Nor is there
any suggestion that we can develop absolute predictions based on the identi-
fication of necessary and sufficient conditions for a particular development to
occur. Social phenomena are often too complex for social science to emulate
the natural sciences. However, careful use of models and extrapolations frompast experiences enable us to contend that if certain conditions are present
then there is a serious probability that particular kinds of developments will
occur. By taking existing knowledge about organized and transnational crime
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ANTICIPATING ORGANIZED AND TRANSNATIONAL CRIME 315
much of which is encapsulated in so-called models and using this as a
framework for thinking systematically and imaginatively about the future it
is possible to make contingent propositions about the further evolution of
organized crime.
Models and their implications
In recent years there have been critical failures in anticipating the expansion
of organized criminal activities in many places such as Mexico, Russia, and
China. Yet such failures encourage the development of both more knowledge
and more refined models that, if used with care and judiciousness, can provide
a significant starting point for extrapolation and successful anticipation of
future developments. Accordingly, this section identifies models of organized
crime and then extrapolates from them contingent propositions about future
behavior. There are various ways of classifying the existing models or frame-works at the national and transnational levels. Here they are organized under
five major headings: political, economic, social, strategic, and composite or
hybrid models. Variants of each model also are discussed. The models are
of two kinds: models of conditions political, economic, and social, that
are conducive to the expansion of organized crime, and models about how
organized crime operates. In effect, they cover both the attributes of the en-
vironment and the attributes of the actors. Some are well-established; others
more recent. We have chosen them, however, on the basis of their utility in
helping us anticipate future developments in organized crime.2 In each case,
we provide a succinct summary of the central ideas and hypotheses embed-
ded in particular models or approaches and a series of propositions regarding
future directions and activities of criminal organizations that stem from these
models.
Political models
Weak states
Political models revolve around the nature of the state and political institu-
tions. Critical dimensions appear to be the strength or weakness of the state,
the extent to which its government is authoritarian or democratic, and the
degree of its institutionalization of the rule of law. 3 Strength and legitimacy
of the state are among the most important determinants in the work of several
authors. These include Francisco Thoumi who argues that Colombia becamecorporate headquarters of the cocaine trade because the weaknesses of the
state gave Colombian drug traffickers an important competitive advantage
over their counterparts in Peru and Bolivia.4 Colombia had an extremely
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316 PHIL WILLIAMS AND ROY GODSON
polarized political system that was characterized by a high level of viol-
ence. The low level of effectiveness and legitimacy of the state meant that
drug trafficking organizations could operate with a high level of impunity.
During the 1990s, in particular, the lack of financial support for election
campaigns provided a perfect way for drug trafficking and organized crime
groups to obtain access to the political elite and to develop and perpetuate
political-criminal symbiotic relationships.
Another perspective on the weakness theme was provided in the analysis
by Diego Gambetta to explain the rise of the Mafia in Sicily.5 He suggests that
mafias come into existence in order to provide private protection and contract
enforcement. They arise where the state itself is incapable of providing such
protection and, in this sense, are a necessary evil. The Mafia in Sicily, in
his view, came to monopolize the business of providing private protection
and contract enforcement, filling the vacuum and offering services that in
most other countries were provided by the state. Organized crime evolved
from there, and in the period after the Second World War developed a sym-biotic relationship with the Christian Democratic party that was based in part
on Mafia help in mobilizing votes during elections. The political-criminal
nexus in Italy was a major factor in allowing the Mafia not only to remain a
deeply entrenched part of Italian social, economic and political life but also
to operate with a high degree of impunity at least until the 1980s.
Strong regimes becoming weak
While weak states have long been associated with the rise of organized crime,
there kas been a more recent recognition that strong authoritarian regimes can
also act as incubators for organized crime. These regimes are generally char-
acterized by one-party rule, a lack of oversight of the ruling elite, an absence
of checks and balances and civil society, and the prevalence of patron-client
relations. The conditions for corruption described by one analyst as mono-
poly plus discretion minus accountability are almost always present in
authoritarian states and exploited by officials who often extend their corrupt
activities into links with criminal organizations.6 In effect, this kind of state
encourages the development of organized crime but within limits that are
established, defined, and maintained by state authorities. Criminals tend to be
at the service of the political establishment rather than a threat to it. Tradi-
tionally, Mexico and the former Soviet Union approximated this situation.7
Both had organized crime, but it was muted rather than overt, its realm of op-
erations circumscribed by the power and authority of states with strong socialcontrol mechanisms. There were collusive relationships between criminals
and state or party officials but they were under the control of the officials
rather than the criminals.
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ANTICIPATING ORGANIZED AND TRANSNATIONAL CRIME 317
With the transition from authoritarian to more democratic forms of gov-
ernment in the 1990s, however, not only was the existing pattern fundament-
ally altered but also this controlled equilibrium was destroyed. The trigger to
the upsurge of organized crime was a weakening of state structures that seems
to be an inevitable accompaniment to the transition process. In the Russian
case, the collapse of the Soviet state with its well-established mechanisms
for social and political control, and the moves towards democratic structures
and procedures, changed the power relationship between officials and the
criminals. Without a strong enforcement apparatus to ensure the criminals
were kept within existing boundaries, organized crime was able to expand the
scope of its activities in ways that were unprecedented. Symbiotic or collusive
relationships remained, but the establishment was no longer the dominant
partner. The change was reflected in patterns of corruption which were
no longer intended primarily to enrich the nomenklatura but to ensure the
criminals were able to act with impunity. The result, of course, was a major
expansion of organized crime in Russia and other Newly Independent States.The process was accelerated by hyper-inflation, unemployment and a gen-
eral decline in economic conditions which provided both incentives and pres-
sures for criminal activity as a means of survival and advancement in a new
economic environment. Indeed, the distinctive feature of the post-Soviet states
was their dual transition from authoritarianism to democracy and from a
centrally-controlled economy to freer markets. With political change accom-
panied by economic reform the absence of legal and regulatory frameworks
for new businesses provided major opportunities for organized crime to ex-
pand the domain of its activities. The result and this is where there is an
interesting parallel with the Sicilian experience is that criminal organiza-
tions in Russia and elsewhere in the Newly Independent States helped fillthe regulatory vacuum. The need for protection, debt collection, and con-
tract enforcement for business provided a whole new set of opportunities and
functions for Russian criminal organizations. With the state failing to provide
what was needed, organized crime came to play a significant role in the Rus-
sian economy. At the same time, the lack of safeguards in the privatization
process ensured that criminals and officials were the major beneficiaries.
There are variations on this theme in Mexico. Political corruption and the
system of bribery and corruption have been present at least since Spanish rule.
