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Annexes

ContentsAnnex B – Country context: China........................................................................................................................13

Annex C – Country context: Colombia..................................................................................................................15

Annex D – Country context: Mexico.....................................................................................................................17

Annex E – Vivid Economics: TA in demand in priority countries...........................................................................20

Annex F – Commercial opportunities...................................................................................................................21

Annex G – Market Engagement............................................................................................................................23

Annex H – Vivid Economics: Principles for Transformational Climate Technical Assistance.................................27

Annex I – Summary of lessons learned and stakeholder discussions...................................................................28

Annex K – Rationale for components...................................................................................................................32

Annex L – Learning Strategy.................................................................................................................................38

Annex M – Full Risk Assessment...........................................................................................................................40

Annex N – Appraisal case.....................................................................................................................................46

Annex P – VfM measures by programme component..........................................................................................56

Annex Q – Finance flows through delivery partners.............................................................................................59

Annex R – Financial Profile year by year...............................................................................................................60

Annex S – Programme components, role for BEIS and role for contractor..........................................................61

Annex U – Roles and responsibilities of governance groups................................................................................67

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Annex B – Country context: China

China is the world’s largest emitter of greenhouse gasses. The country currently produces 27% of global CO₂ emissions, which is more than that of the US and EU combined. China is also the world’s largest producer and consumer of coal, accounting for 50.6% of the world’s coal consumption in 2016. The pace of China’s low carbon transition will therefore be key to meeting the objectives of the Paris Climate Change Agreement.

China is at a crucial stage of maintaining steady economic growth and promoting structural adjustments. Meanwhile, green development and ecological civilization have come to the forefront as key national strategic objectives. However, as environmental externalities are still yet to be internalized, China is faced with major challenges in restraining polluting investments, attracting sufficient private investments to green sectors and promoting the leveraging effect of government funds as part of its efforts to achieve sustainable development.

President Xi Jinping and the State Council, the top decision making body in the country, have committed to this agenda adding greater impetus to development of the market in China. Rapid growth of the green finance market in China would have a global impact, but it is not risk free. Despite impressive trends and great global interest in development of green finance, capacity, training and knowledge are also in short supply. China is in urgent need of information, tools and best practices in order to enact appropriate green financial policies and in particular to ensure that standards in China align with, rather than undercut, global standards. There is also a need to build greater commercial momentum behind green finance investment. Green investment still makes up a small proportion of total investment in China and is still largely seen through the lens of corporate social responsibility or political expediency.

Meeting China’s environmental commitments and addressing above challenges cannot be delivered through public funds alone. For example, China is spearheading the Belt & Road Initiative as a means to close the infrastructure gap across Asia, which the Asia Development Bank estimates at $1tn a year to 2020. China’s domestic policy banks, private banks and construction firms will play a key role in delivering this initiative in third countries, though private capital is essential to ensure such players adhere to high environmental standards of infrastructure development, including through green finance tools, to enable the sustainable development of new infrastructure in Asia.

Over the past three years, green finance has become a major area of UK–China collaboration. This is the result of an accumulation of embassy Prosperity Fund projects, strong backing from HMT, leadership at the G20 through co-chairmanship of the G20 green finance study group by the Bank of England and People’s Bank of China (PBOC), and thought leadership through a partnership between the City of London Green Finance Initiative and People’s Bank of China Green Finance Committee. These initiatives have leveraged and further catalysed private sector interest in green finance products. China’s green bond market has grown at pace from $1bn in 2015 to $36bn last year, and PBoC forecasts it could reach $400bn by 2019/20. London has also been a leading global centre for green bond issuance, and the London Stock Exchange has hosted China’s first ever offshore green bond RMB and RMB covered bond issuances.

The UK sees green finance as essential to achieving both the UK’s domestic clean growth ambitions and the international commitment to unlock the trillions needed for the global transition to a resilient low carbon economy. China’s move on green finance has strategic benefits for the UK. Greening Chinese financial markets is a prerequisite to a low carbon transition and reduced carbon emissions.

Over the past six years the UK has provided more than £2m to China for Green Finance Technical Assistance through the Prosperity Fund. Having successfully supported research and activities in green bond, green index, environment disclosure, green cities development as well as G20 green finance study group, the UK has played a leading role in working jointly with China to put green finance on the heart of the UK-China collaboration. China recognises the UK’s strengths across all financial sectors and is eager to partner with and learn from UK expertise and experience to develop its own market potential. Having helped put green finance on the agenda in China, the

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This TA programme will be originated and managed by post in Beijing. Key priorities for a technical assistance programme include improving methodologies to assess environmental risk, reinforce legal definitions of what constitutes a green financial product and standardise legal documents, improve information disclosure on performance of green assets, develop more complex and innovative financial products and practice models, capacity building both domestically at regional/city levels and internationally (particularly along the BRI) to ensure sustainable impacts, and raise awareness amongst policy makers and financial institutions around the potential of the green finance market.

The successful delivery of the green finance programme in China will also give the ICF team an opportunity to replicate such TA approaches in other MICs, for which we know that there is an increasing global demand. As well as strengthening the relationship between the UK and China in this important trade and growth area, we expect that this activity will enable us to build a network of green finance practitioners and stakeholders, and inform the design of potential green finance interventions with other countries in time.

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Annex C – Country context: Colombia

Colombia submitted its Nationally Determined Contribution (NDC) to the United Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change – UNFCCC in September 2015. It includes a mitigation commitment to reduce greenhouse gas (GHG) emissions by 20% by 2030, with respect to the projected Business-as-Usual Scenario (BAU). Subject to the provision of international support, Colombia could increase its ambition from 20% to 30% by 2030, with respect to BAU. It also includes both adaptation and means of implementation (MoI) sections, including a south-south cooperation commitment by which Colombia could share its climate change experiences with other developing countries.

Colombia’s mitigation commitment must be implemented with the joint collaboration of the following sectoral Ministries:

Ministry of Mines and Energy Ministry of Trade, Industry and Tourism Ministry of Housing, City and Territory Ministry of Transport Ministry of Agriculture and Rural Development Ministry of Environment and Sustainable Development

This is in line with Colombia’s National Development Plan for the period 2014-2018 that mentions the need to advance in intersectoral actions towards the development of a green growth strategy, aligned with commitments included in the NDC.

Within the framework of Colombia’s National Climate Change System (SISCLIMA), in February 2016 sectoral Ministries received a Presidential mandate to identify policies and/or measures to achieve Colombia’s mitigation commitment, with the support of the Colombian Low Carbon Development Strategy (ECDBC), the Ministry of Environment and Sustainable Development (MADS) and the National Development Department (DNP).

This includes the prioritisation of different mitigation actions in relevant sectors, including energy, forests, agriculture, transport, housing and industry. Specific relevant actions with the highest mitigation potential include: expansion of mass transport systems’ networks; electricity generation with a broader participation of renewable energy; reduction of fugitive emissions in the mining, oil and gas sectors; Nationally Appropriate Mitigation Actions (NAMAs) on bovine cattle raising and on domestic refrigeration; commercial forest plantations; replacing inefficient stoves by efficient wood stoves; as well as reduced deforestation and forest restoration.

This prioritisation exercise is the result of a series of meetings and sectoral workshops led by MADS and DNP in 2017, with the support of the NDC Partnership (NDCP) where Colombia participates as one of its first country members.

DNP has performed a series of studies to find out what would be the costs to implement the mitigation component of Colombia’s NDC. One of the most relevant findings is the need for Colombia to increase its mitigation annual investments by approximately £575 million (0.27% of 2016 Colombia’s GDP) to meet the goal of reducing emissions by 20% by 2030. Total annual investments are estimated at approximately £775 million (0.35% of 2016 Colombia’s GDP), of which 38% would be contributed by the public sector (approximately £300 million) and 62% by the private sector (approximately £475 million).

With respect to adaptation, the Colombian Government has advanced on the development of territorial and sectoral adaptation plans. However, there are still challenges to finalise or improve sectoral adaptation plans for agriculture, mining, energy, health, housing, transport, trade, industry and tourism. Other adaptation measures of Colombia’s NDC have also made significant progress, including the creation of new protected areas, protection of “paramos” (high mountain Andean ecosystems) that provide most of Colombia’s water for human consumption and for different economic activities, among others.

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Colombia also recently committed in the context of the One Planet Summit to work in the elaboration of its long-term low GHG emission climate resilient development strategy well ahead of 2020, in accordance with Article 4, paragraph 19, of the Paris Agreement. This commitment is in line with work already done for the implementation of Colombia’s NDC.

Both MADS and DNP currently co-chair the Intersectoral Commission on Climate Change (CICC) 1, which is the ministerial level forum under SISCLIMA where decisions on Colombia’s NDC implementation are formally adopted, among other relevant climate change issues (currently DNP holds the Secretariat of CICC).

It is worth mentioning that UK’s environmental work relates to the peace process in Colombia given the direct links between the causes of conflicts and the current environmental problems across the country. This includes deforestation, unsustainable rural development, lack land property rights, and lack of presence of the State in remote areas of ecological importance due to strong presence of armed actors in the rural landscape of Colombia).

Although the UK is already heavily investing the peace process, supporting specific points of the Peace Agreement through technical assistance (e.g. sustainable rural development) will help to decrease deforestation rates, improve livelihoods in territories and enable the presence of the State to create conditions that can support ICF climate objectives.

In this context, Colombia has different areas of technical assistance demand to meet its international commitments on climate change mitigation. TA should focus on existing sectoral priorities and actions assigned to different ministries by the CICC. Currently there are 43 priority mitigation actions, out of which 33 have quantified emission reduction impacts. These priority actions are in line with Colombia’s Sectoral Mitigation Action Plans (PAS) developed under Colombia’s Low Carbon Development Strategy. The PAS cover electric energy, hydrocarbons, mines, agriculture and rural development, transport, waste and wastewaters, housing and territorial development, and industry. Deforestation, which contributes a significant share of Colombia’s emissions, is a crosscutting issue to be tackled by all sectors and regions. Moreover MADS and DNP have identified climate finance and MRV as crosscutting issues for all sectors.

Based on work MADS and DNP have already done with the NDC Partnership, technical assistance to meet prioritised mitigation actions will require at least five priority areas of support:

Long-term climate strategies and vision Developing pipelines of bankable projects Private sector investments mobilization Human capacity development Alignment of NDCs with the Sustainable Development Goals (SDGs)

1 The CICC was created by Decree 298 of 2016, which established the SISCLIMA. The CICC is the ministerial level forum under SISCLIMA to coordinate and give guidance on the implementation of Colombia’s Climate Change National Policy. Its current members are: Minister of Environment, Minister of Interior, Minister of Finance, Minister of Agriculture, Minister of Mines and Energy, Minister of Transport, Minister of Foreign Affairs and Director of National Planning Department

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Annex D – Country context: Mexico

A) WHY THIS INTERVENTION IS IMPORTANT IN YOUR COUNTRY? (CONTEXT)

Mexico has been recognized for its leadership, commitment and ambition, both at national and international levels in fighting climate change. Mexico was the first developing country in having a General Law on Climate Change, and the second globally, after the UK, and has subsequently developed a series of policy instruments, becoming not only a global player in the field, but a regional leader for its robust and innovative national climate change architecture. This institutional structure contemplates policy instruments like the Mid Century Climate Change Strategy, a Special Climate Change Programme, a National Emission Registry, National Climate Change Fund, among other instruments framed in a National Climate Change System.

Mexico’s promising national climate context has been reinforced through its active role and high commitment in the international arena. Mexico is the only developing country to have submitted already five National Communications and six National Greenhouse Gas Inventories to the United Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change (UNFCCC). Furthermore, it was also the first developing country to submit its Intended Nationally Determined Contribution for greenhouse gas reductions under the Paris Accord, establishing legal binding targets of reduction.

Our close relationship with Mexico has derived in successful collaborative schemes between both countries, as outlined in the following examples:

UK support was instrumental in getting Mexico’s General Law on Climate Change passed in October 2012. The UK was the only country in the world with a Climate Change Law, in this sense, its collaboration with Mexico to facilitate the law development process, through a sharing experience mechanism assisted by the international network of parliamentarians GLOBE.

The UK has also contributed supporting the development and implementation of Climate Change Action Plans (CCAPs) in some states and municipalities of Mexico during the present government´s administration.

In 2013, MEXICO2 was created as a cost-effective voluntary greenhouse gas (GHG) emissions mitigation mechanism for companies willing to contribute to the national efforts pledged under the General Law on Climate Change. This project was funded by the British Embassy and implemented by SIF ICAP to support the development of an online carbon platform, which will eventually evolve towards a fully operational Mexican carbon market.

The NAMA Facility, a joint initiative of the German BMUB and BEIS, has funded the develop of a Housing NAMA in Mexico, which promotes cost-effective, energy-efficient building concepts across the housing sector with a particular focus on low-income housing.

Between 2014 and 2015, the UK Embassy worked together with the Ministries of Energy (SENER) and Finance (SHCP) and Mexico´s Bank Association (ABM) to design a financial mechanism to leverage wider participation of commercial banks in the financing of low carbon infrastructure.

