an ngo perspective · this report is one of a series looking at forest governance from an ngo...

Forest Governance in Ghana

An NGO perspective

A report produced for FERN by Forest Watch Ghana, March 2006

Recommendations for a Voluntary Partnership Agreement with the EU

Abbreviations

AFLEG AfricanForestLawEnforcementGovernanceCBNRM Community-basedNaturalResourceManagementCFC CommunityForestCommitteesCFM CollaborativeForestManagementCSO CivilSocietyOrganisationDfID DepartmentforInternationalDevelopment(UK)EC EuropeanCommunityECFP EuropeanCommunityForestryPlatformEU EuropeanUnionFLEGT ForestLawEnforcementGovernance&TradeFSDP ForestSectorDevelopmentProjectFWP Forest&WildlifePolicy(1994)GHATEX GhanaAssociationofTeakExportersGTA GhanaTimberAssociationGTMO GhanaTimberMillersOrganisationIRS InternalRevenueServiceMSG MultiStakeholdersGroupNTFP Non-timberForestProductTRF TimberRightsFeesTUP TimberUtilisationPermit(non-commercialloggingpermit)VLTP ValidationofLegalTimberProgrammeVPA VoluntaryPartnershipAgreement

Author: KyeretweOpoku,CivicResponseGhanaPhotos: DorothyJacksonEditor: RebeccaWhitbyDesign: DaanvanBeek,Utrecht,NetherlandsPrinted: ZuidamUithof,Utrecht,Netherlands©FERN,March2006

FERNofficeUK1CFossewayBusinessCentre,StratfordRoad,MoretoninMarsh,GL569NQ,UK

FERNofficeBrussels4Avenuedel’Yser,1040Brussels,Belgium

www.fern.org

ThispublicationwasmadepossiblewithsupportfromtheUKDepartmentforInternationalDevelopment(DFID)andtheDutchMinistryofEnvironment(VROM).

TheviewsexpressedinthisreportarethoseofForestWatchGhanaandhavebeensubjectedtoapeerreview.TheydonotnecessarilyrepresentFERN’sposition.

Cover photo: Local communities need access to forest products and a sustainable, well managed forest resource. Skilled craftsmen make dugout canoes from species such as wawa trees (Triplochiton scleroxylon), generating an income and providing essential equipment for local fishermen.

Contents

Executive summary 5

1 Introduction 7

2 The state of forestry in Ghana today 9 2.1 Unfairaccesstoforestresources 9 2.1.1 Deforestation 9 2.1.2 Discrimination 10 2.2 Unfairbenefitssharing 11 2.2.1 Termsoftrade 11 2.2.2 Revenuecollection 12 2.2.3 Revenuedistribution 13 2.3 Conditionofforest-dependentcommunities 15 2.3.1 Economiccondition 16 2.3.2 Humanrightscondition 16 2.3.3 Socio-culturalrightsabuse 17 2.3.4 Insecurityandconflict 17

3 Forest policy and law in Ghana: context, content, impact and potential 19

3.1 Context 19 3.1.1 Colonialforestry 19 3.1.2 Post-colonialforestry 19 3.2 Content,efficacyandpotential 21 3.2.1 1994forest&wildlifepolicy 21 3.2.2 Forestrylaws 22

4 NGOs and Ghana’s vpa process 23 4.1 GhanaVPApreparations2005 23 4.2 GhanaVPApreparations2006 24 4.3 NGOs’dilemma 25 4.4 NGOs’strategichopesfortheVPAprocess 26 4.5 SpecificNGOVPAobjectivesfor2006 28 Conclusion 29

appendix 30 NationalmeetingonGhana’sproposedentryintoavoluntarypartnership

agreementwiththeEuropeanUnion 30

References 32

ThisreportisoneofaserieslookingatforestgovernancefromanNGOperspective.OtherreportsinthesameseriescoverGhana,Congo(DRC)andMalaysia.ThesecountriesareamongagroupofcountriesthatareexpectedtonegotiateVoluntaryPartnershipAgreementswiththeEU.TheaimoftheseVoluntaryPartnershipAgreementsistocontrolillegalloggingandtocontributetosustainableforestmanagement.TheseriesaimstoprovideconstructiveinputtothedevelopmentoftheseVoluntaryPartnershipAgreements.Allreportsareavailableatwww.fern.org.

Forest Watch Ghana

ForestWatchGhanaisabroadcoalitionofcivilsocietyorganisationsandNGOsinforestry,environment,rurallivelihoodsupport,developmentrightsadvocacy,culturalrightsadvocacy,informationrightsandgovernance.ItsmembersincludeKachitoCommunityDevelopmentCentre,GhanaIntegrityInitiative,JuxtaposeIntegratedDevelopmentAssociation,ProgrammeforWomenandChildreninDevelopment,FriendsoftheEarth,FriendsoftheNation,LeagueofEnvironmentalJournalists,CAREInternational,GreenEarthOrganisation,CentreforIndigenousKnowledgeandOrganisationalDevelopment,InstituteforCulturalAffairs,GhanaWildlifeSociety,IntegratedActionforDevelopmentInitiatives,ConservationFoundation,GhanaConservationNetwork,RuralYouthDevelopmentAssociation,ThirdWorldNetworkAfrica,TropenbosandCivicResponse.

Forest Watch Ghana’s “Forests for the People” campaign works for fair access to forest resources, fair sharing of benefits from forest exploitation, participatory forest governance and greater civil society involvement in forestry.

Laws Discussed

1 ConstitutionoftheRepublicofGhana,1992.2 ForestCommissionAct1997,(Act571).3 ForestsOrdinances,1927(cap157).4 ForestProtectionDecree,1974(NRCD243).5 FreeZoneAct,1995(Act504).6 LocalGovernmentAct,1993(Act462).7 TimberResourcesManagementAct,1997(Act547).8 TimberResourcesManagementRegulations,1998,(L.I.1649).9 TreesandTimberDecree,1974(NRCD273).

Executive summary

Ghana’sforestrysectorisindeepcrisis.Thetimberindustry-ledassaultonthisresourceisbuildingtowardsecologicalcatastrophe.Thestate’sfailuretocaptureevenaminimalportionofresourcerentforthepublicandforthecommunitiesthatownanddependontheseforestsfortheirlivelihoodhascreatedasocialcatastrophe.Thedescentofaffectedcommunities intopoverty, socialdecay, conflict, andviolence threatensapolitical andsecuritycatastropheaswell.

Ghana’sforestsectorhasanelaboratesuperstructureofconstitutionalrights,seeminglyprogressivepolicies,comprehensivelaws,well-developedinstitutions,andacadreofwell-trainedprofessionalforesters.Theworkingsofthesectorare,however,determinedlargelybythesubstructureofexploitativeandrepressiverelationsbetweenthecorporatetimberindustryandthestateontheonehandandforest-dependantcommunitiesandthepublicontheother.Theserelations,establishedundercolonialrule,remainintactthroughoutthenaturalresourcesector50yearsafterindependence.

Recognitionthatthesectorneedsgovernancereformratherthanjusttechnicalassistanceandcreditisanimportantstepforward.Governanceinitiativesthatfocussolelyonthesuperstructure (laws and policies) without addressing the basic political economy offorestry and the wider extractive sector cannot lead to change. NGOs believe that theEuropean Union (EU) Forest Law Enforcement Governance & Trade (FLEGT) andVoluntary Partnership Agreement (VPA) strategies have the capacity to disrupt theexistingpoliticaleconomyforthebetter.

If theEUandtimberbuyersally themselves,howevertemporarilyor tangentially,withtheenvironmentalandsocialjusticeagenda,itwillcreatespaceforpeacefulreform.TheEuropeanCommissionandEuropeanbuyerscansupporttheparticipationofNGOsandcommunity representatives in the VPA process politically and materially; they can, inparticular, supportadefinitionof“legality” thatsubstantivelyaddressespressingsocialand environmental concerns and not just formal legislative processes. This precedentwouldrepresentasignificantbreakthroughforthesector.NGOswillworkwithandforsuchaVPAprocessinadditiontopursuingotherinitiatives.

ANGOsperspectiveofforestgovernancerecommendationsfortheVPAprocessinGhana FERN 5

6 FERN ANGOsperspectiveofforestgovernancerecommendationsfortheVPAprocessinGhana

Dawn over the Kakum National Park. Most of this area of moist evergreen forest was selectively logged from at least 1975 to 1989. It is now is a major tourist attraction featuring a canopy walkway.

Introduction

ThispaperlooksatGhana’sforestrycrisisandtherolethattheEUFLEGT/VPAinitiativecan play in transcending this crisis. It adopts a socio-economic and environmentalperspectivethatissupportiveofforest-dependentcommunitiesbutsetstheirimmediatedemands within a national framework. This perspective rests on the premise thatforestry is about the relations between different social groups around forest resources.“Governance”isthusnotjustanaspectofforestry,butitsessence.Thosewhoareseriousaboutreformingthesectormustrecognisethisfactanditsimplications.

