anti communist resistance potential in the sino soviet bloc

8/13/2019 Anti Communist Resistance Potential in the Sino Soviet Bloc

1/32


2/32

TBloc dition

Inof a llll 'lll,xtestrcn,apathe wrnain

In ~ n o wtt-nli; a r d

' ' ~Jll l SSJIISlI IL' l l t

La: : : ~ dc; lte:tdiort gimt wi:sis:, .It dcms

inrrb


3/32

DECLASSIFIED Authority NN 947003Slik C ~

C ';\(; Cc..ntrc;. . J : ; j t . < . J . l i ~ ~ n c ~ l . < ; s . . ~ - ;.. Dfit e. flfif 3 :

ANTI-COMMUNIST RESISTANCE P O ~ E f t f . t * f J - ,/'IN THE SINO SOVIET BLOC

THE PROBLEMTo appraise the intensity and scope of dissidence and resistance in Sino-Soviet

and to estimate the resistance potential under cold and hot war conin the Bloc. 1

INTRODUCTORY NOTEn estimating the resistance potential

in relation to their governit is necessary to know the nature,and depth of their discontent, theof their will to resist, and theirwill and capability of the regime tocontrol.n a Communist-ruled country the best,s is the regime's in

r e s i s t a n ~ e and its constantthe C,ommunist environ-

Lacking any legal avenues for expressthe popul.ation still can indi

its discontent through a variety ofand inactions unfavorable to the

widespread opposition. These types ofare symptomatic of discontent,do not necessarily reveal the extent,and specific causes of underdiscontent. The will to resist, the

skill in doing so, the motivation, and theopportunities, vary from element to element in the population, and from time totime.In this estimate, the following terminology is used to describe these typesof action:

1. Dissidence is a state of mind involvingdiscontent or disaffection with the regime.2. Resistance is dissidence translated intoaction.3. Organized resistance is that whic.h iscarried out by a group of individuals whohave accepted a common purpose, agreed

'This estimate covers resistance potential in en-tire Slno-sovtet Bloc. More detalled coverageof individual Bloc countries Is set forth in theattached Annexes on Albania, Bulgaria, Czechoslovakia, East Germany, Hungary, Rumania, theUSSR, North Korea, and North Vietnam. Polandand Communist China are considered ln theover-all estimate, but no annexes are includedon these countries. For more detalled treat-ment of these two countries see R ~ 1 AntiCommunist Resistance Activities and Potentialtn Poland, dated 20 July 1954, and RIR-2, Anti-Communist Resistance Activities and Potentialln China, dated 2 November 1954.

1


4/32

DECLASSIFIED Authority NN 947 3

and worked out a commuresistance is that which is

out by individuals or loosely assocertain limitedplan or strate

organized or unoris that which expresses itself in

acts against the regime. I t mayforms as intelligence collection,

2warfare, assistance in escape and evasion,open defiance of authority, or preparatory activity for any of the above. I t mayor may not involve violence, and may beconducted openly or clandestinely.6 Passive resistance organized or u n o r ~ganized, is that which is conducted within the framework of the resister's normallife and duties, and involves deliberatenonperformance or malperformance ofacts which would benefit the regime, ordeliberate nonconformity with standardsof conduct established by the regime.

ESTIMATEis evidence of widespread dissi

in all Communist Bloc countries.in general dissidence is greatestthe peasantry, even the youth andworkers, two groups whichbe expected to be most favorableindoctrination, have beincreasingly disaffected in the Euro

and to a lesser extent inthe intensity of dissidenceconsiderably. It is probably least

in the USSR, where Commuhas become more firmly established.e Far East Bloc areas, where Com

is exploiting the new surge of nastrong than in the East EuroSatellites, where national interests

to those of thethe existence of dissidencethe Bloc, active organized re

is practically nonexistent. Aed small guerrilla .bands may

'

still be operating in some Satellites, notably in Albania, but they are no more thana local nuisance which probably will bewiped out sooner or later by the securityforces.4 Even though dissidence within theSino-Soviet Bloc creates a resistance potential, we believe that under continuedcold war conditions active resistance isunlikely to develop. There may be a fewisolated acts of unorganized resistance,but the effectiveness of Communist security controls and police state methodswill probably remain such as to makeactive organized resistance virtually impossible, except in a few almost inaccessible areas. Therefore, even in countrieswhere dissidence is strongest, such as EastGermany, we see no prospect of resistanceactivities developing on a scale sufficientto threaten the stability of the regimes.At a maximum such activities will tendto delay the achievement of Communistpolitical and economic objectives. At aminimum they will constitute a nuisance

SE9AE l


5/32


and will raise the moraleelements . Increasedbe likely only ifapparatus were

other hand a substantial deSuch resistance is unlikely serithreaten the political stability of'However, parin agriculture, it will probablya troublesome and even seriousBloc countries, im

the fulfillment of their political.Nevertheless,that the persistent pressuresby Communist regimes willreduce the extentof even pas

and will almost certainlythe emergence of coordinated reactivities.

of the USSR and to a lesserin Communist China, the out

in support of the reWidespread destructibn or prohostilities, however, might leademergence of resistance. In thethe USSR, suchBaltic States and the Western

~ h o p e s of liberation would be re-at the outset, intensifying there- potential. In the European Sat-the outbreak of war would notmulate hopes for liberation butlso increase popular unrest andresistance. We believe, however,1ctive organized resistance would.nless the Bloc suffered severesetbacks, and Western forces.ed Satellite territory. Commu-

3nist military and security forces would almost certainly remain sufficiently strongto prevent or check outbreaks. However,we estimate that major resistance movements in the Bloc, comparable to those ofWorld War II, probably would not developin areas still under Communist controluntil the local security organizations hadbeen seriously weakened and the USSRand Communist China were unable toenforce order in .their respective orbits.Until such circumstances arose, activitiesof resistance elements would probably beconfined to intelligence collection andtransmission, surreptitious antiregimepropaganda, aid to Western personnel inescape and evasion operations, and defection inducements.7. In many countries of the non-Commu'nist world there are organizations, composed of and led by persons who haveemigrated from countries of the SovietBloc. In general these organizationshave lost effective contact with theirhomelands and do not significantly contribute to resistance potential. Virtually all have suffered from internal bickering and lack of funds and have been penetrated by agents of Communist securityforces. The people within the Bloc knowvery little about emigre organizations.With rare exceptions they would almostcertainly not welcome leading emigres inpositions of power after liberation.8. In the event of war, the nationalityof invading forces probably would in general have little bearing on the cooperation offered by resistance elements in theSino-Soviet Bloc, provided these forceswere clearly integrated in a broad antiCommunist military organization. Incertain situations, however, long-stand-

8139 Rli i

~ c c r ~ ~ = =


6/32

DECLASSIFIED Authority NND 947003S E ORE f l 5

ANNEXES T NI 10 55

The following Annexes have been coordinated among the lAC Agencies:PageAnnex A: ALBANIA 6

Annex B: BULGARIA 9Annex C: CZECHOSLOVAKIA 2Annex D: EAST GERMANY

5Annex E: HUNGARY 8Annex F: RUMANIA 2nnex G: USSR 24

Annex H: NORTH VIETNAM 28Annex I: NORTH KOREA 30


7/32

DECLASSIFIED Authority NND 947 3

ANNEX A:C USES OF DISSIDENCE

The widespread popular dissidence in Al-springs from political, social, cultural,religious as well as economic causes. Thethe Communist regime topatterns, village autonomy, and religion ~resented. For many centunes,central authority has been an

andto all authority, alien or native,the confines of the immediate tribes,villages. This trait is particularly proin the northern areas predominantinhabited by the Ghegs, mountain tribesuntil World War I had little contact withmodem world. The more accessible southtribes, the Tosks, have been in closer touchnew ideas and inodem techniques, andTosk intellectuals were the first to becomein Marxism.

Moreover, the present Communist regimewith the traditionally hateds. Ever since the Slavs drove the Al-back into the mountainous edges ofAdriatic, the Albanians have been antiThe massacre of Albanians by Serbsthe 1912 Balkan1 War aggravated thisThus Communism, particularly forGhegs, has the handicap of its Slavic asso

all the more so since the Albania Comwas founded in 1941 by Yugo1948 when Tito defected and Albanianleader Hoxha cast his lost withCominform.

