analysis on china's power (hanna kim)
TRANSCRIPT
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Should We Tremble atthe Sleeping Giant?
Analysis of China s Power in theModern World
Hanna KimIndiana University Bloomington
August 2010
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As China continues to be on the rise by advancing their military, having more
communicable relations with other countries, and building its economy, people are
starting to question their motives. Will the rise of China be a threat to global security and
international peace? If it is, this could have potential detrimental implications for the
wellbeing of all nations and the peaceful accord trying to be upheld by most nations. If it
is not, then this could be advantageous to the international community and could
potentially alter the hierarchical structure the worlds powers have created .
I will begin by addressing three schools of thought power transition theory,
bipolarity/successor-state theory, and institutionalist theory of the multiple
schools of thought that try and explain what could happen as a result of Chinas rise.
I will begin with the work of the founder of power transition theory, A. F. K
Organski. Then, I will discuss the contrasting ideology to power transition,
bipolarity, by usin g Robert S. Ross (1999) work. His work dedicates itself to the
prevalence of geographic conditions, but bases itself around the idea of stable
bipolarity. Having addressed pessimistic arguments, I will then focus on the
optimistic viewpoint of instituti onalist theory . John Ikenberrys (2008) work
commits to this theory by discussing the idea of states thriving through
international organizations to better themselves and creating international peace.
All of these theories has its own discrepancies and can be contrasted to one
another to see it. I plan to compare and contrast these theories while critiquing
their flawed ideas in terms of Chinas rise through the work of Avery Goldstein
(2007) and Renee Jeffery (2009).
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From this, I plan to explain three prominent East Asian conflicts: the struggle over
the South China Sea between China and the United States, the potential power conflict on
the Korean peninsula, and the U.S.-China dispute over Taiwan. Through these three
examples, I plan to explain the expectations of the power-transition theory and the
institutionalist theory. This will be able to explain which theory had a stronger empirical
basis.
At the end, I will assess the conclusions drawn from these three theories and
cases. By doing so, I will make recommendations to the United Nations, the United
States, and Chinas peripheral nations on how to handle Chinas rise and what this meansfor them.
Literature Review
Power Transition Theory
Emerging from the publication of A. F. K Organskis World Politics , the original
power transition theory argued against the realist interpretation of international
relations being anarchical and saw it as being hierarchical (Kugler and Organski
1989: 172). The hierarchy that is suggested is in pyramid form at the apex of
which sits the dominant nation that, for most of its tenure, is the most powerful
nation in the international order (Kugler and Organski 1980 : 173). This hierarchy
creates competition for states to be at the apex, creating a shift in power between a
rising state and the dominating state (Goldstein 2007: 647).
The states that challenge the status quo (dominant) power tend to be the
states that are not satisfied with where they are on the hierarchical pyramid. These
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challengers, as according to Jeffery (2009: 312), want to redraft the rules by which
relations among nations work.
Since first created, there have been many revisions to the power transition
theory. Through statistical tests conducted by Organski and Kugler (1980) of the
power transition hypothesis that the combination of parity and transition is
conducive to major war, they found that among those states capable of contending
for global leadership, no wars take place without a transition and, further to this,
half of t he observed transition were followed by the outbreak of war (Jeffrey: 2009
312). Power transition theory now tackles questions that deal with items such as
nuclear deterrence and democratic peace (Jeffrey 2009: 312).
However, the problem with power tr ansition theory is that there is little
support for any of power transition theorys main empirical implications (Lebow
and Valentino 2009: 389).
Lebow and Valentinos (2009) work consists of seven empirical implications
of the power transition theory, all of which they proved to have little evidence.
Several of these arguments cohesively pertain to Chinas rise.
The first implication states, the international system is dominated by a
single power capable of imposing order (Lebow and Valentino 2009 : 392).
According to Lebow and Valentino, however, there is little empirical evidence for
the existence of dominant powers in the modern state systemFor 41 of the
decades the system has been in existence it was multipolar, for eight bipolar, and for
one unipolar. Over the last 500 years, numerous powers have tried and failed to
impose their preferences on the system. (Lebow and Valentino 2009: 392).
