MEN-AT-ARMS SERIES

THE GREEK AND PERSIAN WARS

EDITOR: MARTIN WINDROW

THE GREEK AND PERSIAN WARS

Text and colour plates by JACK CASSIN-SCOT

ISRN o 83045 27 I f6

Thc preparation of 111is trxt wnulrl havr bccn impnnsihlr wi tho11 t thr nssiatancc o F Charlcs Wonrill, who gavr of' h i s time rnml cr~lrrouslv, ancl savrtl ~ h c Iwmk ham manv rsron of'I;i(.~. IlI~~~rr;~tions 2:3 to 30 art. taken firm Cn.~l~/rn~ o f t l ~ r &rek.r and Kornnni hy 'l'hrnnas Hopr (1)rlvr.r P~~hlicationsl.

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Tlir yci81.s Stro 323 1 3 . ~ : . \vrw ;I ~wrirxl ctF intcnsr military activity it1 rht- c.;~scr-rn 51 c.tEitcr.r;l~~c.;~r~ ;mrl his hlinor. 7 ' 1 ~ ron~l)atu~lts. 1%-11rrI1c.t rlwy \tbrrc- involvcrl in prtty inter-st i ~ t t . sr~~iflic.ts or t h ( . opprmsivr- \rn;~~.monqc-tit~c a~lrl i~~ i l~r l - i ;~ l i sm of 1111-

Prmians i ~ n d 1lac.c.r Donians. Tr~~nd t t3(- &)1'1111lr-s of'

rvar rrrarir ; ~ n t l \.icrtq, olitb~l rphc*~~lr-r:~l. In thr r.ilrly filih rmtury n.c. ;~ftcs ttlr. l i~ l l nf IIIC

Lydian Empirr-, t l ~ r . I'rrsian \vilfi t~r.g;m as arl idcoloqic;~l ronflic!. tinlgh t 1wtwct.n ;I t!.rannirat mi~11ty vrnpil-t. ; ~ t l t l ;I ~)r'outl tIrm~ri~tic- frcctlcnn- lovin? prtq~lc. '!'he immc*cli;trt. ~.;IIISI- t\*as tllc. rc\.olt orthr C;rrrk citics in lania, alt~nq th r crnlral coast

:\ristaqor;w. :\?I urgc.rlr ;~pprnl Tor:lid was at~swvrcil h!. 11o111 ;\thcns and the snlall city stiltc of 1:rrlria on thr i s la t~ l ol' F,t~lmra ; :Irhcns sul>l,lirrt twcn~y-li\+c* sIlips. Spartx, thr grvatcst mili tar! ~ ) o w c ~ - within I hr tiellmic \rfc)r-ltl, h i d no qrrat likiriq for rtiskant

which tiicy ~ a p t u r t ~ l ;tnd rlrst royt.rl. For some rcason I h r :\lthcnian con t ing~tl t \\.its thcn crrdrrrcl

I. Relief ahowing the archer-bodypard of Dnriuu, the 'Immortals'. T h e e spltadid f i p p r r r r were made in coloadml glazd bricks and dtcoratd thr wall* of the Patmct OF Suka. (7hc Pcrscpolir)

e Detrif rmm an Attic marble relid, s h d g au Arhcni.a hsplitr aarnplrtr with mmnd shitkd (aapiaj,hrir style htlmtt, M y and I re a m o u r and rhc Ionr-chnftnl spear. [Natiooal Muscum, A ~ h m s )

hotnc-, hut this initial success opcnecl the way for Zl~rc her thrusts all along the coast, spreading the revolt to the cities ol' ~ h r Hcltrxpnt, Calia and, finally to the Greek tnwns of Cvprus.

Thc Pcwians reviewed [his rcl-rcllinn with some

alarm. 'l'be court oTSusa saw imrnt.cli;rtcly that, iT succmsful, i t would haw a drastic cft'ect on the authority of the empirc. 'I'hc 'Grcat King' Darius realized thc skill and strrngt h oft hc rebels only tw wrll, as thcy wrrr part oT his empire's military forces, and hc considered that his most usc6ul course of action was to adopt a naval expcdition as the pivot of his campaiqn; a strikc by his ships cornbinid with the landins or troops would prove the crucial factor in turning hack thc flood or revolt.

Hastily zqzss~mblcd royal contingents from the sa'trapies of Asia Minor were rushed, first to rontain the Ionian inrantry, anct then to mnvc forward t a k i n ~ the ofknsivr. Thc Ionians gave way and

made a strategic withdrawal rrom Li , ar d'. rs , rctrcat- in^ to Ephcsus whrre. after a shor~ firrcr I~attlc, they wrrt. drfratrd and forced ro capiiulatc, A Pl~oerlician naval sqnarlron uncler Isrrsian corn - tnand was ordcrcd to Cyprus. Thr lactical in- tclttions wcrc thc dcstmction ofthe Greek fl~ct and the landing of an occupation Torcc. 'I'hr (;rt*rk Ilwt gave a gtmd account or ilsrli, inllictin~ Fra t clarnnq* o n thc Persian slrips, I,ul things wwt-nt I)arlPy Ibr thc insitrgvnt Hellrnic land forcm and Cyprus I'cll nnrc. a ~ a i n under Persia11 rt~le. Altvr this tht* revolt l ~ t mtlst of i t s impetus.

,"I yvar Eatcr, the Penian atmirs, caking Full advantaqc. 06 thc drclininx rrvolutionary spirit, rrrapturrd thr- towns and citirs on the Hrllrsjx)nf and in Aeolia. C~arEa. however, offrrrrl grr-at rrsistanrc, and a k r two bloody and costly I~a~zlrs t hr Prrsians wrrr rc-j)~~lsr-rl. nltt t l ~ e loriian I:l<*rt was drfcatrd off the island oE'Lade, anrl, with thc ELII of thr Ionian city of Milct114 in 494 n.c., the rcvol t was ovcr.

Aficr t hc Ionian revolt, ~ b c invasicln or rhc Greek mainland became inevi~ablc. In rhe sprinq of 492 B.C. narius sent a p s o t ~ i n ~ cxprditisnary force tl~mugh t h r Hellespont; this consisted o f a larqe fleet supported by a well provided arrnv, under thc command of Mardonius, his son-in-law. On the hordrrs of Macedonia the troops had to sustain a v io l~nt assault by a Thracian trihc and Masdonius was woundcrl. At the same timc this flct-t ran into a scijprc storm whilst rounding the dangrrt~us penin- sula of Mount Athos, and hair 01' tllc ships wcrc eilhcr drivcn ashore or wrecked. '1"hough some authority had heen re-cstahlish td, Mardonius wilhdrcw and rcturned to Persia wherr: hc was temporarily rclieved or his command.

Spring 491 R.C. saw a flurry of envoys from Darius, t~s t ing the morale orthe Greek states. His rquest 'demanding carth and water I'nr vnssalsgc* was acccptrcl by many slates from the norlh Aegcan to the UardanclFcs, but Athens and Sparta rrfilsed. With so many states in his powcr Darius fell rcartv lo attack.

Otlr year later, in (he spring 01'4130 R.c., a laqe

newly-hi11 nect and a l a r ~ c army asscrnbled near Tarsus on the Cilician coast oppositr Cyprus. This forcc was under the.jnint command oiilrtaphernt-s ~Darius' ncphcw) and Dati~ (a Mcdian nobleman), who took with them thr c-xilcd Athenian quisling Hippias as t h c i r guide. Thcir orclcm were to destroy thr cncrny forces on thr mainlanrl ol'Grercc and to

pillage and destroy thc ports and then the cilirs or Athms and Eretria, Sor t tlrir part In the revolt. Thc opcraltion procerrled along the soutl-tcrn shores of Asia Minor, thrn westwards horn Ionia. "I'hr Rcct movcd through thr Cyclades reaching Naxos, which had sunrivcrl carlicr attacks llut was now xscauttrcl and sackrd. Having: secured thc first objective, command of the Cvcladm and the

Acqean Sea, the I'crsianspushcd forward with their invasion. 'T'hr fIrrt advancwl rrom island to island, commandeer in^ troops ancl hostagrs. Rrsistance was cnco~~ntrrrd at Carys'trls, the rnosl wuthrrly

town of Kuhora, hut , with n force nt.snrnc ~j,ooo l i ~ h t i n a mrn against thrm ancl their crop clrs- troye~i, t tlc' C;~rystians soon capitulated. Pcrsian troops disemhnrkd on Euhora and laid s i c ~ c te Eretria which rcsistnrl for a wrrk. I ' a k i n ~ fill1

advantage of a 'bctraval from insirltb fhc city, the Persians eapturrd and pillaged wifhout mcrcy. r\ quick thrust across the short crossing brou~hr the Persian army onto the shores or Artira.

Hippiaa, as thc Persian military adviscr, recorn- mended 111e Bay of Marathon as thc bcst place Tar disembarkation. It was an idral h:~rhour;lqe, a lony firm, Hat plain between the mountains and the sea, pmtrctrd fn>m the north and cast winds, and within rasy rrach or Ath~ns, which lay somr 38 kilomcrrcs ro the norlh-cast, rhrozqh thr Hymcttus-l'rntrle Pass. 'l'he s i~nr ly I>r.;\~h could accornmrxlatc t hr 6r~o s h i p , which rcr~t~ircd somc livr killomctrcs, I:urthrrrnorr., rhr nprn plait1 of'

attic sladcs 0 4 6 1 2

kilonlctres -

l i a r i ~ t h r ) ~ ~ n1li.rc.d thr riqht r.ontli~ion.i ti)r thr Pcrsian ra\.;llr.y. ;~q;iinst tc-l~irh t l ~ t * :'ct hc-nian ~~~~~~~~y \rnt~ld hc inc.lli.c.tivc.

'171~ invasion flrcr 11r;lc-hc.tl on ill(. s;tnrly short-, ha~rlrcl u p 111(. ships xtlrl <liscml)arktrl ~ h c 1lorsr.s. ' l ' l~c sitv cl~cl\;rn was t r l the t~orth-c.;~sr 01' t tiv t>ct\\-.rt.~~ tllr. rn;~rsht.s nntl i r k r l ~ t . protvrrion 01' th t prnmontory, .r . ;~l lcvl (I~I-tosura, on t h r latltlw;~rtl sidr. 'l'llr c;~n~p w : ~ rit~~;l!c.d aicar ~ h r X1;~karia spring tc~l~ich pmvi(ltul ~ C K K I graxinr: Tor I I I V hrmcs aucl a plrntihrl s~rpply ol'z*~atrr.

111 :\tlit*ns the sittl;ilinn rum vcrv di tlimr.etlt rrom 111;11 wl.tic.11 had prt.zliiilv<P irk the d;tys 01.1-lil~pins. In pmvtAr t ~ o \ v was :III ~ l v c ~ ~ - c l r o n ~ ~ ~ ~ : ~ t ~ i I t ~ r - i ~ ~ - c - I ~ i c f

3. &tad frum an ampham *hawing a mouatd warriar in full a n n w r , arcampmid hy his servant. (Not ional Mu-, Yaplei)

c;~l l td i t p~ l~~r t t t r t - l t itr~rl nrw tnilititry It-a<lc.rs I r/rfltr,pib of tllr Kv1,11l>Fir wlln wrrt. rlrtcrnrinrd to mainr;~iti thr intlrprr~clr-nrc ol' :\thc.ns; rhr cr,t~~m;inder-in-r:hirf' was (.:i~llim;lchus nl' :lpliiclna anrl thc c~vt-riil! pli~rr t~rr ant1 stratr,qisr was X~lil- t i i i c l r . ~ I althclugli hc :~lsr) st.nlccl :is ontm of' thc ten tli\.isional ct)rnmanrlt.rs,.

E l a r i n ~ 1w;nc-ons \r;lrtlc-ct t hc :\thr=tli;inx that thr 13c.rsi;~n inv:ision t rmps 1l;td landtul. ' 1 1 ~ ~icrvs was tirkrmn a h s t runllt-r 10 Sp:trt;\ ; rhc Spa~.tat~r;, i ~ l t t ~ ~ t ~ c ! ~ S ~ T I I ~ ~ ~ h ~ t i c . ;~nnouncrd tl~at their rc- li~fous cotlsr-ic-nrr losl,;ldr rhcir [ m o p firm cmtrr- inq inlo r l ~ t . fivltl oI'I)atrl~ until alirr t11v tilt1 1 1 1 o o n .

:I$ i t .j :lugrist. this mr;lnt n wait ol'sis to srvrn cl;~ys hrlhrc. I hc. ;~rri\.;~l rl l ' rt.it~forct.mt~t~ ts. Another rr*qurl;t lo Pl;ltat.a, a small Rocoi i a t~ ~ ( I M ' T I \vhi~61 lay to rhr nnl-rll of :\itir;i. \tr:as answr.rt.tl wirh ;I

volunteer forcr oI'qrv~ral hunclrcd m m . Miltiadex gave thc first instruction Tor battlc, 'contain rile invadinq rorccs nn thr \)c*achr's ancl resist an

advance on .4thms'. It'itliin a few hut~rs or thr alarm, some ro,ooo hcavily armccl infitntryrnet~. mainly hoplitcs, wrro on the march to thc plain or' Marathon thrrlugh the H yncttus-t'cw t c.lr gal>.

'I'hr Athenians took up thcir position at thr sonthern end of thc plain with Mount A~ricliki cJn thcir l e l i flank and the sea to the right ; the Rrvxisa marsh lay slightlv to thc war. 'I'hr ccjastal road to Athrns was tiow efictivclv scalrd. J'rrm rverc cut down and man-hauled into drfrnsivc p s i tions with thc branrlles licing the Pcrsian linrs, a prccal~tion atpinst thr Prrsiat~ cavalry!.. From 7 to I r .August thc front lincs rrrnained static, five kilomctrcs apart, ncithrr side willing to rnakr thr first mnvc. Thc .4thvni;trus wcrv loath to commit thrir tmops to hat tlc, as thc advantap lay wi tk thc Pcrsians in an open -plain con flirt. Aqinst thr superior Pcrsian force of cavalry and arrhcrs, thr Athrnians had only inrantrymen. The Pcrsians remained irnmobilc hccause r hrv

had II(F wish to engage tthcir own weak and inhior infantry agains~ thc Grcck hoplitrs in thcir prc- p a r d position ; thcy wcrc also hoping for ;t s i~na l from Hippias' ii-iends within Athens itscll: Rut thr stalemate could not last indefinitely and Datis finally put Iiis own battlc plans into action. Under mver of darkncss on thr nigIlt of I I 112 August hr reem barked most oft hc cavalry as well as his task force and, slipping out, sai1r.d Tor Phalrran nay leaving behind Artaphernm with a holdinq force facing thc Athenians. Thc departure of' Da~ is did not ga z~nnoticecl and Milliadcs' scouts wrsc quick to iniirrn him of thc h r t . ?he r l~hcnian commanders were surnnlonccl and Miltiadcs out- Iind the only posible chancc of a Greek victory : the Persians could not passi1)ly react1 Phalcron by sea in less than tw hours; 1,eashing and d iscmhark- ing would take a frw more hours, by which timr it would be late aFtrrnoon or early eveninq; in thc immediate vicinity, on the plain of Marathon, Artaphernm had lost a large part of the cavaliy and tmp, but would still have his archrrs. Thr quesrion waq whcther thc Aihenians shnulcl risk an engagemcnt with the Pcrsian forces; if they did, ant1 clefeated thcm, there was still timr to doubIt back Tor the defence of Athens. It was 5.30 a.m., so

thc cngaqrrnmt must hr f i s u ~ h t anrl won in r11n.c. hours. ' I ' i rn~ was short and thc order tn attark was ~ i v r n .

Tkr A~henian tmopswrrt:drawn up in thr hattlr ordcr Miltiadcs had plannrcl. 'l91r: commanrlrr-in- chicf, C:alIimacllus csmmaorlnl tlic r i ~ h t flank, and thc lcfi flank was Iicld 1 ~ ) - the Platacans. ' 1 ' 1 1 ~ centre, which was to takc thr l ~ r u t ~ t of thc first anstaught, was under tl~r +joint cornrnenci ol' Themistoclm and Rristrides. 'l'ht. Athenian tartic. was to wcakcn the ccntrc hy widen in^ thc space 'bctwcen cacli man ancl to rcrlucr rhe ranks t o tibur instcad of thr usual r i~ha . 'Tltc chance r ~ l 131.eakthrough was a caltula~cd risk. Thc rnairt strcngth wi~g massed on thc flanks which i l was

11q~d U'C)IIICI complctc at1 rnrirrlinfi movement.

"I'hr Pcrsian li>rrcs were drploycd as Miltiadcs anticipatrd : thc crntrr was stalIi.cl with the rriitk troops ar~tl thc flanks wrrr helcl 11y interior hartalions drawn fmnl thc conscripts oft hc clnpirr . 'IBc risks Ihr thc Athenians wcre great, howcvrr;

5. Dcd I from a p i m of d f i g t u t Attic bowl (fith cmtury kc), showing m~ Athenian boplite wnmor mttncking n Fersipp stmdard-befrrr. (LOIMP, P u r i ~ J

rhrir strcngth was a l i t t l r orrcr half' that of thv Persian cen trc, and tIlr opcn qround to hc covcrrd put thr Greeks at the mprcy of thc rlitr Pcrsinrr arrhcrs.

At almut 6 a.m. otl 12 August the distance l>ctweetl t11e two armics was apprclxirnately nnr anrl a halr kilornetres; t11r lrtrrnpet wunded thr con- mand and thr Alhcnian ranks movcrl forward. T h e acivance start cd briskly, drveloperl into a trot, thcn

hrokc into thr. clnublc as thcy rushrtl thc last 140 rnctrcs to avnirl thc hail arrows. T h e Persian royal coneinqc'ents put up a stronq resistance, the centre standinq its ground, forcing th r Athcnian hoplitrs t ~ ~ c k . Mranwhilc, on cither flank the Athenians wit11 thrir slronE concentration uf troops carried all ihcforc ~ h c m ant1 ptlt the P&rsi;~n flanks tn

fliqht, man?) ~ ~ r t r r a t i n ~ to thc Great M;irsh whew they drtmned. Ot hcrs retrratcd along ~ h c sllorr tr, thcwaiting ships in thc I~eof'tbc pronlontow. Zlr'ilh thc Pcrsian flanks in cornplcte disarray, tl~r

rlthcnian ancl l'latacan flar~ krrs dimgaged thc pursuit accol-ding to plan. Regroupi nx, thry rclturnrd to thr sccnc of thc batrlc whcrc thc remain in^ Prrsiarls wcrc out flanked in r douhir pincer rnovcmcnt. Thc rctn8at in^ Persians rouxht their way back in the dirrction ol'thcir s h i p along the narrow gap Ir~twcon thc marsl~cs and thr beach. Thrv werr closrly pursrlcd l)y t l ~ r Athrn- ians, who were drtr*rrninc.cl to dcs~rov t hc enemy forces and fleet. 'I'hc I'ailurc at' the Persians to envisaqc surh a contingcncv was qui tc astonish in^, especially 21s t h r d>vious Athenian preparations can hartlly haw mrapcd rhcit notice. Ry a.m. on r l r \ ~ p ; r l ~ t ~ h c surviving Pcrsian

roval trmps ancl the ships of khr Mararhon task forcc wrrr out at sra and heading for PhaErron. In the final count ol'c;~-ualtiw thr Pcrsians had lost 6400 nlrn and an unrt.c.orclcd num hcr 01' prisoners and ~vounrl~*d ;*long with scvrn ships. "I'hc ?t~Fic- nians suni~mrt surprisin~ly few castmities with on iy 192 dead, inclucl ing: t hcir commander-in-chief Callirnachus.

In orcler to cornplvtc his ovcrall stl-aregic plan, l\liltiadcs had to clernand fmm his mcn ionr more He~ulcan cndravour, tht- march l~ack to Athens, 'as bst as thrir feet could carry them'. Commander Aristeidrs and one division wcrc left lwhind to

guard thr prisoners of war and raptured cquip- mrnt . 7'hr rcttrrn ol'the Athenian army, quick in comparison with thc slower naval squadrnns of D;itis, had to take fill1 advantage of surprise iT h'liltiades' plan was to take elrecl, GIfhen thc Persian invasion task iorce arrived, the Athenians were alrcacl y in thrir delinaivc posirions at Cynosarg~, muth or thr. citv ancl fiicin~ tlw st:;t. And, whcn Dalis arrived in Phalcron Bay, hc founcl the citv wrll drfended. Attcrnpis t o I;~nd woultl have h e n tlscl~ss so hc allcharmi and awair td Arrapllcrnrs'

L Pi-orl-d sbot which w e r t t t n d am rnimdtun with the d d or n leather s l ia~. The sling m n a w u q ~mund, d niter aomc turn8 n wider n w e p mar ucctrrnplirhd and one cad of the lrmthrr sling w a n rrlrnutd, b u r l k ~ the 1cmd shot vwuy with qrtat momrrrtum. 'IXe *hot warn o f t e n i n s c r i h r l with mrk.iaEts. (Rrit inh Museum, Lnndon)

drtachmcnt. Thcir arrival: i l l a dvplrtrtl and 1)atrrrecI condition Idi only orw rollrsc Ibr thc Prrsiati inval;icln rot-cv, il stra~eqic wirhdrawal. l,;lck to Asia.