Another basic cause of dissidence is Cominterference with Albania's culturalage. After Albania became independent1912, a number of French, English, andschools were created, young Albanianssent to Western universities, and Westinfluence grew considerably. Theattempt to enforce Soviet orientation

6

ALBANIAhas made Albania's few intellectuals payperfunctory lip service to Communism butthey remain strongly opposed to Soviet culture. The regime, apparently unable tochange this situation, has frequently chargedits teachers with still bejng bourgeois, andhaving a low ideological level. The Communist crusade against religion has furtherincreased popular discontent not only because of interference in matters of belief butalso because religion is regarded as a partof the national cultural heritage. Religiousgroups (Islamic, Greek Orthodox, and RomanCatholic) which played a major part in thecountry's cultural development have beenbrought under state control.4. The present inadequate standard of livingis a further cause of dissidence. Althoughliving standards have always been low thedifference between pre- and post- Communistliving conditions is great enough to evokegrumbling which is considerably enhanced bygovernment economic measures such asquotas and forced loans.MAJOR DISSIDENT ELEMENTS5. Dissidence toward the regime appearsstrong among all classes. With the exceptionof the top governmental bureaucracy, theranking officers in the army, the national andlocal Party leaders, and the security forces,there is no group -even within the Patywhich derives real benefits from the regime.The suppression of. elements considered incorrigible and their internment in forced labor camps has exacerbated the widespread illfeeling toward the government. fter 10years of Communist rule approximately 10percent of the population is still in jails andlabor camps. Annual amnesties have not decreased the prison population which indicatedthat new enemies of the people have replaced those freed.6. The Peasantry Albania is a country ofpeasants, who comprise the largest and mostformidable anti-communist element. The

S:BORE P


8/32


principal reasons for peasant disaffection arecrushing taxes, heavy obligatory deliveryquotas for which the government pays lowprices, seizure of livestock, imposition of voluntary (forced) labor and forced state loans,collectivization pressures and police terrorization. Mainly because of peasant opposition,only 16 percent of the arable land has so farbeen collectivized: Poor and landless peasants in the south ;and central areas initiallyprofited by the so-called agrarian reforms of1945-1956 but were quickly disillusioned. In -dividualistic and proud of their past independence, the peasants are indifferent to andcare less for Communist ideology. The in -tense peasant antagonism against Communistpolicies largely accounts for lack of reliabilityof the armed forces and industrial labor, both\of which groups are recruited chiefly from thepeasantry. 7. Youth Albanian youth, both rural andurban, had joined the liberation movementsagainst the Italian and German occupation,and the Communists, camouflaging themselves in the National Liberation Front, succeeded for a period in attracting large num-bers of youth. However, by 1950 Communistpropaganda had become ineffective becauseof economic inequalities, voluntary labor,imposition of a foreign ideology, and economicwant.8 Military The rank and file of the AlbanianArmy cannot be considered loyal to the regime. One indication is the fact that unitsof the army have never been used to stampout guerrilla activities. Fanatical Communist security police were used instead. Onlythe security police, some noncommissionedofficers, and ranking army officers who roseto their present position during the wartimepartisan warfare or under the Communistregime are considered reliable. These groups,and the network of informers placed in everyvillage, are the security backbone of the Al-banian regime, and have prevented anti-Communist bands from overthrowing the Tiranagovernment by force.9 Intelligentsia and Clergy Intellectualsand clergymen represent a considerable resist-

7ance leadership potential. Most of the Al-banian intelligentsia fought the rise of Communism during the war. Balli Kombetar(National Front), the strongest anti-Communist nationalist organization during WorldWar II, was founded by intellectual democrat ic elements. Many of the intelligentsiawere exiled, executed, or jailed after the Communists came to power. Of the intellectualsremaining in Albania, only a few can betrusted by the government. The clergy, particularly the Roman Catholics, also hate theregime. While Moslem and Orthodox priestsappear to have been cowed, the regime canprobably not rely on them.INTENSITY OF RESISTANCE10. There is evidence that Albanians have notlost the hope of eventual liberation, and isolated acts of overt resistance are still reportedto occur. However, mounting police terrorand brutality have decreased active resistanceduring the past five years. On the whole, thesuccess of security forces in detecting and destroying guerrillas has greatly weakened thesmall, scattered, and uncoordinated guerrillabands operating in mountain redoubts. Es-cape to Yugoslavia and Greece and passive resistance have become the primary expressionsof opposition to the regime. Despite policesurveillance, there is passive resistance in industry and agriculture such as obstructiilgthe work of Soviet advisers, damaging machinery, producing goods of poor quality, hiding produce, and failing to meet farm quotas.EMIGRE GROUPS11 The situation in Albania differs from thatin other Satellites in that much of the resistance activity that exists is directed by emigregroups in Greece, Yugoslavia, and Italy. Thereare four principal Albanian emigre groupsin the West, the BK (Balli Kombetar), theLegality Movement (close to King Zog), agroup of nonparty individuals, and the National Independent Bloc, whose leaders collaborated with Fascist Italy. The first threegroups became affiliated in the National Committee for Free Albania (NCFA) in 1949. tgave the appearance of relative strength bycombining most of the emigre groups and

B:BSR:B t


9/32

DECLASSIFIED Authority NND 947 3SEORET 8

obtaining financial and moral support fromthe West. This Western support is the strongest unifying factor in the emigration. However, when in 1953 the National IndependentBloc and some other individuals were accepted in the NCFA, certain left-wing members of BK split off and formed the NationalDemocratic Committee for a Free Albania(NDCFA) 12 There have been some contacts betweenresistance elements in Albania and the principal NCFA affiliates. Most resistance groups,particular ly those reportedly operating in central and southern Albania, appear to haveidentified themselves with the NCFA Al-though there is still much political and personal factionalism rending Albania emigreorganizations, they appear to be in a relatively better shape and seem to have more contact with their homeland than the emigresof the other Satellites.13 There is also a Yugoslav-sponsored Leagueof Albanian Political Refugees in Yugoslavia,which has the advantage of being closer toAlbania than other emigre elements. Its contacts with certaiil resistance elements n Al-bania, through Yugoslav intelligence servicecross-border operations, have probably beencloser and more numerous than those of the

e s t e m ~ r i e n t e d elements with the NCFAemigres. At one time, arms, supplies, andmoney reportedly were supplied to the un-derground by this group. However, due to- Yugoslavia s normalization of relations withthe Bloc powers, the group s activities havereportedly been sharply curtailed.RESISTANCE POTENTIAl UNDER COlD WAR

CONDITIONS14 The few isolated resistance bands n Al-bania may continue for some time to ~ c u p ythe attention { Communist security forcesand inflict sporadic damage in the fields ofcommunication and transportation. How-ever, the regime s security measures make virtual ly impossible the organization of guerrillawarfare on a n a t ~ o n a l cohesive, and centrallydirected scale. Any guerrilla forces wouldprobably also be short of weapons and sup-

plies. Thus, a gradual liquidation of theseactivities is likely. However, a substantial degree of pasSive resistance will probably continue to manifest itself.RESISTANCE POTENTIAl UNDER WARTIME

CONDITIONS15 Because most Albanians are probably convinced that only an East-West war could bringthem liberation, the outbreak of general warwould almost certalnly strengthen their resistance potential. At the very least, it wouldprobably stiffen the hostility of the peasantrytoward the regime. Both peasants and workers would probably try to sabotage the Communist war effort when they could do so without undue risk t themselves. Furthermore,the feasibility of at least covert help from Yugoslavia, Greece, and Italy, the geographicisolation of Albania from the Bloc, and thenecessity for the regime to use all availablemanpower to secure its frontiers from attackor infiltration would probably make it easierin Albania than anywhere else in the Blocfor guerrtllas to prepare organized resistance.t is likely that well led and equipped antiregime Albanians could infiltrate the countryfrom Yugoslavia or Greece.16 Although large-scale uprisings probablywould not occur immediately upon the outbreak of war, Albanian resistance elements,i f supported from the outside, might be ableto organize some active resistance. However,the commencement of large scale guerrillawarfare would depend upon sucq, developments as Western military successes, theweakening of the regime, the attitudes of Yugoslavia and Greece, and the ability of theWest and the emigre groups to provide leadership and aid. Unless the USSR were able toreinforce Albania with Soviet units soon afterthe war broke out, a large-scale uprising coulddevelop, particularly in the northern and central regions, before Western forces actuallyreached Albanian territory. Such a development would presuppose, however, that largenumbers of Albanian conscripts escaped tothe mountains, even though many of theirofficers remained loyal to the regime.

OEJORiJ i


10/32


NNEX B

OF DISSIDENCETraditionally, through race, language, andBulgarians have been closelywith the Russians. Prior to the SovietSeptember 1944 the majoritythe population favored friendship with theBut the conduct of the invading Sothe ruthless exploitation of Bulresources by the USSR, and the relentout by Communisthave quickly spread disillusionmentresentment Bulgarians have tong beento political tyranny but the imposition

system that made a mockery of theirsovereignty has alienated most Bulregime's economic policies areby most of population as deto further Soviet interests rather thanof Bulgaria. Extensive Soviet controlsmade Bulgaria a, virtual Soviet colony,available evidence indicates that mostchafing under their Commuand loatheiSoviet domination.