TheEUFLEGT/VPAinitiativeontradeinillegallyloggedtimberisthemostsignificantinternationalinitiativeonforestryreforminmanyyears.NGOsandsocialstakeholdersin general are enthusiastic about it. It has, however, one weakness. In countries likeGhana, thestate (theEU’sVPAnegotiatingpartner) isa structuralpartof the forestryproblem. Itwill settle forcosmeticchangegiven theopportunity.Success requires thattheEUnegotiatorsmove,howeversubtly,beyondtrade facilitationnegotiationsandatleast table the wider social and environmental issues around forestry in Ghana. If theprocessremainsatasuperficialorsuper-structurallevelitwillnotdelivervalueforanyofthepartiesinvolved,andcouldevendiscreditparticipants.Thepriceoffailurecouldbeafurther(evenfinal)lossoffaithinsystemicapproachesonthepartofcommunitiesandastrengtheningoftendenciestowardsdisintegrationofanalreadyweakstate.

1.


8 FERN ANGOsperspectiveofforestgovernancerecommendationsfortheVPAprocessinGhana CHAPTER1

Timber cut by chainsaw operators is freely on sale throughout Ghana, although it is illegal under the Timber Resources Management Regulations of 1998. It is usually the only affordable timber for local communities and is also widely used in government construction projects.

The state of forestry in Ghana today

2.1 Unfair access to forest resources

2.1.1 Deforestation

Ghana suffers from rapid deforestation and destruction of biodiversity. Between 1900and1990Ghanalost80%ofitsforestcover(8mha–1.6mha)1.Satellitepicturesofstate-managedforestreservestakenin1990and2000demonstraterapiddeforestationwithinthesereservesaswell;somelostasmuchas90%ofcoverinthisshortperiod.Therearenomorerecentmeasurements,butcommunitiesandForestWatchGhanamembersworkingattheforestfringecontinuetoreportrapidshrinkageofforests.Officialestimatessuggestthat logging isproceedingatabout fourmillionm3peryear–4 times the sustainablerate2.Ghanahasthedubiousdistinctionofbeingthefirstcountrytohave lostamajorprimate species since the Convention on Biological Diversity came into force: the redcolobusmonkeyhasbeenextinctsince2003becauseofdestructionofitshabitat.

TheForestryCommissionhasjoinedtheforestryindustryinblamingbushfires,farmers,andchainsawoperatorsfordeforestation.Thisisagrossdistortionofthetruth,however.Whiletherehave,forexample,beenbushfires(especiallyinthemid-1980s),thesecanbepurposefullysetbytheunscrupulousasatactictodestroyevidenceofover-logging.Thereisalsoillegalclearanceforfarming,butthis,too,oftenoccursinthewakeofindustrialdevastation.Finally,thereisindeedachainsawproblem,buttheevidencesuggeststhatchainsaw operators are increasingly funded by and answerable to persons close to theestablishedtimber(export)companies– thesamecompanieswhich,accordingtocivilsocietyactivists,alsoprovidetheprimemarketforchainsaw-cutlumber.Themaindriverofdeforestationisthetimberindustry,whichisabletosubornnationalpolicyprocessesto protect its profits3 and systematically violate permit regulations with completeimpunity4.

Of course, the logging industry is objectively propelled by an installed primary andsecondarycapacitythatis6timesthesustainablesupplyofwoodfromGhana’sforests�.Withanaverage(anddeclining)efficiencyof37%�, the timber industrysimplycannotaffordtoimportwoodatinternationalmarketprices.Withthedomesticresourceonitslastlegs,thereispressureoncompaniestocashinwhilesomeresourceremains.Thereis

1 The1907ForestPolicycontemplatedthedestructionofallnon-reserveforests.2 Birikorangetal.(2001).3 Forexample,theForestryCommissiondoubledtheannualallowablecutin2002despitethedeforestation

crisis.TheForestryCommissionalsomadeconcessionsonminimumgirthandallowablecutrestrictionsinJune2005aspartofitssettlementwiththeGTA.Further,inDecember2005,Parliamentratifiedillegal“ReplacementAllocations”issuedbytheForestryCommission.

4 AlmosttheentireindustryoperatesindefianceofthepermitsregimeestablishedbytheTimberResourcesManagementActin1998andcontinuestooperateunderconcessionagreementsthatexpiredbyoperationoftheActinSeptember1998.SeeForestWatchGhana(2004).

5 Birikorangetal.(2001).Halfofthiscapacitywasacquiredbetween1993and2000.6 Ibid.

2.


alreadytalk(andsomeevidence)ofcapitalflightfromGhanatimberintoothersectorsandintootherproducercountries,particularlyintheCongobasin.

2.1.2 Discrimination

Theownershiprightsofpre-colonialcommunitiesandtheapplicabilityoftheircustomarylawstosurfacelandarenotindispute�.TheConstitutiondescribestheseas“stoollands”(landsownedbypre-colonialcommunities,symbolisedbywoodenstools).Article267(1)says,“AllstoollandsinGhanashallvestintheappropriatestoolonbehalfof,andintrustforthesubjectsofthestoolinaccordancewithcustomarylawandusage”.

Since independence, the state has successfully claimed ownership of minerals�, hydro-carbons,andwaterresources.Thestatehasalsocompulsorilyacquiredlandsforvariouspublicpurposes.TheConstitutionrecognisestheseas“publiclands”.Forover100years,thestatehasasserted theright tomanageareasdesignated forest reservesonbehalfoflandowners�.In1974,thestateextendedthispowertostandingtimberresourcesoutsideofforestreserves.

In practice, state management rights have meant expropriation of communities. TheonlyincidencesofownershipthatthesecommunitiesstillenjoyaretherighttoreceiveashareofroyaltiesfromforestexploitationandtoparticipateininventorytakingpriortotheawardofTimberUtilisationContracts.Thestatetakesmostimportantdecisionswithoutreferencetocommunities,anddiscriminatesagainstcommunitieswithrespecttoresourceaccess.Lawsdatingbackto192710havecriminalisedcommunityuseofforestreserveresources. In197411, theMinisterwasempoweredtoextendthisregimetoanytimber-bearingforestsbydeclaringthem“protected”.Indeed,theprovisionofdraconianpunishments for thesmallest infringementof forestuserestrictionshasbeen themostconsistent feature of forestry legislation through the years12. Of course, the ForestryCommissiondoesnotapplytheserulestotimberorminingcompanies–onlytoruralcitizens.

Though the 1994 Forestry and Wildlife Policy stresses the importance of collaborativeforestry management (CFM) and community-based natural resource management(CBNRM),thestate’slegislativeeffortssincethendemonstratewhereitsrealcommitmentslie:

• In1997thestateenactedacomprehensiveinvestmentcodefortimber–theTimberResourcesManagementAct13.TherearenolawssupportingCBNRM.

7 TheAborigines’RightsProtectionSocietydefeatedtheBritishattempttopassaCrownLandsOrdinanceinthePrivyCouncilin1897.

8 Includingsea-saltcrystallisednaturallyinlagoonsduringthedryseason.9 ForestOrdinance.10 Ibid.11 TreesandTimberDecree.12 Governmentsreproducetheserestrictionsalmostasareflexeverytimetheypassnewlegislation.Today

differentpresentationsoftheserulesappearintheForestOrdinance,theForestProtectionDecreeandtheForestryCommissionAct.

13 TimberResourcesManagementAct.


• TheForestOrdinanceprovidesforNTFPaccessinforestreservesbasedonpermitsissuedbytheForestryCommission14.Thestatehaspassednolawsregulatingaccesstonon-timberforestproducts(NTFPs)onwhichcommunityhouseholdsandbusinessesdepend.Thereare,norulesspecifyinghowtoapplyforsuchpermits,howapplica-tions will be processed or evaluated, or how the Forestry Commission will pricepermits.Noristhereprovisionforrevieworappealagainstunfavourabledecisions.The process is fraught with arbitrariness, discouraging community access to theirforestresources.

• The situation regarding non-commercial timber use is no better. The TimberResourcesManagementRegulationsof1998(LI1649)establish“TimberUtilisationPermits” (TUPs) that allow communities, District Assemblies and NGOs to accesstrees for non-commercial purposes. TUPs are clearly a legislative afterthought notmentioned in the parent legislation15 but appearing in the Regulations16 under achapter headed “Registration and Use of Chainsaws”! Further, the Regulations donotspecifyapplicationandoperatingproceduresforthesepermits.TheresultisthatcommunitiescannotinpracticemakeuseofTUPs.Rather,theForestryCommissionillegallyusesTUPstofacilitatecheapcorporateaccesstologs.Between2001and2003theForestryCommissionissuedatleast125TUPstocommercialloggers17.

2.2 Unfair benefits sharing

The ongoing expropriation of community resources by timber companies becomesclearerwhenone looksathowstakeholders sharebenefits fromtimber.Forest-owningand -dependant communities receive negligible returns from the destruction of theirresources.ForestWatchGhanamembersbelievethatcommunityrepresentativesreceivelessthan5%oftheirroyaltyentitlementsandnoneoftheirentitlementtotimberrightsfees(TRFs)1�.Therearethreedistinctelementstothisproblem1�.OnerelatestothetermsoftradebetweenNorthandSouth.Thesecondrelatestothestate’stendencytofacilitateindustryexpropriation(whichinturnfacilitatesindustrypatronageofforestryofficials)at the expense of forest-dependent communities. The third relates to elite capture ofrevenuecollectedbythestate.