Marathon had provcul that the hpavy troops of the hoplirr inrantry cottld cornprrc succrssli~lly ag;Jnst supcrioritv of numbem, particularly whcn tlicir opponrnts wcrr only liqhtly arrnccl, hut [hc Circck victory should not bc o\~rrcstirnattd. Thc Pet-siitn losse~; wrrc c;lsiIv I W ~ ~ R C l ~ y SO l i ~ r ~ ~ ;1 ~ W C T

and scnrct only to emphasize thr nccd Ibr a prnprrly pwparcd rxywdition il' Gwrcr was za br suhjigarrcl. 'I'h;~t rite Pt-rsians woriltl rrtllrn was

incvitahIt*, ancl it was clcartv t-ssrntial h r thr Grcrks to rralizc thar, dmpitr t he glov of Ma- rathon. they had done Iittlr- morc than I~uv limr in wliich to prcparr t Iicmsrlvcs for t h r rrsurnption or the con flick.

In 4W.9 w:. Miltiad-, rotnmanrling tthv A1hr.n- iarl flvrr, attrmptcd to regain cnt~~rt)l of rhost- Aegean islands which had capitz~latcd to thc. Persians, hut his naval forcc insufTicirnt to accomplih this task and his hlockadc of Parm bitcrl ;I dcl'cat which let1 tn his imprisonment ar Athcns, whew hc d i d smn after ol' a wound rcceivcd ar Paros. Thc Ath~nians ncxt tried LO

obtain mastpry of thc Saronic CuIi'by ovcrpoww-

7.- C r o m rutpfdrq a h o w k ~ a n Alhtn ian horseman, 475 m.c. The h m m is without *ndrElc or stirrups hut with full head hmeuzrs. 'Fht horwman wrar.c a lonq, hiahly-patlrrnrtl, rtiArlnak and r a m r n the -hart j ~ v e i i n s . (Villa Ciiulira, Hornr)

in^ rhc pro-l'rrsian island oT:\r.@qina whusc raiders mntinually ravagrd rhc shorm ot'tittica. This too w;rs n f;lilurt, ant1 i t llccamc ob\pious that rhc Arl~rnian flrr~ raulrl o&r little pmtrction ;qainst a 11mlil~ S V ; ~ powrr.

'l'lle vacancy crrnlcd 1)y thc fall of h4iltiadr.s was frllrd '1'hc.rnislr~:lr-s, who rully apprrciatrd nht nclvl fir a stronq naval ti~rcc ; thc discovr~y of nrw silvrr d r p ~ i t s it) chc Lauricln mining district placed surplus capital (hr dispjsal of' thr A~sembly and enal>lr(l thc Athtbt~ians, ~rcrsuaclcd by 'I'hrrnis- toclrs, ~ r s tommcncr a shiphuildinq programrnt. inrrnrlrcl t o prodrice [wn huntlrrcl new triremes filr thc Athrniat~ fleet.

By this tirne Gr~rccb had rcrcivrd alarming relxlns ol' cxtrnsivc I'rrsian inv;~sirln pl.c.parnlit)ns, rum- o t ~ r s pr<~pagali~l l>y D ~ I - ~ I I s ' son. Svt*xvs~ [hr new I'crsian kin^, who apprrriatrd t hc psychalqical v[Ti.cl of w~ch storirs, prrhaps haping thcrrhy to Entlucc selmc areas o~Grr~rt. 10 cil l~i l ul;itc without a fish t .

To facilitarr thr rnclvrrncnt ~f his army into Grcecc. Serscs had orrlerrd thr I)rid~ing of the Hellcspcmt, a maqnificcnt achivvvrnrnt on thr part a l his rnqinccrr; who t~secl avtSr six hunclrcrl ships to

construct two huge pontoon brirlqcs. I n order to avnLI risking his fleet arountl thc d;ingcrous cape of Moutrt rlthrrs hc tlihrl acannl (lug r:at.rtns thc isthmus. and rracm ol'this canal can still t 3 ~ idrntificd.

Set-xcsdrrnantluu! rcln t i r~grt~ls lkom vvrysatrapy of the Persian Empire ant1 the rmponse enabled him to amam an imposing lbrrc. Ry 48 I KC. he had

set up his I~eacEquancrs, at Sardcs in 1,ydia ancl sent out toall t11e Grrpk stat(% rxccpl Athens ancI Sparta for thc carth and wa'tcr of submission. Tlrc sizt. (IT the Persian arm?; has htcn a clurstion ofrlispn~r and conjccturr cvcr since Horoclot us' c~rifinal figusc. gros4y exaggrratccl, of ovrr two millicin com- txttants. More realistic latter-day commrntators estimatr Xrrxm' forcr at some r jo.ooocomhatants, approximately half OF which arc thought to havc h e n Prrsian troops, and i t inc lud~d thc hcst cavalry available li-orn t h r Mditrrranean arca. His fleet, said by Hrrodot~rs to nurnl~cr about I ,200

vessels, many of which werc snlall t ranslxlrts. hasted a contingent o f skilled Phoenician svilrnrn and forces from E4ypt, Carin and Ionia. Sinrr :in

army of such a size coulcl nor hope to live off so arid a land as Gmrcr i t nepdpd to be provisionrd rrrlrn the sca as i t prncccclcd around thc shows of thr Thracian scil ancl into ccntral Gwccr. Thr Hvvt would also ~>mvidr a mili rer? bar-k-1111 w1icnt.w.r necessan.

Serxrs clrarly intrndecl the subju~atinn nf tlic whalcofGrrcce ifpossible Tor he harl to~nmittrrf an rnnrrnous numbrr of troops and had mad(. rxtcmn- sire ~~rcl)arations, inr:ludinq an aLwr.rntLnt with 11rc

C;~rlhaginians who wrrc tn pin clown thc wt=qtcmrn

Grrrks ol' Sirily whilst Scrxrs attack(.cl from the. vast.

Hy tlie spring of 480 R.C. [he huge itmy I~ad crossvd ~ h r Mrllrsl~lr~t w h ~ r r i t was-joinecl by the flcrt, and was making its way. in 111rce separate columns, rc~warcls Thrssaly, prt-c*r.rl(*d by alarrning rumnurs that i t was drinking [hv ri\.ecs dry.

Mranwhilc, thr I;rtr.h, in the autumn of 481 R.c., rrummnntd to thr Isthmus of' Crlrirlth 1rpt.r- srnta1ivt-s c~l'all thtsc statrs which hacl nnt at ready subniittcd t o Pcrsia. and an alliancr, lrrl hv Alllens ancl Spart;i, was Srwrnt-c!. I-lowtvrr. a s~~clclcr~ blow was rlc-alt to Crrvk rrcolution 11y ~ h r voicr of thr Tlrlphic. orarlt., which prr~lictc.rl rlisast~r for ~thc Grccks and arlviscd thr Athrnilins in particular ta

flcr For thrir livtx. 'Thv oraclr rlairn~tl that the only hopr lay in a wtrdr-n wall, and although (his prtw~rnahll; indica~c.ri thc wrmclen rlcfcnces oi' t hc :Ir.rt~polis, ir wiu i n ~ ~ r p r e t ~ r l hy 'I'hernistoclm to mran tllr Grt-ck f1t.t-t.

On the qucstion nf strate,:, opinion ar thc Isthmi;tii cc~nfi*rc.nc-c- was dividrtl. 'I'he Spartans and rhrir l'(-lr~~~r~ri~ic.siiiri nrighhours hclcl tcn- ;~ciously t o ~hr: view [hat tlie main d~rencc sbould

GEPIERAL SURVEY

- Road

- Trsci

----- Goat r r x k

4.*k h:am contours

8. DcmU f a a 8 mid on m G m k pveshme, A* late gtb century acj this depicts a s t q l c between Athenian and Spr tnn wnrriom durhp: thr Pclopwncskn war. (Mtnpo- litan Mu- of Arc, U.S.A-)

be at the Isthmus of C~rinth-the gateway to thc Peloponnese. This plan howrvcr had drawbacks, principallv that it woufrl leave the Persians Trre lo cstahlish thernsclvcs in northern and central Greece, also I tiat the Isthmus could he outflankccd ;by spa and i t s drfrndcrs causht between ~ w o forces. I f the plan was adopted Athens wor~ld he left ao [lie r a v a p or the Persians, and, understandahty, this was an unpopular idea with the Athenians. Consequently it was a ~ r c c d that an attempt should be made to hold the Pcrsians in Thessaly; hecausc of the inferioritv CI t' Chck numbers, however, this would enlv he possihlc if the narrow passe were dricndecl. At t h ~ nTurst of the 'l'hmmlians, an initial t'orce nf I o,ooa hoptites in two divisions-onc Spartan under Evacnetus and the or her Athenian under Themistoclcs -wcrc transported by ship to

Hillus whrncr ~ h r ~ m a r c h 4 to the Vale ol"1Pmp in northern 'l'hessaly. Hut, on arrival, F ,vaenetus found that there werc morc pasqes than he could rcaaonably hope to hold, and, much to the discouragrment or the Grccks. the army retscatecl to thc Isthmus.

The Council at Corinth now docidcd to attempt a defcnce in the arca af central Grrrcc to the west of

thu Eutxlean Channel, a posirion favourable to the Grcrks bccause i t compris~d narrow, easily de- tensilrle passm for thr armv ancl hccausc any outflankinq rnovrrncnt hy the Persian flcst would t a k ~ i~ into the Euhoean Channcl whrw its sizc would hc a disadvantage. It' tha land hrcc could hold out against Xerxcs' army lonq cnough to indue<: srrrh a move by t hr Persian fleet, the Crccks mighr inflict upon the la tw a drrrat sufficient to prevent its attacking the Isthmus by sca. Givcn a little extra time by Xcrxrs, who had moved his armv on a tcn-dav detour ol'Mount OEyrnpus, the Crccks thrreforr resolved to stand at Thrrmopylae, supprtrd by thrir fleet in h e Malian Gulf. The Crrrk army, Icrl Iy Lconidas, king OF Spana, consist rd of 7,000 ro 8,mo hopli tes and light trtxlps, some or whom were Roeotians al' dul)ious loyalty, ancl includctl thr 300-strong Spartan roval b c l y - guard. Undrr ~ h r clTcctivl- control oi'the Athenian Thernistoclrs, the Grcek fleet, comprising 300 triremes, 147 of which werr from Athens, was mooted in the hay of Artemision, north of Euboea.

It has been suxgcstcd that the Persian plan was to arrive sirnulrancnusly at Thcmopylae and the northern end nl' thc Eubean Channel whilst a Phoenician naval squadron was to enter tht channel frnm thc ~ 1 1 t h and trap the Greek fleer, but the Pemian flcct was still ar its l~ase at l 'hcma when Xerncs' advance forces met rhe Greek hoplifes derending 'rht.mr~py!ae. On hearing this news thc Persian bingnrdrrrd his flrrt toprocced ta

Eulmea, but i t was caught in a storm off the east

coast of Magnesia and lost, according to Her. do tus , 4oa warships. Thc Phornician squadron was also routrd hy thc ralr, enabling; 53 Greeksliips guarding tllc channel at Chalcis to head hack towards the main Ilrrt at Artrmision.

Detcrmincd 10 takc advantage of the Persian disorder l'hemistocl~ prnuadrd the Greeks to

at tack. Thc cngagvmcnt which followed war incondusive, hut it bccame clcar that the superior mobility oI' thv Check rrircmcs was causing prob- Icms Tor the lar~cr Prrsian forces. Thc fnllowinq dav, the Pcmians rnountrcl an olf'cnsivc but again the oulc-omr was indrcisiv~, and drspitr bray I w m on both sides, the Greeks manag4 to hold the enemy back, prrventing it Tram supporting tht army at Thrrmopvlae,

I.19hilst thr Ilrru wcrr- thus cngaged at Artc.

mision, the Persians had Ixrn attcrnptin~ to break he was awaitin!: a Pcmian naval victory at

through the pass ar Thcrmopylae. 'The pass mmistcd, at t h i s rirnr, ot' thrce narrow rlefilrs nr 'g;ttrs* of which rhr crnrral one was 'I'llel-mnpylar pto1,r.r. Thr two o111t.r g;lics, ~ I I ( , IVrst. Iyinc a little ewt or t h ~ " mouth oft hc rtsopl~s rivcr, ancl t hr East, ncar the tow11 nT :\Ipc.ni, wmt. siruant-d vc111idis- tanfly otl cithrmr side ol' ~ h r Midrllr Catt.. South of thc pass 1;iy t hc vscarpmcnt of Mo~tnr Oeta, and throug11 11tis [c~.rairr l a 1 1 a [rack which c.xrt.ndcd from the- I:ik?;t xatc- t o thc Aajptrs I:cqr. Ry rnrnns

of this tr;ir.k tllc. pass a1 Thcrmopylac could he nut flxnkrrl Srtvrn (41 hc*r dirccrinn. I.ci>nidas chow 10

occupy the. Midrllr <;air. wlicrc thc pass was prnbxbly only fnttr metres witlc. A fPw mtbn \vould he ahle ta hold such a ~msit ion. a l ihnu~h tllr Crvrks intender1 to spnd rc.i 11 lkrrrmrnls tr) aid Lconidas* small hand. 'I'o Ilrotr-rt himsrlr from bring out- flanked to thr south, Lconidas post~tl r,ooo Phncian troop. all t h c - r n m 11e coztld liparc., to guard thr trark through the. cmscarpmc.nt. ~rnd thrn srttlcd down to a w i ~ i ~ Xrmca' arrival.

On reaching the Malian plain, Xcmes waited for bur days, hoping* according to H e d o t u s , that his vast army would Frighten the Greeks into flight, b't~t some rccrnt historians think it mow prohablc that

Artemision before enga~ing thc Grcrk hoplit-. O n thc filih clay, hnwt.vt.r, hr attackccl the Middle Gatc and was rrpulsrd hv thr hcavilv amourcd C:reeh, who wtmrt. suprriclr in respect of training and ctquipmsnt m d against whom his light troops had litrPc cffcct. This tactic was repentetl thc next day with E t ~ c samc rmul L, ancl Serxcs realized that some other way or braking the Grepk position would have to hc found, Sir, with his navy trapped at slrzcmision, he was without supp1it.s.

l'hr prnl>l~m was suddenIy rrsolvcd I>y oncw EphiaItcs whn infornled Xemes of the cxistense of the path which t hc Phociana werc guarding. Acrina as a guid~, Ephialrrs l ~ c l a conringrnt or thc " 1I mmc~rt;tls' (royal hodvguard) alnng rl lv track in an attempt to attack 1,conidas' posi~ion kern th.r rear. ' l ' h ~ Phocian guard was routed and news soon rrached Lronidas of zhc imrnincnt danger. Opin- ions dilfer as to what occurrcd next, but it is fairly clear that thr forces from central Greece rnovrd hack kowards thc East Gate [caving Lmnidas and

9. A d d C r a m r bqp m 4 a- the st-le htwcta DrtIus in a chariot m d Al tnnder *nd his a m . T h e d d o f t h e P c m h koldiefln d m ~ shown ihC high Icmnt head c o v e r i q which also conce~lcd the lower part OF thc face. (National M U - ~ n m . Nmplv~)

thcir headquarrrrs at TheEm, 'Thv Athmiat~s, string their city ~>clwcrlrss against Sencs' I~ITCCF., c v a c u a ~ ~ d thr non-combatant popula~ion to r le~ina, T'rt~czcn and Salamis whilst t h r ablr- lwciird mcn wcnt ahoard ~ h c ships tcr await thc ncxz conflict. A few p u ~ tl~rir faith in a drfmcr or Athcns and rcrnained in tht- stockaded. Acrr~polis. Thc Spartans, rn~anwhilr. harl built a Ihstiliuation acmss thc Istl~mus of C~rinth and thc Grrck army now concrntrarvd an thr drfmct. which had, all alonq, most appcalcd to the Pelopo~~nt.sians.

?[cm.lues had no rouble in annihilatitlg thcdcr~nrIc-ss ofthe ACI-opolis and pillaqing ilthcns, ancl Ilmught his flret into thc Saronic Gulf to a ~nooring at Phalcron. jyhilst thc Grcrk llcrt rrmainecl tin.tlr- frat&, ~hcrr was no possil,ility of Pmian maslr? dGrrcce; wonrr or later a navaI engaiyrnpnt was inrvitablr.

'Thcmis~oclcs was strnrlgly in fitvour of an carly rngaEctnetl1, prrfrrahly on Grt:rk terms. E~ut. as IISLI~I, Greek learlrwhip was dividr~l, sqtrnc sfill prcfi-rring a consolidated dcfcnce oS t h e Isthmus. Howcvcr. the size of' ti lr Athrnian rnntribt~tion In the Llert cnablecl cl'hcmistocles to Tclrcc ;I drcision hv ~hrc':ut~ning a withdrawal of thr .Athenians il' hattlr was not olli:rrrl in thc. Stl-aits orsalarnis. ' I ' l t is position was favc~urahlr to the Grrrks hcc:~usc or t hr ~ a r t i r a l disadvanragr which thr l'rmian nutn- I~crs w o ~ ~ l d ~xprrirrlrt. tl~rrr, At rlrtm~ision the Persian flcet had I~rrn ablc ro drploy itscjf' with rclativr vasc. hut thew would I,r c<)nsidc.r;iblc rrstrictions on mannvrtvrrs in the narrow straits

north nlSa!atiiis. 'I'hc-mistoclcs had, oTrc~uwc, still lo inrlticc Scrsrr; tr~ofi-r l>attlc, and, bc-r-d with the wavering mnralr of his mrn. hr i s said to I-~avc rntirrrl rhc Pprsjan corn~t~andvr with a rnEsr message. suggestinq iha~ tl~c Gre~ks, dyicrtcd ancl irrrsolulc, woulcl oKir l i t t l r or no rcsistnnct~.

C3n thv r v r ofthr hat~lc, 22 Scptcrn1,rr 480 KC.,

MT AEGALEUS

SALAMIS CHANNEL

~LIPSOKOUTALI I

t TAlANTONESIk

11.. h n i l from Crrtk vase p i n t b g q50 ns, shmving an lrrbtr ntzinf in~ Mu bow.

the Greck flcct lay krtwern rhr nt~rth coast of the island or Salamis and thr coast nf Altica north-west of Piraeus. The Pcrsians had drawn up facing north in a line, thrikc d-cp, from thr Cynosura pro- montory on Salamis to Pirarus. The channel bctwcrn Salamis and Megara, t h r o u ~ h which the Grerk pmi tion could be reached rrtm the west, was

Irft un~t~artlc-d by Thrmistocles, pssihl l; to tempt Xerxes to rmptov thc same tac~ic as had initially been adnprcd at Artemision-la divide his force and trap thr. Crcck fleet in 111r hapr orcapturing it intact. 'I'his Xrrxcs did, senditig his Kpptian ct~ntingmt arouncl the south coast ofsalamis to seal t hrw western channcl. The Greeks were apparently still arguing whcn r hcv received ncws of t hc Pcrsian movrs, and thry rra1ir.d that ~hcrr was no other course opvn to thcm but to fight. Accordingly, the Grcck fleer rlrrw up in batlie formation facing Hcracleion on the show ofnttica. They had at thcir disposal about y o vessels, the Athenians caking the Icft wing and the Aeginetans the right. Ry the mornin# nf F ~ C ha(tl(* t hr Prrsi ans hail dc-plt)ycd, with thcir right wing held by rhe skilrul Phoenicians and thc Ioniaii ships (once more under. Persian rutc) on the left. Whilst still rnanwuvring into position, the Persians wcrc rowed upon 11). the Gr~eks who began to rorcc the Icatling Persian ships hack upon rhcir FcIlows, causing disorder in zhc overcmowdcd Persian forma tion, This was ~ollowed hy an Athenian flank attack on the Phoenician ships, which wfrc pushcd hack into their own

rs. Milthdes, the G m k com-drr who m s r c ~ i b ~ t the C;mk victery at Mmrnchon.

rcntrr anrl rmlo thc [.(last of :\tticn. :\ti rvt.rltu;il rr*lrr*atiny. Prrsiatl f1cc.t !jut cvenruallv h l l o w d it as

suilirt-t l hc.;~vy Irsscs - ;iccorrlirlg tr r 1-irrtdot us. .roo ship ;irid 1w;rrlvrl hack r o l'halrron wlit.ilc-4. it rrturnrtl c.vrnrualty to l l ~ r Mrllcxlwn~t. Facccl now will1 ilrt. iinpowi I~lr task rh' ~,ro\.ixioning il huge army from st1c1-1 a rleplr~trtl flrrl, Srrsr.; had nn option h u ~ 10 withcll-alw the' I,ulk or h i s forces.