These conditions continued in the 20th Century, during most of which the PRI
had a virtual monopoly of power. Politics and society during this period were
based on patron-client relations and the relationship between government and
organized crime accorded with this general pattern. Leaders of the govern-ment and ruling party used organized crime for personal enrichment and to
provide funding for the social control apparatus. In turn, they allowed organ-
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318 PHIL WILLIAMS AND ROY GODSON
ized crime to operate with a high degree of immunity. Lupsha and Pimentel
have termed this the Elite-Exploitative model a term that could be applied
equally well to authoritarian regimes.8 However, in Mexico and elsewhere
this situation has broken down. As the PRI dominance of both political and
economic sectors eroded, so did its control over organized crime. As a result,
organized crime in Mexico helped also by links with Colombian drug traf-
fickers and proximity to United States markets expanded. In an interesting
contrast with the Russian (and Italian) case, local extortion in Mexico has
been far less pervasive. Organized crime in Mexico has taken the form pre-
dominantly of trafficking in drugs, people, motor vehicles and various other
forms of contraband. This is not entirely surprising. The proximity of the US
market as well as a long tradition of smuggling across the common border
meant that organized crime focused its activities predominantly in this area.
Such variations notwithstanding, both cases are examples of the weakening of
authoritarian states, with far-reaching implications for the level of organized
crime.Even some parts of pluralistic democratic systems can be so strong that
they encourage or facilitate criminal activities. In New York, for example, the
effective licensing and regulatory practices, in effect, very strong state mech-
anisms with little real accountability, transparency, or rule of law, apparently
had some of the characteristics and incentives to criminality seen in a number
of authoritarian systems. The US Cosa Nostra was able to benefit from these
arrangements for many decades, dominating a variety of industrial sectors
and the construction industry in particular. In the 1990s, however, changes in
accountability and the development of more effective rule of law mechanisms
at the state, federal, as well as New York City levels, apparently led to the
diminution of Mafia control.
9
Weak states characterized by ethnic conflict or terrorist activity
Fertile soil for the growth of organized crime is also found in states that, in
effect, implode or disintegrate. The low level of legitimacy of some states can
take the form either of ethnic secession movements or an attempt to obtain
control of the state apparatus by force and exclude competing factions. Where
this results in the disintegration of the state, as in the former Yugoslavia, there
is likely to be an increase in criminal activities for several reasons.
The collapse of central authority is likely to be accompanied by a col-
lapse of the criminal justice system and the removal of constraints on
behavior. War crimes and organized crimes sometimes have the sameperpetrators.
Competing factions or separatists often resort to criminal behavior to
fund their political struggle. This was evident, for example, with the
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ANTICIPATING ORGANIZED AND TRANSNATIONAL CRIME 319
Kosovo Liberation Army which reportedly used profits accrued through
the involvement of Kosovo Albanians in heroin trafficking in several
countries in Western Europe.10 During the last several years of the 1990s,
the number of Kosovo Albanians arrested in Europe for drug trafficking
has increased significantly. The US and many Latin American govern-
ments also claim similar developments occurred in Peru in the 1980s
(e.g., Sendero Luminoso), and with the Colombian FARC, ELN, and
paramilitaries in the 1990s.
Conditions of chaos provide a fertile ground for criminal entrepreneur-
ship and a lucrative payoff for the supply of even legal goods that are
in high demand but low supply. Those who can supply goods that are
not readily available reap large rewards. Ironically, the opportunities for
criminal profiteering in regions of ethnic conflict are increased signific-
antly by the imposition of international embargoes which create illegal
markets such as those in the Balkans. During the war in Bosnia, for ex-ample, the Serb paramilitary leader Arkan (formerly a contract killer for
the Yugoslav Communist party, and wanted for armed robberies in the
Netherlands and Sweden) gained control of gasoline and other products
and, according to the UN War Crimes Tribunal, became wealthy as a
result.11
The cessation of conflict can also lead to an upsurge of organized crime
as former combatants use their expertise in violence in furtherance of
criminal activities. The end of the war in Bosnia, for example, was asso-
ciated with the spread of organized crime from the Balkans into Central
and Western Europe. Criminal groups from the Balkans have not only
become active in Austria and elsewhere, but are also extremely violent.A major study of organized crime in the Netherlands noted that out-
side the circles of Dutch criminal groups, it is mainly former Yugoslav
gangs that repeatedly exhibit a willingness to use violence against police
officers.12 This is hardly surprising given the number of specialists in
violence who had graduated from military to criminal activities.
None of this is to claim that all domestic conflicts, whether based on ethnic
hatred, ideological differences, or religious intolerance, have an organized
crime spin-off. There are cases in which this has not occurred. Nevertheless,
these should not obscure the fact that in an era when conflicts over identity
and political power have become ubiquitous and funding from other states
has become far more tenuous than during the Cold War one of the mostimportant means of obtaining the funding for political and military struggle
is through criminal activities, a development that typically results in fighters-
turned-felons.13
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320 PHIL WILLIAMS AND ROY GODSON
Similar dynamics are evident in countries in which unsatisfied demands
for self-government among a significant minority of the population have gen-
erated terrorist campaigns. In some of these terrorist groups engage in crim-
inal activity to fund their political activities. The Basque ETA, for example,
has a subordinate organization called KAS that typically committed crime
for profit on its behalf, collected revolutionary taxes, and had control over
Jarrai, a youth group which is heavily involved in street violence and provides
an important source of recruitment.14 Similarly during the 1980s surprising
numbers of Tamils were arrested in Europe for drug trafficking. Even the
IRA, which obtained much of its financing from voluntary contributions,
helped to finance its armed struggle through a variety of criminal activities
ranging from video piracy and Eurofraud to bank robberies, extortion of small
businesses and the theft and sale of construction equipment from Britain.15
One possibility for the future and this is speculative is that some
terrorist groups will transform themselves into criminal organizations primar-
ily focusing their activities on illegal profit-making activities. For example,where a political settlement removes the political rationale for continued vi-
olence or where some members of terrorist organizations are so hooked on
the lifestyle and so attracted by the profits, they are tempted to continue the
illegal profit-making for mercenary rather than political reasons. In North-
ern Ireland, for example, some terrorists, instead of reverting to law-abiding
citizens, have become full-time criminal entrepreneurs. There are precedents
for this. Perhaps the most notable of which is the transformation of Chinese
Triads from political to criminal organizations. Initially established in the
17th Century to oppose the Qing dynasty, the many Triads were bereft of
their cause by the collapse of the Qing and the establishment of the Republic
of China in 1912. While some members entered politics, those who werenot absorbed by the political machine returned to the well-established Triad
organizations for power and status. However, without a patriotic cause to pur-
sue, the secretive and anti-establishment nature of the organizations helped
transform them into criminal groups.16 This kind of transformation from
political activism or terrorism to organized crime is not pre-ordained, but is a
distinct possibility that needs to be considered.