Since 2016, the Embassy is supporting the development of a green bonds market to finance adaptation and mitigation projects through capital markets. A steering committee, including institutions such as the Mexican Stock Exchange (BMV), ABM, HSBC, BID, and the Ministry of Environment (SEMARNAT) has been created for this purpose.

Following Mexico’s announcement of their Intended Nationally Determined Contribution climate (now NDC) ahead of UNFCCC COP21, the Embassy funded a project implemented by E3G to develop a financing strategy for a successful implementation of Mexico´s NDC.

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The Climate Finance Accelerator, hosted by the UK Government, City of London’s Green Finance Initiative and the Moroccan Presidency of COP22 with support from BEIS, International Climate Finance, among other institutions, has brought together policy makers from various countries, including Mexico, with private sector financiers to identify financing propositions for projects aligning with NDC needs.

However, despite the progress achieved, Mexico still faces challenges to meet its (conditional or non-conditional) NDC commitments and to ensure a sustainable clean growth in the country in areas like:

Strengthening crosscutting schemes of coordination and collaboration amongst all levels government to ensure an effective national climate governance.

Developing innovative financial mechanisms to overcome market barriers and accelerate mobilization of private capital at scale in order to achieve Mexico’s NDC targets and develop greener and cleaner markets.

Building institutional and technical capacities, particularly at the subnational level in climate matters.

Encouraging research and technical innovation for a number of key areas like energy, transport, waste management, among others.

But this high scale and long-term intervention will also bring clear windows of opportunity for UK in terms of:

Showcasing and inspiring successful cooperation schemes in key countries like Mexico, emphasizing UK’s skills, expertise, leadership and potential partner of choice.

Increasing UK’s visibility and ensuring continuity of successful cooperation between both countries after presidential elections and the establishment of a new administration.

Ensuring Mexico’s continuity in the development of transparent, competitive and efficient energy and green markets for further potential commercial opportunities, aside the oil and gas sectors.

B) OUTLINING AT A HIGH LEVEL WHAT AREAS OF (TA) ARE IN DEMANDBuilding upon: 1) Previous and current stakeholders’ engagement 2) UK’s comparative advantage 3) Complementarity with other Funds and international donor’s intervention in country, the following table presents demanded areas.

Potential area RationaleGreen Finance

- There is a clear recognition amongst Mexican counterparts of the UK’s global leading role in promoting green finance, not least given the recent publication of the UK’s Green Finance Task Force Report, which was widely praised by both government and private sector.

- Prosperity Fund initiatives have paved the way for a successful dialogue between key Mexican institutions (Stock Exchange, Banking Association, Development Banks, Asset Managers) and their UK counterparts (through the Green Finance Initiative and institutions like the Climate Bonds Initiative). There is clear appetite for ambition to become a regional green finance leader building on The City’s experience, but equally, a substantial need for support in this process.

- Initiatives like the Climate Finance Accelerator (CFA) have been described by Mexican 7

Official-Sensitivegovernment as a milestone in the implementation of Mexico’s climate commitments. We have repeatedly been asked to continue supporting subsequent stages of CFA to identify as many bankable projects as possible in order to effectively achieve Mexico’s NDC commitments.

- As highlighted in the recent visit led by Sir Roger Gifford, there is a great necessity in cascading down and incorporating UK’s best practice and lessons learned in green finance in key sectors like mobility, sustainable infrastructure, renewable energy related projects, and across all levels of government (Ministries of Energy, Treasury, Environment, Central Bank, Development Banks, and subnational governments). Mexico has shown appetite to strengthen collaboration with the UK on this agenda, following the successful experiences between the UK and China, underpinned by ICF.

Transport - Mobility represents a cross-cutting topic where different stakeholders (government at different levels, society and academia) and sectors (digitalization, infrastructure, finance, etc.) strategically converge.

- Previous initiatives supported by Prosperity Fund have already contributed to position

the UK as one of the key actors contributing to the development of sustainable mobility policy. However, implementation of such policy instruments remains a challenge.

- Mexican government recognise UK expertise in promoting low carbon mobility, particularly in areas like Electric Vehicles, where an integral strategy led by the Office of Low Emissions Vehicles has incorporated innovation, financial, fiscal and policy incentives to boost low carbon growth. There is substantial appetite to develop joint work on this space.

Energy - Mexico has country has undergone a substantial electricity market transformation, following their constitutional energy reform in 2013. This represents a massive opportunity to deepen UK’s collaboration in the sector, in areas like policy and regulatory frameworks, financial mechanisms, innovation and technology development.

- The first competitive electricity auctions held in the Mexican market have run successfully, establishing world records for the cheapest cost of renewable-generated electricity. However, the country still faces fundamental challenges to guarantee energy security, including in areas like transmission and distribution (through smart grids), storage, and market integration, amongst others. These are all areas where the UK has proven to lead the way and where a transformational difference could be made in Mexico to enable further penetration of renewables in the system.

- Due to legal binding commitments, Mexico may need additional support in order to meet its clean energy target by 2024 (35%) and subsequent indicative years.

- Diversify and enrich a more low carbon development portfolio. At the moment, under the Prosperity’s Fund Energy, there is a mix of oil and gas, and renewable projects.

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Annex F – Commercial opportunities

The ICF Technical Assistance Programme is likely to increase opportunities for commercial engagement in a number of low-carbon sectors, which will be accessible for UK companies, as a secondary benefit of the capacity-building activities. This note sets out where we expect these opportunities to arise, and the measures that we are taking to ensure that UK companies are able to engage in the programme. We believe that these measures are within the bounds of the International Development Act.

1. Working in sectors where the UK has strategic advantage

This programme will provide technical assistance in a number of low-carbon sectors in China, Colombia and Mexico, which will be selected according to the demand in each country. We have already established that the sectors in demand in China, Colombia and Mexico are areas in which the UK has particular strengths (green finance, governance and legislation, energy systems, and monitoring, reporting and verification (MRV)).

The programme is bilateral: managed by HMG, working directly with partner countries. It is therefore very strongly UK-branded, with high potential for visibility for the UK. This will be further underpinned by the relationship-building underway through the Climate Partnerships in Colombia and Mexico.

2. Communicating business opportunities to UK companies

Through the Calls for Proposals, the programme makes funding available to organisations and institutions to deliver technical assistance activities in country. The selection of delivery agents through this Call for Proposals will be open, transparent, and competitive, available to any suitable agent, including UK companies.

We will promote the opportunities through our networks, engaging with FCO and DIT (using the ‘Exporting is Great’ website) to ensure that UK companies are made aware of opportunities.To strengthen the potential for this programme, we have already:

- Recruited BEIS representatives at post in China, Colombia and Mexico, who have been conducting extensive stakeholder engagement, identifying and building networks with relevant actors.

- Engaged with DIT in London and in each country to join up and work together to realise opportunities.- Held Director-level stakeholder roundtables in London to provide businesses, think tanks, NGOs and

academics an opportunity to engage with our plans for the TAP and highlight the opportunities for their institutions to get involved.

- Increased our understanding– commissioning research to identify areas of TA in demand, which will also identify the relevant organisations and institutions that could potentially service this demand, including supply for UK companies (building on an initial mapping exercise into the UK’s low carbon strengths).

We have already received strong appetite from UK stakeholders to collaborate on this programme. Once the pilot programme has been approved, we will work with the BEIS commercial procurement team to develop a formal market engagement approach, including hosting a supplier day in London.

3. Building relationships to enable future engagement

Through the skills-sharing missions as part of the pilot programme, and the diplomatic engagement around the Climate Partnerships, we will build strong bilateral relationships between the low-carbon sectors in the UK and our partner countries, which will facilitate future engagement.

4. Collaborating across HMG to ensure links are made

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Official-SensitiveIn order to maximise the impact of our endeavours to help UK companies to access the commercial opportunities which may arise through this programme, we have engaged extensively with the relevant domestic teams such as the Clean Growth, Green Finance, and Prosperity Fund teams, as well as relevant DIT teams and the FCO attaché network. We will continue to link up with the Industrial Strategy Clean Growth Grand Challenge and Great Green Britain Week, and will feed back export market information to HMG teams.

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Official-SensitiveAnnex G – Market Engagement

1. Comprehensive market engagement is fundamental to realising the TAP vision of a programme which can “leverage the full range of UK and global expertise to accelerate the low-carbon transition.” At the core of this effort is the need to sustainably grow the global low-carbon ecosystem, particularly the market for the services which can drive green growth and decarbonisation at scale and at pace. This is set out in more detail in paragraph 16 of the Business Case.

2. This annex sets out the nature of planned market engagement activities – although given the adaptive nature of the TAP the focus is on principles rather than providing exhaustive detail – as well as describing the market engagement that has taken place to date.

1. Objectives

3. The objectives of the market engagement activity as part of the TAP are threefold.

i. Firstly, there is a pressing need to stimulate, prepare and inform the market of potential TAP delivery partners prior to conducting the four procurements listed in section 9 of the Business Case. The first delivery partner to be procured will be that for M&E, so that they can ensure robust strategic M&E systems are integrated into the final design of the TAP.

ii. Secondly, the wider market of potential bidders for the two TAP funds must be engaged in order to ensure that applications to both the country programme fund and the challenge fund are of sufficient quantity and quality to enable realisation of the vision.

iii. Thirdly, we will seek to use these market engagement interactions to extract insights which feed into the wider TAP governance architecture. See section 15 of the Business Case. There will also be a feedback loop in this regard, as our approach to market engagement will be informed by the various governance mechanisms we will draw on (steering committee, expert groups, etc. as set out in Annex U).

4. The core principle of the market engagement activity, as with the wider TAP, is that it will be agile and holistic. What we are attempting is novel and innovative, so there is no clear template to follow. For the market engagement activity this means that, in practice, the three objectives listed above will in many cases overlap and interact, and the core team will take steps to ensure synergies are maximised and duplication avoided.

5. Referring specifically to the more traditional market engagement objectives (1 and 2 above), we will seek to realise the full range of benefits of market engagement, namely:

i. Stimulate competition and maximise market responsiveness (to maximise the quality and VfM of TAP delivery);

ii. Define requirements (as early as possible in the life of the programme);iii. Ensure feasibility (drawing on market expertise to help understand what is achievable);iv. Streamline procurement (by minimising the dialogue needed during the formal procurement process).

2. Approach

6. The novel nature of the TAP requires an atypically large focus on market engagement, in order to secure optimal value for money. Market engagement will be undertaken along the following lines:

i. Phased – There will be phases of delivery, requiring the market engagement work to be phased as follows: Phase 1 : Pre-market engagement is already underway. This has included two Director-level events which

were held in London as well as a wide range of informal consultations. This phase will also include market engagement under the first round of funding within the TAP Pilot Programme.

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Official-Sensitive Phase 2 : As soon as this Business Case is agreed we will kick off market engagement for the key delivery

partners, prioritising M&E and comms (May-June), to be followed by the skill-sharing and fund delivery partners (July-September).

Phase 3 : Around the time that the fund delivery partner is in place we will run full market engagement for the first round of programme funding. This will draw heavily on the lessons learned from the pilot phase funding round (Phase 1).

Phase 4 : For subsequent rounds of implementation funding we will delegate some responsibility for the market engagement to the fund delivery partner, whilst ensuring that all strategic relationships and full content knowledge remain within the core team in BEIS. This phase will also involve market engagement with

ii. Layered – There will also be multiple tiers of engagement, each with a different optimal level of HMG involvement: Delivery partner : These are the most critical partnerships, requiring the most intensive market

engagement to ensure that we get the right partner, on the right terms. This is why we will prioritise Phase 2 of the market engagement, with a focus on ensuring both the breadth (range of potential suppliers) and the depth (level of detail that we go into) of these interactions.

Implementation partner : The projects that the TAP supports will consume most of the budget and drive most of outcomes, so selecting the right projects, with the right partners, is essential. Market engagement with potential implementation partners will be particularly intensive during Phases 1 and 3, and we will focus on capturing lessons during each phase to feed into subsequent phases.

Implementation sub-suppliers : Sub-suppliers spending UK ODA represent reputational risks for HMG and so while the core BEIS team will not prioritise market engagement with these groups, it will be essential that we can communicate directly to ensure full consistency of understanding.

iii. Localised – As an intercontinental programme the TAP market engagement will have to remain globally consistent while also recognising local context: London : As the headquarters for the TAP London will host the core market engagement events, at all

phases. Tier 1 countries (e.g. Colombia and Mexico) : Given the need for in-country partners and local expertise,

in-country market engagement will be essential. The multi-sector focus for Tier 1 countries means that these engagements will have to either be broad in focus, or to feature multiple sector-specific engagements.

Tier 2 countries (e.g. China) : As above, local expertise will be essential, however given the single-sector focus in Tier 2 countries market engagement will be appropriately limited.

iv. Comprehensive – There are a number of strands to this: Extensive desk review and cross-Whitehall consultation have alerted us to a range of good practices.

Methodologies are likely to include full-day workshops, online consultations (e.g. through the new ‘Solutions Exchange’) and DIT’s range of portals.