2.2.1 Terms of trade

“Market prices” for tropical wood products do not reflect the real economic, environ-mental,andsocialvalueoftheforestsdestroyedtosupplywoodproducts.Inthecaseof

14 ForestOrdinance.15 TimberResourcesManagementAct16 Subsidiarylegislationnormallyregulatestheexerciseoflegalrightscreatedbyaparentstatute.Itis

unusualforittocreaterightsabsentenablingprovisionsintheparentlegislation.17 TherewasaministerialbanonallocationofnewTimberUtilisationContracts“inforce”inthisperiod.

TheForestryCommissionBoardofDirectorssimilarlyembarkedonquestionableallocationsofso-called“ReplacementAllocations”tofavouredcompanies.

18 Theanalysisofstumpagecollectionandroyaltydistributionfollows.TheForestryCommissionhasnotcollectedTRFssincethelawcameintoforcein1998.ThecurrentpositionoftheForestryCommissionisthatcommunitiesarenotentitledtoparticipateinTRFs.

19 Thescandalousexploitationofwagelabourinforestsandmillsfallsoutsidethisdiscussion.

CHAPTER2 ANGOsperspectiveofforestgovernancerecommendationsfortheVPAprocessinGhana FERN 11

theexportindustry,thisrepresentsadirecttransferofforestrentstobuyers,andperhapstoNorthernconsumers. In thecaseofdomestic sales, the transfergoesdirectly to theGhanaian industry.Thissubsidyensures thatan inefficient industry thatrecoversonly37%ofthewoodsuppliedtoitneverthelessstaysinbusiness.

2.2.2 Revenue collection

Industry keeps the bulk of its turnover. It does not meet statutory obligations to thestateandthepublic,principallytimberrightsfees,stumpagefees,andincometaxes.Theexportindustrydoespayexportlevies,butismobilisedtohavethisimpostrevoked.

Timber rights fees

Onlysixofapproximately600-oddactive timberconcessionholdershaveregisteredtopaythetimberrightsfeesthatbecamemandatoryinSeptember1998undertheTimberResourcesManagementAct.TheMinistryofLands,ForestryandMinesandtheForestryCommissionnevertookstepstoenforcethepermitsregimeestablishedbythislaw(andopposedbyindustry)becauseitinvolvedaredistributionofresourcerent.ForestWatchGhana has calculated conservatively that this represents a subsidy to industry of $100millionperyear20.

Stumpage fees

Industryhasaccumulatedarrearsinstumpagefeesoverthelasteightyears21.TheForestryCommissionassessesthesearrearsatabout30billionCedis(3.3million$).22ForestWatchGhanadisputesthisfigure23.ForestWatchGhanaarguesthattheForestryCommissionunderstatesthestumpageentitlement(e.g.,byfailingtoindextheseforinflationbetween1997 and 2003, when average fees dropped from about $12.00 to $3.00). Further, theForestry Commission only invoices about half of the accrued stumpage24, and thencollectsonlyhalfagainofwhatitinvoices.Finally,theForestryCommissionalsofailedtocalculatethecommercialinterestthatthelawimposesonthesearrears2�.ForestWatchGhanacalculatesthatthecorrecthistoricaloutstandingiscloserto300billionCedis2�.

20 ForestWatchGhana(2004).21 In2005,theForestryCommissionattemptedtocollectthesearrears.TheGTAsuedincourttoblockthe

ForestryCommissionandthreatenedtoexposelong-termcollusionofForestryCommissionofficialsinallowingcompaniestocutundersizelogsprovidedtheydeclaredtheminimumgirthontheLogMeasurement&ConveyancingCertificates.TheForestryCommissionthenusedthisfalsifiedinformationtocalculatestumpageobligations.Aslongasindustryignoredstumpageobligations,itobviouslydidnotmindthehigherrates.TheoutofcourtsettlementinvolvedtheForestryCommissionacceptingdefermentofarrearsforanotheryearinterestfree,waivingofminimumgirthstandardsandrelaxingofAnnualAllowableCutrules.

22 ForestryCommissionForestServiceDivision(2005).Alsorepeatedinseveralmedia-reportedspeechesbyA.S.K.Boachie-Dapaah,ChiefExecutiveoftheForestryCommission.

23 ForestWatchGhana(22June2005).24 ForestryCommissionF&ADept.(2005).25 Commercialinterestratesoverthelast8yearshaveaveragedabove30%.26 Asof2005.


Income tax

TheLargeTaxpayersOfficeoftheInternalRevenueService(IRS)reportsthat,since2001,mostofthelargemillers–whoarealsomajorconcessionairesandexporters–registeredas“freezoneenterprises”undertheGhanaFreeZoneBoardAct.Thesecompanieshavetherebyacquiredten-yeartaxholidaysanddonotpaythe30%corporateincometaxthatwouldotherwiseapply.TheIRSconsidersthisanabuseoftheFreeZoneActsincethesecompaniesaremillingtimberacquiredeitherfromconcessionstheythemselvesholdorfrompurchasesatsubsidizeddomesticmarketpricesratherthaninternationalprices.TheIRSobservesthatinmanycasesthesecompanieshaveusedoldandthusineligibleplantstoqualifyforFreeZonestatus.

Export levy

The3%levyonwoodexportsisperhapstheonlyareaofeffectiveForestryCommissioncollection (70% recovery). The timber industry, however, opposes this2� and MinistryofLandsForestryandMineshasexpressedareadinesstoseetheForestryCommissionsurrenderit.Indeed,inDecember2005,havingfailedinabidtoabolishthelevy,Ministryof Lands Forestry and Mines instructed the Forestry Commission to pay the proceedsintotheconsolidatedfund.TheeffectofsuchinterventionsinstumpageandexportlevycollectionwouldhavebeentocollapsetheForestryCommissionfinancially.

2.2.3 Revenue distribution

Forestry Commission management fees

TheForestryCommissionannually collects less then20%of its stumpageentitlement.Powerful interest groups appropriate this revenue inequitably and illegally. Ghana’sconstitutionprovidesaformulafordistributingrevenueaccruingfromstoollands.ThisformulaissetoutinArticle267(6)asfollows:Ten percent of the revenue accruing from stool lands shall be paid to the office of the Administrator of Stool Lands to cover administrative expenses; and the remaining revenue shall be disbursed in the following proportions:

a twenty-five percent to the stool through the traditional authority for the maintenance of the stool in keeping with its status;

b twenty percent to the traditional authority; and c fifty-five percent to the District Assembly, within the area of authority of which the stool

lands are situated.

27 Industry’scaseislegitimate:itisirrationaltopenaliseexporters.Industrycannotinsistonarationalisation,however,whenitrefusesitselftomeetstatutoryobligations.


TheForestryCommissionignoresthisconstitutionalprovision.Itofficiallyappropriates60% of revenue deriving from forest reserves and 40% of revenue deriving from off-reserve2�as“managementfees”2�.Ofcourse,theForestryCommission’sclaimforcompensationislegitimate,butmustberesolvedwithintheConstitution.Threesolutionsarepossible:

i Forestry Commission expenses are charged to the consolidated fund and the statefindsawaytotaxstoollandsrevenues;

ii ThestateandForestryCommissionmustrequest forestowners topaytheForestryCommissionfortheservicesitprovides;or

iii Steps are taken to amend the Constitution to provide for management costs or toempowerparliamenttoprovideformanagementcosts.

Community representation and local elite capture

TheConstitutionselectsthree institutionstoreceivecommunities’sharesofroyalties30.These are District Assemblies (55%), stools (25%) and traditional authorities (20%).None of these institutions accounts to forest-owning communities for royalties theyreceive;noneoftheseinstitutionshasdeployedtheseresourcesindevelopmentprojects

28 Birikorangetal.(2001).29 TheForestryCommissionhasrecentlyintroducedascaleoffeesapplicabletodifferenttypesofplantation

forests.30 FromthispointforwardadiscussionofTRFsisnotpossiblesincethereisnorecordofcollectionon

whichtobaseanalysis.


A market in a forest-zone village.

that could create long-term economic opportunities that compensate communities forresourcedestruction.Eachhasitsownuniqueproblems.

District Assemblies are constitutional institutions regulated by the Local GovernmentAct31.Theyarecomposedtwo-thirdsbyelectedassemblymembersandone-thirdbypresi-dentialappointees.ThePresidentalsoappointstheDistrictChiefExecutive.Assemblieshavelimitedstatutoryrolesinforestry.DistrictForestManagersarenotaccountabletoAssemblies.OneresultofthisdisconnectisthatAssembliesdonothavetheinformationnecessarytobudgetfortimberroyaltiesorinstitutepropercontrolsontheiruse.Thisislargelyatechnicalproblem;thestatecancreatemechanismstocorrectit32.

The stool presents a more serious and complicated problem. Traditional politicalinstitutions are undergoing a very uncertain transition. Stools are not thrones. Theysymbolise the social unit and not the personal authority of the person who occupies33the stool. Families, shrines, states, and confederations all have stools that symbolisetheir unity. Since, under customary (and constitutional) law, land resources arecommunalproperty,itfollowsthatroyaltiesbelongtothecommunityasawhole–nottochiefs.Chiefsincustomarylawarecustodiansofthecommunityinterestandnotfeudallords34.

