an international regime of fresh fuel …...an international regime of fresh fuel supply and spent...

AN INTERNATIONAL REGIME OF FRESH

FUEL SUPPLY AND SPENT FUEL DISPOSAL

Chaim Braun and Michael May

Recent events in Iran and elsewhere demand a reevaluation of the need for increasing nuclear fuel

supplies and assuring reliable flow of fuel to nuclear power user states vis-a-vis the need for

strengthened security for all countries against the use of weapons of mass destruction (WMD). The

right of countries to a guaranteed supply of nuclear energy for peaceful uses must be balanced

with the global community’s desire to limit flows of nuclear material and sensitive nuclear

facilities that could create opportunities for nuclear proliferation. This article proposes elements of

an international regime of fresh fuel supply and spent fuel disposal that will guarantee fresh fuel

supplies to countries honoring their obligations under the Treaty for the Non-Proliferation of

Nuclear Weapons (NPT), while reducing concerns about diversion of spent fuel for weapons

purposes. A specific application to countries with small pre-commercial uranium enrichment

plants is also proposed.

KEYWORDS: Nuclear fuel supply assurance; Small uranium enrichment plants; Iranian

uranium enrichment program; Nuclear fuel leasing

Recent events in Iran, Libya, North Korea, and elsewhere demand a reevaluation of

increasing nuclear fuel supplies to specific nations vis-a-vis strengthened security for all

countries against the use of weapons of mass destruction (WMD). The right of countries to

guaranteed supply of nuclear energy for peaceful uses on the one hand, must be balanced

with the global community’s desire to limit flows of nuclear material that could create

opportunities for nuclear proliferation, on the other. This article proposes elements of an

international regime of fresh fuel supply and spent fuel disposal that will guarantee fresh

fuel supplies to countries honoring their obligations under the Treaty for the Non-

Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons (NPT), while reducing concerns about diversion of spent

fuel for weapons purposes.

The measures proposed here address the provision of nuclear fuel through direct

sales or through lease-take-back arrangements on an equitable basis to all countries,

including countries of concern, as well as the need for secure spent fuel management.

These proposed measures fit in the web of existing international agreements designed to

place ‘‘birth-to-death’’ safeguards on the worldwide nuclear fuel cycle. A major

component of such agreements is a spent fuel management strategy, which is essential

in preventing diversion of that fuel for plutonium separation and use in a clandestine

nuclear weapons program. The concepts outlined below are an extension of some of the

ideas proposed by U.S. President George W. Bush in his speech at the National Defense

University (NDU) on February 11, 2004, and the follow up statements by the Department

of Energy (USDOE) during 2005.1

Nonproliferation Review, Vol. 13, No 1, March 2006ISSN 1073-6700 print/ISSN 1746-1766 online/06/010057-24

– 2006 The Monterey Institute of International Studies, Center for Nonproliferation Studies

DOI: 10.1080/10736700600861400

A parallel path based on multilateral approaches to providing guaranteed fuel

supplies while protecting against the spread of proliferation-sensitive technologies within

the international nuclear fuel cycle has been proposed by Dr. Mohamed ElBaradei, the

director general of the International Atomic Energy agency (IAEA) in his presentation

published in The Economist (October 2003), and in an update presentation to the

International Institute for Strategic Studies (IISS) of December 2005, by the IAEA Working

Group on Multilateral Approaches, and elsewhere.2

The proposals herein also complement several additional nonproliferation initiatives,

which are now in their early implementation stages. These include the IAEA Additional

Protocol to the Safeguards Agreements with each member country; the voluntary

international marine interdiction scheme, the Proliferation Security Initiative (PSI);

and United Nations Security Council (UNSC) Resolution 1540 dealing with export controls.3

An international guaranteed fuel supply arrangement was recently proposed by several

U.S. authors, and an extension of scope-of-fuel-supply guarantees under Article IV of the

NPT to non-nuclear energy resources has been proposed by one of the authors of this

article.4

Two general trends are evident among the recently submitted initiatives: The U.S.

DOE in its more limited proposal calls for the creation of a limited-sized fuel bank which

will serve to guarantee nuclear fuel supplies to countries that have promised not to

construct and/or operate sensitive nuclear fuel cycle facilities. DOE has also expanded its

fuel assurance proposals with the announcement of its Global Nuclear Energy Partnership

(GNEP) Program of February 7, 2006.5 One of the elements of the GNEP Program proposes

the integrated implementation of international nuclear fuel assurance measures by several

supplier states to countries willing to give up sensitive fuel cycle facilities, and is thus an

extension of the earlier proposals President Bush mentioned above. The IAEA in its more

expansive proposals calls for controlling a significant portion of the global nuclear fuel

trade and for assigning fuel supplies to those countries meeting various nonproliferation

obligations required by the agency. A detailed listing of such obligations has recently been

suggested by Pierre Goldschmidt, former IAEA deputy director general and head of its

Department of Safeguards.6 The IAEA would also control the operation of 10 large nuclear

fuel cycle facilities and may direct some spent fuel to be stored in some of those facilities.7

The proposals herein fall within this range of options, and particularly as applied to fuel

leasing, could further improve the comprehensiveness of the global nonproliferation

regime based on the joint implementation of the initiatives mentioned above. This article

reviews the complementarity between our proposed measures and the other nonproli-

feration initiatives mentioned here.