Full stakeholder and market mapping will ensure that we maximise inclusion, including with SMEs, and tailor our approach accordingly. This will follow a series of mapping exercises, building on what we already know of our key market stakeholders:o Big potential delivery partnerso Specialist, small-scale think tanks and advocacy specialistso Philanthropists and other donors who share the aims of the TAPo Niche expert consultancies and individual consultants

We will continue to work with colleagues, particularly the BEIS procurement team, to ensure that our market engagement activity is fully fit-for-purpose. We will also incorporate the lessons from DFID’s recent supplier review.

This TAP market engagement work will also be integrated into relevant work elsewhere in BEIS (e.g. clean growth team) and HMG (e.g. DIT’s low-carbon team and sector panel, FCO Prosperity Fund – including their non-ODA work).

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7. Initial thinking on the potential modalities for this market engagement work point to a wide range of options, including:

Within the TAP teamo Bespoke events in the UK

Could involve a combination of half-day workshops and conferences, in-depth seminars, networking events (which could help consortia to form)

Could consider a roadshow to involve key economic hubs outside of Londono Bespoke events in country (starting with China, Mexico and Colombia), using a range of

engagement types as listed aboveo Drawing on the contacts and activities of the BEIS ICF International Partnerships team

Leverage the rest of HMGo Ministers , including by highlighting tie-ins to key government priorities, such as the Industrial

Strategyo Ambassadors , with a focus on key TAP countries but also exploring where else in the network

there might be appetiteo Nick Bridge , the UK’s Climate Envoy, will be invited to promote the TAP on his travels, and to

conduct market engagement wherever possibleo Trade envoys , which we expect Minister Perry to invite to consider the promotion of low-carbon

services as among their prioritieso DIT teams in country , who we will work with to ensure that they have access to full information

about the opportunities around the TAPo Any broader market engagement events in the UK or in priority countries where we might be able

to promote the TAP Online activity, such as webinars, as well as having a dedicated web page with information for the market

about the TAP Formal channels, such as OJEU, as required

3. Activity overview

8. This indicative table shows the sequencing of the first 10 months of activity following PIC. Green boxes denote market engagement activity relating to a call for programme proposals, yellow boxes demote market engagement activity relating to a tender process for a delivery partner, and red crosses denote deadlines for bids and tenders. As stated above, market engagement activities will be integrated at every opportunity.

May Jun Jul Aug Sep Oct Nov Dec Jan’19 Feb’19China pilot xMexico pilot xColombia pilot xLearning partner xComms partner xSkillshare partner xFunds partner xChallenge Fund xCountry Prog Fund x

Two very specific next steps, following PIC approval, are as follow: Work with the BEIS commercial procurement team to develop a formal market engagement approach,

building on the objectives and principles set out in this annex.

4. Activity to date

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Official-Sensitive9. A pre-market engagement event held in London in April 2018 provided a range of useful insights, which we have

sought to incorporate into this Business Case. The key points raised were:

1. There is a clear need for TA;2. Don’t race to spend & don’t spend money on things that aren’t going to be impactful;3. Must be demand led to be impactful;4. Putting effort into coordination in-country will increase the impact;5. Go into this for the long-term; 6. Build in learning across the programme (ideally 5-10% of overall budget);7. Let go of our traditional definition of ‘low-carbon’ – need to think about this in a wider sense, especially

building in ‘resilience’ and sustainable development;8. Commercial benefits will follow if you build long-term relationships (finance, services and goods).

These points are set out in detail in Annex I.

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Official-SensitiveAnnex H – Vivid Economics: Principles for Transformational Climate Technical Assistance

Attached separately.

https://www.vivideconomics.com/wp-content/uploads/2019/08/171204-Principles-for-Technical-Assistance-1.pdf

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Annex I – Summary of lessons learned and stakeholder discussions

Vivid Economics set out five key principles for good Technical Assistance based on a wealth of existing research, including lesson-learning from relevant existing ICF and DFID programmes. The principles show that it is critical that the provision of Technical Assistance is demand-led, achieves transformational aims, is ambitious whilst remaining flexible, includes opportunities for learning and is owned and progressed by the country partner. In addition to this research, BEIS’ own scoping provides guidance to inform the design of this programme. Notable lessons include those from CDKN2 (a DFID-supported climate TA programme in operation since 2010); the National School of Government International (a government unit providing advice to government on technical assistance partnerships); a review of all of DFID’s challenge funds; and two director-level hosted stakeholder challenge sessions with prominent representatives from low-carbon consultancies, academia, think tanks, and NGOs. These lessons are summarised below:

1 Spend money wisely, programme over long-term timeframes. Pressure to meet targets can lead to spending decisions being rushed and not focussing on the most effective interventions. Longer term programming ensures UK is seen as a committed partner and builds trust. Focussing on inputs rather than outcomes can mean that spending is tied to very specific deliverables, and therefore support cannot respond to changing in-country circumstances (e.g. institutional change, technical needs and political economy). Response: Delivery through ‘grants’ rather than procuring for services; building the programme gradually and sustainably, moving into new countries where we understand demand and can build relationships; multi-year budgeting; designing in a way that it becomes a key part of the ICF delivery architecture with at least a 10-year programme life.

2 Led in-country. Programmes are effective when led by in-country nationals: local expertise is vital to understand political economy and build stronger working relationships and trust, which will provide entry points for projects. Take time to understand and adapt to the context, drivers and political dynamics that influence the pace and direction of change. Invest in people with partnership-building skills. Understand other donor activity to help maximise the effectiveness of all TA interventions. Response: Building teams in embassies with a mix of technical and diplomacy skills, locally engaged and UK based; ensuring donor coordination / activity in country scoping and linking with the NDC Partnership 3 where relevant.

3 Programmatic vs flexible. Develop strategies and Theories of Change to ensure that programme goals are known and understood, but remain flexible to changes in the demand, local, and global contexts. Use understanding of demand and markets to act as an effective ‘broker’ between demand and supply. Response: Develop country-level Theories of Change to ensure that the programme’s activities are guided by an overarching set of outcomes / longer term programmatic aim; have a strong focus on market engagement, communicating opportunities to the market in recipient countries through the FCO and DIT networks, and in the UK.

4 Monitoring and evaluation. Embed M&E from the beginning, across the programme, to ensure strategy and delivery is regularly informed by the growing evidence base and can adapt accordingly. Learn by doing. Response: Recruit dedicated M&E resource into the team, procure a learning partner up front and build M&E systems and culture into the programme from the beginning. Build programme culture to talk about and learn from failure. Be willing to move on / change direction when programmes aren’t working.

2 https://cdkn.org/wp-content/uploads/2017/10/CDKN-Country_Programme_final_web-res.pdf 3 The NDC partnership is a programme delivered by the World Resources Institute, funded by the UK and other donors, which supports developing countries to identify their needs, coordinate donor activity where possible, and to ensure effective implementation of their NDCs.

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Official-Sensitive5 Governance. Advisory and steering committees can formalise engagement between local and

international delivery partners. Strong governance committees can bring in external actors with knowledge, expertise and networks. Set expectations to ensure that the governance allows decision-making on a consistent basis. Response: Bring experts on different thematic / country-focussed issues into the steering committee, keep strategic functions in house so that the TAP’s strategy and decision-making function is close to BEIS; ensure that the learning partner informs the governance process, so decisions can be made effectively, and issues can be appropriately escalated. (annex U sets out the governance proposals in more detail)

6 Strong project management. Excellent project management is critical to deliver Technical Assistance programmes successfully, as the desired transformational outcomes are somewhat removed from the individual elements of the programme. Response: The ICF as a whole passed a recent x-HMG "health check" on PPM, but suggested needed more risk-based portfolio approach and embedded programme learning. The portfolio management aspects will be embedded in a strengthened ICF PMO team and the programme and project elements in the TAP team itself.

The TAP team held director level stakeholder sessions to inform the programme in January 2018. The key lessons from these stakeholder sessions can be summarised as follows:

1. There is a gap: need for TA, latent demand, post-Paris there is a real gap. Other donors are active, but there is more than enough work to do to justify additional programming. The real world isn’t technically / politically aligned with NDCs.

2. Make sure the set-up allows you to spend money wisely: Don’t race to spend & don’t spend money on things that aren’t going to be impactful. Need to find the cutting edge. Don’t pay for inputs (funding limitations and perverse incentives) but pay for outputs, define project structure in terms of outcomes rather than day-rates. Consider the cost of some of the expertise that we want to access when we design our procurement approach (e.g. finance/legal). Work with in-country entrepreneurs. Think about 15-20% available up-front for innovation and money to write plans and develop project concepts with local partners. Small businesses can’t afford up-front costs and project preparation capacity is badly needed. Collaborate with universities if timescales work, they’re cheap and expert.

3. Be an effective ‘broker’: Must be demand led to be impactful. There is a tension between managing the demand and having a small enough number of themes to work on to keep the programme manageable. Make sure to get the country to understand how the short-term action fits into a longer term strategy and partnership.

4. Putting effort into coordination in-country will increase the impact: Coordinate between all of the different things that HMG is doing. And between all of the things that other donors are doing. The power of this is going to be connecting up. Risk of fragmentation is even more important for TA. UK has real skills in convening.

5. Go into this for the long-term: need to build trust, invest in long term relationships. Most effective TA deployments have been where there are strong local government relationships with the FCO leads. Invest in people who have partnership building skills – this might look different in different countries and we may need a number of different ‘strategic partners’. Make sure the in-country teams feel like they have ownership.

6. Build in learning across the programme: 5-10% of overall budget. Being smaller and more agile than other donor programmes, and starting from scratch enables us to embed a strong learning component into the programme from the off. Having clear stories of success and being able to describe the impact will be powerful to keep the programme on track and having a programmatic story could be interesting to Ministers. The country itself will be the ambassador for thought leadership.

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Official-Sensitive7. Let go of our traditional definition of ‘low-carbon’: need to think about this in a wider sense, especially building in ‘resilience’ and sustainable development. We don’t have the answers to the sustainable infrastructure challenge, so we need to help facilitate the process to find the answers together. Commercial benefits will follow if you build long-term relationships: finance, services and goods. Design considerations:

In terms of design, there was general consensus that the hybrid model of some in-house and some contracted services with an eye to an ‘institution’ over the longer term will be the best approach and that getting the governance right will probably solve a number of the design issues.

1. Consider having a demonstrably impartial chair and a network / board of objective external experts to provide support and challenge.

2. Set expectations and ensure that the governance allows you to make decisions on a consistent basis – carefully considering the risk appetite for the level of due diligence and where the analytical / due diligence function sits.

3. Keep strategy and network in-house. As the project evolves and the objectives are understood the governance could move further away, but in the first instance it is likely to need to be more ‘in-government’.

4. Recognise the skills and culture you need in order to find the right ‘home’ for each of the functions.

5. Consider having focussed country advisory groups. Design in a way that means you can draw in knowledge on the ground.

6. People are important. Will need more people in house, and in Embassies. Know the market, develop a list of experts you can ‘call’ to put together a cadre of good people, and lean teams of people on the ground who know the local context. Need to carefully consider the secondments into countries to get this right. Think about the value proposition to the private sector of seconding experts to the TAP team.

7. Need a strong project management unit, dealing with procurement, managing quality and due diligence, running coordination, reporting on VFM with analytical capability.

8. Make the TAP recognisable as clearly HMG. No doubt this is public policy, public money, public good.

9. Work bottom up in country, with top-down diplomacy.

10. Estimates between 15-30 people + outsourced procurement + secondments. With a minimum 15-20 unit hub in London plus satellites in country offices.

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Annex K – Rationale for components

COUNTRY PRESENCE

This component is to increase head-count at FCO posts, to coordinate and support the programme activities.

This programme will require the development of quality bilateral relationships, to include policy dialogue, lesson-sharing and problem-solving, brokering and coordinating – in order to support the training and knowledge transfer associated with the skills-sharing component of TA. We consider that this function would be best provided by HMG officials, in order to deliver on our key aims to have clear UK identity in-country, direct relationships, and the ability to understand and deliver UK objectives.

Centring the country coordination at Post will also enable us to leverage wider embassy resources such as press and communications teams, HMA representation, and DIT relationships. Furthermore, this programme is supporting and laying the ground work for the success of other UK climate projects, and placing BEIS staff at Post will enhance the delivery and oversight of all BEIS programmes in country.

We therefore propose to provide the resource to increase headcount in the Embassies in the launch, which in the first instance will be Mexico, Colombia and China (where we expect to see three-to-four country programmes during this Spending Review period). We will consider providing this component to other participating global regions on a country-by-country basis as the programme develops, based on the scale of activity in each new country, and the consequent necessity for a coordinating presence at Post.

We anticipate that any staff required will be a combination of UK Based (UKB), and Locally Engaged (LE), dependant on the resource within the existing climate teams in embassies.4 A combination will ensure the advantages of having a strong understanding of the political economy of the country and sector, existing strong relationships (or the ability to build them), and native language speakers; and understanding of UK public policy and Whitehall processes, clear “UK” representation, and influence in diplomacy and negotiations.