Thecolonialadministrationpromotedchieftaincyaboveotherstoolinstitutions.Italsopromoted private property in natural resources. Since the colonial period chiefs havetherefore sought to increase their powers and re-invent tradition to suggest personalrightsoverstoolproperty.35Today,chiefstendtoappropriateroyaltiesfortheirpersonalorhouseholduse36.Theyclaimthat this is themeaningof“maintenance of the stool in keeping with its status” and that it isonly theroyaltiesallocated toDistrictAssembliesthatbelongtocommunities.EnhancementofchieflypowerswasprobablyindeedoneoftheobjectivesoftheConstitution’sdrafters37.Howeversincelandiscommunalpropertyitfollowsthatroyalties(compensationtolandowners)belongtothecommunityasawholeandnottochiefs.The“status”ofthestoolcanthereforeonlyrefertothewellbeingofthecommunitythatitsymbolises.“Traditionalauthorities”arealsostools.Thetermreferstothemostseniorstoolswithinthe political hierarchy of traditional states or confederations. Traditional authoritiesmaybeland-owningstoolsintheirownright,butthisisseldomafunctionofpoliticalseniority. The paramount stool of a traditional authority may command the politicalallegiance of thousands of subordinate stools without gaining control of stool lands.The move towards pseudo-feudal status that began under colonial rule, however, has

31 Act,1993(Act462).32 Itisanopensecrethowever,thatDCEsareunderpressuretofindfundstosupportrulingpartyactivities.33 Chiefsdonotactuallysitonstools;theykeeptheminspecialstool-housesandperformsacrificestothem

severaltimesayear.34 Indeed,customarypracticewasforthechieftosurrenderallhisprivatepossessionstothestoolupon

enstoolment.35 AninterestingdescriptionofthisprocessisprovidedinBerryS(2004)36 Forexample,communitiesinEnchihaveusedtheirDistrictForestForumtodemandaccountabilityfrom

chiefsandtoinsistthatroyaltiesgotofundForestForumcosts.37 ThechairmanoftheDraftingCommitteearespectedinternationaljuristisalsoParamountChiefof

AsokoreinAsante.


encouraged traditional authorities to advance claims to rights over subordinate stools’lands,notablyinAsante.

There are two problems associated with the role of traditional authorities in royaltiesadministration.First,somesubordinatestoolscomplainthatpaymentofroyaltiesthroughtraditionalauthoritiesinpracticeenablesparamountstoolstoappropriatepartorallofthesemonies.Secondly,byallocating20%ofroyaltiesdirectlytotraditionalauthoritiestheConstitution furtherblurs thecustomary lawdistinctionbetween“ownership”and“political leadership”. Itcondonesstatesponsorshipofelitechieftaincy institutions inawaythatgivesthemastakeinthesystemwherebytimbercompaniesexploitcommunityresources.

2.3 Condition of forest-dependent communities

Thesocialconditionofforest-dependentcommunities(60%ofGhana’s20millionpeople)isalarming.Forcenturiesbeforecolonialism,theseculturesdependedonforestresources.Economicproduction,socialorganisation,religiousbelief,andidentityalldependedonthis relationship. Destruction of the forests and community exclusion from access tothemhasmassivelydisruptedthesecommunities.UnlikeEuropeortheAmericas,wheresimilar rates of deforestation occurred in the nineteenth and early twentieth century,deforestation in Ghana has not been part of any domestically integrated development.Theresulthasbeenthecatastrophicdecayofforest-dependentcommunities.

2.3.1 Economic condition

Deforestationleadstoareductioninthewaterandsoilnutrientsthatsustainagriculturalproductivity,which is themainactivityof thesecommunities. Italsomeansthedisap-pearanceofNTFPs(plants,animals,andminerals)onwhichsuchcommunitiesdependforfood,preservatives,medicine,construction,packaging,andotherbasicneeds–thusforcingthemintothecasheconomy.Negligiblereturnsfromtimberextraction, lackofforwardintegrationofindustry,andstatewithdrawalfromsocialinvestmentmeansnoinvestmenttocreatenon-agriculturaljobstosustainthesecommunities.

2.3.2 Human rights condition

Communities also experience significant human rights abuses at the hands of timbercompanies and state officials. This includes destruction of crops and destruction ofcommunity infrastructure during haulage operations. Communities that have triedto resist these abuses or to demand compensation are largely ignored. In some cases,farmersreportthreatsofreprisalsbytimbercompanyofficials.Thearbitraryandbiasedenforcementofforestreserverulesagainstcommunitymembers,thoughsanctionedbystatute,alsoconstitutesrightsabuse.

2.3.3 Socio-cultural rights abuse

Deforestationalsoundermines traditional religionandculture–an important issue in


communities already facing social crises, and one that tends to strengthen traditionalhereditaryinstitutionsattheexpenseofmoderndemocraticones.

2.3.4 Insecurity and conflict

The combination of felt deprivation, rights violations, and a sense of betrayal by stateinstitutionsisincreasingthelevelsoftensionandconflictinforestfringecommunities.These tensions are exacerbating pre-existing gender, age, and lineage tensions. ForestWatch Ghana members report increasing domestic violence, chieftaincy disputes, andneglectof theaged, including its extremecommunity form–accusationofwitchcraft.There is also increasing tension between earlier settlers (so-called indigenes) and latersettlersinparticularareas:inotherwords,ethnicityiscrystallisingasaclassdistinctionin some places. Forest communities are also confronting timber companies in anorganisedmanneranddemandingrentillegally.Forexample,manyCommunityForestCommittees3� around theDesiriReserve (typically chairedby the “Odekuro”3�) in theNkawieForestDistricthavesetupillegalroad-blocksandforciblydemand“tolls”frompassingtimbertrucks.Communitiesaretacitlysupportingraidsofcompanyconcessionsbychainsawoperators–whoatleastpayrentupfront.Mostsignificantly,however,bothgangsofillegalloggersandforest-dependentcommunitiesarenowwillingtoconfrontthestateoverresourceaccess inan increasinglyviolentmanner.TherehavebeenrepeatedreportsbyDistrictForestManagers thatgangsof illegalchainsawoperatorsarearmedandprepared to resist state interferencewith theiroperations.There isnoevidence tosuggest that this represents community-based “activism” or whether communities aresimplyrespondingtoandtakingadvantageoftheobviousbreakdowninauthority.Therearenonetheless severalplaces, suchasDesiri,where the statehas lost controlover thereserves and where armed communities have demonstrated a willingness to confrontForestryCommissionofficials,police,andmilitarytoprotectillegalfarmingactivities40.Thoughstateofficialstendtoplaytheseincidentsdown,thesetrendscouldcompletelyunderminethestate,andnationalintegrity,ifnotchecked.

Further attempts at state repression will only accelerate this disintegration: preciselysuchabuseofcommunitiescreatedthecrisisinthefirstplace.Repressionultimatelyfails–especiallyinastateasweakasGhana’s.Thenationalpoliticaleliteunderstandbutrejecttherealsolutionstothiscrisis,whichinclude:

i The participatory development of a programme of local government and naturalresources policy reform that cedes some measure of control over resources todemocraticlocalinstitutions;

ii Greaternationalinvestmentinmodernisingruralcommunitiesonthebasisoflocalresourceutilisation;and

iii A conscious effort to democratise rural institutions and to re-develop a national

38 CommunityForestryCommissionsarevillage-levelcommitteesinitiatedbytheForestryCommissiontomobilisesupportforforestpolicygoalsandtorepresentcommunityconcernstoDistrictForestOffices.

39 An“OdeKuro”isaVillagehead-man,literally“holderofthetown”.40 In2005,forexample,themediareportedthatinEnchicommunitiesengagedin3daysofgunbattles

withForestryCommissionofficialsandpolicewhotriedtodrivethemoutofillegalfarms.Intheprocess,communitieskidnappedandseriouslyinjuredseveralpoliceofficers.


andevenpan-Africanidentitytocounterthedisintegrativeeffectofethnicpoliticalagendas.


Forest giant in wet evergreen forest at Ankasa Resource Reserve, one of Ghana’s most biodiverse sites. The south of the reserve was logged during the 1960s and 70s.

Forest policy and law in Ghana: context, content, impact, and potential

3.1 Context

Forestpolicy,forestlegislation,theforestrybureaucracy,andtherestofthegovernancesuperstructure all have roots in the colonial experience, and continue largely to bedetermined by the substructure of exploitative international economic relations thatcolonialismintroducedtoGhanabetween1850and1950.Post-colonialchangesinthissubstructureareresponsible,however,forthespecificfeaturesoftoday’scrisis.

