anti-corruption agency strengthening ......assessment of anti-corruption commission of the maldives...
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ANTI-CORRUPTION AGENCY STRENGTHENING INITIATIVE ASSESSMENT OF THE MALDIVES ANTI-CORRUPTION COMMISSION 2016
ii Transparency maldives
Transparency International is the global civil society organisation leading the fight against corruption. Through more than 100 chapters worldwide and an international secretariat in Berlin, we raise awareness of the damaging effects of corruption and work with partners in government, business and civil society to develop and implement effective measures to tackle it.
©2017 Transparency Maldives
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ANTI-CORRUPTION AGENCY STRENGTHENING INITIATIVE ASSESSMENT OF THE MALDIVES ANTI-CORRUPTION COMMISSION 2016
iv Transparency maldives
AcknowledgementsTransparency Maldives wishes to express its immense gratitude to the staff and seniors of all government institutions, independent institutions, NGOs and international organisations and private individuals who provided valuable time and information for the preparation of this report. We also would like to thank the individuals who worked in, or with the government in this field and shared their knowledge and experiences with the research team. Particular acknowledgements are due to the Anti-Corruption Commission of the Maldives and the Government of Maldives for their support and cooperation in the compilation of the report. We also take this opportunity to thank the team at the TI-Secretariat, Berlin for their continuous support during the research, as well as the support extended by the fellow chapters on the programme.
vassessmenT of anTi-corrupTion commission of The maldives 2016
tAble of contents
Acknowledgements iv
AbbreviAtions vi
ExECUTIVE SUMMARY 1
INTRODUCTION 8
1. MALDIVES POLICY CONTExT AND PERCEPTIONS OF CORRUPTION 10
economy . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 10
politics . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 11
society . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 12
levels of corruption . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 13
2. INSTITUTIONAL BACkGROUND AND PROFILE OF ACC 16
legal framework . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 16
Jurisdiction and responsibilities . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 16
financial resources . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 17
human resources . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 18
structure . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 18
complaints and investigations . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 19
prevention, education and outreach . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 21
3. kEY FINDINGS 23
legal independence and status . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 26
financial and human resources . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 27
detection and investigation . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 29
prevention, education and outreach . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 32
cooperation with other organizations . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 33
oversight and accountability . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 34
4. CONCLUSIONS AND RECOMMENDATIONS 49
recommendations . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 50
Annex 1: bAckgroUnd to tHe ProJect 52
Annex 2: interviewees 53
Annex 3: stAkeHolders consUlted 55
Annex 4: references 56
vi Transparency maldives
AbbreviAtions
ACA Anti-Corruption Agencies
ACB Anti-Corruption Board
ACC Anti-Corruption Commission of the Maldives
ADB Asian Development Bank
CPI Corruption Perception Index
CSO Civil Society Organisations
DRP Dhivehi Raiyithunge Party
EC Elections Commission
GCB Global Corruption Barometer
GDP Gross Domestic Product
HIES Household Income and Expenditure Survey
HRCM Human Rights Commission of the Maldives
IMF International Monetary Fund
JSC Judicial Services Commission
MDP Maldives Democratic Party
MMPRC Maldives Marketing and Public Relations Corporation
MOFT Ministry of Finance and Treasury
MP Member of Parliament
MVR Maldivian Rufiyaa
NIC National Integrity Commission
PGO Prosecutor General’s Office
PPCA Prohibition and Prevention of Corruption Act
PPM Progressive Party of the Maldives
SAARC South Asian Association of Regional Cooperation
TI Transparency International
TM Transparency Maldives
UNCAC United Nations Convention on Corruption
USD United States Dollars
WB World Bank
1assessmenT of anTi-corrupTion commission of The maldives 2016
execUtive sUmmAry Anti-Corruption Agencies (ACA) can be powerful tools in combatting corruption. When they are independent of the Government and empowered to investigate corruption allegations, they have the potential to hold even the most powerful to account. As such, The United Nations Convention Against Corruption enjoins participant countries to establish independent bodies tasked exclusively with enforcing national anti-corruption efforts.
Though the 2012 Jakarta Principles broadly delineate the principles by which ACAs must abide, there is currently no comprehensive standard tool that can be internationally applied to measure their efficiency. To exploit this area of opportunity Transparency International (TI) has recently launched the ACA Strengthening (ACA) Initiative.
The ACA SI assessment tool enquires into seven dimensions: 1) ACA’s Legal Independence and Status 2) ACA’s Financial and Human Resources 3) ACA’s Detection and Investigation Function 4) ACA’s Prevention, Education and Outreach Functions 5) ACA’s Cooperation with other Organizations 6) ACA’s Accountability and Oversight 7) Public Perceptions of the ACA’s performance.
Each dimension is composed of relevant and measurable indicators scored high medium or low which are assigned the numerical values of 2, 1 and 0 respectively used to score that dimension. There are 50 indicators in total. Cumulatively they are used to score the overall performance of the ACA.
key findingsThe overall score of the Maldives’ ACA the Anti-Corruption Commission (ACC) was 58%1, which falls in the moderate range. Among the indicators: 13 feature in the high (green) category; 26 in the moderate (yellow) category; and 6 in low (red) category. The dimension on public perceptions was not scored as there were an inadequate number of respondents.
The highest scoring dimension was Legal Independence and Status at 79%, followed by Prevention, Education and Outreach at 67%. The ACC scored lowest with regard to cooperation with other organizations partly due to the poor working relationship between the Prosecutor General’s Office (PGO) and the ACC. The ACC also scored low on Financial and Human resources due to the instability of government providing funding and the extremely high staff turnover rate. Narrated below are summaries of the findings for each dimension.
legAl indePendence And mAndAteThe ACC performed well on this dimension due to a strong legislative framework clearly delineating its mandate and providing it with a wide investigative berth. Furthermore Commissioners are appointed to fixed terms and can only be divested of office by a parliamentary vote on the basis of breaching conduct clearly specified in the ACC Act.
1 While the actual number of indicators for the assessment is 50, one indicator was omitted for Maldives, due to unavailable or insufficient data.
2 Transparency maldives
Nonetheless the mandate of the Commission can be broadened. The overarching anti-corruption legislation, the ‘Prevention and Prohibition of Corruption Act 2/2000’, neglects to criminalize illicit enrichment, significantly narrowing the scope of corruption related issues that the ACC can investigate.
Questions can be raised regarding the Commission’s practical autonomy due to the fact that the President of the ACC was one among several select state officials that were offered luxury apartments by the state below market rate, which he accepted. Several interviewees were of the view that these flats were offered to select state officials holding posts tasked with ensuring the accountability of the state in an effort to compromise their impartiality.
finAnciAl And HUmAn resoUrcesEnquiring into the ACC’s financial and human resources yielded important areas of opportunity for improvement. First and foremost the stability of Government provided funding is uncertain – with budget reductions occurring in 2015 and 2016.
The ACC must ensure that the skills of their investigative staff are strengthened particularly with regard to conducting investigating complex financial crimes, and furthermore there is a need to move away from excessive reliance on witness testimony.
It is further important to highlight that the staff retention rate of the ACC is extremely low and the ACC must mitigate this occurrence, either by increasing staff remuneration or by conducting internal surveys of staff to determine how the ACC’s work environment can be more appealing.
detection And investigAtionSimilarly the ACC should take steps to improve its relatively low score on the dimension pertaining to Detection and Investigation.
Improved co-ordination between the ACC and the Prosecutor General Office (PGO) is crucial to ameliorating both the extremely low conviction rate for corruption related cases and, similarly, the number of corruption cases forwarded by the ACC to the PGO which are rejected by the latter. It is furthermore essential that the efficiency of the ACC’s investigations be improved. Investigations into high-profile corruption cases, specifically, the MMPRC corruption scandal is widely seen to have become prolonged, which has called into question the efficiency of its investigations.
Prevention, edUcAtion And oUtreAcHThe ACC performed relatively well with regard to this dimension on the grounds that it affords a sizeable portion of its budget to prevention and awareness raising activities and is proactive in its efforts to disseminate awareness raising materials. A novel effort by the ACC is the production of a TV drama series illuminating the occurrence of corruption in every-day life. Such efforts can be further strengthened by ensuring that their social media presence reaches a wider audience, in particular the youth.
This dimension could be further improved if the ACC increased undertaking reviews of organizational procedures of other institutions. As the ACC’s research function was only recently introduced the ACC has thus far only performed 3 organizational reviews. Finally, expending effort to consult a wider range of stakeholders, in particular with the Private Sector, would profitably benefit the ACC’s research efforts.would
3assessmenT of anTi-corrupTion commission of The maldives 2016
profitably benefit the ACC’s research efforts.
co-oPerAtion And coordinAtion witH otHer AgenciesWith regard to its co-ordination with other agencies and institutions the ACC scored fairly low. It is urgent that collaboration between the PGO and the ACC be strengthened. This is essential as the ACC cannot execute prosecutions of its own accord and must rely on the PGO for this crucial task. The ACC is also encouraged to strengthen its relationship with the Private Sector. Further the ACC could explore avenues for enhancing their presence in international networks, for instance by participating in the ADB-OECD initiative on Asia Pacific.
AccoUntAbility And oversigHt of tHe AccThe ACC scored well on this dimension, chiefly on the strength of the ACC’s efforts to keep the public appraised of its activities and outputs through the regular publication of its informative and comprehensive annual reports.
Though the ACC scored adequately with regard to external oversight there is a highly important caveat to note. An oversight body tasked with monitoring independent institutions – the Parliamentary Committee on Independent Institutions - does nominally exist; nonetheless this committee has thus far neglected its responsibility in total. The Commission did not summon the ACC for any type of enquiry or clarification request during the review period and practical oversight of the ACC by an external body is non-existent.
�
Tabl
e: A
sses
smen
t by
Sum
mar
y : I
ndic
ator
s by
dim
ensi
on
dim
ensi
onin
dicA
tors
1 A
cc’s
leg
Al
inde
Pend
ence
An
d st
AtUs
Lega
l ind
e-pe
nden
ce
Man
date
Lega
l pow
ers
App
oint
men
t of
Com
mis
-si
oner
s
Com
mis
sion
-er
s te
rm o
f of
fice
and
re-
mov
al
Ope
ratio
nal
auto
nom
y an
d im
parti
ality
Gov
ernm
ent’s
re
lianc
e on
A
CC
to u
se
corr
uptio
n as
a w
eapo
n ag
ains
t pol
iti-
cal o
ppon
ents
2 A
cc’s
fi-
nAnc
iAl
And
HUm
An r
e-so
Urce
s
Aver
age
prop
ortio
n of
A
CC
’s b
ud-
get t
o to
tal
gove
rnm
ent
budg
et fo
r the
pa
st 3
yea
rs
Suf
ficie
ncy
of
AC
C’s
bud
get
for p
erfo
rmin
g its
func
tions
Secu
rity
and
stab
ility
of
AC
C’s
bud
-ge
t dur
ing
past
3 y
ears
AC
C p
erso
n-ne
l’s s
alar
y an
d be
nefit
s
AC
C’s
sel
ec-
tion
crite
ria fo
r pe
rson
nel
Exp
ertis
e of
A
CC
’s p
erso
n-ne
l in
corr
up-
tion
inve
stig
a-tio
n
Exp
ertis
e of
AC
C’s
pe
rson
nel i
n co
rrup
tion
pre-
vent
ion
and
educ
atio
n
Trai
ning
of
pers
onne
lSt
abili
ty o
f pe
rson
nel
3 A
cc’s
de-
tect
ion
And
inve
stig
Atio
n fU
ncti
on
Acc
essi
bilit
y to
cor
rupt
ion
com
plai
nant
s/in
form
ants
, in-
clud
ing
publ
ic
and
whi
stle
-bl
ower
s du
ring
the
pas
t 3
year
s
Res
pons
ive-
ness
to c
or-
rupt
ion
com
-pl
aint
s du
ring
the
pas
t 3
year
s
Will
ingn
ess
to
initi
ate
corr
up-
tion
inve
stig
a-tio
ns d
urin
g th
e pa
st 3
ye
ars
Aver
age
num
-be
r of c
ases
in
vest
igat
ed
per y
ear d
ur-
ing
the
pas
t 3
year
s
Effic
ienc
y an
d pr
ofes
-si
onal
ism
of
corr
uptio
n in
vest
iga-
tions
dur
ing
the
past
3
year
s
Aver
age
con-
vict
ion
rate
of
cor
rupt
ion
case
s in
ves-
tigat
ed o
ver
the
pas
t 3
year
s
Will
ingn
ess
to in
vest
igat
e in
fluen
tial p
er-
sons
for c
or-
rupt
ion
with
out
fear
or f
avou
r du
ring
the
pa
st 3
yea
rs
Rol
e in
rest
i-tu
tion,
ass
et
reco
very
, fre
ezin
g an
d co
nfisc
atio
n du
ring
the
past
3 y
ears
Doe
s th
e A
CA
iden
tify
gen-
der i
n co
mpi
l-in
g co
rrup
tion
com
plai
nts
and
mon
itor-
ing
corr
uptio
n tre
nds?
4 A
cc’s
Pr
even
tion
, ed
UcAt
ion
And
oUtr
eAcH
fU
ncti
ons
Aver
age
prop
ortio
n of
op
erat
ing
ex-
pend
iture
allo
-ca
ted
to p
ublic
ou
treac
h an
d pr
even
tion
durin
g th
e
past
3 y
ears
Cor
rupt
ion
prev
entio
n in
itiat
ives
dur
-in
g th
e p
ast 3
ye
ars
Num
ber o
f re
view
s of
or-
gani
zatio
nal
proc
edur
es,
syst
ems
&
capa
bilit
ies
cond
ucte
d to
pr
even
t cor
-ru
ptio
n du
r-in
g th
e pa
st 3
ye
ars
Freq
uenc
y of
incl
udin
g co
rrup
tion
prev
entio
n re
com
men
da-
tions
in A
CC
’s
inve
stig
atio
n re
ports
dur
ing
the
pas
t 3
year
s
Pla
n fo
r pr
even
tion,
ed
ucat
ion
and
outre
ach
and
its im
plem
en-
tatio
n
Col
labo
ratio
n w
ith o
ther
st
akeh
olde
rs
in p
reve
ntio
n,
educ
atio
n an
d ou
treac
h ac
-tiv
ities
Res
earc
h an
d ex
plor
atio
n of
cor
rupt
ion
risks
, con
text
an
d co
nditi
ons
Dis
sem
inat
ion
of c
orru
ptio
n pr
even
tion
info
rmat
ion
and
use
of
cam
paig
ns
Use
of i
ts
web
site
and
so
cial
me-
dia
for d
is-
sem
inat
ing
info
rmat
ion
on c
orru
ptio
n pr
even
tion
5 A
cc’s
coo
P-er
Atio
n w
itH
otHe
r or
gAni
-zA
tion
s
Gov
ernm
ent
supp
ort (
e.g.
A
ttorn
ey-
Gen
eral
’s
Offi
ce, D
irec-
tor o
f Pub
lic
Pros
ecu-
tions
) to
AC
C
for p
rose
cu-
tion
of c
or-
rupt
ion
case
s
Coo
pera
tion
betw
een
AC
C
and
othe
r in
tegr
ity a
gen-
cies
Coo
pera
tion
betw
een
AC
C
and
non-
gove
rnm
enta
l or
gani
zatio
ns
incl
udin
g C
SO
s an
d pr
ivat
e co
m-
pani
es
Par
ticip
atio
n in
inte
rnat
iona
l ne
twor
ks
Coo
pera
tion
with
AC
As
in
othe
r cou
n-tri
es
6 A
cc’s
Ac-
coUn
tAbi
lity
An
d ov
ersi
gHt
Info
rmat
ion
prov
ided
in
and
acce
ssi-
bilit
y of
AC
C’s
an
nual
repo
rt an
d w
ebsi
te
Ove
rsig
ht
mec
hani
sms
Pro
cedu
re fo
r de
alin
g w
ith
com
plai
nts
agai
nst A
CC
pe
rson
nel
Out
com
es o
f co
mpl
aint
s ag
ains
t AC
C
or it
s pe
rson
-ne
l ove
r the
pa
st 3
yea
rs
7 P
Ubli
c Pe
r-ce
Ptio
ns o
f tH
e Ac
c’s
Per-
form
Ance
Pub
lic c
on-
fiden
ce th
at
gove
rnm
ent
has
give
n A
CC
the
re-
quire
d po
wer
s an
d re
sour
ces
for c
urbi
ng
corr
uptio
n
Pub
lic c
on-
fiden
ce in
A
CC
’s a
d-he
renc
e to
du
e pr
oces
s,
impa
rtial
ity,
and
fairn
ess
in u
sing
its
po
wer
s
Con
fiden
ce
in A
CC
’s a
d-he
renc
e to
du
e pr
oces
s,
impa
rtial
ity,
and
fairn
ess
in
usin
g its
pow
-er
s, a
mon
g pe
rson
s w
ho
had
dire
ct
cont
act w
ith
AC
C
Con
fiden
ce
in A
CC
’s
dign
ified
and
re
spec
tful
treat
men
t of
pers
ons
unde
r in
vest
igat
ion
Pub
lic p
erce
p-tio
n of
AC
C’s
ef
fect
iven
ess
in c
orru
ptio
n co
ntro
l
Per
cept
ion
of A
CC
’s e
f-fe
ctiv
enes
s in
cor
rupt
ion
cont
rol a
mon
g pe
rson
s w
ith
dire
ct c
onta
ct
with
AC
C
Per
cept
ion
of A
CC
’s e
f-fe
ctiv
enes
s in
de
alin
g w
ith
com
plai
nts
amon
g fe
mal
e ci
tizen
s w
ho
had
dire
ct
cont
act w
ith
AC
C
�
Scor
ing
key:
HigH
sco
reG
reen
Sco
re =
2
mod
erAt
e sc
ore
Yello
w S
core
= 1
low
sco
reR
ed S
core
= 0
scor
ing
not
Poss
ible
Gre
y
6 Transparency maldives
On the basis of our research and assessment the following recommendations are proposed to enhance the effectiveness of the ACC:
recommendAtions
legAl indePendence And stAtUs
l Continue working with the Attorney General’s Office to push for legal reforms to the PPCA and ACC Act, particularly with regard to:
● Expanding the definition of corruption to encompass illicit enrichment. ● Granting the ACC the legal discretion to halt ongoing projects which are suspected of
corruption and to issue binding recommendations. ● Specify in legislation the educational and other qualifications required of a Commission
Member.
finAnciAl And HUmAn resoUrces
l Build capacity of all investigate staff through intensive and professional trainings. Training staff to investigate financial crimes should be accorded particularly urgent priority.
l Undertake staff satisfaction surveys to enquire into the reasons for high turnover and to generate solutions accordingly.
l The Government and Parliament must ensure the budgetary stability of the ACC by not suddenly withholding funding and must ensure that the ACC is adequately resourced to carry out their mandate.
detection And investigAtion fUnctions
l ACC’s overall investigative function need to be strengthened by training staff to enquire into complex financial crimes and by ensuring stronger documentary evidence collection to complement witness testimonies.
l If there are lengthy delays with regard to their inquiries into high profile corruption cases, the ACC must justify this and be proactive and regular in keeping the public informed of the progress of their investigations, so that questions are not raised about their efficiency.
l Ensure that awareness messages on how to report corruption complaints to the ACC are targeted to all segments of the population, including skilled and less-skilled expatriates.
Prevention, edUcAtion And oUtreAcH fUnctions
l The ACC should increase the number of reviews regarding organizational procedures. l Present their social media initiatives in a manner more appealing to youth. This could potentially
increase the reach of their awareness messaging in consideration of the Maldives’ relatively young population.
l Consult a wider range of stakeholders in research efforts, including the general public, the private sector, associations and external bodies
7assessmenT of anTi-corrupTion commission of The maldives 2016
cooPerAtion witH orgAnisAtions
l Increased collaboration and correspondence with the PGO is urgently needed. This further entails arranging regular opportunities for the ACC investigative staff to attend court hearings and trials.
AccoUntAbility And oversigHt
l Active involvement of the Parliamentary Committee on Independent Institutions is needed with regards to evaluating the ACC’s performance and in assisting with challenges faced by the ACC.
8 Transparency maldives
introdUction
Independent institutions specialized in detecting, investigating and preventing corruption, that are granted sufficient resources at their disposal to effectively perform these tasks are essential in combatting corruption. In accord with this, the first international legal framework for anti-corruption - the UN Convention against Corruption (UNCAC) - prescribes the existence of independent bodies established through national legal systems to enforce, implement and promote anti-corruption policies and principles. Furthermore the 2012 Jakarta Principles, developed in consultation with ACA heads, practitioners and experts from around the world, represent a widely respected set of guiding principles according to which ACAs should conduct themselves.
Despite this, a comprehensive and standardized tool for evaluating ACAs and thus illuminating areas in which they can be improved has been wanting. In response to this in 2015 Transparency International (TI) developed an initiative aimed at strengthening the ACAs and commenced its use with selected countries in the Asia Pacific Region.
The ‘Anti-Corruption Agencies Strengthening Initiative’ proposes a biennial assessment of ACAs, using an analytical tool, to be followed by sustained engagement, dialogue and advocacy at both national and regional levels. The assessment tool was developed between 2013 and 2015 through a collaborative dialogue between TI, interested staff from ACAs in the Asia Pacific region and a group of experts convened by TI. TI initially applied this tool in 2015 to conduct an assessment of the Anti-Corruption Commission of Bhutan. Since then four countries have completed assessments.
Between August and December 2016, Transparency Maldives (TM) carried out the assessment of the Anti-Corruption Commission of the Maldives (ACC), using the same tool. This assessment was conducted with the support of the ACC and with the objective of providing the ACC and the Government of Maldives (GOM) up-to-date and practical information regarding the performance of the ACC and particular areas in need of improvement.
The review period for this assessment is 2014 to 2016 (two years). It is hoped that this report can serve as a useful guide for both the ACC and other relevant stakeholders to strengthen and expand their efforts for anti-corruption in the Maldives.
AboUt tHe AssessmentTM carried out the assessment of the ACC between August 2016 and November 2016. The research was led by independent consultant, Aminath Haifa Naeem and comprised of a desk review of relevant laws, regulations, reports and media briefings, followed by 35 interviews and 3 Focus Group Discussions with key stakeholders, primarily within government and also with non-State actors. The fieldwork took place between August and September 2016. A draft report outlining key findings and recommendations was presented for review to the ACC in October 2016 for accuracy and completeness. Furthermore the draft report was presented to External Stakeholders for feedback in November 2016.
The assessment tool is designed to capture the internal and external factors that affect the ACC in addition to gauging the ACC’s reputation amongst the general public. With this in mind, a comprehensive indicator framework - made up of a total of 50 indicators (see Table 1) - has been developed in consultation with experts (see Annex 1 for more information on the development of the tool by TI).
9assessmenT of anTi-corrupTion commission of The maldives 2016
These indicators were formulated to develop a broad platform to assess the capacity and effectiveness of the ACC and to identify gaps and areas of opportunity. The indicators fall under seven broad dimensions of analysis, which are listed in the table below.
� Table 1: Dimensions of Assessment
dimensions of Assessment nUmber of indicAtors
1. ACA’s Legal Independence and Status 7
2. ACA’s Financial and Human Resources 9
3. ACA’s Detection and Investigation Function 9
4. ACA’s Prevention, Education and Outreach Functions 9
5. ACA’s Cooperation with other Organizations 5
6. ACA’s Accountability and Oversight 4
7. Public Perceptions of the ACA’s Performance 7
Total 50
Each indicator has three possible scores – high, moderate and low – and three defined levels of value for each indicator, depending on the condition assessed. To score each indicator, the research team identified the specific source of information, where necessary, from the ACC’s legal basis of support and reports, and further substantiated each score with in-depth interviews with the ACC’s staff and management, as well as through interviews with other government agencies, branches of government, media and civil society organizations.