SKILL SHARING

This component is to facilitate skill-sharing by seconding UK public and private experts into partner organisations in-country to share technical knowledge, and embed good practice in an identified policy area of specific need. Skill-sharing could range from short-term outward deployments, inward thematic conferences, and long-term secondments depending on need.

This is the most strategically important part of the programme: increasing the visibility of UK expertise on the world stage, responding to the ICF’s guiding principle to “Inspire by sharing UK skills to raise ambition” and to Ministerial ambition to share British leadership, as set out in the Clean Growth Strategy. It will also allow for wider UK engagement in the UK Aid strategy, opportunities for collaboration and networking between UK institutions, personal and professional development opportunities for UK staff, and recruitment and retention opportunities for UK employers.

To give an indication of scale, in this Spending Review period we envisage providing:- Up to five long-term seconded personnel in both Colombia and Mexico (ten in total)- Up to 100 short-term TA assignments (these may be short visits either outward or to the UK, or other skills-

sharing activities)

4 Any locally engaged staff will fall under the FCO’s head count allocation, and UK based staff will be on BEIS’ head count. The type (HEO/SEO/G7, UKB/LE) of resource in each country will vary depending on the existing climate-related resource at post, and the depth of TA (and wider) programming we expect to do with that country.

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Official-SensitiveWe envisage sourcing experts from across public, private, third, and academic sectors, in order to provide the wealth and breadth of expertise that exists in the UK. The table below anticipates where the relevant UK expertise is likely to reside.

Table 1: UK expertise, and the institutions in which it resides

What type of expertise? Where does the expertise reside? Demand

Carbon budgets, long-term planning

HMG, closely related public bodies, advocacy groups/think-tanks High

Green Finance and carbon trading

Private sector institutions, banks, universities Very High

MRV of emissions Specialist technical agencies Moderate

Energy decarbonisation

HMG, arms-length bodies, private companies) High

It will be necessary to address the resourcing implications of providing personnel for long-term secondments, though we do not anticipate the current scale (ten people over three years, from across the public, private and third sectors) to be unduly disruptive. In the case of providing HMG experts we will need to consider and appropriately address any headcount issues which may arise; while in the case of facilitating non-HMG experts we will need to consider appropriately substituting the seconded resource. We will consult with other HMG ‘Seconded National Expert’ programme arrangements to inform these delivery arrangements.

There are a number of different skill-share programmes across HMG, and the approach is on the rise as a cost-effective way of delivering ODA which can result in secondary benefits. As mentioned above, the existing programmes’ management arrangements and cost structures provide an opportunity for learning to shape this programme.

The different cost structures available lend themselves to different levels of scale and types of deployment. Where the pool of expertise is narrowly defined, skill-share programmes can be delivered in house or through budget transfer to one implementing partner. In instances where the expertise in demand varies, and is housed in different institutions, implementing partners are responsible for passing on grants to institutional partners who broker assignment opportunities: this adds additional cost, and introduces risk, but means that the programme can be responsive to demand. And we understand from discussions with countries so far, that the type of expertise they are interested in cuts across different sectors. This suggests that the delivery model will need to involve a number of actors and partners in the delivery chain, and that as a result the delivery model will allow for a variety of different offers.

From the Vivid research and discussions with stakeholders, we are developing a clearer idea of what the UK’s ‘offer’ is across green finance, long-term emissions planning and governance, energy market reform, MRV, and sustainable infrastructure. We will work with the Strategy team in BEIS to develop a roster of expertise for HMG, and will conduct market engagement to better define the UK offer.

In designing this component to the programme, we will also roundly consider how the programme will draw on the TA expertise which sits within HMG, how we can ensure that lending out UK expertise does not impact on the capacity of the UK to achieve its domestic objectives, and the implications for a potential private sector delivery partner managing HMG experts.

PROGRAMME FUNDING

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Official-SensitiveAlongside the skills-sharing element, we propose to provide programme finance for technical assistance activities through two funding streams: a competitive Challenge Fund, and discretionary country-specific funds. These are detailed below.

i. Challenge Fund : A competitive fund which will be open for applications though a set schedule of windows. We envisage opening calls for proposals on a six-monthly basis. These will be open to projects in our priority countries as well as all other ODA-eligible countries.

Over 80% of BEIS ICF funds are delivered by multilateral development banks (MDBs), primarily the World Bank. Setting up a separate grant Challenge Fund through this programme would allow the ICF to support multiple small scale innovative projects and diversify our delivery partners beyond MDBs. Making finance available in this way would also enable us to be truly demand-driven through this programme, by allowing institutions to bid for funding for innovative projects in areas which are not necessarily in the UK’s comparative expertise.

DFID has been using challenge funds since the late 1990s and currently runs around 50 challenge funds, spending over £1.6bn in total. The key strengths of challenge funds are:

a. Their competitive bidding processes drive up the quality of grants and therefore the return on investment for the donor;

b. Adopting and managing a large portfolio of grants and programmes allows for higher-risk or innovative approaches to be tested along with approaches which are less likely to fail, but may deliver lower returns on KPIs;

c. They are demand-led and draw on the expertise and experience of many different kinds of grantee, allowing for relatively small projects to be tailored to address specific issues in specific geographies, and delivering a high overall learning value;

d. They allow for donors to support the ‘long tail’ of smaller programmes which may have high impact, but where high transaction costs make it more difficult to provide funding.

In designing a challenge fund, in line with lessons learnt from DFID’s ongoing review of its challenge funds, BEIS will be mindful that:

1. The right collection of people with the right set of skills and expertise is assembled to ensure the challenge fund delivers.

2. A sufficient number of bidders participate – it can only deliver VfM if there a large number of high quality proposals.

3. Overheads are kept appropriate: hiring more expertise can often increase the quality of grants by making the application process more rigorous, but many challenge funds have high administrative costs (ranging from 3-15% of fund capital).

4. Expectations among recipients are managed appropriately: challenge funds have relatively long lead-in times for set up and disbursing grants, and the competitive nature of the process means that there is no guarantee that a particular project will be financed.

Challenge funds often operate across several geographies or have several thematic ‘windows’. The TA Challenge Fund will operate with similar principles, with two sets of geographic windows: one for high-priority countries and one for other developing countries – as well as four key priorities: energy decarbonisation, green finance, deforestation, and climate legislation and governance. The advantages of building a broad geographic and thematic scope into a single challenge fund are that it provides savings on overhead costs both for the fund managers, and for BEIS as a sponsor, encourages high quality bids by pooling a larger sum of available capital, allows for a more strategic approach on investment decisions across a large portfolio, and makes the fund more visible on a global stage.

There are several options for design of a delivery vehicle. Due to the geographic and thematic diversity of the TA Challenge Fund, it is possible that several delivery partners will be required; however, they can be organised in different ways. For example, we could contract out to one prime organisation and one M&E advisory organisation, with the prime organisation creating a pool of expertise on which to draw for specific cases.

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Official-SensitiveAlternatively, the prime organisation can subcontract to individual delivery partners M&E, assessment of programmes, and ongoing management of programmes. The precise design of the delivery vehicle will be dependent on the size and willingness of the market. The UK has genuine strengths here, with organisations such as PwC (Climate Development and Knowledge Network), Palladium, and McKinsey (Partnership for Forests) already managing broad-scope TA funds across different thematic areas under the climate umbrella.

According to best practice a two-step application process would be used. This would entail first stage applications which would consist of a brief concept note. These would first be filtered by the delivery partner5 before a shortlist of the most promising concepts is put to the selection committee (overseen by BEIS, but also involving outside experts). Selected concept notes will be given guidance and funding to draw up a full proposal, which will first be pre-checked by the delivery partner (to ensure compliance with all criteria), and then put to the selection committee for final decisions.

The Challenge Fund will be structured similarly to the wider TAP, as outlined in Figure 1. The BEIS ICF team will retain strategic control by facilitating the selection committee (which decides on which projects gets funding) and setting the terms for future calls. The delivery partner will manage the promotion of the calls (alongside the comms partner) and sift the applications. An illustrative flow diagram is provided below.

Figure 1 – Challenge Fund flow diagram

ii. Country Programme Funds : Programme finance available to fund specific projects in our priority countries, as identified through scoping work. This will initially be deployed in Mexico, Colombia and China.

When working in-depth with a priority country, we will conduct in-country scoping and research as part of the programme delivery to identify the key sectors where interventions are most in demand, will have the most

5 Selection criteria will be finalised in conjunction with the delivery partner but are likely to include assessments of the likely impact on emissions reductions and poverty (including on economic growth more widely), level of innovation and potential for transformational change, sustainability, additionality (i.e. the project or work would not occur without funding from the TAP Challenge Fund) and depth of partnerships.

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Official-Sensitiveimpact, and have the best conditions for transformational change. As well as using this information to target the secondment component of the programme, we will also make funds available for organisations to deliver the TA activities in those identified areas. These organisations will become our delivery partners in certain elements of the overall programme of Technical Assistance in that country, and will become engaged either through grants advertising or through invitations to tender for particular pieces of work.

This provision of finance is distinct from the Challenge Fund, in that applicants to the Challenge Fund will originate their proposals as an ‘innovative TA solution’ from an open brief; whereas organisations applying for country-specific funds will submit a proposal for a service provision in response to a pre-identified need.

Evidence of effectiveness of Technical Assistance

Box 1 below shows evidence on the effectiveness of TA from the ICF’s existing portfolio and the table below that shows existing ICF TA interventions and their areas of focus.

Project Type of intervention/activities Country focus24

Box 1: Effectiveness of Technical Assistance

Evidence from the existing ICF portfolio shows that Technical Assistance is an effective way to use smaller amounts of finance to catalyse wider transformation, and that there is high demand for assistance from developing countries.

The ICF supports a number of TA activities through its portfolio of investments (See at Annex A), which are often linked to capital investments that we are making: for example, we have provided £8m of TA alongside our £48m investment in the Renewable Energy Performance Platform (REPP), and £6m of TA alongside our £30m equity investment into the Global Climate Partnership Fund (GCPF).

The TA we have already provided through our existing programmes has delivered impressive results. For example the TA component in GET FIT Uganda was fundamental to the success of the programme, building capacity in their regulator to deliver small-medium scale renewables and standardise Power Purchase Agreements (PPAs). Without this, the 17 PPAs, which once built will be around 25% of Uganda’s installed capacity, would not have been issued. Uganda was ranked 7th in ClimateScope 2016 for renewable energy attractiveness to private investors.

Another example is the roll out of the UK’s 2050 calculator programme to 10 developing countries, which has built capacity to support governments and sub-national actors develop their own 2050 models. At the same time, through the development of government-government relationships, the programme has allowed FCO and DFID to promote the UK as a low-carbon leader and build stronger working relationships with key agencies.

Our TA will however not be limited to this new standalone offer: there continues to be a role for other targeted TA programmes (e.g. the planned £8m contribution to the International Energy Agency; the planned £26m to a new Cities programme), and for TA attached to our CDEL spend (e.g. the £175m Sustainable Infrastructure Programme, which is being considered by PIC alongside this business case, of which £18.5m will be for TA).

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ADB Technical Assistance project Project pipeline development Asia

REPP (Renewable Energy Performance Platform)

Support (technical and financial) for projects in early stages of development. E.g. due diligence; ESIA; financial structuring; brokerage with RMIs; support securing finance etc.

Sub-Saharan Africa

GETFIT Uganda

TA for regulatory reform and capacity building for Ugandan Electricity Regulatory Authority (e.g. tariff modelling, due diligence expertise, targeted training), and development of standardised PPAs.

Uganda (with potential future programmes in Zambia, Mozambique, Ghana and Namibia)

World Bank Climate Investment Funds

Clean Technology Fund – project pipeline development; Low and Middle Income

CCS programme Support to develop technical and institutional knowledge through pilots China, Indonesia, SA

NAMA FacilityEmbedded Technical Support Unit (TSU) provides TA/CB combined with or closely linked to financial instruments of the Facility.

Burkina Faso, Tajikistan, Peru, Thailand

CP3The Seed Capital Assistance Facility to develop a pipeline of partner; Mercer report (completed); IFC Advisory Services (closed)

International (DfID led)

2050 Calculator Government to government support on energy modelling and low-carbon development planning

India, Bangladesh, Vietnam, Thailand, Indonesia, Colombia, Brazil, Mexico, Nigeria, South Africa

Capacity Building Initiative for Transparency (CBIT)

Building capacity of institutions around monitoring, reporting and verification (MRV) of emissions so that they can meet the requirements of the Paris Agreement. Work could include providing training, tools, access to data etc.

All non-Annex 1 countries under the UNFCCC

Silvopastoral systems

Support to cattle ranchers to introduce more sustainable methods- activities include trainings, demo farms, peer-to-peer learning

Colombia

UK Climate Investments (i.e. international GIB)

Management support, building quality assurance systems etc given they are providing equity

India, South Africa, Kenya, Tanzania and Rwanda

Green Africa Power (GAP)

Set aside budget support for project set up, monitoring, evaluation and knowledge dissemination. Sub-Saharan Africa

Global Climate Partnership Fund (GCPF)

To build capacity in developed country financial institutions. Emerging Economies (Global)

Fiji COP Fund Support for Fiji hosting COP23 in November 2017. Fiji

Ci-Dev

Demonstrating how low carbon development projects, delivered through the Clean Development Mechanism (CDM), can deliver both development benefits and emissions reductions.