DISSIDENT ELEMENTSThe Peasantry. The peasantry, some 80of the population, constitutes theopposition element. In the past,were comparatively few landless peaspeasants owned a small tract ofthey tilled with the help of a coive system. They are bitterly opposedcollectivization. While the regime hasfacade of Alexander Stam-Bulgarian National Agrarian Union,collectivization policies have nullthis gesture. The regime's extremelymethods of implementing Commuagricultural doctrine have aroused inpart of most peasIndustrial workers at one time thesupporters of Commurusm, have

conditions, totalitarian labor discipline,

9

BULGARIAand inadequate wages. So far, the newcourse and the return to Bulgarian controlof some Soviet-Bulgarian joint companieshave had little effect on depressed living conditions. Industrial workers resent the extremely harsh labor laws which bind themto their jobs by penalty of imprisonment orconfinement in a forced labor camp and permit mandatory transfers. Significantly, theselaws have been created to prevent unjustifiable absenteeism, growing labor turnover, anddeteriorating labor discipline. Drastic measures are also being taken to prevent growingindustrial sabotage.4. The clergy has been subverted o intimidated with the help of the governmenkon-trolled Union of Orthodox Priests and otherpro-Communist religious organizations. Theformerly independent Bulgarian OrthodoxChurch, embracing nearly all Bulgarians, hasbeen compelled to come under the RussianPatriarchate The leadership of the smallCatholic and Protestant communities has beenvirtually destroyed, and a large part of theMoslem minority deported to Turkey. The remaining non-Commurust clergy is stronglyopposed to the regime and constitutes a considerable resistance potential. Regime measures to discourage religious practices havealso contributed to dissidence.5. Youth There is some evidence that a considerable number of Bulgarian youth may begradually losing whatever initial enthusiasmit had for Communism. The restrictions anddiscipline imposed upon it by the Party areprobably increasingly resented. The regime'sirksome methods of indoctrination probablyhave caused many young people to resist Commurust teachings and to look for liberationto the West. Evidence suggests that a significant number of university students are opposed to the regime. However, youth haslittle outlet for expressing its resentment.6. Military The majority of the officer corpsis probably loyal to the regime. Most officers,


11/32


since the purges of older elements, have obtained their rank through Communist influence and are not anxious to lose their privileges, even i f they do not agree with the regime's policies. The enlisted personnel arerecruited mainly from the peasantry, thestrongest antiregime element, but the loyalty of the Bulgarian Army is probably somewhat higher than in the other Satellites. Theclose ethnic relationship of Bulgaria withRussia probably influences the attitude of theArmy.INTENSITY OF RESIST NCE7 Although dissidence is strong in almostevery segment of Bulgarian society, few Bulgarians have dared to defy the regime openly. The regime has been able to suppressactive resistance and little opportunity forit exists. At present there is no evidence oforganized resistance; acts of open resistanceare few and reports describing them areoften uncomfirmed. There have been two major purges of anti-Soviet elements: one brokeup a n t i ~ o m m u r i i s t opposition between 1944and 1947; the other, an internal party affair,took place after Tito's 1948 break with theCominform and resulted in removal of thoseBulgarian Communists who favored greaterindependence of the USSR.8 On the other hand some degree of passiveresistance against the. regime has continuedin spite of the purges. Instances such assubtle economic sabotage by peasants andworkers have occurred frequently, althoughthey are, qualitatively and quantitatively, lessthan in most of the other Satellites. Peasants hide livestock and grain, secretly slaughter livestock, disregard sowing and plowing regulations, avoid plantirig maximumamounts of grain, and fail to make use of themachine tractor stations. Office and factoryworkers neglect maintenance of machinery,refuse to attend conferences and meetings,interpret government regulations with astrictness designed to show their absurdity,malinger, and practice absenteeism. Bulgarians who have theopportunity listen to Westem broadcasts which the government is trying to jam. A few Bulgars continue to escapeacross the frontiers or defect abroad.

10

I;MIGRE GROUPS9 The few Bulgarian emigre groups are badly split and plagued by personal rivalriesamong the leaders. Until 1952, the BulgarianNational Committee was regarded as the mostinfluential but without the support of theNational Committee for Free Europe, _its in-fluence has waned. The most widely knownemigre, former political leader G M Dimitrov,has been unable or unwilling to improve thesituation. Despite extravagant claims of certain emigre leaders, there is no evidence thatemigre elements have in any way guided orassisted organized or unorganized resistancewithin Bulgaria. Although present evidenceindicates that Bulgarians still remember Dimitrov, it is difficult to determine how widespread his following may be.RESIST NCE POTENTIAl UNDER COLD WAR

CONDITIONS10 n view of the regime's effective security.controls, close Soviet supervision, and theabsorption of Bulgaria into the Soviet securitysphere, there is little likelihood that organizedresistance can develop under cold war conditions. Isolated instances of unorganized active resistance will probably continue to occur,but without tangible outside help or a weakening of the Communist apparatus they willprobably diminish. The average Bulgar ian istoo engrossed in the daily struggle of livingand too cowed by the police state to have timeand energy left for resistance activities. Atbest, active resistance will be restricted toantiregime propaganda, some intelligence activity, and performing isolated acts of subtlesabotage, not necessarily recognizable as such.Cautious passive resistance will probably continue to be the only real outlet for disaffection. Since agriculture is the main-stay ofthe Bulgarian economy, peasant dissidencewill continue to create major problems forthe regime. However, i f the new courseis continued and produces tangible results, orif the Buigarians come to feel there is littlehope for their liberation, passive resistanceand dissidence may decrease.


12/32


RESISTANCE POTENTIAL UNDER WARTIMEONDITIONS

11 Upon outbreak of an East-West war theresistance potential in Bulgaria would almostcertainly increase. However active resistanceprobably would be severely inhibited by thepresence of Soviet forces which could be expected to. move into Bulgaria and establishbases for operations in the Near East and theMediterranean area. Emergence of largescale resistance could not be expected untilthe Communists had suffered major militarydefeats transport and communications facilities were disrupted and above all until Western invasion were imminent.12. n the event of such an invasion especially i f prior contacts had been established for

11

guiding coordinating and supplying Bulgarian resistance groups outbreak of some guerrilla fighting would be likely. Escape and evasion operations for Western personnel couldbegin to function. The Rhodope and Balkanmountains provide ideal terrain for guerrillabases. However participation in such activities probably would not assume the characterof a mass movement. Although ulgarianhistory has been characterized by individualacts of violence 500 years of Turkish rule didnot produce great rebellions. A Bulgarianpopular uprising against the Communist regime almost certainly would not materializeunless the Soviet rule had broken down Western victory appeared assured and clear-


13/32


ANNEX C: CZECHOSLOVAKIABASIC CAUSES OF DISSIDENCE1 Even though the old Czechoslovak Republichad a more vigorous democratic tradition thanany other EfLStern E\,lropean country and wasstrongly oriented toward the West, Communist strength was greater in Czechoslovakiathan in the other present Satellites. In thelast free elections in 1946, Communist candidates got 38 percent of the votes 43 percentin Bohemia-Moravia and 30 percent in Slovakia). Since the 1948 coup, however, theCommunist regime's drastic reshaping ofCzech political and economic life has alienatedmany one-time sympathizers and even manyParty members. COmmunist police statemethods, the discrimination against nonParty members, and the subordination ofCzech interests to those of the USSR standin sharp contrast to life under the first Re-public. Czechoslovakia's new submission toforeign domination after its long struggle forindependence is deeply resented on culturalas well as political grounds. In addition, disaffection is created by Soviet economic exploitation and internal mismanagement whichhave sharply lowered living standards. Foodis scarce, agricultural production is lagging,and housing is inadequate. Consumer goodsare often either unavailable or poorly madeand expensive. The n w course has to datedone little to ameliorate this situation.

MAJOR DISSIDENT E LEMENTS2. ndustrial worker , many of whom votedCommunist in 1946 and helped the regimein the 1948 coup, are now one of the mostdisaffected groups iii Czechoslovakia. Theycomplain about_ too long work hours, unpaidovertime, voluntary Sunday shifts, and toomany deductions from the paycheck. Theydislike the severe labor discipline and thefavoritism toward Party members.3. Youth is restless, disillusioned; and regimented by government youth organizations.Children of non-Party members are discrim-

inated against in education and restricted inthe choice of career. Most dissatisfied arethose who were denied advanced schoolingon political grounds and sent into unpopularindustries such as mining. The greatest proportion of Czechs escaping into Germany andAustria consists of persons under 24 years ofage.4. The p e ~ a n t r y well aware of the regime'sdesigns for eventual collectivization, are notdeceived by the temporary reduction of pressures under the new course. Hostile towardthe government and Party, they complainabout high delivery quotas and low prices,lack of consumer goods, harassment by localParty officials, and unfair government distribution of farm machinery and fertilizer.5. Minorities Communist attempts to eliminate the thorny minority problem in Czechoslovakia have so far failed. The Slovaks inparticular appear dissatisfied with Prague'sgrowing domination of local administration.They tend to place the blame for this, and the1948 coup, on the greater popular supportgiven the Communist Party in Bohemia-Moravia during the 1946-1948 period. They alsorecall past Czech incursions into Slovakaffairs. The Communist Party continues tohave less infiuence in Slovakia than in Bohemia-Moravia and the Slovak potential foractive resistance is probably higher. Whereas the German wartime occupation provokedmainly passive resistance in Bohemia-Moravia and only a few isolated acts of defianceoccurred, the Slovak active resistance tradition was demonstrated in the uprising atBanska Bystrica in 1944.