This report is divided into four sections. Section 1 outlines the context with regards to the economic, social and political characteristics of the Maldives, as well as its perceived level of corruption. Section 2 explores the legal and institutional conditions in which the ACC operates. Section 3 presents key findings and a detailed assessment of each indicator, with comments on key issues and specific gaps that have been identified. Section 4 presents the conclusions of the assessment and Transparency Maldives’ recommendations for strengthening the ACC based on the findings.
Due to the fact that only 24 respondents contributed to the Public Perceptions dimension the research team opted not to score this dimension.
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1 mAldives Policy context And PercePtions of corrUPtion
economy The Maldives is an upper middle- income economy with the real Gross Domestic Product (GDP) per capita standing at United States Dollars (USD) 4,427.9 in 2015. Despite its high GDP per capita, Maldives is noted to be economically very vulnerable,2 given its very open economy and natural physical vulnerabilities. For instance, in 2015, poor economic conditions in major tourism source countries, such as China and Russia, directly impacted the tourism sector of the Maldives. Political tensions in the country in recent years have also seen an impact on tourism arrivals.3 Furthermore, declining prices and low demand in the international tuna market impacted the fishing industry, which was already seeing a fall in fish catch since 2013. As a result, real GDP growth slowed in 2015 to 1.5%, after a growth of 6.5% in 2014 and 4.7% in 2013.4 This fall in imports has also contributed to the widening of the current account deficit to 9% of GDP in 2015 and is expected to grow further in 2016.5
The most recent census conducted in 2014 reported that the national population of the Maldives is just over 344,000 6, while the total population including expatriates was estimated at 466,472 for mid-2015.7 The Maldives consists of 1190 coral islands, formed as part of 26 natural atolls. Of this 199 islands are inhabited. These islands are spread over an area of 90,000 square km 8, making transportation costly. This is exacerbated by the small-sized communities in outer islands, posing challenges to expanding the private sector outside of the capital and achieving economies of scale in service provision. All recent government have attempted to address this by either relocating entire communities, developing transport systems to increase connectivity and reduce isolation, or by encouraging families to move and consolidate on larger islands.
Maldives is ranked 128th on the Doing Business Ranking by the World Bank in 2016, falling by three places from 125 in 2015. Amongst the 10 indicators in this ranking, ‘Dealing with construction permits’ scored the worst, as did ‘Getting Credit’. While the Doing Business ranking may be impacted if more countries are added to the list, the Distance to Frontier (DtF) ranking can be used to compare countries across time. The
2 Monitoring of Graduated Countries from the Category of the Least Developed Countries, Maldives 2012, paper for UN Committee for Development Policy. Avaibale at: http://www.un.org/en/development/desa/policy/cdp/ldc_documents/maldives_monitoring_report_2012.pdf (Accessed 28 August 2016)
3 Such as cancellation of bookings following the declaration of state of emergency by government on 4 November 2015. Source: Annual Report 2015, Maldives Monetary Authority, page 18.
4 Annual Report 2015, Maldives Monetary Authority, Page 186
5 Annual Report 2015, Maldives Monetary Authority, page 84
6 Statistical Release I: Population and Households. Available at: http://statisticsmaldives.gov.mv/population-and-households/ (Accessed 28 August 2016)
7 Including both expatriates and locals. Source: Annual Report 2015, Maldives Monetary Authority, page 186
8 Systemic Diagnostic Country Report for Maldives, World Bank, 2015, page 21
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DtF ranking also shows a decline for Maldives in the past five years from 66.52 in 2012 to 55.04 in 2016.9,10 The Index of Economic Freedom, developed by the Heritage Foundation and the Wall Street Journal, ranked Maldives as number 132 out of 186 countries with an overall score of 53.9. It found the status of economic freedom of the country to be ‘mostly unfree’, although improving since 2013.11
An Asian Development Bank assessment of the Maldives in 2015, noted that ‘change in government and perception of irregularities, including mismanagement of resources and corruption, have led to policy uncertainty which reduced investor confidence in the country.’12
� Table 2: Policy Context of Maldives
dimension dAtA soUrce of dAtA, yeAr
Area of country 298 sq.km.
Census 2014Census 2014, DOIE 2014
Worldwide Governance Indicators 2014, World Bank, www.data-bank.worldbank.org
(indicators are scored from -2.5 to +2.5, where the higher num-ber indicate better governance, percentile indicates the percent of countries below Maldives, for example 55% of countries scored worse than Maldives in the control of corruption indicator)
Land Area 90,000 sq.km.
Population (local) 344,023
Expatriate Population 60,000 – 120,000
Type of Government Presidential Republic
Control of corruption -0.11 (55th percentile)
Voice and Accountability -0.33 (37th percentile)
Political Stability 0.90 (79th percentile)
Government effectiveness -0.37 (42nd percentile)
Rule of Law -0.49 (36th percentile)
Regulatory Quality -0.36 (40th percentile)
Politics Following the Maldives official conversion to Islam in the 12th century the country’s typical form of Government remained a Sultanate. The 20th century witnessed two brief and unsuccessful experiments in Republicanism prior to the Sultanate’s final abolishment in 1968. Under first Ibrahim Nasir, and then Maumoon Abdul Qayoom, an autocratic executive characterized the country’s political regime.
A reform movement centred around advocating for democratic reform gathered strength in the early 21st century and culminated in the inauguration of the 2008 Constitution, which defines the Maldives as a Presidential Democracy and established separation of powers between the executive, legislative and
9 This measure shows the distance of each economy to the “frontier,” which represents the best performance observed on each of the indicators across all economies in the Doing Business sample since 2005. An economy’s distance to frontier is reflected on a scale from 0 to 100, where 0 represents the lowest performance and 100 represents the frontier. Source: http://www.doingbusiness.org/Custom-Query/maldives, World Bank. (Accessed 29 August 2016)
10 Maldives is not included in the Global Competitiveness Index.
11 2016 Index of Economic Freedom, Maldives. Available at: http://www.heritage.org/index/country/maldivesThis index looks at 10 factors, which are grouped into rule of law, limited government, regulatory efficiency, and open markets.
12 Maldives: Overcoming the Challenges of a Small Island State: Country Diagnostic Study. Asian Development Bank, 2015, page 50
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judicial branches of government. In the same year Maldives held its first multi-party democratic elections, ushering in a new President, Mohamed Nasheed, ending almost 30 years of rule by President Maumoon Abdul Qayoom.
The Maldives has experienced much of the tumult and uncertainty that often accompanies nascent democracies and the political atmosphere remains deeply polarized.
Key events that have occurred since the transition to the 2008 Constitution include Nasheed’s resignation from the Presidency under contentious circumstances in February 2012; repeated undue judicial interference in the country’s political affairs, including in the 2013 presidential election cycle, which the current President, Yamin Abdul Qayoom, won; the arrest of key opposition figures under dubious charges under the present administration; and several abrupt changes to the Vice Presidency. Former Vice President Ahmed Adheeb is currently in prison following his conviction for several charges, including the possession of firearms and for the attempted assassination of President Yamin.
There has been also been a rapid passage of Government sponsored legislation that arguably restricts several of the freedoms enshrined in the constitution: this includes the recriminalisation of defamation and a broadly defined Terrorism Act that severely restricts freedom of speech and several limitations on freedom of assembly.
Press freedoms have also come under threat in recent years, with press freedom in the decline the past several years.13 Threats to journalists is on the rise too, the most salient example of this is the disappearance of journalist Ahmed Rilwan under mysterious circumstances in August 2014.
The term ‘grand corruption’ has also recently come to prominently feature in the country’s political discourse. An audit report of the Maldives Marketing and Public Relations Co-opration (MMPRC) in 2014 indicated that several senior government figures including, allegedly, former Vice-President Adheeb were complicit in the embezzlement of funds worth several million US dollars.
A strengthened and active role by independent institutions is more crucial than ever to ensure that that the values of impartiality and accountability are not lost in the political turmoil that the country is currently embroiled in.
society The Human Development Index (HDI) for 2014 – which measures life expectancy, years of schooling and Gross National Income (GNI) per capita – ranked the Maldives 104th out of 188 countries, with an overall score of 0.706. The country has seen a steady improvement in this index, from 0.603 in 2000.14
While the country grew from one of the poorest countries in the world to a middle-income country within 30 years and driven by the tourism industry, the linkages between resorts and local communities are limited. Sparse career opportunities in the atolls coupled with limited education opportunities have created a trend of steady migration to the capital. Mass migration to the physically restricted capital island, has made it one of the most congested cities in the world with a density of 53,700 people per square kilometre.15
13 https://rsf.org/en/maldives
14 Human Development Index, UNDP. Available at: http://hdr.undp.org/en/countries/profiles/MDV, (Accessed 11 September 2016
15 Systemic Diagnostic Report for Maldives, 2015, World Bank, page 9
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The country has seen a surge of expatriate workers, while local unemployment has increased. For instance, of the 28,000 jobs created in 2014 in the tourism sector, only 40% were filled by Maldivians.16 Precise statistics of the exact number of expatriates are not available. The National Census of 2014 enumerated 59,813 foreigners employed in the country, compared to 145,757 employed Maldivians.17 However according to the Department of Immigration and Emigration, the total number of expatriates had reached 120,000 in 2014 with estimate of undocumented workers standing at around 30,000.18 Two years later the Department placed the estimate at 40,000.19
A number of these undocumented workers are victims of fraudulent recruitment agents who lure new workers to the Maldives with the promises of non-existent jobs.20 The US State department ranked Maldives on Tier 2 Watch-list of its Trafficking in Persons report.21 It also noted the alleged involvement of government officials in fraudulent recruiting practices which can lead to human trafficking.22
According to World Bank figures for Maldives, unemployment in the 15-24 age group was 25 percent, more than double the unemployment rate of the total workforce (11.8%).23 While a portion of these are still school-aged children or those pursuing higher secondary or tertiary education, unemployment of the youth is often associated with social ills such as drug abuse and gang-related violence.24
A 2011 International Monetary Fund (IMF) report on Anti-Money Laundering in the Maldives found anecdotal evidence that corruption and trafficking in illegal drugs produce significant amounts of illegal funds. The report also found that the current legal framework does not address these issues sufficiently.25
levels of corrUPtionThe 2012 Annual Report of the ACC noted that a nationwide public survey on levels or perception of corruption has not been conducted by the ACC to date, due to lack of adequate financial resources. However, it noted that audit reports and other indicators can be used to gauge the level of corruption in the country, and that the indicative level is of concern to the Commission.26
16 Systemic Diagnostic Report for Maldives, 2015, World Bank, page 100
17 Employment Leaflet. Available at: http://statisticsmaldives.gov.mv/nbs/wp-content/uploads/2016/02/Employment-Leaflet.pdf (Accessed 12 September 2016)
18 ‘Nearly 8,000 expats repatriated, says Defence Minsiter’ November 16, 2014, Sun Online. Available at: http://english.sun.mv/26090 (Accessed 12 September 2016)
19 ‘Illegal expatriate workers cost RF130million annual loss to Maldives’ news article by Department of Immigration and Emigration, Maldives, June 27 2016. Available at: http://www.immigration.gov.mv/index.php?option=com_content&view=article&id=240:illegal-expatriate-workers-cost-rf130-million-annual-loss-to-maldives&catid=56:news-in-english (Accessed 12 September 2016)
20 ‘Corruption and the plight of migrant workers’ Transparency Maldives, 1 May 2014, Available at: http://transparency.mv/2014/05/corruption-and-the-plight-of-migrant-workers/ (Accessed 12 September 2016)
21 Tier Placements, Available at: http://www.state.gov/j/tip/rls/tiprpt/2016/258696.htm (Accessed 12 September 2016)
22 See for example “2014 Trafficking in Persons Report” US State Department. Available at: http://www.state.gov/j/tip/rls/tiprpt/countries/2014/226771.htm (Accessed 12 September 2016), ‘Migrant workers’ voice: illegal and silenced in the Maldives’ 1 April 2015. Available at: http://apmigration.ilo.org/news/migrant-workers2019-voice-illegal-and-silenced-in-the-maldives (Accessed 12 September 2016)
23 See Systemic Diagnostic Report for Maldives 2015, World Bank, page 50 and also youth unemployment data for 2016 for all countries using ILO definition. Available at: http://data.worldbank.org/indicator/SL.UEM.1524.ZS (Accessed 12 September 2016)
24 See for example Systemic Diagnostic Report for Maldives, 2015, World Bank, page 52
25 ‘Maldives; Detailed Assessment Report on Anti-money laundering and Combating the Finance of Terrorism’, IMF, January 2012, Page 10
26 Annual Report of the Anti-Corruption Commission 2012 page 22
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Maldives acceded to the United Nations Convention against Corruption (UNCAC) on 22 March 2007.
The most recent CPI that Maldives was included was in 2016, in which Maldives scored 36 (on a scale of 1-100, with 100 being very clean and 0 designated as fully corrupt corrupt), with a ranking of 95 out of 176 (where the best scoring country is ranked first).27 The table below shows the Maldives ranking in comparison with other SAARC countries.
� Table 3: CPI indexes for SAARC countries
coUntry 2012 2013 2014 2015 2016
Afghanistan 8 8 12 11 15
Bangladesh 26 27 25 25 26
Bhutan 63 63 65 65 65
India 36 36 38 38 40
Maldives n/a n/a n/a n/a 36
Nepal 27 31 29 27 29
Pakistan 27 28 29 30 32
Sri Lanka 40 37 38 37 36
Source: Transparency International CPI 2016
The GCB survey of 2013, conducted by TI, shows a continuation of this bleak outlook for the Maldives. Of the people surveyed, 83% felt that corruption had increased over the previous two years and 97% felt that corruption is a serious issue in the public sector.28 The Worldwide Governance Indicators, produced by World Bank, reports that for the Control of Corruption indicator, Maldives has improved in ranking against other countries in the index since 2008 (from 18.9 in 2008 to 54.8 in 2014, where higher numbers show a better ranking), although the overall score for the country is still low at -0.11 in 2014.29 Maldives was not included in the 2015-2016 Global Competitiveness Index.
According to research done by TI in 2011, fewer Maldivians reported that they had to pay a bribe in the previous 12 months, and more respondents were willing to report corruption to authorities, compared with countries in South Asia.30 While only 13% reported to be asked to pay a bribe in the previous 12 months during the GCB survey, 65% of the respondents from Maldives believed that personal contacts were
27 Corruption Perceptions Index 2016, Transparency International, Available at: http://www.transparency.org/news/feature/corruption_perceptions_index_2016 (Accessed February 1st 2016)
28 Maldives Corruption Barometer Survey 2013 Infographic, Available at: http://transparency.mv/files/download/07f5bee10f7192d32d85eac83af8cd68.pdf (Accessed 11 September 2016)
29 Scores are given within a range of -2.5 to +2.5 where higher numbers indicate a better governance. Worldwide Governance Indicators, World Bank. Available at: http://databank.worldbank.org/data/reports.aspx?source=Worldwide-Governance-Indicators# (Accessed 11 September 2016)
30 Daily Lives and Corruption; Public Opinion in South Asia’, Transparency International, 2011, page 10 and page 18
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important to get things done,31 which is close to the global percentage of 64%.32 However, 89% claimed that they would report an incident of corruption while two thirds of those who said that they would not report, said it was because they did not think it would make a difference.
Three different public surveys were conducted in 2011,33 2013,34 and 2014,35 to gauge various institutions in their level of perceived corruptness. In all three of these surveys, respondents reported that they placed the least trust in the Parliament, followed by political parties.
A study by the International Foundation for Electoral Systems (IFES) conducted during the March 2014 Parliamentary Elections, concluded that vote-buying was a serious problem in the Maldives, at alarming proportions. The study found that one in three Maldivians were offered bribes or personally witnessed someone else being offered bribes. 82% of those who were offered a bribe, said they were offered cash with 53% being offered a value between USD 262 and USD 1,309. 36 A pre-Presidential election assessment conducted by TM in 2013 also found that vote buying was a serious issue and that there were groups of people who were particularly vulnerable, such as victims of drug abuse and those who are financially struggling.37
31 Maldives Corruption Barometer Survey 2013 Inforgraphic. Available at: http://transparency.mv/files/download/07f5bee10f7192d32d85eac83af8cd68.pdf (Accessed 11 September 2016)
32 Global Corruption Barometer Report 2013, Transparency Maldives, page 14. Available at: https://www.transparency.org/gcb2013/report/ (Accessed 11 September 2016)
33 Corruption Perceptions Index 2011, Transparency International
34 ‘Daily Lives and Corruption; Public Opinion in South Asia’ 2011, Transparency International, page 8. Available at: https://www.transparency.org/whatwedo/publication/daily_lives_and_corruption_public_opinion_in_south_asia (Accessed 11 September 2016)
35 Democracy Survey 2014, Transparency Maldives, 2014
36 ‘Money and Elections in the Maldives: Perceptions and Reality” IFES, November 2014, page 2
37 “Pre-Election assessment” 2013 Presidential Elections In the Maldives, Transparency Maldives, 28 March 2013. Available at: http://transparency.mv/wp-content/uploads/2013/03/tm_pre_election_assessment.pdf (Accessed 13 September 2016)
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2 institUtionAl bAckgroUnd And Profile of AccThe Anti-Corruption Commission (ACC) is an independent legal entity, established on 16 October 2008 by Constitutional decree. Though replacing a previous iteration – the Anti-Corruption Board (ACB), which had been established under Presidential decree in April 1991 - the Commission commenced with the on-going investigations and pending complaints received by the ACB.
The ACC is independent of the government and is made accountable through the Parliament. The Parliamentary Committee on Independent Institutions is mandated to oversee the work of the ACC and other independent institutions. The ACC is therefore not subject to executive bodies but the courts do have a right to determine the constitutionality or legality of any actions of ACC under question. The ACC Act states the Code of Conduct for the Commission Members but not the staff of the Commission. A detailed Code of Conduct for its staff was developed separately by the ACC.
legAl frAmeworkThe overarching Anti-Corruption Legislation in the Maldives is the Prevention and Prohibition of Corruption Act (PPCA), which was passed in 2000. The Constitution lays out the key features and responsibilities of the ACC, which is given more expansive detail in the Anti-Corruption Commission Act 13/2008, ratified in September 2008.
Various amendments to both the ACC Act and the PPCA have been forwarded by both ACC and external bodies which have not yet been accepted by the Parliament.38 One such issue area of reform for consideration put forward by the ACC is a wider definition of corruption in the legal framework. The PPCA currently encompasses bribery, government employees taking undue advantage, accepting gifts from a party who has requested government services, business dealings of certain position holders with foreigners who request something from the government and assigning work or procuring or using government property for personal gain. However Illicit enrichment is also not criminalised and the Parliament rejected the amendment put forward by ACC for its inclusion.39
JUrisdiction And resPonsibilities The main functions of the ACC are laid out in Article 21 of the ACC Act and include investigation and prevention of corruption. The Law specifically states that the ACC should inquire into all allegations of corruption. It also gives the ACC the responsibility to recommend further inquiries or investigation and to recommend prosecution of alleged offenses where warranted. In addition, the ACC is required to carry out research on prevention and submit recommendations for improvements to relevant authorities. The Act
38 Proposed amendments to Anti-Corruption Commission Act forwarded to Attorney General’s Office. Available at: http://acc.gov.mv/en/2016/07/proposed-amendments-to-anti-corruption-commission-act-forwarded-to-attorney-generals-office/ (Accessed 11 September 2016) and also information provided by ACC for research purposes
39 Country Review Report of Maldives for the Review Cycle 2010-2015 of Implementations of Articles 15-42 of Chapter 3 and Articles 44-50 of Chapter 4 of United National Convention Against Corruption, page 4-5
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also tasks the ACC with promoting integrity and honesty in State affairs and promote public awareness about corruption.
The jurisdiction of the ACC extends to all institutions and employees of the state, including the executive, legislative and judicial branches, government companies, public companies with government shares, associations and political parties funded by the state. Non-profit organisations and associations operating without the objective of a commercial benefit are also included; irrespective of whether they receive State funding. Foreigners who are involved in an on-going investigation of the commission are also included. It does not however, investigate the private sector unless there is an involvement of a State institution or official.
The ACC does not have prosecutorial powers under any circumstance and they must forward investigations to the Prosecutor General’s Office (PGO) for initiating and conducting all court proceedings. Therefore, the ACC forwards cases for prosecution to the PGO, if it believes that there is ground for conviction. The PGO has absolute discretion to determine if and when to prosecute40 and is accountable to the Parliament. The Attorney General is mandated to provide general policy directives to the Prosecutor General in carrying out his functions and duties.
finAnciAl resoUrcesThe Law does not prescribe a specific amount or proportion of the budget to be allocated to the ACC. However, the ACC Act states that the government must provide funds from its annual budget, to be determined in consultation with ACC. The law allows ACC to accept funds from foreign persons, foreign organisations and other governments for the sole purpose of achieving the mandate and objectives of ACC, and in-kind assistance has been received such as sponsorship for short-term trainings abroad.
The average annual allocation to the ACC from the State budget (after any deductions throughout the year) was roughly MVR 28.56 million (USD 1.85 million). The ACC operated primarily on State funding during the period under review, although some donations were received in each of the review years. For instance, in 2015, the ACC raised MVR 427,368 (USD 27,715) as income41 and also received MVR 416,685 (USD 27,022) in donations. During the period under review in this report, the ACC was granted an average of 82% of the budget it requested from the State.
These funds are allocated without interference to investigation activities, awareness, capacity building and prevention in accordance with ACC’s activities identified through its own planning process. MOFT or Parliament would only set the ceiling amount for the institution.42
Annual Reports for 2013, 2014 and 2015 all note that budgetary constraints are a challenge for the ACC. The 2013 Annual Report noted that the Commission was not able to fill its additional staff requirement due to budgetary constraints. Planned capacity building activities were also hindered. In, 2013, out of the 29 trips that were initially planned for investigation purposes, funds were allocated for only for 11 trips and no funds were allocated for travels for prevention and awareness purposes.
40 Article 7:223 of the Constitution (2008)
41 This is more a savings on expenses rather than an income generated
42 Interviews with Secretary General of ACC and ACC Commission Members
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HUmAn resoUrces The number of staff at ACC grew from 61 at the beginning of the review period in 2013 to 102 staff by the end of 2015. Of this, four staff were based in the Southern office of ACC, which was the first office of ACC outside of the capital, which was established in December 2015.43 A Secretary General is appointed by the Commission to oversee the day-to-day functions of the ACC. Hiring and dismissal of employees are carried out by the institution directly but the number of staff overall is subject to the budget it receives (both for reasons of salary and physical space requirement for staff). The turnover rate of the ACC is high at 25% in 2014, 14% in 2015 and 14% in the first six months of 2016. Turnover is reported to be the highest in the investigation department.
strUctUreThe structure of ACC was modified and came into effect on 1 June 2015. Previously divided into four sections, the new structure divided the organisation into seven sections, as per the chart in figure below.