Least developed African countries: Kenya, Madagascar, Ethiopia, Mali, Uganda and Rwanda

CDKN Support for Negotiations. International (DfID led)

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Annex L – Learning Strategy

The full learning strategy will be developed alongside the learning partner, once appointed. However at this stage we can describe the learning strategy for the pilot, and how we expect this to feed into the TAP, to demonstrate emergent thinking.

The learning strategy for the pilot will seek to explore the following groups of questions:

1. Programme Management

1. Human resources in-country. How many staff are needed in each country to run what scale of activity? What are their tasks? Which activities and components of the programme are best managed from post, and what are the resource implications? Where are the economies of scale? What are the implications and recommendations for working in more countries, where we have a lesser relationship with the Embassies?

2. Human resources in London. How many people are needed to manage and coordinate what scale of activity? What are their tasks? What could be outsourced? What level of oversight is needed for which components?

3. Ways of working. How do we work with colleagues internationally on a day-to-day basis? How do we communicate well and make the most of expertise? How do we understand in-country culture? What should the Governance be like in country? What systems need to be in place? What would need to be different at a bigger scale?

4. HMG coordination. How can the work feed into other programmes in the ICF, and how can the Climate Partnerships contribute and benefit? Who are the key teams in HMG who can contribute and benefit? How do we manage those relationships?

5. Processes. Procurement, legal considerations, market engagement, financial mechanisms, HR. What processes are available to us? What constrains us? What are we able and not able to do? Where does bureaucracy outweigh benefits? As a result, what are the benefits of outsourcing which components?

6. Timelines. What timescales are we reasonably working to? How accurate is our forward planning? 7. Governance in London. How robust are our decision-making and selection process? Are we being

fair, open and transparent?8. Communications. How well-known or effective is the brand? How can we increase our visibility?9. Monitoring and evaluation. What are the indicators of success of the pilot programme? What are

the best ways to run M&E for the TAP? What processes are valuable? What is the best way to assemble country-level Theories of Change, and collect evidence to test if they are holding true?

2. Programme Delivery

1. Demand and beneficiaries in country. What TA is in demand? What is the most appropriate method for assessing demand on an ongoing basis? Should we always draw this analysis down from KEEP? Or should we require management agents and/or delivery partners in-country to contribute to this? How do we assess when TA is not appropriate (e.g. where other barriers are such that TA won’t help)?

2. TA supply. How do we balance providing technical support with political and diplomatic skills? How do we ensure that we operate well within political economy constraints? What positions the UK as suitable supplier for TA? How do we ensure that the components that we’re offering are able to meet the demand?

3. Market engagement for management agents. How do we effectively engage the market? What is the appropriate scale, and what are the appropriate management arrangements?

4. Market engagement for TA delivery partners. What is effective market engagement in the UK and in country? Who are the best suppliers of TA? What relationships do they already have with in-country stakeholders? Are the mechanisms that we’re using the best ones to attract the best

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Official-Sensitivesupply in the fairest possible way? How do we maintain relationships? Is there anything to be learned from the conversations that Vivid and the in-country partners are having at the moment? What materials will we need to produce for our delivery partners to be able to effectively represent us in country?

5. Risks. How do we identify and manage risks throughout the project cycles, and the programme overview?

3. Programme Overview

1. Components. Are the programme components the right ones to be effective? What is benefit of identifying TA projects to fund through a demand-driven open challenge call? What would be different if we were more prescriptive from the outset (i.e. approached countries with a menu of options for support)? How do we manage relationships with the beneficiaries once projects are underway? What are the benefits of short-term skills-sharing? What are the benefits of long-term secondments? What works and doesn’t work about each of these things?

2. Approach. What are we offering that is attractive? What are we not offering which may be important (i.e. multi-year certainty)? How do multiple activities across a number of countries add up to one programme?

3. International Development Act and Gender Equality. How do we effectively build in gender considerations into our programme activities? How do we ensure that we adhere to IDA requirements?

In addition the following figure demonstrates how various learning outcomes from the pilot will feed into the design and delivery of the TAP.

Figure 1

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Official-SensitiveAnnex M – Full Risk Assessment

The following table represents the key risks associated with the programme and the proposed mitigation plan. These risks will be regularly monitored and appropriately reviewed by the BEIS project manager, in discussion with the delivery agents.

Probability and Impact ratings are on a scale of 1 to 5 (low to high). The Risk Level is then established by multiplying the two together (which gives a scale of 1 to 25, low to high), where 1 to 6 is Green, 8 to 12 is Amber, and 15 to 25 is Red.

Risk Summary (Event and Effect)

Prob

abili

Impa

ct

Risk

sc

ore

Leve

l

Mitigation PlanTarg

et Risk

Delivery

1. Low impactGiven the novelty of this programme there is a possibility that the impact will either be very limited, or simply that it will be impossible to demonstrate significant impact.

3 4 12A/R

Apply the highest standards to every aspect of the programme’s development, in particular the market engagement and country partnership elements, both of which will be central to achieving impact. Ensure that the programme is appropriately resourced, both in terms of the quantity and the skills and experience of staff.Procure a learning partner as soon as possible following PIC approval, ensuring that comprehensive terms of reference are based on thorough review of good practice in this area.Ensure all senior stakeholders agree and are comfortable with the fact that there is residual risk inherent in undertaking an innovative programme such as the TAP.

A

2. Intervention Design – Demand LedThe delivery model should respond flexibly to developing country needs. If the delivery model doesn’t enable this we may fund interventions which don’t have in-country buy-in (across the public and private sector), therefore reducing the impact and ability of our interventions to facilitate lasting change.

2 5 10 A

Allocate time for up-front country scoping to understand and test country-demand.Build in tolerance for changes in programme direction if the priorities of recipient governments change.Ensure M&E arrangements can give us real-time information about the effectiveness of interventions, in order to course-correct where required.

G

3. Intervention Design – Assessing NeedOur interventions need to be additional to what is already being delivered through UK ODA, and other donor programmes. If we don’t have a good enough understanding of assistance that is already being provided, we may not effectively programme our TA.

3 3 9 A

Develop networks with key stakeholders to understand who is providing support. Ensure other donor activity is included in in-country scoping work.Increase BEIS presence in country to conduct donor coordination and keep up to date with ongoing and planned initiatives.Understand priorities to assess where TA is still needed and would be additional.

G

4. Intervention Design – Supply Capability

2 4 8 A Engage early with suppliers to understand their needs in terms of contract design, in

G

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There may not be sufficient capability or appetite in public and private low carbon specialist organisations to engage with the programme, or we may design the intervention in a way which doesn’t incentivise these institutions to participate.

order for them to participate. Use advertising / comms to spread awareness among suppliers.Work with commercial and procurement teams to assess the most appropriate payment structure, and learn lessons from DFID experience.Ensure sufficient finance or incentives are in place to encourage participation, including to back-fill posts, and ensure sufficient lead time before assignments so that organisations can factor the programme into their business plans. Ensure consistency across tenders to maintain supplier confidence.Get buy-in to the strategic importance of the programme across the department and integrate its aims in wider corporate initiatives and policies (e.g. HR, L&D, retention policies and approaches) to incentivise managers to release their staff.

5. Relationships with key stakeholdersThe delineation of responsibilities between BEIS and the delivery partners may be unclear. If we don’t have clear ownership of key tasks, and relationships with stakeholders, we may not deliver effectively, and could cause confusion with recipients.

2 4 8 A

Set out responsibilities clearly in terms of reference.Ensure delivery partners understand their roles and responsibilities. Engage regularly, especially in early programme stages to build shared understanding of respective responsibilities.

G

6. Intervention Design – FCO supportTo target our interventions effectively, support our understanding of the in-country political economy, and get UK visibility we rely on the FCO’s in-country footprint. If the FCO isn’t sufficiently staffed or incentivised at senior enough levels we may not target our interventions effectively, limiting our visibility and influence.

2 3 6 G

Put BEIS staff in FCO network using BEIS budget, and spend time training staff and communicating TAP objectives and requirements.Engage with Ambassadors and senior teams in Embassies at Director level.Work closely with FCO in London, get buy-in from the Foreign Secretary and their Special Envoy on Climate .Design the governance arrangements to ensure FCO participation.

G

7. Monitoring & EvaluationThe expected results from TA activities are difficult to measure (e.g. it is difficult to directly attribute emissions reductions, or finance mobilised to TA) and this programme will need an adaptive, integrated M&E approach. We need to design a framework where we can measure impact without creating onerous reporting burdens for delivery partners or recipients.

2 2 4 G

Recruit a dedicated M&E adviser to the team to develop M&E approach.Build in the M&E component from the beginning of the programme.Ensure that the M&E is demand-driven, so that we, and partner countries, get something out of it.Learn from DFID partnership programmes.

G

Financial

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Official-Sensitive

8. Significant underspend of agreed budget – probability that procurement, grant awards and other elements are either delayed or restricted in scope.

3 3 9 A

Keep key assurance groups (BEIS procurement, commercial, finance) engaged. Regular reviews.Flex elements of programme where appropriate.Use larger ICF programmes to account for underspend.

G

9. Lack of budgeting flexibility between years & SR period – given the nature of technical assistance, and that spend will be cash rather than PN, then lack of flexibility may cause individual project failure and barriers to delivering overall outcomes

3 3 9 A Discuss with BEIS finance and HMT what is appropriate. G

10. Fiduciary / FraudFunds could be used for unintended purposes, a risk particularly where the delivery model has a long chain of small projects and assignments, and we are working through new delivery partners.

2 4 8 A

Conduct delivery partner reviews to ensure that appropriate management arrangements are in place to minimize this risk. Put in place delivery chain mapping procedures. Learning partner undertake audits.

G

11. Compliance Accounting – Pay in Advance of NeedThe budget will need to be managed to ensure that the delivery partner has enough funds to manage the programme and is incentivised to find originate high quality opportunities, but is not paid in advance of need.

2 2 4 GCommercial and finance advice on payment structure when we negotiate this with a delivery partner.

G

12. Fiduciary / Fraud / SafeguardingFunds could be used for unintended purposes: a risk particularly where the delivery model has a long chain of small projects and assignments, and we are working through new delivery partners.

1 3 3 G

Conduct delivery partner reviews to ensure experience managing long delivery chains and appropriate arrangements are in place to minimize risk through the whole delivery chain. (see Annex X for detailed risks and safeguarding measures)

G

Value for Money13. Effectiveness of partners in countryEffectiveness of external skill sharers, secondees and delivery partners – are they adding value?

2 4 8 A

Stringent vetting of all skill sharersAlignment of their incentives with ours (through a clear contractual system of performance-related rewards and potential penalties).

G

14. Pressure to spendPressure to meet spend target reduces our ability to choose high-quality interventions which deliver value for money.

2 4 8 A

Ask for an extension to delay spend of [up to £20m] of the funds into the next spending review.Balance any potential underspend with other ICF programmes.

G

Operational

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Official-Sensitive

15. Change in Political Direction – UKMinisters may choose to focus on different geographies,

2 5 10 A

Demonstrate the value for money of the programme in terms of facilitating countries to meet their climate goals, and inspiring others to act.Demonstrate the benefits to the UK of being a leader in low-carbon and the secondary opportunities that provides.Take a robust approach to learning, performance evaluation of the delivery partner and communication.

A

16. Intervention Design – NoveltyThis is the first time BEIS ICF has worked bilaterally and we don’t yet know exactly what the delivery model will look like. We may not find a suitable delivery partner or consortium of delivery partners. Our preferred delivery partner fails the delivery partner review.

2 5 10 A

Conduct extensive market scoping to understand the capability and capacity of potential delivery partners.Ensure the delivery partner has existing international experience and understands ODA rules.Ask for flexibility from PIC to our procurement approach to learn from market engagement activities.

G

17. Resources – Long Term NeedLessons learned from other TA programmes tell us that interventions are more successful when they’re based on a strong, long lasting relationship. We only have the RDEL available for a 3-4 year programme. If our programme is limited to this length of time, we might not realise the potential transformational impact.

2 4 8 A

Ensure that we have monitoring arrangements in place to learn lessons as we go.Conduct an evaluation of the programme to understand the relative benefits of bilateral working to make the case for increased funds in the next spending review.

G

Country context18. Change in Political Direction – RecipientA number of the countries we propose to work with have upcoming elections (Mexico and Colombia in the next year). These could result in a change to the level of political engagement or appetite to work with the UK on climate.

2 4 8 A

Focus on interventions that we have confidence will be followed through, even in the event of Ministerial or key person change.Activities stack up on their own.

A

Reputational19. Intervention Design – VisibilityThe UK will be working bilaterally with countries; therefore if the programme or personnel in-country represent the UK poorly there could be damage to in-country buy-in, the networks necessary for success and the UK’s reputation.