6. The clergy chiefly Roman Catholic, hasbeen decimated by the regime. Many highermembers of the hierarchy have been arrestedand replaced by priests willing to collaboratewith the Communists. The lower clergy isunder close surveillance and obliged to submit sermons for censorship. The Church has:been denied the right to educate. Known be-


14/32

DECLASSIFIED Authority NN 947003

licvers are harassed and are deprived ofchances for improvement of their position.The regime has more recently taken stepsdesigned to give the impression that it is notundermining the Church though in fact suchsteps are bringing it more under state control.These measures have greatly lessened theclergy s resistance potential.7. The middle class especially the professionaland managerial groups, either has been dispossessed outright and placed under surveillance, or works under supervision of Partymembers whose professional background isalmost invariably i n f ~ r i o r In spite of recentattempts of the regi..rrte to enlist their cooperation, the vast majority of these groups arethoroughly disaffected; they have lost theirsocial and financial status a.re limited in theirchoice of jobs and use of talents and live inconstant fear of being blamed for any failureof the regime.8. Military Since many officers have a stakein the continuation of the regime, and therewere thorough purges of pro-Western officersin 1948, the over-all reliability of the officercorps has probably increased. However, thereis evidence that its loyalty to the regime leavesmuch to be desired. Unreliabili ty is even morepronounced among the rank-and-file who reportedly resent the harsh discipline, close Soviet supervision, lack of leave, and constantindoctrination. As a conscript force, thearmy reflects the low morale of the generalPOpulation. The all- force is probably one ofthe least reliable in the Satellites. There havebeen several defections from the militaryservices to the West in the past few years.INTENSITY OF RESISTANCE9. Although dissidence seems to be somewhatmore pronounced in Slovakia than in Bohemia-Moravia, there is little evidence of activeresistance in either area. Communist polleecontrols are so pervasive that people areafraid to voice their criticism of the regime,let alone engage in open resistance. Moreover, there is a conviction that Soviet troops,while not at p r s ~ t stationed iri Czechoslovakia, would come to the help of the regimeto put down any :revolt that could not be

13handled locally, and there is no hope that anyuprising would receive Western help. Theonly open demonstration of Czech disaffection occurred in the abortive Pilsen riots ofJune 1953 following the . currency reform.Otherwise, the Czechoslovaks have been sullenand apathetic, passively expressing their dissatisfaction with the regime through a highpercentage of absenteeism (sometimes up to20 percent of the entire labor force), shoddyworkmanship, high labor turnover, opposition to farm collectivization and crop deliveryquotas, higher attendance at Church services,refusal to accept Eastern cultural orientation,etc.EMIGRE GROUPS10 . There are numerous and voluble emigregroups with headquarters in the US Canada,and Europe, but there is virtually no evidencethat any of them play an active role in Czechoslovakia resistance. The most important isthe Council of Free Czechoslovakia, consisting of Czechs and Slovaks and perhaps representing the nearest approximation to theMasaryk-Benes tradition. The Czech National Council and the Slovak National CouncilAbroad are separatist organizations of minorimportance. The extreme-rightist Slovak Liberation Committee, led by Ferdinand Durcansky, who maintains contact with extremerightist Germans, probably has little infiuence in Slovakia. Representatives of the oldpolitical parties, and of a Czech labor groupand a Sudeten-German group, also liveabroad, but they have little personal following among the emigres in the West and probably less in Czechoslovakia itself, although thenumber of party followers is probably stilllarge.11. t is possible that some contacts betweenthese organizations and their home countrywere maintained between 1948 and 1951 butthere have almost certainly been no contactsof significance since. According to defectorreports, internal Czechoslovak interest inemigre groups is feeble and does not indicatea desire to entrust future leadership to anyof the emigre leaders. Therefore, it is unlikely that emigres are in a position to direct

BEIOREI t


15/32

DECLASSIFIED AuthorityNN 947 39 li: C R F Tt 14

resistance activities nor is there evidence thatany one of the factio,ns would be acceptablefor government leadership in a liberatedCzechoslovakia.RESIST NCE POTENTIAL UNDER COLD WAR

CONDITIONS12 There is considerable resistance potentialin Czechoslo\akia, particularly among industrial workers, and there might be an occasional recurrence of isolated riots like that ofJune 1953. However, active cold war re.sistance is highly unlikely to emerge on any significant scale so long as there are stringentpolice and party controls. On the other handpassive resistance probably continue inthe form of absenteeism, isolated acts of sub- tle industrial and agricultural sabotage, disseminating the contents of Western broadcasts, and escapes and defections to the West.RESIST NCE POTENTIAL UNDER WARTIME

CONDITIONS13 The intensification of regime securitymeasures upon the outbreak of general warin Europe, and the active part icipation of Soviet forces, would make immediate organization of large-scale resistance all but impossible. Even unorganized passive resistancewould probably become more dangerous. However, i f the West appeared to be winning, anincrease in passive resistance and unorganized attempts at sabotage could be expected.Resistance in the Czech lands would probablybe mostly passive, but in Slovakia more activeresistance might develop. For example, smallanti-Communist guerrilla bands might be ableto operate successfully in the more remoteand inaccessible areas of Slovakia. The sue-

cess of such efforts would greatly depend uponthe ability of the West to establish contactsand furnish arms. 14 f Western forces approached the Czechborders and the effectiveness of the securityorganization weakened, restlessness and insubordination would probably increase sharp-ly More intelligence for the West would beforthcoming, more escape and evasion operations on behalf of Western personnel wouldbe undertaken, and intensified anti-Communist propaganda could be expected. An impending Western invasion of Czechoslovakiawould probably demoralize indigenous security forces to such an extent that Soviet troopswould largely have to take over. At such atime, parts of the Czechoslovak Aimy andpolice would probably defect in growing num-bers. Some of them probably would try toestablish an anti-Communist record by participating in organized resistance. At thispoint, the anti-Communist intelligentsia,freed political prisoners and displaced personsmight contribute substantially to organizingresistance.15 However, full-scale guerrilla war in Slovakia and open organized resistance in Bohemia-Moravia still could not be expected before a virtual breakdown of Communist controls. Moreover, there might be, at least forsome time, conflict between anti-Communistand pro-Communist guerrillas, diminishingthe effect of resistance and confusing escapeand evasion operations. Some antiregirneresistance e lements might also insist on taking ferocious revenge for their sufferings atthe expense of assisting the West i ri combating Communist troops.


16/32

DECLASSIFIED Authority NN 947 33 B C R B P 15 .

ANNEX D:B SIC C USES OF DISSIDENCE1. The widespread popular disaffection in EastGermany is intensified by the fact that unlike the other Satellites, the German Democratic Republic (GDR) 1 is not cut off fromcontact with the West. The special conditions of the occupation have made impossiblethe complete separation of the GDR fromWest Germany, and both the GDR and theFederal Republic have encouraged contactsbetween the two areas. Such contacts existon an extensive scale. Moreover, the EastGermans are tied West Germany by commort bonds of national identity and by thehope that eventual unification will mean liberation.2. Most East e r m ~ s do not feel that theyare living in a separate country and do notlook upon the GDR as permanent. Rather,they see it as a temporary administrative device, imposed upon them by Communist puppets backed by SoViet guns. The abortive uprisings of 17 June 1953 proved to the EastGermans as well as to the Soviets that without the backing of the Soviet Army, the GDRregime could not remain in power. Moreover,the Soviet occupation in East Germany cannot be disguised. Consequently, Communismis now identified with Soviet rule and dis-credited accordingly. The leaders of the Communist SED (Socialist Unity Party) and thegovernment are generally hated and detested.Police state measures to keep the people inline exacerbate these sentiments.3. Economic hardships are another majorcause of . antireg ime sentiment. Except forthe Party hierarchy, government, and the intelligentsia, nearly every East German hasbeen adversely affected by the practices of theregime. While the introduction of the newcourse in mid-1953 and some Soviet reparations concessions had somewhat improvedliving conditions, these improyements have

' For the purposes of thls estimate, the GDR lsassumed to inclu.de East Berlin.