43 Audit Office, ACC’s south-regional offices opened” 1st December 2015, VNEWS. Available at: http://vnews.mv/54861 (Accessed 13 September 2016)
Anti-Corruption Commission
Prevention Section
Operations Section
Member’s Bureau
Member’s Bureau
Hasan Manik
Southern Regional Of�ceMohamed Ahsan
Abdullah
Financial and Accounts
Ahmed Yameen
Administration Section
Rifaath Ali
Internal Audit
Secretary GeneralAbdullah Rasheed
Commission MembersHassan LuthfeeMuavviz RasheedSofwath MohamedAminath MinnaYazmeedh Mohamed
PresidentVice President MemberMemberMember
Operations Section
Complaints Registration and Evaluation UnitAbdul Azeez Moosa
Investigation and Coordination UnitMariyam Nasha
Mohamed
Post Investigation and Reporting UnitAishath Areefa
Legal and Asset Recovery Unit
Mohamed Nishath
Investigation UnitMajid Hassan
Intelligence Unit
Prevention Section
Education and Awareness Unit
Mohamed Saleem
Prevention and Research UnitIkleela Ismail
Networking and Security
Information System
Development
Information Technology
SectionShabnoon Khalid
Human Resource Development Unit
Procurement and Maintenance Unit
Admin Unit
Administration Section
Rifaath Ali
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One of the most significant changes brought to the structure in 2015 was the renaming of the Education and Research Section as Prevention Section, which was further divided into two units: Education and Awareness Unit and Prevention and Research Unit. It was envisioned that this would enable more research to be carried out by a dedicated research unit, whereas previously, the bulk of this section’s work was taken up by awareness activities.
The second major change was the addition of 3 new units to the Operations Section: the Complaints Registration and Evaluation Unit, the Investigation Coordination Unit and the Post Investigations and Reporting Unit. This allowed the investigative officers to focus more on the investigations, while having support units to process complaints and post investigation communications. This also made more efficient use of the Commission Members’ time as all complaints are now evaluated and additional information collected to a degree before being presented to members for a decision. The Legal Unit is a vital addition to the Commission, as it provides legal counsel to the Commission and where needed, identify and draft legislation required for the ACC to function efficiently. Currently, the Unit is also reviewing the backlog of cases sent back by the PGO without prosecution. The Legal Unit also provides legal counsel to the Prevention Section through review of legislature to recommend preventative measures.
The ACC has offices in the capital and in one other location: the Southern Regional Office in Addu City, which was opened on 1st December 2015 and is currently staffed with five personnel, three of which are investigation officers.
Intra-section work or work that is required to be done by a panel of staff, is often done by forming temporary or permanent committees. One such temporary committee was formed to work on the National Integrity Plan. There are however five permanent committees of the ACC, which are the Human Resource Development Committee, a Performance Appraisal Committee, a Sexual Harassment Committee, Agency Tender Committee and a Review Committee regarding the Right to Information Acts’s Clause 42 which mandates State organizations to submit annual reports to the Information Commissioner’s Office. 44 The latter three committees are formed under legal obligations in respective laws and regulations. The first committee was formed under Sexual Abuse and Harassment Act 16/2014 and the second formed as required under the Amendment to the Public Finance Regulations. The final committee was formed under the Right to Information Act 1/2014 to review any complaints or queries for information by the general public.
comPlAints And investigAtionsThe ACC receives complaints or allegations of corruption via phone, letter, email, corruption complaints form, an on-line form or in person. All complaints are now scrutinized by the Complaints Registration and Evaluation Unit and additional information is sought if necessary. After this process, the complaints are submitted to the members, where one of four actions are taken: disregard; sent for more clarification; submitted to another more relevant agency; or commencement of investigation.45
Cases may be disregarded for reasons such as the crime not being clearly reported or known to the complainant, anonymous calls with not enough information to proceed with, or the complaint not falling within the ACC’s mandate.46 During 2014- July 2016, 17% of the complaints received were disregarded for these reasons.
44 Annual report of the Anti Corruption Commission (2015), Page 8
45 Information from ACC website, www.acc.gov.mv (Accessed 22 September 2016)
46 Meeting with Secretary General of the ACC, 22 September 2016
20 Transparency maldives
During the review period, the ACC received 2503 complaints47, on average 1001 per year. Of this, the ACC decided that 1964 qualified for investigation. In addition, the commission initiated 242 cases, with a total of 2206 cases being investigated during this period.
During the period of January 2014 to July 2016, the ACC concluded the investigation of 2070 cases, of which 96 cases were concluded for further investigation. The remaining 1974 cases were closed due to insufficient evidence of corruption. During this period, 66 cases were actually forwarded to the PGO.
Looking at the data for the past five years, there is a declining trend in both the number of complaints received from the public as well as a decrease in the number of cases initiated by the Commission. However, this is following an unusual peak in 2013, which may have been due to the fact that it was a Presidential Election year, with complaints coming in related to the increased political activities and campaigning. This however, remains to be verified. A progressive decline in the number of complaints to ACC is a trend that the ACC should address as a priority.
� Figure 1: Complaints and Investigations of ACC
Source: Annual reports, various years
47 According to the Annual Reports, the ACC receives more than this in actual number of complaints. However, 2652 is the total number of different cases that it has received complaints or reports about. (1085 in 2013, 801 in 2014 and 944 in 2015). Source: relevant Annual Reports of ACC
No. of complaints received
No. of actual cases received as complaints (a)
No. of cases initiated by commission (b)
No. of pending cases by end of year
Total no. of cases (a) + (b)
Cases decided not to be investigated
2500
2000
1500
500
0
1000
2010 2011 2012 2013 2014 2015
21assessmenT of anTi-corrupTion commission of The maldives 2016
As per ACC regulation (number 2010/R-18) the decision on whether a particular complaint falls within the mandate of ACC or not, and furthermore, whether ACC will proceed with investigation, is taken at a meeting of Commission Members. These decisions are taken by a vote of the members present at the meeting, where the quorum is 3 Members.
Data on convictions during 2014 and 2016 was not available for the this research. There is however, data available for the previous years. During the period of 2010 to 2014, ACC had submitted 175 cases to PGO.48 According to a position paper by TM on illicit enrichment, between 2010-2014, 37 cases were prosecuted for the offence of undue advantage by government employees but as of July 2015, only a single case of undue influence had gone through the complete process of appeal. Three cases of bribery have been prosecuted, out of which 1, involving former MP Ismail Hameed of Kaashidhoo Constituency - ended in conviction.49 .
In 2014/2015, ACC implemented a new case management software which allows it to register and manage all cases and complaints. This has led to improvements such as: quicker search of related previous cases; better maintenance of statistics; quicker responses to callers who inquire about progress of cases they have submitted; reduced possibility of duplication of investigation efforts over identical cases; and provides updated information on the progress of all cases within the institution.
As previously discussed, three different public surveys found that the public perceived the Parliament and political parties to be the most corrupt institutions. However, analysis of complaints received from the public to the ACC show that few complaints are made about these institutions. For example, the statistics for 2015 show that there were no complaints against the Parliament submitted to the ACC that year.50 It would be prudent for the ACC to be proactive in investigating institutions that are prevalently suspected of corruption despite the lack of formal complaints lodged.
Prevention, edUcAtion And oUtreAcHIn addition to its investigations, the ACC has a Constitutional responsibility to carry out research on prevention of corruption, to recommend areas for improvements to relevant authorities, to promote public awareness and to promote honesty and integrity in State institutions.
According to the 2014 and 2015 Annual Reports, the ACC carried out a number of awareness activities in Male’ and other inhabited islands. ernment offices in inhabited islands. ‘Family evenings’ – which are public events organized with games and information kiosks – and information sessions for school children were initiated in 2015. These activities are carried out throughout the year and are led by the Education and Awareness Unit.
Additional activities are carried out on International Corruption Day on 9 December every year, which mobilizes more resources within the ACC. Furthermore, since 2015, 21 April has been designated as National Anti-Corruption Day, which is marked by the ACC with a weeklong programme consisting of a significant range of activities.
48 Information provided by ACC, 02 November 2016
49 Paper on illicit enrichment, Transparency Maldives, 15 July 2015. Available at: http://transparency.mv/files/media/619a1d6b41cf58562104e5ef97c21f5d.pdf (Accessed 22 September 2016); Tormer MP Ismail Abdul Hameed of Kaashidhoo Constituency was sentenced to banishment for 1 year and as a result, lost his seat at the Parliament
50 Statistical Yearbook for ACC, 2015, page 12
22 Transparency maldives
As stated in its new Strategic Plan, the ACC is also in the process of developing a five-year National Integrity Plan outlining the strategies and activities that will be implemented in partnership with other institutions to prevent and investigate corruption. Currently, there is no State-sponsored national development plan either, which would have included the government’s anti-corruption strategies and general policy directives taken from the ruling party’s manifesto. Therefore, the National Integrity Plan can play a vital role in guiding all institutions to implement prudent measures.
23assessmenT of anTi-corrupTion commission of The maldives 2016
3 key findingsThe findings and scoring of this research are derived from 50 indicators which are grouped into 7 dimensions measuring distinct aspects of the ACC’s performance. These indicators were designed to assess the internal and external factors impacting the ACC’s ability to fulfil its functions. Each indicator has one of three possible scores: high (2), moderate (1) and low (0).
The research yielded that the ACC scored high on 3 dimensions: Legal Independence and Status; Prevention, Education and Outreach Functions; Accountability and Oversight. It scored moderate on 3 dimensions: Financial and Human Resources; Detection and Investigation Functions; and Co-operation with other organizations. The dimension on Public Perceptions was not scored due to the paucity of the number of respondents to this dimension. See figure 2 below for detailed scores.
� Figure 2: Scores by dimension
The scores for individual indicators under each of the dimensions are given below in Table 6.
0
10
20
30
40
50
60
70
80
90
Legal I
ndepe
ndenc
e
and S
tatus
Financ
ial and
Human
Detectio
n and
Invest
igation
Preven
tion, E
ducat
ion an
d
Outreac
h
Coopera
tion with
Others
Accou
ntabili
ty and
Oversig
ht
�
Tabl
e 6:
Ass
essm
ent S
umm
ary
Indi
cato
rs b
y D
imen
sion
dim
ensi
onin
dicA
tors
1 A
cc’s
leg
Al
inde
Pend
ence
An
d st
AtUs
Lega
l ind
e-pe
nden
ce
Man
date
Lega
l pow
ers
App
oint
men
t of
Com
mis
-si
oner
s
Com
mis
-si
oner
s’ te
rm
of o
ffice
and
re
mov
al
Ope
ratio
nal
auto
nom
y an
d im
parti
ality
Gov
ernm
ent’s
re
lianc
e on
A
CC
to u
se
corr
uptio
n as
a w
eapo
n ag
ains
t pol
iti-
cal o
ppon
ents
2 A
cc’s
fi-
nAnc
iAl
And
HUm
An r
e-so
Urce
s
Aver
age
prop
ortio
n of
A
CC
’s b
ud-
get t
o to
tal
gove
rnm
ent
budg
et fo
r the
pa
st 3
yea
rs
Suf
ficie
ncy
of
AC
C’s
bud
get
for p
erfo
rmin
g its
func
tions
Secu
rity
and
stab
ility
of
AC
C’s
bud
-ge
t dur
ing
the
past
3
year
s
AC
C p
erso
n-ne
l’s s
alar
y an
d be
nefit
s
AC
C’s
sel
ec-
tion
crite
ria fo
r pe
rson
nel
Exp
ertis
e of
A
CC
’s p
erso
n-ne
l in
corr
up-
tion
inve
stig
a-tio
n
Exp
ertis
e of
AC
C’s
pe
rson
nel i
n co
rrup
tion
pre-
vent
ion
and
educ
atio
n
Trai
ning
of
pers
onne
lSt
abili
ty o
f pe
rson
nel
3 A
cc’s
de-
tect
ion
And
inve
stig
Atio
n fU
ncti
on
Acc
essi
bilit
y to
cor
rupt
ion
com
plai
nant
s/in
form
ants
, in-
clud
ing
publ
ic
and
whi
stle
-bl
ower
s du
ring
the
past
3
year
s
Res
pons
ive-
ness
to c
or-
rupt
ion
com
-pl
aint
s du
ring
the
past
3
year
s
Will
ingn
ess
to
initi
ate
corr
up-
tion
inve
stig
a-tio
ns d
urin
g th
e pa
st 3
ye
ars
Aver
age
num
-be
r of c
ases
in
vest
igat
ed
per y
ear d
ur-
ing
the
past
3
year
s
Effic
ienc
y an
d pr
ofes
-si
onal
ism
of
corr
uptio
n in
vest
iga-
tions
dur
ing
the
past
3
year
s
Aver
age
con-
vict
ion
rate
of
cor
rupt
ion
case
s in
ves-
tigat
ed o
ver
the
past
3
year
s
Will
ingn
ess
to in
vest
igat
e in
fluen
tial p
er-
sons
for c
or-
rupt
ion
with
out
fear
or f
avou
r du
ring
the
past
3 y
ears
Rol
e in
rest
i-tu
tion,
ass
et
reco
very
, fre
ezin
g an
d co
nfisc
atio
n du
ring
the
past
3 y
ears
Doe
s th
e A
CA
iden
tify
gen-
der i
n co
mpi
l-in
g co
rrup
tion
com
plai
nts
and
mon
itor-
ing
corr
uptio
n tre
nds?
4 A
cc’s
Pr
even
tion
, ed
UcAt
ion
And
oUtr
eAcH
fU
ncti
ons
Aver
age
prop
ortio
n of
op
erat
ing
ex-
pend
iture
allo
-ca
ted
to p
ublic
ou
treac
h an
d pr
even
tion
durin
g th
e pa
st 3
yea
rs
Cor
rupt
ion
prev
entio
n in
i-tia
tives
dur
ing
past
3 y
ears
Num
ber o
f re
view
s of
or-
gani
zatio
nal
proc
edur
es,
syst
ems
&
capa
bilit
ies
cond
ucte
d to
pr
even
t cor
-ru
ptio
n du
r-in
g th
e pa
st 3
ye
ars
Freq
uenc
y of
incl
udin
g co
rrup
tion
prev
entio
n re
com
men
da-
tions
in A
CC
’s
inve
stig
atio
n re
ports
dur
-in
g th
e pa
st 3
ye
ars
Pla
n fo
r pr
even
tion,
ed
ucat
ion
and
outre
ach
and
its im
plem
en-
tatio
n
Col
labo
ratio
n w
ith o
ther
st
akeh
olde
rs
in p
reve
ntio
n,
educ
atio
n an
d ou
treac
h ac
-tiv
ities
Res
earc
h an
d ex
plor
atio
n of
cor
rupt
ion
risks
, con
text
an
d co
nditi
ons
Dis
sem
inat
ion
of c
orru
ptio
n pr
even
tion
info
rmat
ion
and
use
of
cam
paig
ns
Use
of i
ts
web
site
and
so
cial
me-
dia
for d
is-
sem
inat
ing
info
rmat
ion
on c
orru
ptio
n pr
even
tion
5 A
cc’s
coo
P-er
Atio
n w
itH
otHe
r or
gAni
-zA
tion
s
Gov
ernm
ent
supp
ort (
e.g.
A
ttorn
ey-
Gen
eral
’s
Offi
ce, D
irec-
tor o
f Pub
lic
Pros
ecu-
tions
) to
AC
C
for p
rose
cu-
tion
of c
or-
rupt
ion
case
s
Coo
pera
tion
betw
een
AC
C
and
othe
r in
tegr
ity a
gen-
cies
Coo
pera
tion
betw
een
AC
C
and
non-
gov-
ernm
ent o
rga-
niza
tions
in-
clud
ing
CS
Os
and
priv
ate
com
pani
es
Par
ticip
atio
n in
inte
rnat
iona
l ne
twor
ks
Coo
pera
tion
with
AC
A’s
in
othe
r cou
n-tri
es
6 A
cc’s
Ac-
coUn
tAbi
lity
An
d ov
ersi
gHt
Info
rmat
ion
prov
ided
in
and
acce
ssi-
bilit
y of
AC
C’s
an
nual
repo
rt an
d w
ebsi
te
Ove
rsig
ht
mec
hani
sms
Pro
cedu
re fo
r de
alin
g w
ith
com
plai
nts
agai
nst A
CC
pe
rson
nel
Out
com
es o
f co
mpl
aint
s ag
ains
t AC
C
or it
s pe
rson
-ne
l in
past
3
year
s
7 P
Ubli
c Pe
r-ce
Ptio
ns o
f tH
e Ac
c’s
Per-
form
Ance
Pub
lic c
on-
fiden
ce th
at
gove
rnm
ent
has
give
n A
CC
the
re-
quire
d po
wer
s an
d re
sour
ces
for c
urbi
ng
corr
uptio
n
Pub
lic c
on-
fiden
ce in
A
CC
’s a
d-he
renc
e to
du
e pr
oces
s,
impa
rtial
ity,
and
fairn
ess
in
usin
g its
pow
-er
s
Con
fiden
ce
in A
CC
’s a
d-he
renc
e to
du
e pr
oces
s,
impa
rtial
ity,
and
fairn
ess
in
usin
g its
pow
-er
s, a
mon
g pe
rson
s w
ho
had
dire
ct
cont
act w
ith
AC
C
Con
fiden
ce
in A
CC
’s
dign
ified
and
re
spec
tful
treat
men
t of
pers
ons
unde
r in
vest
igat
ion
Pub
lic p
erce
p-tio
n of
AC
C’s
ef
fect
iven
ess
in c
orru
ptio
n co
ntro
l
Per
cept
ion
of A
CC
’s e
f-fe
ctiv
enes
s in
cor
rupt
ion
cont
rol a
mon
g pe
rson
s w
ith
dire
ct c
onta
ct
with
AC
C
Per
cept
ion
of A
CC
’s e
f-fe
ctiv
enes
s in
de
alin
g w
ith
com
plai
nts
amon
g fe
mal
e ci
tizen
s w
ho
had
dire
ct
cont
act w
ith
AC
C
�
Scor
ing
key:
HigH
sco
reG
reen
Sco
re =
2
mod
erAt
e sc
ore
Yello
w S
core
= 1
low
sco
reR
ed S
core
= 0
scor
ing
not
Poss
ible
Gre
y
26 Transparency maldives
The section below highlights the key findings of each of the seven indicators.
legAl indePendence And stAtUsScoring 79%, the ACC performed best on Legal Independence and Status. Strengthening their overall score are the definitive constitutional legislation granting the ACC its independence and defining its fairly comprehensive mandate; the definitive standard tenures afforded to Commissioners; and the lack of provable evidence of the ACC being used as a tool to intimidate a political opponent. The ACC also performed adequately with regard to their legal powers, appointment of Commissioners, operational autonomy and impartiality – though issues arise relevant to each of these indicators, which if addressed could further improve their score.
The ACC is constitutionally mandated to exist as an independent legal entity51 and its mandate encompasses investigating corruption as well as educating and raising the public’s awareness on its detrimental effects. The ACC Act defines the jurisdiction of the commission to extend to state institutions, the executive, parliament, judiciary, state companies, non-profit organizations and any community funds.52 The ACC cannot execute prosecutions of its own accord but can forward cases directly to the PGO for prosecution.
The ACC possesses wide powers with relevance to conducting investigations.53 They can summon witnesses or persons related to investigations and can procure statements. They may also enter premises within their jurisdiction to examine documents and confiscate them for further investigation. They can also instruct a person under investigation not to leave the country without the ACC’s permission. Additionally they also possess the discretion to enquire into and freeze bank accounts.
One key hindrance to the ACC’s effectiveness is that the overarching legislation policing corruption has significant gaps, limiting the scope of corruption related issues that the ACC can investigate. Crucially, the Prevention and Prohibition of Corruption Act 2/200 does not include illicit enrichment and ACC efforts to incorporate it have thus far been unsuccessful.54 Furthermore embezzlement is only partially criminalized under the penal code.55
The ACC’s legal powers in terms of prevention are weak. During the initial years following its establishment, the ACC practiced giving cessation orders to on-going processes and projects should they have received a complaint or if there was an on-going investigation regarding the matter.56 While this power is not explicitly granted them in law, it was practiced by the ACC in good faith with the objective of preventing corruption. However, a Supreme Court judgement in 2012 halted this practice on the basis that existing laws did not grant them such powers and that they can only issue recommendations, which lack legally binding force.57
With regard to the appointment of commissioners the standard procedure is that a selection of names are forwarded by the President to the Parliament; these names are shortlisted from interested candidates
51 Constitution (2008), 7:199
52 ACC Act 13/2008, Section 24
53 Interviews with Rozaina Adam, Member of Parliament, Former Director of Legal Affairs at PGO, UNODC Crime Prevention and Criminal Justice Officer,
54 Interviews with ACC Commission Members
55 Maldives Penal Code (2014) Section 215a
56 Interviews with ACC Members and Head of Legal Unit,
57 See for example “ACC: Steps would be taken if people’s budget is tapped for Eid celebrations’ Sun Online, August 29 2016. Available at http://english.sun.mv/39390 (Accessed 15 September 2016)
27assessmenT of anTi-corrupTion commission of The maldives 2016
responding to a public announcement, and names suggested by the President himself. These persons are then evaluated by the Parliamentary Committee on Independent Institutions for their education, experience, leadership attributes, integrity and marks for performance at the interview.58 Once commissioners are elected, the President and Vice-President of the ACC are selected by the Commission Members themselves.59
One gap in need of addressing is that though the Constitution stipulates that Commissioners should possess the requisite education and experience necessary to perform their functions it does not adequately clarify what would constitute such. The Commission has suggested an amendment to the ACC Act to include and specify the educational qualifications and experience required for an ACC member, which have yet to be discussed by the legislature.
ACC members are granted standard tenures of five-year terms, which may be renewed once for a total of two terms. The Constitution states that the removal of a member can occur by a vote of no confidence by Parliament and only on grounds of misconduct, incapacity or incompetence; the exact grounds for what would constitute such are clearly delineated in the ACC Act, where eleven conditions are described which must be respected and followed by members at all times. Any breach of these are grounds for dismissal.60
Within the review period of this report, there were two notable instances that cast doubt on the full impartiality of the ACC. The first is that the ACC’s president was among several state officials who had accepted a luxury apartment granted by the state at prices below competitive market value; several interlocutors were of the view that these apartments were granted to select individual in positions tasked with holding the state accountable to win their favour.
A further instance relates to an amendment to the Tourism Act which gave the government the discretion to lease islands without a competitive bidding process. The ACC’s neglect to remark on the issue is noteworthy because the ACC had previously taken the government to task for its procurement procedures, which involved the selection of parties for government projects without an open bidding process.61
The amended Tourism Act specifies that the ACC must be informed in instances where the government exercises this discretion. However, such decisions only need the approval of the President to come into effect. That islands can be leased to third parties without a competitive bidding process is a possible avenue for corruption and the ACC’s neglect to publicly remark on the issue is concerning.
finAnciAl And HUmAn resoUrcesThe ACC scored only 44% in the Financial and Human Resources Dimension. The primary reason it scored so poorly in this dimension are because of the low scores it received on the indicators pertaining to the security and stability of its budget and the stability of its personnel; furthermore there is room for improvement with regard to the expertise of ACC staff. It should also be noted that though the ACC on average receives over 80% of its requested budget, this does not capture the ACC’s tendency to submit
58 Independent Institutions Committee report, Number MMk/2014/R-7 (20 August 2014)
59 ACC Act 13/2008
60 ACC Act 13/2008 Articles 6,14,17, Constitution (2008) 7:207
61 8th Amendment to Tourism Act 13/2008 clause 5(D)3, 11th Amendment to Public Finance Regulations, 'Anti Corruption Commission has expressed its concerns over the 11th amendment to the Public Financial Regulation', ACC, 09 July 2016. Available at: http://acc.gov.mv/en/2016/07/anti-corruption-commission-has-expressed-its-concerns-over-the-11th-amendment-to-the-public-financial-regulation/ (Accessed 22 September 2016)
28 Transparency maldives
budget requests in anticipation of funds that the Government is actually likely to provide - and the stability of Government provided funding is uncertain. Furthermore, as will be expounded upon below, the turnover rate of ACC staff is alarming.