3 3 9 A

Robust recruitment processes, ensure the experts deployed have an appreciation of sensitivities working internationally (for skill-share).Conduct a delivery partner review.

G

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Official-Sensitive

20. Intervention Design – Delivery PartnersThe programme is likely to be contracted to delivery partners, who may be large international consultancy firms. There is a risk of public criticism for spending public money on firms perceived to have high fees.

2 2 4 G

Perform robust due diligence on the most suitable delivery partners for the programme, including full delivery partner reviews, to ensure the money is spent appropriately. Work with DFID and BEIS commercial expertise to ensure contracting maximises VFM. Allocate the contracts competitively, to give us a robust defense in the event of any potential criticism.

G

21. Working internationallyDelivering ODA programmes in middle-income countries (MICs) can carry reputational risks when compared against aid provided to the poorest or most unstable countries. MICs can be perceived by the public to be comparatively wealthy countries, and interventions can therefore attract public criticism for spend.

2 2 4 G

Ensure Ministerial comfort in working in MICs with regular engagement. Ensure that there is a catalysing effect of the programme, and commitment of country’s own resources. Emphasise the exponential global benefits of the programme.

G

Compliance22. Accounting – Payment in Advance of NeedThe budget will need to be managed to ensure that the delivery partner has enough funds to manage the programme and is incentivised to find originate high quality opportunities, but is not paid in advance of need.

2 2 4 GCommercial and finance advice on payment structure when we negotiate this with a delivery partner.

G

Legal23. Challenges on matters of law (e.g. State Aid, IDA)Legal challenge, or accusations of not meeting legal commitments (e.g. on State Aid, or regarding the ODA-eligibility rules within the International Development Act) could cause significant reputational harm and/or prevent some or all aspects of delivery.

1 5 5 A

Thorough scenario planning and scrupulous programme design with BEIS Legal to ensure that all legal risks are minimized, for example by ensuring that all grants are awarded on the basis of free and fair competition. Regular assessment of legal risk to ensure exposure remains within acceptable levels.

G; safe

24. Safeguarding of UK skillshare deployed staff, and of stakeholders they interact with (including women and children).

2 5 10 A

Enroll in Intl Aid Transparency Initiative.Use FCOs "OneHMG" to provide duty of care for embassy and long-term secondments and safeguarding training mandatory.For short-term / project work: Ensure partners use vetting service; have a code of conduct throughout delivery chain; safeguarding training mandatory; draw on result of DFID’s recent safeguarding review.

G

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Official-Sensitive25. Logistical challenges make some / all of elements of programme impossible to implement effectively (e.g. tax compliance in country, T&Cs for secondments etc)

2 4 8 A

Market engagement to flush out key challenges, procure experienced international delivery partner, use pilots / embassies to understand local challenges in depth.

G

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Official-SensitiveAnnex N – Appraisal case

Tier 1 Appraisal – Whether to create a TAP

Do Nothing Increasing Funding to and expanding TA aspects of existing ICF interventions

Develop a BEIS ICF flagship TA programme

1 . Principles for delivering effective TA6

We would ensure that our existing investments continued to be delivered in line with the principles. However, there is limited flexibility in existing programmes, and some delivery structures mean that there is limited ability for the programme to be owned and progressed by the country partner. Score: 2.5

We would ensure that additional TA interventions were in line with the principles. We could increase the transformational potential of existing interventions (e.g. the TA addition to GCPF) and support new TA programmes (e.g. C40).Score: 3.5

We would build requirements for our delivery partner to deliver TA in line with the principles. We would establish strong in-country presence. Through market engagement and a competitive tendering process we would ensure that the delivery partner had a track record of delivering effective TA, and fully understood these requirements.Score: 4.5

2. Potential to reach scale and sustainability

Limited potential to reach scale as TA delivery limited to existing or planned interventions.Score: 1

Ability to increase funding to new and expand existing TA programmes – using their contacts, network, footprint and delivery structure. But the scale of existing programmes doesn’t necessarily target the key countries and sectors to bring about the greatest impact. Also resource limitations in-house and the existence of ready-made, effective platforms to fund limits scale. Score: 3

Developing a new programme from scratch gives us an opportunity to deliver at scale. This isn’t without risk and we would need to pilot the approach and learn lessons as we go. However, if set up effectively, the delivery model could enable us to build-up to scale over the long-term. A key limiting factor could be the availability of relevant expertise in certain areas in high demand, and headcount limitations for any in-house functions.Score: 4

6 Demand-led; Achieves transformational aims; Ambitious whilst remaining flexible; Owned and progressed by the country partner, Opportunities for learning.34

Official-SensitiveDo Nothing Increasing Funding to and expanding TA

aspects of existing ICF interventionsDevelop a BEIS ICF flagship TA programme

3. Visibility and opportunities for soft power and influence, leveraging UK expertise

Limited potential as existing interventions are predominantly delivered through multi-donor and multilateral channels through which we have very limited visibility, opportunity for influence and ability to leverage UK expertise. Score: 1

Limited potential for UK visibility as existing and new interventions will be through multi-donor or multilateral channels therefore it is difficult to delineate the UK’s role and contribution. Where the embassy network is not involved in the programme delivery and stakeholder engagement in country, the relationships and influencing ability is difficult to realise. However, making new contributions to funds increases our ability to agree terms that result in increased UK visibility. When making new interventions we are able to negotiate better terms to feed information back to UK institutions about potential opportunities, however existing platforms often have their own go-to delivery partners, so realising UK opportunities is more challenging. Score: 2.5

Designing a BEIS ICF flagship TA programme, with strong buy-in from Whitehall including relevant FCO and DFID networks, and working bilaterally as the sole donor, will result in strong visibility for the UK. By placing UK experts in Ministries in partner countries, by increasing BEIS representation at post, and by being able to articulate the UK’s low-carbon offer, we will maximise visibility and create opportunities for soft power and influence. We must also ensure that aid is delivered effectively and is demand-driven, which could result in us supporting interventions where the UK does not have comparatively best expertise. But through this programme we have increased ability to leverage expertise through skill-sharing between UK institutions and partner countries. This must be done in line with ODA rules around tied aid.Score: 4.5

4. Resource implications

No further resource implications, but potentially limited ability to meet our RDEL spend target (or knock on pressure on rest of BEIS ICF team to consider how to scale up RDEL spend as alternative way to meet RDEL spend effectively.) by only making TA investments alongside CDEL programmes. Score: 5

Additional resource implications required to develop business cases for, and then manage, additional TA programmes. PIC keen for ICF to reduce the long list of small investments.Score: 3

This approach is likely to have the largest resource implications as it could call on the resource of domestic teams in the department, and our arms-length bodies. It will also require increased BEIS ICF and FCO team resource to manage in order to fully leverage all of the benefits (particularly UK visibility,). However, this is a logical component to a bigger programme so should be judged from a VfM perspective in the round (e.g. stakeholders have informed us that the level of HMG resource associated with TA programmes enables better outcomes). In addition, for this option we would use a phased delivery approach to ensure we follow a ‘no-regrets’ pathway.Score: 2

5. Development benefits

We will not be able to deliver additional development benefits further to existing programmes. Score: 1

We will be able to deliver increased development benefits in line with scaled up activity.Score: 2.5

We will be able to deliver increased development benefits with scaled up activity as part of a cutting-edge integrated programme. This approach will also be novel in its scale and scope – maximising economies of scale – and in its comprehensive and fully integrated learning element (which will result in increased benefits over project lifetime.)Score: 4

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Official-SensitiveDo Nothing Increasing Funding to and expanding TA

aspects of existing ICF interventionsDevelop a BEIS ICF flagship TA programme

6. Potential for learning

While there are learning elements in existing programmes, which covers TA, further learning will be limited by reliance on the original scope of the TA approaches when current programmes were designed.Score: 2

Despite the potential for a small TAP under this option, our potential for further learning remains limited as most of our existing interventions have evaluation components. Score: 3

We would be able to embed learning throughout the programme, designing in an ‘agile’ learning approach (as detailed in the learning annex). Score: 5

7. Finance considerations

No additional risk in terms of delivering against fiduciary requirements, however, could limit ability to meet RDEL target.Score: 2

No additional risk in terms of delivering against fiduciary requirements, and improves our ability to meet RDEL target.Score: 3

Poses some risk in being able to deliver against fiduciary requirement, but increases our ability to meet RDEL target and sets up institutional capability to deliver TA over the longer term. Score: 3

Total Score (14.5/7 = 2.1 average) Discount

(20.5/7 = 2.9 average) Consider

(27/7 = 3.9 average) Strongly Consider

36

Official-SensitiveTier 2 Appraisal – How to create a TAP

A: In-house B: Combination C: Totally outsourced D: New Institution1 . Principles for delivering effective TA7

Unlikely to be able to set up a team in house with access to all expertise in demand by partner countries. Limited in-country presence so limitations being demand-driven. Score: 2

Having flexibility between in-house and outsourced functions enables HMG and the private sector to play to strengths and ensure effective delivery overall. Managing this through a number of different contracts enables access to an increased supplier base (and therefore the best-placed suppliers/ expertise).Score: 5

Ability to enshrine principles in tender specs should ensure high compliance. However a lack of HMG involvement in day-to-day decision making and delivery likely to undermine effectiveness of TA, which evidence shows can be boosted if HMG can test if support is owned and progressed by the in-country partner.Score: 4

A new institution staffed with climate and development professionals and with access to in-country teams and expertise -designed to programme TA in line with principles would score highly, but this is untested, ambitious and likely to come with some risk.Score: 4.5

2. Potential to reach scale and sustainability

Very limited given headcount and space restrictions. Limited low-carbon skills and expertise inside HMG therefore would also rely on some contracting.Score: 2

Sub-contracting programme elements that don’t need to be conducted by HMG enables increased scale. Some risk around institutionalising HMG’s role in the programme in a way that makes the internal role resilient to head count cuts and government re-structure.Score: 3

More capacity in the private sector to scale up and create a programme over the long term. However, limitations in terms of building relationships with partner country governments with limited HMG involvement.Score: 3

Building an institution would take time, therefore it might be difficult to reach scale quickly, however setting up an institution (linked but separate to government) would ensure sustainability over the longer term. Score: 3

3. Visibility and opportunities for soft power and influence, leveraging UK expertise

Strong opportunities, however, lack of access to suite of UK expertise and lack of ability to be demand led further than the HMG offer may reduce effectiveness of the programme, and its relevance and interest to partner government.Score: 2

Good opportunities, the HMG role would maximise visibility and the flexible delivery structure would enable access to a wider set of suppliers, including, where relevant, UK expertise. Would still need to actively manage this as some components delivered through others.Score: 3

Very limited, especially with limited HMG in-country role. Potential to negotiate into programme contracting, but incentives would be difficult to align. Score: 1

A new, bespoke institution, staffed with and able to access the best low-carbon expertise would be very visible and make us very relevant to partner countries.Score: 4

4. Resource implications

Very stretching option – would require at least 40 additional staff in the ICF team, with inefficiencies (and further increases in headcount) likely as a result of gaps in internal expertise.Score: 1

Likely to need a much larger internal team (approximately 30 people) however the ability to contract out the areas that can’t be done in-house provides for high flexibility (and hence resource efficiency).Score: 3

Limited internal human resource need but there is likely to be a high price tag given that we would be tendering for a complete service.Score: 2

Very stretching from political buy-in, high institutional set-up and delivery costs.Score: 1

7 Demand-led; Achieves transformational aims; Ambitious whilst remaining flexible; Owned and progressed by the country partner.37

Official-SensitiveA: In-house B: Combination C: Totally outsourced D: New Institution

5. Development benefits

Although we would continue to work through DFID and FCO colleagues where possible, we would be unable to work through in-country delivery partners (resulting in a lack of access to experts) therefore potentially limited development benefits.Score: 2

An optimised model that enables strong country buy-in, and access to the best expertise, is likely to increase the programme results as a whole, including development results. Risk with delivering through numerous partners means they may not automatically be inclined to focus on development impact so this would need to be incentivised.Score: 3.5

The delivery partner(s) would need to demonstrate track record of delivering aid, so would expect good development benefits, but inefficiencies through outsourcing the whole programme as a single contract could slightly limit this.Score: 2

An institution staffed with development professionals would be skilled at ensuring development outcomes are realised. But, novelty, risk, and time to set up institution may limit this in the short term.Score: 3

6. Potential for learning

Ability to exercise full control over strategy, design, and implementation would maximise potential for learning (though this would be very labour intensive).Score: 4

Learning would need to be embedded in the programme design and contracting to bring together the in-house and subcontracted elements of the programme. Could have a stronger learning team in-house and keeping some functions internal means a strong link to UK policy learning.Score: 4

We would require all lessons to be shared with BEIS, however this would be difficult to verify. Lack of HMG involvement risks learning between UK & partner countries being limited.Score: 3

Learning function embedded into new institution would enable positive learning in and between countries, and globally. However the same risk applies as with option C that BEIS would have limited control over the process or use of results, compared to option B.Score: 3

7. Finance considerations

Low risk in terms of being able to deliver against financial requirements. Score: 4

A larger number of delivery partners brings increased programme risk therefore more active management of delivery against financial requirements. Score: 3

Due diligence processes on delivery partner(s) would ensure low risk of delivering against financial requirements. Score: 4

Setting up a new institution may require non-ODA budget, and involves considerable legal complexity which may impact on ability to meet financial requirements. (This could be partially mitigated by drawing extensively on the models used for recently-created new institutions, but high residual risks would remain.)Score: 2

Total Score(17/7 = 2.4 average) Discount

(24.5/7 = 3.5 average) Strongly Consider

(19/7 = 2.7 average) Consider

(20.5/7 = 2.9 average) Consider

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Official-SensitiveAnnex P – VfM measures by programme component

Programme element

What are we paying for? VFM Economy VFM Efficiency

Peop

le

Day rates of short term skill share experts

Day rates for those short-term skill share experts on deployments, T&S and local costs

We have benchmarked these costs against other skill-share day rates.Employees of companies asked to work pro bono on the roster. For independent contractors, day rates capped below full market rate with a senior and junior day rate to keep costs down whilst attracting right people. All travel and subsistence in line with HMG policy including DFID’s policies on consultant spend and expectations on T&S. Performance of people on the roster will be reviewed on a six-monthly basis by 360 feedback undertaken by ICF/delivery partner, with BEIS reserving the right to remove any under-performing candidates, or those whose skills are no longer required (this will follow FCO's successful approach undertaken for their Stabilisation Unit.)