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Implication two states, Dominant powers impose orders beneficial primarily
to themselves (Lebow and Valentino 2009: 393). Lebow and Valentino found two
reasons that made this empirical implication false. Firstly, there have been many
rising powers that have tried to enforce self-interested international orders but
have failed (Lebow and Valentino 2009: 393). Secondly, a hegemonic rule, by
definition, is a tyranny. A tyranny cannot gain respect or legitimacy on an
international scale, and so unless it transforms into a different type of rule, it cannot
impose anything and be taken seriously (Lebow and Valentino 2009: 394).
The fifth implication is the idea that rising powers will attack the dominant
powers to get ahead or vice versa (Lebow and Valentino 2009: 400). According to
Lebow and Valentino (2009: 401), it makes more sense, strategically, for dominant
powers to attack targets of opportunity, such as declining powers, to increase their
powers. Then, Lebow and Valentino (2009: 401) make an interesting
instituationalist argument that states, the most sensible policy for leading powers
in dealing with rising powers ought to be efforts to moderate their challenge by
incorporating them into the system if they are outside it (Lebow and Valentino
2009: 401).
Implication six states, hegemonic states and rising powers go to war to
defend or revise the international order (Lebow and Valentino 2009: 401). The
falsity to this can be seen in the examples used by Organski and Kugler and them
devot[ing] little attention to validating their claims by examining the motives,
calculations and decisions of his torical actors (Lebow and Valentino 2009: 403).
An example is of Hitlers war in the west and invasion of the Soviet Union during
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World War II. He did not do this because of fear of a growing Russian or French
Power. Hitler, Lebow and Valentino (2009: 403-404) argue, was more inclined to
the determining influence of will power, morale, leadership and racial purity than
to the utilization of standard measures of economic and military power.
The seventh, and final, implication of the power relation theory is that the
effective way to solve the conflicts of interest produced by power transition is war
(Lebow and Valentino 2009: 404). Yet, how can war solve these conflicts when
there has not been much damage to the states power (measured to be GDP and
po pulation)? According to Lebow and Valentino (2009: 405), the bloodiest wars
seldom kill more than 1- 2 percent of a combatant countrys population.
After giving a detailed description of power transition theory and then
thoroughly debunking all implications of it, Lebow and Valentino further invalidate
by making an interesting claim about the irony that would ensue if power transition
were, in their opinion, a true theory: It would be ironic if U.S. China relations
deteriorated because each power based its expectations on how the other will
behave on theories that lack empirical validation (Lebow and Valentino 2009: 408).
Bipolarity/Successor-State Image
Though bipolarity and the successor-state image are two separate theories, in order
to focus on the commonality of their over-lapping idea of two equally powerful
states combating for power, I have fused them into one.
Bipolarity occurs when two states wield, internationally or regionally, the
most economic, militaristic, and cultural influence. Unlike power transition theory,
this ideology believes that two states have equal and great influence. These two
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states, instead of being strategic partners to overcome the world, will be strategic
competitors engaged in a traditional great power struggle for security and
influence (Ross 1999: 96).
Similarly, the successor-state image portrays China in a bipolar relationship
with the United States, mainly because of Chinas correlation to the Soviet Union.
The ideology behind this is that because it is ruled by a Communist Party, todays
China must be aggressively expansive like the Soviet Union of yesterday (Overholt
2008: 226).
Ross (1999) argues that the bipolarity between China and the United States
is stable and is one of the factors that will create regional peace. However, how can
peace be created through two nations that could potentially consistently compete
with each other to be at the top?
The successor-state image does not see a positive outcome and due to its
basis being ideological considerations, it will always be biased to the fearful views of
the Communist Party. If the basis of a theory is purely opinion on trends, then it
does not seemingly make a strong argument. Without any empirical evidence, the
argument cannot even be credible.
Yet, through their equal strength, each state is weaker than the other in
certain aspects. The United States maritime and air supremacy is hard to match
while China has a quickly advancing economy and the natural resources to continue
this growth and have strategic autonomy (Ross 1999: 93). Their weakness shows
the bipolarity of the situation just as much as the strengths.