'Fhr Prrsians had hrrtl rleti-ated 1)y ;I cnm- lin;riion or supcrior Grerk tactics ant1 their own inrptittwlr in fail in^ lo npprcriatt- that shrc-r wrbight ol'numtlrm 7it-as insuficirnt to c-arn tltt- clay arainst forces which. although stmallc-r. wrrc: or hi~hr-s qualit?.. I'hr fight for inclepct~.rlcncc was a powerSul ~nolivation for thc Greeks, ;trlcE t 11c. u ~ ~ c l i s ~ > u trd victor!: at Salamis hoostet.1 the-it. moritlr ;~nrE rrpmation at thr rsprnst. ol' Xrrsrs' n~ iqhi \ Wii r

rnachint.. Unawart. (1 t" Xrrxcs' in t~nt ions, tlu* Grrrks

drlayecl hcfilrc sctltin~ out in pursuit or thr

h r a s t h r islnntl ol':inrlrt~s wherr tlrt=!' llc.ltl ;I council . , 01' wral-. I hrrnistnclcs ~ a ~ w u r r t l sail in^ ;kt nncc for thc Hdlrspnnt ant1 rlrstso~ing; Xrrsrs' Mvny hack ;~uross thr l~~-itfgr.s, thus trappi~lg liiiri without supplirs: hut ot hcrs k i t 1hal lliis tvottld rnch;in rhr pil1;tgin.q nf C:~.cccr 1,y a lxrqr and star\-ing army, and rllr pl;in w;u dropp~rl. h grt-;it tic-i l l of prrstiqr harl hc-rt~ Inst Ily Xtmcs

at Salarnis ancl hc hacl ro consirl~.~. carrfi~lly thc in~pl ir i~t i tx~s rd ' witl~clraw;~l. I,oss or Tact= 1ni~l11 ins~irr+ rrvolt on ~ h r wtbstt.rn ln~rdrr orltis ernpire as i t had ;~Irr;trly dotle in 'lhracr anrl M;~c.rclonia, and hr rlt.cidt-rf maintain the till-rat t o C:rt*ccc by lravinq \)art o f his army in ' ~ ' l ~ r s ~ a l y , 'I'hrarr and !tl;acc-c!r~ni;~. ~ ~ n d c l - hf arclnniiis x ~ ~ r l ; \ ~ ~ i ~ l f i ~ z ~ l s , whilr taking thr rmt hack wit11 him over thc Hrllrspor~~ 10 rtBasscrt cont 1-01 thr c.;istc-rn Argean coasl. wlrirhcr he srnt his flwt Tctr thi. samv purposr. Mardonius was lcii in 'I'hrssal y with

13. Dttnil S- a -lid the hcrd aCa G& -0s ha a Bwotian-qpe helmet. (The Al-dcr SPrcopham, Pstnnbul Museum)

q. Pi- f- a relid sbowhg a amggk ktwtcn Marc- dapinn d Persian warrior* Thtrrc f i p r r r wtr. mmd an the rarnaus AJcxudcr Smrropbnpn by o d e o f &c k i u ~ or Sidon, AWlonymus, who w c c u d hin throw rhrou~h the innu- of M-drt. (The Alr-ader Srrcopbp~h, Israubul Museum)

suficicnt rorccs to rcnrw tlic olrrnsivc at his cliscrrtir,n. His armv uonsistrtl of 12,non cavalry sncl ahnut .~O,OOO infanlr)l or whom mmt: wrrr run tingen ts from central and northern Grrcr~. Included in this torce, which was a continual threat to Grevk indcprnclencc, wcrc thc Immortals and the Guard C:avalry.

A n attcmpl to won the Athenians and t h ~ i r valuable H i r t into a trenly wirh thc P ~ n i a n s mrt with failure, and Mardonius, hoping lo thn:atcn thcm inko sul)mission, rnarchrcl on Athsns, 'l'his provokcd t h r Athenians into an aqrcernrnt with Spasta to mount a n imnldiatc offcnsivr upnn thc irrv;lrlcr. M~si(lt's, Srrxm t l i iq1rl ;12 anv limp srnrl a rrfirrhishcd flrrt to asqist Mardonius; the Grrcks cnuld not affhrd to hrsi tatr Ihr loo long.

As thc Spartans rnovccl up through the Corin- rhii~n isrhlnus in 479 P.C.. ldardotii~~s firrd

Athens ant1 rctircd to Bocoliir whrrc the ~vrrain w;rs admiral)ly w~itcd to his cavalry, assrml~ling his filrcca n p p i t r Mount Cir hrrac nn the :%wpua plain hrt w r r n Thcl~cs and I'1atar.a. Ry f'rlIin2 a nurnbcr oE' trrrs in thcr area 11r crtbatccl sti t l lilrthrr ad\antage ror his cavalry, and w;u waitinq at tllr rc;rdy when thr 3.5,ooo-strnng Clrcrk huplirc hrcr, mrnrnal~ded Fy rhc Spartan Pausimius, nlo\-cld ovrr Mount Cithrrat. and camprd nciw l'lataca na tlic slnprs ovrrlookiny the plain.

Matrlonius cornmcncccE hatilit iw IIV scndinq his cavillry nqainsl 111v Grccks. who wrrt. pmqirianed on ground zrnsuitahJr for a cavalry action. Pre- dictably, t h ~ Prtrsians wrre forcrtl to rctrrat, hut ia has hcrn proposed that the loss nnf is rav;tly was a pricc Mardnnius was prcparccl to pay in orcler to

lurr tlw Creeks into il more oprn position on the plain. 'l'liis is indrcd what happrntd, f i r Pausanius Icd his men onlo the plain and statinned them l>ctwrcn Plataea and rhc ~Isopus, a littlr ~ 1 1 t h or ~hz . rivrr. T h e Spartan hoplites took ~lrr right flank, tlw rlthcnians the Irfi, with the rernaintlcr of the ;~llics occup~ing thr tcntrr. On srring this, Mar- donills drew up his f i ) r ~ c s lacing them, can thc other sirlc of the river, and in this position thc two armia wait(-d, sn Herodottrs says, Tor c i ~ h t clays. Earh commander may h a w bcrn wailillx lfbr I hr othvr to

makr t h t first mow, Imth appreciatin~ thr slrrngrh nTa mawd hoplizr drrcncc. Howrvrr, Pvtxian raids ilz thr mnllntainc behind thc Grrck lines seriously threa~rnrd Pausanius' supplirs, a situation which the skarionary Grrek rorcr:s on t hc plain could in 110

wa?. allcwintr, Aftrr il pvriotl ors~x~r;~r l ic skirrnishn betwren rhc two rorces, Maxdonius dccidrrl to

commit hirnscl f and at ~ackvd wit 11 his cavaly, whosc missilrs pinned dowtl t hr lucklcs Grceks.

Cbntinurd prcssure Tmm thc Prmian cavalr! succcrtled in prcvcnring nhc Grrrk lcfi and crntrr from using thc watrrs aT the Asnpr~s, mmpcllig thrm to rclv on thc Gargaphia spring which lay hchind ~ h r Spartans and Irotn wtrirh thrse latter had heen drawing thcir supplies. PJn fortunate1 y I i r Pausanizrs the I'rrsians managrd sonichnw tn

ctut flank or push hack the Spartans ;uld rcndcr the spring untlsahlr, thus leavine ~ h r Grrcks withoa wiltcr. Furt trcmorc, t h ~ CirrcL supply mum thnmgh hillorrnt Cit hrrac had been l>~sirgr:rd. I t war now ~ l p a r ha^ Marclonius was control to pursue a policy of attrition whirh might wrll sw:~.rcd f

Pausanitla did not rnanagr tn rr-r.;t;~l~lish his linrsnf mmrnuniratiim and hrnrr t h r provisionin~ 01' h i s army.

'2'hc Spartan cornmantler was I'aced wit11 a ha;rarrlo~~r rctreat into hlounl Ci ther;~r 20 hold the main passes. a manoeuvrr hindered 11). 11ie poor 9pir.it in rvhirh snmr nl' the allirti Greeks rrrc-ivtul nrrlvrs from a crimmanrlrr who war, not ~l'thrir own citv-state. I t srprns thal Pausatlius plnpsrcl lo withdrr~w thc Spartans, \vho lav on rhr G~.t*ek right winq, to Morln~ Ci~hrrae in o~*drr to re-oprn tllc

supply lines, whilst the a1lir.d li,rces in thr. Grr.r.k centre were to rplrcat south towarrl Ylataea. Last to

move woulcl be I he I\ thmians, who wpre tn l>rncei=d wut h-eaxtwards across thr path recently takrn hy ihc allies and positinn ~hrmsclvrs as 111r new Gr~t-k ccntrr.

Severhal Lqctors cmnplicatrtl this manrlc.uvrtm. 'l'hr atrcmpc was scvrrelv l~andicapprd t ~ y darknt.ss. and i t i s hclicvcd by some that the Athenians tcfi~wcl to obey Pmsanius' order to withdraw, leaving themselves cut OK tinrn the rest of r b ~ army which prcrc~ecl~d as plannrd towarrls Mor~nt Cithesar. Although the allied Grrrks srrm tn lmvr rno\~ocl back suuccss~islly to Plataca, cli~cnsion in the Spartan ranks dclayccl the Grcck riqht flank

and rhr rnanncuvrc was nrll ~ s c c u t c ~ l until cl;l>-

break. Mardnnias' c.avalry wrrr srnt to harass thr

Spartans until tht. infantry ct,ultf l,e I~rougllt lo

tmgage ~l icm, antl, tlircrting tht. 1k)lwt ians on lllr Pt-rsim right to attack 1 hc cxp)sctl i2t hc-nians. htb

mohilizml ihc hulk of his ann!- a~ainrt the Greck riqht. Rcalizinc that h is Spartans wo~~lrl h a w to Iwar thr I3runz nf thr Persian attack, Paulrnniusst.nt ct, thr vrnhattlrd ilthmians Tor assistanrt., h111 rht. Grrck ccntrc was by now pinned down and con!d not rtspnncl.

IVhrti the Prrsiatl inihnwy was upon the Spar- tans, Pausat~ius decided to take aclvantagr of rhr cnnges(ecl Prrsian rii~mhrrs and launch a coun tcr- attack with his hopliirs. 'l'hrrr S'ollnwrd a ficrctr hattlr whirh rrmainccl undcridcd until Mardonius himsc.Ef li-ll ant1 his mcn flccl. 'l'he Athtnians rncrtnwhilt. hat! rnanagrd to mut thr Zheolians and the Grprk I'Orcrs w m t nn to capture and clestroy t hc Persian camp.

I~ollnwinq rip their victnrl;, thc Grrcks hrsirqvrl 'l'hehrs, whirh capitulated a f ~ c r [went? clays and hnnrlrrl ovrr to I'ausanius, and thcrt-by to thcir

15. D m d from anearly bmm-retitrmhowlng A m b m m ~ ~ w n carnet hcial:atcacked by A~syrinan, p h cmtury n , ~ (Palnnof AssurbanipE, Ninwch)

Eitnrilitics r t id nt12 cease imrnc*rliatrly. and !i>r man!: yrars altrmtards Persian trnops i.cnlai nrd in Thracr.. Thr rnnflict c*ntErrE finally, i t is hc.licrvccl.

t h ;I !rt.al! rl;tt in~ f j n n ~ .t+q 48 R.c.. t l~r I'cxu-t. of C:alli;ts.

A f e r the. virtorim at I'lalara and h4?.cale an atlierl C;rt.ok flret 1111dt.r Pausanitrs s r r ahout drivinq thr F'c.1-siann out ol' thc Carian islands. ( :yy>rus a11tI tllr Hcllesptn~~. Pnrlsanius, how~vcr, provrd 10 1w ;I ~yrannical, comrnandcl-, wlioa~ ways wcrr unpop~r lar with tht. non-Prlnponntbsi;~n con- tinct-t~ts 111" thr flcct; evetltu;~ll!., aTt~r an lomian mrttiny l'nllnwing the rakina nf'Ityxantiiirii. hr was r r r n l l ~ l I , \ rhr Spartans. rvl10 pulletl out or thr irvnturc al~ogvc.rhcr.

16. D r d l from the ' G ~ t n m a c h i a ' Stirzr, sbowhg the Creek boplit* ubitld So-tion. (Siphniur Trmnnry. Delphi) flkp T~~~~o////cv-(!II %%-I* dr:lths, thtnc lcadrss who wcrr svmllathctic to the Ptmrsi;in C ; ~ I F C . Ry this tirnr rhe Pt~rsians, wrrc tnaking ttirir way hack to thr Hcllmpont, having witt~tlt.;lwu a strI,stanrial pitrt of rhrir ;~rml;, uncler t\rt;~I,asus, lkom thr tirlrl at Platac-a.

1311rinq the- si1rnmt.r of 479 R.C. a mrssagc was rrrcivrd kmn ~ h r lonian I;rvrks which st~gqwtrd that il' they I ~ ~ P T P $\*~n rhr arllqmrt 01' a IPirt thcl; wotiltl rrvot t ngilinst t hr I'rwf;~ns. Con~nanrlrct b y rhr S1~r1a11 kinq. 1,cotychidas. thc Get-k I1t.c.t lrli Delns Tor Sarnor;, off the eastcmrn Aegean coast, anrl rnovtd fkorn tlic.rr. to X4ycaIr in Ionia whew Xrrxcs hid amaswcl a l;~rg(* army to maintain a sun.ril- lihnc~ nl' thc Ionian Greeks. Lror ychidas' fhrcm landed n l c a r h,Iyci~li- and succt-s~fir l ly ?~ssaultt~l thc Pcrsiarn p s i ~ i n r l ; thr Pcrsian sllipq, wlli~ll hacl I)CCII 1,citclic.rl f i~r sality, wcrc dt.stn)yrd.

Hiivinq I lins immol~ilizcd Persian wa p w e r thr G r r r k s rK<.crivrly prntcctcct th~rnsclvc=s arainst rtlrthcr. invi~sintn liom Asia and wrre now snlc marrtrn of thc ~Zr*qrati. '1'h.c v i c r q at ?ulvralr, ratilitatc.d by the Ioniitn Crr~ks who drsenwl thc Prrsians as snrm as tlie 1);lttlc commrntcd, led to uprisinys throuq11out the Ionian coastal arca anrl t h r rxpulsion nt' Prnian ty.ants and prrisons.

The Cirrrks tno\rrtl l i rxt against Srstosin otrler to wn-st rhr Hrl l rspnt kom thc I'rrsians ancl to drstrol~ the gatrway into Grrrk tcrri my. Lccl 13:

NantI~ippus, tIlr- Athenians l,t.~;ic,rpcl S~stus and the city fdl at Iils~ in thr sprinr: or 478 R.c,, rhou~h

I h r Alhenians now scttlrrl down to consider thr li~trtrt* oi'thr hvgcan states and thcir own rclatinns with thc I'rIolxlr~nrsiana. The Pw.si;~ns mighr onc clay rrturu to Ci1-rrt-c to rcnrw rhr rnn flirt, arlrl thr Grrrk?; wisb~ci, mrn-vovcr, to rctain rc~ntrol ol ' thr eastrrtl Acgctan roast ti-om which the rrcent invasinn harl come.. Thc Spartans, who had alwa?q l~crn rtbltic~rtnt to ,ioitl o ~ f i ~ i v ~ s . w ~ r r cblcirly not intrrrs~rtl in li~rthrc rxp~ditinns aqalnst t l l r Pcr- sians and wvre I I t~rcasponsivr to At hcnian init iat it.6

in this dirrbctian; nr) clr)~rhf tht)? watrhrd with rnncrsn as thc Arhrnians hiistcned to FortiT?~ [heir city, which h;icl twice bcrn ra\.aqrd dusinq the war with Persia. ll'ork was also szartccl lo makr Pirarus into a wrll-protcctrrl nil~al haw.

12thms. ricrcrnlinrd lo maintain t hr ~)rcssttw againsr th(. Pcmians, stluqh t alliances wii 11 sym- p;r~lit.tir sralcs, and in thr w i n t ~ r of478. j j KC. thr Ilrlian-Attir Maritime Icaguc was iormrd. Ovcr 100 stalt-s joit~ccl with Athct~s in an i i l l i i t ~ ~ c ~

apparcnily intended to I)(. a p.rm;lnrnt ~ ~ n i o n . Thr hradq uartcrs wcre sit uatc.d on Dclos, where* rrprc- s~nt;rl ivcs met ant1 the tscasury was founded. t i t r ~ v r statrs suppliccl ships to augment thc Atlir.tni;lt> flrrt wllilst lh r smallcr nnts r.ontril>utrd financial support assessrd hy ilrist idcs, thr twa- surrr, Apan ii.om hindi 1 1 ~ tlnr Lt-afir~c. taqr~hcr hcron a xutr rconnmic h t i n g , this practice p l ; t c ~ l lave sums or rnonry undrr Athenian control. The I,crag~rt. opcra~t.rl rlTvutivrly in harassing the

I G m k Ught Idan1 ry (gymnet) s Cmh b-vy infratr). rhaplire) 3 Greek di-r

Petsiaru. l l t l t i t slowly hrtame clear that thr ,Athenians rtirl not ronsirlrr i t to hr a clctnocratic alliancr o1'ti.r.r stiur-s. Sclmt. tirnc. during tthr pcriml '1 70 69 D.c., Yaxos trrrnin;~tcd its atlianuc with thp I,~aguc, 1 t was i tnmctliatcly l~csieqecl and li~r-rrd to capitularr ; rlthrns, i t srrrned, wor~lcl not tol~t-a;?te insubordin:ltion From her 'allies'. :\I i~bnut thrsmnv timc (:aryst~a nntl thr surrounding land in sor~tl~rrn I : ~ ~ l ~ l c n was fort-iMy ;innrxml hy r h ~ h a g u c k~l- thc

sakr of consnlirlarinq i t s ~crritnrirs. 'I'hr impli - calt inns wc~?c thlvious- ;\ t hcns was transforming; thc Lcaque into an crnpire. 'l'lle brcrs avai lahlc to [hc 1,ra~ur wrrr mnsidcrable. 111 4fi8 rc.r:. it rlralt a rlrci<ivc blow t o the Pt-rsians who wcrt. launching a ncw fleet, cvmprisin~ 200 ships, from rhrir Phw- niriiln shipyarrls. tt?i~r l)ctwrm Sparla ancl itthcns qradu:~lIy beca~nv irlcvitahlc, fin+ thr rIthc.nii~ns had

17. Creek warrior d l Do- helm@ d the arpis muad shield. The lonq-nhnftcd qmmr ;a missing. (Aphaia Trmple, At+) I& A. P e h helmet, pmbbly worn at Mnrathon 490 m . c E.

Thmcian h e h ~ t 5th crntury nr:. C. Boaotian helmet, p ~ s i b l y worn by Al-dcr'n soldier^ 3rd century R.(L n. Grrc'k hdmet p 3ML. 0.c:.

mad(* allint~cps w i ~ l ~ 'Illrss;ily ;~ntl h~Irg;wa ant1 with Rrqcls, a ~ m ~ . ~ r f i ~ l 1'~Fnponnt~ii~n rival of r hu Spartans. rls rrlations worst-nr-rl with .~Legina ancl Corinth. who wrrrb+j(maln~rs c ~ t ' z h r rr:ldinq potenrial 01' Piracus. hy now tltc c-llirf' 6 r c r k Iwrt. tcnsion in thr I't.lopnnt~cse rapidly l~rramt- ac-utc..

'lhc pmmincnr figure in r\tIlcnian politirs at this t in~e was Prrirlrs, who \vasdrtrrminrrl to unitr thr w l l a l ~ of Grcccc under rlthrnian rvli~ious Iradrl-- ship. I n 457 n.c., Ilc completrrl tllr lbrlifira~icm of' ITraeus and linkrcl i t tr, :\rIicns \vith il wiillcil c.orridor almu t seven kilomrt rtms w i r l ~ . , ;tnrl hir command was 10 scr* thc city reach thc hcigl~l ofits imperialist aspirat ions.

Athenian expansionist polirv had hecnrnr sn

obvious [ha! Sprra scnt an I I ,mu-s~rong army lo

Rocotia to prrsztarlc. its inhahitants to join E ~ P

Pcloponnesian Lva~l ic- and rtmsist Arhrns. and this fclrcr drl'eatsd an Akhrnian army at 'I'anagra, ens1 or Thehes; hut i t thcsn withc!rcw IO the IstEirnrts I r n v i n ~ the hroriitns ;it thr mt-rry 01' thr 111 hrn- inns. who took c o l ~ ~ r o l of t l i r wholv arm, rxct-pr Thrhcs i twff, two months later. Evcnt~rally a five- year pvac*c treaty wasncgot iat~d Ijt - tw~~n tlw rZItl~cnians ancl thc Prlopnnnrsian I,c:lgvr in ,ls'z R.c., I)ut i t was t101 until ++5 n.c. that a c l r f i n i ~ i ~ r

t r t t ~ c ' . intrrldrrl tcl last liu- (lrirty yrnrs. rr'as aqrt.c*d Prl-ic-1w dircl in .y2g Bar:. and thc. rlrw Iradlr-,

howevr-r. find t lcr rnt~cually acct.pt;clhc* t r r n t s whit-11 h i s attituclr, t11r11rcI h i s attrnt inn c I HP wnuld hr likcl y to form i i Eal;~ in,q pPnrc, and t11r Iic>perl to scm\-c.r tllr links I)ctt\*t.~-t~ Syr;~c-~~sc. ;inti t hc tnmat!: l i b 1 1 prthy to 1 hc* ct)rr f tict ol' irlrrrcsts wl~icll I ' ~ I n ~ ~ ~ n n ~ ~ s i ; ~ ~ ~ s , Ihr rhr Syrarusnns h;nl a sub- rharitctesisrd rrlittions bctwrc.t~ :\thcnr a11c1 stantial flrc-r which roulrl 1,~- n thl-[.a[ to the Spar la. Xtl~rnians. Thr war provrd inrntlclusivc. Ihr lmth

:\tht.ns atlrl Sp;irta, l)ur in 425 R.c:- an t.s11cditiw1 ro 19. &tail F- r $rb-tury LC painted v a y rhowing rn varicty orwr~poan and clothing. (Louvre, Pariu)

Sicily t11rnt.d thc sralrs in favour nr thr -4thrnians. Forty ships undcr Eurymctlion ;tnd Stq)h(-)clrs wrgrt8 e r r i t to rcinbrctr tmops all-cady in Sicily. T't;vcclling

I with thrm was Dcmosthrnt.~ who, i ~ l i h c ~ ~ ~ g h hold- ing no cotnmanri, was t-mpowt.rt.d to rlst. t ht. iIc.r't as

I he saw GL. Wlwn I<uryrnr:don and Srlphoc-.lrs t~ceivcd ncws that sixtv Pvloponnrsian ships 11ad i~rri\ped at C:cn.rvra off thc wcst coast of Kpirlrs thry drcided lo hasten strniglltaway tn r ~ ~ r r t tltr rtirmv, drspitr thcir inlbriority ofnumbrss. Oppns in~ this, Dernosthenr~ maclr thr :ipparcntly cstranrrlin;~~ prc~lmsition that thr flrrt slrt~l~lrl instc:trl put in at thr headlnncl nfPyltw on thr wrst coast oTXIIr.csc.nia, along which they wwc at that timr: s ; ~ i I i n ~ . Drmostllenes' plan was tc) hrriSy and htdd Pylrjs, Ijul the two aclrnirals wcrr unimprrsscrl artd wt.rrb only persuaded t n along with t h r - ir1c.a whcn ir

, storm co~npcllccl 111{-m to shcltc~. in N;tvarins I3ay, , protcctrd IIV lhc. Pylos prninsula and thc island nt'

Sphactcria. Walls wcrth connrurzrd IO thr south- east and south-tvt-s~ ol' PvEos, and alw to ~ h r tlc>rtlj where i~ was cnnnccred by a sand bar In the.

m. A r6tbcmtury rngtavin~ of i Madoniaa phd- cm-ryit~g Ihe long 'saris-' !-cayi, ( B i b mainland . Dernosthcnes, with l ivv shi1.n :lrltl I .ooo

( I i ~ i o l h + ~ N m t i m n s l e , ~ q . i l / hoplirrs nnrl l i ~ 1 1 t trnps, was lrfi tn garrisn~~ tIir 1 hci~dland.