Democratic states with high legitimacy as crime resistant states
Identifying the conditions under which organized crime can flourish is also
suggestive of conditions which it finds inhospitable. Well-functioning demo-
cracies with a high level of political legitimacy, a strong and deeply en-trenched culture of legality, rule of law, structures for accountability and
oversight, and high levels of transparency inhibit the emergence of organized
crime. If these characteristics are present, it is more difficult for organized
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ANTICIPATING ORGANIZED AND TRANSNATIONAL CRIME 321
crime to develop a symbiotic relationship with the political and administrative
elites and to come into the mainstream of political life in the country.
Resulting propositions about the political environment and organized crime
From all this it is possible to formulate several propositions about the sets
of conditions under which criminal organizations develop and flourish and
conversely do not develop in particular states:
States that are weak provide a congenial home base for criminal organiz-
ations. Operating from this home base criminal groups can extend their
operations elsewhere, especially if they have products (whether drugs,
women, or arms) which are in demand elsewhere.
Strong states act as incubators for criminal organizations but generally
succeed in circumscribing and containing these activities. The weaken-
ing of these states, either gradually or suddenly, as part of a transition
from one form of political and/or economic system to another, facilit-
ates the expansion of criminal activities well beyond the previous limits.
Although the political-criminal nexus that developed in the previous re-
gime will tend to survive the change, the power relationship within the
nexus is likely to move in favor of the criminals. Similarly, corruption
which in the old system was used to benefit the political elites now
becomes a major instrument used by organized crime to protect itself.
These developments tend to perpetuate the weakness of the state and
hinder the prospects for a successful transformation to the rule of law
and to a functioning and vibrant democracy.
States in which there is not only a political transition but also transition
from a command economy to a free market will experience not only a
significant increase in the level of organized crime but also more per-
vasive forms of organized crime. In such economic transformations, or-
ganized crime is likely to go well beyond the supply of illicit goods and
services to become deeply entrenched in the economy. Criminal groups
will exert control over many business enterprises, especially those in
the export sector, will have a significant influence on financial institu-
tions such as banks, and will also demand protection money from large
and small businesses alike. Extortion will become one of the staples
of organized crime in transition economies as criminal groups developparasitical relationships with new enterprises. The converse is that in
states in which the transition is only political, organized crime will not
develop in these directions to anything like the same extent.
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322 PHIL WILLIAMS AND ROY GODSON
States in which there are ethnic conflicts or terrorist movements are also
likely to see an increase in organized criminal activity, as are neighbor-
ing states, especially in weak or ungovemable regions.
Peace agreements in ethnic conflicts, civil wars, or states in which terror-
ist groups have been active sometimes generate an increase in organized
crime if former members of military or para-military organizations turn
their attention to crime for mercenary or personal, rather than political,
reasons.
Although the proposition about the transformation from a command economy
to the free market suggests that it might be possible to anticipate, in broad
terms, the form that criminal activities will take in certain kinds of transition,
for the most part the political models help us to understand the scale of or-
ganized crime and the conditions that lead to its increase. The various models
are encapsulated in Table 1:
Other models provide opportunities to anticipate in more detail the activit-
ies and strategies of criminal organizations at both the domestic and transna-tional levels.
Economic models
There are two closely related economic models that provide a basis for anti-
cipating future trends in organized crime. The first is about market demand
and the nature of criminal markets; the second is about the way criminal
enterprises behave in criminal markets. Both models emphasize the profit
motive and economic considerations as opposed to political conditions. Both
also provide insights into the kinds of organized crime behavior that it might
be possible to anticipate.
The market model
The first model focuses on the dynamics of supply and demand in illegal
markets whether local or global. An illegal market has been defined as a
place or situation in which there is a constant exchange of goods and ser-
vices, whose production, marketing and consumption are legally forbidden
or severely restricted by the majority of states. Moreover, the activities of
that illegal market are socially and institutionally condemned as an inherent
threat to human dignity and the public good. Typical markets of this kind . . .
include hard drugs, illicit arms sales, trade in economic and sexual slavery,
capital originating from criminal activity, and deals involving secret informa-
tion and intelligence.17
At least four different kinds of products are the focusof criminal markets: prohibited goods such as drugs; regulated goods such as
fauna and flora or antiquities; stolen (and counterfeit) goods such as cars; and
products that are differentially taxed in different jurisdictions and are often
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ANTICIPATING ORGANIZED AND TRANSNATIONAL CRIME 323
Table 1.
Political conditions Implications Result to anticipate
Weak state Opportunities for organized Organized crime can flourish
crime to develop with little and use the state as a home
interference; base
Role of organized crime as
substitute for protective and
regulatory functions of the
state
Strong state becoming Initial incubation then States in transition particularly
weak expansion of power of vulnerable to organized crime
organized crime as state loses inhibiting progress toward
power democracy, rule of law, and
the free marketStates characterized by Factions use criminal activities Increase in organized crime,
ethnic conflict, insurgency to fund their political struggle; including violence, within the
or terrorism and use embargoes as state and its neighbors.
opportunity for trafficking and End of conflict may lead to
profiteering transformation of terrorist
organizations into primarily
criminal organizations
Strong democratie states Constant struggle between Organized crime provides
with high levels of organized crime and law illicit goods and seeks
legitimacy, transparency, enforcement vulnerable economic sectors
rule of law but largely on the defensive
smuggled from the low tax jurisdiction to the one with higher taxes. Research
and analysis of illicit markets suggests that they are often disorganized, rather
than highly organized, with multiple participants who cooperate and compete
in complex and unpredictable ways.18 Indeed, one proponent of this approach
is highly skeptical about the role of hierarchical criminal organizations in
illicit entrepreneurship, contending instead that organization is merely a form
of govemance in, or regulation and enforcement, in the criminal world.19
Theargument is that it is individuals or small groups of members of a criminal
organization rather than the organization per se who meet the demand for
illicit products.
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324 PHIL WILLIAMS AND ROY GODSON
The critical dimension in this view is not criminal organizations, but the
dynamics of illegal markets. Prohibition regimes (which simply reduce sup-
ply but not demand and therefore push up price) generally encourage an influx
of suppliers, varying greatly in size and power. These markets are rarely
dominated by a small number of large syndicates. A good example is the
trafficking of women for commercial sex an area of activity that is generally
regarded as being controlled by organized crime. In fact, although criminal
organizations are the single most important kind of player in this market, there
is a wide range of participants in the trade, including: brokers and agencies
who recruit the women, often using false promises of employment; corrupt
officials who assist in provision of passports, visas, work permits, and any
other documentation; brothel owners and criminal groups who pay the sup-
pliers and put the women to work; and corrupt policemen and politicians
who take payoffs in money or in kind for turning a blind eye to prosti-
tution in their jurisdiction. Moreover, although some criminal organizations
are directly engaged in the trafficking, others simply facilitate the process andprotect, or tax the agencies and entrepreneurs involved. The implication of
all this is that the much touted monopoly control over markets is much more
elusive (except perhaps at the local level) than many traditional accounts of
organized crime imply.