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The successor-state image sees only wrong in the rising power. Three
assumptions create the foundation of this argument: any rising power will
violently disrupt the system (Overholt 2008: 20), power is built and sustained
through the practice of territorial conquest (Jeffery 2009: 318), and any country
professing communist or leftist ideologies must somehow be aggressive, like the old
Soviet Union (Overholt 2008: 20- 1).
In response to bipolarity, China is demonstrating the need to balance that is
associated with it. To help strengthen their economy, China got rid of the binding
Marxist ideologies to pursue a more market-based economy. To be able to compete,
they improved the ground forces and modernized the technology for their navy and
air force. To diminish the potential of conflict with the United States, China has
become more cooperative with its peripheral nations as well as the United States
(Ross 1999: 97). Yet, it is important that though these may seem like advancements
toward peaceful relations, it is more so correlated to their preparation for their
possibility of heightened power (Ross 1999: 98).
Though bipolarity will cause the U.S.-China relations to be tainted by high
tensions, Ross argues that Washington does not have to be hypersensitive to
relative gains issues or to the prospect of Chinese military expansionism (Ross
1999: 118).
Overholts (2 008: 13) opinion, differing to the ideologies of the successor-
state image, state that not only does Chinas communism not constitute a threat to
the rest of the region or world, but notions that it is stubbornly defended by a cadre
of gerontocratsthe C hinese counterparts of Leonid Brezhnev, Yuri Andropov, and
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Konstantin Chernenko slowly dying in their expensive chairs while their antique
system withers away are false.
Institutionalist Theory
Instituationalist theory sees Chinas rise presenting at least an opportunity for
building cooperation, rather than intensifying conflict (Goldstein 2007: 639). This
theory accepts the anarchic idea that all states are similar in the idea that they are
all self-interested and egotistical (Goldstein 2007: 646). However, institutionalists
feel that the consequences of anarchy can be controlled by international
organizations. The idea is that the institution can clarify the benefits that can come
from cooperation (Goldstein 2007: 646). According to Goldstein (2007: 646),
institutionalist theory provides a logic of contingent cooperation based on mutual
benefit among states as an alternative to intensifying conflict despite the constraints
of anarchy.
While power transition theory suggests a pessimistic view of the rise of
China, institutionalist theory offers optimism in the idea that the rise of China does
not necessarily mean great international conflict (Goldstein 2007: 650).
Ikenberry gives three reasons as to why the Western order has been
successful. These reasons, however, are closely-related to the positives of the
institutionalist theory. His first is that , in the Western system, the barriers to
economic participation are low, and the potential benefits are high. China has
already discovered the massive economic returns that are possible by operating
within this open- market system (Ikenberry 2008). The second reason he gives is
that, the larger aggregation of democratic capitalist states and the resulting
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accumulation of geopolitical power shifts the balance in the orders favor
(Ikenberry 2008). The final reason is that the, system of rules and
institutionsrepresent one of the great breakthrough of the post war era. They
have laid the basis of unprecedented levels of cooperation and shared authority
over the global system (Ikenberry 2008).
Ikenberry is aware of the institutionalist idea that all states are anarchic, but
that can become beneficial if mitigated correctly. He states, The incentives [the
three reasons] create for China to integrate into the liberal international order are
reinforced by the changed nature of the international economic environment. The
most farsighted Chinese leaders understand that globalization has changed the
game and that China accordingly needs strong, prosperous partners around the
world.
Critiques and Theory/Hypothesis
The rise of China will not be a global threat to security and international peace,
simply because nothing supports that claim. The power transition theory created
the idea that a rising power will challenge a status quo power of equal power.
However, all the implications of what the power transition theory stand for have
been critiqued and proven wrong by Lebow and Valentino (2009) through logical
explanations and the usage of historical references of revered power transition
theorists to disprove their claim. Bipolarity makes sense in the idea that two
equally powerful states are dominating as the lead power. However, China is a
nation on the rise, not at the level of the United States. It has just recently seen great
spikes in economic prosperity and the like. Also, Ross (1999) argument that
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bipolarity could actually create peace between China and the United States seemed
absurd, considering they are rivals, regardless of anything else. The Successor-state
image is based upon opinionated implications of a Community state having power.
It is justified through fear and does not have empirical evidence to make an
accepted conclusion.