1

.\lt~;tntvi.liilc. thr 1niUn l)nd!' 111 2 1 ~ . flvrt maclr lor C;nlr? 1.a otirc Inrarr. I lc*nir f i t l~er~~\ ' I ~ ; I I I w:~q to

insiiyatc atlrl nljlltr)l-t I+L'VOIT i n .\!csEvII~;~. i l t ~ ~ l t I I C S l ~ ~ t i t ~ b rrspnnst. \\-as ~ \ v i ! i - 'TIlc* I,ulk ol' I I I V I 'rlo~nwt~csiatt al+ln!* wi thdrrw frc~rn :\ttica. \ r * l ~ i c . h liad oncc aq;tirl Ix~r t i nrr.~~l~ir .r l , ancl ~ ~ ~ ~ t . t * l i r c l t l i r r c ~ l ~ t ( ~ I'! 10s. Tt~r S C ~ ~ I ~ I I I I . ~ ) ~ ~ ;I[ C:~II.( .~IX W;IS

iristnrctetl to sail i~tlr~lrtli;tfr.ly klr tllr samt. spot. n rn~os thc~ l t - s . LEP.C'EC \\.it11 lhr ~i-Q.09131'Ct ol' a t !;irk frrlln land ant1 %-;I. reel i~c.stc.tl inimrrlinlv wicl frcim t hr rlthcniat~ H(-c.1, tlow at %;rt.~;nthirs.

Thr Spartans prcl>at*rul t o track tllr garrison at 13!mlus, prrli.r.it11ly hclkrr 11ic. rcttll-ll ol'111c. : t lhrnian llt-ct, l ~ i t liit~n{I 1 h a ~ thi. i1111y l~ra t -~i (+i t l~ l i - ap- prcr;~chrs wrrr ;I! rliose ~x l in i s irlrriltl) l imi fit-rl by Dr*n~osthrt~es. Hrqlinq to prriprnt :2tl1r1iiail ~ t s r r d ~ h r . irlancl nl'Sph;wrrria, ~l l r . Sparlans Ia~~rlrtl t h ~ r ~ ;\ garrison (11' 420 11r;lviiv ar~nc-rl n l rn , of' \ \ , I w m ;I

litili. 11ndr.r a 11ii3r wcre rl-uc6 'Spartialvq', t'l'i~vk

Sp;u-tan trrwps. 'I'ltr attack rlri l'!,lte was pnrti- czilal.ly r l i l l jcul~ 1 w . c . a ~ ~ ~ ti!' 11s strct iqth as ;r fior~ific-i~tion. ;\a(! ~ h r Spart;~"' \wrc coi~i i t r t i ;~ l l \ ;Iwanh of T he possil i i i t y o I ' a~ tack rrtlni t h r :ltl~t.rii;in

I1rt.t t hrnugh thr. sot~tht-rrl t.litr;tncc to 111t. I)ay, which i t was i ~ i ~ ~ ~ c h ~ i b l r to I~loc-k;itlc succ*qf'irlly.

1:or thc clcl'rl~rt- ol' hi5 posilicln D r r n n s ~ l ~ r r i t r ~ m ~ c d I l .1~ qrra tcr ~>;irt "This Eirst-r. at tE?r Iandwalr3 f o r ~ i !it-a~ions wliilq~ 111m l i i ~ ~ ~ s ~ l l ' l ~ ~ ~ ~ ~ ~ l r c ~ a 5tmall 11r)cIv ot'hoplitrs to fight t J r :~ssnu!~ 1)). sim;l. Thc lat~<lu.:~rrl tl~Srnrt.s wvrr. as 1111- Spa rt a l a di\;c.c)vrqr~d. im - p o s i i ~ l t ~ t t ) hl-racl~. and t hry had nrl n-tnrc szlcct-ss w h r n thry trircl lo sitrl ihcbir ships r~vl-r thc rock) i~pprnach r t , t l ~c IlearEl at ~ h r ~ o ~ t t t l - ~ r + r s ~ ~~~~~~I. CII thc hratllancl. :\tirr a day of' f ~ ~ r i o u s figl1tin.q thc Prlopnrrt-sians wit!>rlrt-w to awai t tltt- i~rl.ivnl ol m i t i c r i ~ l ~ lilr ~llc. buildin!: ofsieqe r t~ginvs.

Soon alirr rhr lull irt t l ~ v liqh t ir~g, chr. i\theninri ship$, no\\- n ~ ~ n t l ~ r r i n ~ fi fry, nr.ri\-r.d itnd ir~sprc.rt.d t31ia situation. Scrillq no nl)pi~rtut~it> ritht*r to ctltrt'

thi* bay, \vllic.li W ~ S o ~ c i ~ ~ ) i r c l tlic S ~ ) ; ~ r f i l n l l r ta t ,

or to ~tlakc, a I;inrlitiq at Pylrls i t h ~ ~ v wo111~1 11;tt-1'

ht.rtl rln room l'nr sr, w;my \.c.sst.Ixl t!~c.y I . P ~ ~ F C * ~ !

rlrwtl~ tcl ~ h r isl;~tlrl nl' Protv. Early ncxt morriin~ the Sl>art;ins wcrr pu( t ing to

sra, i t t i c a r h a v i n ; ~ I,c-auhcd iht-ir ships Tor lhr. ~iight. W I I P I ~ t111- r\tllrtliilrls ~ I I S I I P C I in I I ~ H I I I 111r111: 111~'

Spa r t an ships urr~+r p u s h ~ d hark 10 i h r shnrc am!. rx , r~~tual l?+, t hr ;!rheni;~n~ mrccrerlc+ri in c;~ptusit~,q fivr \,ca~t-Is ancl cornplt-tc. mnlmaricl; I )T tlir Ila?.,

rrf tllr ;irtnihticr h a d hrrn violatrd, rcfil.;ccl to hand Iliic k thra Sj3i1rln11 s l ~ i l ~ . i l l l~! 1>1~1~kit( l~ '~I Sphac~rriii clrlct- nrorr. 'l'hr c*?rpc=c-rirt inn was r l i i lt the garristrn o n Spl~;ic-trrin woultl I)c s t a r ~ r r l in to surrender. Ijut

S~; I I 'LA~I pltr i f i t~ n l a n ; l ~ ~ E lo run rtn;dl S I I ~ P ~ ) s h i j ~ ;islirrre rln ~l ic seawartl sicle ol' Spl~uc.tc-ria. w11r.n stt-one wincl.; k v p ~ ttlr A ~ I i ~ n i a t ~ ~ i t i ~ i ~ I ~ ~ the lmy. and ; ~ f t c r s rvrs ;~l wccks ic W;IS rvIc1~11t ll~at tlw zarrisnn U.~AIICI l i o t st;In.e.

D~rnost hc.11c.r was tuakillq plans filr arr assault nn Spliac t r r i ; ~ whvn C:Ert)~i irjipc.i~rcd. h a v i r ~ ~ I~oi~stcd Ir, tl~r h ~ ~ ~ - r n l ~ l y in :\lllrns thal Ile coultl 1;1kc the i.;l;rnd in twc-nt y clays. :In initial as~~uEr wiis n i a t l ~ with 8on Iurplizcs a1 rhc. sclr~~hcrn eml ol* thc idand i~nr l a S p a r l ; ~ n outpsr ht.lrl I>? tllit.2~ 1~1c .n rsaq

r)\*r-rlmwt-i=vrI ; rt>,t)uo rl~ol-r mrn ii~llowrd. tntnrly P i ~ h r troops itlrlrwling; ahnlil 80n a r c h r ~ s WIIO h i ~ d il c.onridrr:iI)l~. ittlvan t R ~ P t 1 ~ ~ 1 ' 111'a~ily a1-mvC1 hop- litc.; in tht. nrr.kl; tc r ra i~l . Ut.rncathcnrs' tacticb was t o {ill-m L I ~ S 111t . hoplit(-s Ihritlq t h r Spartans hut tn rt-trvnt t r - l~r t t l);lltlr ivas IIILLTCCI, It.a\.ing thr Sp;mr:ins 13 rry tn t hc largcs t1~1rnht.1-s r l f ligh1 trrlr)ps p ~ ~ r c l n r o ~ u ~ i l tlicir flatrks ancl war whn assaiftd thrm wit 11 rni~silt.r S r n t ~ ~ a clistat~c-c*. \ t ' < ~ r t ~ clown hy this lactic and unah l r to ~ltnkt. n succcsqf~il countrr- at lilt-k. tl~nsc. Sliartans who ha(I not fillell I-rtrr;rtrd ill lhcir tratlititmally t l i ~ c i p l j t ~ r ~ l iil'iliiol~ to thr rot-! at thc norllrt-1.n cnd nPtElr islanil. t v h c r ~ t h r y r;tngrd t hcrn.wli-t-s in ;I semi-cil+clr to f i t ~ c the ent-my. :It t11c. s~rmntit 01' a hill, rh~ir flitnks prot~ctril. the tlrli-nrlcrs 11c.ltl ~ h c i r own urliil :t group of' liqhtlr armc.rl tnc.11, rommat~clrtl hy n h~lc-ssrnian captain. cntnt. 111) o1.t-r thc hill and 1i.H u p o ~ ~ t h r ~ n T~nm ~ h r rear. Yo.rr. I ha1 virton- tvas assu~=rd, t hc !t t henianr l~rid off. p l ' ~ t \ ~ ) ~ i f l g to rhe Spartans that tbcy sut.rr.rrdcr. Rlivr m u c h cliscussicm rhc remaining 2 9 2 mrn. I st) al' t E i r ~ r ~ Spnrtiat~s. g;~\~c* t hrmst*l\.n 1" iitw'I wcrr takrw to ;lthet~s.

U r p i t c tilr I>rilliancc o6l3emnsrl~c:ncs' tactics in tr l i~s inq tt, clllploy liis h o p l i t ~ r in ii s i t ~ ~ a t i o n wllrw

liqht troops coi~ld be u m I so much morc cKec lively, it was C:l~on who. on returninq to Athens, took [lie praiu- fi~r so prrsrigious a victory. ancl it seclmcd that the roriuncs or (he warmongers in Athcnian politics werP irr thc. ascrnciant. RUL, two years laicr, Cleon tlird in thc rout of thc Athcnian army at :\mphiupolis. and a fi rty-yeat peace treaty was t~ccntiatcd which called for Athcns to hand hack thosc cities shc had annexed durinq the war, along: with thc prisoners from Sphacteria. In return, she rtqaincd nearly all the territories she had possessed at the commrncrment ofhcrstilities. And so the war, which had heen so acutely cxp-nsivc in h t h human and ctonomic tcrms, led only to a rc- sumption of thc sratus quo, as far as Athens and Sparta wcrc cancerned. Rut Carinth, Boeotia and Mcgara were so djssatisfiecl that the reopening of hnstflitirx was incvitablrr.

Scvcr;tI firmrr Spartan allics, Argra, Cot-inth, Mantinca ant1 Elis, formrd an alliancc Indc- pt'wlrnlly orthc Laccclacrnonians and nrgotiatd a trr-atv with thc Athenians in 420 B.C. under the acgis of a ncw ancl influential ilthcnian st rate go^, Altil,iadrs. This state of afiii',lirs was shortlivecl for, aftrr a Spartan victory at hIantinca in 418 n.c,, the I'rloponnmian statcs rcjoinrvl thc Spartan camp

and I,acdacmonian supremacy ovcr t hc Pclopon- ncse was once morc cstahlishcd.

Under hlcibiadr~ thc Athcnian qumt for mas- tery of the Grwk worlrl found ncw inspiration ancl the :\ssernhly, despite the opposition oi'Rlcihiadrsl fellow slrnt~gos Nicinq, rat i f ~d an amhitious scheme toconquer Sicilv, in particular t h ~ port orSyracuse. An impressive rorcr was rnustcrcd comprising 5 ,m hopIitcs, 1,300 lighrly amed troop and a fleet of t34 triremes with a complement of a b u t 20,000

men. In addition (0 this ~hcrtt were large numbers of supply ships and attendant vessels. Although the land force was rclativcly small, the supremacy of her fleet ovcr any Syracusan opposition gave Athens hope For victory in SiciIv. 'l'he expedition was led by Nicias, AIcihiadcs and Lamachus; but not lone: i t f i c r i~rrival in Sicily, Alcihiadcs was recallod ro face political charges, and chose instead to cr;c.ape to the Peloponnesc. 1,arnachus ~avoured a swift attack on Syracuse, hut Nicias wasted time in ft~tilc cxcrcises and the Svracusans took the opp~rtunity to orgianizc thcir drfcnccs and srnd for help to Corinth and Sparta.

TR t h r s p r i n ~ nf 414 B.C. an Athenian assault gained po~qrssinn oft hr plntcau nrl.:pipoiat., which commanded the city from the wmt, ancl thcv hcgan huilclinq ;L wall running nnrth lo south ovpr the pla~rau in an attcrnpt to cut Syracuse o r rmm the rPst or Sicily. Tlie Sywcusan op1msiltion was unallle to prcvent this ancl the siruarion was hecornins despcraw, when [he Corinthian fleet arrived, hackrd up hv a hastily raiscd army of n,ono hop1itc.s and light troops Icd bv Cylippus. This iirmv manaarcl toseizr the nor1 hern part orEpipolac and to construct a counter wall wetwarcls across the plateau, frustrating the Arhrnians and cutting; their land communications. This forced t hr: Athcnians to scnd for reinforcerncn ts, which wrrr dispalchtrl unrtrr thr mmmand nf Drrnasthcnrs and Eury- rncdon. Upon his arrival, Desrnosthcnes dccidcd that an irnmecliatc. attack offvrcd thc best chancc of surrws. Hc midc a night attack on Epipolac hut was t~ns~rcccssii~l and ~hvt-rfi,rc. dutidcd that with- drawi~l was t hc wisest cor~w. Drlayrcl by Nicias' intlrcisinn, tht. hthrnian flrrt was aucldrnl y block- aclrd bv thc Syracl~sans in rhc Grrat Harbnur and, despit~ a valiant attrmpr to smash thhr way through tn rrrrdorn, the armv was hrcetl t o makr a lanclwarcl retreat towtlrrls Ca~ania , nnrth ot'Syra- cuse. 'I'hey mart-hetF in it hallow wltlarth, prnrrctrd around the outside by heavy infantry. Falrltv communications Ird to thr separation ofthr lrading division, undrr Nicias, Tram thc rwr , Id bv Demoslhenrs, and thr. fi~rcv w m sonn overtaken and massacred hy [he Syracusan army. Nicias and Demmthrnm werr cxrcutcul and rhc 7,000 sur- vivom were imprisonrd in ~ h c stone cluarries of Svracusr, where thry sulI'errd rrrril>lle privations in thc merciless dimate.

'Thc Symrt~san dis:1stc.s was an irnmcnsr srthack to Athenian imperinlism and her enemies were quick to lake aclvantag~ of the situation. Several stales revdled, ancl Sparta kegan refurbishing her fleet with too ncw ships. Besides these develop- ments within Greece itsell; thc Persians, on the othcr side of the Aeqean, renewed their interest in thc Ionian Grcek states.

Alcibiarlm, who had tcft just bcfbrc thc fateful events at Syrarusc, was at thk timc busying himself with political machinations involving Athcns, Sparta and the satrap nS Lydia, Tissapht.rncs. Puttinq hirnselrat thc tlisposal of the Athcnians,

Alcil~iaclrs Ilvlprrl thr.rn ro rrqain tt~r Hrlles~~orlr :~nrl I hc Ikq)l~orus 1)ul. aftrr the clrii'at cr3' an :ltIirnian flc.c.t i l t Intiurn i r ~ ,l.oI; R.c., hr. was repl;~cvd 11); Chlnot~. Hritsinq 1hn1 lhc. Sl);~~-t;in llr-ct unclpr L~~i l t l ( I t '~ W:IP ; ~ t r ~ n ~ p l i l l g 10 disrupt .\11tct1-

inn Ponlic. tr;itlr nnrl hat1 l~c~<it.qrrl 1,arnpsncits ill

t h r Hclleslm~it, I.>~non rclok I Ho ships anrl nIlit+ed hat r lc a[ :~cgosptharni.

'Thr t l ; y :ilirr he arsivvd C;c>r~c)n rrlwvd up rowal-rls thc. Sp;trt;in fl ret at t,ntnpsacus only to find ~ h a l Lys;mndt.r rt.fuscd t n engage. ;lncF so 111c ;\I lirnians rc tu rn~r l ro .2r.%osy,or;1mi, ~)rtrsucul by Sp;lrt;m rccounai~ssncc ships. For ;I Khrt hcr tour clays this escrcisr was rrpr-a1 rrl ; r hr nrst dav. I lie t i t hvnians, relturnit~~ li-om ?;(.I anotlrrr u n n ~ c c c ~ ~ f ~ ~ l

challengr, put ashnrr in the hay oi' Aegcspotarni to rallcc~ supplies. Apprisrrt or this 11); his srnurs,

Lysander launchrcl a wrprise attack and captured all but nine of thr: Athcnian ships, massacring ovcr 3.000 men. Connn escaped with cighl s h i p to Cyprus, and a solitary dispatch tmar madr its way hack to Athrns with news of thr rlisastcr.

'I'he Spartans followcd up this virtual annihi- lation of the Athenian Ilect by hc*sir,qin~: Athens with thc Pcloponnesian army, and, blockaded from thr sea hy the victorious Lysandrr, Athpns was obliged to negotiate a wttlerncnt. The Spartans, in a position to demand almost any terms, ins i s t~ l that the Long Walls and brtifications be pulled down, a11 foreign possrssions ,@vcn up, ancl Athen- ian control confincd to Atrira ancl Salamis.

Sparta. hitherto thr champion ofindividual state autonomy in Greece ancl thc vnrrny of Athenian imperialism, now revealed thr vrry attitudes against which she had nstensibly f c n ~ ~ h t . The oligarchic governments SIIP at~crnptcd lo impose upon sul!jcct states proved unpopular, and Sparta had considcrahle trouble maintaining her leader- ship in Grrrk politic?, 11r the rnd at' thc Peloponnesian war thc city

militias which, during the years of mnff ict, had been almost permanently mohilizrd, wcrc disban- ded. Largt* numhcrs of experjencccl wlclicrs were thus seeking employmenr of some kind, and, capitalizing on their capacity as fightinx mmcn, thcy hired thcmselvcs out to anyone who would pay we11 for their services. In 401 s.c. an opportunity arose for many mercenaries to take up arms a ~ a i n in the pay of Cyrus, yorrngcr brother of the Pcrsinn king Artaxerxes. Intending to overthrow his hruthcr, Cyrus induced the cities of lonia to revolt against the satrap Tjsaaphcmes, and rnustcrccl an infantry force aT 40,000 ( 1 o,ooo of whom wcm rnrrrcenary hoplites) together with about 3,000 cavalry. Included in this force were joo hoplitrs sent hv Sparta, well aware that she was in debt to Cvrus for aid he had supplied during the Peloponnvsian war.

After marching 2,400 kiIomctrrs, Cvrus con- rronted Artaxcrxta' armv at Cunaxa, north of Babylon. Artaxerxes' a m y was prnhably half ns stmng again as Cyrus' army and was rquippecl with the scytlird chariots upon which the Persians relied to break up the cncm y's formation. Cyrus' trnops allowed thr I'rrsian chariots and cavalry to p:us

t h m u ~ h thrir ~=anks rrlativcl y harn~lrssly and thvn i~rf\vinced on the. Prrsians, many nl- whom Ilrd immcdiatcl y . Cvrus' ~ i ~ v a l r y then charged. but in an attrmpt to rcach h i s hruthvr in ordrr to kill him ~wrsnna11y Cyrtis was separa ted lkom t ht* suppnrt r ~ f

his army and lost his lifi-. The conclusion nl'thc hattlr left both Greeks and

Persians unsure oiwhat to rln next. Despite ~ h r i r victory, thc Grccks wrrc faccd with attemptins a withdrawal with many hmtile Bmians still in thv arm. The Persians, for thrir part, wcre Inath ro rngagc the Greeks but krcn to be rid or them. ' l ' l~cy offrrrd tn escort them out of the country and hack m Grcccc, hut soon after the march srartrd thc Grcck gcncrals were l u r ~ d away fmm the army ancl put t o dcath and the rctrcatine soldiers were thrn atkackrd. Quick to dercnd thrrnsrlvcs, t l~cy gmup- erl in *2 hox fnrmatinn with hop1irt.s munr1 t l~r outside and, keeping the Persian cavalry and liqhr tronps at hay with slingers, ~ h r Grccks. who had maintained good order and quickly clcctrd new strate~oi, managed to reach Trapezos on thc Rlack Sra. This extraordinary rrlrtmat wrll illustratecl thr in~cnuity of Grrrk soldirrs in maximizing thcir strrn~th in the race or Tar suprrior nurnl)rss.