The enterprise model
The second economic model starts from the notion that organized crime
groups are essentially enterprises with the emphasis on the business dimen-
sion rather than the criminal.20 There is a continuum of business enterprises
from licit firms which engage solely in licit businesses, through licit firms
which sometimes act in illicit ways, to illicit firms which operate in illegal
markets and provide prohibited or highly regulated goods and services. This
is not to ignore the characteristics of criminal enterprises that differentiate
them from their licit counterparts the need to conceal their activities, the
importance of security precautions, the use of violence and the use of corrup-
tion. Important as these differences are, though, they should not obscure the
commonalities, the most important of which is the desire for profit. Indeed,
wherever enterprises fall on the licit-illicit continuum they behave in essen-
tially similar ways: they typically scan their environment for opportunities,
seek to make rational judgments about opportunities and dangers, and seek to
maximize their profits where this does not involve unacceptably high levelsof risk. Not all criminal organizations engage in a formal planning process;
nevertheless their thinking, intuitively or deliberately, will reflect standard
business needs and take into account such factors as new product opportunit-
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ANTICIPATING ORGANIZED AND TRANSNATIONAL CRIME 325
ies, product dominance, profit margin, market needs and opportunities, degree
of competition, risk management, retirement strategy, and the like.
Resulting propositionsAlthough there are differences among these two economic models, they both
place considerable emphasis on the market and the opportunities it provides.
They see criminals as rational actors constantly seeking new opportunities
to maximize their profits. Furthermore, even if one accepts the argument
that criminal entrepreneurs are usually a few individuals or small groups
and that criminal markets are not dominated by large-scale hierarchical or-
ganizations, the implication is not to reject parallels with licit business. In
both the licit business world and the world of criminal enterprises, there
are enormous variations in size and structure of the firms. Acknowledging
that much criminal enterprise is run by small businesses rather than large
conglomerates simply reflects this diversity. Consequently, these two modelscan, in effect, be lumped together to suggest the following propositions about
criminal operations and the kinds of developments that can be anticipated:
Criminal organizations will constantly seek new geographic markets and
if these markets are lucrative will not usually be deterred unless met by
overwhelming countervailing power or cultural resistance. This helps
to explain why a growing number of criminal organizations have in-
creasingly become transnational in their operations. Globalization has
offered new opportunities and provided new imperatives for licit busi-
nesses seeking to be competitive. It has had the same effect in the crim-
inal world, encouraging criminal organizations to meet (or create) mar-
ket demand well beyond their home state. In effect, criminal organiza-
tions go where the rewards are greatest, exploiting disparities in price,
as well as differential laws and regulations and culture. The implication
of this is that even states that have well-established criminal justice sys-
tems that in some ways are resistant to organized crime find themselves
attracting criminal organizations that see them as a lucrative venue for
business. Not surprisingly, therefore, the United States has become a
host or target state for transnational criminal organizations with home
bases in other states. The search for new markets also explains why,
since the end of apartheid, South Africa, with its open borders, weak
criminal justice system, well-developed infrastructure and by African
standards at least high level of wealth has become a major target for
African criminal organizations as well as those from elsewhere. Nigeriancriminals have transformed the South African drug market through large-
scale imports of cocaine, while Chinese, Russian Moroccan, and Italian
criminals are also active in the country.21 In a similar vein, Colombian
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326 PHIL WILLIAMS AND ROY GODSON
drug trafficking organizations, through the 1990s, developed major new
markets in Western Europe and the former Soviet Union. This is evident
in the increasingly large seizures of cocaine in the Newly Independent
States.
In terms of products, the enterprise model suggests that some criminal
organizations will increasingly diversify their activities into a range of
illicit products. Among the illicit markets that have taken on new dimen-
sions in recent years are commercial sex and the trafficking of women
and children, CFCs, automobile theft, and illegal trafficking in fauna
and flora. Furthermore, we should expect to see both product specializ-
ation and the rise of poly-commodity trafficking organizations. There is
evidence of the latter in the Florida-Puerto Rico, California-Baja chan-
nels which are used for bringing drugs and people to the United States
from Central and South America and for taking motor vehicles from
the United States to Central and South America. Among the criminal
enterprises that are operating simultaneously in a variety of illegal mar-
kets are Mexican, US, Chinese, Nigerian, and Turkish groups. Chinese
criminal enterprises engage in a wide variety of activities ranging from
the smuggling of illegal aliens to large-scale intellectual property theft
and counterfeiting; Turkish entrepreneurs traffic in heroin, people, an-
tiquities, and, in some cases, nuclear materials; while Nigerian groups
in a section of Johannesburg operate both drugs and prostitution. This
pattern of diversification is likely to be replicated elsewhere.
Just like licit enterprises seeking to minimize their tax burdens, crim-
inal enterprises seek to protect their profits. They often use offshore
financial centers and bank secrecy jurisdictions to protect their money.
It would not be surprising if, in the future, they also make increasinguse of smart cards and e-money to break the audit or investigative trail.
In order to keep ahead of efforts to clamp down on money laundering
through more stringent regulation of the banking sector even in offshore
financial centers, they have an incentive to use other mechanisms such as
trusts, international business corporations, and new financial instruments
such as options and derivatives that protect the identity of the beneficial
owner. As new offshore financial centers open up, so criminal entrepren-
eurs use them, tentatively at first, and more fully as they become more
confident of the protection they provide.
Just as licit enterprises engage in cooperative as well as competitive be-
havior, criminal organizations are likely to collaborate with one anotheragainst common adversaries, particularly law enforcement. The collab-
oration may take diverse forms ranging from strategic alliances and joint
ventures at the most ambitious level through tactical alliances, contract
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ANTICIPATING ORGANIZED AND TRANSNATIONAL CRIME 327
relationships, supplier customer relations, to spot sales at the most basic
level. Cooperation will be particularly attractive when well-established
criminal enterprises have saturated the existing market but are facing
obstacles in their efforts to break into new markets. A local partner can
greatly facilitate such an entry and by exploiting existing distribution
channels and corruption networks can ensure the rapid development of
the market.22
Where cooperation has resulted in the development of major competit-
ors with a large market share, criminal enterprises will seek to develop
alternative allies, to re-establish their market position and to diversify
into new markets. This suggests that not only will some Colombian drug
trafficking organizations seek alternative partners to Mexican trafficking
organizations (as they seem to have done with the Dominicans) but they
will use routes that do not go through Mexico and develop new markets
where Mexican organizations are not major players.