However, the Institutionalist theory has legitimate evidence along with
structure that is logical. China being on the rise is not a threat simply because it is
inevitable through anarchic ideologies. However, to mitigate these anarchic ways,
international organizations can clarify benefits of cooperation and peaceful
transitions. Regardless of the peace that could be had through institutionalist
theory, it is inevitable that features of power transition tension, distrust, and
conflict will arise.
Through the institutionalist theory, if more international organizations place
more pressure on China, will it comply? I believe they would comply for their own
self-gain. China being on the rise shows its interests in gaining power, economic
prosperity, and advancements in various fields. By complying with an international
organization, China would no longer have to worry of petty conflict and be in a
globalized hemisphere of economic prosperity. If China were to combat, it would
face the United States and its allies of which have been created through the Western
order. The Western order is so dominating that though China is on the rise, the
likelihood of wanting to get tangled into a web of many enemies would hinder
Chinas growth and ability to rise higher as a power.
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Methodology
I will be using the controlled comparison method. In order to see how the theories
coincide with the event, one must compare and contrast the variables. Though this is the
best methodology for this case study, it is not without its shortcomings. The general
weakness of controlled comparisons is that in social science the characteristics of paired
cases are never nearly identical. The method of argument is even weaker because paired
cases usually deviate even further from having wholly different characteristics (Van
Evera 1997: 57-58). However, the comparative methodology will allow relationships to
truly be deciphered through each of these cases and the significance of each case can be
brought to light when they are put with the theories that correspond to them.
The congruence approach to analyzing these cases could have been used in terms
of an overall territorial conflict between China and its peripheral nations. However, the
South China Sea case happenings were around the same time as the Korean peninsula
ones. Then, the U.S-China disputes over Taiwan had happened twenty years before
either of the previously mentioned conflicts even began. Therefore, a sequence of events
in order to split the over-arching conflict would not have worked.
Process-tracing could have also worked, however, the research question as well as
the theory that I plan to represent as the most reliable theory do not subject itself to
historical cases that have taken long periods of time. Without this, it would be hard to
trace the decisions of a government and having a factor that would connect the
independent variable with the dependent variable.
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Case Study
The first case is the U.S-China relations on the South China Sea. This case portrays the
disputes over territory within the South China Sea and even claiming the sea itself. Then,
this case will be compared to the power conflict on the Korean peninsula that dealt with
Chinas relations with North Korea and how it had changed . Due to both of these cases
implementing the institutionalist theory as more empirically sound, I will end on
explaining the U.S-China disputes of Taiwan and how this case differs from the previous
two. From there, I will compare and contrast all three theories.
All of these cases have a focus with U.S-China relations. This effectively
controls for the players of both cases. Also, all of the dealings are with the U.S. and
China along with its peripheral states. China and the peripheral states have many cultural
similarities that can control for overall cultural differences.
Case: South China Sea
The South China Sea is a body of water encompassed by states such as China, Taiwan,
Vietnam, Indonesia, Singapore, and the Philippines. Though the English name for this
sea is the South China Sea, territorial claims have led to other names such as the
South Sea for China and the East Sea by Vietnam. China claims that mo st of the
territory in the sea belongs to them. Other nations disagree. According to the CIA World
Factbook, The Natuna Islands are disputed between Indonesia, China, and Taiwan. The
Malampaya and Camago gas fields are argued between the Philippines, China, and
Taiwan. The Spartly Islands are debated between Vietnam, China, Taiwan, Brunei,
Malaysia, and the Philippines.
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In 1992, China declared its Law on the Territorial Sea and the Contiguous
Zone. This asserted what territories belonged to the Peoples Republic of China that
includes the mainland and its offshore islands, Taiwan and the various affiliated islands
including Diaoyu Island, Penghu Islands, Dongsha Islands, Xisha Islands, Nansha
(Spratly) Islands and other islands that belong to the Peoples Republic of China. The
states within the Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN) along with the U.S.
greatly feared what this meant. As the Chinese economic and military capabilities were
increasing, along with their actions in support of their territorial claims, ASEAN nations
felt this to be a sure-fire threat to the status quo power.However, a different story began to emerge by the mid- 1990s. As Beijings
capabilities increased, they backed away from its previously assertive posture and began
to express surprisingly strong support for accelerating regional efforts at institutionalized
multilateralism (G oldstein 1999: 655). Regional organizations and informal regimes
started to arise and vary in significance.