3.1.1 Colonial forestry

The colonial state was the creation of European merchant houses. They created it tosupervise the final destruction of pre-colonial modes of production that survivedthe trans-Atlantic slave trade. These modes of production were based on communalagriculture,low-volumemanufacture,andtrade(includingtrans-continentaltradeinsalt,gold,leathers,etc.).Colonialismsubordinatedtheelitesofpre-colonialculturesthroughmilitaryconquestordiplomacy,andreducedthesetopaid“NativeAuthorities”withinthecolonial localgovernmentsystem.They thenenhancedorcreated41NativeAuthorities’coercive powers over their communities in order to facilitate foreign corporate accessto landed resources, and to develop through conscription the infrastructure necessaryforanexporteconomy–roads,railways,mines,ports,andsoon.They introduced,orencouraged the development of, cash crops for export. They discouraged traditionalsubsistenceeconomicactivitiesinabidtoforcecommunitiesintothecasheconomyandtocutofftheirlinkswiththeirresources.

Thisenabledtheestablishmentofadependent“national”economybaseduponexportofminerals,cashcrops,andtimbertoEurope,inexchangeforcashwithwhichtoimportindustriallymanufacturedcommodities.ThroughNativeAuthorities, thecolonial stateguaranteedinvestorscheapaccesstomineralandtimberconcessions.Italsoensuredlowtaxationofextractiveindustrieswhiletheworkingsofthe“internationalmarket”ensuredthatpeasant-producedcommoditieswereavailableatlessthantheirvalue.ThisensuredthatthemostofthewealthproducedinthecolonywasrealisedandretainedbyEuropeancompanies.WhatlittleremainedintheGoldCoastwenttopaythecostsofthecolonialadministration and to reward local collaborators; almost nothing was left over for theruralcommunitieswhodependedonandlegallyownedtheseresources.

3.1.2 Post-colonial forestry

Post-independancegovernmentshavemostlystrengthenedthefundamentalsofGhana’s

41 InmanypartsofWestAfricachieftaincyasaninstitutionwasacolonialcreation.

3.


extractiveeconomy42.Thestatecontinuestoensurecheapaccesstocommunities’assetson behalf of the corporate sector (especially the transnational corporate sector)43. Thestate continues to abuse community rights44. The international commodity marketscontinuetoundervaluenaturalresourcesandtransferwealthtobigbusinessintheNorth.As a result, Ghana suffered internal economic disruption, and now even depends onfoodstuffsimports.

The British transfer of the power of patronage to Ghanaian politicians changed theinternal composition of the timber industry and its relationship with the political andforestry establishments. These changes have determined the specific character of thepresent crisis. Hundreds of indigenous supporters of successive civilian and militarygovernmentsjoinedtheranksofloggingconcessionaires.These,ofcourse,putadditionalpressureonresources45.Moreimportantly,fromagovernancepointofview,theychangedthe character of “regulation” completely. Whereas British concessionaires were largelywell-established corporations (such as Unilever) employing professional foresters andlawyerstomanagetheirrelationshipswiththestate, fewofthenewtimbercontractorsunderstood or were interested in a rules-based regulatory system, and none worriedabout environmental impact or sustainability issues46. They were politically savvy andwilling to use their connections to override regulatory restrictions on their activities.It was (and remains) difficult for underpaid forestry officials to assert authority overwealthyandpoliticallyinfluentialtimbermen,especiallywheretheseprovedwillingtooffersubstantialrewardsto“flexible”officials.Astheirwealthgrew,timbercontractorsfreed themselves from their original political sponsors, spread their risks, and becamepatronsofthenationalpoliticaleliteasawhole.Intime,theyextendedtheir influencefrompoliticianstomorepowerfulsilviocrats,andthroughouttheforestrysystemtoitslowestoperatinglevels.

Normally,thoughthesuperstructureservesthedominantinterest,itdoessowithsomeindependenceandinaccordancewiththeinternallogicof,forexample,thelegalsystem.InGhana,thetendencytoprovideinstantgratificationtopowerfultimbermenultimatelyundermined the integrity of the superstructure. Between 1948 and 1992 there was nomajor policy review despite independence, Africanisation, international commodityprice collapse, nationalisation, and the many shifts in the political-economic functionoftheforestsector.Politiciansandcivilservantsranthesectorbyad hocadministrativefiat;governmentspassedlawstocatchupwithadministrativepronouncementsornotatall4�.Managementplansmostlyexpiredinthelate1960sandwerenotreplaced.Withthe

42 Ghana’sfirstindependentgovernmentdidcommittobuildinganationalindustrialbaseandexpendedstateresourcesinestablishingnationalmillingandfurnituremakingcapacity.Withitsoverthrowin1966pursuitofaself-reliantnationaleconomyand“downstream”investmentinthewoodindustryceased.

43 Smith,E.Kofi,(1999)demonstrateshowbetween1955and1965averagetaxesoncocoafarmerswere33%comparedtoawoodtaxrateof2.5%.

44 Forexample,in1974,theForestProtectionActextendedtheMinister’sdraconianpowersoverForestReservestoanystandingtimberresourcesthatthestatedeclares“protected”.

45 Financialandtechnologicalentrybarrierstotheloggingsectorarelowcomparedtomining.Therewasareadymarketforlogs.Indeedthelargermillersandexporterswerewillingtopre-financeloggersinordertoguaranteeacheapsupplysource.Thismadetimberconcessionstheidealwaytorewardpoliticalsupporters.

46 Ofcourse,somesophisticatedindigenoustimberbusinessesdoexist.However,thesearetheexceptionandtheydonotopposethegeneralmodusoperandioftheindustry.

47 Abanonroundlogexportationhasbeenineffectsince1992withnostatutorybasis.


increasingpowerofindustry,sectorgovernancecapacityatrophied.By2004,thesituationhaddegeneratedtothepointwheretheForestryCommissionBoardcouldunashamedlyjustifyflagrantabuseofthestatutorypermitsregimewiththeclaimthatithadactedin“thebestinterestofthetimberindustryandthenation”4�.

Ofcourse,someprofessionalforestersandenvironmentalistsraisedconcernsabouttherate of deforestation. They lacked the organisation, skills, critical mass, or evidence tomobilisepublicopinion,however.

3.2 Content, efficacy and potential

3.2.1 1994 Forest & Wildlife Policy

Bytheearly1990s,severalfactorshadcombinedtocompelafundamentalpolicyreview.Therewasglobal(particularlydonorcountry)concernabouttheenvironment,especiallyclimate change and the importance of tropical forests in combating this; there washeightenednationalawarenessofdeforestationanditsconsequencesfollowingthemajordrought and bushfire crisis of the mid-1980s; and finally, the public became aware ofthecentralrolethetimberindustryplayedindeforestation.Indeed,fromthelate1980sthroughtheearly1990s,Ghanawasatthecentreofaseriesofspectacularexposésofthecorruptionandrapaciousnessoftheinternationaltimberindustry4�.Allpartiesthereforehadaninterestinrestoringorderandcredibilitytothesector.Obviously,thereformerseithermiscalculated thestate’s realagendaorunderestimated thestrengthof industry-statesymbiosis.The1994Forest&WildlifePolicythatresulteddidnotmarkaseachangeinGhana’sforestgovernance;indeed,itrepresentedonlyatemporaryset-backtoresourceplunder.

The1994Policyisnotaclearguidetothecorrectiveactionthattheauthoritiespromised�0.Itdoesnotchoosebetweenfundamentalparadigmsforforestry,butgivestheimpressionthat all agendascanco-exist, reading rather likeamenuof competing interestgroups’agendas. It fails toengage sector-specificproblems.To theextent that forest regulatorsandpoliticianspaidanyattention to itatall, theyclearly read itas license tocontinuebusinessasusual.

Despite its limitations as an administrative guide, however, the policy is a usefuladvocacytoolforNGOs.Itclearlycommitstocollaborativeforestrymanagement(CFM)– enhancing the role of communities in forestry at policy, managerial and implemen-tation levels. Itcommits toending“timberisation”andtopayingmoreattentionto theenvironmental, cultural, scientific, and social functions of forestry. It promises greaterattentiontoNTFPs,andcommitstoanefficient“lowvolumehighvalue”timberindustry

48 ForestryCommission(2004)-Rejoinder.49 Adjetey,L.(1991)andFOE,(1992).50 Smith,E.Kofi(1999).Smith,thethentechnicaldirectoroftheministry,describesas“madness”thepre-

1994situationinwhichtheshort-termdemandsofindustrydominatedstatepolicytothenearexclusionofbothbio-diversityandcommunitysurvival,andpredictsthatthePolicywouldleadtoare-balancingofpowerthatwouldensuresustainableandequitableforestresourcemanagement.


thatcreatesmeaningfuljobsandcedesgreaterrenttothestateforthebenefitofsocietyas a whole. Finally, it states a commitment to greater transparency and probity in themanagementofthesector.TheseareimportantissuesforNGOs,andapolicyreferenceisausefulcampaigntool.

3.2.2 Forestry laws

Muchofwhathasbeensaidaboutthe1994Policyappliestosectorlegislation.Whereasthe1994Policypreserves thestatus quoby throwingcompetingagendas into themix,however,post-1994legislationlargelyignorescommunityrightsissues.Whenworkbegantowards new sector legislation to give full effect to the Policy, a committee submitteddiscussionpapers�1onthebasisofwhichDfIDconsultantsdraftedanewForestActandaTimberRightsAct.Thesedrafts,whichclarifiedsubstantiveandproceduralquestionsofcommunityrights�2,whereshelvedbytheministry.E.KofiSmith�3attributesthistothepoweroftheindustrylobby,whichsoughttopreventcompetitivebiddingandTRFsfrombecominglaw.Sincethen,therehasbeennorealattempttopassmeaningfullegislationpromotingorprotectingcommunityrightsinforestry.