With Cyrus dead, Tissaphcrncs attcmprrd to re- mtahlixh his rule in Iania, and thr Grrck cities there appraIcd to Sparta Sir pro~rction. A flcct com- manded by Pisander was sent to thrir aid hut at thr battle of Cnidus in 394 R.C- it clashrd with a P<.rsian forcr undcr Conon, the Athmian cornmandcr who had rscaprd at Argospotami and had had a change oS l~eari. T11c Spartans lost ii fty trircmcs, and al t hope or naval suprcrnacv in the Ac~can. Takinq advanza~e 01' this dcfcat, the Greek ciry starcs handed ~ogrther in revol L. Suppnrbcd by the Persians, Thches, Athens, Corinth and Arxos rrbclld, and although thcy wcrc dcfcated hy the Spartans ncar Corinth in July 394 R.C, they entered upon thc Corinthian war, c l u r i n ~ which some notable succcsscr; were scored against thr Spartans hy tht alliecl generals. Even~ual sialcrnatt led to Persian-inspired peace propnsds which dernandrd thcl Forfrit of Asiatic Greek citios to thc Persians, and sc-cstahlishccl Spartan lradership in Greece. I t was nor long hcfore the inevirat>le rebellion came. This timt. thc centre was "I'hrhrs, fortunate in her military commander Epam- inonclas, who is said to have introduced into Grrek

warfare the successf~rl usc of a tactic arainst thc renowncd Spartan hoplitex.

In a valley near Leuctra in Bwutia, a Spartan force thought to num her approximately I 0,000, of

whom 1,aoo wcrc cavalry, met Epaminondas whose army was of a simiIar siw and constitution. 'The Spartans took up their traditional formation, with thc best tronps on the right wing, and thc rest of their infantry spreacl om, twelve deep, in a relatively straight line. Eparninandas posted his Theban infantrv, fifty deep, on the left of his force oppmi~c the track Spartan troops, and had the remainder of his men set obliquely back towards his right wing. The cavalry of both sides, stationed ahead ol' the infantry, cngagcd first, and the Spartans were decisively dcrcatcd; whilst still in disarray, thr Spartans werc hit by the massed strength of the hopli tes on rbe Theban left and were unahlr to resist. The Spartans lost over I ,000 men, qoo of whom werc Spartiates, a trrrible blow to a state whose rorces had never heforc: hren drfeated in pitched, battle. Et was now thc turn of Thches to dominate, just as Sparla and Athcns had once done, but this served only to unitc thc city states of

the old PeEopnnacsian I A - ~ R U C a~a ins t hcr, Icadinq to a r o n ~ r o ~ ~ i a t l o n or the Theban and allied armirs at Manrinca. Roth lbrces were over 20,000 strong and Eparninondas' tactics were the same as they had been at Leuctra. The massed 'I'hehans broke chuir oppencnts* right wing, hut Epaminondas was killed, and without his grnius r h ~ Thchan army failed to push home for a cfccisivtt rrsult, AIicr that, Thcban p w c r failecl, ancl the city states, squab- blinx over poIitical control, Ijrtle st~sp~ctecl thl: radical changes which la): in the near liiture.

~A/XUIIAY- the 9~/7t On the death of his brother Perdiccas in 359 KC. Philip I1 of Macedonia, then aged ~wcnty-thwe, srizcd the throne. During his reign he created a unificd national army such as had nwer been seen by thv volatilc alliances of Greek states. In the first twu pat s ofhis rule he succeeded in redefining the boundaries of the rragrnented kingdom hc had inherited, and spreading his intrrrasts farthrr afield towards Pangaeus, Thrace ancl Chalcidicc.

Although reluctant at first to interlire in the afhirs of other Greek states, Philip was forced in 354 R.C. to take action against Phocian inaetf'erence in Thmsaly, which lay immerliatrly to thc south of his own lands. Dcfcating the Phocian army near Phcrac in 351 R.c., he movt*d on against Phocis itself, but a m v i n ~ at Thermopylae he found the Phocian army supported by 5,000 Athenian hop- litcs and decided that i t would hc prudent to

withdraw. Phi lip was anxious to avoid conflict with Athens, thc forcmost naval power in Greece, but Maceclonian policy was by now amusing concern in the Grcck statcs. Athens however, keenly aware of her current weaknesses, was happy 20 accept peace proposals concluded in 346 B.C. which receivd Philip into thc Dclphic Arnphictyony; this was a federation or Grwk statcs, and i t is at about this time that Philip dcvdoprd iclras not only of extcnrling Maccrlanian hrgcmonv nvcr thr whnleof Greece hut of uniting the Greek states and carryinq the war against thcl Pcnians. Despite setbacks at Pcrinthus and Byzantiurn in an attempt to take con tml of the traclr routes of the HclIcspont, Philip moved muth once morr and in 339 LC., bvpassed Thermopylae anrl occupied Elathia. Athcns and

Thehrs f i ) rn~d an alliance against him and. raising a forre of owcr 40,cx)n mrn, they nwt Philip at

Chaemnea in 3138 R.C. Philip, with 3n,m infantry and 3,000 cavalry, cntrustcrF to t l w cavalry on his lrft wing, who werr lcrl hv his son Alexander, thc task of hreaking the Thc'uan phalanx. 'I'his t h y duly did, whilst Philip's rie;ht wing madr a ractical retreat lo draw thr Athenians on and hrcak the Greek linr. Thc plan was succcs~ft~l, and tlsc Athenians, trappcd bclwprn Philip and Alexander's victorious cavalry, wrrc severcly defeated. Apprcciatinq the scnsrlrsmcs5 of anni- hilating rhosc soldiers he Ilopcd mon lo command himsell; Philip allowrul t l ~ e alljm rt, r ~ x p c .

Tltis victory rffcctiv~ly estahlishvrl Philip's It-adenhip of rhr Hellenes, ant1 having sccurcvl hrinrh, hr summoned to thp city rlr.lcptcs from thc Greek states and pmpmed ctlr Ibm;ltion of a drfcnsivea!~~-nsivo lca~utr under Macrdonian mil- itary command. 'l'bc C;rucks wrrc hrccd to accrpz.

Philip's aim was to Icad an cxp~l i t ion into Asia a~a ins t rhc Pvrsians whose perpetual intrrfrrrnce in Grrrk alhirs wprcsrnltrcl a ~hrrar t o hllarrcl- onian hrgrmony. In 376 n.c. he scht11 ~ o , m mrn under ParmcaL) lo rs t i~hl i sh n fmtholcl llryor~rl thr Hellespont in nithynia and t h ~ 'I'roarl wliilat hc himsell' assernblrcl t hc main invxqiotl I'orrr. Philip was, IIOWPVCT, dcrrtincd ncvcr to rralixc his am- hition personally, for in thc atltumn ol' 336 n x . . at

ltis daughtcr"~ wpdctinq in Prlla, he was assassi- nated, and i t was lrrt ro h i s son, Alexander, tn rnakr sure tha~ ~ h c kdcration did not drgcnoralc rmcc more into a rltrstrr or bickering rivals.

I'hilip's death was followcd Isy revolt amonq thc ritv-stares, ancl only after Alcxandcr had swifily supprcsrd rrflrllion in Thchw and destroyed thc rity did the Grrekx rvalizc. that thr rlrw rufrr conld rctain as strnng a holcl as his fathrr had over insurgent rncml~rr-starcs of the contcrlcracy. Thrrr had l~een implications of Prrsian I,~-ibery in thr rcvolt, ancl i t was olwioris to Alexander t h a ~ his Fat hrr's plan must hr implcmcntcd if Grerk unity was to IK maintainrd. Lcavinq a small force of 9,- men and a fi-w horse to ktrp ortlrr in Grrcce, hlcxandcr leli Pella Ibr Scstos, and in spring 334 sac. brought his army into 'I'roas,

' h e Pclsian forccs untlcr thc recently enthront.4 Darius I11 wcrc cornpowd, as usual, ol' a vast conglomeration of trmps of ditT~rrnt nat innalitics

whn were never rvcltlrtl into n sinql~, wtll t ) c v ~ n - izcd fightinc bodv. 'E'hc 1mt trt>r~ps, C;~-t=c-k mcrct.nnrirs nncl Persian c;iviilsy, oficn round themst-lvr..u undcr the higher camrnancI of'rclativciy incnmprtmt satraps who lack4 tllc ability to make the hrqt use of them.

Alrxander's force of approximat~l y 3o,noo incintry and 5,000 cavalry had a core or r 2,noo Maccdonian root ancl I ,800 first-ratr hlacrclonian cavalry, I ~ u t inclrirfcd, along with :i,ooo merccn - irrica, j,oao i n k t r y ant1 Goo hnrsr from t llr Grrck stales. Qnrstions of stratc-gy lay cntirrly w i ~ l l ~ h c M ;tccclonian high rnm nlsnrl , and a sys1c.m was rlrvisc.rl wherclp+ rcinforcrmrnts were 1)rotlght prrinrEically rrom Grrr*rt. lo kccp the arm?. up to st rmgt h. Thc Itlact.tlonisns' chier wc-i~knrss \ r u s

their f1t.t-I, which mmpriscd only rfio trin.rnt.s, Thc i~dvancr hrrr ~rnclcr I'armvnitr harl Iwrn s~~lli l . inq sr\,rrely at the. hand~~1'Memnon0~Rh~~l~1.1~~.;1~1d ~ h t satraps ol' thc nci,qhbourina rrgiot~a. on Ilc;~rinq or hlexandcr's arrival, joincd 14cmnon in t hc 'I'roarl.

+ P h m helmets, hw, W p a r r ~ , quiver, tunic, rxe md javclfn. Mnny arthcrrc were aftrn worn and c a m r d by Ptmian troops.

U 11dc1- thc cotntrlar~d o f Aristz~. satrap o f Hr~llrs- ~mntinc Fhryin, t h ~ y discusserl thcir stratc-gy: Mrrnnon's nt,und arlvicr was to rrtrc.:it. dcstroyinq the land as 11ley went, arid t l ~ r . t i to v a r y thr war into Grevct-, leaving 1hr. i)c.lr.agut.~*rd Alrxandrr in a hostile wasteland ; l ~ i t tlijs plan was r ~ j r t t r d hy 111~ satraps. who fitv~~urrcl an irnmcdiatr conflict. app;~rcn rly placing thcir uonfidcnce in thc advan- t i i p thcy h;ld avcr Alcxandcr in their choicr nf' rcl-rain. F'osi tioncd on the eastern !lank of thc rivcr Granivus (which was in thc area ol' the Darclati- c.lIt.s), thrv cnt~ld forw .'\lr?cancler to alcernpt a prrcario~~s crossing whic tl wou ltl 111-rak h i s l iw- marion and hindrr thr rlf'rctivr use nf rava1t-y. ?\lthouqb thr Pvrsinn infantry was nr) rnatcbh for that ol'thr Macvtfonians, Aristrs war; rrlyingon hi9 supcrior 11t1rnl)rrs or ~;-Iv;I~I-v ovvr I 5,000- to

countcs any Mart.tFonian attack. On reaching I I I C /,a~tLc-ground Alcxandcr's staff

saw clcarly thr dangers o f a dirccc advance across the river, and so, ovcrnight, they rno\~cd down- sttram. forcling; the river at dawn. Ry the time the Persian ravalrv, summonrd by scouts, had arrived at hlrxander's crznsing point, tlzr Maccrlaniarl phalanx llaci Sr)r-mt.d u p and hlc*xandcrk cavalry charged, forcing a I'crsian rrtrcat.

'131e g~.ound on the castrrn s i c k of rhr Granicus gave the Maccdonian c.aval~-y the chance to cxercise its skill t o tFlc full. and as soon as the Pcrsians advanced on his position Alrxancler moved his right wing cavalry against r hcm. Moving first towards the Persian Irft, hc suddenlv bore round and forcrd his wrdgc Formation inro the Persian centre. 'I'hc cnrmy rvplirul with a similar chargr ap i t ls t the .Macrdonian ccnzrc, but Irft thcir infijntry an easv target lbr thp Maccdcmian phalanx. A further cavalry char~c, this timc by Parmrnio on the Macedonian riqht wing, pur the Persians to fligfr t, leaving only a pocket ol'rcsistance kern Memnon's Greek mvrccnarics, snon ovcrcome by the triumphatit Alcxandor. 'Thc clrfcat cost ..\ristes 2.500 cav*2lty, and disprlltxl anv illusions Darius miqht have had about thc gmvity of the Macerlonian threat.

Many cities in Asia Minor submittrd without troublc to Alcxancler, b u ~ h v mt.t with sornr. rcsistancc, particularly at Mllrtua anrl Halicar- nassus, After a short siego ,Milvtus was t~rupicd, but Halicasnassus, d e h d c d by thc c-xpcrienccd

/ 2% ( i m k -(. hehim& o f t h e b r r i c sty1c,shittd !

d abort sword.

Memnon who had cscaprd at Granicus, proved intransi~ent ; Alexander leTr. a dctachmrnt of 3,000 font anrl noo horse ro besiege the port, and hradcd on round the Lycian coast, aiming cvcntually to occupy all the ports or the uastcrn Meclitrrrancan, thus renclrrritlg the Persian flcel inoperative. By Octobcr 333 R.C. h e had arrived at 'Tarsus in Cilicia whence he mevcd arnuncl thc coasz of Syria to Myriandsus, only la hear t h a ~ Daritls' forces had nlanoeuvr~d inrn position hehint1 him, at Issus, on the northern bank of 111e rivcr Pinarus. Hia lincs of supply artcl communication cut, Alcxandcr was forced to turn a h u t and light. His exhausted troops marched back towards ~ h c Pinarus where the Persians, having once again choscn thcir position with care, awaitprl rhrrn. Darius was protecting his weak Asiatic infantry with Greek mercenaries, who, along with the 2.000 first class Pcnian tmops of the Royal Rodyguard, and rhc lightly-armed Cardaces, made up the Persian front line. As Alexander approacl-lcd, Darius moved his

main cnvalq fi)rt.c. onto his I - ~ s F I ~ wing w a r rhr scil

shorc.. Partnrt~io and i2lcxanctrr- Ictl 111c leli and r i ~ h r winq c . a v : ~ l ~ rrppc-r-tivcly. t hc. pl~il!;tns takinq up the relitrr.

As soor1 its thr first vclltry of arrrlws h;ld hrerl loosect hy thr Pet+sian ;irrhers, 11lvx;iridrr led t h c = Cotllpariir~n C:av;~lrl; in a hrilliilztt c-harce ivllich shattr~.rcl Tkrius* riqt~t winq. Wnwt.vt.r, [his crcatrtl a gap to t h r rig111 01' thr ntrugglinq hInccdorliitn pI~;~l ;~nu aticl intn ~ l ~ i s grrp Daril~s's I :i.rrk ~ncrcrr l -

;tri(-s pn~~rec l , I M I tling i*m-iotlsly wi I 11 . \ I ~ ~ S : I T ~ ( ~ ~ ~ I - ' S centre. 121t.xandrr's mitit1 cot1cr.r-ti ntlw wils citlirr t i1

capturp Dari tis or tcl kill him. hc~pirtq t o rcmoIbe, nltlnq with tl~r. C;rc*iri Kiriq, any 1Lrtl1cr unirrrt oplmsiirinn wit hit1 rhr Pvrsian F,';lttpirt., n;~rius, s r r i n ~ rllr rlanqcr, flrtl ~ h r l~atrlrfielrl. : ~ l t h o u ~ l ~ h~ apparently woundcrl :\lcx;lndrs wf H) illmost rook him i r i a dirt.rht chargr.

I t in re h t - rhould ~ n i r s ~ r t . , Alrx;~zlrlt~r hat l first In

mxkc sure of his victory: hr twnerl 11Ix right wirlg nqaiust llle 13c-rsE;in cvntrc.. Thc nivrrcrlarirs wrrr shatt~rrc! and thrir prrrlicanrcnt taustrl thc caralr.! on thrir r i ~ h t ro li~Ilow P)arius in Clisht. 't'hr. hf;lcedonian~ fbl lowctl and t IIP I'c.t.si;~~is wrrc rnutccl. "rIrsanr1c.r was now [irt. t o pursllr the. Grri~t Kin3 himwlf, I ~ u l I);~ri~ls Ilai1 TTI~ IC~C gow1 his rVscnpr, 0vr.r 1 o,ooo I;I.(*I'~ ~ ~ i ( - r ~ t ' ~ i ; ~ ~ . i ( * s ~ ~ ~ c c t ~ ~ s f i ~ l l y rp- trcbst~rl, to nfkt. 111c.ir srrvic.f*s in thr= nrsl c.onflict. whir11 wras in~vi ( i~ l~Ic- ils Ic)tiq its n:ll-iitx n.rnaincrl oveslorcl ur t hz. Prrniiu~ F,mp>in..

r\lrxandrr prtsl~rcl on clowr~ rhr Syriars romt. taking all tllc E'rrsian naval hmra arlrl rlicrt*l>y ollti~ining comj)Irtr rtll~lrol i r ~ rhv r*nstchr-tl hlrtli rcr- rantLan, rldvtour was made i r l l r ~ T,.qpl, hi11 I,? the

sumrncr or 331 R.C. Alcaantlrr hat1 Icrl l ~ i s atmy back notthw;trrls 11trt>ugh Syria 1 0 Thapsactw t)n thr Kttphratcs, r n rrltltc' for Ral~ylon, thr rconomic crn trc r)rt hr Empirt.. Mcanwhilt.. Ihrius, 2 hinkinq that hlrxandt=r wt~uld head clown t l ~ l r f3upl1r;l tcs.

preparvtl f i r 1 rrprat of Rrta~c~~~xcms' dvl'ral ; i t

Cutlaxa which tay a little rrorth or H;lhylori. Thr astlltr Mact.rloninn Ir-itdekr was not, l~owtlvrr. I r k I,r rlrawt~ intr) t h i ~ trap. ;rnrl having < T ~ I W C C I t l l r * Ri\.r.r F,uphratr.s struck ort t nordl tnr\rards Czarrhac. narius was fi)rccd to rllangr his plan< and ht- look his hrctrs to h r l ~ r l a , hollinfi to met-[ illcxander at

tI1r Tigris. Hy Srpt cmhc-r hc for~nd [ h i l t Alcsandr.1- was heading still i'urihcr 11ortIi arlcl rlrcitlt-d no rngage him ar Gua,q;imel;t, wllc.rt* thcrr w:u a plaitt

wtlirh, suitahlv Ect.rllctE. wr>ultl br atlmirmaI>lr t r ~ ~ n i t l Li~r his r-;l\.;~lry : ~ t l t l chariots.

A lirs a1 10~,in.q 11 is ;irIny srvrral rlilvs' rcsl, Alrsa~~rl r r . wllo harl hcb;tiul l i l~rn c-;~ptnrrd scottts of E);11-i us' finill plan, rract~rcl ~ b r I ~ t t 1 lrfic.Irl i171d saw to his hol-rc~r rhar I1;lri ~ r l ; ' tbrcc.s WVTF considc*rably st rnr1qc.r t l ~ n r ~ hc- hilrl hrlirvrcl. Thc Great King was rrlyinq ntl a srrt)nqEy arrnrrl cav;~lr! ol' :+~,O(IO to

fntm~ hi^ fkont linc: the- hIarr.ilr~nian c a v a l l ~ wotllrl lw ot~tnumllcrctf i111nt')st livv ro orrtm. O n *r!j

Sep~c.rnl)cr :\lrx;lntlr.l- r*c.c.onncli trcrl t l ~ r plain ;I t ~ r l

The E>atilt- orclrr nl':\lrxi~nclvr's army was clr;lwn 1113 1 1 ~ ~ ~ 1 clay in rnuc.11 thr snttw way ;ts i t l ~nd 11ct.11 at C;r;uiicns ant1 Issus, IJLII with i h t w i n p strt-ng- tilt-nrcl ant1 ; ~ ~ g l r d llnrk li-om the mait1 litrt-c. 13~*Iiind ;I c.;~v;tlry srrckc-11 ( ~ n thr r i ~ l l t wine, hc ~>l:lrrd a ~ ) i ~ w c r f i ~ l mrrrrnar): force, whils~ the rvrnaind~r 01' rl~c rl~c.l.r-t.n;lrics and t t ~ c 1,raglrc it~lkr~ry ~srr~tcctrtl t h r . rr*nrh. '1'11~ 1c.t-t winq WRF. its

tn makc ,a dvcisivt* r l ~ a r g c into t11r )?c*rsi;tn cetllse whc-rr Dsrius Itimscl I' w;w positionccl. i\s t h r two

;irmius apprnachrrl rach athvr, r\lrxanrl~t~'s rrlrn drilicrl n\-c-l- tr~w;trds lIlr mngh qrn~lnd ou Daritts'

Ivft and this manocuvrr Forr-t.d rhc Pcrsians t u take rhr inilia~ive. UI'SSI~S, J ~ a c l i l ~ ~ 1 1 1 ~ Pc.rsinn Irrt-wins ca i~ i l l r~ , cnyagrcl 111t. h1l;tc-cdonians. 1 3 ~ 1 ~ fin~nrl that hr nrlcdrcl con~inual rrinforcc~~icnns lo ct~trn lcrtlc t rhc. l a r ~ e num1)rrs oI'rnr11 :21chxantlc.r was pushing (utt 10 re-sist him. O n rhr Maucdonian Lrli fl;ink

q. G m k m r r t o r dm- from a k r e in m Florentine @my.