After the mid-1990s, China became very involved with these institutions.
Goldstein (1999: 656) claims that, Beijing had apparently concluded t hat working
through multilateral institutions would more effectively serve its own interests than the
free-wheeling bilateral approach to dealing with smaller neighbors separately which it
had adopted in the first half of the 1990s.
By Beijing choosing to participate with the institutions more, they are falling in
line with the ideas of the institutionalist theory. Beijing has been essentially pursuing
their own interests that will end up benefiting all surrounding nations. In dealing with
problems such as competitive currency devaluation, devising arrangements for resource
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exploitation and agreeing to a common code of conduct in the South China Sea, and
signing a protocol prohibiting nuclear weapons in Southeast Asia, Beijing has chosen
communication with other institutions instead of their exclusive gains. It would seem
that Beijing felt that their countrys interests would be served best through cooperative
solutions to the disputes that surrounded them.
However, this correlation and peaceful communication could all be a temporary
solution and tactic for a larger strategy (Goldstein 1999: 657). According to the power
transition theory, this could all just be a ploy to buy time. Since the ASEAN states
became alarmed at the actions of Beijing, they began to ally themselves with the UnitedStates. This over-shadowed China and creates the United States as an even greater
superpower. By creating peaceful relations, it gives China a temporary fix on the
situation.
Also, this cooperative behavior by China may simply reflect the military
requirement to focus on Taiwan, instead of provoking confrontation with the United
States and its allies.
Through all of this, there is no evidence stating that the assertions made through
the power-transition theory are true. However, one can see the correlations between the
actions of Beijing and the institutionalist theory. With their cooperation and their
investment in institutions, the institutionalist theory suggest that if the benefits continue
to come into fruition, than the desire to get rid of multilateral cooperation will be null.
Case: Korea
In the first half-decade of the post- Cold War era, Chinas policy toward the Korean
peninsula was comparable to the power- transition theorys general ideas. At th e core of
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Chinas policy was the remaining support for the Norths unification agenda and an
opposition to the presence of the U.S. military in the South.
However, after the Cold War, China worried that their power was being checked
by the U.S. through the actions of their ally of North Korea. The danger that North Korea
had posed to its neighbors conveniently allowed the United States to revise and updates
its Cold War security alliances with Japan and the Republic of Korea, as well as
promoting the deployment of missile defenses. These actions can be seen through a
power-transition lens of China using its influence to shape the international order around
them and the United States standing strong to their power and position in that area.Yet, as is comparable to the South China Sea incident, the 1990s brought a new
wave of thoughts to China and its relations with Korea. The end of the decade revealed
that South Korea was one of Chinas key economic partners as well as the political
relations between th e Republic of Korea and the Peoples Republic of China
strengthening.
By the end of the twentieth century, Korea was becoming a venue where shared
interests presented one of the greatest opportunities for Sino- American cooperation
(Goldstein 2007: 662). This resulted in Beijing promoting a Korea policy since the 1990s
that makes cooperation a reality a policy with provisions for increased transparency and
standards of verification to reduce the fear that any participant will exploit agreements
to ac hieve a dangerous advantage over others (Goldstein 2007: 662).
Beijing began to play a participatory role that started with the four-party talks in
1999. This intensified as Chinas role in the nuclear crisis of 1993 -1994 changed during
the 2002-2003 announcement that North Korea had tested a missile from Pyongyang in
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2006. Before they would play a more passive role as the U.S. and Democratic Peoples
Republic of Korea created the terms for the Agreed Framework. However, as the latter
happened, Beij ing began to be a more active and play a center role. Beijings main goal
was to edge the United States and Democratic Peoples Republic of Korea away from the
edge and push more multilateral talks that would yield a new bargain.
Though China can be seen doing more negotiations and following the highlights
of institutionalist theory, it can also be seen, through power-transition theory, that China
could be stalling for more time. Like explained for the South China Sea case, power-
transition would say th at the policy Beijing has tell more about its willingness toaccommodate necessity today than it does about the preferences that may motivate a
stronger China tomorrow (Goldstein 2007: 666). However, as is like the South China
Sea case, the power-transition theory interpretation of events has little evidence to
support it. Most of the claims made are based upon interpretations that would lead to
future projections of events. For the case of the Korean peninsula conflicts, there is more
empirical evidence supporting the ideas of the institutionalist theory being implemented.