With regard to personnel salary and benefits, though the ACC offers similar levels of remuneration compared to other independent institutions and state companies as well as a slightly higher salary than what is typically offered to civil service employees, the ACC does not offer an exceptionally attractive package. For example, for a typical recruit possessing an undergraduate law degree an initial starting salary of MVR 19,000 (USD 1232.966) is offered by the ACC, which is similar to what she could be earning elsewhere either in government or in the Private Sector.62
The recruitment process for staff is largely transparent and meritocratic. Job advertisements are posted on the ACC website and in the government gazette and all applicants are evaluated against weighted criteria. The detailed results of each candidate are posted on the website in an anonymous manner, where each applicant is provided a reference number to monitor their own results. A selected number of the top scoring applicants will be called for interview. Procedures for recruitment are laid out in the Staff Regulations, which is available on the ACC website.
With regard to the expertise of the ACC’s staff in conducting investigations, the research indicated a pressing need for trainings in specialist investigative methods, especially with regard to conducting financial investigations; furthermore it was reiterated several times that the ACC’s investigations evince an overreliance on witness-testimony.63
Corruption prevention and education is carried out by four units of the ACC. The Investigation Unit produces preventive recommendations after each report and sends them to relevant institutions. The Legal Unit reviews laws and regulations and conducts assessments on the procedures of other institutions. Furthermore there are two units dedicated entirely to prevention work, the Education and Awareness Unit and the Prevention and Research Unit. Prior to May 2015, the latter two units functioned as a single section with a focus on education and awareness. It was only after this that the ACC put a special focus on its research function with the requisite levels of directive and resources.
Thus far, the ACC has produced a Civil Servants Perception study and an assessment of two selected aspects of the public health sector. Risk profiles of Customs and Immigration sectors are underway. These studies have thus far had limited consultation with the private sector. Increasing focus group discussions with the private sector and other relevant stakeholders may yield important insight and novel perspective.64
An average of USD 50,000 was allocated for training from the annual budget during 2014-2016.65 This includes contributions to those pursuing long-term studies abroad, as well as trainings conducted in the country. Training opportunities for the staff are limited66 and in-depth specialist training opportunities are very rare.
Training and induction of all new staff, including investigative staff are conducted internally under the guidance of senior investigators and the Legal Unit. In addition to the induction period, the ACC has recently
62 Salary scales are taken from a sample of job advertisements published during September 2016.
63 Interview with Anti-Corruption Experts.
64 Additional stakeholders that could be consulted include Transparency Maldives or International Organisation of Migration in the case of Immigration Assessment.
65 Information from ACC, 08 September 2016, ACC Annual Reports 2014 and 2015
66 Also noted by IFES, 2014
29assessmenT of anTi-corrupTion commission of The maldives 2016
introduced internal arrangements to share experiences of exemplary investigations and also to give feedback to investigators through sessions organized with the commission members and all investigators.67
Some bilateral training assistance is available to the ACC, notably from the Malaysian Anti-Corruption Academy. However, few slots are provided to the ACC for this training each year.
The turnover rate of the ACC is very high at 25% in 2014, 14% in 2015 and 14% in the first six months of 201668. The turnover was noted to be the highest in the investigation department, which consists mainly of lawyers and finance degree holders. It was reported that the majority of the legal staff leave for better career opportunities, as they typically envision working in a State institution like the ACC as an opportunity to build a solid grounding of experience prior to finding more lucrative employment in the private sector.69
� Table 8: Staff turnover at ACC 2014-2016
yeAr stAff At beginning of yeAr
recrUitment resignAtion /terminAtion
investigAtive stAff wHo left dUring tHe yeAr
2014 69 35 19 11
2015 86 32 14 8
2016 104 27 24 12
Source: ACC August 23rd 2016, Annual reports of ACC for 2015 and 2014
detection And investigAtionScoring only 56% there is significant room for improving the dimension on Detection and Investigation. The most salient issues were that the conviction rate for corruption cases remains very low with only one conviction in the past 3 years pertinent to a corruption related case; furthermore there is a pressing need to improve co-ordination between the ACC and the Prosecutor General’s Office to ensure a higher rate of successful prosecution for corruption offences.
The ACC generally appears accessible to the Maldivian population for corruption complaints. During the review period the ACC reported receiving a total of 2,503 complaints. Complaints were received from each and every atoll of the country, indicating that there are no geographical barriers to reporting. Furthermore the ACC has also developed an internal whistleblower regulation in 2016 to encourage whistle-blowers to report corruption issues.70 The ACC could further enhance their practical accessibility for lodging complaints by encouraging the large community of expatriates residing in the country to report any incidents of
67 Interviews with Secretary General of ACC, ACC members, Head of Legal Unit
68 ACC Annual Reports 2014 and 2015 , information provided by ACC on 23 August 2016
69 It is noteworthy that the Attorney General’s office also experienced a high turnover rate amongst its legal staff, while the Prosecutor General’s Office did not report high turnover. The salary at AGO is approximately the same as at ACC while the PGO offers a higher salary and the opportunity to actively partake in criminal proceedings. Information provided by former Deputy Prosecutor General Hussain Shameem and Senior State Attorney at Attorney General’s Office.
70 Interview with Secretary General of the ACC
30 Transparency maldives
corruption they might witness through targeted messaging.71
The ACC reports a high rate of complaint review and investigation. Of the 2,503 cases received during the review period (Jan 2014 - Jun 2016), 1,964 (78%) cases were found to qualify for investigation. Of these, investigations were completed for 2,112 cases (which includes cases from previous years).72
The ACC scored adequately with regard to the number of cases initiated of their own accord. During the review period the ACC initiated 242 cases (on average 96 cases per year)73 and were typically prompted following a review of media reports and audit reports produced by the Auditor General’s Office.
Though this is not a low number there are potential avenues the ACC could explore in order to improve their score on this indicator. For instance individuals working in the private sector generally refrain from reporting the small and petty bribes and favours expected of them by Government officials in order to obtain efficient service – and the ACC could be more proactive in documenting these occurrences and initiating appropriate action.74
� Table 9: Details of the number of cases handled by the ACC from 2014 to June 2016
nUmber of cAses 2014 2015 2016 (JAn to JUn)
totAl (JAn 2014- JUne 2016
Initiated by the Commission 125 66 51 242
Qualified for investigation 722 611 416 1749
Dropped due to: 1. outside ACC mandate 2. insufficient information, 3. unable to clarify anonymous of complainant.
243 137 61 441
Forwarded to other relevant government office
6 47 30 83
Evaluation and investigation completed (in-cluding from previous year):
783 855 432 2070
Concluded for prosecution 38 26 32 96
Closed with no corruption offence found 745 829 400 1974
Forwarded to PGO 35 21 10 66
Returned from PGO 38 46 53 137
Pending by end of year 2353 2139 2148 2148
Source: Annual reports, information provided by ACC
A particular cause for concern is the extremely low conviction rate for corruption related offences. According to information obtained from the PGO, of the 74 cases that the ACC sent to the Prosecutor Office during the review period, only one resulted in a successful prosecution.
71 Interview with Head of Complaints Registration and Evaluation Unit
72 Information from ACC on 01 September 2016, ACC Annual Reports 2014 and 2015.
73 ACC Annual Reports 2014 and 2015, Information from ACC on 01 September 2016
74 Focus Group Discussion 2
31assessmenT of anTi-corrupTion commission of The maldives 2016
With regard to the efficiency and professionalism of investigations there is much room for improvement. Several interlocutors have noted that the ACC’s investigations are often over-reliant on witness testimony and furthermore the ACC’s investigations into prominent corruption matters have on occasion taken an inordinate amount of time to complete. For instance the ACC’s investigation into a financial scandal involving the Maldives Media and Public Relations Corporation (MMPRC) – a government owned Tourism Promotion company – which was being used to siphon several millions of dollars worth of funds into the private accounts of senior government figures has still not been completed despite the issue having surfaced to the public in late 2014 following an audit report by the Auditor General’s Office.
According to the ACC, they had been investigating the matter even prior to the audit report in response to an individual’s complaint. However, and despite the ACC reporting to the media in February 2016 that their investigation into the matter was in its final stages, key findings have still not been made available to the public. 75
Furthermore, the PGO rejected several cases sent by the ACC (see Table 9). The reasons provided for this are discrepant. According to the PGO it is incumbent on the ACC to increase the skills of their investigative staff, as the PGO often received cases that have not been investigated thoroughly enough to warrant prosecution. The ACC conversely notes that this is not the reason that the PGO provides; further noting that cases are either returned for further clarification or the PGO simply opts not to prosecute. The ACC encourages the PGO to provide the exact standards and pre-requisites for a case to warrant further prosecution, and further encourages the PGO to leave such decisions at the discretion of the courts.
The ACC and the PGO have, on the ACC’s initiative, recently signed a memorandum of understanding aimed in part towards ameliorating the communication lapses between the two institutions. The ACC’s investigative findings are now presented to duty prosecutors as a preliminary step to ascertain how cases can be strengthened if necessary, prior to formally sending cases for the PGO to be processed.
One significant challenge to the ACC’s investigations is the geographical dispersion of the islands in the Maldives. A case might pend for one or two years contingent on the amount of time taken to receive the statement of a single individual. Another obstacle may be the difficulty in retrieving documents from offices, especially documents related to cases from previous years as such documents may be stored in a separate location or island.76
It is positively noted that the ACC has evinced a willingness to investigate prominent persons, including members of parliament, ministers, political party leaders, former presidents, board members of government corporations, and members of independent commissions77
With regard to Asset Recovery and Restitution, the ACC does not have a legal mandate to recover assets and does not do so directly78, and there is nothing in any law that deals with recovery of assets in a non-drug-trafficking case.79 However, it does instruct other law enforcement agencies to recover and confiscate
75 Sun Online ‘ACC: Issues noted with MMPRC, investigation at last stage’ avaliable at: http://english.sun.mv/36167
76 Interviews with former staff of ACC, Secretary General of ACC
77 Interviews with journalists, former employees of ACC, Lawyer, Member of Parliament, Information from ACC on 07 and 18 September 2016
78 Interviews with ACC Members, Senior State Attorney at the Attorney General's Office, Head of Legal Unit at ACC and former employee of ACC.
79 The Auditor General’s Office is however testing the process, on grounds that there are no restrictions for seeking assets lost. For asset recovery, a conviction is needed first and since this is rare, testing of the current protocols on asset recovery has also been limited. However, the Attorney General's Office has submitted a case to recover an asset following one conviction and this case is still pending with the courts. Source: Interview with Senior State Attorney
32 Transparency maldives
assets when appropriate. A recently common practice adopted by the ACC is to inform the Prosecutor General’s Office of the amounts lost by the State, with a request to recover them. The ACC’s annual reports highlighted that during 2014-2015, a total of $113,727 was lost to the State.80 The ACC has frozen bank accounts in the past and has also confiscated computers in an office, during an investigation in in 2012. Data on asset recovery during the review period was not available.
Prevention, edUcAtion And oUtreAcHScoring 67% on Prevention, Education and Outreach, the ACC did comparatively well on this dimension. The strongest indication that the ACC affords a high priority to its Prevention, Education and Outreach initiatives is that it allocated an average of USD 60,000 on operating expenses for public outreach and prevention activities during the review period. Furthermore, the ACC has been proactive in conducting various awareness programs each year – including the conception and production of the television series ‘Bithufangi, which seeks to shine a light on corruption issues faced by ordinary citizens in their daily lives. The ACC prepares an annual activity plan for prevention, education and outreach, and though budget constraints have been noted to be a challenge, it is largely successful in implementation.
The ACC performed worst on the indicator regarding the number of reviews conducted on organizational procedures. As the ACC’s research function was only introduced recently (in 2015) the ACC has thus far only produced 3 organizational reviews.81
More positively, the ACC’s investigation team always identifies prevention recommendations and includes them in the investigation reports, which are then forwarded to all concerned offices – though systematically following up on the implementation and adherence to these recommendations should be afforded higher importance.82
Although conducting research is a Constitutional mandate and responsibility of the ACC, there was minimal attention afforded to research and exploration of corruption risks and conditions in the country.83 Until late 2014, the ACC considered country-wide educational awareness as its main priority, with research being relegated in importance.84 As positive stride is that, as mentioned previously, a dedicated research unit was established in 2015, which has since produced two studies: one on selected aspects of the health sector and the other, the aforementioned civil service perception study. Two further studies are currently being conducted by the ACC: one for Maldives Customs Service; and the other for Maldives Immigration.
The range of stakeholders consulted in the ACC’s current research is limited. Although other stakeholders are occasionally consulted, the main focus of research is on the institution under analysis. A wider range of consultations can illuminate novel perspectives on challenges faced by the institution.
The ACC utilizes several mediums to disseminate awareness materials on corruption and information on the institution. The Commission has conducted a campaigned entitled ‘Integrity First’ which was promoted by memorabilia such as key tags and special logos and, as previously mentioned, has begun a television
80 ACC Annual report 2015
81 Information provided by ACC on 07 September 2016 and and 01 November 2016
82 Interviews with ACC Members, Secretary General of ACC, Head of Investigative Unit, Post Investigation and Reporting Unit Head
83 Sources: former employees of?, ACC Members, CSO leaders, Analysis of previous annual reports and publications of ACC also reveal this.
84 Interview with Head of Prevention and Research Unit
33assessmenT of anTi-corrupTion commission of The maldives 2016
drama series focused on issues of corruption in the current society. This is a commendable effort by the ACC and the combination of TV, radio and social media will reach a significant portion of the local population. However, the TV and radio programs are only in the local language and these efforts can be strengthened in their effectiveness if a variety of languages were used.
The ACC operates an active twitter and Facebook page, with over 8000 followers on Facebook and over 1000 followers on twitter. The Commission also uploads quarterly statistics to its website.85 Short awareness messages posted on social media in catchy or thought-provoking ways could potentially increase the ACC’s reach, especially if the messages were portrayed in a manner appealing to youth.
cooPerAtion witH otHer orgAnizAtions The ACC scored 50% on this dimension. Though scoring moderately on other areas, and scoring highly with regard to its participation in International Networks, one indicator which warrants particularly urgent attention is the ACC’s relationships with the most important stakeholder, the Prosecutor General’s Office.
It was reiterated several times during the research stage that a poor working relationship exists between the ACC and the PGO.86 This is highly problematic in light of the fact the ACC does not possess the legal discretion to initiate corruption proceedings of its own accord and must rely on the PGO to fulfil this task. One indicator of this poor relationship is that despite the large volume of documents relevant to each corruption case forwarded to the PGO by the ACC each year, discussions between ACC investigators and prosecutors are irregular. Furthermore the ACC is neither informed nor invited when Prosecutor General’s Office attends court hearings on cases forwarded by the Commission, which is unfortunate considering that the presence of ACC investigators familiar with the relevant cases could potentially expedite corruption cases.87 During the research period, a memorandum of understanding was signed between the ACC and the PGO intended to ameliorate these and similar issues.
The ACC is broadly cooperative with other state institutions mandated to enquire into issues of integrity. Three such institutions exist: the Judicial Service Commission, (JSC) which attends to the ethical oversight of the Judiciary; the Elections Commission (EC) which is mandated with ensuring that elections are conducted freely and fairly, and the National Integrity Commission (NIC), which is tasked with overseeing four separate law enforcement agencies.
The JSC has in the past challenged the ACC’s authority to investigate matters related to the judiciary on the basis that it falls within the JSC’s mandate.88 Nonetheless according to the ACC it has continued to investigate corruption issues relating to the judiciary without interference by the JSC.89
The National Integrity Commissions Act of 2015 states that all complaints related to the country’s overarching anti-corruption legislation, the PPCA Act 2/2000, should be forwarded to the ACC, which must investigate
85 https://twitter.com/acc_maldives, https://www.facebook.com/ACCMALDIVES/ , www.acc.gov.mv
86 Interviews with ACC Members, Secretary General of ACC, Head of Legal Unit, Senior State Attorney, former investigative staff of ACC, UNODC Officer
87 The ACC and the Prosecutor General’s Office, on the ACC’s initiative, recently signed a Memorandum of Understanding to address these lapses in communication, which can hopefully address these issues in future.
88 Judicial Service Commission Act 10/2008
89 'Complaints against Judges must be processed by JSC: Chief Justice’, SunOnline, 22 September 2012. Available at: http://english.sun.mv/5832 (Accessed 27 September 2016)
34 Transparency maldives
such matters within 30 days of receiving them and inform NIC of the result.90 The NIC has since forwarded at least one case to the ACC. In practice, the ACC forwards all cases falling under the purview of the NIC to them along with a request to return any corruption related issues to the ACC. As part of its procedure to inform any relevant offices following the conclusion of a case, the ACC also informs the NIC of the outcome of its investigations and recommendations.91
Elections related corruption complaints may be submitted to both the EC and the ACC and each institution investigates complaints independently. Following the completion of investigations relevant to elections the ACC always informs the EC of its completion, along with preventive recommendations. However, the EC does not inform ACC of any cases of corruption that the EC investigates.92
The ACC evinces a positive willingness to work with Civil Society Organizations. The ACC has in the past worked with TM in organizing its National Anti-Corruption activities and works with several other NGOs through its National Integrity Plan.
Private sector co-operation with the ACC, especially for investigation purposes has thus far proved lacking. In several instances the ACC has resorted to obtaining a court order or warrant in order to obtain requested information.93 Further, as has been previously noted, individuals in the private sector often resort to petty bribery to obtain efficient services – and colleagues who are acculturated to similar behaviour would be hesitant to report these on-goings. Hence the ACC cannot rely on complaints alone to identify corruption hotspots in the system and it would be prudent for the ACC to review their methods of enquiring into and preventing the occurrence of corruption. If the ACC facilitates open discussions with the private sector with a focus on acquiring feedback about institutions in general rather than with the intention of collecting evidence, corruption hotspots may be better identified.
With regard to the ACC’s participation in International Networks, the evidence indicates that it is currently sufficient. Maldives acceded to the UNCAC in 2007. It has also been a member of the Asia/Pacific Group on Money Laundering since July 2008. The ACC also participates in the International Anti-Corruption Conference and its annual general meetings. Furthermore the Commission’s Strategic Action Plan for 2015-2019 has a dedicated policy aimed at increasing international collaboration with other organisations and authorities although the plan does not specify bodies. As the ACC is not currently a member of the ADB-OECD Anti-Corruption Initiative for Asia-Pacific, this is an avenue that they could potentially pursue. .94
oversigHt And AccoUntAbilityAt 63% ACC performed adequately with regard to the oversight and accountability of the institution. Particularly commendable are the efforts exerted to ensure that its Annual Reports – all iterations of which from 2011-2015 are available on its website - are informative and accessible to the public. Internal oversight of staff is adequate and appropriate actions are taken in response to their ethical lapses. Though the ACC scored adequately with regard to external oversight bodies on the basis that a nominal oversight committee exists in the form of the Independent Commission on Independent Institutions – further examination would reveal that this oversight body does not make any effort whatsoever to fulfil its responsibilities and there is
90 National Integrity Commission Act, Clauses 36(a) 2 and (b)
91 Interview with ACC Member
92 Meetings with ACC Member, Elections Commission Member
93 Interview with Head of Investigation Unit
94 ACC Strategic Action Plan for 2015-2019, page 34,
35assessmenT of anTi-corrupTion commission of The maldives 2016
no external oversight of the ACC in practice.
With regard to the ACC’s Annual Report, the ACC act obligates the Commission to prepare and submit these to oversight bodies before 28th February prior to publishing, which must occur within 14 days of submission. These reports are fairly comprehensive in nature. The ACC’s website is similarly informative with a summary of all cases from January 2011 onwards available to the public. Similarly, recommendations to offices, cases sent to the Prosecutor General’s office and cases dropped by the ACC since 2011 are summarised and published on the website and updated in monthly intervals. The website contains detailed information on its personnel and internal regulations, as well as statistics on the awareness activities carried out by the Commission.95 The ACC has made notable effort to further increase the accessibility and scope of information available on its website - introducing an English section in 2015 and recently enabling online complaint reporting.
As previously noted, though a Parliamentary Commission on Independent Institutions exists, its members have thus far neglected to fulfil their responsibility and the Committee and did not question the ACC during the review period.96 Though it was reported that some members of the committee suggested summoning the ACC to inquire into its delay in investigating a well-publicized financial scandal they decided that such an effort would have been superfluous as the issue was being investigated by a body under the purview of the President.97
With regard to disciplinary measures against staff, internal regulation specify the circumstances in which disciplinary measures can be taken against staff and also which measures to be taken in such circumstances. During the review period, three cases of questionable behaviour were noted from staff and the Commission investigated all of these cases and took action where action was warranted.98 Such actions and issues are not made public by the ACC, nor is there legislation obligating them to do so.
95 Raajje TV, Sun Online and Mihaaru.
96 Interviews with Secretary General of ACC, ACC members and journalists
97 Interview with Rozaina Adam, Member of Parliament/Member of Independent Commissions Oversight Committee
98 Interviews with Secretary General of ACC, ACC members
�
1. A
CC
’s L
egal
Inde
pend
ence
and
Sta
tus
(7 in
dica
tors
)
indi
cAto
rin
dicA
tor
vAlU
esJU
stif
icAt
ion
of s
core
s An
d dA
tA s
oUrc
esHi
gH (2
)m
ediU
m (1
)lo
w (0
)
1. A
CC
’s le
gal
inde
pend
ence
Inde
pend
ent
Age
ncy
Sep
arat
e ag
ency
ou
tsid
e m
inis
-try
With
in p
olic
e or
m
inis
tryB
oth
the
Con
stitu
tion
and
addi
tiona
l leg
isla
tion
in th
e fo
rm o
f the
AC
C A
ct g
rant
the
AC
C
fully
inde
pend
ent l
egal
sta
tus.
Sour
ce: C
onst
itutio
n 20
08 (7
:199
) AC
C A
ct 1
3/20
08 a
rticl
e 2,
Mee
tings
with
Com
mis
sion
2. A
CC
’s m
anda
teFo
cus
on in
vest
i-ga
tion,
edu
catio
n an
d pr
even
tion
(and
pro
secu
tion
if ap
plic
able
)
Prim
ary
focu
s on
in
vest
igat
ion
Edu
catio
n an
d pr
even
tion
with
-ou
t inv
estig
atio
n
The
man
date
of t
he A
CC
enc
ompa
sses
inqu
iring
into
all
alle
gatio
ns o
f pub
lic s
ecto
r co
rrup
tion
and
‘[pro
mot
ing]
hon
esty
and
inte
grity
…at
[the
] ins
titut
iona
l and
pub
lic le
vel’
thro
ugh
prev
entio
n an
d ed
ucat
iona
l effo
rts.
Thou
gh s
corin
g hi
ghly
on
this
indi
cato
r tw
o ca
veat
s ar
e w
orth
not
ing.
Firs
t, th
e A
CC
do
es n
ot p
osse
ss th
e le
gal d
iscr
etio
n to
con
duct
pro
secu
tions
, whi
ch is
the
prer
ogat
ive
of th
e P
rose
cuto
r Gen
eral
’s O
ffice
. Sec
ondl
y, d
omes
tic a
nti-c
orru
ptio
n le
gisl
atio
n ne
-gl
ects
to in
clud
e ill
icit
enric
hmen
t, br
iber
y of
fore
ign
parti
es a
nd E
mbe
zzle
men
t. So
urce
: Con
stitu
tion
2008
(7:2
02),
AC
C A
ct (1
3/20
08) 2
2, U
NO
DC
Cou
ntry
Rev
iew
Rep
ort o
f C
hapt
er 3
and
4
3. A
CC
’s le
gal
pow
ers
Ext
ensi
ve p
ow-
ers
(e.g
., ar
rest
an
d se
arch
of
arre
sted
per
-so
ns; e
xam
inin
g su
spec
t’s b
ank
acco
unts
, saf
e-de
posi
t box
es, i
n-co
me
tax
reco
rds
and
prop
erty
; se
arch
and
ent
ry
of p
rem
ises
, etc
.)