EAST GERMANYbeen insufficient to reduce popular disaffection. Although the GDR's antireligious campaign has not been as violent as those of otherSatellites, it also contributes to popular dissatisfaction. Finally, the regime's attemptsto orient East German culture eastward aremuch resented. The East Germans considerthemselves culturally as belonging to theWest, and believe their culture to be superiorto that of the East. Communist attempts tochange this outlook have contributed to resentment against the regime.4. Disaffection in East Germany is very great,not only among the disaffected groups listedbelow but also among many rank-and-filemembers of the Party and its mass organizations, the government bureaucracy, white collar workers, and the technical intelligentsia. During 1953 340,000 East Germans fiedto West Germany; during 1954, the numberof refugees decreased to 200 000. It has beenestimated that not more than 10 percent ofthe population actually support the regimeand it is almost certain that such s u p p r t ~confined to people who have a personal stakein the regime's continuation. Very few aremotivated by ideological conviction.MAJOR DISSIDENT ELEMENTS5. Industrial Workers In contrast to theother Satellites, where the peasantry is thechief dissident element, disaffection and resistance in the GDR are greatest in the industrial centers. About one-third of the estimated 6.5 million wage and salary earnersin the GDR are industrial workers. Seventypercent of these are employed in the nationaized industr ies. There is evidence that manyworkers, probably a majority, are dissatisfiedwith the regime. Most East German workershave been traditionally social-democratic andstrongly trade union minded. German socialdemocracy has always been evolutionaryrather than revolutionary and, therefore, wasthe target of intensive Bolshevik hostility.Since the tradition of free trade unionism is


17/32

DECLASSIFIED Authority NN 947 3e E O R E f 16

so strong, the fact that under the GDR theunions have become instruments of government control has greatly contributed to thedisaffection of the workers. Furthermore,the workers are disgruntled with low wages,substandard living conditions, insufficientfood supplies, lack of consumer goods, everpresent offensive propaganda, forced attend-ance at political rallies, imposition of Sovietlabor methods, and a constant drive for moreproduction without adequate rewards.6. The Peasantry There are still some 600,-000 independent peasants in East Germanywho cultivate about two-thirds of the arableland. Even though many of them benefitedfrom the postwar land reform, the overwhelming majority are opposed to the regime, largely as a result of the collectivization programbegun in mid-1952. Special privileges wereextended to members of the so-called cooperatives, to the detriment of independentfarmers. Since mid-1952, about one-seventhof the arable land has been abandoned by itsowners. The new course improved conditions somewhat and the regime, in view ofpoor agricultural production, slowed down itscollectivization program. However, peasantdisaffection is still strong. Moreover, thereare indications that the collectivization program is being resumed.7. Btuinessmen Private industry still accounts for 15 percent of total industrial production; private wholesale and retail tradeaccount for about 6 and 31 percent respectively of trade turnover. Although this groupreceived some relief as a result of the newcourse, they probably realize that this is onlya temporary reprieve and that their groupwill eventually tie liquidated. The outlookof this group is of necessity antiregime, butmany of its elements continue to be conservative and cautious, inclined only to passive resistance, if any, and that only provided theysee no risk.8 The Clergy The Protestant and Catholicclergy has been outspoken in assailing Communist atheism and combat particularly theregime's effort to indoctrinate youth. Concessions made by the regime to the Protest-

ants in mid-1953 did not alter their attitudeThe adverse effect of the regime's antireligiouscampaign on a large part of the populationand the support received by the churches in'East Germany from the West Germans haveforced the regime to apply a milder type ofpersecution than practiced by other Satellitegovernments. The resistance potential ofthe clergy is considerable, though it is notat the point of open active resistance at thistime.9. Military Many officers of the 100,000 menKVP (Garrisoned People's Police) and thesmall naval and air contingents probably resent Soviet controls. They enjoy preferent ialtreatment but as a group, their basic loyaltyto the regime is questionable. It is uncertainwhether the GDR regime could rely on themin time of war, especially i f the Communistssuffered reverses, but there is probably lessresentment in this group than in any otherin the GDR, and their resistance potential islikely to be limited. The morale of enlistedmen is low. The general popular disaffectionis shared by most ~ o l d i e r s many of whomhave been pressured into service against theirwill. In spite of some improvement of theirliving conditions during 1954 most of themare probably not loyal to the regime andwould side with the West i f given opportunity.10. Youth Groups The regime has madestrenuous efforts to control ~ indoctrinateyouth. There are indications of support forthe regime by some young people, but manyhave become indifferent or disillusioned. Theinfluence of parents, older w o r k e r ~ . and nonCommunist teachers, and the nearness of theWest still milita te against success of the Communist youth program. In most cases, theattitude of East German youth is one of opportunism. Although the majority of EastGerman youth almost certainly is not yetloyal to the Communist regime, it has madelittle or no efforts to resist the regime. Arelatively small group of more mature youngpeople may eventually constitute a resistancepotential but just as many will probably become Communist enthusiasts unless theirchances for better living improve greatly.


18/32

DECL SSIFIED Authority NND 947 3

INTENSITY OF RESISTANCE11. Despite the great extent of disaffectionin the GDR, with the single exception of the17 June 1953 uprisings it expressed itself onlyin defection, transmission of intelligence, passive resistance (without risk involved), antiregime propaganda activities, and apathy.Although unrest was growing before June1953, the intervention of the Soviet Army inthe June uprisings, the lack of expected helpfrom the West, and lack of progress toward reunification weakened East German hopes foran early liberation and led to a more passiveattitude. The failure of the 17 June uprisings resulted in the arrest or flight to the Westof many actual or potential resistance leadersand made it clear to those who remained thata successful uprising against the regime isimpossible so long as the Soviet Army controlsEast Germany. Some improvement in livingconditions and such political concessions asmore freedom of travel between East and WestGermany, as well as East German reluctanceto take risks against overwhelming odds, havecontrived to keep resistance predominanUypassive.12. However, the feasibility of access to theGDR from West Berlin and West Germanyhas facilitated the organization of some resistance groups operating from these areas.These groups encourage cautious covert resistance activities; their main objects areantiregime propaganda, keeping files of persons in Communist prisons and assistingfamilies of the prisoners, keeping track ofcrimes committed by the Communists, keeping alive the spirit of resistance, and gathering as much information as possible. Theydiscourage, however, overt active resistancewhich stands little chance of escaping harshretaliation.RESIST NCE POTENTIAL UNDER COLD WARCONDITIONS13. While rearmament of West Germanywould almost certainly raise East Germanhopes for eventual liberation from Communist

17

rule, strengthened GDR police controls, andSoviet help i t necessary, will probably forestallany attempt at open resistance. So long as theUSSR maintains sizeable forces in East Germany, resistance will almost certainly remainlimited to intelligence collection, antiregimepropaganda dissemination, and defection.The East Germans realize that the steadilyimproving infiltration methods of the regime ssecurity organs render attempts at organization in GDR territory extremely dangerous.They probably also realize (after June 1953that under present conditions tangible Western help for large-scale resistance will not beforthcoming during the cold war period.RESIST NCE POTENTIAl UNDER WARTIME

CONDITIONS14. The outbreak of a general war probablywould not lead to organized resistance at once,although (depending upon the location ofbattle fronts and the fortunes of war) therewould probably be an increase in isolated actsof sabotage and violence. But so long as Soviet power remained unimpaired, savage retaliation for any act of resistance, coupledwith a limited number of areas offering concealment, would make organized resistancevirtually impossible. Active resistance on anextensive scale would almost certainly not beinitiated until Communist controls appearedto be weakening or breaking down as a resultof Soviet defeats and the proximity of Western forces.15. f East Germany became a combat area,many of those East German forces whichcould do so would probably seek to join theWest in fighting the Bloc. Furthermore, ifmilitary operations were in progress withinthe GDR, organized resistance groups almostcertainly would supply information, disruptSoviet communications, sabotage war material, and assist Western soldiers in escapeand evasion on a scale measured by Westernsuccesses. On the other hand, Western defeats would immediately lead to a reductionin East German resistance activities.

Il


19/32

DECLASSIFIED Authority NND 947 3E C i t i ~ 18

ANNEX E:BASIC CAUSES OF DISSIDENCE1 Dissidence, which is very widespread inHungary, has its roots in economic discontent,deeply entrenched nationalism, traditionalwestern orientations, historical and psychological antagonism toward Slavs, and strongRoman Catholic religious heritage (two-thirdsof the Hungarians are Catholic). Dissidence. is aggravated by recollection of the 1919 BelaKun Communist regime which included Ra-kosi, Gero, and other current leaders, by dislike of Communism on the part of all agegroups, and by antagonism toward neighboring Satellites which have acquired formerHungarian territories. The inadequate stand-ard of living is probably the most importantcause of dissidence. Work norms are high,wages are low housing is poor, and food isscarce. The people resent regimentation,compulsory. political activities, and the lackof leisure time. They also resent the oppressive police state system which is maintainedby the state security apparatus, by the civilpolice, and by the presence of two Soviet divisions. Apathy and cynicism are widespread.M JOR DISSIDENT ELEMENTS2. The peasantry with the exception of a relatively small number of collective farm members who were formerly landless, representsthe largest single focus of opposition to theCommunist regime. The concessions introduced by the so-called new course in 1953have done little to alleviate peasant complaints. In spite of the financial and socialhardships connected with such action, aboutone-half of the approximately 515,000 peas-ants in collectives took advantage of the regime's offer to withdraw if they so desired.Moreover, the continuation of the newcourse is uncertain.3 .The majority of industrial workers someof whom were among the few original supporters of Communism, now constitute a major dissident element. A low living standard

HUNGARYpoor working conditions, the perversion oflabor unions into instruments of the regime,the constant pressure for more productionwithout adequate incentives, harsh labor dis-cipline, and the regime's poor showing inlabor protection and welfare have made theproletariat a potential resistance elementrather than the spearhead of revolution.4. Youth. One of the most conspicuous failures of the regime has been its inability tosecure the firm support of youth. By its ownadmission, the principal youth movement(DISZ) is plagued by a general apathy toward Party work, which retards the recruitingof future intellec'tual cadres for Communism.Open criticism of this organization has beenrising steadily since 1952 and the newcourse has so far failed to meet this situation.The majority of students in high and technical schools and universities remain negative orindifferent toward Communism.5. Military. Considerable resistance potentialis believed to exist within the Hungarianarmed forces. Their loyalty is generally questionable, except for higher officers who havethe greatest stake in the regime. The AirForce is believed to be predominantly loyal.However, since the majority of young armyofficers are recruited from rural areas, theyalmost certainly share those antiregime atti-tudes which make the peasantry the greatestfocus of dissidence. The rank-and-file of thearmy, who have none of the officers' privileges,have even less reason for allegiance. Sovietcontrol of the Hungarian Army contributes toanimosity and disaffection as does forciblealliance with neighboring Satellites who areancient enemies. This resistance potentialof the armed forces, however, cannot be realized unless a marked deterioration of the regime's control system takes place.6. The clergy both Catholic and Protestant,no longer show open defiance of the regime.They do, however, exercise considerable influence among the people and, despite their lack