To operate effectively in markets that are diffused or disorganized
and contain multiple players, criminal enterprises will seek to develop
patterns of cooperation with participants in the licit world who play a
critical role in supplying the commodity (parents of villagers who sell
their daughters; officials at chemical manufacturing plants willing to di-
vert precursors), in moving the commodity (customs and immigration
officials who have to be bribed) or in selling the commodity (art and
auction houses who sell antiques that do not have proven provenance).
In short, any criminal enterprise seeking to develop an effective market
niche will develop significantly collusive linkages with the licit world.
Criminal enterprises will seek to penetrate legitimate business to protect
their funds, to provide apparent legitimacy for wealth, and, in a few casesto provide an option for a transition to licit business or retirement from
criminal activities. Licit business enterprises also can be excellent covers
for various kinds of trafficking activities. In order to diversify and protect
their profits, criminal enterprises will move into the licit business world,
exploiting vulnerable points of entry into particular firms or industries.
This was done in the garbage disposal and construction industries in
the United States, hazardous waste disposal in ltaly, and, more recently,
the commodities, aluminum, banking, and export industries in Russia.
Criminal organizations will not only use these licit enterprises as a cover
for illicit activities, and possibly as a further source of profit, but also,
over the medium and long term, as a means of legitimization.Whereas the political models were useful primarily for anticipating changes
in the magnitude and type of organized crime, the enterprise and market
models provide more insight into the business opportunities and incentives
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328 PHIL WILLIAMS AND ROY GODSON
Table 2.
Economic model Implications Result to anticipate
Market dynamics Organized crime responds to Criminal organizations will
market dynamics and exploits become major participants in a
demand for its goods and variety of criminal markets,
services especially where there but will not have monopoly
are prohibition regimes control over these markets
Enterprise model Criminal organizations will Criminal enterprises will seek
act in ways similar to licit to diversify markets and
enterprises and will seek out products, to protect profits (for
new business opportunities, example, by using offshore
structures, and strategies to financial centers), and will
maximize profits cooperate with other criminal
organizations and will collude
with various individuals,
institutions and agencies in the
licit world
that are available and the kinds of strategies that particular groups are likely
to adopt to maximize their profits. Understanding the dynamics of illegal
markets and the business strategies pursued by criminal enterprises to should
enable governments and private enterprises to anticipate new departures in
criminal activity. This is summarized in Table 2.
Anticipation of criminal initiatives, however, requires that analysts under-stand the specific perspectives and perceptions of the criminal organizations
and understand their logic, their assessment of risks and opportunities and the
considerations that will determine their ultimate policy choices. This theme
is discussed further below.
Social models
Although the political and economic models of organized crime are among
the most compelling, they are certainly not the only significant models. Social
models emphasize such factors as the cultural basis for organized crime, the
idea of criminal networks as a social system, and the importance of trust andbonding mechanisms as the basis for criminal organization. Whereas political
models focus on the opportunities available in particular kinds of govern-
mental arrangements and enterprise models focus on the market opportunities
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ANTICIPATING ORGANIZED AND TRANSNATIONAL CRIME 329
and how they might be exploited, social models focus on the grass-roots level,
the cultural conditions that encourage and facilitate criminality, as well as the
way in which crime is actually organized.
The cultural model
Organized crime is facilitated by particular cultural and subcultural factors
such as patron-client relations, ties of family and kinship, suspicion of out-
siders, and informal exchange networks.23 Communities where social organ-
ization has these characteristics generally are characterized by the absence
of an effective rule of law system and the expectation of a culture of law-
lessness. Often they also are characterized by the emergence of secret societ-
ies engaged in criminal activities. In Sicily, for example, where there was a
powerful tradition of clientelism in which success was believed to depend on
connections with those with power, the Mafia structure itself is territorial and
family based. Loyalty to the local crime family (cosu) was reinforced byoaths and rituals designed to encourage omerta silence before the law.24
Indeed, the creation and maintenance of loyalty and allegiance, achieved
through rituals and oaths and backed up by penalties for defections, was
simultaneously a sub-cultural norm and a fundamental defense mechanism
against the power of the ruling class and its repressive legal techniques.
Traditional Chinese organized crime had similar cultural underpinnings.
As one observer has noted, In the development of Chinese crime groups,
the values and norms of the Triad subculture have been paramount.25 Ini-
tially, the Triads were politically motivated secret societies and although they
degenerated into criminal organizations, their character and many of their
functions continued to be influenced by their origin. The criminal Triads,
for example, continued to use oaths and rituals to induct new members. In
many respects, these resembled the oaths and rituals of the Sicilian Mafia and
were similarly intended to instill a high sense of loyalty and an enormous
fear of disloyalty. Indeed, the Triad emphasis on loyalty, brotherhood and
secrecy although not intrinsically criminal provided an important basis for
criminal activities.26 Yet, there has also been some dilution of this compon-
ent of Chinese organized crime and the formal Triad structure and Triad
norms have become less important. As the groups replaced their patriotic
or benevolent causes with criminal activities, other changes also occurred.27
Membership was granted to almost anybody who wanted to join, and leaders
lost track of and control over their followers. Members became interested in
enhancing their individual gains. Nowadays, the Triad values of patriotism,brotherhood, righteousness, and loyalty remain only in proclamations.28 For
some observers, however, there is still an important cultural underpinning for
Chinese organized crime. This is the notion of guanxi or reciprocal obligation
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330 PHIL WILLIAMS AND ROY GODSON
which treats family obligation as an imperative even if its spans generations
and continents. Although guanxi relationships are not as tightly enmeshed as
those of traditional Triad ties, some observers believe they provide a basis for
the global activities of Chinese criminals. Guanxi provides a basis for trust
and therefore facilitates a great deal of criminal activity in the same way that
it facilitates much licit business.29
It is also arguable that cultures in which the culture of lawlessness and
corruption is endemic provide an important incubator for the development
of indigenous organized crime and an attractive target for transnational or-
ganized crime looking for new opportunities. In Nigeria, for example, the
political system is based largely on what has been termed prebendalism,
that is a pattern of political behavior in which individuals compete for public
offices in order to use them for the personal benefit of the office-holder and
his faction.30 Closely related to this are patronage and clientelism, patterns of
behavior that place much more emphasis on contacts and favors as a means
of getting ahead and accumulating wealth than on norms, standards of be-havior, or the rule of law. Such a cultural climate easily condones criminal
activities so long as they are successful in the acquisition of resources. When
coupled with authoritarian military rule that characterized Nigerian politics
for several decades, this cultural factor helps to explain the rise of Nigerian
organized crime. High levels of education, mobility, and well-established
trading patterns, as well as the link to Britain, all help to explain why Nigerian
crime has become ubiquitous at the global level. Indeed, the cultural model is
sometimes incorporated implicitly or explicitly into the next model which
focuses on ethnic networks.