Case: Taiwan.
In the beginning years of the post-Cold War era, there were talks between Beijing and
Taipei (capital of Taiwan/Republic of China) about a mutually acceptable answer to their
sovereignty that seemed hopeful. These two sides not only had regular discussions on
this issue, but also expanded indirect trade and investment, and relaxed restriction on
social intercourse (Goldstein 2007: 669). In the early 1990s, these effo rts leant itself to
thoughts of Beijing and Taipei being able to institutionalize cooperation and relaxing
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fears of either side jeopardizing that both could have by instead exploiting a temporary
advantage to win the sovereignty debate.
However, the problem that led to the beginning tensions originated from the
mutually perceived idea of focusing more on relative, rather than absolute, gains. Beijing
focusing on its relative gains had caused it to consider two positions on managing
tensions in the Taiwan Strait.
The first position, Goldstein (2007) states, reflects the fear that Taipei and its
ally in Washington may believe that the high costs of disruptive military action will keep
the Peoples Republic of China (PRC) from responding to events that tes t itsdetermination to prevent Taiwans independence. Goldstein (2007) goes on to state that
due to wanting to combat these beliefs, China has developed a sharp reaction toward,
statements from leaders on Taiwan that suggest new definitions of the islands status
(Chen Sui - bians 2003 assertion that there was one country on each side of the Strait;
the decision to add Taiwan to Republic of China passports), a democratic political
process on the island that empowers supporters of independence, and moves to strengthen
Taiwans unofficial relationship with Washington.
Beijing feels that Taipei would not be foolish enough to rid the support of the
United States with an open declaration of independence. However, the mainland does
feel that Taiwan wi ll implement salami tactics in order to expand its international
space (Goldstein 2007: 671). In response to this, China declared that it would
jeopardize the economic benefits coming form the cooperative relations across the Strait,
if there is need to respond harshly to Taiwan and its potential of preventing reunification.
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669). These advocates of restraint can easily enlighten China on their potential losses if
they were to tarnish their reputation as a regional actor that is safe and responsible. The
second reason is that these mainland advocates of patience can argue that forbearance
rather than coercion also fosters trends on Taiwan that reduce the attractiveness of
independence (Goldstein 2007: 669).
In this case it is clear to see that the implications of power-transition theory are
more visible within the resulting events of the Taiwan case. Instead of continuing peace
and thinking of their interests being the peace of domestic issues, China feels threatened
and focuses on relative gains. Assessment
There are many similarities between the South China Sea case and the Korea case. Both
of these cases resulted in China being able to use the institutionalist theory to resolve the
issues it faced in the beginning. Though in both of these cases, China started out as a
rising power that seemed to be implementing the ideas of power-transition theory, China
seemed to always end by negotiating with nations and participating within institutions. It
is clear to see that the Chinese cooperation within institutions and with other nations was
to further the desires of China. However, within the institutionalist theory, they accept
that all states are anarchic in that they are self-interested and egotistical.
Also, both of these cases had the same reason as to why the power-transition
theory was invalid. By showing that the connotations of the power-transition theory were
based on projections of future behavior, it was simple to see that it was invalid due to its
lack of empirical evidence.
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The Taiwan case was different than the South China Sea case or Korea case
because the resulting reaction from China was more easily correlated with the power-
transition theory than the institutionalist theory. Instead of China and Taiwan continuing
their regular talks about the peaceful resolution to sovereignty, China and Taiwan began
to focus on the gains of their state and not the whole picture.
However, there is one similarity between the Korea case and the Taiwan Case.
Both of these cases become less about the state (Korea and Taiwan) and more about the
United States ability to preserve leadership and Chinas continued growth.
Goldstein (2007) mentions the institutionalist theory being a theory of optimism.Though there are strains of the institutionalist theory that can be pulled from the Taiwan
case, the optimism begins to wane as it becomes clear that the tensions between Taiwan
and China are still high.