Som
e po
wer
sFe
w o
r non
eTh
e C
omm
issi
on m
ay s
umm
on p
erso
ns, e
nqui
re in
to a
nd fr
eeze
ban
k ac
coun
ts, c
onfis
-ca
te a
sset
s, v
erify
doc
umen
tatio
n an
d al
so in
itiat
e le
gal a
ctio
n ag
ains
t ind
ivid
uals
who
di
sobe
y th
e A
CC
’s o
rder
s.
How
ever
, the
AC
C la
cks
the
pow
er to
hal
t on-
goin
g co
ntra
cts
on s
uspi
cion
of c
orru
ptio
n.
Thou
gh th
ey h
ad p
revi
ousl
y is
sued
hal
t ord
ers
to p
roje
cts,
a S
upre
me
Cou
rt ju
dgem
ent
in 2
012
stat
ed th
at th
e A
CC
can
onl
y is
sue
non-
bind
ing
reco
mm
enda
tions
to te
rmin
ate
proj
ects
, ten
der p
roce
sses
and
Sta
te c
ontra
cts.
So
urce
: AC
C A
ct 1
3/20
08 c
laus
es 2
2,24
, PP
CA
2/20
00 A
rticl
es 1
7, 2
0,21
,22,
IFE
S 2
014
page
13
, Sup
rem
e C
ourt
Dec
isio
n 20
12/S
C-A
/21
2nd
Sep
tem
ber 2
016,
Mee
tings
with
Com
mis
sion
m
embe
rs, H
ead
of L
egal
Uni
t, M
embe
r of P
arlia
men
t, P
revi
ous
Dire
ctor
of L
egal
Affa
irs a
t PG
O,
UN
OD
C o
ffice
r, S
trate
gic
plan
of A
CC
201
5-20
19
4. A
ppoi
nt-
men
t of A
CC
C
omm
issi
oner
(s)
Inde
pend
ent
com
mitt
ee u
sing
ob
ject
ive
crite
ria
and
proc
edur
e is
tra
nspa
rent
Min
iste
rial c
om-
mitt
ee u
sing
ob-
ject
ive
crite
ria b
ut
proc
edur
e is
not
tra
nspa
rent
Prim
e M
inis
ter/
Pre
side
nt/ H
ead
of S
tate
mak
es
the
deci
sion
and
th
e pr
oced
ure
is
not t
rans
pare
nt
Com
mis
sion
ers
of th
e A
CC
are
app
oint
ed v
ia a
maj
ority
vot
e of
Par
liam
ent f
rom
a s
elec
-tio
n of
nam
es fo
rwar
ded
by th
e P
resi
dent
. The
Pre
side
nt’s
nom
inee
s ar
e se
lect
ed fr
om
a co
mbi
natio
n of
can
dida
tes
who
resp
ond
to a
pub
lic a
nnou
ncem
ent f
or th
e po
st, i
n ad
-di
tion
to n
ames
sug
gest
dire
ctly
by
the
Pre
side
nt h
imse
lf.
The
Exe
cutiv
e do
es n
ot p
ublic
ize
the
résu
més
of t
he in
itial
can
dida
tes,
but
the
proc
ess
of s
corin
g an
d vo
ting
in P
arlia
men
t is
trans
pare
nt a
nd fo
llow
s w
eigh
ted
crite
ria e
ncom
-pa
ssin
g ed
ucat
ion,
inte
grity
and
exp
erie
nce.
One
issu
e is
that
thou
gh th
e C
onst
itutio
n sp
ecifi
es th
at A
CC
Com
mis
sion
ers
mus
t pos
-se
ss th
e re
quis
ite e
duca
tiona
l and
oth
er q
ualifi
catio
ns to
fulfi
l the
ir ob
ligat
ions
it n
egle
cts
to s
peci
fy w
hat w
ould
con
stitu
te s
uch.
So
urce
: AC
C A
ct 1
3/20
08 A
rticl
e 5,
11, P
ropo
sed
amen
dmen
ts to
AC
C A
ct s
ubm
itted
by
AC
C to
the
Atto
rney
Gen
eral
’s o
ffice
on
15 J
une
2016
, In
terv
iew
with
MP
s, A
CC
mem
bers
, Jou
rnal
ist.
5. A
CC
C
omm
issi
oner
(s)’
term
of o
ffice
and
re
mov
al
Fixe
d te
rm w
ith
tenu
re (d
ifficu
lt to
rem
ove
Com
-m
issi
oner
s w
ith-
out c
ause
, e.g
. in
com
pete
nce
or
prov
en m
isco
n-du
ct)
Fixe
d te
rm w
ith-
out t
enur
e bu
t not
di
fficu
lt to
rem
ove
Com
mis
sion
ers
No
fixed
term
and
C
omm
issi
oner
s ca
n be
repl
aced
ea
sily
The
tenu
re o
f an
AC
C M
embe
r is
a fiv
e-ye
ar te
rm w
hich
can
be
rene
wed
for a
noth
er fi
ve
year
s. T
erm
s of
dis
mis
sal a
re s
tate
d in
the
Con
stitu
tion
and
AC
C A
ct.
Sour
ce: A
CC
Act
13/
2008
, Arti
cles
6, 1
4 an
d 17
, Con
stitu
tion
2008
7:2
07, I
nter
view
s w
ith C
omm
is-
sion
Mem
bers
, Jou
rnal
ists
and
Mem
ber o
f Par
liam
ent.
6. A
CC
’s o
pera
-tio
nal a
uton
omy
and
impa
rtial
ity
Hig
h (n
o po
litic
al
inte
rfere
nce)
Lim
ited
(som
e po
litic
al in
terfe
r-en
ce)
Low
(hig
h le
vel o
f po
litic
al in
terfe
r-en
ce)
The
AC
C h
as a
gre
at d
eal o
f aut
onom
y in
dev
elop
ing
its o
wn
regu
latio
ns a
nd p
roce
-du
res
as w
ell a
s w
ith p
ertin
ence
to re
crui
ting
and
dism
issi
ng s
taff,
sub
ject
onl
y to
bud
get
cons
ider
atio
ns.
Thou
gh g
ener
ally
ope
ratin
g au
tono
mou
sly,
ther
e ar
e ce
rtain
indi
catio
ns c
astin
g do
ubt o
n th
e fu
ll im
parti
ality
of t
he A
CC
. S
ever
al in
terlo
cuto
rs e
xpre
ssed
con
cern
ed th
at th
e P
resi
dent
of t
he A
CC
was
one
am
ong
seve
ral s
tate
offi
cial
s th
at h
ad b
een
sold
luxu
ry a
partm
ents
by
the
stat
e w
ell b
e-lo
w m
arke
t rat
e. T
he p
reva
lent
vie
w w
as th
at th
ese
apar
tmen
ts w
ere
sold
at s
igni
fican
t di
scou
nt b
y th
e st
ate
to w
in th
e fa
vour
of s
elec
t ind
ivid
uals
task
ed w
ith e
nsur
ing
its a
c-co
unta
bilit
y.A
noth
er e
xam
ple
is th
e la
ck o
f voc
al o
ppos
ition
by
the
AC
C fo
llow
ing
an a
men
dmen
t to
the
Tour
ism
Act
whi
ch g
rant
s th
e go
vern
men
t the
dis
cret
ion
to a
llow
isla
nds
to b
e co
n-tra
cted
to th
ird p
artie
s fo
r tou
rism
dev
elop
men
t with
out a
n op
en b
iddi
ng p
roce
ss.
Sour
ce: M
eetin
gs w
ith S
ecre
tary
Gen
eral
, Com
mis
sion
Mem
bers
, CS
O le
ader
s, M
embe
r of P
ar-
liam
ent.
for d
etai
ls, A
men
dmen
t to
Tour
ism
Act
13/
2008
cla
use
5(D
)3, 1
1th
Am
endm
ent t
o P
ublic
Fi
nanc
e R
egul
atio
ns, ‘
Ant
i Cor
rupt
ion
Com
mis
sion
has
exp
ress
ed it
s co
ncer
ns o
ver t
he 1
1th
amen
dmen
t to
the
Pub
lic F
inan
cial
Reg
ulat
ion’
, Jul
y 9
2016
, http
://ac
c.go
v.m
v/en
/201
6/07
/ant
i-cor
-ru
ptio
n-co
mm
issi
on-h
as-e
xpre
ssed
-its-
conc
erns
-ove
r-th
e-11
th-a
men
dmen
t-to-
the-
publ
ic-fi
nanc
ial-
regu
latio
n/ ,
vario
us n
ews
artic
les.
7. G
over
nmen
t’s
relia
nce
on A
CC
to
use
cor
rupt
ion
as
a w
eapo
n ag
ains
t po
litic
al o
ppon
ents
Gov
ernm
ent h
as
not u
sed
AC
C a
s a
wea
pon
agai
nst
polit
ical
opp
o-ne
nts
Evi
denc
e of
lim
-ite
d us
e of
AC
C
by g
over
nmen
t as
a w
eapo
n ag
ains
t pol
itica
l op
pone
nts
Evi
denc
e of
w
ides
prea
d us
e of
AC
C b
y go
v-er
nmen
t as
a w
eapo
n ag
ains
t po
litic
al o
ppo-
nent
s
Ther
e is
no
evid
ence
of t
he A
CC
bei
ng u
sed
as a
tool
to in
timid
ate
a po
litic
al ri
val.
Sour
ces:
Inte
rvie
ws
with
MP
s (a
n op
posi
tion
party
MP
/ mem
ber o
f Ind
epen
dent
Inst
itutio
ns a
nd a
M
P fro
m ru
ling
party
), Jo
urna
lists
, CS
O le
ader
s, V
ario
us n
ews
artic
les.
�
2. A
CC
’s F
inan
cial
and
Hum
an R
esou
rces
(9 in
dica
tors
)
indi
cAto
rin
dicA
tor
vAlU
esJU
stif
icAt
ion
of s
core
s An
d dA
tA s
oUrc
esHi
gH (2
)m
ediU
m (1
)lo
w (0
)
8. A
vera
ge p
ro-
porti
on o
f AC
C’s
bu
dget
to to
tal g
ov-
ernm
ent b
udge
t for
pa
st 3
yea
rs
Abo
ve 0
.20%
Bet
wee
n 0.
10%
to
0.2
0%B
elow
0.1
0%Fo
r the
per
iod
of 2
014-
2016
the
budg
et a
lloca
ted
to th
e A
CC
on
aver
age
(incl
udin
g an
y ad
ditio
ns o
r cut
back
s m
ade
durin
g th
e ye
ar) i
s 0.
16%
of t
he S
tate
bud
get.
The
budg
et
for A
CC
for 2
016
is ju
st o
ver M
VR
33
mill
ion
(abo
ut U
SD
2.1
5mn)
. So
urce
s: M
aldi
ves
Mon
etar
y A
utho
rity
July
201
6 st
atis
tics,
info
rmat
ion
prov
ided
by
AC
C
9. S
uffic
ienc
y of
A
CC
’s b
udge
t fo
r per
form
ing
its
func
tions
Mor
e th
an a
d-eq
uate
(80%
to
100%
of b
udge
t re
ques
t is
ap-
prov
ed)
Ade
quat
e (6
6%
to 7
9% o
f bud
get
requ
est i
s ap
-pr
oved
)
Inad
equa
te (l
ess
than
66%
of
budg
et re
ques
t is
app
rove
d) a
nd
relie
s on
fund
ing
by C
SO
s an
d do
nor a
genc
ies
The
AC
C re
ceiv
ed a
n av
erag
e of
82%
of t
he a
mou
nt it
requ
este
d fro
m th
e go
vern
men
t du
ring
the
perio
d 20
14-2
016.
The
AC
C re
ceiv
ed M
VR
29.
mill
ion
in 2
014,
MV
R 3
5.9
mil-
lion
in 2
015
and
MV
R 3
3.1
mill
ion
in 2
016
(as
of J
uly
2016
). Fo
r the
se th
ree
year
s th
e A
CC
has
sub
mitt
ed a
bud
get r
eque
st fo
r an
aver
age
of M
VR
40
mill
ion.
How
ever
, it s
houl
d be
not
ed th
at th
e am
ount
of b
udge
t tha
t the
AC
C re
ques
ts a
re b
ased
on
thei
r exp
ecta
tions
of w
hat t
he G
over
nmen
t wou
ld a
ctua
lly b
e w
illin
g to
pro
vide
, rat
her
than
on
the
sole
bas
is o
f wha
t the
y as
sess
to b
e a
suffi
cien
t am
ount
to e
ffect
ivel
y fu
lfil
thei
r tas
ks.
Ann
ual r
epor
ts fo
r 201
3, 2
014
and
2015
not
e bu
dget
ary
cons
train
ts a
s ch
alle
nges
. Th
ese
cons
train
ts tr
ansl
ate
to c
halle
nges
suc
h as
bei
ng u
nabl
e to
exp
and
phys
ical
sp
ace
of o
ffice
and
lim
itatio
ns o
n tra
vels
due
to la
ck o
f fun
ds. S
enio
r man
agem
ent o
f the
A
CC
iter
ated
the
sam
e co
mpl
aint
s du
ring
the
inte
rvie
w p
roce
ss.
Sour
ces:
Info
rmat
ion
from
AC
C, A
nnua
l Rep
orts
of A
CC
, Mee
tings
with
Sec
reta
ry G
ener
al a
nd
AC
C M
embe
rs.
10. S
ecur
ity a
nd
stab
ility
of
AC
C’s
bud
get
durin
g pa
st 3
ye
ars
AC
C b
udge
t is
gua
rant
eed
base
d on
pre
vi-
ous
year
’s a
lloca
-tio
n an
d ha
s no
t be
en re
duce
d
AC
C b
udge
t has
no
t bee
n re
duce
d du
ring
past
3
year
s
AC
C b
udge
t has
be
en re
duce
d du
ring
past
thre
e ye
ars
The
stab
ility
of t
he A
CC
’s b
udge
t is
unce
rtain
and
sub
ject
to fl
uctu
atio
n. F
or in
stan
ce in
20
14 th
e A
CC
’s b
udge
t inc
reas
ed b
y 40
% in
com
paris
on to
the
prev
ious
yea
r. In
201
5,
ther
e w
as a
noth
er in
crea
se in
tota
l allo
catio
n. H
owev
er fo
r 201
6, th
e al
loca
tion
was
re
duce
d by
nea
rly M
VR
3 m
illio
n co
mpa
red
to 2
015,
whi
le th
e to
tal g
over
nmen
t bud
get
incr
ease
d by
22%
(MV
R 5
bill
ion)
from
201
5-20
16.
From
201
5 up
to J
uly
of 2
016,
the
gove
rnm
ent g
rant
ed th
e A
CC
add
ition
al fu
nds
of a
p-pr
oxim
atel
y M
VR
3 m
illio
n (a
ppro
xim
atel
y U
SD
200
,000
) eac
h ye
ar. I
n S
epte
mbe
r 201
4,
the
AC
C w
as o
rder
ed a
brup
tly to
cea
se a
ll co
st-in
curr
ing
activ
ities
for t
he re
st o
f the
ye
ar, e
ffect
ivel
y re
duci
ng th
e A
CC
’s b
udge
t allo
catio
n fo
r 201
4 by
15%
. A s
imila
r ins
truc-
tion
to h
alt a
ctiv
ities
was
giv
en in
Dec
embe
r 201
5.
Sour
ces:
Mee
tings
with
Sec
reta
ry G
ener
al o
f AC
C a
nd C
omm
issi
on m
embe
rs.
11.
AC
C p
er-
sonn
el’s
sal
ary
and
bene
fits
Com
petit
ive
sal-
ary
and
bene
fits
Ade
quat
e sa
lary
an
d be
nefit
sLo
w s
alar
y an
d lim
ited
bene
fits
The
sala
ry (i
nclu
ding
all
bene
fits)
of t
he A
CC
sta
ff is
com
para
ble
with
oth
er in
depe
nden
t in
stitu
tions
and
Sta
te c
ompa
nies
. It i
s sl
ight
ly h
ighe
r tha
n th
e ci
vil s
ervi
ce, b
ut o
n av
er-
age
the
AC
C d
oes
not o
ffer a
n ex
cept
iona
lly a
ttrac
tive
sala
ry c
ompa
red
to w
hat c
an
even
tual
ly b
e ea
rned
in th
e pr
ivat
e se
ctor
. S
ourc
es:
Mee
tings
with
AC
C C
omm
issi
on m
embe
rs, g
over
nmen
t gaz
ette
(ww
w.g
azet
te.m
v), a
vas.
iula
an.m
v, le
gal p
rofe
ssio
nals
, pr
evio
us A
CC
sta
ff.
12.
AC
C’s
se
lect
ion
crite
ria
for p
erso
nnel
Mer
itocr
atic
and
trans
pare
nt p
ro-
cedu
res
Lim
ited
mer
ito-
crat
ic o
rtra
nspa
rent
pro
-ce
dure
s
Pat
rona
ge a
nd
non-
trans
pare
nt
proc
edur
es
Job
adve
rtise
men
ts a
re p
oste
d on
the
AC
C w
ebsi
te a
nd in
the
Gov
ernm
ent g
azet
te.
All
appl
ican
ts a
re e
valu
ated
aga
inst
wei
ghte
d cr
iteria
, and
the
deta
iled
resu
lts o
f eac
h ca
ndid
ate
are
post
ed o
n th
e w
ebsi
te in
an
anon
ymou
s m
anne
r, w
here
eac
h ap
plic
ant i
s pr
ovid
ed a
refe
renc
e nu
mbe
r to
mon
itor t
heir
own
resu
lts. A
sel
ecte
d nu
mbe
r of t
he to
p sc
orin
g ap
plic
ants
will
be
calle
d fo
r int
ervi
ew.
Sour
ces:
inte
rvie
ws
with
Sec
reta
ry G
ener
al, C
omm
issi
on M
embe
rs, A
CC
web
site
, AC
C g
ener
al
regu
latio
ns C
hapt
er 6
, AC
C R
ecru
itmen
t Pol
icy,
IFE
S re
port
2014
13.
Exp
ertis
e of
AC
C’s
per
son-
nel i
n co
rrup
tion
inve
stig
atio
n
Hig
h le
vel o
f ex-
perti
seLa
ckin
g ex
perti
se
in s
ome
area
sLa
ckin
g ex
perti
se
in m
any
area
sTh
e A
CC
’s in
vest
igat
ions
chi
efly
rely
on
the
test
imon
y of
witn
esse
s an
d vi
ctim
s. F
urth
er-
mor
e, th
e A
CC
is in
nee
d of
trai
ned
staf
f with
a w
ider
var
iety
of c
orru
ptio
n in
vest
igat
ive
skill
s. T
hey
are
in p
artic
ular
nee
d of
sta
ff tra
ined
to in
vest
igat
e co
mpl
ex fi
nanc
ial c
rimes
. So
urce
s: A
CC
201
5 A
nnua
l rep
ort,
Inte
rvie
ws
with
AC
C m
embe
rs, H
ead
of In
vest
igat
ion
Uni
t.,
prev
ious
Dire
ctor
of L
egal
Affa
irs a
t PG
O, C
rime
Pre
vent
ion
and
Crim
inal
Jus
tice
Offi
cer,
UN
O-
DC
.201
5 an
d S
tatis
tical
Yea
rboo
k of
AC
C, I
nfor
mat
ion
sent
from
AC
C o
n 28
th S
epte
mbe
r, A
CC
w
ebsi
te.
14.
Exp
ertis
e of
AC
C’s
per
son-
nel i
n co
rrup
tion
prev
entio
n an
d ed
ucat
ion
Hig
h le
vel o
f ex-
perti
seLa
ckin
g ex
perti
se
in s
ome
area
sLa
ckin
g ex
perti
se
in m
any
area
sTh
e sc
ope
and
rang
e of
sta
keho
lder
s co
nsul
ted
for t
he A
CC
’s re
sear
ch is
lim
ited.
The
re
is m
inim
al e
ngag
emen
t with
the
priv
ate
sect
or fo
r res
earc
h pu
rpos
es.
Sour
ce: A
CC
Ann
ual r
epor
ts 2
014
and
2015
, Int
ervi
ew w
ith p
revi
ous
empl
oyee
, AC
C c
omm
issi
on-
ers.
15.
Trai
ning
of
AC
C’s
per
sonn
elW
ell-t
rain
ed p
er-
sonn
el w
ith m
any
train
ing
oppo
rtu-
nitie
s
Som
e tra
ined
pe
rson
nel w
ith
limite
d tra
inin
g op
portu
nitie
s
Trai
ning
is u
n-im
porta
nt a
nd
negl
ecte
d
All
new
sta
ff un
derg
o an
indu
ctio
n an
d ar
e fa
mili
ariz
ed w
ith th
e la
ws
and
regu
latio
ns
gove
rnin
g th
e A
CC
und
er th
e gu
idan
ce o
f sen
ior s
taff.
All
inve
stig
ativ
e st
aff a
ttend
a o
ne-w
eek
train
ing
deliv
ered
by
the
Pol
ice,
whi
ch p
rimar
ily
focu
ses
on in
terv
iew
ski
lls.
Furth
erm
ore
som
e bi
late
ral t
rain
ing
exis
t, no
tabl
y fro
m th
e M
alay
sian
Ant
i-Cor
rupt
ion
Aca
dem
y, th
ough
the
frequ
ency
of t
hese
trai
ning
s ar
e ve
ry lo
w. M
embe
rs a
lso
cont
rib-
ute
to c
apac
ity d
evel
opm
ent b
y at
tend
ing
mon
thly
ses
sion
s w
ith a
ll in
vest
igat
ors
whe
re
they
sha
re e
xper
ienc
es o
f exe
mpl
ary
inve
stig
atio
ns a
nd a
lso
give
feed
back
to th
e in
ves-
tigat
ion
team
s.
Trai
ning
opp
ortu
nitie
s be
yond
the
indu
ctio
n pe
riod
for t
he s
taff
are
limite
d an
d sp
ecia
list
train
ing
oppo
rtuni
ties,
not
ably
in in
vest
igat
ing
com
plex
fina
ncia
l crim
es a
re in
suffi
cien
t.A
n av
erag
e of
US
D 5
0,00
0 w
as a
lloca
ted
from
the
annu
al b
udge
t for
201
4-20
16 fo
r tra
inin
gs.
Sour
ce: I
nfor
mat
ion
from
AC
C S
epte
mbe
r 8th
, Mee
tings
with
AC
C m
embe
rs, S
ecre
tary
Gen
eral
, P
revi
ous
Em
ploy
ees,
UN
OD
C o
ffice
r, H
ead
of L
egal
uni
t, IF
ES
repo
rt, p
age
16
16. S
tabi
lity
of
AC
C’s
per
son-
nel
Low
turn
over
and
re
sign
atio
n ra
te(0
% to
5%
per
ye
ar)
Mod
erat
e tu
rn-
over
and
resi
gna-
tion
rate
(mor
e th
an 5
% to
10%
pe
r yea
r)
Hig
h tu
rnov
er
and
resi
gnat
ion
rate
(mor
e th
an
10%
per
yea
r)
Acc
ordi
ng to
the
info
rmat
ion
prov
ided
by
the
AC
C, t
he c
omm
issi
on e
xper
ienc
ed a
per
-so
nnel
turn
over
of;
25%
in 2
014,
14%
in 2
015
and
14%
in th
e fir
st s
ix m
onth
s of
201
6.