The ethnic network model
Ethnic and diaspora networks have been significant, particularly in the devel-
opment of transnational organized crime. As one component of the broader
process of globalization, transnational ethnic networks transcend national
borders and often facilitate transnational criminal activities. Even though most
immigrants are law-abiding citizens who are more likely to be the victims
rather than the perpetrators of crimes, the Sicilian diaspora helped to bring
Mafia-like organized crime to the United States in the late nineteenth and
first half of the twentieth century. In the second half of the twentieth century
this process was extended to, among other places, Australia and Venezuela.
Similarly, the Chinese diaspora brought the Chinese variant to many parts of
the Pacific and other regions, such as the United States, Western Europe, andeven Russia. For its part, the Nigerian diaspora has allowed Nigerian criminal
groups to pose problems for law enforcement in countries as diverse as Bri-
tain, South Africa, the United States, Russia, Italy, and Brazil. Colombians
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ANTICIPATING ORGANIZED AND TRANSNATIONAL CRIME 331
in the United States, Turks in Western Europe, and Russians in Israel have
greatly facilitated the creation of network structures for criminal activities.
Indeed, ethnic communities can be an important resource for transnational
criminal enterprises, providing recruitment opportunities, cover and support.
Recruitment based on ethnic loyalties is facilitated when immigrant groups
are alienated rather than integrated into their adopted society. As one analyst
observed: Many immigrant groups have been totally marginalized in Europe,
some live in cultural ghettos. They readily provide some of the personnel for
international organized crime.31 Low status and poor conditions mean that
the rewards offered for assistance in smuggling or other illegal activities are
relatively attractive in spite of the risks. Even casual participation or involve-
ment on the margins can yield greater rewards than can be obtained through
the licit economy. Furthermore, ethnically-based criminal networks are also
difficult to penetrate since they have inbuilt defense mechanisms provided by
their language and culture. These barriers are often strengthened by ties of
kinship, and inherent suspicion of authority. A further consideration is thevulnerability of their relatives at home to punishment should the migrants
decide to collaborate with law enforcement in their new home country. Just as
transnational corporations have their local subsidiaries, transnational criminal
organizations often have their ethnically based criminal groups and networks
within immigrant communities.
The social network model
A third social model of organized crime is sufficiently broad to encompass
both the cultural and ethnic network models while also extending beyond
them. This can be termed the social network model. Part of the impetus for
this came from dissatisfaction with descriptions of the Mafia in the United
States as simple hierarchies. Joseph Albinis work, for example, revealed that
even Italian organized crime in the United States could best be understood
through patron-client relations rather than formal hierarchies.32 A similar
conclusion emerged from a historical study of organized crime in New York,
in which Alan Block concluded that not only was organized crime more
fragmented and chaotic than believed, but also it involved webs of influ-
ence linking criminals with those in positions of power in the political and
economic world. These patterns of affiliation and influence were far more
important than any formal structure and allowed criminals to maximize op-
portunities. In a similar vein, Francis Ianni highlighted the importance of
networks in African-American and Puerto Rican criminal activities in NewYork.33 In some quarters, however, there is still a tendency to regard tradi-
tional hierarchical models such as the Cosa Nostra in the United States, as
real organized crime, to equate hierarchy with organization, and to dismiss
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332 PHIL WILLIAMS AND ROY GODSON
networks as disorganized crime. Such assumptions are misleading and mask
significant anticipated organized crime behavior.
This is even more apparent from the recognition given to networks as an
effective organizational form for innovation whether in business or in politics.
Society has developed through various stages, each characterized by various
organizational or institutional patterns. It has evolved through tribes, institu-
tions, and markets, with networks, it is argued, now becoming a dominant
organizational form.34 At each stage a new organizational pattern does not
replace old ones, but surpasses them in efficiency and effectiveness for at
least some tasks. In the business context, the search for affiliates, allies, and
partners, and the formation of transnational business networks has become
critical in enabling firms to compete effectively on the global level. In effect,
there has been widespread adoption of the keiretsu model that was long seen
as a critical ingredient in the competitiveness and efficiency of many Japanese
companies. The internal counterpart of this has been the tendency in some
firms to seek skillful management, innovation, and enhanced productivitythrough largely horizontal network based structures rather than the traditional
pyramids or hierarchies.
The same tendency is visible in organized crime. Gary Potter, for example,
has suggested that organized crime in the United States can best be under-
stood in network terms, while Finckenauer and Waring, in a study on Russian
emigre criminals in the United States concluded that they operate largely
through network structures.35 Nor is reliance on networks confined to the
United States. As one data-rich report on organized crime in the Netherlands
noted in reference to the Dutch drug trade: There is no evidence of one big
organic identity at the command of one leader with various echelons function-
ing quasi-automatically within it. The world of the Dutch wholesale tradingdrugs can better be described as an extensive network where thousands of
individuals, often in cliques and groups, are linked by formal or informal
relations, or where these relations are easy to establish through friends of
friends if business so requires. Intersections can be discemed in the network,
and individuals and groups with more power than others.36 The authors also
emphasize the dynamic quality of these networks: they contend that although
many of the relationships are not particularly stable, clashes among them are
generally followed by the creation of new action sets to implement specific
criminal activities or more long-term coalitions.37
This is not surprising: networks are sophisticated organizational structures
that are well suited for criminal activities. Among the major characteristics
of criminal networks are the following:
They are flexible and adaptable, able to respond quickly to market oppor-
tunities and to the efforts of law enforcement to disrupt their activities.
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ANTICIPATING ORGANIZED AND TRANSNATIONAL CRIME 333
They are highly resistant to disruption and even when they have been
degraded have a significant capacity for reconstitution.
They are capable of considerable expansion through recruitment of new
members, whether individuals or organizations. They have a capacity to extend across national borders either through
ethnic linkages or through simple business linkages that enable them to
exploit new opportunities.
They can extend in ways that allow them to cross boundaries of demarc-
ation such as that between the licit and illicit sectors of the economy and
society.
Networks seek to defend themselves through expansion into the upper-
world and recruitment of politicians, bureaucrats, judges, and law en-
forcement agents who are susceptible to coercion or bribery.
Criminal networks develop safeguards against infiltration and damage.
In particular, they develop mechanisms to insulate the central figures
who are responsible for organizing the core of the network and directing
the networks activities. In addition, they will develop a high degree of
redundancy and duplication, something that in licit business is regarded
as wasteful and unnecessary. For criminal networks, in contrast, such
redundancy is essential. It makes them highly resilient to disruption and
provides a significant capacity for reconstitution in the event that they
are damaged by law enforcement.