8:SORB l


20/32

DECLASSIFIED Authority NND 947 3~ E O R S T 19

of aggressive leadership, maintain some covertand sporadic opf>osition. The clergy arecautious and adroit in the use of the "between-the-lines" technique in sermons andstatements. The government-sponsored National Peace Committee of Catholic Priests hasrepeatedly admitted failure in propagandizingCommunism. B u ~ while the clergy's resistance p o ~ n t i a l especially in the provinces,remains strong at present, it is bound to decrease as more and more clergy are replacedby Coin Ilunist supporters.INTENSITY OF RESIST NCE7. Hungary's recent history, including WorldWar II, abounds with resistance incidents,but no broad resistance movement emergedand no local groups achieved lasting success.During the Germa.n occupation, sporadic actsof sabotage were committed against the Axispowers. The much more effective Soviet control system has restricted Hungarian resistance to passive, unorganized manifestations.Other factors, such as physically and psychologically exhausting work norms, materialwant and compulsory political activities havefurther discouraged active resistance.8 However, passive resistance in Hungaryappears to have been more widespread andeffective than elsewhere in the Satellites. Al:-though existing controls preclude open uprisings, intensified passive resistance by industrial and agricultural workers is impedingthe regime's efforts to build a strong andviable economy.EMIGRE GROUPS9 There are three main Hungarian emigreorganizations: the Hungarian National Council in New York, General Andras Zako'sLeague of Hungarian Veterans with headquarters in Innsbruck, and the HungarianLiberation Movement, led by General FerencKisbarnaki-Farkas, with headquarters inMunich. The leadership of the latter twogroups was merged in 1954 Although it ispossible that these emigre groups have beenin touch with elements of unknown reliabilityinside Hungary, it is unlikely that they have,s sometimes claimed, organized any significant resistance rtovements. Information

which they have gathered has proved ofdubious value. Moreover, the political disunity and the controversial background ofmany of their leaders has almost certainlydiscredited these emigre groups in the eyesof resisters inside Hungary. Besides the abovementioned emigre groups, there also existsa numerically small but well-organized groupof extreme rightists under General ArpadHenney, consisting of fanatical Nazi-type activists, most of whom were members or supporters of the so-called Arrow Cross Partyduring World War II. This group will notcooperate with Western powers unless itsconditions are met; its political ideology,somewhat camouflaged, runs so counter toWestern concepts as to make its successfulintegrat ion in to a general resistance movement unlikely. There is some evidence thatYugoslavia has had limited success with clandestine operations to propagate Titoism inHungary.RESIST NCE POTENTIAL UNDER COLD WAR

CONDITIONS10 Effective internal security control and lackof know-how will continue to limit the development of organized resistance, active or passive. Cold war activities, at best, will probablyremain restricted to information collection,clandestine antiregime propaganda, isolatedacts of sabotage, and unorganized passive resistance. Poor terrain impedes the formationof nuclei for future guerrilla operations; thedevelopment of contacts for escape and evasion w:ould be difficult, even on a local level.Further factors militating against an activeresistance build-up are: the vigilance of thepolice, the presence of Soviet troops, lack ofexperienced resistance leaders, lack of contact with Western agencies that could guideand help them, and the absence of a welldeveloped security consciousness. However,Hungarian capabilities for unorganized passive resistance, especially in industry andagriculture, will remain substantial.RESIST NCE POTENTIAL UNDER WARTIME

CONDITIONS11 Under conditions of open warfare, Communist security measures would almost cer-

8EJ9iREJ f


21/32


OEORET 20be so greatly increased that no signifi

had won major victories in Europe.event of such victories, passive resistandattempted possibly with theitary or police elements.be increased popto assist in escape and evadefections would become more nurnHowever, premature guerrilla warsabotage would t?e likely to provokenature which would retard, ithe development of effective re

I f Western military success broughta deterioration of the Hungarian state

and security apparatus resistance activitieswould almost certainly sharply increase.Their scope and effectiveness would dependupon the extent of Western aid, the ability toestablish communications, and the degree ofweakness in the state security controls. Assist :ance to Western forces probably would takethe form of organized support of escape andevasion operations, information collection,psychological warfare, sabotage and, possibly,limited guerrilla warfare. The most likelysources of defection under such circumstanceswould be: a) anny enlisted personnel; b)the mass of political prisoners; c) the un-reconciled intelligentsia; d) peasants and industrial workers in areas near the Westernforces; and e) youth.


22/32

DECLASSIFIED Authority NND 947 3S E R H i f 21

ANNEX F:OF DISSIDENCE

After the USSR occupied Rumania at theof World War II, it quickly proceeded toNorthern Bukovina and Bessarabia,the 'non-Communist government,the King out of the country, and delepower to a puppet regime under absoluteAs a result the vast majorityRumanians, deprived of their Western conand of self-determination, have come tothat their country is virtually a Sovietony. They have almost certainly identifiedwith their traditional fear of

Moreover, Soviet economic exploita1944 has been so great that even arich in natural resources as Ruhad been chrori.ically in want. Warand the operation of Somixed companies placed aload on its economy. The sharplystandards which resulted areon Soviet exploitation. Adding tofear and resentment on thesethe brutal methods of a Communiststate have imposed an alien way of life.DISSIDENT ELEMENTSPeasantry. The violent opposition of thecomprising about 70 percent of thehas constrained the regime to proin collectivizing agriculture.

kulaks and small farmers but alsopeasants have resisted the process.questionable whether even the poor, landwho constitute 42 percent of thecan

to adopt the collective prine itself. By the regime's own admissionproduction is lower than beforewar. The kulaks and small farmers are

almost all the grain the countryand the regime has been unwi lfu:lg to

drastic steps in the face of their apparentThus the peasantry constitutes a

RUMANIA3 Industrial workers are worse off than thepeasants, who at least are able to dodgeforced deliveries and to acquire on the bhickmarket what is needed for their personal consumption. The urban and industrial population suffers from a depressed living standard,poor housing, food shortages, and other privations. Workers cannot obtain necessaryconsumer goods; they are forbidden to leavethei r jobs and are subject to constant politicalindoctrination and police surveillance. Thosewho supported the regime at the beginningof the Communist rule are becoming dis-illusioned, and a considerable passive resistance potential is accumulating.4 Youth . Large sections of Rumanian youthare opposed to the regune. Tradition, whichis strong in Rumania, together with the individualistic tendencies of youth, militateagainst acceptance of regimented life andCommunist group control techniques. Theregime has been far less successful in gainingthe loyalty of youth than it had expected.5 Military. Wlth the exception of thosehigher officers who are good Communists {orwho have survived the purges) and who havea stake in the regime's continuation, the reliability of the armed forces is questionable.Opportunism has been a predilection in Rumania, ingrained during centuries of forel nrule, and most of the officers are probablyopportunists. Enlisted men, coming mainlyfrom rural areas imbued with the antiregimefeeling, are almost certainly only bowing toforce. f the regime were to lose its grip onthe control apparatus and i f Soviet supervisionwere withdrawn, very few of the enlisted menwould prove reliable.6 InteUectuals clergymen national minori-ties In addition to the above, there are various lesser groups which might have considerable resistance potential. The intellectualand professional elements in particular havegenerally resisted Communist indoctrination.There is evidence that not enough Commu-


23/32

DECLASSIFIED Authority NND 947 38 E C R B i 22

teachers are available. Manythe professions and almost all offormer higher and middle classes, now detheir property and displaced socially,in tensely hostile tQ the regime. The topof the Orthodox Church has beenthe Moscow Patriand some of the leading anti-Soviet

h ~ v been eliminated, but thethe lower clergy and thepriests remain at heart anti-CommuThey constitute a considerable resistpotential, as do the clergymen of theand Uniate Church whose instituhave been virtual ly destroyed. Nationalparticularly the Hungarians, aredissatisfied, and indeed, would be

to any Rumanian government whichnot cater to their national aspirations.

AI though dissidence is strong in almost allRumanian society, including thethe government and Party,has steadily dein the past several years and appearsbe virtually extinct at present. Isolated inof active unorganized resistance areand are sometimes adby the Communists. Moreover, thehas not succeeded in eliminating pascontinues to express itin economic sabotage. However,resistance is not exclusively anti-Comin motivation, but reflects consideraof self-intereSt or frustration. Actseconomic sabotage such as absenteeism,

to machinery, occasionalgeneral negligence may or may not bemotivated. Whatever the motivathere does appear to be considerable re

and the over-allthe Communist program.adnptted by the regime.