However, the Taiwan case can be viewed as an important exception to the
broader usefulness of institutionalist theory (Goldstein 2007: 676). He goes on to state
that zero-sumness is what characterizes this dispute. The fact that very few international
issues rise to that level makes this case an anomaly.
Also, the actions taken in Taiwan gave the global community insight as to what
issues China would take a stronger stand. When it comes to the pride and overall safety
of the Republic of China, it would seem they will not budge. The fears of China
consisted of Taiwans ally of the United States and Chinas inability to show weakness.
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Conclusions and Policy Implications
Evidenced through three different cases in this paper, the institutionalist theory proves
itself as the leading contender to what China is really doing with their rise.
Yet, each theory is not without its share of discrepancies. The institutionalist
theorys foundation is that the nation acknowl edges its desire for self-gain and has the
willingness to work with others. As proved through various wars throughout history,
cooperation has not always been the answer to nations actions to further their self -gain.
However, in the case of Chinas rise , their reactions correlate well with the idea of
cooperation and willingness to compromise an idea that seemed previously impossible
for this nation. Chinas ability to find a middle ground with other nations puts it out of
the league with power transition theory and bipolarity/successor-state image theory.
In the future, research on how communism plays in part with the tension should
be done. By doing this, one can also assess the successor-state image theory that bases its
fear of Chinas rise on the possibility that it is the successor to the Soviet Union. Thus
far, the only knowledge that can be correlated to the successor-state image theory are
conspiracies. In order to give evidence for or against this theory, there needs to be more
empirical information. Seeing as how many people fear the rise of China due to the fear
of the rise of communism, I feel that it would be prevalent and pertinent to do so.
Chinas future with its continuing rise, through the predictions of the
institutionalist theory, shows a harmonious communication between nations. For
example, at the climate change conference in Cancun, Mexico for 2010, China has
already shown signs of this theory. They have been more flexible and willing to be a part
of the binding agreement that would allow outside verification on whether or not it is
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making good on its pledges to curb emissions a contrast to their previous years of
absolute refusal. Even in the arguable Wikileaks, China has apparently become more
agreeable to the idea of North and South Korea fusing into one democratic nation. This
is a huge contrast to their previous ideas of supporting North Koreas fight for a
communist-dictatorship society.
There are three main contemporary actors that are involved in Chinas rise: th e
United Nations, the United States, and Chinas peripheral.
The United Nations needs to continue to push China into cooperation. By
showing China what it could gain from cooperation at the climate change conference, theUnited Nations has the ability t o stabilize Chinas anarchic tendencies while also keeping
cooperation with other nations for peace. By cooperating, China has the ability to not
only ease the minds of other nations, but also to create a better environment for their
country by reducing greenhouse gas emissions and lower their current top rank of
emitting the most greenhouse gases. The United Nations needs to make it obvious to
China in every policy that their country has the ability to have tremendous gains by
simply cooperating.
The United States needs to cooperate with China. Though this nation is on the
rise, there is no indicator that it will harm the United States ability to be a dominating
status quo power. There needs to be constant dialogue between the United States and
China about the variety of areas of disagreement in order to create an actual relationship.
With issues such as humanitarian rights and the manipulation of the monetary system, the
only way to have China reconsider is to discuss with them what it would mean to them,
as far as gains, to not participate in these issues. By cooperating with other nations that
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view their actions as wrong, they will be able to hinder conflict and create a better image
for themselves which will ultimately lead to a vast amount of gains by simply gaining
the trust of other nations. The United States needs to keep in mind that despite the
feeling of threat that comes from Chinas rise, the most peaceful way to combat it is to
help China get more involved in the international community and to keep a constant flow
of dialogue with them.
Chinas peripheral nations need to keep a weary eye on China. There have been
many occasions in which China has implemented action based on its anarchic tendencies.
However, if these peripheral nations can keep dialogue with China and get theinternational community involved, China will see the advantages of cooperating. The
tensions that are felt by all nations that are involved with Chinas rise is inevitable.
When the security and well-being of nations are threatened, it is easy for them to feel the
need to combat through force. However, if China can constantly be involved in the
dialogues of the United Nations, or just one-on-one with the different threatened nations,
there is a chance that it will continue to cooperate, as it has shown in the past.
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