Instead, Parliament passed bastardised versions of these laws: the Timber Resources Management Act 1997 (Act 547)andtheTimber Resources Management Regulations (L.I. 1649). These created a new permits regime that both strictly restricts resource accessby industry and raises the state’s share of the resource-rent through a combination oftimberrightsfeesandstumpagefees.Ofcourse,thedraftingofbothwassuchthatitheldup implementationofaccessrestrictionsand fiscalmeasuresuntilafter2002,atwhichtimeParliamentpassedtheobviousamendments.After2002,theForestryCommissionandindustrysimplyignoredaccessrestrictionsandfiscalmeasureswithimpunity.Thenewlawsalsogivecommunityrepresentativesaroleintheconductofforestinventories(withoutidentifyingwhowillpaythecostsofthisparticipation)thatprecedetheallocationoftimberresourcesbythestate.Theyfurtherassertfarmers’righttodeterminewhethertreesstandingontheirfarmsmaybefelledbyTimberUtilisationContractholders.Theymake provision for Social Responsibility Agreements under which timber companiesspend up to the equivalent of 5% of stumpage obligations to support projects socialprojectsincommunitiesaffectedbytheiroperations(althoughsincecommunitieshavenowayofknowingwhatstumpageobligationsare,performanceisdifficulttomonitor).Finally, they provide for criminal sanctions for forestry officials who subvert the Act.Withall their flaws, theTimberResourceManagementActand theTimberResourcesManagementRegulationsthereforeremain(togetherwiththeForestsOrdinanceandtheForestProtectionDecree)veryimportantlegislationfromaNGOpointofview.NGOsarepromotingtheseasthebasisofthedefinitionoflegalityfortheVPAprocess.

51 Boachie-Dapaah,A.S.K.(1995-1996).52 Cirelli,TeresaM.(1997).53 Ibid.


NGOs and Ghana’s vPA process

4.1 Ghana vPA preparations 2005

TheGhanagovernmentmadeapubliccommitmenttonegotiateaVPAwiththeEUinOctober2003attheYaoundéAFLEGMinisterialMeeting.Ithasneverthelessbeenslowtosetclearobjectivesforthesenegotiations,defineaprocessformovingforward,orsetupstructurestoleadoratleastsupportthatprocess.KnowledgeofandinterestinVPAswas until recently limited to a few senior officials in Ministry of Lands Forestry andMines/ForestryCommission.Therewaslittlenoticetakenwithintheforestrysector(andnoneoutsideit)untilDfIDwasauthorisedbytheEUin2005toassistGhana’sprepara-tionstowardsnegotiations.Themajormilestoneshavebeenasfollows:

• InFebruary2005, theGhanaLandsandForestryPolicySupportFacility (GLFPSF)publishedareportentitled“LegalTimberandGhana”,whichlookedattheproblemsoflegalreforminthetimbersector,andinparticularthequestionofadefinitionof“legality”posedbytheVPAprocess.

• In March and April 2005, the Forest Sector Development Programme tasked threeconsultants to find out what stakeholders already knew about EU FLEGT/VPAs;providebasicinformationtointerestedstakeholders;andcollectpreliminaryfeedbackonstakeholders’aspirationsforaVPA.

• Inmid-May2005,representativesoftheUKTimberTradeFederationaswellasbuyersfromGermanyandItalyheldameetinginKumasiwithexportersandrepresentativesof the various industry associations to underline their commitment to compliancewitha“legality”standardandtotheVPAastheprocessfordefiningthis.

• In May 2005, DfID and Ministry of Lands Forestry and Mines held a “NationalMeetingonGhana’sproposedentryintoaVPAwiththeEuropeanUnion”inAccra.The forestry establishment, representatives of relevant state agencies, industry, andcivil society groups including NGOs, organised labour, and stools met for the firsttimetodiscusstheVPA.RepresentativesoftheECandEUmemberstateswerealsopresent.FacilitatorspresentedthefindingsfromtheMarch-Aprilsurveyasthebasisfordiscussion.Eachgroupofstakeholdersexpressedtheirhopesandfearsabouttheprocess;eachaskedmaterialquestionsabouttheEU’sspecificagenda.Forthemostpart,definitiveanswerswerenotavailable,as theEUitselfhadnotagreedthefinalregulationestablishingtheVPAscheme.However,allgroupsrecognisedthatGhananeededtodoitsownpreparationsandnotsimplyreacttotheEU.Therewasgeneralconsensusabouttheneedsfor:

– A workable definition of “legal timber” (though not about what that definitionshouldbe);

– Asystemforverifyingthelegalityoftimberfromforesttoexportpoint(thoughseveralparticipantswerescepticalabouttheForestryCommission’sValidationor

4.


LegalTimberProject(VLTP)approach); – AcredibleMonitoringandValidationAgencytooperatetheagreedverification

system(thoughtherewassomediscussionaboutwhetherthisshouldbelocatedwithinoroutsidetheForestryCommission);

– Anindependentthirdpartytoaudittheentiresystem;and – Fullstakeholderinvolvementateverystageoftheprocess(thoughtherewasno

agreementastowhetherthis includedactualnegotiationsorjustagendasettingand oversight, who stakeholders are, or how to represent them). The meetingrecommended the immediate convening of a Multi-stakeholder Group�4 byForestryCommission/MinistryofLandsForestryandMinestoconsiderhowtomoveforward.

• InJuly2005,attherequestoftheECdelegationinAccra,theForestryCommissionpresented a list of required studies and other preparatory works. Civil societyparticipants protested what they saw as EC willingness to proceed bilaterally withMinistryofLandsForestryandMinesandForestryCommissionwithoutreferencetootherstakeholders.Theyalsoobjectedtosomeoftheproposedstudies,whichtheysuspectedrepresentedatimberindustryassaultonelementsofthelegalregime,suchascompetitivebiddingfortimberrights,theprovisionbyanindependentthirdpartyofareservebidfortimberrightsauctions,andthepaymentoftimberrightsfees.

• On22September2005,theForestryCommissioninvitedvariousstakeholdergroupstonominaterepresentativestotheMultiStakeholdersGroup.

• After the European Council adopted the FLEGT-Regulation late last year, therewas a flurry of consultancy and NGO initiatives related to the VPA process (someof them EC-funded), visiting Ghana, holding workshops, and making demands ofGovernmentofGhanawhichitwasnotyetpreparedtoaddress.

• In November, a Forestry Commission official issued a discussion paper drawingattentiontothefullcostsofVPAcompliance.

4.2 Ghana vPA preparations 2006

In January 2006, the Forestry Commission/Ministry of Lands Forestry and MinesappointedChrisBeeko,whoisalsoVLTP��Coordinator,asVPACoordinator.Presumably,thispositionrelatestotheforestrysectorandnottothecoordinationoftheactualnegoti-ationswiththeEC,whichwillinvolveseveralministriesandbeledbyeithertheMinistryofTradeortheMinistryofForeignAffairs.

54 TheMultiStakeholdersGroupshouldincluderepresentativesofIndustry(timberandNTFP),landowners,organisedlabour,NGOs,andthevariousstateagencieswithaninterestinVPAs.Atthemeeting,NGOsarguedfortheinclusionofotherstakeholderssuchastheresearchcommunity.NGOrepresentativeswillproposeamorespecificrepresentationstructurewhenitfinallyconvenesinMarchorApril2006.

55 TheValidationofLegalTimberProjectistheForestryCommission’sattempttocreatethetechnicalinfrastructuretotracktimberandproductsfromtreetomillorexportpoints.TheVLTPoriginatedoutsideoftheVPAframeworkbuttheForestryCommissionnowwishestoincorporateitasthevalidationsystemfortheVPA.IndustryandsomeNGOsarenotenthusiastic.


PreliminaryindicationsarethattherewillbeaninitialmeetingwithECrepresentatives(withDfIDofficialsperhapscontinuingtheirroleasfacilitators)asearlyasMarch2006.ActualnegotiationswillcommenceinJuly.Ghanaisataveryearlystageofpreparationandthesedeadlinesarenotlikelytobemet.Theydoindicateclearly,however,thatthingsaremoving forward,and that social stakeholdersmustbeunitedandwellorganised iftheyaretoinfluencetheprocessanditsoutcomes.

4.3 NGOs’ dilemma

NGO activists in forest governance face a dilemma. Their methods may increaseawareness of the problem and demonstrate viable alternatives, but reasoned argumentwillnotfundamentallychangetheconductofeitherindustryorthestate��.Nationalinsti-tutionsofdemocraticredress(Parliament,thecourts,theCommissiononHumanRights,police,etc.)donotyethavethestrengthtotamethevestedintereststhatdominatetheextractivesector.Theyareasweakastheforestrysuperstructurediscussedearlier.IndeedmanyNGOactivistsbelievethatParliamentandthejudiciaryarealreadyunderindustry’sinfluence.NGOsarenotsetuptotakeonwhatisessentiallyapoliticalchallenge.ForestWatchGhana,whichisanumbrellaadvocacyvehicleformostNGOsactiveinforestryand forest community welfare issues, has had very little success in influencing officialconduct.Ithas,however,beensuccessfulinexposingtheseriousnessandoriginsofthesector’sproblems.