King Mihal who could become a rallyingof the Rumanian emigration, appears

to accept factions of three exile parties aslegal representatives of the Rumanian people.Factional strife, however has greatly undermined their importance. The King is probably the only person who maintains a semblance of continuity of a non-Communist Rumanian government-in-exile. There is also agroup of left Socialists, and some Iron Guardists, who are opposed to a restoration of themonarchy. Evidence exists that the King isstill popular in Rumania, particularly amongthe peasantry, but the problem of non-Communist succession to the Communist regimewill probably remain a source of factionalstrife.9 Few, i f any, contacts seem to exist betweenthe emigres and the homeland. Communications are very precarious and censorship isrigid. All borders are closely guarded andpatrolled. Rumanian language broadcastsfrom the West are jammed; they appear tobe heard best in rural areas. Printed antiregime propaganda which has frequentlyreached Rumanians is reported to have encouraged sporadic manifestations of resistance.RESIST NCE POTENTIAL UNDER COLD WAR

CONDITIONS10 Under cold war conditions, such active resistance as may still exist can be expected todecline as the regime s security controls improve and as long as there is no clear indication of positive aid from the West. Nevertheless, there may be sporadic, disjointed guerrilla-type raids of no more than local significance, particularly from the less accessibleparts of Rumania. Passive resistance willprobably also continue in a variety of fonns,chiefly economic sabotage. At best, such activities will retard the implementation of theregime s political and economic program; atthe least, they will have a nuisance value,keeping numbers of reliable Communistsfrom performing more useful work.RESIST NCE POTENTIAL UNDER WARTIME

CONDITIONS11 In the event of open war, Rumanian security forces would almost .certainly be re-

8F:l8:RB f


24/32


d by Soviet troops. The resulting inminimize even passive resistance. Neverextent of active organized resistanceon the military situation in

the nearness of Westernthe help made available by the West,

3and the attitude of the Balkan act countries,notably Yugoslavia. There might be someattempts at defection to Yugoslavia, i thatcountry sided with the West. s Westerntroops approached Rumanian territory, guerrilla warfare against local Communists andSoviet units might tlare up even before West- -ern forces actually entered the country.


25/32


ANNEX G:

BASIC CAUSES OF DISSIDENCE1 Russia has a long history of resistance, butthe revolution of 1917 was the only successfulact of resistance in modern times resultingin the overtlllow of a government in power.It occurred only after the war had virtuallydestroyed central authority. The new Bolshevik leaders were careful to establish security controls strong enough to prevent anotherpopular revolt. Nevertheless, passive resistance continued. t showed great strengthduring the 1930 s when Stalin was forcingthrough collectivization of agriculture. Atthe beginning of Wor;ld War II mass desertions occurred and various national minoritieswere willing to collaborate with the Germansuntil harsh Nazi policies rebuffed them. Thecolossal devastation of World War II resultedin widespread discontent which necessitatedpowerful application of coercive measures.The most troublesome postwar areas provedto be those which the USSR had newly an-nexed: the Baltic States, the western partsof the Ukraine and Belorussia, and Moldavia.Partisan movements flourished in all theseareas, especially in the Baltic States and thewestern Ukraine, until mass deportations andpolice terror succeeded in subduing them.The continued strain mposed upon the Soviet people by Stalin s foreign and economicpolicies compelled the Politburo to retain mostof the wartime controls and even to strength-en some of them. However, by 1949, orderhad been restored throughout the country,and operations against the partisans in thetroubled areas had eliminated nearly all organized resistance.2 Many Soviet citizens; largely convinced bySoviet propaganda of the improvements sinceCzarist days, probably feel that their lot hasimproved. Moreover, a core of adherents ofCommunist ideology are willing to accept privations in its name. However, there appearsto be some degree of discontent and disaffection at nearly every level of Soviet society.This dissidence is not based so much upon op-

24

USSRposition to Communist ideology per se s uponneglect or denial by the Communist leadership of basic popular rights and needs. Poorliving condit ions probably constitute the mostsignificant cause. The apparent unwillingnessor inability of the Soviet Government to raisethe standard of living is exacerbated by theknowledge, acquired by millions of Sovietsoldiers during World War II, that things arebetter abroad. All-pervading fear of the policealso contributes greatly to dissidence as dothe social stratification, nepotism, and favoritism, which divide the ruling elements fromthe masses. Finally, antireligious campaignsand the Russification of the national minorities have created extensive resentment.DISTRIBUTION OF DISSIDENCE3. Peasantry Of all social groups, the peasants have suffered most under Soviet rule.Their living standard is the lowest, except forthat of the forced laborer. Soviet ruthless ness in collectivization and pressure for in -creased production have provoked strong hostility. The attempts by peasants to recovertheir status as individual land owners duringthe German occupation demonstrated theiropposition to the collective system. Continuedinsufficiency of agricultural production sincethe war is probably due in part to lack ofpeasant cooperation. The g o v m m n ~ hasmade a number of minor concessions to thepeasants but not enough to stimulate theircooperation or to overcome their oppositionto collectivism.4 Youth A considerable segment of Sovietyouth probably support the Soviet regime.Generally, they receive special considerationfrom the government. Their education and indoctrination are carefully supervised. Nevertheless, there are elements among the youthwhose loyalty is open to question. Amongthem are: (a) children of parents persecutedby the regime; (b) descendants of Czarist officialdom; (c) offspring of kulaks, of purgevictims and of inmates of forced labor camps;

SEEJRiill f


26/32


(d) the young men who have served in thearmed forces abroad and were able to compare their living standard with the muchhigher one outside the USSR; and (e) sometudents of higher educational institutions .

There have been persistent reports of anti-Communist organizations among universitystudents; such a group was uncovered at theuniversity of lvfoscow and allegedly at Kaunas.Constant admonitions in the Komsomol papers have denounced youth's flouting of Soviet taboos.5. National Minorities About 45 percent ofthe Soviet population consists of nationalminorities, some with a distinguished historyof their own. Russification of these minorities under the Tsars had little success. Initially the 3oJsheviks propagandized the constitutional and cult\lral autonomy of theircomponent republics and autonomous regions.After the war, possibly as a result of the poorshowing of loyalty to .the Soviet state duringthe German occupation by certain minorities,they sharply restricted cultural autonomy.Some minorities were, liquidated as such bydispersal of populations, and whatever auton-omy other minorities still enjoyed was virtu-ally ended by intensified Russification andSovietization. Consequently, disaffection wasrampant. OWing the first postwar years,200,000 partisans in the Ukraine and 100,000in Lithuania reportedly battled Soviet troops.By 1949, the back of the revolt was broken.But even now the Ukrainian Party Secretariatfinds it necessary to call publicly for vigilanceagainst infiltration by Ukrainian partisans.6. Repressed Elements The millions of Soviet citizens who have been sentenced toforced labor camps and exile in remote Siberian areas constitute a fairly important resistance potential. During World War llmany such individuals emerged as leaders ofcollaboration in German-occupied territories.Their hatred of the Soviet regime almost certainly transcends their patriotic feelings.Knowing this, the government keeps formerinmates of labor camps .under strict controls.There have been persistent rumors of uprisings by forced laborers, supposed to haveoccurred between 1948. and 1951. In the

25

summer of 1953, strikes occurred at theVorkuta and Norilsk camps in the Far Northof Siberia. While the uprisings, from all accounts, were nonpolitical, they speak for thedesperation of these repressed elements.7. InteUectual s n spite of the preferred position of intellectuals in Soviet society, -ideological controls and restriction of their freedom to create have probably led to accumu- lated resentment. As a result, quite a fewintellectuals have withdrawn into themselves,refused to study Marxism, and turned to insignificant fields where Party control is lesspronounced. Except for a few Communistfanatics, those artists and scientists who findthemselves frustrated by Party ukases tellingthem what is correct, appear to be conforming outwardly while inwardly resisting. How-ever, before a breakdown in Soviet controlsthey will almost certainly maintain sufficientconformity to avoid losing their material advantages.8. Industrial Workers There is frequent evidence of discontent among the mass of factory workers. The very low living standardconstant pressure for production under un-favorable conditions, lack of freedom of movement, and harsh labor discipline have almost certainly caused widespread discontent.While there has been a slight increase in foodand consumer goods in recent years, it is notnearly enough to satisfy the workers. Moreover, the promises of increased consumergoods since Stalin's death, have recently beende-emphasized.9. Armed Forces In general the armed forcesconstitute a bulwark of the reginle ratherthan a threat to it. Over-all morale is considered to be sufficiently high to insure thereliability of the armed forces, although thereare many reports of low morale in individualinstances. The officers, especially in the higher ranks, are a favored economic group. However, the Kronstadt mutiny (1921), the purgesin the late 1930's, the low morale of the RedArmy at the beginning of World War II, massdesertions and the establishment of a resistance army under Vlasov in German-occupiedterritory, and the persistant postwar defections in Germany and Austria have caused the

IH J 8 R il 'f'