Parmenis was just rnanaginq to hold olf Mazcus and the Persian right wing cavalry. As sonn as thc Persians were fullv occupicd on both his Ranks Alcxandcr led a rurious charge, in thr prnvecl weclgc formation, riir~ctly into the Persian ccntre, and succeeded in putting Ifilrim to nigh[. Bcssus, now cut off from Darius and I'earing that Alexander's wedge might turn upon his cavalry, began to rctreat. Once i i lwcarne cleat that narius had fled, Mazeus iao withdrew from thc stru~gle and the Persian front line rapidlv disintega~rd. Reports of the losses at Guag-arncla wcrr incnn- sistent, and t herc are no reliablc f ig~ses on which to base an estimate. Alcxandcr imrnedia~cly sct off after Darius, only to find that he had onrc more disappearecl. However, Alexander hacl 1-s cause t o worry now that the defeat at GuagameIa had desrroyed thc Great King's crcdihility.

Alexander marched on to Babylon, and looh i t

easily hccause the walls had been allowcd to crumble awav; from thcre hr moved eascwarcls through Susa, Yrncpolis and Pasgarda, thcn north - west to Ecbatana. Darius still eluclrd him, and whcn, a Tew clays latcr, Alexander finally caught up with him, he hacl twcn rnnrdered by UPSFUR, who no doubt felt that Darius'failure at Guagamcla was too murh to hear. h~surninc the titlc of King aF kin,^, Alexander

marched to thv <:astern satrapirs trt cnnsolidatr his npw empire, csrablishing !I'orts for thc dcfcnce of his north-eastern firmtier be tbre turning south inlo India, Hc cmswd the Indus and arrivcd in 326 B.C.

at H ydaspes (Jhclum). Alexandrr had hoped to ford the rivcr,Jhclum at Haranplir but arriving. at the crossing Sound Porus, an lndian king, waiting on the apposite bank with a ~n'orrnidahle rorce including archrm, c hariats and, mtlst t crri fyinp: of all, elephants. Crossing the rain-swtdlrn river at this point was, ofcourse, out ol'thc question, and so Alexander plannccl to deceive Porus in to holding his position whilst the main Macrdonian farce was transported upstrram to cross the river further east atJalapur. Leaving a forcc under thc command of Cratenis at Haranpur to trick Pcwua into hlicving that the army was dctaying there, Alcxandcr moved a rorce of 5,000 horse and 10,000 foot upstream ancl hrgan to transporl i t across to the south bank. Nrws of this manoeuvre rrachd Porus whilc there was still time for him to counter it, and he r r a l i x d that his wisest move was to cngaye Alcxander as soon as pmible, preferahIy before the Maccdanians re-formed on thc southcrn hank. Leaving a small force to hold Crarsn~s off, he went upstream to mcet Alexander with an a r m v esti- rnatcd at about 22,000, including ~,ooocavalry and I 30 elephants.

Porus drew up his hattlc Line, ahout six kilo- mrtresIong,on ii flat sandy plain.castofthccros~;in~; at Haranpur. The hulk ol'his m o p wcre infantry bur on each wing hc postcd his cavalry, scrrcncd by war chariots. Whcn thc two armies met, Alrxandm sent two divisions of cavalry, out OF sight, around thc Indian right wing. His hope was that upon srring the depfetcd main Macrdnnian cavalryl Porus would launch against i t both win,gsofhisown cavalrv, in an attempt to wipe it our and gain a swirt victory. Alexandef s assumption was correct; as the right wing of the Indian carralrv charqed,

Alexander's rrsrwr force took them Tmrn the mar. N'i th t hc Indian horsr trapprcl, Alexandrs odered the phalanx and Guards Brigadr to advancc, and the battle was soon won.

The march into lndia continued, Alexandrr planning tn rrach the Ganges and then thc coast. However, his men, veterans of an arrluons and lcn~thy campaign, found thcir morale hmkcn hy the unkaral>lc monsoon climate and they rcfuscd to 30 flurt her. Alcxancl~r had no option l ~ u t t o make the journcy homeward. He consrruc~~d a f lcrt on

thc Jhrlum and fbllowcd thc river to rhe mouth of the Indus, where, having established a naval station a t Pattala (Hydc.rahad), hr dividcrl his army intcr two sections and made his way hack to

Susa, which h c rcached in thc sprinp, of 324 B.C. A yrar later hc moved to Babylon, his chosen capital, and began tn plan various explorations or his empire. Alexander himself ncvcr implemen tcd thrsr projects, Sir be fell ill with malaria, and on lo

Junc 323 B-c., he died leaving his empire to bc fought ovcr by the strongest of his gcnrrals.

In the years after his death rhe memory or Alexander merger! with romantic talcs of

sup~rhuman valorir giving rise to the myth which represents him as a demi-gd, parsuing a vision of world unity. A closer look at Alcxandet's hiatoty may suggc-qt a rather d i K ~ r ~ n t story, blr t even today his military prowess and indirrputablv brilliant generalship rcmain his most endllring rnonumrnt.

A I Pminn stundard- h ~ m ~ r This s(anda1-d-hearer, taken rrom a paintitl~: or] a Grcck vase, wcars [he traditional woli'-skin tic-ad- d r m 0ovr.r thr head and shoulrlrrs as a clistinction or rank. Thc colnurfi~ I, pat t~rncd, tir nic and trousers madr thc standarcl-bearcr easy to recognize in battle. The 'uniTom* followed thc Mrdian style with close-fitting tunic and narrow slcrvcs, tight at thc wrist; under the plain short skirt, thc close- fitting truscm also fitt~l-tightly at the ankk. No

e8, G d w a d q drawn f- t Sicilkan v a ~ .

- - - -

was a bow and quiver darrows. Traditionally the Persians and the Meclrs scrved mainly as archers.

A 2 Pmsinn Imrnortol s p ~ n m a n 12rotn information shown in colourrtil glazed -hick rrliers in the ruins or PcncpoIis the Immortal spearman is depicted hcrr in the dress ol* thr kinx's bodycuard; thry wcrr thc clite corps of the kinq's bodyguard and army, and they wcrv callcd *TmmartaIs' hcc.a~isc thcir numhrrx were never allowed to fall helow ro,ono, with the possjhlc addition of somc infantry and cavalry. 'l'hey ware the Pessian style 0~1ong-skirtcd, loose-fitting tunic with thc wide flowing slccvcs. The skirt was hitchcd up in front with a f r ing~ l waist sash. I t is possihlc that a claw-fit tin^ under-tunic was worn with

shield was carried as both hands were required to narrow slrcves fitting rightly at the wrist (these can raise the standard, hut slung from the leu shoulder be seen crmcr~ng from the wide slcrve). The tunic,

lg. G m k a-r, showing pn early shield from *be inside, helm&, g m v c q swoxd, bow, quiver m d herald stpffs.

was colourrt~lly d r c o r a ~ d with floral or grornet ric drsigns. '111~ hair and hvard were plaited in thc Persian fashion, and rncircling thc head was a broad twisted cord lillrt. He carried the main Persian weapons, a spear and how with quivcr. h r h the bowand thcvrnatcquivrrwere hung !+om ~ h r Irfi shoulrlrr and the long, 24-mrtrc spear wizh thr pomegranate hrrt t spike was carrird in thc right hand. Far rhc officers, the hurt spikr was gil E and for the m m i t was in silver. On active svrvfce rhr Median stytc clrms wolild probably havc been worn.

Ag Per~inn arc/rrr The Median-styk dress Tor an archer was a Iring tunic coming ta rhc knct.. with the tight-fitting sleevrs to thr wrist. Under the tunic trousrm were worn. A coloured sash was wound round tht. waist, knotted in thp centre and thc ends allowed to hang clown in front; the rcct wvre ccovrred with Iighr slipprrs. TIlc hair and beard werc: dccoratrd with plai IS and rlr~ssrd i tr I Ilr Pcssian style, ancl a hrim l e s ~ high 'howlrrr tvpc' hat was worn. A shaped quiver, which also carritul t hc how, was carried over the left shouldrr, and in thr riqh~ hand was a typical spear.

B Arnh cnmd cfit~nlry 'I'hr has-relief work in thr ruins ol' thc Palacr or Assl~rbanipal at Ninrveh shows details t~ftht . ratncl- riding Arabs. The Assyrians had almost des~rnyed thc clesert nomads to which thest. camel riders belonged and had thrrehy oprned thc way Lbr rhc Persian attack and invasion r)T thcir countrv.

'The Prrsians further clrvrlopcd thc camel cavalry corps far lhoir own r~sc and thc firsk-known successful operation was ;t~ainst thc RalrvIonian, C:tocs~;us, in 547 KC. anrl Iatrr sqainst khc clrsert nomads or Syria and Arabia. The carncI carps was oftcn a two-man unit ol' cavalry, kuing us(:<! as lightly-armed mounted bwmen. Mobility and manoeuvrability srcrn to have bccn the stronE points of this arm of thc Persian cavalry and ~ h c y wrrc probably used for skirmishing and for pursuing thr retreating enemy.

CI G r ~ k lifltt in fnnlv {gymn~!) TIlcsc soldiers were uacd as p.ciloi, which was a ti tte given to the light iniantrv skirmishers. Thcir main taqk wnq to oprn the ronnict hy harassing the rnrrny in short swiii attacks with ~ h r cavalry on their flanks. The hoplite phalanxes, holding the

central position, wou Id chargc the cnrmy after several attacks by thr fisiloi.

This p n ~ f soldier (~ht. name means nakrcl) was armed with thr simplest wcapons, a sword (ntfirll- nira) and a,javrlin or club. Thc hrielks! ofclothing, usually a chiton turned clown and Ihstcnrcl at the- waist, wllich lcft his arms cornplctclv f r ~ e , and movernerlt unimpairt*d. W e made iin excellent skirmisher Tor the typc ofwarrare which was carried out in this prriod.

Cz Creek henry infonlrv (Irofilite) The massed formation of hoplites was a most formidable tactic, thcir harsh clisciplinr: and fanatical llcrusal to yield gmund making them idcal soldiets, ' 1 % ~ heavy brll-shapcrl cuirass so pnpular in the clm~ical pcriocl was now giving way to a composite flc*xihlr leather-I~ackccl corselet which was covered with small over-lappirt~ metal ptatcs. Over this t~ody-piece were two s houldrr-picrrs, which were sccuscd at the back, and then pulIr.cE over the shoulders and lacccl at the ii-ant. This corselet was worn over the simple chiton which camc down to the miridlc or thr thigh. Thc hody, kom the waist down, was prfitrctcd, as wrre sornrtimr's the shoulclers, by strips of lrathcr known as ~ / P ~ I I , ~ P . T

(feathers) usttally weighted with a small mcl;a! plate.

Thr large round shiclcl, which was called arr aspis, was peculiar ro the hoplitrs ;it was designed so that the support arm lsat~cl and the hand grip positioned thr shicld to prott:ct half of the holdrr and half oi' the hoplite on his lcft. This rnacle thv solid Formation firwhich they werc rcnowned. Thr shield-boss was d t c n shapecl likc thc hcad of' an animal and paintrd. The shins and lower Ergs wt.w protccred by hronm greaves, with the reel oftm hare. As all hoplires had tn find thcir own equipment there wrre various stylcs, and thr hclmct was no cxccption. The hopli tc illust r a t d wean a Doric-slylc hclmet, which was compIeteIy dosed except for two smalI openings for thr eyrs, and ornamented with a large horsehair crest fixed to the top of the l~elrnct, with a Leatl~rr on each siclr.

The sho1.1, thrust in^, straight sworcl was Lor fighting at close quartcrs ; for the fbrmation chargr ~thc long-shafted spcar was usccl. Until the timc o f Alcxandrr, the hoplitcs often wore their hair Irm~,

9 G m k trumpeter with shir1d (aspis), from which hlmg n paiattd t r ~ protector, f- a vase p h t i n p .

which roll Id Be a rlisadvantaqe in closc-rluarte~. fightinq.

C:j C h p k s l i n ~ ~ r Similar to t Ile , g m n ~ t \ . , thc slingcrs were also light infanir!. skirmishers (f2~ilni). They worr a simple chiinn with na arrnnur other than the small: round shield (pe l fe ) . Apart from the sling thcir only weapons wou1d l)r pcrhaps a small knifc or dagger carricd from a shouldcr sling on rhr Irft sirlc. '['he sling made tiom lrather could he a most cfTectivr and dangvr<sus wcapan in t hc right I~anrls ; rnissilcs werr tit her sloncs or small [earl pircrs, sornctimes rnrssagrs were carvtd on rhr rnissilrs, f i r ltse in siege warfare. It was said that thc finest sl ing~rs in thr Grcrk army came h~rn thc island ol' Khorlcs.

D P~rsjun cnrlnlrymnn \Vhm drscribing rhr: Pcmian army of this prriod with i t s hrtc.rr>,qrneous apprarance it must he bornc in mind that, despi re arehacolo~ical discovesics and Grvrk writcls such as Mrrtnlotus and Xen- ophon, thr dress i s rnostly rrr.onstruction ant1 oprn

to dispute, especially as the Persians went un- chronicled by thcir own pccrplc. This cavalryman is rirrpinq a shielcl; opinion is ciividr~l allout whrther or not shirldrr were carried. 'l'ht- 1lorse is withrlut armour Tor, although thcrr wrrc cavalry units which were partially armourucl, this was not a widespread practice.

Durinc mrnhat the Prssian arm); worc Mcdian drcss, which was mnrr practical f i r horse-hack rid in^ and campaigninq, ancl which was usually brightly rolourtgcl. A vcsy ornate and elahorate bronze helrnrt was worn which had a home-hair crest an [he lop and a trailing tail at the basr of thc helmet. His quil tcd lincn cuirasl;, po~qihly with metal shoulder pit-ccs, had thc advantage of bring

3'. F-ian smIdicre m a v - m i q dm- from ruins st Pc~snpolis.

liqht in weight and very functional. The weapons were javelins or spears or bows ancl arrows. The mounts used I>y both Grceks and Pcrsisns wrrt: wrll-brcd horses of about fiurtccn to fiftccn hands and were typical of the countries surrounding the Mediterranean at this period. The Persian cavalry used bridles that were very much the same as m d e r n onm. 'Sherc was no saddle and no stirrups; the cavalryman's only cumfbrt was a s a d d l ~ dorh which was secured l,y a girth to the horse.

E r G r d ho/dir~ Thc appearanrr of' thesr hcavil y-armourcd hop- lites varied from city state to city statc only by the various emblems and blazons painted on thc shicld racesand armour. Althou~h constantly at war with each other, they joined forc.es to combat thc Pcmian

invasions in qge and 480 E.C. 'I'hc basic dress was the corsclet with the two shoulder piecm. the lower part ofthc body bring covcrcrl by I he Irathcr strips $ t ~ m x ~ ~ r ) . Thr shield was rotind and measurtd a hour one mctre or rnclre in diametcr ; rr l i rkn this had largc I ~ ~ S S P S on t l ~ v litl)n~ in the ti~rm rjrnnirnal hrads ancl werc usvcl i11 close-quarter fiqhting 10 push against the cncrmy and crush him. Thc Clorinthian- typc helmet was made in onc picrr with ;t larae colourcd horsehair crest. Painted hron7x grcavcs wen= warn as Icx protcrctors. Thc short thrusting: sword was carried hanj$nq from a leather strap over the right shoulder. A long spear was often used which had a hcad at ei thcr cnrl ; whrn thc shaft was 't>roken thc w c a p n could br rr.vcrscd and the fight continued.

E2 Gr~tk ard~rn Thc Greeks werr: not renowned Tot thrir prowcss as archers, compared with thr Persians, although same sourccs stair that thr Athenians did maintain a rqirncnt ofarchers during thc Pcmian wars. This rcconstruction is from a statue datcd r . 480 R.C. and shows an archcr in action. Hc wosc a Iion-skin head-covering-. anrl a lrathcr c o m ~ l c t with shnuldrr picc~s ovcr the t radi t ianal chilnn tunic. From I hc waist hung the leather p t e r t ~ t e , ~ . Over his shoulder hung the quiver which was usually very ornarcly decorated. He squatted so as to be in the best firing position. They were used in the phalanx among the hoplites and, in the p~ i io i , as tight infantry.

These archen were mercenaries and, apart from rhc Scythian archers, were the only troops to be hired by the Athenians as regular light infantry. They were employed in the same capacity as slinqers and othrr l i ~ h t tmclps, c-ithcr a% p.G/ni or positioned among the hoplite heavy infantry. Their di~ltinctivc: characteristic was thc rcd chiton tunic. They worc no body arrnour and rhcir only protection was the small round bronze shicld (Jeltn), As wrll as IHIW i ~ n d quivrr of arrows i t i~ possihlc that r hey i ~ l ~ carried javelins.

FI PJ~?yginn h~ary- in fnn@ mPrcPnary Thew tough mercenaries came from the north of Asia Minnr and scrvrd h t h Grcrk and Persian maskrs. Their tunics wcrc colourful and thcir body

m. Greek noldiet.9 returnlnp; from battle. cmfY;n~: from the mmrnrmnratiun mnrl~lr of Salnmim. (Pirnww Museum)

atrnour was made from leather with metal rein- rorcemenw. Under the leather arrnour the arms and lrp wrrt: cnvcrcd with a highly-coloured thick, woven material. which was close-fitting and wa% tight at thr wrisrs and ankles. 'I'he: head wascovrrrd hv a metal helmet which came in various forms; thc one hcrr has movable chrrk-pircrs, which arc shown turned up. Weapns consisted or spear, sword or axe (bipennes). A specia! feature was the crescent-sl~aped shirld which cna bled thc soldirt to

gct vrry rlosc to thr cavalryman.

FP I'ursintr s / ~ c ~ r n n n This i s in a11 probability a Pcrsian spearman, hut as

53. Crown Prince Xcnes, detail From the Treasury Frieze at Pcrsepolis. ( N a d m l Mu~rurn, Achcns)

all troop or the Persian army wore the Median- style dathes on campaign it may be a littlr di ficuit to distinguish thc regular troops from the d i t c 'Immorralq'. The ca1ourfi1l tunic came to mid- thiqh or slightly lower; trousers were worn unclcr the tunic and fitted very closely to thc leg and ankle. Various snurms stale that armour was worn Irut, as thcre is no evidence of this, i t must IH: assumed rhar it was worn tlndct the runic, a common pract ic~ in warmer climates. Thr head was covcrrd by a lnosc cloth which framed the face,

38

34. A Creek hoplite without 8 #Meld, dttpfl from a *lief. (Natiopal Muacum, Athens)

aficn concealing thr lowcr jaw. The, high crown was usuaIly a sign of' rank. Equipment was the standard shicld, quiver and h w and thc long spcar.

F3 PPI. rinn oJictr Persian officers ware a quilted type amormr over (he rlathing, as the Persians and ,Metlrs wcre used as lightly-armed mounted archers. OfTicerx wore the Mcdian-type campaign dress with the knee-length tunic, and trousers. 'l'hr quiltcd armnur camc to waist and a sash encircled the waist. A short broad-

sword, similar to the Creek one wm used, mainly lror thrusting, this was supported in a scallbard which hung froni a leathcr sling from ttlc left shoulcler. A turban covered the head and a cloak, which was v c y usrful an campaip, was olien worn.

G I Gwrk cnvalrynim With all the trappings or thc hoplite, the heavy cavalryman was ablr to fulfil the roles of in- fan tryman and horseman. Often these elite caval- rymcn cum hoplitcs woulrl ride to the site of thc battic then dismount and fight on Smt. The rtluipmrnt and arms wrrr thr samc as those oi" a 11oplitc with the exception of thc shicld; a caval- ryman never carried onc. Thc typc of ht=[m~t worn IJV this cavalryman was known as 'Attic', alier the Coddcss Athene. As a11 thc qu ipmmr was pur- chased hy thc so lc l i~rs ~hernsrlvcs, therc was very little uniformity.

C2 ir-/t~s.~a/inn ra7vlyntan Onc of the most poplar f i~urps znkrn from Grerk vast: painting is the unualal figure o1'1hi.ThessaIiatl horseman. Thme cavalrymen carnr from thc plains of Thmsaly in the north of Greecr, and wcre rnercenarics. This tyllical Thesalian wrars the chiton tumcd dawn to he waisl and, over his shouldrrs, a s t i f f brightly-coloured cloak. His clistincrivr Thcssalian hat was aften called a sun- hat Sccause of its wry wide brim and small crown. As all howmcn of that period did, h e rndc without saddle or stirrups, only a small rphippion or saddlecloth was sometimes placed on thr home's hack. 'l'he h o w was tbr usual small Mditrrranran type, extensively lrsed by thc cavalry at this time. Spears nr javelins were carricd.

G3 Amnured i v f i n ! ~ Rofilif~ TIIOU~IF the appearance of the hoplites varied with

the pcrsonal taste or the individual the basic equipmmt prevailed, the metal or lrathrr Irasrrl torselel over the clrr'ton, shown here, with thr addition of a cloak. T h c large round shicld jaspir) had a blazon painted on, with a small canopy attached to guard thc Icgs from sword or spear thrusts. Bronze grcavcs werc worn. On the h a d was the Ionic helrnrt which had a fixed nose-piece and two hinged check-picces: the fixed crest was a tnlourcrl horsvtail.