At thesame time,NGOscannothold thesocial forces thatarebuildingupwithinourcommunities in check. Ultimately, these communities respond to their perception ofinjustice, deprivation, and marginalisation within the larger society. Forest resourcesplay a major role in this perception because these are the only assets that many poorcommunitieshave,assetstheycanseebeingcartedawayby“strangers”withstatesupport.The patterns of violence discussed in 2.3.4 pose a real danger to Ghana’s statehood.Similar patterns of conflict in countries all over the world have followed a predictablecourse where not checked: violence will escalate in frequency and intensity; ethnicity(lineage, tribe, religion)willbecome thebasisof socialorganisationat thecommunitylevel. Democratic constitutional institutions such as District Assemblies will give wayto ethnic leaders seeking to exploit these tensions for their own purposes. Ultimately,a relatively minor incident can trigger complete collapse, with local ethnic politiciansemergingaswarlords.Ofcourse,warlordsveryquicklylinkupwith(orbecome)naturalresourceplunderersintheirownright.Ghana’ssocialeliteandtheirpoliticalleadersareindenialaboutthesetrendsandcontinuetoassureinvestorsanddonorsthatalliswell.However,SierraLeoneandCoted’Ivoirewereequally“peaceful”beforetheycollapsed,seeminglyovernight.Timeisrunningout.

56 Mostoftheideasthat,e.g.,ForestWatchGhanahasproposedtotheForestryCommissionhadalreadybeenproposedbyprofessionalforestersandshelved.


4.4 NGOs’ strategic hopes for the vPA process

GhanaianNGOsbegantostudyEUFLEGTandVPAsin2004.In2005,VPAsbecamea major focus. NGOs regard VPA negotiations as potentially strategic. Negotiationswill deploy political and economic forces more potent than Government of Ghana orindustryandcanthusdisruptthestatus quo.Forexample,boththeEuropeanUnioninitsownrightanditsMemberstatesaremajordonors–asignificantvoiceinagroupthatprovides70%ofGovernmentofGhana’sdevelopmentbudgetandoftenasmuchas40%ofrecurrentexpenditure.Inaddition,EUtimberbuyersaccountfor60%ofGhana’swoodexportsandtheirmostprofitablecontracts.Neitherthedomestic(export)industrynorthestatecanignoreordismissaninitiativepromotedbyEUgovernmentsandbuyers.Thetrick,then,istogettheseforceslinedupbehindtheforestryreformagenda.

NGOactivistsdonotassumethatbuyersorEUbureaucratssharethecommunityagendain its totality. The elements that do place the environment and social equity abovecorporateprofitsarenotdominantintheseinstitutions.NGOsthatfollowedthedebateabout VPA leadership within the EU are aware that the Directorate General of Trade(ratherthanEnvironmentorDevelopment)endedupinthedrivingseat.Theyrecognisethatthismeansatendencytowardstradefacilitation.ThisisthebiggestfearthatNGOshaveabouttheVPAprocess; if theEUadopts theattitudethatanythingsanctionedbyGovernmentofGhanaisacceptabletothem,thenNGOswouldfeelcompelledactivelytodenouncetheprocess.


Mona monkeys (Cercopithecus mona mona) at Tafi-Atome Monkey Sanctuary in Ghana’s Volta Region. The villagers brought the fetish monkeys with them when they migrated to the area 200 years ago, and protected them and the sacred grove in which they lived. By the late 1980s the forest and monkeys had dwindled severely due to the erosion of traditional beliefs by Christianity. With Peace Corps support the Tafi-Atome villagers were able to re-establish community management of the forest and a develop a successful community-based ecotourism project.

However,NGOsalsorecognisethatboththeEUandbuyersaresusceptibletoEUpublicopinion–withoutwhichFLEGTwouldprobablyneverhaveseenthelightofday.TheEUFLEGTActionPlanreflectsconcernsofordinaryEUcitizens.Fortunately,thereexistsanactivewell-organisedNorthernNGOmovementaroundtropicalforestswithlinkstoEUconsumersandvoters.ItisreasonabletobelievethattheEUwillapproachtheVPAwiththeseriousnessandintegritywithwhichasuperstructurenormallyoperates.

Ghanaian NGOs hope that, by working with Northern NGOs, they can establish analliance with EU negotiators. Ghanaian NGOs do not expect the EU to wage pitchedbattlesforthem;alltheyneedisopenspaceforcommunityandNGOvoicesaspromisedbytheActionPlan.Onceatthetableandparticipatinginanopenandtransparentprocesswithreasonablepublicity,socialstakeholderscanholdtheirownagainstindustryandthestate.Astrongpolitical line fromtheEUwouldopenup tacticaloptionsandalliancepossi-bilitiesthatcivilsocietyispoisedtoexploit.

a Foronething,allNGOdemandsfallwithintheAFLEGdeclarationthatGovernmentof Ghana drafted and signed up to in 2003. They also derive logically from theGovernmentofGhana’s1994ForestandWildlifePolicy.TheNGOpositionon thedefinitionoflegalityderivesfullyfromcurrentlegislation.Itwouldbedifficult(albeitnotimpossible)forGovernmentofGhanatoretreatfromitsownpublicpositionsinthefullglareofpublicity.

b Secondly,thereisapossibilityofnewalliancesinthefaceofpressurefromEUbuyers.Clearly,thearrangementsthathavemaintainedthestatus quoforthelast30yearsareunderseriousstrain.The2005lawsuitbetweentheGhanaTimberAssociation(GTA)andtheForestryCommissionexposedagrowingriftbetweenprofessionalforestersand timber magnates. It also demonstrated friction between the GTA (small-time,low capacity “contractors”) and the Ghana Timber Millers Organisation (GTMO),large-scale industrialists. GHATEX, for example, filed a legal suit�� against theForestryCommissiontoblocktheholdingoftimberrightsauctions.Thisrepresentsa challenge by junior companies to the sweetheart deals that better-connectedcompaniestakeforgranted.TheForestryCommissionBoard’sdirectandsuccessfulrebuff of the Minister’s attempt to terminate export levy collection demonstratestensionsatthislevelandrepresentsanunprecedenteddefeatfortheGTMO.Withinthe GTMO itself, solidarity is breaking down: these are, after all, competitors. ThelargercompaniesdependontheEUmarket;theyareinterestedinpursuingsustain-abilitycertificationbutcannotdosounlessregulatorypracticeimprovessignificantly.TheyarequestioningwhytheyshouldfollowtheleadofcompaniesthatdonothavesignificantEUcontractsoraneedtoaddresscertificationintheshortrun.Somehaveopenly expressed a desire to reposition themselves and take a more openly criticalstancetowardsthestatus quoandthetimbermagnateswhosupportit.NGOshavetodeveloptheskills toexploitthesedivisionsandtoencouragedissenterstotakeaprincipledstandontheissues.

57 GHATEXsecuredaninjunctionontimberrightsauctions,claimingthattheForestryCommissionabusespre-qualificationprocedurestopromoteitsfavouritesanddisqualifycompaniesthatareopenlycriticaloftheForestryCommission.


4.5 Specific NGO vPA objectives for 2006

The first taskofNGOs in2006 is toconveneastrategymeetingof social stakeholdersrepresentedontheMultiStakeholdersGrouptocoordinatetheireffortsbasedontheMay2005stakeholders’declaration,butwithbroaderanddeeperparticipation.Some issuesfordiscussionareasfollows.

Multi Stakeholders Group remit

What is the specific roleof theMultiStakeholdersGroup?GovernmentofGhanawillresistcivilsocietyparticipationinactualnegotiations.Shouldcivilsocietyrepresentativescontestthis?Shouldtheybecontentwithanadvisoryrole?Shouldtheyinsistonpartici-pationinmandatesetting?Shouldtheyseekparallelmeetings?

Multi Stakeholders Group procedures and structures

Whatprocedureandstructurewillapply?Willittakedecisionsbyconsensusorbyvote?Willmeetingsrequirequorums?Whochairs?Howoftenandwherewillitmeet?

Composition

What should the balance of representation be (especially if decisions will be taken bymajorityvote)?Shouldcivilsocietydemandincreasedrepresentation?

Timetable for EC-Government of Ghana negotiations

What is the ideal timing of negotiations? When will important preparatory work becompleted?Immediatenegotiationscouldbea tactic to“legitimise”thestatus quo.Ontheotherhandpostponementtowards2008enhancesthepowerofindustryaspoliticiansbeginlookingforcampaignfundsforelectionsinthatyear.

preparatory work

Whatstudiesandsurveysarerequiredtoinformnegotiations?TheMay2005workshopgavetheMultiStakeholdersGrouparoleinsettingthesepriorities.Civilsocietyorganisa-tionsthereforeobjectedwhentheForestryCommissionunilaterallysubmittedafundingprogrammetoEUmemberstatemissionsinAccra.

publicity

WhatpublicprofileshouldstakeholdersseekforVPAprocesses?Howwilltheyachievethis?

alliance strategies

WhatallianceswillcivilsocietyorganisationsseekaroundVPAs?Howwilltheypursuethese?Arerevenueagenciesobjectiveallies?Areprofessionalforestersalliesoropponents?