27/32

DECLASSIFIED Authority NND 947 38ECHI3 * 26

Soviet Government to take extraordinary precautions, including police and Party surveillance, and virtual isolation of troops fromnative populat ions in occupied territories. Afew defections to the West are still occurring.Harsh discipline, a wide cleavage between offi-cers and men, inescapable indoctrination andsurveillance by an allprevading informer system create d\scontent in the service and tendto decrease the value of its material advantages of clothing, shelter, and food. Moralein the Soviet Navy and Air Forces appears tobe higher than that in the Army.INTENSITY OF RESIST ANCE10 Although some dissidence exists at nearlyevery level of Soviet society, the regime hassucceeded in establishing such pervasive authority that the p e o p ~ e are forced to devotetheir energies to coping with the system ratherthan to conceiving an alternative solution ortaking steps to achieve such a solution. Extensive resistance, such as occurred in thenewly acquired terntories after the end ofWorld War II, had virtually ceased to exist by1950. The strikes anq riots reported in FarNorthern labor camps may not have reflectedpolitical motivation and in any case werequickly suppressed. Whether indications ofpassive resistance in .agriculture, industry,and the lower bureaucracy are not merely ademonstration of time-honored Russian indifference or apathy caimot be estimated withany confidence. n sum, the gulf betweendissidence and resistance in the USSR is farwider than elsewhere in the Bloc (except possibly in Communist China).EMIGRE GROUPS11 Numerous emigre organizations claim torepresent Russians and national minorities.Of these, the Solidarists (NTS) Grea t Russians - are the largest and most important.Some former Vlasov adherents and numbersof recent defectors have joined this movement. Whenever emigre groups knownby Soviet defectors or by listeners to Russianlanguage broadcasts, it 1s the NTS which appears to have the pre-eminent place.

12 According to defector reports, there islittle or no awareness among the Soviet peopleof the present activities of emigre groups.Defectors who admit familiarity with thesegroups acquired their knowledge in Germanyand Austria. However, there are likely to besome memories from the war when manyemigre groups, particularly the NTS, were active not only in German-occupied Soviet territory but also among the millions of Russiansdeported to Germany for forced labor. Moreover, the Soviet press itself keeps such memories alive by occasional attacks on the emigremo.vement. During the early postwar years,there were some contacts between emigregroups and partisan groups in western areasof the USSR. Some tenuous connections maystill exist but are almost certainly negligible.The Soviet security apparatus has pacifiedthe new Western territories and deportedmany of the inhabitants, partially replacingthem with Great Russians. Some slight contacts may still exist between the West andmembers of the former Uniate Church in theUkraine which was forcibly amalgamated withthe Russian Orthodox Church in the late1940's.13 The minority emigre organizations are notnow in a position to gain the sympathy of theGreat Russians to any appreciable extent.The peoples of the recently incorporatedareas, especially in the Baltic States and theWestern Ukraine, may for a while be inclinedto look to emigre organizations for support.But in those national minority areas whichhave long been under Soviet rule the Ukraine,Georgia, Byelo-Russia, etc.), the people wouldalmost certainly feel, like the Great Russians,that the emigres have been away from theirhomeland so long that they have lost theirgrasp of Soviet realities. The people wouldalso resent what they believe to be the emigres' luxur ious living in the West. and arestil l disillusioned over the connection of someemigre organizations with the Nazi regime.They probably are unaware of any acceptablepolitical alternative to Soviet Communism.On the other hand, the Soviet Government itself has given signs of apprehension lest emigre groups be used for infiltration purposesand has indicated fear of their organization

S BOR B f


28/32

DECLASSIFIED Authority NND 947003

and propaganda. This was demonstrated inthe Khokhlov and other cases, where they didnot shrink from elaborately preparmg themurder of an emigre leader. Another aspectof the effort to neutralize emigre groups isthe Soviet attempt to encourage emigres toreturn, promismg them good treatment.RESISTANCE POTENTIAl UNDER COlD WAR

CONDITIONS14 Under continued cold war conditions, active resistance against the Soviet system ishighly unlikely unless the regime s securityapparatus becomes serlously weakened. Somedegree of passive resistance will probably continue, ranging from camouflaged disobedienceof Party rules to agricultural and mdustrialsabotage. t may also be expressed in cynicalattitudes toward the regime, attempts tolisten to Western broadcasts, lack of interestin working for the objectives of the government, and defection.RESISTANCE POTENTIAL UNDER WARTIME

CONDITIONS15 In the event of general war securitywould be tightened, virtually all people wouldbe employed in the defense effort, and patri-otic appeals would be launched. We are un-able to estimate the extent of or the impacton resistance potential of such factors as: (a)Western military action; (b) the popular psychological reactions to such actions; or (c)the regime s ability to :portray the war as apatriotic and e f e n s i v e ~ one.

27

16 In the event of major Soviet reverses,some mass defections from the army mightoccur, particularly among members of minority groups. f the war were prolonged andhostilities carried to Soviet soil, chances forresistance activities would probably improve,and an invading army might meet withcautious, but at least partially sympathetic,response as soon at it became evident thatNazi methods of occupation would not be repeated. In such a situation, anti-Communistpartisans particularly in the minority areas,could probably be induced to fight their Soviet masters. Nevertheless, even if hardpressed on the mil itary fronts, the Soviet leaders would make a determined effort to maintain sufficient control in the hinterland toprevent resistance elements from becomingactive behind their lines. Moreover, in eventof an impending collapse of the Soviet Government anti-Soviet elements of the population, together with labor camp inmates andforced exiles, could attain significant resistance capabilities. Aside from such groups,resistance among the broad masses of theGreat Russian population would be difficultto organize. Patriotism, indoctrinated respectfor Soviet authority, or apathy probably wouldrender them passive and disinclined to activeopposition. Unless the security apparatuswere seriously weakened, little activity couldbe expected from the mass of the GreatRussian population beyond local harassingoperations, help to Western personnel in es-cape or evasion, dissemination of antiregimepropaganda, limited intelligence activities,and defections.

fH l 0 f t l i


29/32

I DECLASSIFIED Authority NND 947003O ORIST 28

ANNEX H: NORTH VIETNAMCAUSES OF DISSIDENCE MAJOR DISSIDENT ELEMENTS

In the past, the main P,olitical factors whichill-will toward the DemocraticID ,RV) have been: im-

of personiu freedoms, terroristic policeand religious~ n f i u e n c e of the unChinese. More recently disaffectionarisen from the transition to peace of athe absorptionand :large cities) whichincreasingly feeling the weight of Comoppression; and from resentmentthe DRV for ha,ving sanctioned, attemporarily, the divf.sion of the country.hostility has alSo been created byeconomic factors as:: (a) heavy tax burwhich deprive peasants of their surplusprevent merchants from accumulating(b) land reform ~ e a s u r e s displacingnumbers of families .and creating severe

ation of the currency; and (e) occasionalrice shortages in certain areas. Livingin DRV territocy have always beenbut they are now even worse, and therelittle chance for a speedy improvement.Recent DRV measures, including the,n French installain North Vietnam, and the Communist

i f implesomewhat allevi'ate the economicnow reportedly :prevailing in DRVhas beenced to some e*tent by the followfactors: (a) the p r s t i ~ accruing to theas the result of its long successful warthe French; (b) its posture as a strongand determined government; and the popular appeal of the regime's vigornationalism. The regime's identificationI

not recognized by the mass of the as a Communist tactic, and may confor some time to counteract popular

3. The Catholics numbering some one andone-half million (of whom, however, at least500,000 will have left for the south beforeMay 1955}, are probably the largest potentialresistance element in North Vietnam. f theDRV honors its promise of religious tolerance,they may resign themselves to passive cooperation with the regime. U however, there-gime should decide to take strong measuresagainst Catholic leaders and organizations,the Catholics might be provoked into strongeropposition.4. Ethnic minorities numbering ~ b o u t oneand one-half million, oppose domination bythe Vietnamese Communists but their resistance is ineffective. The DRV is now establishing autonomous administrative areasfor larger ethnic minorities under Communistcontrol, such as the one million Thai tribesmen; the same policy may also be applied tothe Nungs, Muongs, Meos, Mans, and Thos.The resistance potential of these tribes is low,since they have no cohesion, leadership, orunity of purpose.5. The peasants will almost certainly remaindissatisfied unless the regime can alleviatetheir grievances. However; no more thanpassive resistance can be expected so long sthe regime exerciSes pervasive political andpolice controls.6. The dispossessed elements among whomcan be counted non-Communist Chinese, remnants of non-Communist political groups,merchants, and landlords, are, of course,highly dlsaffected and, given an opportunity,would participate in resistance activities. Inview of the regime's very tight security controls, however, these elements will almost certainly be gradually liquidated.INTENSITY OF RESISTANCE7. Incomplete information, paucity of intelligence sources, and the fluidity of the presentsituation virtually preclude an accurate estimate of the character and intensity of re-

B lSRfil't'


30/32

DECLASSIFIED Authority NN 947 3S E O R ~ 29

sistance within DRV territory. Prior to theGeneva agreement there were indications ofan anti-Viet Minh potential caused chieflyby Communist terrorism and persecution, andby fe

anti communist resistance potential in the sino soviet bloc

Documents