In view of these characteristics, networks are an ideal vehicle for execut-
ing transnational criminal activities such as drug trafficking and other forms
of smuggling.38 Understanding their characteristics therefore, should enable
analysts to anticipate certain kinds of criminal behavior. Indeed, each of these
social models yields certain insights that can be used to anticipate some of theactivities of criminal organizations.
Resulting propositions
These various social models yield propositions about the evolution of organ-
ized crime that have implications for prevention and enforcement efforts and
their likely degree of success:
Where patron-client relations are a key component of a national culture,
criminals will seek high level patronage and protection from the political
establishment. In return, they will provide either monetary or political
favors, or some mixture of both. This overlaps with one of the political
models but whereas that model emphasizes the opportunities that comefrom weak oversight and transparency, the emphasis here is on the cul-
tural conditions that transform patronage, clientelism, and culture into
criminal-political relationships.39
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334 PHIL WILLIAMS AND ROY GODSON
Since defections are a fundamental challenge to criminal organizations
rooted in sub-cultural norms, cooperation with the authorities will invari-
ably result in attempted retribution against the defectors and their famil-
ies. This can be understood partly in terms of simple revenge. Yet, such
killings also represent an effort by criminal organizations to re-establish
and re-impose norms that are not only essential to their operations but
that are critical to their sense of identity. In other words, traditional
criminal organizations will seek to maintain or restore their sub-cultural
traditions and norms even if this requires extensive violence.
Diaspora communities can become a base from which certain criminal
organizations operate. As a countrys population becomes more diverse
so will its criminal organizations. Moreover, different criminal organiz-
ations tend to develop different styles of operation. Nigerian groups for
example, typically exploit targets of convenience whether the social wel-
fare system in Britain, or credit cards in the United States and Canada, or
the demand for heroin in any number of countries. Consequently, where
immigrant communities are growing, law enforcement should expect
manifestations of organized crime to emerge from within them and to
spread well beyond them. Once again this points to the need for a greater
understanding of the diverse forms that organized crime can take.
Criminal networks will seek to expand and co-opt a whole set of sup-
port players who provide entry points to the licit worlds of government,
finance and business. Organized crime-corruption networks will become
increasingly pervasive and make use of the upperworld professionals
such as lawyers and accountants for services such as money laundering,
of government officials for network protection and support, and law
enforcement officers for counterintelligence.
Once established, criminal networks will not be easily defeated. Unless
the nodes and connections that are identified and eliminated are critical
to the functioning of the network, criminal networks will simply use
alternative nodes and connections. The redundancies they create as de-
fense mechanisms mean that it is difficult to degrade them. Moreover,
even if they are seriously impaired they will often display a remarkable
capacity to reconstitute and regenerate themselves in a short time period.
Indeed, the remnants of one criminal network can continue to function
even in truncated form. In Colombia, for example, the destruction of
the Cali cartel meant that Colombian organizations became part of a
less-concentrated trafficking network which has continued to supply theUnited States and other drug markets. The possibility for regeneration is
something that crime prevention and law enforcement practitioners can
monitor in order to minimize the prospect of being taken by surprise.
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ANTICIPATING ORGANIZED AND TRANSNATIONAL CRIME 335
Table 3.
Social models Implications Result to anticipate
Cultural and sub-cultural Loyalty is not to state but to Criminal organizations will
model based on patron-client family, kin or ethnic group. not only flourish but will
relations, ties of family and Personal exchange penetrate government, creating
kinship or on patterns of relationships are more crime-corruption networks
corruption important than the rule of law. that are difficult to eradicate.
Ethnic network model based Transnational ethnic networks In many cases diasporas will
on ethnic ties in immigrant and immigrant communities be followed by the growth of
communities that are marginalized provide organized criminality. For host
cover and recruitment for societies this means that
criminal organizations and are organized crime will become
difficult for law enforcement more diverse.
to penetrate
Social network model based Organized crime can best be Network organizations will
on the notion that networks understood in terms of extend into the licit political
are not disorganized but network structures that are and economic world and will
are highly sophisticated characterized by high levels of also extend across national
organizational forms flexibility, redundancy, and borders. Networks will prove
resilience as well as a capacity highly resistant to traditional
to cross boundaries. law enforcement attacks.
If the political models help us to understand the level of organized crime and
the enterprise and market models to understand their business strategy, the so-
cial models highlight yet other dimensions. Recognizing the cultural origins
of particular groups, the importance of ethnic networks as a facilitator for
forms of organized crime that are novel to the host countries, the propensity
of criminal networks to expand across borders and into the licit world, and the
capacity of these networks to defend and even regenerate themselves provides
opportunities to anticipate developments. These models are encapsulated in
Table 3.
The strategic or risk management model
Another model that has not been fully developed in the organized crime lit-erature, but that recognizes that criminal organizations are in an adversarial
relationship with government and law enforcement agencies, as well as each
other, is what can be termed the strategic or risk management model. This
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336 PHIL WILLIAMS AND ROY GODSON
model is based partly on the proposition that criminal organizations seek not
only to maintain their survival and maximize profits, but also to minimize the
law enforcement risk.40 It is also based on the recognition that in adversarial
relationships each side tries to anticipate the behavior of the other and act
accordingly.
While analogies such as American football or chess are over-simplistic
since they depend heavily on rules, the essence of the competitive structure
is similar in that criminal organizations and government agencies are intent
on outwitting each other, anticipating each others initiatives, and taking ap-
propriate countermeasures. In some respects, of course, this overlaps with the
model of organized crime as criminal enterprise, which also recognizes that
criminal organizations face risks from government and rival groups. It expli-
citly acknowledges that criminal organizations have to operate not only in a
competitive environment, in which force becomes the arbiter of competition,
but also an environment in which governments and law enforcement agencies
are, in effect, trying to put them out of business. Consequently, criminal en-terprises face a distinct form of risk which has implications for their structure
and behavior. Hence, criminal enterprises are risk management entities par
excellence.41 Their risk management strategies can range from simple efforts
to separate the organization (or its leaders) and the crime, or they can be much
more elaborate and extensive.
Indeed, it is possible to identify three kinds of measures that are or can be
generally incorporated into risk management strategies:
Initiatives designed for risk prevention whether through passive avoid-
ance or more proactive measures designed to shape the environment in
which criminal organizations operate. Criminal groups function most
effectively when focused on entrepreneurial initiatives rather than coun-tering law enforcement. Consequently, they seek to ensure the safety of
the leaders, the continued viability of the organizations and the immunity
of their proceeds from seizure through the creation of a low-risk envir-
onment and the exploitation of safe havens. The proceeds of crime in
the face of aggressive law enforcement will typically be sent to offshore
financial centers and bank secrecy havens where they are relatively safe
from forfeiture and seizure laws.