H I . Hz, H-7 Cret-k I I Y ~ O U T P ~ inf i~n!~_l 'I'hese qoldiers camr rrom the Grcek city states 01' Athens, Sparta, Tl~ehcs or Corinr h. A1 though 111err was deep enmity between them they sallied to2e:erhpr whrn th(- Prrsians invadrd. At t h e battle ol' Marathon in 490 B.c., with thc phalanx ol' thr A1lleniar1 l~c~pliws, they dcfcawd thc. Prrsian arc11rr-s who w t w ac-claimed as the Iwst in tIlr.

world. At thr l~attlr of Thcrnmopylar 300 Spartan (HP) hoplites hrlcl nul for thrrr days against a fierce t ou times greatpr in numhcr, until all werc k i 3 l d . T h e hoplitr's main squipmcnt rrrnained the cuirass or corseler which covcrrd thr rrppr pa~t of thc M y , made of metal or some flrxi1,lc maai.rial onftr which metal strips werr altachrd. The shield had a rnctal arm-loop inside, at thr ucntrc, thmuqh which the left arm was pushcd up to thc rlhow, ancl a mrhl handle near the rim. Hrlrnrts wcrc ust~al ty onc of three types : Doric, cornplctrly closecl with slats For thc ryes, Corinthian, madr in cjnc pirce with Iixccl nose alicl cherk-pirctms, r,r lonir, witl-t

movahlc cheek pieces. These helrncts nearly always had crmts, though later ones were worn without crcxts. Metal greaves, sandals and hoots were worn. Thc lung spcars wrrc not thrown, hut were uscd as thrusting weapons, either from almve to the neck, or from 1x10~ to the point under the cuira~q. 'I'hc short .word or dagger was used as a ttlsus~ing rat h ~ r than a cutting wcapon.

:I Iln arthrr.cni~rhanr uln xrc. rl'llr~ v:ur Crrrqur. .?yr I1.r:. *-a bli lr iarlrr. lc cornrnnndani Grrcquc rmpnnuh lc dc la vicroirc tlt Muwll~on. c3 'Ti.tr d'un wcrrirr Crmquc pnrraeil un caquc l h t r . 14 RrlirTrl';'ll~x;lnrl4 5 ~ r r p h a r m d l . l w ~ r > ~ n a ~ ~ t la h r t r c n r r r Ira p r r r i r n M a r h l a u ~ i c ~ i t c~ I ' m r s . 15 Bar-rrlirf r lu yrntr qiir lr. n io#i l ran\ I- : b ~ ~ r m * q t ~ i all;iquenq I- Arahr% ~ I ~ I I T + < - 3 c l~~~ i t i c ; iu . r 6 l&i.r:til t l ' u~ l r Iriu-dr 'Gi~. tnt~,m;trh i~ ' , l l lrmtnrbl u l l r It~rrn;mltr~rb r l r Irt>uj-lirr t ~ ~ ~ p l ~ i v t.rrr1111r. 17 <;lherric*~ I ;1rt,i#11r ;~wt i-;~qur [Iur1<111r rt l n h ~ ~ r l i r r ri~nr!. ~8 n;\ I (~;tsrli~i* In*-m. + ~ I I II.<:. , ll; C :AUIIIY 'l'tlr~i.ir11 a i r 1 ~ E > I I I ~ > ?~n-rlt* rt .~: . C :.nsqk~~ lL,,.l,. dl, .3+,,>? <i~Il.. n.c, (1) 8 C::L<~I,P 1 ;,,vr ,,v *,,Kh , $ t "> n.<: tg ll"iil,l t l ' l , , , ,-.nr <l;tt;~rrtrl~t~i.r~~rr,r-rl~.montr;h~~t III~I'\ ;lril.~l,il!.ll~;rlr.*CI ~ l ' l 1 ~ 1 6 h . 1 ~ I : I ~ ~ ~ ~ ~ Y U ~ Y ~ I I I

14ri+nlr rib( Ir IIWIII~I ,lrll 11111. ~ > t ~ i ~ l i i ~ t x r hl.tc~111~1i111~n r r p ~ i IYlrtr 111. FI>IIKIIPT I,~III c% 'S.kriw',

nt Uravurr N u n phalanx datant d u t f inr Jklr. p. Ar rh r r p n a n t un b n CI rn Fin Ikrqrnwhulzc spam! r inr Wnffr; narh dnrr firiwhihrn V m , 4yi l'hrv.~lr.n, u;uc r,~y, n.r:.T*a x r t h r n i t ~ i r n t uuliria par Alcxx~lr l r r rn q : ~ , R.<:. sg v.Chr r% M~l~ ia t ! r r , q r iw l l i r h r lhfrhlr l la lwr w.ihrrnd (lr111 'ivg 'K h l a r ~ h o n . FCmclirm I ' l r rv~irm. ranlutl lr r r hipnlrra. y <:.L~II<Y P h v p ~ ~ ~ r . arc. I r tpnnv. 1.3 t l ~ i v ~ l ~ v r Krin,gvrh~l>I I~III -FZew~$;m' 1 lrml,n.. 14 Uvhr l \,~btb .\tcx:\rulvm t i , t t i t j : i v l i r~ r ti^ L r n r v ~ i r ~ i I . I biirkoph.1~ ri l i t,nl Kimirlld ~ w i w h r n n ~ i ~ ~ w l o r ~ i w h ~ n lint1 p-miu-l\rr~ K r i q r m t t o l ~ l m P r r r . *5 C;uvrricr (:n.r-rlur pnt:u11 un r;tulur l)r,~iqui., ,kcrt UII dsm!rlla-ntl. t 5 lb.m-~u-!ir~ di* t~r 7. Jiif>rb~u~icie.rt, Aswrirr ~ r r i l r t ~ :1mIx1 ;ill( tn~uc,t~rr r t IIIW vp+r rorlrrr. & 1L~acItr.t ' l ' l~cb~rts iat-et- arr et rarq!ium. q vi11v11 K.*tnrl II~~II~PI?: arb. r 6 D ~ I . ~ I I d r r 'C:~~.~t~roin.wcl~i.a'-Frirqe%' rut i r u r I I u a I u I r r i i ~ i i d j irqrl~ll ial~l~vr I t ~ q ~ I ~ t ~ * - S u ~ t ~ i l r i - F n i t ~ r a t i ~ m t f t ; r ~ r c t i i ~ - h r r Krlrqc1 nlrl ~II~MIICO Chrr r i r r (;rrcq~tr drsini,d'tln v;lrc Sicilirll. ngA rm~r r rh4 . r~quc p L:t\Pr4,rnn14. I1dn1 ti11d r u ~ r t a l ~ , r r ~ 5~ I i i t l i . m8 ,,.I! l'rwwrhrr t l?ltu. i!w%*,(,:l~r. I s 1 '~III.I~IW~I~I I;m-rlur r lu i JOLJP (It. 1.1 tumprtlr. 31 klrEatn I'cru., rit..mir~h clur n ~ ~ r i r , % alc H r t n~ . ;,. i z t ~ r t i ~ ~ ~ u b r r i r'.(:hr. ~,rr ICmliiwhcr 1Ir lm; .(, jahrl~utmla+rb v.I Ilr. .r l ; I'cra11r~lk. 31 Slldiuts I;CCC(]LIPI rrvrt~.unl r l r lr birrilillr. cI.tworr d r SilJdmuir rn I . r ~ , ~ - l r i ~ . l ~ r ~ l1rl111. IN^ jrn r.t:hr. sg 1 k-tail r-irwr V i ~ w i l l15 rlrm 5. j.r ttrlr~~trrlrr r I t t ~ ~ t ~ r ~ n t r i i i . S i f I I I I dc I e r r :r..( :hr. I tnil v r tv l l i~ . t l rn rn IV;~lla-rr 1111rl. I l l ~ k l l . i r l a l m i + < ~ t ~ ( ~ k ~ * . ~ 1:inSlir.h ;trlrtlrrri q l r I ' r ~ w p l i s , 1 {cq~litr Grct.rlr~r. ~ ~ ~ . ~ ~ , t i ~ r l r ~ ~ ~ ~ r I r r ~ : v111rt I>I:<~~~!~>II~\CII~*~I I'LI.II,WIIX nmt d r n ~ ~ ~ n ~ r n ' S : t t i ~ ~ t - l . . ~ n ~ r ~ ~ ' ,

or Stirh rinrr Phalmx rros d r m t7 . j r h r h u d ~ r t . pn F.in hynuhuzre mil phvyirhrr Mu47.r: r lac l~ r i n r r Vnwrr, 535 \,.Chr. Alrxandrr srlerr dim- Krirqrr

Notes sur Ies pfpnch- en cedeat qr+u t -( :hr. cir~. Q Phrirvgiwlw ?ic.hilrlrr, Kt l rhrr unfl R ~ ~ n r l r . iq l ' l ~ ~ ~ b u - h c IIrlnrv. &rqm, I l i l rnnr . K ( rh r r , t Irnlrl, .k~t unrl WnrRpr.rr. I 'm iwh r rrispprn I~rnlbtztrn viek a L 1 a - w ~ < ~ ~ ~ c ~ ~ ~ t d r l t l r . a5 l ~ r i ~ l ~ i w ~ ~ ~ r i Ku,1cgthr 1 ~ ~ 1 1 ~iort*c-l~rn

ha IR Pclrtcut r l r rlra-11 hrac p a r c l rnr roifftbrc cn p u dr lotly,rlr 1. l h c H r l ~ n , Srhillt rrrltl kurza.rlr 3%-hwrr~. 16 l'hrl~:in~-a-ht+r 4e,llilrl mlr I h q r l ~ t l u l l l l l l qu '>~Ix rll,ullr- Iwwr ~lr*l ir lgurl rrn n n c ; il rrl. tmrlr IKIX (14' ~YJII{ LIT ~.mr 11 l i ~ r h r r . 7 I;ril.chiwk,~r F;rirprr: n ~ r ! ~ eillrlll ]'lartik rn c lnrr Kunrtllsllr ln h w i n dc w?i 11rux nlirinr prr E1iv1.r tr rIr.lprau. k z tan4 irr rrrr ' Imn l rw\~ t ' Flqnrrn~. -zR ;"~LII~\L bwr L r ~ r ~ v r : nitt-11 riwr Vxw . t r ~ Si>.ilirtb. q (;riecl~~whrr 11:llbili r n m~;~*dc du n g r p r i l l nli: ilr 6hictu :qllrli.u x imi car i lr ~~'avuifrit IM Ic Ilarrrrsrtt. 30 I:rzccl~iuchrr ~I'n,mprrrr. ,nit r i r r r r n Srlvilrl alavem hinE rillt rlrrrlr rldh r l~ t i~ i r r t~ r r rn~ i r~~r~hr r , 1rr<lillr11r IU~.IM)II. A3 ArrI l r r l3rw ~O~.III! IIII\IR[II~ R 1 ~ ~ T j l h m r 15~411% l lutr I~rrr lh. 5I11li~tl.

3F Prniu-hr Solalatrn mrh r in r r r>n~*lrllum~r: in den Ruincn zu Pcrsrlk ~s B (:i~wEmi.~if d':\riih C I U ~ dm rhameattx,, prir tl'un bar-rrlirr dxns Ir I':~laia l i;r irrhivE~r % ~ l ( l . t t r ~ ~ it11f ctrtn Ki i rkkctn n: tr l~r r incr % hlarht. Nar I clnmm I - h ~ l i n . 1 1 n 1 I I r i I m h l a r m ~ a r - I k n l ~ ~ r i i l i n S r lm in . 33 Krr,llljrlnr Yrrxcx; n a r l ~ rlrlir Scllstzkanlmr- rlmrrr d qtu .kppur la-nuirr~t In rnrtntr l~rrdr ~~,AIIK:IU, 1.4 avail Xlmw u ~ ~ v r i i l i t v<~!f I . r~r - r ; I 'rrwtx~lis C;rlec:hi* tb..t I~O~LILIT. y~uvq!rc Ics I'rmr pu iwn r rnvnll lr I r i ~ r pays.

CI (;ymnrI, Ii~i-rr rtibnrvri<- I;rr.rulttr. elr,nl Ir hthl 1winr.i ~1 Ct,bil I ~ P

r.t,mn>mccr lr rrurvfli~ rn har r r lmt I 'mrmi. Cn I lopli lr, i n h b r r i r itrvm

u r i i n n I I i n a c I I i I m i p i r n Farbtpfeln ruurliir t r n i l ~ 11111' I'kwnllnr (lr mn rhlr p r ~ r f l r . I rs I loplitnr rl:linll rrntrnlrnk p u r rmr sol~tlr l<~rnal lnn. Q Asiioi. fn~rulwrr (irra-tlur; WI lbztdw +tall t i l r I I I t i n t i t I 5 I t m i I Am Di-rr ~ m i n r h r S landanm l r kc r l raw D t m t R r j r l s h x ~ i r h m rjnrn II~IIII~II rluc 1'011 1.1ilbr .wrwrnl aver- drs innut<m. $V<~!rtwIr b11~e.r K r ~ p i ~ ~ n d S r h ~ ~ l ~ r - n l . 1,1 ha1 kv111rrr .?wl~ilrl 4I.k r r tiir \ I . I I I C ~ A ~ ~ n1i1

b w i t l r ~ ~ 1 fi111(Irn 4r.1grn n111w. kt I'~rww11cr 'L~n%~rr l~ I ichcr ' !-in7fn1r;t~rr in dtr Cn I'mr I r l r rmt tine cuira*rr (l(~~llll~ dc roilc- W'JrG1rr skyr drr '1 r,rt,l~r ulrr krmqliclren Iritbrr.lrrlr. DIP h i m n ' ~ ~ c ~ a ~ r t llluu,llrn' ria s i r nn d r r %;thl

p i r m d r m r r : ~ I p ~ u ~ r 11-rp3ul~k r t un r q u r r i l l rn~nzcavr r l ln r ( r h r cfr t r i l s r l r nir tmrrr ~~,.,~,r, t~rr.i lrzusi.c~kr~~ rrl.lulJr wudm. As lFvrriwllrr l % ~ v ~ ~ ~ . t ~ ~ ~ ~ ~ ~n I-hrv.11 el u l l r qurur rrllinlnrc. II pnr un inrwr,tinhr, lrleliqur l'rm 1111 clllr #,a ric w mrrtlst-~lrr ~ I ~ ~ . ~ , ~ I ~ ~ , pnrlrait P;: i rf mnnlrnr 1.1 Qwlqll- T~ICI-.YUX p , r i ; ~ i r n t d- .~rnrurm li,~"-

,, , , , I r . lnol, , r l r l , , j l ; la , Fl A r ~ l > i w h r Ka~ l t e t r r i t t ~ r i ; ntlch rincnr Hw-wlici i ln l?rl;cr~ 7-11 Aur~rbanipuP. t%t ~rmlslrih!r i cr lui qu'on t~q i t i~ t * 1i1:11111rn,ant. Ninrvr l l . l h i i ~ l w r r i r r hartrn tl ir Sl.tlnrrlr d i m r kzrnrtrr~rcndci~ \lrusrmkrlrgrr

hrlnallr aurqrmtlrt brnrt so <I.-II ~ V W liar ~ I U - p m v h r n Einmarnch in ihn-rn EI Ck1 H ~ l p l i t r C j r q u t ponc un c .q l l r tlu l v ~ Cor in lh~, qili i.lnir h i t cn un l,+llli~r rn,~ll,ft, nrimrrau atlw cnttl lulr r l r c h ~ v z l l a r ~ ? re rr,lr~rc. Llnr l n n ~ r ~ r lanrr avail rlrtrx Ixrlnn rlc , . I ~ ~ ~ ~ ~ ~ r;llr rlr rllli s1 la fl;ct,r I . ; ~ ~ ~ t*rrlrr.rit ;ltr Ct (:).rnnr~, ~ r i c c h i i h c Lrirhlm-lnbnterjc-minklrr. Ihrr Au lmhr r n r n, dir rmrrrrri.c Krvir ,t,. 1h34trr ,-htt, FA ~ i ~ , , ,uF lr, (;mrlufl rr'i.,nir,,l pw %irhlar111 dun-h h .u l in~h igcn (14 I.'rilirlr?l ru rrrrfinm. Ca Ha~pl l l r : ~ r c h i w h c rrt~ullllll~ p,Ilr brllm m~hrrI, il I,ilntll l,l.~~~ il\YjCn~ milin~rllllr rrRlmrnt *t-!lw-rr1~1 Ilit:b~~'.rttr trill sririctir 51,h11<1, t las sr qn~alli-I war. ( I s rr urwt~l i l ~ l r n . p , , ( r . t . , 1 i n , , '1 rx@nrrr l ) jq~ slr 311th r k t i l ~ r ~ k ~ u t r h ~ n d f n hlan~l hnl l idrrmkrn Lrmntr. So h~ldrrc ,.i i.lalnL tn .I.tllr~ tr nu~m q,li ~,brc.IIt 1<111,+ ~ ~ h ~ , ~ ~ ~ ~ ~ ~ ,,11 I , . ~ F ~ ~ miirt d i r l r s l t F<~nir i~t i<>n t i ~ r wr lrhc 111r H ( ~ p l i t ~ l u, twn lh t~ i t hnrrr l . C3 Astllll: ~rt Iantr& ~~*RUI IM .~C . ~ r i ~c . l ~ tn .h r r S l r i ~ ~ r l~r l r r l r rvr . Scitir Strinsrllr lrt lrr war atrq Intrr. r l i t Sl iuu~irm

*.lr rntacrlcr i t r i n r rwlrr Nlri\tu<kc rl ic rhh Insrhr i t~ r frklKrt\. FI I.'lnT;intrrir ~ncrcmni r r Phwqirnnr l r r i TI* n t i l i r par In m i i t r m Grwqtrrs rt ~ r r r r r ~ ~ r ~ r , r t ~ ~ i r r r n ~ , , m l r ~ c ~ m ~ ~ l n ~ lwm,rttai, aualldardr,nn~worhrrau D I ' r i x~wb~m kavz l l r r i v 1ir11 wib1srm-m l . r ~ n ~ n - K ~ ~ w . Llir .%h~tttcr\#u~ck~ v r r , , , , , ; rr,,nlrr warr11 vicllrirtrl an5 Strtnll. Lkr rn r r kwu r r l i ~ r I~rr>ni.knr H t l m hat rinrn , , , i l r l n l , , I , l q a l l t 1 Kuh*hnurk;ul~n~ mil htr3hh.m mrlcm Hl r~~c r l r i l . lir h;tl finrrr Srhilrl r~ l lwr~ l i l l:,,r:lirnt r.,my,;lqnc, rg (),firrr prnr nvvr frlrlrcr =, m;.ntr..l,r ,,rilr ~L.I,-~I riniqr,~ 12urllrn Lrlnr. k-titala.1 urnern ulwrlfn. hl.ll~a-llr l*r(.rtlr. U . : L ~ ~ I I rllit p-ttcl:~r~t 1.1 c:mnil>.t~-n~. t c i t l ~ ~ m r P l ; ~ m ~ s c l ~ auy~cr<utrt ; i l r r d i m S i ~ t r war nit h~ 1iltlir.h Sartrl unrl

S l r iq l ,u~~r l warm rlicht in ~rl*rd-surh a h r d a s Kopi i lurk schrint wl tr mdrm rlr GI Chvalirr C:rrcrlur. qui -1 muvrnt i h r h n d f n aIlhnt au rrrmhat r t enmite x *.ill, IIW~ a pircl F u r con l i t ~ r l ~ r r I ' r n ~ m i : mn r q u i p n r n t m lr rnFnir q u r rrll~i dr t i ~ i c r I i t t i . I t l : t l t ~ I I El U I ~ ~i+hi*hc Hopjirr traqt riwn k o r i l l t h ~ ~ h c n Helm, d m r i n m ohvnAj'P {lrr p];linra rrord ~ ; ~ f i ~ ~ rl I,li rtait I,lr,l,ahlrmmr brrl Sriirk ~ r l r t t i q t wnnlr. lir I ~ n ~ e v r i ~ ~ o l ~ l u s ~ r , g r l i ~ r t > ~ r Konllnnrkltnrm. llir lanqr m r n ; I t i I ~ r t I r r a I i . 1."11" 'httf Spir t rn xu lx-~drn l ~ ~ ~ l - m : w l ~ l e r r i f l h 'm t~ r wrrrlrn. E* l l i c Pllkin,mr t.I,,,,]jlr :,-& irpnrranl tl,l lnnirlllr avrc Irr,,rcrn,l.i p.,rnir 4,. I. inwklrr l wiurrc nir h? t i lr i hrr & C I I K ~ ~ I ~ Z ~ w ) I*nl hfz11 wtl: 1'tnrtl. L T U I X ! P ~

rh;tnllllnp,ur I,.* hllln: lr ~ ~ ~ i d ~ i ~ ~ q,li prnd <lr nn ~ ~ ~ ~ ~ , + ~ ~ ~ j , ~ ~ ~ ~ ntwr, unt r rh i r l r r l~ slr ;wn~rl>lir h r i n Kqirnf111 dimrr K n r ~ r r n ~ h r r n r l rlrn tirr c ~ r u ~ n <l i.]*.r -11 111. Iarlrr IR r r c rn -K r i r ~ rn . EQ K r r ~ i w l l r r &~rnu.h i r tz r . A~lc*rr d r r St.\ 11iirr w:trvn r l l r