This
hig
h tu
rnov
er w
as n
oted
in e
ach
and
ever
y in
terv
iew
con
duct
ed w
ith A
CC
per
son-
nel.
The
mos
t com
mon
reas
on fo
r the
hig
h tu
rnov
er w
as re
laye
d as
the
depa
rture
of
lega
l offi
cers
in th
e In
vest
igat
ive
Uni
t for
bet
ter c
aree
r opp
ortu
nitie
s.
Sour
ce: I
nter
view
s w
ith S
ecre
tary
Gen
eral
of A
CC
, AC
C m
embe
rs a
nd s
taff,
pre
viou
s D
irect
or o
f Le
gal S
taff,
pre
viou
s A
CC
sta
ff. IF
ES
repo
rt 20
14
�
3. A
CC
’s D
etec
tion
and
Inve
stig
atio
n Fu
nctio
n (9
indi
cato
rs)
indi
cAto
rin
dicA
tor
vAlU
esJU
stif
icAt
ion
of s
core
s An
d dA
tA s
oUrc
esHi
gH (2
)m
ediU
m (1
)lo
w (0
)
17.
AC
C’s
ac
cess
ibili
ty to
cor
-ru
ptio
n co
mpl
ain-
ants
/info
rman
ts,
incl
udin
g pu
blic
an
d w
hist
le-b
low
-er
s du
ring
pas
t 3
year
s
AC
C is
hig
hly
acce
ssib
le a
s re
flect
ed in
the
high
pro
porti
on
of c
orru
ptio
n co
mpl
aint
s re
-ce
ived
rela
tive
to
popu
latio
n an
d pe
rcei
ved
leve
l of
cor
rupt
ion,
an
d pr
opor
tion
of c
ompl
aina
nts
confi
dent
to id
en-
tify
them
selv
es
AC
C is
acc
es-
sibl
e as
refle
cted
in
the
mod
er-
ate
prop
ortio
n of
cor
rupt
ion
com
plai
nts
re-
ceiv
ed re
lativ
e to
po
pula
tion
and
perc
eive
d le
vel
of c
orru
ptio
n,
and
prop
ortio
n of
com
plai
nant
s co
nfide
nt to
iden
-tif
y th
emse
lves
AC
C is
inac
ces-
sibl
e as
refle
cted
in
low
pro
porti
on
of c
orru
ptio
n co
mpl
aint
s re
-ce
ived
rela
tive
to
popu
latio
n an
d pe
rcei
ved
leve
l of
cor
rupt
ion,
an
d pr
opor
tion
of c
ompl
aina
nts
confi
dent
to id
en-
tify
them
selv
es
Dur
ing
Janu
ary
2014
to J
uly
2016
, the
AC
C re
porte
d re
ceiv
ing
a to
tal o
f 2,5
03 c
om-
plai
nts.
In 2
014
and
2015
, com
plai
nts
wer
e lo
dged
from
eac
h an
d ev
ery
atol
l in
the
coun
try.
Very
few
, if a
ny c
ompl
aint
s ar
e lo
dged
by
the
larg
e co
mm
unity
of e
xpat
riate
labo
urer
s th
at re
side
in th
e co
untry
and
the
AC
C is
enc
oura
ged
to m
ake
effo
rt to
mak
e its
elf a
p-pr
oach
able
to th
is p
ortio
n of
the
popu
latio
n.
Sour
ce: I
nter
view
s w
ith H
ead
of C
ompl
aint
s E
valu
atio
n an
d R
egis
tratio
n U
nit,
Hea
d of
Pos
t Inv
es-
tigat
ion
and
Rep
ortin
g U
nit,
CS
O le
ader
s, S
ecre
tary
Gen
eral
, AC
C m
embe
rs, F
ocus
Gro
up D
iscu
s-si
on 2
.
18.
AC
C’s
re
spon
sive
ness
to
cor
rupt
ion
com
-pl
aint
s du
ring
past
3
year
s
AC
C is
hig
hly
resp
onsi
ve a
s re
flect
ed in
the
high
pro
porti
on
of c
orru
ptio
n co
mpl
aint
s in
ves-
tigat
ed a
nd in
-ve
stig
atio
n ca
ses
com
plet
ed d
ur-
ing
past
3 y
ears
AC
C is
resp
on-
sive
as
refle
cted
in
the
mod
er-
ate
prop
ortio
n of
cor
rupt
ion
com
plai
nts
inve
s-tig
ated
and
in-
vest
igat
ion
case
s co
mpl
eted
dur
-in
g pa
st 3
yea
rs
AC
C is
not
re
spon
sive
as
refle
cted
in th
e lo
w p
ropo
rtion
of
cor
rupt
ion
com
plai
nts
inve
s-tig
ated
and
in-
vest
igat
ion
case
s co
mpl
eted
dur
ing
past
3 y
ears
The
AC
C re
ports
a h
igh
rate
of c
ompl
aint
revi
ew a
nd in
vest
igat
ion.
Of t
he 2
,503
cas
es
rece
ived
dur
ing
the
revi
ew p
erio
d (J
an 2
014-
Jun
201
6), 1
,964
cas
es o
r 78%
of t
he
com
plai
nts
wer
e fo
und
to q
ualif
y fo
r inv
estig
atio
n. In
vest
igat
ions
wer
e co
mpl
eted
for
2,11
2 ca
ses
durin
g th
e re
view
per
iod
(whi
ch in
clud
es c
ases
from
pre
viou
s ye
ars)
. So
urce
: AC
C A
ct 1
3/20
08 2
1 (a
), A
CC
Reg
ulat
ions
, Inf
orm
atio
n fro
m A
CC
on
Sep
tem
ber 1
st, 2
014
and
2015
Ann
ual R
epor
ts o
f AC
C. M
eetin
gs w
ith A
CC
mem
bers
, SG
and
Hea
d of
Com
plai
nts
Reg
-is
tratio
n an
d E
valu
atio
n U
nit
19.
AC
C’s
w
illin
gnes
s to
in
itiat
e co
rrup
tion
inve
stig
atio
ns d
ur-
ing
past
3 y
ears
Hig
h nu
mbe
r of
corr
uptio
n in
ves-
tigat
ions
initi
ated
by
AC
C
Mod
erat
e nu
m-
ber o
f cor
rupt
ion
inve
stig
atio
ns
initi
ated
by
AC
C
Low
num
ber o
f co
rrup
tion
inve
s-tig
atio
ns in
itiat
ed
by A
CC
From
Jan
uary
201
4-Ju
ne 2
016,
AC
C in
itiat
ed 2
42 c
ases
(on
aver
age
96 p
er y
ear)
. Th
e A
CC
prim
arily
beg
ins
inve
stig
atio
ns o
n its
ow
n in
itiat
ive
base
d on
cas
es id
entifi
ed
thro
ugh
med
ia re
ports
and
Aud
it R
epor
ts p
rodu
ced
by th
e A
udito
r Gen
eral
’s O
ffice
. Th
e A
CC
als
o co
nsid
ers
case
s it
iden
tifies
thro
ugh
soci
al m
edia
. Th
e C
omm
issi
on is
no
t pro
activ
e in
inve
stig
atin
g in
divi
dual
s w
ho h
ave
cons
picu
ousl
y am
asse
d si
gnifi
cant
am
ount
s of
wea
lth in
cong
ruen
t with
thei
r exp
ecte
d ea
rnin
gs, p
artly
bec
ause
illic
it en
rich-
men
t has
not
bee
n cr
imin
alis
ed in
the
Mal
dive
s.
Sour
ces:
Ann
ual r
epor
ts 2
014
and
2015
, Inf
orm
atio
n fro
m A
CC
on
Sep
tem
ber 1
st 2
016,
Inte
rvie
ws
with
AC
C C
omm
issi
oner
s, In
terv
iew
with
hea
d of
Inve
stig
atio
n U
nit,
Pre
viou
s A
CC
em
ploy
ees
20.
Aver
age
num
ber o
f cas
es
inve
stig
ated
by
the
AC
C p
er y
ear d
ur-
ing
past
3 y
ears
Mor
e th
an 1
,000
co
rrup
tion
case
s in
vest
igat
ed b
y th
e A
CC
per
yea
r du
ring
the
past
th
ree
year
s
Bet
wee
n 30
0 to
99
9 co
rrup
tion
case
s in
vest
i-ga
ted
by th
e A
CC
pe
r yea
r dur
ing
the
past
thre
e ye
ars
Less
than
300
co
rrup
tion
case
s in
vest
igat
ed b
y th
e A
CC
per
yea
r du
ring
the
past
th
ree
year
s
From
Jan
uary
201
4 to
Jun
e 20
16, t
he A
CC
con
clud
ed in
vest
igat
ions
into
2,0
70 c
ases
(th
is in
clud
es c
ases
pen
ding
from
pre
viou
s ye
ars)
. Thi
s is
an
aver
age
828
case
s pe
r ye
ar. D
urin
g th
is ti
me,
40
inve
stig
ativ
e of
ficer
s w
orke
d on
an
aver
age
of 2
5-30
cas
es a
t an
y gi
ven
time.
So
urce
s: A
nnua
l Rep
ort 2
014
and
2015
, inf
orm
atio
n fro
m A
CC
on
Sep
tem
ber 1
201
6, P
revi
ous
empl
oyee
s of
AC
C
21. E
ffici
ency
and
pr
ofes
sion
al-
ism
of c
orru
p-tio
n in
vest
iga-
tions
by
AC
C
durin
g pa
st 3
ye
ars
Hig
hly
effic
ient
an
d pr
ofes
sion
al
inve
stig
atio
n of
co
rrup
tion
case
s
Effi
cien
t and
pro
-fe
ssio
nal i
nves
ti-ga
tion
of c
orru
p-tio
n ca
ses
Inef
ficie
nt a
nd
unpr
ofes
sion
al
inve
stig
atio
n of
co
rrup
tion
case
s
The
AC
C’s
inve
stig
atio
ns in
to p
rom
inen
t cor
rupt
ion
scan
dals
hav
e on
occ
asio
n be
com
e pr
olon
ged;
for i
nsta
nce
the
AC
C’s
inve
stig
ator
y re
port
into
the
MM
PR
C fi
nanc
ial s
can-
dal,
whi
ch w
as b
roug
ht in
to p
ublic
ligh
t on
Oct
ober
201
4 is
yet
to b
e pu
blis
hed
as o
f the
re
view
per
iod.
Fu
rther
mor
e se
vera
l ant
i-cor
rupt
ion
expe
rts h
ighl
ight
s th
at th
e A
CC
’s in
vest
igat
ive
staf
f la
ck th
e ex
perti
se to
enq
uire
into
com
plex
fina
ncia
l crim
es a
nd th
ere
is a
n ov
er-r
elia
nce
on w
itnes
s te
stim
ony.
In
vest
igat
ions
are
ofte
n de
laye
d du
e to
the
chal
leng
es p
osed
by
the
uniq
ue g
eogr
aphy
of
the
Mal
dive
s, w
hich
con
sist
s of
sca
ttere
d is
land
s cl
uste
red
arou
nd s
epar
ate
atol
ls
grou
ps. T
his
is fu
rther
exa
cerb
ated
by
the
high
cos
t of t
rave
l to
the
isla
nds.
Th
ere
has
been
onl
y on
e co
nvic
tion
for a
cor
rupt
ion
rela
ted
offe
nce
durin
g th
e en
tire
revi
ew p
erio
d.
Sour
ces:
MP
(mem
ber o
f rul
ing
party
), M
eetin
g w
ith H
ead
of In
vest
igat
ions
, Sec
reta
ry G
ener
al,
Hea
d of
Com
plai
nts
Reg
istra
tion
and
Eva
luat
ion,
UN
OD
C O
ffice
r, pr
evio
us e
mpl
oyee
s of
AC
C,
Inte
rvie
ws
with
per
sons
who
sub
mitt
ed is
sues
to A
CC
or w
ere
unde
r inv
estig
atio
n, 2
015
Sta
tistic
al
Year
book
of A
CC
, Inf
orm
atio
n se
nt fr
om A
CC
on
28th
Sep
tem
ber;
inte
rvie
w w
ith P
rose
cuto
r Gen
-er
al A
isha
th B
isha
m o
n N
ovem
ber 1
3th.
22. A
vera
ge c
on-
vict
ion
rate
of
cor
rupt
ion
case
s in
vest
i-ga
ted
by A
CC
in
pas
t 3 y
ears
Abo
ve 7
5%B
etw
een
50%
to
75%
Bel
ow 5
0%Th
e C
onvi
ctio
n R
ate
is b
elow
50%
Sour
ce: P
aper
on
illic
it en
richm
ent,
Tran
spar
ency
Mal
dive
s, 1
5 Ju
ly 2
015.
Ava
ilabl
e at
: ht
tp://
trans
pare
ncy.
mv/
files
/med
ia/6
19a1
d6b4
1cf5
8562
104e
5ef9
7c21
f5d.
23.
AC
C’s
w
illin
gnes
s to
in
vest
igat
e in
flu-
entia
l per
sons
for
corr
uptio
n w
ithou
t fe
ar o
r fav
our d
ur-
ing
past
3 y
ears
Con
side
rabl
e ev
iden
ce o
f in-
vest
igat
ion
of i
n-flu
entia
l per
sons
fo
r cor
rupt
ion
Som
e ev
iden
ce
of in
vest
igat
ion
of in
fluen
tial
pers
ons
for c
or-
rupt
ion
No
evid
ence
of
inve
stig
atio
n of
in
fluen
tial p
er-
sons
for c
orru
p-tio
n
Ther
e is
evi
denc
e th
at th
e A
CC
has
initi
ated
inve
stig
atio
ns o
f infl
uent
ial p
eopl
e su
ch a
s m
embe
rs o
f par
liam
ent,
gove
rnm
ent m
inis
ters
, for
mer
pre
side
nts,
ele
cted
cou
ncill
ors
and
seni
ors
offic
ials
of p
ublic
com
pani
es. T
he v
igou
r and
sin
cerit
y of
suc
h in
vest
iga-
tions
, esp
ecia
lly o
f cas
es th
at w
ere
conc
lude
d w
ithou
t suf
ficie
nt e
vide
nce,
has
not
bee
n ve
rified
. So
urce
s: V
ario
us n
ews
repo
rts, p
revi
ous
AC
C s
taff,
inf
orm
atio
n fro
m A
CC
on
7th
and
16th
Sep
-te
mbe
r
24.
AC
C’s
role
in
rest
itutio
n, a
sset
re
cove
ry, f
reez
-in
g an
d co
nfisc
a-tio
n du
ring
past
3
year
s
Very
act
ive
role
by
AC
CM
oder
atel
y ac
tive
role
by
AC
CIn
activ
e ro
le b
y A
CC
The
AC
C is
not
lega
lly m
anda
ted
to e
ngag
e in
ass
et re
cove
ry. I
n fa
ct, t
here
is n
o la
w o
n re
cove
ry o
f ass
ets
exce
pt in
dru
g tra
ffick
ing
case
s.
A co
mm
on p
ract
ice
by th
e A
CC
is to
info
rm th
e P
GO
of t
he a
mou
nts
lost
by
the
Sta
te,
alon
g w
ith a
requ
est t
o re
cove
r the
m. T
his
is d
one
whe
n ca
ses
are
forw
arde
d fo
r pro
s-ec
utio
n. F
urth
erm
ore,
the
AC
C h
as fr
ozen
ban
k ac
coun
ts in
the
past
and
has
als
o co
n-fis
cate
d co
mpu
ters
from
an
offic
e un
der i
nves
tigat
ion
in 2
012.
Sour
ce: A
CC
Ann
ual r
epor
t 201
5 , I
nter
view
s w
ith A
CC
mem
bers
, Sen
ior S
tate
Atto
rney
at t
he A
t-to
rney
Gen
eral
’s O
ffice
, Hea
d of
Leg
al U
nit a
t AC
C a
nd P
revi
ous
empl
oyee
of A
CC
.
25.
Doe
s th
e A
CC
iden
tify
gen-
der i
n co
mpi
ling
corr
uptio
n co
m-
plai
nts
and
mon
i-to
ring
corr
uptio
n tre
nds?
The
AC
C h
as
gend
er s
ensi
tive
dem
ogra
phic
in-
form
atio
n th
at a
l-lo
ws
it to
mon
itor
how
cor
rupt
ion
and
its s
ervi
ces
affe
ct w
omen
dif-
fere
ntly
The
AC
C h
as
gend
er s
ensi
tive
dem
ogra
phic
in
form
atio
n th
at
coul
d al
low
it to
m
onito
r how
cor
-ru
ptio
n an
d its
se
rvic
es a
ffect
w
omen
diff
eren
t-ly,
but
it d
oes
not
activ
ely
mon
itor
thes
e di
ffere
nces
.
The
AC
C d
oes
not c
olle
ct g
ende
r se
nsiti
ve d
emo-
grap
hic
info
rma-
tion.
The
AC
C d
id n
ot h
ave
this
info
rmat
ion
com
pile
d pr
ior t
o th
e in
itiat
ion
of th
e A
CA
SI i
n th
e M
aldi
ves.
How
ever
, upo
n re
ques
t dur
ing
the
rese
arch
pha
se o
f the
stu
dy, t
he A
CC
was
ab
le to
pro
vide
dat
a on
gen
der s
peci
fic c
ompl
aint
s fro
m J
uly
to O
ctob
er.
Sour
ce: I
nfor
mat
ion
prov
ided
by
AC
C, 1
st N
ovem
ber 2
016
�
4. A
CC
’s P
reve
ntio
n, E
duca
tion
and
Out
reac
h Fu
nctio
ns (9
indi
cato
rs)
indi
cAto
rin
dicA
tor
vAlU
esJU
stif
icAt
ion
of s
core
s An
d dA
tA s
oUrc
esHi
gH (2
)m
ediU
m (1
)lo
w (0
)
26.
Aver
-ag
e pr
opor
tion
of
AC
C’s
ope
ratin
g ex
pend
iture
allo
-ca
ted
to p
ublic
ou
treac
h an
d pr
e-ve
ntio
n du
ring
past
3
year
s
Abo
ve 1
% o
f A
CC
’s o
pera
ting
expe
nditu
re
Bet
wee
n 0.
5%
and
1% o
f AC
C’s
op
erat
ing
exp
en-
ditu
re
Bel
ow 0
.5%
of
AC
C’s
ope
ratin
g ex
pend
iture
On
aver
age
the
AC
C a
lloca
ted
1.17
% o
f its
ope
ratin
g ex
pend
iture
to p
ublic
out
reac
h an
d pr
even
tion
activ
ities
. S
ourc
e: In
form
atio
n fro
m A
CC
on
Sep
tem
ber 1
st 2
016.
27.
AC
C’s
cor
-ru
ptio
n pr
even
tion
initi
ativ
es d
urin
g pa
st 3
yea
rs
Man
y co
rrup
tion
prev
entio
n in
itia-
tives
(ave
rage
of
3 o
r mor
e pe
r ye
ar)
Som
e co
rrup
tion
prev
entio
n in
itia-
tives
(ave
rage
of
1-2
per y
ear)
Few
or n
o re
-vi
ews
wer
e co
n-du
cted
(rel
ativ
e to
no.
of o
rgan
-is
atio
ns in
juris
-di
ctio
n)
Dur
ing
the
revi
ew p
erio
d, th
e A
CC
revi
ewed
onl
y 3
orga
niza
tiona
l rev
iew
s. In
add
ition
, th
e A
CC
mad
e re
com
men
datio
ns o
n sp
ecifi
c or
gani
satio
nal p
roce
dure
s to
four
inst
itu-
tions
. Tw
o of
thes
e ch
ange
s w
ere
gene
ral p
rocu
rem
ent r
ecom
men
datio
ns a
nd th
e ot
her
chan
ges
wer
e re
com
men
ded
for s
peci
fic is
sues
(for
exa
mpl
e, le
asin
g of
land
for b
usi-
ness
es in
Mal
e’ a
nd ta
xi s
ervi
ce p
ropo
sal e
valu
atio
n pr
oced
ures
). M
ost o
f the
se p
ro-
cedu
res
wer
e st
udie
d on
requ
ests
mad
e by
the
inst
itutio
ns, a
lthou
gh th
e ci
vil s
erva
nts’
pe
rcep
tion
surv
ey o
f 201
4 an
d he
alth
rese
arch
of 2
015
wer
e in
itiat
ed b
y th
e A
CC
. Giv
en
the
num
ber o
f org
aniz
atio
ns th
at a
re u
nder
the
juris
dict
ion
of th
e A
CC
ther
e is
muc
h sc
ope
for i
mpr
ovem
ent.
Sour
ce: A
nnua
l rep
ort 2
015
and
2014
, Inf
orm
atio
n fro
m A
CC
Sep
tem
ber 7
th, A
CC
Act
13/
2008
C
laus
e 24
.
28. N
umbe
r of
revi
ews
of
orga
niza
tiona
l pr
oced
ures
, sy
stem
s &
ca-
pabi
litie
s co
n-du
cted
by
AC
C
to p
reve
nt c
or-
rupt
ion
durin
g pa
st 3
yea
rs
Man
y re
view
s w
ere
cond
ucte
d (r
elat
ive
to n
o. o
f or
gani
satio
ns in
ju
risdi
ctio
n)
A su
bsta
ntia
l nu
mbe
r of r
e-vi
ews
wer
e co
n-du
cted
(rel
ativ
e to
no.
of o
rgan
-is
atio
ns in
juris
-di
ctio
n)
Few
or n
o re
-vi
ews
wer
e co
n-du
cted
(rel
ativ
e to
no.
of o
rgan
-is
atio
ns in
juris
-di
ctio
n)
Dur
ing
the
revi
ew p
erio
d, th
e A
CC
revi
ewed
onl
y 3
orga
niza
tiona
l rev
iew
s. In
add
ition
, th
e A
CC
mad
e re
com
men
datio
ns o
n sp
ecifi
c or
gani
satio
nal p
roce
dure
s to
four
inst
itu-
tions
. Tw
o of
thes
e ch
ange
s w
ere
gene
ral p
rocu
rem
ent r
ecom
men
datio
ns a
nd th
e ot
her
chan
ges
wer
e re
com
men
ded
for s
peci
fic is
sues
(for
exa
mpl
e, le
asin
g of
land
for b
usi-
ness
es in
Mal
e’ a
nd ta
xi s
ervi
ce p
ropo
sal e
valu
atio
n pr
oced
ures
). M
ost o
f the
se p
ro-
cedu
res
wer
e st
udie
d on
requ
ests
mad
e by
the
inst
itutio
ns, a
lthou
gh th
e ci
vil s
erva
nts’
pe
rcep
tion
surv
ey o
f 201
4 an
d he
alth
rese
arch
of 2
015
wer
e in
itiat
ed b
y th
e A
CC
. Giv
en
the
num
ber o
f org
aniz
atio
ns th
at a
re u
nder
the
juris
dict
ion
of th
e A
CC
ther
e is
muc
h sc
ope
for i
mpr
ovem
ent.
Sour
ce: A
nnua
l rep
ort 2
015
and
2014
, Inf
orm
atio
n fro
m A
CC
Sep
tem
ber 7
th, A
CC
Act
13/
2008
C
laus
e 24
29.
Freq
uenc
y of
incl
udin
g co
r-ru
ptio
n pr
even
tion
reco
mm
enda
tions
in
AC
C’s
inve
stig
a-tio
n re
ports
dur
ing
past
3 y
ears
Freq
uent
ly
S
omet
imes
Not
at a
llP
reve
ntio
n re
com
men
datio
ns w
ere
alw
ays
iden
tified
by
the
inve
stig
atio
n te
ams
and
incl
uded
in in
vest
igat
ion
repo
rts. T
hese
reco
mm
enda
tions
wer
e fo
rwar
ded
to a
ll co
n-ce
rned
offi
ces.