Aretheretimbercompanieswecanworkwith?CanwetakethesolidarityofNGOsandothersocialstakeholdersforgranted?

Resources

What technical and financial resources can social stakeholders mobilise within andoutside EU development assistance? What is available internally? Can EU civil societyorganisations(NGOs,Unions,churches,etc.)providesolidarity?Forexample, in2005,ForestWatchGhanaestablishedcontactwiththeEuropeanCommunityForestryPlatformcoordinatedbyFERN.Thishasprovedtobeastrategicrelationship.ItledtoamemberoftheForestWatchGhanaMCattendingmeetingsinBrusselswiththeECDirectorateGeneralofTradeontheVPAprogramme.Moreimportantly,thisenabledForestWatchGhanatonetworkwithcivilsocietycoalitionsfromEurope,Indonesia,Cameroon,Brazil,andtheDemocraticRepublicofCongo.ThishasopenedotherdoorswithForestWatchGhananowregularly invited toEuropeanmeetingsonVPAsand illegal loggingwhereForestWatchGhanahasbeenabletodrawattentiontoGhana’sproblems.ForestWatchGhanahasalso interactedwithabout30CameroonianNGOs(membersof theECFP)working on forest governance and the VPAs at a workshop in Yaoundé in September2005. In March 2006, Forest Watch Ghana will participate in an IUCN sponsored“networking”visittoMonroviatodiscussGhana’sVPAexperiencewithLiberianNGOs.NothingwouldbemorepotentthantohaveallproducercountriesraisingsimilarissuesatVPAnegotiations.

Other platforms

WhatotherplatformsareavailabletoadvancethesectorreformagendaandinfluencetheVPAprocess?Forexample,ForestWatchGhanaisorganisingregionalandnationalforestforumsthisyear.TheForestryCommissionisorganisinganotherwithsupportfromFAO.WhatusecanwemakeofmeetingsoftheNationalHouseofChiefs,etc.?

Conclusion

EnvironmentalandsocialNGOsarepreparingtoengagewiththeVPAprocessbasedonaclearunderstandingofGhana’sforestrycrisisandwhatprogresswillrequire.Thiseffortwill takeuphugeNGOresources(time,moneyandaboveallcommunitygoodwill) inthemonthsahead.TomoveforwardandhaveanychanceofsuccessNGOswillrequiretechnicalandmaterialresources,andpoliticalsolidarity.Activelinksbetweenproducercountry and committed Northern NGOs will be the only way to influence EuropeanCommunitycivilsociety,EUnegotiatorsandtheGhanagovernmenttocreateahealthierandmorestableresourceuseenvironment.


Appendix

National meeting on Ghana’s proposed entry into a voluntary partnership agreement with the European Union

NGO position��

1 WearecommittedtoGhana’sForest&WildlifePolicyaimof:“conservationandsustainabledevelopmentofthenation’sforestandwildliferesourcesformaintenanceofenvironmentalqualityandperpetualflowofoptimumbenefitstoallsegmentsofsociety”.Wearespecificallycommittedto:

a Sustainabilityandbiodiversity;and b Equity,i.e.: i Rurallivelihoodsprotection;and ii Optimisedsectorcontributiontooverallnationaldevelopment.

2 WesupportAFLEG&EUFLEGTinitiativesthatcontributesubstantivelytoForestandWildlifePolicyobjectivesmentioned.Wecautionagainstnarrowtradedealsthatprojectmarketaccesswithoutconcretelyaddressingwiderecological,social,anddevelopmentissues.

3 WeareworkingcloselywithNGOgroupsintheEUandinotherproducercountries

topushforandmonitorFLEGTprocessesthatmeettheneedsoftheworlds’peoples.

4 Asregardsprocess,ourminimumrequirementisaguaranteeoffullparticipationof

allstakeholdersatallstagesoftheFLEGTprocessthrough,e.g.: a Representativesteering/planningcommittee; b Supportfordevelopmentof“nationalforestforums”andotherconsultative

mechanisms;and c Concretesupportforcivilsocietyparticipationintheseprocesses.

5 Asregardscontent,ourminimumrequirementsarethat: a Certificationoflegalityispursuedasthefirststepinaprogrammetowards

sustainabilityandsocialresponsibilitycertification; b TheEUshouldimposeafull-scalebanoncirculationofillegaltimberproducts

andnotjustrestrictedproductsfromvolunteeringproducercountries.TheEUshouldalsouseitsdiplomaticinfluencetoglobaliseregime;

c Ghana’sdefinitionof“legaltimber”(evenintheshortterm)shouldincludestrictcompliancewiththeTimberResourcesManagementActandtheTimberResourcesManagementRegulations,i.e.:

i ImmediatecancellationofallillegalTimberUtilisationPermits,Salvaging

58 Thiswasadoptedbysocialforestrystakeholdersparticipatinginthemeetingandrepresentinglandowners,organisedlabour,andNGOs.July2005


Permits,ReplacementAllocations,andcommitmentofaffectedareastoapoolforreallocationexclusivelythroughcompetitivebidding;

ii ConversionofeligibleconcessionstoTimberUtilisationContractsandcancellationofineligibleconcessionsandcommitmentofaffectedareastopoolforreallocationexclusivelythroughcompetitivebidding;

iii RetentionoftheIndependentThirdPartybidcomponentofthecompetitivebiddingprocess;and

iv Fullrecoveryofrevenuearrearsandoutstandingpenalties. d Fundingissetasidefromtimberrightsfeesandstumpagefeestopayfor: i Development/updatingofmanagementplansforallforestmanagementunits; ii Developmentofafull-scaleforestmonitoringsystem(beyondtheLegal

ValidationofTimberProgramme);and iii IndependentmonitoringofGhana’sforestrysystem.

6 WebelievethatVoluntaryAgreementsshouldthenfocusonprovisionofincentivestocompaniesandcountriesthatcommittohigherstandards,ratherthansanctions.

7 OurminimumagendaforwiderstakeholderdiscussionstobesupportedbyFLEGT

alongsideVPAnegotiationsincludes: a Fairaccesstoforestresources: i Aproperlyregulatednontimberforestproductsregime; ii Aworkableincentiveschemesforprivateplantersandmanagers; iii Legislativebackingforcommunitymanagementschemes; b Fairsharingofrevenuesandbenefitsfromforestry: i Reviewofstumpagecollectionmechanism; ii Reviewofstumpageandtimberrightsfeesdistribution; iii Reviewofremuneration,jobsecurityandworkingconditionsinthetimber

industry; c Stakeholderparticipationinsectorgovernance; d Provisionsformitigationofimpactsoftransition.

8 Wearecommittedtoworkingingoodfaithwithallstakeholdersinanystructuresnecessaryordesirabletoachievetheseobjectives.Wewillhelpto:

a Developamethodologyandprogrammeforcompliancemonitoring; b Supportindependentthirdpartycompliancemonitoring; c AnalyseanddisseminatereportsfromITPmonitors; d NetworkwithlocalandinternationalNGOforbettercompliance;and e Promotethesuccessesoftheschemelocallyandinternationally.

APPENDIX ANGOsperspectiveofforestgovernancerecommendationsfortheVPAprocessinGhana FERN 31

References

1 Adjetey,L.,etal.(1991)“ReportoftheTimberSubcommitteenationalInvestigationsCommittee”(unpublished).

2 Birikorang,G.,etal.(2001)“GhanaWoodIndustryandLogExportBanStudy”.

3 Boachie-Dappah,A.S.K.,etal(1995&1996)“TheproposedContentsofaNewForestAct:DiscussionPaper”,MinistryofLandsandForestry.

4 Cirelli,M.T.(1997)“ReportofforestryLegislationConsultant”,FRR/ODA.

5 ForestryCommission(23October2004)“Rejoinder:Ghanaloses¢900billion($100Million)AnnuallyfromUncollectedTimberRightsFees!”,GraphicCommunicationsGroupLtd.

6 ForestServiceDivision(2005)StatementofContractorsAccountsasof31December2004,ForestryCommission(unpublished).

7 ForestWatchGhana(1October2004)“GhanaLosesC900BillionAnnuallyfromUncollectedTimberRightsFees!”,GraphicCommunicationsGroupLtd.

8 FriendsoftheEarth,(1992)“PlunderinGhana’sRainforestforIllegalProfit:Anexposéofcorruption,fraudandothermalpracticeintheinternationaltimbertrade”,(Vol.2)FOE.

9 ForestryCommissionFinance&AdministrationDepartment(2005)“Self-financingoftheForestryCommissionby2005:Reviewofscenarios”,ForestryCommission(unpublished).

10 Smith,E.Kofi(1999)“Developments&SetbacksinForestConservation:theNew

PoliticalEconomyofForestResourceUseinSouthernGhana”,MinistryofLands&Forestry.


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