Kvrtve c1ir ~ * I I I Z ~ ~ ~ I I a l ~ r + y ~ t l i r e I r i r t ~ f r - I n ran t r r i r t,tbn dr11 Athr11r11 WII- HI, Hz. H3 Ilnpli~a tla citis Grrqun d'hthrnm. T h t k rr Vnrinrhc pofiant ~ ~ r ~ ~ ~ l ~ r e r l r l l ~licttr,lptn.ll, ~ m i n I\ r l c v a y l ~ m : Ih r iqur . tbmr I;I rkuluctkr rrmurrai t I- smica~r avm. idrs Irulcr p u t 113 :vw.. CLltinth~xn, r n y u r ~ i c rat "11 mmt-r.1~ ;wF,- un nrr Fui FI f'kxiqcrhr s l d n r r vnn der wh*;.crm Inhn l r r i r . Sir d i r n l m m w h l untn I I ! 1 , r I i t a x I I . pr imhiwhrn *llcll w k h c n l'mhnen. th-r l-lalhm~ndnrhild m n e l i r h l t - IUI~KLI~ I i i n t ~ e ~ ~ ~ i r n ~ , i r l k pi1 c o u p l~luki)! ( 1 1 1 ~ IanrCm, drt, Srrlrlut whr tlah an tIr11 K.rvallrnr~ hrrnnnrrko~~~mcrr. Fa I'vnisrhr

I ..*nnrneraRrr i n rn r t l i~ rhcr ' l 'mrh t . S i t wawn r u l~wr r vrm dvn F . l i l r ~ n ~ IJIFII. t t i c u l c h vhlrht.Tr;lrhr irrl I:rl<lr cru~crr xu untrnrhr i t l r l r . Fg lJt. lurs~llr~ Ohiyivr n l ~ l w: t l l l r r~ rn i l l a rnL31 u1~1 r i n rm Ilrnhanp,,{lar\ 1111 FrIdu- .LtLwrm ~ l i r ~ ~ h i l r w:I~.

tSbtr~&rift GI ( ; r i ~ h i r h r r Iinvnllcrint. E. war uh l i rh im Karnpfe i thtmitrrn urn! clrn K a m p RII F~1s-fortft1nr1irti. Lr w u n l r a l ~ Wrqdifr (nhrrnhnr Sdii lr l i ;rurfinirslrt. , I.;irl Rrlirr dcr Jr.;crm-I.cihRarrlc DA,..,l,, At,lrniwhrr Gg '111mIi<rhrr Kaval l r r is~. D i r w K r i a - ~ r r aramlnr?li .~un N ~ ~ r r i ~ r i r r h r n l i ~ r r d

svldm, doriwhm I,elm, , ktail mil KrirKrr ,jnd 1111d w:jrcll r.rn1iutl1r.h S1ltl lrcr.63 Hupllrv. Kel)rtvrrrtr Infxnrcnr ruiz ~orrlwcllrm

k l a i l i , , , t , v , , , , , !lr' lm :d i r twwcqliu.trn I%arkr l~rturkr lwa< i r r rn !~ . Vom Srhllrlr hmy! r ln rn

rinpr. Scllslr all.r ,41,1k,l. 5, +,.,hrh,lndrrl, Rrjrrhlsrhr I lr,pli,r Finrn 'i'ihrlla~~'', als tk inwl lurr Kwrr i St-hwrrrhia~l~=n *anti I . a n a ~ - i ~ ~ t ~ c l ~ r ~ r d ~ r h t ,

~ I I 1 1 1 r 1 r I 6 I i t t k i t I I I n S l l t l hrrll"irl' I I I I . 7 I I I ; I I n t ~ r ~ ~ ~ i i l l r 5 H Huplircndcr gr i tch i i l t cn Sl;ult-Ymten Athcn.Spann,Thchnndrr Korlnth. v.C:hr. 8 Kzirurr von :\tIirn 1rr111 Sp;lrr:tw;ihrmd r l r i ~ ~wlrptlnnmjrrhctt k r i c K r t ~ Slc rr.,qrir d r r i Hr8mtrprn: dunscl~r-rrrl l cinpxhlnmn mi l An~r rm-h l i i~ rn : I ~ I I I I ~ I 1 i 1 1 I 5. , r l u ~ ~ i r t h 9 h i i ' i ~ r i ~ ~ ~ l ~ ~ x h r 3 1 1 ~ r111G111 S ~ k k UII~ n l n t l x i rn rn NXVLI-UMI t ( . ~~k r l l <~ l t r l n k t t i l n r l 1 I : \ X ~ I I ~ . I i I r l h r i l r l l r fif lrt 1u~1; ~ l r l i ~ l - h r - mil k ~ ~ i l ~ 1 1 ~ 1 1 B~(.~TMIIIc~~*. Dir l a n ~ c t,a[lrrn w u n h : ~ ~ t t ~ ~ l ~ a ~ ~ . ~ ~ r r n ; i I ~ t ~ , IIIT~EI g r u ~ l r l r n vrndrt~, 1 1 1 Sti~Imw;~Crt Slcnl~~rr.

Contmucd from buck rovcr

160 11 rl:' - ~ , . r r J l ~ ~ f . j r , t - v : f I

44 \I.rl; : .o, t r .h! . r A -..I I ! 43 ~II!;.' + , r ~ - b # i A --,.I::

90 ~ I , I , < , : ~ P I ~ ~ : - / * ,,.-.I ! , 106 '.! If:'- r ,.,r7>.-I r-. . ..I: 112 '.I : ,.I,., ! - I P *.. , -. : 199 ': I;.' :.-w , I lS l I . . , . a.

11 1 ->.I,: . I." .:.-.".,- 227 '\.,'1"- $..I '. .1a11r.

%a 'h.,,p', I- I~I . .. r,,"p- I f b f . . t . . l ,~ I-: f.1.19,: ' I , ~ . i , i . r . , l a 1 ~ 3 . ~ , . ~ m ~ ~ v l ~ ~ ' . I , , 1 .

223 A 14.1, 8 Ir, ',-?r!: ,; I- t I -Y\:,.,

151 l'r 15-1 :rr C I . , . ".:..I.-, 149 I $ 16.. , ..,I ;.v m-c. -~r . - . 192 t'r r . : ~ :I Fb 9-rr4.S ~-.oa. . g r . .

162 l!r I<-~:I, 3,;. l a ; -.-:: ! * - ' I 7 1 l'r.,-.- 1 1 - 7 : r.,.,!~ hb,.' I s > 165 I>.,. .-.*II, ;.tn, , ,, lr,I>~-~-t. I 8 9 I)!. ". lr~f.rm,.,s,:: : I,"

84 LY:I ~TOI':' imrrv I 4 14 ?:-.!' , . $ b c ~ i .lt,l lnht*; I I I 1 I 9 'W.1 -,:.in': Int tn:rv I ? I 153 bV4-? -,,\-.,a?':, t - ,yhl I!!I... 1 26 V- - hr~-.l-'- I )>I>* ;, ; 117, 130 ' i , ,~ ' ,n<-. 1.1 -.I -,:3., 1- - ..dr . 204 %,';-,I! -I,>- .#,<- !>,a<, ,,II-,~ I r,L-,;>* 167 t - r .lnq>*. ,*. -1.i . y t6f:'J =.

96 I >,:a ii~,lpnlr, T.TK,.>, 206 I I . . ~ . ( ~ , ~ ~ . ~ l : lnr,~y I ?'c I F 226 T~.~.A:T,F:~~.; .~$A), I~ A:.! 1 0 :

96 AI:!IIP,-/ I 44 ,1rrr,vr-t, 77 I Il?..(>. ! t " T i 17'VI~ .,rk I

7& 1 1 , 9,*>: :t-.!Y! !2:f$a-:,,:l 114 1 !-m.k,r>':t.r. "IT:',.'.'.-

19T H CENTURY 232 !I >In , 8 i d <#.\r '-I?,l 4~

381 i ,'. l n I,:~::I,,: 8;3 "1 173 At I * ~ I ( , ~ A Tk,,lr iAz.~t I ? {'I ! 56 Mvbd 1 .I:, A i r - ~ r i , r r W.II I U.:h "

272 -IO'!C>B~:LI Atlvt,-~~~,r-m I&, i 6 ; 63 A0.4,~ ,,;I- l t ~ : ' ~ tn',':~-: I F+,K ' A :

170 t.,.rr I ..I* ', , E ':%<I. 4rr-ow , , ' i.cr!PcPr >I?

177 8 !, ?!1v:>.

k7? I : , {!,.id :,p.v 1 I' ,:::. w,lr t t l ~ , .

I90 (.I: ',l,.lr- rryjpz 207 I b : 'v: l~:rrw~ ?' 11-1 I

37 A.wv :::I t4::i.t ? r r i V ~ t j > ! r ~ ~ I

38 A - r r r ~t h c : * ~ t c n ~ s - 252 11. ,:,,>I ~ I F - ~ G ~ I U . , ~ , a , i f-hv 'J:,tr

, I , :..<,.h"<i,.,.h-,. 158 0 .' L , . r 265 I 7 . I1 ~ t r F. i f id jn'c-w~ I b3 A-LIP J , 3 , I rl I,-I,. lr t- .~r,r.

186 1 I<.Al:,!: I.?; LF.: jv, ,: w I W 9:

275 ll-r I: p i f P . r k l l l r i r ~ iA51-tdh 241 ~<I.~F,I~I Ar n.,01 thp: r 1r.r-ln W I 193 [ i n t ~k A1.m~ a? C. 1-11;.. PI

: 1 4 nl(,-lG=: 196 ; j 's - .u ta<- r 1 Fv= !>(<

IPB : ? , lao..-!~ 201 IcL!: I'*FI? 2 I 2 '\'I lo. I I ' \ I ~ - r r ' r s

: i , %:I t I P f F ( j+ , l r l 215 : ) I 'l.~'t?c.~rAttrr.: 119 ; ; I ~ll~l,., 214 :I: 4.1 : 149 r. .rn : r i ~ ~ i (~~nvd t?&:l ''I

b7 I * I . .:*lr..r. YI,( 1: 268 R,:ttil r x p - , ~ ? : t r

Ir.fl ;,r Mml. I . ~ IF;' :'I 91 iir,r,:..'r-.i+.~l*v H r r Ir.*?r:t 91 .I~I..~I. '..l.ir$:y Hr< rrr.rtr

233 . r~ r , .?hrmv IP7371 1 1 . 237 -rc.rcl: AI~IIV If i i :) 'I : I ; 277 ~ ~ , ~ . ~ . I I ~ . . , ~ ~ T ~ I ~ - I ~ ~ I W ~ : lR7-

57 Th- ,'I. L War

59 !,;L<;- a r r r ~ ~ ~ r ' - . I Fn! na 230 I.Y,A..r, Ik'Y: 'i.'"

95 I t ..l,,:#..t :n..,r. 1K.r.

THE WORLD WARS 80 Il,.. - ... 11, :- ,.,..1, * . l . l - l@ 81 ll , . .!~. r - t ;.. ... , u'r4 A

24s :? ,- r m . n -:I.: t "

269 1 ha-. .rl:::r !.I r r . , I " -1. -I 208 L A O rr?<th at-,:- v * ~ . ; b v I?-P,!J ::,fU 182 11, I- -~l>.tt lr, ->,.I,.. .I

1;1k'1I.1 n 187 : 2 I I 0 qL. 74 : t-m j:~.,? -li ' I ;I 'bh;.,~

I 17 It .. p, i.+ 1 ,%, ,l.v 1 -:I9 -:I 111 p1 t - $ , t< I~I~+~.O. .. ' r, i 20 r.1 -7 8 .,-, l b T:,V -,.tC, ,I 'b*v,.~:;

225 11.- I i~ r , ::!.+. 70 I -:, i~r -I-, ! ''4 ..I!.

216 I ! , , , l<,pd ,'>r--n. 1 - 4 1 -1- 246 T I ~ r . ~ , ~ m r m . l r ~ ~ ~ . ~ JI.~.,, 220 Tt.r.-*, ' 1 : I .:,I

24 Tbr l' v;!-r _>I. ,ILY I..

Zbb I hl'u-r-1. . ~ r * "*, 34 TI,., V j I . twt r:

239 1 . r r - ! -r ' r -. . 'b; : cvts 124 ' .?r?.:r C 117..1~.11l:9.11 ::i-?i4.'i) 2 I 3 , P , >,.;c- I.,--5 I , I 3 9 ' v r m;,r f . ~ r - m - ~ 'ti--,?:

13 1 '.->r.,~>,,r ,',> t . I i I .*I: All 8 .

t 03 '- rmr.n, I. i ' ':l\rl , I A , ~ 'A, .r,:,!.rr 147 VL:.llr i i ,+ ..I I 11 t b ! y ~ h v::l!.r.t*~.i ,. 254 ~?;..111 -rl,:::ll A, 1.1 .r!u lo., c- 238 f i t cc -1701.1 1 \'I? .r*n'*.rl. 142 p,+l-,cAn :vl.,,,tE. Tk!' .:4

I 6 9 Pr-.. ,.: . - r r ,A,ir- --* I'CI,. 45 282 i,, i f srr-3 :r. (JU? .r. I I ''.: 1 15 170 1 1 lr,..Jq q.. , . ' ., . .- :I,.. .-

I : : '\*<,.tlr.!l.- .14

174 I ) 1 '<< ,--r.-,.y:. 27i3 ; 3 I 1:<.1:y % l'*:,l 8 r * lJ~hl1,.

MODERN WARFARE 132 1 >,,,: , d i q f , ~

I74 ll,*m b\,.rv.>r .'. t, I-. - , 1

1 16 I 1.: l ,.r~ .A! :., M. . , , r a. 156 T%. Pzrv 3 '-1 ,.I!I..-\ I.*:.h-b-l 133 P.ttlc!sr r-v1,;IG:;r;.-

I : I L?-d I zrx:, 134 : i t I ' I~v.l l I35 : !I:,\II ~ t x ~ a . ~ . 250 firr-n+:r.c I C , V . P C r r l r ::'L11>dc 117 Ir*.rr,l Ptcvw ':dP 73 120 A ~ . . ' ~ i ~ ~ r % r , - l I I'+1Y-/: I94 hr. :hP-nir . : i ~ I:'.. Fk I 65 hr ?r "i - P t? w::r ! W.., 4.1 l 04 ';yt..r ,~ri ' P i . ~ T T r C :f-. .''I 143 i s : r , l n W- - A ~ T ,-.1::

209 W.?I ar i ' , ~ r r l ? ~ .I I'v'O 7tm 2 I 7 sA'.>i I- L l i~. I "FJ : ?', t83 lf.<I?l7 A6-1<1-1 %';uG

8 I : ~IJL>Ct,.\,, I C ~ l > 5 :K 202 : I t . .:.w: I I X 'l-:r..'~.3 qb.r 242 ;? -, T::~.tq iX.:p:r j .1 ,I:' 3

159 rfrra:lq ' '" ! 178 l!.jrc..~". W.* In A';?. r ;:31 22 I (. ?-ird,I P. ,<>r ii - - +V.,r r.

GENERAL 65 .!~:dal Nevy

807 t : , t - ~ , . , . , I ,!.~lr>, f <,-II~.:>, I \ I OEI ~A.I-U,,.~ inn 1 7 ~ r ,, I Ll,lar:: I 21 I 3a F.,-,:,~~ (..;V,I!~ I ilt.<l<* - 72 1 h:, t-.r,.~-.,.u.#r ' I . .l . .t I-.

21 1 I_?\ T lit?., !.QU.I~!, 205 I-!-: A * I ~ . ' .:1.31>,1. f OUIII>!-

234 :-;+=I TIL~T-, !u,.~~rl)w: ! QI. 1mt5 157 t 1, 1 1 ~r.kcts 123 A*.rrt* al:,.r Arm, 5"' l r7 ! 8 64 L,I+I~./* :lr, AI , ! : y , L - '~'41r I6 l C..\.:.. .!, IO.-IP~. I PVIT 197 PC,, I ' '. aral . j + u M.~.::!rcl Pcl!r r

An unriv~lled wurcc of informstion on the uniforms, insipria and nppmrancc orthe world's fighting mcn of past and present. 'l'hc M~rt-nr-Amts titles cover suhjccts as clivcrsc as the Impcrial Roman a m y ,

the Napn~cnnic wars and Ciermnn airhomc troops in n popularpR-page format including snrnc

40 phatagraphs and diagrams, and cipht frrll<nlnur plntcs.

COMPANION SERIES FROM OSPREY

EF,TTE Detnilcd infomation on the uniforms and i n n f p i a o f thc world's most fi~rnnus military forms.

Fach Wpngc hook contains same 50 photovaphs and diag-rarns, and 12 pages of full-cnlaur arwnrk.

W.rlRRIOR Rcfinitirc analysis of the armour, weapons, tactics and motivation of thc fighting mcn ofhistory. F ~ c h M-page hmk contnins cutaway9 and cxpfnded artwork of thc warrior's wcnpons and amour.

NEW VANGUARD Cnmprchcnsivr: histories of the dcsip, develnprnent and opcration~I usc of the world's armuurcd

vchiclcsnnd artillcry, I*:ach 48-pa~e Iumk ctlntains eight paEcs nof full-colnur artwork including s dctaiIed cutaway orthe vchiulc's inrcriar.

C.4MP.IIIGN C~ncisc, authoritative accounts of decisive encounters in military history. F ~ c h 9Gpagc hook contains

mare than 90 illustrations including maps, nrders o f battle and colour platen, plus a series of thrcdimcnsional hsttlc maps that mark the critical staws of thc campaign.

THE ANOENT WORLD 1 5 1 Fed eval Ch~ww A r n m 279 T-c Ro&r qc ven 21 8 ~hrnr r r r .r l~r,cr i t ~ r n l r . )

I09 An:rwr '*11?,,- - F,rr: 13F I kc l.cdh.ms >V, =-KC 69 r , r#rL S, P,-.,.~I '&.n., X P . 3 7 3 Rf

148 Arwv n' P .-u.inerr : ~ ' : T . I : I l l L 3 + 1 3 v , r ir, War5 46 F?on..q~. h r r r v

! E 0 C:cw.-lralan 93 121 I-lid? an-(.mcan!~nr

I29 f ? w r ~ ,. ! qrnarn: i I I Cic-marl:$ B Dr:lan<

158 ( 1 I G;. 11: A Hr~rr*.t+ C . r l r i 175 i 3 I P,I~?I.!V. P. %~\%1l'cs $80 I-I Splrrr , ' IA.<t. I r4 i t31 : .

243 !> t- -7r L2-rr-t 1 ron - l - r

THE MEDIEVAL WORLD 147 110tr 4 r - , - k 1, 7 ; ir,:3T? ? a r t s h 7 r A'.!--%hc 154 Adh~., R ;~ry n-57.w.roi W,i-, 252 Arm ct of :I.,. YLI~ T Lcrlcvcn 125 A ~ T r . ~ n' I< ,ir->. 7 9 - 1 lh; 150 T h r A?,P o! C tlarlrm.11:r~ 89 Ry~an. . reArn~e: RRh 1 1 18 84 Lwr. V k v ~ R Nur.nar

331 f rrirl. Ycd~rva Armrcr I W - 1330 7s A , r c r a ' P + ~ C - L I ~ . ~ ~ ~ ~

171 LiI,~llad~i R :b*5 i r r rnc , 152 K~lybtrolChr 17

200 I 1 : II! & S n orrqurrta 1050- 1493 I0 5 -he Tr,nvvr 222 - l id . ficr b! T,jncr .rnc

16TH AND 17TH ZENTURiES 146 Thp lr 11 W3rr IaRY- I J 1 I P I bcr 7 L Ill's Ar-nr

3B Thc Lawiskr tu~ts 101 Thc lopq~~radorm 263 Muaht I r d a I :W- 761 234 GLC:AVU~ A d d ~ I > u \ l ! r In f~n-~y 262 C~zauus /~drdd;ll'l~1i7 ~.CAVII~

I4 knp, shC~vrl W?. h r v ~ s I I P kkw Modpl A. rr y 1645 6C 2D3 Cosqs XIV ;Army 267 'I tw Hr ( $hArrny 1660 17W

97 M.ir b w o ~ g b 5 A m y B6 bnura A m ~ m 15jC 1615

184 f ' d * A r n r r IW llh%[I; 188 Po rh hmmcr I s 9 1596 r?;

1 BTH CENTURY 161 lPth * - r t ~ - t l , z?lard#-7 260 Pr:~r ,e+.i!'-, f v v v : I; !d3rtry 2b4 F'r:~r -l..*G,r.b:'c ASP, : ; C..,u.bl? 1 18 J I S - C ~ I : ~ Hrks: 0 7 %

236 1 - - : f r ~ t-rd:,rrx: I ) 140 I *?.c:crc< r-r <,rra: '7 i 248 F,t-tfq-r~< t - ~ < , r ~ . i : :: ,6

271 A~~s.,r~an A r ~ v l7.K W' ' ; 276 A~lrlr~an j u r y IT.\(: 11': : I : . IBO Au,.lrb,irrA*wy 17.iS r,: ,= i

4 8 Wol!r'rA-rrv 228 hr?c.n:ai WimxIlaid Indnns

39 I'r t rh hrwy In h Arcr 244 1 rcnrb ~n Anc* W.\I hncl 37 3 C.rrcr?.! W;151..rror's A m y I I I 1775.

NAPOLEONIC PERIOD 257 I.J..l* r r ~ , r , ' , . . t n r > , u ~ ~ y 11~1:nly

7 9 h.: l*>~,r'* . ; ryp-a l r , :..>mpa'Rn 87 h,,lu> rmur', :-!:-.? ;

61 h J q > - c . : vlr,:\.,~r.rr A C a r a ~ i b r n 55 h.q'',, I?-.I~~I..; R larCtr< 6B h,q,'$ I.,?.- rl~arsmrs 76 E*.~p'r H~.;=..trs 83 N . ~ l ~ ' c , Z ~ ~ ~ ~ ~ r d I : a v a l r y

I 4 I N,lp-r L u r , i lartr)r I 46 N,;p$ L.rpht '*i.!rtry 153 N.rp~rC~1.1rdlnl~n:~(1>

T~tle Jhr contkued an IruMe b m k c m r