The
se re
com
men
datio
ns h
ave
also
bee
n up
load
ed to
the
AC
C w
ebsi
te
ever
y m
onth
sin
ce 2
011.
So
urce
: Int
ervi
ews
with
AC
C c
omm
issi
oner
s, S
ecre
tary
Gen
eral
, Hea
d of
Inve
stig
ativ
e U
nit,
Pos
t In
vest
igat
ion
and
Rep
ortin
g U
nit H
ead,
Jou
rnal
ists
, AC
C w
ebsi
te,
30.
AC
C’s
pl
an fo
r pre
ven-
tion,
edu
catio
n an
d ou
treac
h an
d its
im
plem
enta
tion
Com
preh
ensi
ve
and
clea
r pla
n w
hich
is im
ple-
men
ted
and
ac-
cess
ible
The
plan
for p
re-
vent
ion,
edu
ca-
tion
and
outre
ach
exis
ts b
ut n
ot
impl
emen
ted
fully
Ther
e is
no
or
a w
eak
plan
for
prev
entio
n, e
du-
catio
n an
d ou
t-re
ach
activ
ities
The
AC
C p
repa
res
an a
nnua
l act
ivity
pla
n fo
r pre
vent
ion,
edu
catio
n an
d ou
treac
h ac
tivi-
ties
but t
his
is n
ot a
cces
sibl
e to
the
publ
ic. T
houg
h bu
dget
con
stra
ints
hav
e pr
oven
to b
e an
obs
tacl
e th
e pl
an is
impl
emen
ted
to a
larg
e ex
tent
. In
terv
iew
with
Hea
d of
Pre
vent
ion
and
Res
earc
h U
nit,
Edu
catio
n an
d Aw
aren
ess
Uni
t,
31.
AC
C’s
co
llabo
ratio
n w
ith
othe
r sta
keho
ld-
ers
in p
reve
ntio
n,
educ
atio
n an
d ou
t-re
ach
activ
ities
Hig
h de
gree
of
colla
bora
tion
with
th
ree
or m
ore
join
t pro
ject
s
Som
e de
gree
of
colla
bora
tion
with
on
e or
two
join
t pr
ojec
ts
Littl
e or
no
colla
b-or
atio
n w
ith o
ther
st
akeh
olde
rs
The
AC
C is
pro
activ
e in
col
labo
ratin
g w
ith a
var
iety
of s
take
hold
ers
in A
nti-C
orru
ptio
n A
ctiv
ities
. The
AC
C w
orks
with
loca
l ins
titut
ions
and
NG
Os
in c
omm
uniti
es. I
n 20
15 th
e A
CC
col
labo
rate
d w
ith T
rans
pare
ncy
Mal
dive
s to
mar
k th
e N
atio
nal A
nti-c
orru
ptio
n D
ay.
The
AC
C h
as a
stro
ng re
latio
nshi
p w
ith th
e C
ivil
Ser
vice
Tra
inin
g In
stitu
te in
org
anis
ing
train
ing
sess
ions
for g
over
nmen
t offi
ces
in M
ale’
. The
Com
mis
sion
rece
ntly
wor
ked
with
th
e C
ivil
Ser
vice
Com
mis
sion
to c
ondu
ct a
per
cept
ion
surv
ey o
f civ
il se
rvan
ts.
Sour
ces:
Mee
tings
with
CS
O le
ader
s, P
resi
dent
of t
he C
ivil
Ser
vice
Com
mis
sion
, AC
C M
embe
rs,
Hea
ds o
f Edu
catio
n an
d Aw
aren
ess
Uni
t. M
eetin
g w
ith E
lect
ions
Com
mis
sion
mem
ber.
32.
AC
C’s
re
sear
ch a
nd
expl
orat
ion
of c
or-
rupt
ion
risks
, con
-te
xt a
nd c
ondi
tions
Ext
ensi
ve u
se
of re
sear
ch, t
o de
velo
p ris
k as
-se
ssm
ents
and
se
ctor
al c
orru
p-tio
n pr
ofile
s
Som
e de
gree
of
rese
arch
to
deve
lop
risk
as-
sess
men
ts a
nd
sect
oral
cor
rup-
tion
profi
les
Littl
e or
no
dis-
cern
ible
inde
pen-
dent
rese
arch
ca
rrie
d ou
t by
the
AC
C
Alth
ough
the
AC
C h
as a
Con
stitu
tiona
l man
date
to c
ondu
ct re
sear
ch, t
his
had
been
rel-
egat
ed in
impo
rtanc
e un
til a
ded
icat
ed re
sear
ch u
nit w
as e
stab
lishe
d in
201
5.
Sin
ce th
en th
e un
it ha
s pr
oduc
ed tw
o st
udie
s, o
ne o
n se
lect
ed a
spec
ts o
f the
hea
lth
sect
or a
nd a
civ
il se
rvic
e pe
rcep
tion
stud
y: th
e A
CC
repo
rts th
at th
ey a
re c
urre
ntly
un-
derta
king
two
furth
er s
tudi
es. T
he A
CC
has
als
o ta
ken
adva
ntag
e of
thei
r con
nect
ions
in
loca
l com
mun
ities
to c
ondu
ct 2
isla
nd le
vel p
erce
ptio
n su
rvey
s - t
houg
h th
ese
oppo
r-tu
nitie
s w
ere
prim
arily
inte
nded
as
pilo
t stu
dies
for t
estin
g of
met
hodo
logi
es a
nd g
aini
ng
expe
rienc
e.
Ther
e is
sco
pe fo
r im
prov
emen
t with
rega
rd to
the
AC
C’s
initi
ativ
e to
con
sult
the
priv
ate
sect
or a
nd th
e ge
nera
l pub
lic; b
oth
wer
e co
nsul
ted
only
to a
lim
ited
exte
nt w
ith p
erti-
nenc
e to
its
rese
arch
of t
he h
ealth
sec
tor,
imm
igra
tion
and
cust
oms.
So
urce
s: In
terv
iew
s w
ith h
ead
of P
reve
ntio
n an
d R
esea
rch
Uni
t, pr
evio
us e
mpl
oyee
s, A
CC
mem
-be
rs, C
SO
lead
ers
33.
AC
C’s
dis
-se
min
atio
n of
cor
-ru
ptio
n pr
even
tion
info
rmat
ion
and
use
of c
ampa
igns
Ext
ensi
ve d
is-
sem
inat
ion
of c
orru
ptio
n
prev
entio
n an
d re
lianc
e on
cam
-pa
igns
Lim
ited
diss
emi-
natio
n of
cor
rup-
tion
prev
entio
n in
form
atio
n an
d
relia
nce
on c
am-
paig
ns
Doe
s no
t dis
sem
-in
ate
corr
uptio
n pr
even
tion
info
r-m
atio
n or
rely
on
cam
paig
ns
The
AC
C h
as u
sed
seve
ral m
ediu
ms
to d
isse
min
ate
info
rmat
ion
and
awar
enes
s on
the
inst
itutio
n’s
wor
k an
d ab
out i
ssue
s of
cor
rupt
ion.
The
Com
mis
sion
con
duct
ed a
cam
-pa
ign
title
d ‘In
tegr
ity F
irst’,
whi
ch w
as p
rom
oted
thro
ugh
the
dist
ribut
ion
of m
emor
abili
a (s
uch
as k
ey ta
gs) a
nd th
e us
e of
a s
peci
al lo
go o
n al
l com
mun
icat
ions
. Th
e C
omm
issi
on n
eeds
to e
nsur
e th
at it
s aw
aren
ess
mes
sage
s ar
e at
tract
ive
to a
ll ag
e gr
oups
, par
ticul
arly
you
th. L
imiti
ng th
e m
essa
ges
to E
nglis
h an
d D
hive
hi m
argi
nalis
es
the
larg
e ex
patri
ate
popu
latio
n in
the
coun
try.
Sour
ces:
Inte
rvie
w w
ith C
SO
lead
ers,
UN
OD
C O
ffice
r.
34.
AC
C’s
us
e of
its
web
site
an
d so
cial
med
ia
for d
isse
min
atin
g in
form
atio
n on
co
rrup
tion
prev
en-
tion
Ext
ensi
ve u
se o
f its
web
site
and
so
cial
med
ia to
sp
read
cor
rupt
ion
prev
entio
n in
for-
mat
ion
Lim
ited
use
of
its w
ebsi
te a
nd
soci
al m
edia
to
spre
ad c
orru
ptio
n pr
even
tion
info
r-m
atio
n
AC
C d
oes
not
have
a w
ebsi
te
and
does
not
rely
on
soc
ial m
edia
to
spr
ead
corr
up-
tion
prev
entio
n in
form
atio
n
The
AC
C o
pera
tes
activ
e Tw
itter
and
Fac
eboo
k pa
ges
and
the
Com
mis
sion
’s w
eb-
site
is p
artic
ular
ly re
sour
cefu
l. H
owev
er, t
here
is m
uch
scop
e to
incr
ease
thei
r rea
ch,
parti
cula
rly w
ith re
gard
to th
e yo
unge
r por
tion
of th
e po
pula
tion.
An
Eng
lish
page
was
in
trodu
ced
to th
e w
ebsi
te in
201
5 an
d th
e A
CC
als
o up
load
s qu
arte
rly s
tatis
tics
to it
s w
ebsi
te, i
n ad
ditio
n to
pos
sibl
e ac
coun
ts o
f cor
rupt
ion
as o
ther
pre
vent
ion
mat
eria
l. Th
e A
CC
’s d
ram
a ep
isod
es ‘
Bith
ufan
gi’ w
hich
por
trays
cor
rupt
ion
in e
very
day
life
is re
gu-
larly
pro
mot
ed o
n so
cial
med
ia. T
he C
omm
issi
on a
lso
held
pho
to c
ompe
titio
ns in
201
5 an
d 20
16.
To s
uppl
emen
t the
ir ou
treac
h ef
forts
, the
AC
C c
an a
lso
run
com
petit
ions
and
attr
activ
e so
cial
med
ia c
ampa
igns
to g
arne
r mor
e fo
llow
ers
and
bette
r app
eal t
o yo
uth.
Cur
rent
ly
the
Com
mis
sion
’s s
ocia
l med
ia p
osts
do
not c
omm
and
muc
h at
tent
ion
as m
easu
red
by
num
ber o
f lik
es, r
etw
eets
or c
omm
ents
. ht
tps:
//tw
itter
.com
/acc
_mal
dive
s, h
ttps:
//ww
w.fa
cebo
ok.c
om/A
CC
MA
LDIV
ES
/ , w
ww
.acc
.gov
.mv,
�
5. A
CC
’s C
oope
ratio
n w
ith o
ther
Org
aniz
atio
ns (5
indi
cato
rs)
indi
cAto
rin
dicA
tor
vAlU
esJU
stif
icAt
ion
of s
core
s An
d dA
tA s
oUrc
esHi
gH (2
)m
ediU
m (1
)lo
w (0
)
35. G
over
nmen
t su
ppor
t (e.
g.
Atto
rney
-Gen
-er
al’s
Offi
ce,
Dire
ctor
of
Publ
ic P
ros-
ecut
ions
) to
AC
C fo
r pro
s-ec
utio
n of
cor
-ru
ptio
n ca
ses
Hig
h le
vel o
f sup
-po
rt as
refle
cted
in
abse
nce
of in
ter-
fere
nce
and
aver
-ag
e pr
osec
utio
n ra
te o
f abo
ve 7
5%
Mod
erat
e le
vel
of s
uppo
rt as
re-
flect
ed in
som
e in
terfe
renc
e an
d av
erag
e pr
osec
u-tio
n ra
te o
f 50%
to
75%
Low
leve
l of s
up-
port
as re
flect
ed in
su
bsta
ntia
l in
ter-
fere
nce
and
aver
-ag
e p
rose
cutio
n ra
te o
f bel
ow 5
0%
Acc
ordi
ng to
sen
ior m
anag
emen
t offi
cial
s at
the
AC
C, t
he C
omm
issi
on’s
wor
king
re
latio
nshi
p w
ith th
e P
GO
urg
ently
nee
ds im
prov
emen
t. Th
e tw
o in
stitu
tions
do
not
disc
uss
case
s w
hen
the
case
s ar
e ex
chan
ged
and
the
AC
C is
nei
ther
info
rmed
no
r inv
ited
whe
n th
e P
GO
atte
nds
cour
t hea
rings
to c
onte
st c
orru
ptio
n ca
ses.
The
ne
ed fo
r bet
ter c
oord
inat
ion
betw
een
the
PG
O a
nd A
CC
was
em
phas
ized
by
IFE
S
in 2
014.
An
MoU
was
sig
ned
rece
ntly
bet
wee
n th
e A
CC
and
the
PG
O, w
hich
will
ho
pefu
lly re
ctify
thes
e is
sues
in th
e ne
ar fu
ture
.So
urce
: Int
ervi
ews
with
AC
C m
embe
rs, S
ecre
tary
Gen
eral
, Hea
d of
Leg
al U
nit,
Sen
ior S
tate
A
ttorn
ey, p
revi
ous
inve
stig
ativ
e st
aff o
f AC
C, U
NO
DC
Offi
cer,
Form
er D
irect
or o
f Leg
al A
ffairs
at
PG
O. C
urre
nt a
nd fo
rmer
sta
ff of
AC
C, S
tatis
tics
from
var
ious
ann
ual r
epor
ts o
f AC
C, T
rans
-pa
renc
y M
aldi
ves
posi
tion
pape
r on
Illic
it E
nric
hmen
t, 8t
h D
ecem
ber 2
015.
36.
Coo
pera
-tio
n be
twee
n A
CC
an
d ot
her i
nteg
rity
agen
cies
(inc
lud-
ing
othe
r AC
Cs
if th
ere
are
mul
tiple
A
CC
s in
cou
ntry
)
Hig
h de
gree
of c
o-op
erat
ion
betw
een
AC
Cs
or b
etw
een
AC
C a
nd o
ther
in
tegr
ity a
genc
ies
Lim
ited
coop
-er
atio
n be
twee
n A
CC
s or
bet
wee
n A
CC
and
oth
er
inte
grity
age
ncie
s
Con
flict
and
/or
lack
of c
oope
ratio
n be
twee
n A
CC
s or
bet
wee
n A
CC
an
d ot
her i
nteg
rity
agen
cies
Ther
e ar
e cu
rren
tly th
ree
othe
r ins
titut
ions
in th
e co
untry
whi
ch e
nqui
re in
to in
tegr
ity
issu
es. T
he E
lect
ions
Com
mis
sion
, for
all
issu
es re
late
d to
ele
ctio
ns; t
he N
atio
nal I
n-te
grity
Com
mis
sion
, whi
ch m
onito
rs fo
ur la
w e
nfor
cem
ent a
genc
ies;
and
the
Judi
cial
S
ervi
ce C
omm
issi
on, w
hich
con
cern
s its
elf w
ith in
tegr
ity w
ithin
the
Judi
ciar
y.
In a
ll ca
ses,
the
agen
cies
wor
k on
inve
stig
atio
ns s
epar
atel
y, th
ough
the
AC
C is
br
oadl
y co
-ope
rativ
e w
ith th
ese
inst
itutio
n. In
all
case
s th
e A
CC
is p
roac
tive
in in
-fo
rmin
g th
ese
Com
mis
sion
s of
the
outc
ome
of it
s in
vest
igat
ions
and
any
reco
mm
en-
datio
ns th
ey is
sue.
The
JSC
has
in th
e pa
st c
halle
nged
the
AC
C’s
man
date
to in
quire
into
cor
rupt
ion
case
s re
leva
nt to
the
judi
ciar
y. A
ccor
ding
to th
e A
CC
it h
as c
ontin
ued
to in
vest
igat
e co
rrup
tion
mat
ters
rele
vant
to th
e ju
dici
ary
with
out t
he J
SC
’s o
bjec
tion.
Sour
ce: M
eetin
g w
ith E
lect
ions
Com
mis
sion
er, A
CC
mem
bers
, N
atio
nal I
nteg
rity
Com
mis
sion
A
ct C
laus
es 3
6(a)
2 a
nd (b
), Ju
dici
al S
ervi
ce C
omm
isio
ns A
ct 1
0/20
08, E
lect
ions
Com
mis
-si
on A
ct 8
/200
8 21
(a),
‘Com
plai
nts
agai
nst J
udge
s m
ust b
e pr
oces
sed
by J
SC
: Chi
ef J
ustic
e”
http
://en
glis
h.su
n.m
v/58
32, S
epte
mbe
r 201
2.
37.
Coo
pera
-tio
n be
twee
n A
CC
an
d no
n-go
vern
-m
ent o
rgan
izat
ions
in
clud
ing
CS
Os
and
priv
ate
com
-pa
nies
Hig
h de
gree
of c
o-op
erat
ion
betw
een
AC
C a
nd o
ther
or
gani
zatio
ns in
-cl
udin
g C
SO
s an
d pr
ivat
e co
mpa
nies
Lim
ited
coop
era-
tion
betw
een
AC
C
and
othe
r org
ani-
zatio
ns
Con
flict
and
/or
lack
of c
oope
ratio
n be
twee
n A
CC
and
ot
her o
rgan
iza-
tions
The
AC
C e
vinc
es a
dequ
ate
leve
ls o
f co-
oper
atio
n w
ith C
SO
s an
d its
Nat
iona
l In-
tegr
ity P
lan
enta
ils w
orki
ng w
ith s
ever
al d
iffer
ent o
rgan
izat
ions
. Tho
ugh
priv
ate
com
pani
es a
nd b
anks
gen
eral
ly c
o-op
erat
e w
ith th
e A
CC
in p
rovi
ding
requ
este
d in
form
atio
n, th
e A
CC
doe
s no
t mak
e en
ough
effo
rt to
reac
h ou
t to
the
priv
ate
sect
or
for p
reve
ntio
n an
d aw
aren
ess
activ
ities
. In
terv
iew
with
CS
O le
ader
s. F
ocus
Gro
up D
iscu
ssio
n w
ith p
rivat
e se
ctor
38.
AC
C’s
pa
rtici
patio
n in
in
tern
atio
nal n
et-
wor
ks
Very
act
ive
with
A
CC
par
ticip
atin
g in
3 o
r mor
e ne
t-w
orks
Act
ive
with
AC
C
parti
cipa
ting
in 1
or
2 ne
twor
ks
AC
C d
oes
not
parti
cipa
te in
any
ne
twor
k
Mal
dive
s ac
cede
d to
the
UN
CA
C in
200
7. T
he c
ount
ry h
as a
lso
been
a m
embe
r of
the
Asi
a/P
acifi
c G
roup
on
Mon
ey la
unde
ring
sinc
e Ju
ly 2
008.
Mal
dive
s al
so p
artic
i-pa
tes
in th
e In
tern
atio
nal A
nti-C
orru
ptio
n C
onfe
renc
e an
d at
tend
s its
yea
rly g
ener
al
mee
ting.
An
addi
tiona
l net
wor
k th
ey c
ould
pot
entia
lly p
artic
ipat
e in
is th
e A
DB
-OE
CD
A
nti-C
orru
ptio
n In
itiat
ive
for A
sia-
Pac
ific.
So
urce
: Asi
a P
acifi
c G
roup
on
Mon
ey L
aund
erin
g ht
tp://
ww
w.a
pgm
l.org
/, A
DB
/OE
CD
Ant
i-C
orru
ptio
n In
itiat
ive,
acc
esse
d on
23r
d S
epte
mbe
r 201
6
39.
AC
C’s
co
oper
atio
n w
ith
AC
Cs
in o
ther
co
untri
es
Hig
h de
gree
of c
o-op
erat
ion
with
join
t pr
ojec
ts a
nd te
ch-
nica
l ass
ista
nce
with
sev
eral
AC
Cs
in o
ther
cou
ntrie
s
Lim
ited
coop
era-
tion
in s
ome
area
s w
ith o
ne o
r tw
o A
CC
s in
oth
er
coun
tries
No
coop
erat
ion
betw
een
AC
C a
nd
AC
Cs
in o
ther
co
untri
es
The
AC
C h
as a
n un
ders
tand
ing
with
the
Ant
i-Cor
rupt
ion
Aca
dem
y of
Mal
aysi
a to
pr
ovid
e tra
inin
g to
the
AC
C, a
lthou
gh th
e nu
mbe
r of o
ppor
tuni
ties
real
ized
thro
ugh
this
und
erst
andi
ng is
lim
ited.
The
AC
C h
as a
ppro
ache
d va
rious
hig
h co
mm
issi
ons
in
the
coun
try in
see
k of
trai
ning
opp
ortu
nitie
s fo
rm th
eir g
over
nmen
ts.
Sour
ce: I
nter
view
with
Sec
reta
ry G
ener
al, C
omm
issi
on m
embe
rs
�
6. A
CC
’s A
ccou
ntab
ility
and
Ove
rsig
ht (4
indi
cato
rs)
indi
cAto
rin
dicA
tor
vAlU
esJU
stif
icAt
ion
of s
core
s An
d dA
tA s
oUrc
esHi
gH (2
)m
ediU
m (1
)lo
w (0
)
40.
Info
rma-
tion
prov
ided
in
and
acce
ssib
ility
of
AC
C’s
ann
ual
repo
rt an
d w
eb-
site
Com
preh
ensi
ve
info
rmat
ion
on
AC
C is
pro
vide
d in
an
nual
repo
rt an
d w
ebsi
te; s
ubm
itted
to
Par
liam
ent a
nd
easi
ly a
cces
sibl
e to
the
publ
ic
Lim
ited
info
rma-
tion
on A
CC
is
prov
ided
in a
nnua
l re
port
and
web
-si
te; s
ubm
itted
to
Par
liam
ent b
ut n
ot
easi
ly a
cces
sibl
e to
the
publ
ic
Sub
mits
ann
ual r
e-po
rt to
gov
ernm
ent
but i
s no
t ava
ilabl
e to
the
publ
ic
The
AC
C A
ct re
quire
s th
e C
omm
issi
on to
sub
mit
its a
nnua
l rep
ort t
o th
e ov
ersi
ght
bodi
es a
nd to
mak
e th
em p
ublic
. The
AC
C’s
ann
ual r
epor
ts fr
om 2
011-
2015
are
ava
il-ab
le o
n th
e C
omm
issi
on’s
web
site
. The
web
site
is u
sefu
l and
regu
larly
upd
ated
with
st
atis
tics,
pos
sibl
e st
orie
s of
cor
rupt
ion
and
upda
tes
on th
e A
CC
’s a
ctiv
ities
and
cas
es.
Jour
nalis
ts h
ave
note
d th
at A
CC
regu
larly
sen
ds in
form
atio
n on
rece
ntly
con
clud
ed
case
s vi
a em
ail t
o m
edia
out
lets
. So
urce
: AC
C A
ct 1
3/20
08 C
laus
e 31
, AC
C w
ebsi
te, A
cces
sed
23rd
Sep
tem
ber 2
016,
Inte
rvie
w
with
pre
viou
s em
ploy
ee,
41.
AC
C’s
ov
ersi
ght m
ech-
anis
ms
Ove
rsig
ht c
om-
mitt
ees
with
ac-
tive
parti
cipa
tion
by M
embe
rs o
f P
arlia
men
t, se
nior
ci
vil s
erva
nts
and
prom
inen
t citi
zens
Ove
rsig
ht c
omm
it-te
es w
ith M
embe
rs
of P
arlia
men
t and
/or
sen
ior c
ivil
ser-
vant
s as
mem
bers
Acc
ount
able
to
Exe
cutiv
e w
ithou
t an
y ov
ersi
ght c
om-
mitt
ee
The
AC
C re
ports
to th
e P
arlia
men
t Com
mitt
ee o
n In
depe
nden
t Ins
titut
ions
, whi
ch c
on-
sist
s of
sel
ecte
d m
embe
rs o
f the
Par
liam
ent.
