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BOOK REVIEW

The Consciousness Paradox: Consciousness, Concepts andHigher-Order Thoughts

By ROCCO J. GENNARO

MIT, 2012. x 378 pp. 27.95

In this ambitious book Gennaro refines his earlier version of the Higher-Order

Thought theory of consciousness and attempts to see off opponents. The paradox

consists of the seeming inconsistency of the following theses, which he finds inde-pendently plausible: that a version of the HOT theory is true; that the hard problem

(what is phenomenal consciousness?) can be solved; that infants and most animals

have conscious mental states; that the contents of all conscious experiences are cov-

ered by the subjects own concepts; that most concepts are acquired (although there is

a core of innate concepts); and that there is a plausible account of how HOT theory

might be realized in the brain and can lead to an informative neurophysiological

research agenda (2). He argues that these theses are not only mutually consistent

but true, and persuasively rebuts numerous objections, although for me (a sceptic

about HOT theories) fundamental difficulties remain.

According to the standard HOT theory, defended most notably by Rosenthal, whatmakes a persons mental state conscious is that it is the object of an appropriate

higher-order mental state which is itself unconscious. Suppose I see a red traffic

light. Then if I also have an unconscious thought with the content, I am nowseeing a red light, this higher-order thought ensures that my experience is conscious.

Gennaros wide intrinsicality view (WIV) differs from the standard view in main-

taining that what is conscious is not the lower-order visual experience but a complex:

the-experiences-being-the-object-of-the-unconscious-HOT. You might object that

this merely redescribes what the standard HOT theory specifies, so that the two are

ontologically equivalent. Gennaro replies that the requirement that the two states

form a complex must be taken seriously: there has to be a psychologically real inte-

gration between the mental state and the higher-order metapsychological state

which targets it. Some well-known objections appealing to the possibility of misrep-

resentation are thereby avoided.

HOT theory says that when one has a conscious mental state M, it is accompanied

by a HOT that I am in M (61). This Kantian claim means that the subject must have

the concepts involved in such higher-order thoughts, and a common objection is that

although infants and some animals are surely conscious, they lack the necessary cog-

nitive sophistication. While a few HOT theorists (notably Carruthers) grit their teeth

and deny consciousness to infants and animals, Gennaro does not. Yet he still defendsconceptualism, according to which the content of a subjects perceptual experience is

Analysis Reviews Vol 0 | Number 0 | 2012 | pp. 13 doi:10.1093/analys/ans154 The Author 2012. Published by Oxford University Press on behalf of The Analysis Trust.All rights reserved. For Permissions, please email: [email protected]

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fully specifiable in terms of that subjects own concepts (136). One challenge to this

view is the priority argument. How could I have come by my concept RED without

first having had the right sort of experience? But how could I have had such an

experience if it depended on having that very concept already? This reasoning is a

serious threat to Gennaros position; he suggests that concept acquisition may be thereal hard problem (185). His response exploits two plausible theses: that concept-

possession is a matter of degree, and that we all infants and some animals included

possess a stock of innate core concepts such as OBJECT, SPACE, CAUSE, together with

demonstrative concepts and an I-concept. He shows ingenuity in bringing these

theses to bear on objections, attacking Carrutherss denial of consciousness to infants

and animals and arguing that in any case the WIV does not entail that non-linguistic

creatures cannot be conscious.

But why should the fact that a higher-order unconscious state is directed at a

lower-order unconscious state result in a conscious state? Why shouldnt there be

unconscious states with that structure? Gennaros response to this familiar challengedepends on the Transitivity Principle:

(TP) A conscious state is a state whose subject is, in some way, aware of being in

it (28).

He comments, the idea that I could be having a conscious state while totally unaware

of being in that state seems very odd (if not an outright contradiction). A mental state

of which the subject is completely unaware is clearly an unconscious state. Such

considerations lead him to regard (TP) as an a priori or conceptual truth about the

nature of conscious states (28), hence as a solid foundation for HOT theories. But his

reasoning hereabouts is hard to pin down. Two senses of being aware of a conscious

state seem to be in play. In one of these the assumption is that being aware of (forexample) a pain is just having it, and the point is that:

(A) If someone supposedly in pain is completely unaware of the pain, then the

pain is not conscious.

On that basis denying (TP) would indeed involve a contradiction. The trouble is that

(A) provides no support for the view that what makes the pain conscious is that it is

the object of a higher-order state. However, Gennaro may have in mind a different

sense of being aware of a conscious state, in which the point is that:(B) If someone supposedly in pain is unaware of the fact that he or she is in pain,

then the pain is not conscious.

(B) entails that a subject cannot be in pain unless they conceptualize it as pain. Read in

that way (TP) does seem to support the HOT thesis. The trouble now is that it also

ensures that (TP) is contentious and question-begging, and still doesnt help to explain

why the targeting of a lower-order unconscious state by a higher-order unconscious

state should result in a conscious state. Given (TP)s vital role in the overall argument,

I was surprised to find it so shakily defended. So although there is much that I admire

in this book, I am not persuaded by its defence of the HOT theory and the associated

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claim that a version of the theory solves the hard problem. However, Gennaro makes

a good case for the mutual consistency of the theses supposed to constitute the

paradox.

ROBERT KIRKUniversity of Nottingham Nottingham

NG7 2RD, UK

[email protected]

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