Will have technical and diplomatic skills and provide long term support to in-country institutionsWill help to inform other programme components improving the efficiency of short term skill share and programme funding – line of accountability will be through the delivery partner, which will escalate lessons and policy inputs directly to BEIS and/or the learning partner as appropriate.Will deepen the programme’s stakeholder networkPerformance management for skill share (learning from programmes)Will design contracts such that experts’ incentives are aligned with oursWill ensure that recruitment processes are robust and transparent and attract experts with the desired skills

Salaries of long term secondees

Salaries and associated costs (relocation, accommodation) of long term placements

Wherever possible, and pending final confirmation from HR, salaries will be within BEIS grade pay ranges or kept on company salary if seconded directly (plus cost of living allowances in line with FCO norms for relevant country).Approach will ensure that we attract the right talent, but appropriate for the market. Will use recruitment approach that will allow access to right skills. Individual secondee appointments will be considered on a case by case basis to ensure objectives of secondment justify costs. Will only use secondees where we have identified a clear need and role in particular institution.

Will provide responsive, short term, policy or technical support in areas of identified need at short noticeWill help government departments and private sector institutions quickly understand their clean growth pathway optionsWill inform wider programmingWill design contracts such that secondees’ incentives are aligned with ours

Admin of short & long-term skill share

Building, advertising, managing and maintaining a roster of low-carbon experts, (and potentially providing an administrative function (duty of care) for the long-term secondments)

Business case for this procurement will do VFM analysisMake sure the delivery partner does sufficient advertising and market engagement to ensure that as many suppliers as possible participate in the procurement and therefore it is a truly competitive procurement.Drive costs down through competitive procurement.Benchmark with other DFID skill-sharing programmes.Travel and expense policy will be designed to ensure the most prudent use of resources. Will be an expense approval policy.

Will procure delivery partner to manage the roster of experts. Will drive effectiveness through procurement process. Find delivery partner through the procurement process with experience of managing a roster of experts Will ensure that the terms of reference clearly detail the roles and responsibilities of delivery partner and will have appropriate contract and programme management procedures in place to ensure any course correctionWill ensure incentives are aligned with ours through contracting

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Official-SensitiveProgramme element

What are we paying for? VFM Economy VFM Efficiency

Prog

ram

me

Fund

ing

Demand-driven in country funds in priority countries

Money to low-carbon expert organisations to work on demand driven areas of TA need in our priority countries

Country strategies and scoping will ensure that we are buying the right inputs.  We will drive quality through competition to find delivery partners.

We will benchmark the costs for different in country funded work. We will perform year-ahead budgets.

Country scoping and strategy development will ensure that programme funding is targeted to demand and in line with political economyEngaging stakeholders in advance and then holding an open call for grants will drive competition and enable access to best low-carbon expertise Process to review bids will enable us to check the theory of change for each proposed interventionGovernance will ensure that the intervention is in line with in-country demandProgramme management procedures will ensure that programme is kept on track to deliver outcomes

Global competitive facility

Money to low-carbon expert organisations who bid for funding through the global ‘challenge’ thematic windows

Make sure the delivery partner advertises effectively and engages the market to get sufficient interest so that the facility is as competitive as possible.Detailed transparent investment criteria for identifying activities. Competitive allocation process. Payment staggered and based on delivery of outputs as set out in the Grant Offer Letter. Checks undertaken both by admin delivery partner, and learning partner.We will drive quality through competition to find delivery partners.We will benchmark the costs for different in country funded work. We will perform year-ahead budgets.

Open calls will enable us to attract proposals from a wide range of institutionsBEIS governance, policy and technical expertise will ensure that the most promising proposals are fundedProgramme management procedures will ensure that programme is kept on track to deliver outcomesWell-designed terms of reference, contracts and M&E to ensure winners are adding value

Admin of in-country & global competitive funds

Scoping demand, advertising opportunities, due diligence on project proposals, monitoring and reporting etc.

Drive costs down through competitive procurementCompetitive tender to get the best VfM contract. Payment staggered and based on delivery of outputs. Annual break clauses put in contracts.

Will engage the market and competitively procure a delivery partner to run calls and manage and deliver grants on our behalf.Will find delivery partner with experience of doing thisWill ensure that the terms of reference clearly detail the roles and responsibilities of delivery partner and will have appropriate contract and programme management processes in place for course correction.Will ensure incentives are aligned with ours

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Official-SensitiveProgramme element

What are we paying for? VFM Economy VFM Efficiency

Stra

tegy

& O

vers

ight

Staff in London & Embassies

TAP unit based both in London and in Embassies to manage and deliver the programme

Regular evaluation and comparison against other ICF / similar HMG technical assistance programmes. For example, FCO's prosperity fund has over 200 FTE to manage £1bn of funds (vs ICF having 70 FTE to manage over £2bn), and the Stabilisation unit has over 100 FTE to manage a roster of 600 experts undertaking 400 assignments a year. It is difficult to draw comparisons, as the programmes funded have implications for the resource required to manage, but on the whole, programmes dealing with people and technical support require larger teams to manage.

Post – enlarged team, mix of technical and diplomacy skills, to programme manage, provide political economy analysis, actively engage in/manage donor coordination, and help to realise the impact of TALondon – enlarged team, mix of strategic, programme management, policy and technical skills. Policy and technical experts will perform project due diligence resulting in more effective outcomes

Monitoring & Evaluation

To provide expert advice on programme monitoring to support adaptive programming and programme evaluation. Will require long-term partnership as oppose to one off reports

We anticipate higher costs given our business requirements, but for comparison:Detail on costs for programme level evals in BEIS£400k FCPF: Mid-term eval involving interviews, and 6 case studies £300k GCPF: Mid-term eval involving interviews, and 4 case studies £500k CP3: an evaluation, 5 case studies, plus baseline, plus annual reports and learning products£190k REPP Mid-term eval: Interviews and 1 or 2 case studies£1mill Ci-DEV: 3 evaluations £2mill UKCI: 10 case studies and 1 eval, plus impact eval, case studies, learning products

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Official-Sensitive

Annex Q – Finance flows through delivery partners

42

Official-Sensitive

Annex R – Financial Profile year by year

18/19 19/20 20/21 21/22 22/23Med High Med High Med High Med High Med High

London staff FTE 8.5 14.5 20 27 20 34 20 34 20 34London staff costs £ £504,975 £810,910 £1,104,117 £1,480,641 £1,104,117 £1,795,724 £1,104,117 £1,795,724 £1,104,117 £1,795,724In-country staff FTE 6.3 9.3 11.3 15.3 17.3 21.3 23.3 27.3 0 0In-Country staff costs £ £266,971 £402,382 £753,438 £1,034,158 £1,254,823 £1,545,616 £1,635,890 £1,926,683 £0 £0Comms & Events £ £50,000 £100,000 £50,000 £100,000 £50,000 £100,000 £100,000 £200,000 £200,000 £300,000Monitoring & Evaluation £ £250,000 £300,000 £500,000 £600,000 £500,000 £600,000 £600,000 £700,000 £500,000 £600,000Scoping Research £ £0 £0 £200,000 £300,000 £300,000 £400,000 £300,000 £400,000 £300,000 £400,000Recruitment and induction of skillshare roster £ £46,000 £92,833 £46,000 £92,833 £46,000 £92,833 £46,000 £92,833 £46,000 £92,833Admin of skillshare £ £42,250 £68,250 £172,250 £204,750 £224,250 £256,750 £276,250 £344,500 £364,000 £432,250Number of skillshares 3 4 8 12 10 14 12 16 14 18Short-term skillshare £ £195,000 £260,000 £520,000 £780,000 £650,000 £910,000 £780,000 £1,040,000 £910,000 £1,170,000Number of secondments 1 2 6 6 8 8 10 12 14 16Long-term Secondments £ £143,000 £286,000 £858,000 £858,000 £1,144,000 £1,144,000 £1,430,000 £1,716,000 £2,002,000 £2,288,000Admin of prog fund & global fund £ £150,000 £250,000 £587,500 £1,050,000 £1,012,500 £1,612,500 £1,612,500 £2,475,000 £1,762,500 £2,700,000No. of Prog Fund proposals 0 0 11 23 21 35 29 45 28 40Prog Country Fund £ £0 £0 £4,500,000 £9,000,000 £8,500,000 £14,000,000 £11,500,000 £18,000,000 £11,000,000 £16,000,000

No. of Global Competitive Fund proposals 0 0 8 13 13 19 25 38 31 50Global Competitive Fund £ £0 £0 £3,333,333 £5,000,000 £5,000,000 £7,500,000 £10,000,000 £15,000,000 £12,500,000 £20,000,000

Grand Total £1,648,195.70 £2,570,375.03 £12,624,638.53 £20,500,382.53 £19,785,690.20 £29,957,423.53 £29,384,757.20 £43,690,740.53 £30,688,617.00 £45,778,807.33

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Official-Sensitive

Annex S – Programme components, role for BEIS and role for contractor

Long term secondments

1. Long term skill-sharing will play an important role in this programme, but is unlikely to achieve success or scale on its own. Placements of UK government experts in partner government departments or teams have the potential to take advantage of UK expertise (which we know is in demand, on many topics). However, these placements are likely to work best where there is already political buy-in from the partner country, where they are targeted towards meeting a clearly defined and evident need and in combination with a wider set of activities that are helping to build lasting capacity in partner institutions. Given the need to carefully judge the deployment, and to get the person specification right (with technical expertise, but also a sound judgement of in-country working and ability to represent HMG) this function is better undertaken by BEIS rather than a delivery partner. We will use fair and open competition to recruit these people.

2. Whilst placements have the potential to be highly impactful (if the conditions are right); in terms of delivery, long-term placements are a fairly costly option [£143k based on average UK salary of £75k plus £68k p.a. for duty of care, allowances, travel etc based on FCO One HMG costs for deploying staff overseas], therefore we judge the need for a small number of carefully posted individuals. Given what we know about the potential impact of this type of TA, it only makes sense for placements to be in countries where we anticipate wider-programming. Over the course of the next three years, we could deploy 6-8 experts between Mexico (2-3), Colombia (2-3) and over the slightly longer term, one other new country (1-2), with a view to extending this final set of placements into the next Spending Review period. These would be targeted in areas where there are clear capacity needs in partner institutions, that have the potential to bring about significant emissions reduction and are influential in the creation and implementation of existing and new climate or clean growth plans.

3. Deployments would be identified in collaboration with partner governments and would be in line with the targeted TA that will be identified through the in-country strategies. The pilot activities that will take place in 2018/19 (supported through the TAP pilot business case) will provide us with a solid understanding of TA needs, the post-election politics in Mexico and Colombia and strong networks with relevant stakeholders, to optimise the deployment.

Role for BEIS/HMG: Identifying deployments, recruiting individuals, duty of care, line management, monitoring and reporting, due diligence.

Role for delivery partner: None. Potentially overtime could use some of the short-term skill share functions (esp. duty of care).

Short-term placements

4. As with long-term skill sharing, short-term placements are shown to be impactful if they take place within the context of wider programming. A review of DFID’s existing skill-sharing programmes shows that there are a number of management and delivery approaches, each with their pros and cons, and some key-lessons relevant to the TAP.

Identifying assignments: Some skill-share programmes take a strategic / long-term approach, where they rely on a small number of existing deep relationships for repeat assignments; or develop presence in country, with comprehensive scoping at design state, identifying specific opportunities before implementation begins; or put in a long-term advisor to act as the technical advisor / facilitator of skill-share arrangements. Others are more responsive / reactive which enables the programme to be very responsive to changing in-country demands; however, where this is the case, sometimes the quality of the request is a problem and a lot of embassy time is then taken up more clearly identifying and scoping the request.