Defensive measures and tactics that attempt to control the risks that have
to be incurred even in a relatively benign environment. Even though
Cali drug trafficking organizations had tried to co-opt major parts of
the Colombian government, its leaders developed extensive counter-in-telligence methods and acquired state of the art-technology to obtain ad-
equate warning of law enforcement and intelligence initiatives directed
against them.42
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ANTICIPATING ORGANIZED AND TRANSNATIONAL CRIME 337
Measures designed to mitigate damage and ensure that the organization
exhibits a high degree of resilience even in a hostile environment in
which defensive measures have proved inadequate.
Although there is some overlap among the three strategies, they are comple-mentary. The optimum strategy is to reduce risk through creating a congenial
environment for the leadership and its activities; as in other forms of business,
however, it is impossible to avoid risk altogether. Consequently, the second
component of risk management consists of measures taken to defend against
or control risks. Although this can go a long way to avoiding the imposition
of costs by law enforcement or rivals, almost invariably some costs will be in-
flicted on the organization. It is essential, therefore, for criminal organizations
to make preparations to mitigate the damage (including, as suggested above,
a reliance on network structures that can be reconstituted). Some risks can be
anticipated and costs avoided; other risks and costs can be limited, contained
or controlled; but some simply have to be accepted as part of the price of
engaging in a continuing criminal enterprise. The crucial thing therefore is toensure that inescapable risks and costs do not become overwhelming.
Risk management strategies developed by criminal leaders are multi-di-
mensional and multi-purpose. This is not surprising. The risks they confront
are both varied and pervasive: they include risks that their illegal products will
be seized, that the proceeds of their crimes will be forfeited, that their person-
nel will be killed, arrested or defect to law enforcement, that the integrity of
the criminal network will be compromised by infiltration, and that the enter-
prise will be disrupted or destroyed. Consequently, considerable energy, time,
and resources are devoted to managing these risks. The strategies that result
are designed to protect a variety of things including the leadership, organiz-
ational integrity, financial assets (most of which represent the accrued profitsfrom criminal activities), operational personnel, and the products of the crim-
inal organization. Not all these things have the same importance, however,
and both products and operational personnel will generally be regarded as
less important and more dispensable than leaders and profits.
Resulting propositions
The strategic and risk management model has significant implications for
much of the behavior of criminal enterprises. Among the kinds of strategies
and tactics that can be anticipated are the following:
Criminal leaders will be intent on creating or maintaining a safe haven,
sanctuary, or retirement strategy. One way is to take steps to ensure thattheir home base, at least, remains a congenial environment or sanctuary
from which they can operate with relative impunity. One of the most im-
portant ways to do this is through the use of systemic or institutionalized
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338 PHIL WILLIAMS AND ROY GODSON
corruption whereby the criminal enterprise obtains allies and protectors
at high levels in the state apparatus and the community at large. The pro-
position is that this strategy is likely to become even more widespread
and that regions in which organized crime develops will face a real
problem from systemic corruption that will prove enormously difficult
to reverse and eradicate.
As part of their defensive strategy, criminal organizations will operate
secretly, denying information to outsiders, and try to learn the secrets of
rival organizations and law enforcement agencies. They will also seek to
penetrate or infiltrate governments, law enforcement bodies, and private
sector security, thereby obtaining not only intimate knowledge of their
tactics and techniques, but also advance notice of any operations. There
are many cases of this, including some in Chicago where members of
some of the larger and more powerful street gangs became policemen.43
In other cases, drug trafficking organizations, for example in Colom-
bia, used their lawyers to learn about the methods the government was
adopting against them. In yet others, groups such as the Hells An-
gels have used bribery to corrupt policemen and thereby obtain critical
counter-intelligence that enabled them to undermine investigations.44
The proposition here is that such activities, far from being aberrations,
are increasingly likely to be the norm as organized crime, both domestic
and transnational, becomes the subject of increasing pressure from law
enforcement.
Criminal organizations concerned to protect themselves will make in-
creasing use of proxies and contractors at the operational level, allowing
the proxies to incur the risks of detection and apprehension. Nigerian
criminal organizations have become particularly adept at this, using arange of couriers from US military personnel to middle aged white wo-
men who do not fit the profile of typical drug traffickers developed by
customs organizations worldwide. This has a dual pay-off: it increases
the chances that the drugs will reach the market and it minimizes the
risks to the Nigerian criminals who have, in effect, graduated from a
service role to a managerial position.
Criminal organizations will become increasingly adept at disguise and
concealment of their products and will use technology, the capacity to
embed illicit products in licit, and the availability of multiple trafficking
routes in an effort to circumvent the efforts of law enforcement. Often
criminals will choose the route of least resistance, a calculation whichexplains why radioactive material trafficking had shifted from Austria
and Germany in the mid-1990s to the Caucasus, Turkey and Central Asia
in the late 1990s.45
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Criminal organizations will increasingly exploit technological develop-
ments, including information technologies as a means to enhance and
improve their risk management efforts. The most obvious case in point
is encryption which has been appearing increasingly in criminal cases
and offers opportunities to neutralize electronic surveillance which, in
the last few decades, has been one of the most potent law enforcement
weapons against organized crime. Encryption of communications and
computer systems will make it difficult for law enforcement to obtain
advanced warning of criminal activities, to disrupt criminal operations,
and to provide evidence of criminal activities that can be used in court
cases.
If some of the earlier models help us to anticipate the extent of organized
crime or the kinds of business strategies pursued by criminal organizations,
the strategy and risk management model has very obvious practical implic-
ations. Anticipating risk management strategies and the way they are imple-
mented should enable law enforcement to exploit the vulnerabilities of thecriminal organizations and to impose substantial costs upon them. An assess-
ment of the risk management strategies adopted by a criminal enterprise, for
example, can reveal the priorities for protection and, by implication, the major
vulnerabilities of the enterprise. This, in turn, could enable law enforcement
to deploy its own efforts and resources more effectively in pursuit of high
value targets. Furthermore, identifying the kinds of precautionary actions that
a criminal organization is taking (such as contracting out for money launder-
ing) provides opportunities to exploit these actions (through the creation of
money laundering fronts) and thereby damage and dislocate the organization.
The risk management model is summarized in Table 4.
Table 4.
Risk management model Implications Result to anticipate
Risk management model is Criminal organizations will Organized crime will seek safe
based on the idea that develop a comprehensive havens from which to operate
criminal organizations are in range of measures aimed at and will look to neutralize
adversarial relationships in the prevention, control, and governments and law
which strategy is critical mitigation of the risks they enforcement agencies through
face from law enforcement corruption, counter-
and rivals intelligence and security
practices, including making
greater use of information
technologies.
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Hybrid or composite models
A fifth set of approaches to anticipating organized crime lacks th