Dur
ing
the
revi
ew p
erio
d th
e pa
rliam
ent o
vers
ight
com
mitt
ee d
id n
ot e
xerc
ise
thei
r re
spon
sibi
lity
and
the
curr
ent p
arlia
men
tary
com
mitt
ee h
as n
ot s
umm
oned
the
Com
-m
issi
on s
ince
it w
as c
onve
ned
in M
ay 2
014.
Pra
ctic
al o
vers
ight
of t
he A
CC
doe
s no
t oc
cur.
Sour
ce: I
nter
view
with
MP
s (a
n op
posi
tion
party
MP
/ mem
ber o
f Ind
epen
dent
Inst
itutio
ns a
nd a
M
P fro
m ru
ling
party
), C
SO
lead
ers,
AC
C C
omm
issi
on M
embe
rs a
nd J
ourn
alis
ts
42.
AC
C’s
pr
oced
ure
for
deal
ing
with
co
mpl
aint
s ag
ains
t AC
A pe
r-so
nnel
Com
plai
nts
agai
nst A
CC
per
-so
nnel
are
inve
s-tig
ated
by
anot
her
publ
ic a
genc
y to
av
oid
confl
ict o
f in-
tere
st a
nd re
sults
of
inve
stig
atio
n an
d pu
nish
men
t im
pose
d ar
e pu
b-lic
ized
Com
plai
nts
agai
nst
AC
C p
erso
nnel
ar
e in
vest
igat
ed b
y its
inte
rnal
con
trol
unit
but r
esul
ts o
f in
vest
igat
ion
and
puni
shm
ent a
re
not p
ublic
ized
Com
plai
nts
agai
nst A
CC
per
-so
nnel
are
igno
red
and/
or n
ot in
vest
i-ga
ted
with
out a
ny
expl
anat
ion
Circ
umst
ance
s un
der w
hich
the
Com
mis
sion
can
take
dis
cipl
inar
y m
easu
res
agai
nst
its s
taff
are
expo
unde
d up
on in
the
Com
mis
sion
’s re
gula
tions
, fur
ther
spe
cify
ing
the
type
of m
easu
re th
at th
e C
omm
issi
on m
ust t
ake
in re
spon
se.
The
Adm
inis
trativ
e S
ectio
n, w
hich
is u
nder
the
purv
iew
of t
he S
G, t
akes
dis
cipl
inar
y ac
tions
for s
taff.
How
ever
, the
SG
is re
quire
d to
con
sult
the
Com
mis
sion
Mem
bers
if
he w
ishe
s to
impo
se d
isci
plin
ary
mea
sure
s ag
ains
t sec
tion
head
s. T
he C
omm
issi
on
does
not
pub
lish
com
plai
nts
agai
nst s
taff
or d
isci
plin
ary
mea
sure
s ta
ken
agai
nst t
hem
.So
urce
: AC
C R
egul
atio
n, S
ectio
n 44
, 45,
Inte
rvie
ws
with
Com
mis
sion
mem
bers
and
SG
43.
Out
-co
mes
of c
om-
plai
nts
agai
nst
AC
C o
r its
per
-so
nnel
in p
ast 3
ye
ars
All
valid
com
-pl
aint
s ag
ains
t A
CA
pers
onne
l re-
sult
in p
unis
hmen
t or
oth
er re
med
ies,
an
d ou
tcom
e is
pu
blic
ized
Som
e va
lid c
om-
plai
nts
agai
nst
AC
C p
erso
nnel
re-
sult
in p
unis
hmen
t or
oth
er re
med
ies,
an
d ou
tcom
e is
pu
blic
ized
Com
plai
nts
invo
lv-
ing
AC
C p
erso
nnel
ar
e ig
nore
d an
d
not i
nves
tigat
ed
at a
ll
Thre
e in
stan
ces
of p
rofe
ssio
nal o
r eth
ical
laps
es b
y th
e st
aff o
ccur
red
durin
g th
e re
-vi
ew p
erio
d. T
he C
omm
issi
on in
vest
igat
ed a
ll of
thes
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49assessmenT of anTi-corrupTion commission of The maldives 2016
4 conclUsions And recommendAtionsThe ACC’s overall score is 58%99, which falls in the moderate range. This indicates that whilst the ACC can serviceably perform on the dimensions assessed there is much room for improvement. Of the total number of indicators scored, 13 scored highly, 26 scored medium and 6 scored low. Refer to the spider graph below for a quick visual of each dimension’s scores. Note that the Public Perceptions Dimension was unable to be scored due to an inadequate number of respondents.
� Figure 3: Dimension scores
To recapitulate, the ACC’s strengths include its well defined independent legal status and wide investigative mandate (though it must be noted, within the boundaries of the limited scope of current anti-corruption legislation); stability of commissioner tenures; meritocratic recruitment procedures; responsiveness to corruption complaints; its high expenditure on prevention efforts relative to its budget; the numerousness of its corruption prevention initiatives; participation in international networks; and the accessibility and comprehensive nature of its annual reports.
Urgent areas for reform illuminated by this research include: budget instability; the extremely high staff turnover rate; poor co-ordination with the Prosecutor General’s Office; efficiency of corruption investigations; and low conviction rate for corruption related offences.
Attention must be drawn to one indicator that was buoyed by a technicality: external oversight of the ACC. This indicator was scored adequate in deference to the methodological criteria that a nominal oversight body
99 It should be noted that the indicators relevant to the Public Perceptions Dimension were not scored due to inadequate sample size.
20
40
60
80
100%
1. ACC’s Legal Independence and Status (7 Indicators)
2. ACC’s Financial and Human Resource (9 Indicators)
3. ACC’s Detection and Investigation Function
(8 Indicators)
4. ACC’s Prevention, Education and Outreach Functions 9 Indicators)
5. ACC’s Cooperation with Other Organisa-tions (5 Indicators)
6. ACC’s Accountability and Oversight (4 Indicators)
7. Public Perceptions of the ACC’s Performance
(6 Indicators)
- the parliamentary committee on independent Institutions – does exist. The issue is that this body has neglected to fulfil this responsibility in total with the consequence that there is no external oversight of the ACC in practice.
It should be further noted that the indicators are divided into those relevant to the ACC’s own performance (performance factors) and the ACC’s operating environment (enabling factors) – which are outside the control of the ACC and can either facilitate or obstruct its work. As the graph below shows, the ACC scored lower on performance factors at 45% in comparison to enabling factors, which scored at 56%.
� Figure 3: Enabling versus Performance Factors for ACC Maldives
The ACC generally scored higher on those indicators over which they have less control over, such as the legal
framework governing the institution, guaranteeing their independence, and providing them with a wide jurisdiction to investigate corruption. Nonetheless there is room for improvement. For instance, one of the most crucial systemic issues involves the instability of the ACC’s budget – and it is the government’s responsibility to resolve this and ensure a consistent budgetary allocation to the ACC.
Conversely, the ACC generally scored lower on those indicators over which they have more control over, such as staff retention rate and the efficiency of its corruption investigations. Ameliorating these issues are an internal responsibility of the ACC. Overall this indicates that whilst there are systemic issues relevant to the wider operating environment demanding resolution, the ACC itself has the greater share of discretion in improving their score.
In consideration of the ACC’s strengths and weaknesses the following recommendations are proposed to enhance the institution’s efficiency.
recommendAtions
legAl indePendence And stAtUs
l Continue working with the Attorney General’s Office to push for legal reforms to the PPCA and ACC Act, particularly with regard to:
● Expanding the definition of corruption to encompass illicit enrichment. ● Granting the ACC the legal discretion to halt on-going projects which are suspect and also to issue
binding recommendations. ● Specify in legislation the educational and other qualifications required of a Commission Member.
ACC 2016(Performance Factors 45%
Enabling Factors 56%)
100 %
80
60
20
0
0
40
20 40 60 80 100 %
finAnciAl And HUmAn resoUrces
l Build capacity of all investigate staff through intensive and professional trainings. Training staff to investigate financial crimes should be accorded particularly urgent priority.
l Undertake staff satisfaction surveys to enquire into the reasons for high turnover and to generate solutions accordingly.
l The Government and Parliament must ensure the budgetary stability of the ACC by not suddenly withholding funding and must ensure that the ACC is adequately resourced to carry out their mandate.
detection And investigAtion fUnctions
l ACC’s overall investigative function need to be strengthened by training staff to enquire into complex financial crimes and by ensuring stronger documentary evidence collection to complement witness testimonies.
l If there are lengthy delays with regard to their inquiries into high profile corruption cases, the ACC must justify this and be proactive and regular in keeping the public informed of the progress of their investigations, so that questions are not raised about their efficiency.
l Ensure that awareness messages on how to report corruption complaints to the ACC are targeted to all segments of the population, including skilled and less-skilled expatriates.
Prevention, edUcAtion And oUtreAcH fUnctions
l The ACC should increase number of reviews regarding organizational procedures. 16 l Present their social media initiatives in a manner more appealing to youth. This could potentially increase
the reach of their awareness messaging in consideration of the Maldives’ relatively young population. l Consult a wider range of stakeholders in research efforts, including the general public, the private sector,
associations and external bodies
cooPerAtion witH orgAnisAtions
l Increased collaboration and correspondence with the PGO is urgently needed. This further entails arranging regular opportunities for the ACC investigative staff to attend court hearings and trials.
AccoUntAbility And oversigHt
l Active involvement of the Parliamentary Committee on Independent Institutions is needed with regards to evaluating the ACC’s performance and in assisting with challenges faced by the ACC.
Annex 1: bAckgroUnd to tHe ProJect
Transparency International believes that Anti-Corruption Agencies (ACAs), as public institutions tasked with combating corruption, must be transparent, accessible and accountable to citizens. They must operate with the utmost integrity, maintain a reputation of objectivity and professionalism and demonstrate effectiveness in their duties. Transparency International has identified ACAs as key partners in the fight against corruption and plans to work in constructive collaboration with governments who are ready to invest in improving their anti-corruption effectiveness by building strong oversight and enforcement mechanisms.
Transparency International‘s initiative aimed at strengthening anti-corruption agencies combines biennial assessments of ACAs with sustained engagement, dialogue and advocacy at both national and regional levels. A robust assessment tool was developed over a period of two years in consultation with numerous experts and practitioners around the world. In mid-2013, Transparency International convened an experts meeting in Kuala Lumpur to explore the possibility of developing an ACA assessment tool. After receiving encouraging feedback and useful input, Transparency International commissioned a background review and draft framework by anti-corruption specialist, Alan Doig. The concept received further interest and backing from ACAs in Asia Pacific during the 18th and 19th Steering Group Meetings of the ADB/OECD Anti-Corruption Initiative for Asia-Pacific in 2013 and 2014.
In 2014, Transparency International commissioned anti-corruption expert, Dr Jon Quah to further refine the framework, producing a set of indicators incorporating elements of TI’s National Integrity Systems assessment methodology and other relevant tools and principles. In April 2015, Transparency International organised a Focus Group Discussion in Bangkok, bringing together practitioners, researchers and ACAs to scrutinise the indicator framework and approach. Participants subsequently formed an Advisory Group to guide the finalisation of the tool.
The tool was piloted in Bhutan in 2015 and lessons learned around the research framework, process and approach were captured and used to finalise the methodology in consultation with the Advisory Group.
Annex 2: interviewees
Persons interviewed during Assessment of ACC Maldives, August –September 2016
office / rePresentAtion
nAme of Person Position / Profession
Anti-Corruption Commission
Hassan Luthfee President
Muavviz Rasheed Vice President
Sofwath Mohamed Commission Member
Abdullah Rasheed Secretary General
Ikleela Ismail Head of Prevention and Research Unit
Majid Hassan Head of Investigative Unit
Mohamed Saleem Head of Education and Awareness Unit
Aishath Areefa Head of Post Investigation and Reporting Unit
Fathimath Anoola Head of Legal and Asset Recovery Unit
Abdulla Azeez Moosa Head of Complaints Evaluation and Registration
Attorney Generals’ Office
Shafeea Riza Senior State Attorney
Auditor General’s Office
Ibrahim Aiman Assistant Auditor General
Adam Naseer Director, Technical Services
Mohamed Naseem Manager, Technical Services
Civil Service Commission
Aly Shameem President
CSO leaders Mariyam Shiuna, Executive Director of Transparency Maldives
Thoriq Hamid Program Manager, Transparency Maldives
Elections Commission
Ismail Habeeb Abdul Rahman Commissioner
Focus Group Discussion 1
Ahmed Rasheed, Student at Maldives National University
Naushan Abdul Muhaimin, Executive Director of Care Society (CSO)
Focus Group Discussion 2 (Private Sector)
Mahmood Razi Director, Lintel Management and Investments Ser-vices Ltd
Mujuthaba Musthafa Managing Director, Bungleton Pvt. Ltd.
Abbas Mohamed Director, Veligaa Hardware
Focus Group Discussion 3
Ibrahim Waheed Aswad Sangu TV (Journalist)
Jeehan Mahmood Former Human Rights Commission Member 2010-2015
Ahmed Shahid Former Secretary General of HRCM
Persons with Direct Contact with ACC
Anonymous Female under investigation
Anonymous Female under investigation
Ahmed Aboobakuru Submitted complaint to ACC, President of Contrac-tor’s Association
Ahmed Naufal Submitted a complaint to ACC
Saudullah Ahmed Submitted a complaint to ACC
Ibrahim Nazeem Former Managing Director of Maldives Road De-velopment Corporation, was under investigation by ACC
Anas Abdul Sattar, Secretary General, MDP (main opposition party),was also lawyer for persons under investiga-tion by ACC
Mohamed Iyas Former director of Legal affairs at PGO (2015) , Also lawyer for person under investigation by ACC (2016)
Previous ACC Staff Anonymous
Anonymous
Mohamed Nashid Former Investigative Officer, 2011-2015
Prosecutor General’s Office
Aisthath Bisham Prosecutor General of the Maldives.
Members of Parlia-ment
Rozaina Adam Member of Independent Commissions Committee, Member of MDP (main opposition Party)
Anonymous Member of PPM (ruling party)
Journalists Mohamed Junayd Station in charge, Raajje TV
Zaheena Rasheed Editor, Maldives Independent
Ali Naafiz Assistant Editor, Mihaaru News
Hussain Hassan Deputy Editor, Sun Online
United Nations Office on Drugs and Crime
Claudia Sayago Crime Prevention and Criminal Justice Officer,
Annex 3: stAkeHolders consUlted
External Stakeholders Consulted
office/rePresentAtion nAme of Person Position/Profession
Auditor General’s Office Ibrahim Aiman Assistant Auditor
Attorney General’s Office
Hafiza Abdul Sattar Senior State Attorney
Criminal Court Ismail Rasheed Assistant Legal Officer
Information Commisioner’s Office
Hassan Shakir Muhammad Director General
Muhammad Ahmed Directoer General, Innovations, Research and Foreign Relations
Maldives Police Service Javed Mohamed Inspector of Police
Usamath Muhammad Sub Inspector of Police
Ministry of Finance and Trea-sury
Abdul Ghafoor Abdul Latheef
Senior Policy Executive
National Integrity Commission Ahmed Faiz Commissioner
Privatization and Corporatiza-tion Board
Muhammad Nizam President
Prosecutor General’s Office Mariyam Niyahath Deputy Prosecutor General
56 Transparency maldives
Annex 4: references
Anti-Corruption Commission, Amendments proposed to Anti-Corruption Act, (June 2016)Anti-Corruption Commission, Annual Report 2010, (2011)Anti-Corruption Commission, Annual Report 2011, (2012)Anti-Corruption Commission, Annual Report 2012, (2013)Anti-Corruption Commission, Annual Report 2013, (2014)Anti-Corruption Commission, Annual Report 2014, (2015)Anti-Corruption Commission, Annual Report 2015, (2016)Anti-Corruption Commission, Corruption Perception Survey of Civil Servants Report 2014, (2014) Anti-Corruption Commission, Statistical Yearbook 2015, (2016)Asia Foundation with Maldives Institute for Psychological Services ‘Training and Research, Rapid Situation
Assessment of Gangs in Male’ Maldives 2012, (2012)Asian Development Bank, Maldives Overcoming the Challenges of a Small Island State: Country Diagnostic
Study, (2015)Auditor General’s Office MMPRC Special Audit Report 1, (2014)Auditor General’s Office, MMPRC Special Audit Report 2, (2016)Avas, ACC Questions MP Mohamed Ismail, (31 August 2016)Avas, ‘MMPRC Investigation Report Under Review’, (29 August 2016)Committee for Development Policy, Expert Group Meeting, Monitoring of Graduated Countries from the
Category of Least Developed Countries – Maldives, (2012)Commonwealth Observer Group, Report on Maldives Presidential election 7 September 2013 and re-
run of Maldives Presidential Election 9 November 2013 and Maldives Presidential run-off election 16 November 2013
Government of Maldives, Constitution of the Maldives, (2008)Government of Maldives, Elections Commission Act 8/2008Government of Maldives, National Integrity Commission Act, 27/2015Government of Maldives,1st Amendment to the Prevention and Prohibition of Corruption Act 33/2014Government of Maldives, 8th Amendment to the Tourism Act 13/2006Government of Maldives, Anti-Corruption Commission Act 13/2008Government of Maldives, Audit Law (4/2007)Government of Maldives, Fiscal Responsibility Act (7/2013)Government of Maldives General Regulations of the Anti-Corruption Commission 2010/R-18Government of Maldives, Prevention and Prohibition of Corruption Act 2/2000Government of Maldives, Public Finance Law 3/2006International Foundation for Electoral Systems, Money and Elections in the Maldives; Perceptions and
Reality, (2014)International Foundation for Electoral Systems with USAID, ‘Organisational Assessment of Anti-Corruption
Commission’, (2014)International Labour Organisation News, ‘Migrant worker’s voice: illegal and silenced in the Maldives’,
(April 2015)International Monetary Fund, Maldives Detailed Assessment Report on Anti-Money laundering and
Combating the Financing of Terrorism Country report no. 12/1, (2012)Maldives Independent, Ex-Auditor General Weighs in on Maldives Biggest Corruption Scandal, (23
February 2016)Maldives Independent, Ex-Minister Accused of Corruption Over Independent Day Banquet, (2 December
2015)Maldives Independent, Government authorized to lease islands without bidding, (June 29, 2016)
57assessmenT of anTi-corrupTion commission of The maldives 2016
Maldives Independent, Graft Watchdog advises against awarding ‘mega-projects’ without bidding’, (26 June 2016)
Maldives Independent, Nasheed Ordered to Repay ‘Misused’ Money, (27 August 2016)Maldives Independent, USD 79m Embezzled in Maldives Biggest Corruption Scandal, (6 February 2016)Maldives Monetary Authority, Annual Report 2015, (2016)Mihaaru, No Open Probe Against Gayyoom, Maldives Graft Watchdog Refutes Chief’s Claims, (14 June
2016)Ministry of Tourism, Tourism Yearbook 2015, (2015)Minivan News, ACC Approaches Finance Committee Over Nexbis System, (24 September 2012)Minivan News, ACC Forwards Cases Against Senior Officials of Thilafushi Corporation for Prosecution,
(26 October 2011)Minivan News, Immigration Offices Raided by ACC; Investigators Allege Intimidation, (24 May 2012).Minivan News, Leaked Voice Clips May Be ‘Conversations between friends Helping Each Other’: Yameen’,
(4 July 2010)Minivan News, Supreme Court Precedent in Nexbis Case Makes ACC Meaningless: ACC President, (4
September 2012)Raajje.mv, Maldives ACC questions President Yameen over MMPRC scandal, (27 April 2016)Raajje.mv, Prosecutors attend court as per order, (May 2014)Raajje MV, ACC Concludes Investigation of Major Corruption Case Against Maumoon, (4 July 2016)SunOnline, Steps would be taken if people’s budget is tapped for Eid celebrations, (29 August 2016) SunOnline, ACC Issues Noted with MMPRC, Investigation at Last, (8 February 2016)SunOnline, Complaints Against Judges Must be Processed by JSC: Chief Justice, (17 September 2012)SunOnline, Corruption Case Against Ali Hameed Sent to PG Office, (8 August 2013)SunOnline, Government Decides to Terminate Agreement with Nexbis, (6 August 2013)SunOnline, Maumoon Summoned to ACC for Questioning in Corruption During His Presidency, (5 July
2016)SunOnline, Nearly 8,000 Expats Repatriated, Says Defence Minister, (16 November 2014)SunOnline, “President Nasheed and Top Officials of His Government Ordered to Pay The State What is
Owed”, (25 August 2016)The Fund for Peace, Fragile States Index 2016 (2016)The Guardian, Maldives Political Instability Allows Gang Violence to Flourish, (22 October 2012)The Guardian, Maldives Threatens Migrant Workers With Expulsion Over Planned Protest, (26 March
2015)The Guardian, Maldives’ political instability allows gang violence to flourish, (22 October 2012)Transparency International, Corruption Perceptions Index 2016, (2017)Transparency International, Daily Lives and Corruption: Public Opinion in South Asia, (2011)Transparency International, Global Corruption Barometer Survey 2013, (2013)Transparency Maldives, Baseline Research on floor crossing in the Maldives, (2015)Transparency Maldives, Democracy at the Crossroads: Results of 2013 Democracy Survey, (2013)Transparency Maldives, Maldives migrant Worker System Assessment Report 2015, (2015)Transparency Maldives, National Integrity System Assessment Maldives 2014, (2014)Transparency Maldives, Position Paper: Criminalising Illicit enrichment to curb grand corruption, (July 2015)Transparency Maldives, Pre-election Assessment: 2013 Presidential Elections in the Maldives, (2013)United Nations Children’s Fund, Study on the Decentralisation Process in the Maldives, (May 2013)United National Development Programme, South-South Exchange on Effective Anti-Corruption Agencies;
Bhutan - Maldives - Timor Leste, (2012)United National Office of Drugs and Crime, Country Review Report of Maldives, Review by Palau and
Cabo Verde of the implementation by Maldives of articles 15-42 of Chapter III “Criminalisation and law enforcement’ and articles 44-50 of Chapter IV ‘International cooperation’ of the United Nations Convention against Corruption for the review cycle 2010-2015, (2016)
United Nations Office on Drugs and Crime, United Nations Convention Against Corruption, (2004)
58 Transparency maldives
V News, ACC to Question Gayoom over Presidential Palace Audit Report, (05 July 2016).V News Audit Office, ACC’s South Regional Offices Opened, (1 December 2015).V News, Ex President Gayoom Urges PPM MPs Against Endorsing Tourism Act Amendment Bill, (28 June
2016).V News, MPs Ask for Re-Appointment of Former Auditor General Niyaz, (26 October 2015).V News, Nasheed and Members of his Cabinet Instructed to pay amounts owed to the state, (26 August
2016).V News, Criminal Court begins to review PG cases, (19th February 2014)V News, We are investigating Audit Report regarding Adheeb; Anti-Corruption Commission, (2 November
2014)V News Audit Office, ACC investigation on a corruption case against Adheeb, (22 May 2014)V news, Cabinet minister questioned regarding MMPRC corruption case, (20 January 2016)V news, ACC questions Adeeb regarding MMPRC corruption case, (13 January 2016)World Bank Group, Doing Business 2016: Measuring regulatory quality and efficiency, Economy profile
2016 - Maldives, (13th Edition, 2016)World Bank Group, Maldives Systemic Country Diagnostic, (2015)