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Key lesson for TAP: Encourage programme funded BEIS staff at post and long-term secondees in tier 1 countries to develop deep relationships and networks with in country stakeholders and be able to articulate what skills are available through the ‘roster of experts’. If more reactive / ad-hoc demands come in from non-tier 1 countries, use programme leads and existing climate/energy attaches to judge the pros and cons and assess whether / not to support.

Engaging UK expertise: One of the key risks to skill-share programmes is the availability of expertise, especially when this expertise is otherwise engaged in furthering our pressing domestic low-carbon agenda. Therefore initial enthusiasm to scale up sometimes may not translate into action when an opportunity lands. Even financial remuneration cannot sometimes compensate for the loss of key human capital – particularly in highly technical areas. Interviews with participants suggested benefits such as: engagement in the UK’s aid strategy; opportunities for collaboration and networking between institutions; personal and professional development opportunities; recruitment and retention opportunities; visibility of UK expertise on the world stage. Also if participants understood assignments as being about mutual benefit, they were more likely to engage in a spirit of peer-to-peer learning, and less likely to employ a more outdated, didactic approach.

Key lesson for TAP: Have a clear and compelling case and incentives for UK institutions and individuals to engage with the skill-share programme. Recognise the benefits to the UK, in addition to the partner country. Only rely on HMG officials where there is a clear strategic rationale and impactful outcome.

Country focussed / programme approach: Programmes with a wide country scope have found it harder to get traction in DFID country offices and their ability to develop in-country policy knowledge has been limited. Success has been reported when engaging with country offices at strategic level as the programme then gets factored into the country office strategy. Engagement at assignment level is a help (local insight, understanding of political economy) and a hindrance (significant resource pressure on country office staff – can cause delays). Getting to a critical mass of assignments in country helps to justify a dedicated partnerships resource permanently stationed in country. This in turn helps to facilitate new partnerships and gives valuable local insight into political economy and institutional appetite for reform. When asked about the scalability of their programmes, most programme managers indicated that the constraints would lie in supply, or demand for practitioner experience, rather than the operating model.

Key lesson for TAP: Start with a small number of countries, and spend time understanding demand and in-country policy. Ensure that the skill-share offer is known, understood and owned at strategic level (e.g. by Ambassadors). Embed responsibility for developing partnerships and scoping skill-share demand in the roles of staff at post. Understand that it is unlikely that the delivery model will constrain supply, rather the ability to effectively broker demand with supply, so build up the programme with a good understanding of demand and supply over time.

Type of delivery partner: Of the six skill-sharing DFID programmes reviewed, three of the programmes were procured with standard procurement procedures and are governed by a commercial contract. Of these, one is delivered by a private sector provider (PWC), another by a private/non-profit consortium (KPMG and legal development partnership) and the third by a charity (THET). One programme uses non-competitive accountable grants from DFID, another is centrally funded from DFID through an MOU and the last uses a ‘PES transfer’. Different cost structures lend themselves to different levels of scale and types of deployment. In instances where the pool of expertise is narrow / already well defined, ‘flat’ structures are used, the whole programme is managed ‘in-house’ and no bodies external to government are used to originate or manage assignments. In instances where there is a large array of potential implementation partners, less flat cost structures are used. For example, where an implementation partner draws down funds from DFID then passes it in the form of grants to institutional partners who are in turn responsible for brokering assignment opportunities. The extended supply chain introduces fiduciary risk, reporting complexity and transaction costs, but there are strong justifications for this, given the number of relationships the programme is required to maintain which DFID could not feasibly maintain directly. There are also ‘half-way’ options where HMG holds the relationships, but the intermediary is responsible for brokering and managing assignments.

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Key lesson for TAP: There are numerous ways to financially engage delivery partners depending on the programme design. Given the breadth of low-carbon expertise that we need to engage, the TAP skill share programme will need to use a delivery partner or intermediary to broker, manage and implement assignments which may introduce fiduciary risk and some increased transaction costs.

Management and governance of short term skill-share: Where DFID has found a partner with long-established expertise, and strong and diverse relationships with UK institutions, they’ve been able to be relatively hands off in terms of management and oversight. Otherwise there has been a crucial role for HMG in doing this. Where there is a delivery partner involved, DFID guidance is to be clear about who owns the relationships and who is responsible for originating assignments. In addition, when working with delivery partners who haven’t been involved in ODA programmes before, more support will be needed in helping them to understand M&E approaches etc.

Key lesson for TAP: Be clear about exactly what the supplier is responsible for and where accountability falls (e.g. technical support whilst on deployment, Duty of Care arrangements, originating and the quality of the assignment, logistics, M&E) and what the role for BEIS is. Identify partner(s) with established expertise, relationships in the UK and internationally and credibility (through their teams) in development and climate change. In the governance model consider reporting structures, and make the level of oversight that we expect, and ultimate accountability clear in the ITT to encourage the delivery partner to outline how they see the their internal organisational structures, and the governance relationship with BEIS working. Ensure that the governance arrangements give us a strong voice, and that our role as the ultimate arbiter of the programme is clear to all parties.

5. Taking on board these lessons and what we know about the UK’s low-carbon ‘ecosystem’ (deep and varied) we will need a delivery partner to manage the majority of the short term skill-share programme. At the same time, there will be a key role for BEIS policy and country leads in ensuring that from a technical perspective, the expertise is shared in the most effective way, follows ODA best practice, and is in-line with country demand. In addition, to manage the in-country relationships and UK visibility that will need to be captured by HMG as a result of the placements.

Role for BEIS: Advertising the programme and opportunities to engage, due diligence on skill-share missions from a technical, policy and political perspective, holding and managing relationships with key officials in recipient institutions. Holding policy knowledge in specific topic areas (e.g. green finance, decarbonisation, legislation) to inform future missions. Responsible for agreeing assignments and the type of expert from roster suitable.Role for delivery partner: Advertising the programme and opportunities to engage, recruiting individuals to join the roster, maintaining and managing the roster of experts, engaging with learning partner to ensure that results from skill-share missions are adequately captured. Responsible for putting a call out to the roster for each assignment and agreeing who should be used based on BEIS selection criteria. Will have a Service Level Agreement to deploy within an agreed time frame.

Programme Funds

6. Programme funds will be allocated in two ways: 1. ‘Country-specific’. TA initiatives in tier 1 countries implemented through different supplier bases;

and2. Global challenge fun. A mechanism to manage and oversee a longer tail of TA initiatives in a wider

list of countries implemented through different supplier bases.

7. Based on the scoping that we have conducted so far, including commissioned evidence, a DFID review of challenge funds, and existing TA programmes we have learned the following lessons.

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Official-SensitiveDemand-led, in line with political economy and addressing systemic barriers: In order to have a chance of transforming institutions and leading to the desired outcomes, TA must be delivered in line with demand, and with the grain of existing institutional and structural organisation and politics. TA programmes that have tried to focus on too many disparate challenges have eventually become thematically focussed or narrowed down the sectors that they focus on. By funding numerous linked activities in country, it is possible to stimulate ecosystems and bring about change. Some countries have established mechanisms and processes for assessing and determining their TA needs, others will need up front TA to support the process to identify demand. Lesson for TAP: Put time into scoping demand, make sure there is enough country intel to analyse not just the technical needs but the political economy too. Ensure that analysis of TA needs is done in line with existing in-country processes (where they exist). Be wary of supporting too many disparate interventions, guide interventions with country-level theories of change.

HMG assisting in helping delivery partners to realise the impact of interventions is a big resource gap: FCO and DFID representatives have a key role to play in using their diplomatic expertise and in-country programme oversight to ensure projects stay on track and the impact is realised. Developing strong, productive and long-term relationships with key individuals is crucial. UK has a role to play in coordinating donors and helping increase the impact of all in-country donor funded programmes. Lessons for TAP: Hire BEIS representatives at post, ensure they have a mix of technical and diplomatic skills, and a role in coordinating donor activity. Ensure that relationships can be built with the knowledge that this will be a long-term approach.

Financing mechanisms with long lead times, that are unable to course correct given pressure to spend can lead to poor value for money: most DFID challenge funds that aim to tackle ‘civil society’ focussed challenges are funded through grants (to take an outcome, rather than output focus). Ensure that delivery partners aren’t incentivised to spend money too quickly on poor VFM projects, to get money out of the door. Lessons for TAP: Make grants available, conduct extensive market engagement, support the development of ideas and relationship building at the country level. Make project time scales and processes transparent so the market knows where there are windows of opportunity to engage and how to work with recipients.

Country-specific programmes:

Role for BEIS: Hold relationships with partners in country, advise on best mechanisms and political processes to work with to understand and scope demand, contribute to due diligence on project proposals, engage heavily in steering process to determine sectors and winning concepts, engage regularly with project implementers, ensure UK visibility for funding and outcomes, capture lessons and positive comms, market engagement with potential sub-suppliers (including use of DIT portals for advertising opportunities). Responsible for final decisions on which organisations will receive grant money based on clear criteria set out in call for proposals in line with other similar international aid programmes.Role for delivery partner: Scoping in-country demand, advertising call for proposals, performing due diligence on concepts and full proposals, developing M&E systems and processes and ensuring these are met, market engagement with potential sub-suppliers. Responsible for running a robust, fair and open competition before awarding grants.

Global challenge fund programme:The global fund would be open for both low- and middle-income countries. Grants would be awarded informed by ICF country prioritisation and assessment of individual proposals against clear criteria.Role for BEIS: Provide policy and strategic direction on challenge windows, contribute to due diligence on project proposals, engage heavily in steering process to determine sectors and winning concepts, engage regularly with project implementers, ensure UK visibility for funding and outcomes, capture lessons and positive comms, market engagement with potential bidders to the challenge fund. Responsible for final decisions on which organisations will receive grant money based on clear criteria set out in call for proposals in line with other similar international aid programmes.

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Official-SensitiveRole for delivery partner: Scoping global demand to determine challenge windows ‘need’, advertising call for proposals, performing due diligence on concepts and full proposals, developing M&E systems and processes and ensure these are met, market engagement with bidders to the fund (including use of DIT portals for advertising opportunities). Responsible for running a robust, fair and open competition before awarding grants.

Cross-cutting programme learning

8. As the TAP is smaller and more agile than other donor programmes which BEIS will design from ‘scratch’ we can embed a strong learning component into the programme from the beginning. We anticipate M&E could constitute around 10% of the overall programme budget.

9. The M&E component of this programme needs to:1. Monitor against the KPIs set at the individual project level2. M&E at the programme level to pull together a coherent story from across all country-level

interventions, to include completion of all programme management tools (logframes, data collection, annual reporting etc)

3. The capability to enable South-South intra-programme learning at the regional and global level4. The ability to capture results in real-time, to ensure that the programme can be adaptive and

flexible, and for learning to be able to influence future programming.5. The recognition that the impacts of TA are likely to be realised over the long term, and are difficult

to attribute, which methods should reflect.

Role for BEIS: Analyse results reporting and input this to programme and strategy board, complete annual review, manage learning partner, ensure that M&E processes are in place in different programmes

Role for learning partner: monitor programmes, aggregate results, provide programme level updates, learning products (comms products?)

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Annex U – Roles and responsibilities of governance groupsGovernance Group

How will the programme board operate? Regular Papers

Programme Board - Secretariat from the TAP team.- Sign off business cases and major contracts with

delivery partners- Set strategic direction for the programme, ensuring

alignment with HMG objectives, including which countries to partner with

- Review Programme status and manage strategic risks

- Feedback messages to Ministers & senior stakeholders

- Business Cases- Programme report- Risk Register- Major Contracts- Thinkpieces

Working Group- Review proposals and tenders from delivery partners- Prep materials for the programme board- Assure delivery mechanisms are set up following

Civil Service HR, Commercial & Finance guidance- Review individual project status and manage

delivery risks.

- Project report- Delivery risks- Detailed budgets- Resourcing plans- Evaluation report

Steering Group - Advise the programme on how best to achieve its primary aims, with sector specific advice.

- Ensure that secondary benefits are realised for UK plc

- Help the programme find the correct experts to deliver specific projects within the programme.

- Programme Report- Thinkpieces- Mapping

(Country) Market Engagement Group

- Rigorously assess the demand requirements of each country.

- Consider how the TAP can supply solutions to these demand requirements.

- Ensure that UK sector leads (e.g. power, heat, transport, buildings, forestry) are able to contribute to the delivery of any solutions

- Country specific analytical reports- Sector specific reports

Comms Group - Receive information and event invites for the programme and think how TAP fits with their own objectives

- Feed back to the TAP team any suggestions to improve the programme.

- Newsletter

Small TAP delivery and evaluation

- Effectively deliver the small TAP, with a constant view on how it could be “scaled up”.

- Evaluate lessons learned, both for continuous improvement of the small TAP but also to inform delivery of the big TAP, and wider global carbon reduction programmes.

- Project report- Evaluation reports

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