Guaranteeing Fresh Fuel Supplies and Spent Fuel Management

The problem addressed in this article is how to prevent the indiscriminate spread of

national nuclear fuel cycle facilities among all countries interested in operating nuclear

power plants for peaceful purposes, while guaranteeing to all legitimate users nuclear fuel

supplies on a nondiscriminatory basis. Some elements of a potential solution were

outlined in previous proposals,8 namely:

58 CHAIM BRAUN AND MICHAEL MAY

. Limit, at least for the time being, fuel cycle facilities to countries that currently

operate such facilities on a commercial basis

. Agree to a strict safety and security regime for fuel cycle facilities, transport, and

storage, to be applied retroactively over a period of time to all facilities and

shipments

. Provide guarantees of fuel supplies to countries of concern willing to forego the

construction and operation of indigenous fuel cycle facilities

. Establish regional fuel cycle centers to carry out nuclear spent fuel disposal

programs and potentially also provide fresh fuel supplies to member countries.

Dr. ElBaradei in his IISS speech has proposed a four-tier regime that will answer most of the

concerns listed above.9 The proposed measures listed below are further extensions of

previous proposals and aim to create a regime that ties guaranteed fuel supply through

sale or lease arrangements to an internationally approved and monitored spent fuel

management plan. Tightening the connection between fresh fuel supplies and spent

fuel management, all conducted under a comprehensive safeguards regime, would help

implement ‘‘birth-to-death’’ safeguards on the global fuel cycle. In order to provide

needed security, arrangements conditioning fresh fuel supply on spent management plans

should be designed to:

. Be nondiscriminatory in nature

. Provide guaranteed fuel supplies

. Provide credible obligations for spent fuel take-back

. Be economically viable and equitable

. Support and enhance existing and proposed nonproliferation measures.

Discussed below are elements of a regime that answer these concerns.

Nondiscrimination

This proposal requires all countries purchasing or leasing fresh nuclear fuel to lay out plans

for secure and safe management of that fuel once discharged from the power plant,

starting with long-term spent fuel storage and leading ultimately to spent fuel disposal or

to reprocessing and recycling of the energy values. Such reporting would be a binding

requirement on all future fresh fuel supply sales or fuel lease deals. The reporting would be

done at the national government level, regardless of whether the fuel had been purchased

by a national electric utility or by a private utility. This concept accords with present

practice: In all states using nuclear power, the range of activities at the back end of the fuel

cycle is considered a national-level issue and is handled by the government, or by a quasi-

governmental corporation, rather than by the utilities that use the fuel in their power

plants.

Each country receiving fresh fuel, under this proposal, would deposit with the IAEA

detailed plans for the disposition of the spent nuclear fuel owned by it (or its corporations)

that was used to produce energy in commercial power plants, whether this fuel is

currently within its territory or used in a third country’s reactor(s) (see further discussion on

fuel leasing), or whether the spent fuel will be directly disposed of or reprocessed. Such

AN INTERNATIONAL REGIME OF FUEL SUPPLY AND DISPOSAL 59

declarations would constitute an extension of the currently required national obligations

to report to the IAEA all spent fuel so the IAEA can discharge its safeguards obligations

with regard to that fuel. This proposal is also congruent with the recent new obligation

based on the Additional Protocol to each country’s safeguards agreement with the IAEA

requiring the country to report to the agency all nuclear fuel cycle facilities and fuel cycle

plans, on a forward planning basis.

It should be kept in mind that a multi-country or a regional fuel cycle center,

particularly one charged with overseeing the spent fuel disposal plans of its members,

does not have to be based at one physical location, but could be based in several

existing or new national facilities located in countries within the region, when those

facilities are designated to fall under the center’s purview. In this regard the IAEA could act

as:

. A facilitator in arranging groupings of countries and related facilities into multi-

country or regional fuel cycle centers

. A facilitator of arrangements between countries regarding spent fuel take-back and

storage

. A safeguards inspector of the regional fuel cycle center facilities, providing an upper

tier of inspections on top of the mutual inspections that center members will

conduct in each other’s facilities.

Examples of such joint implementation of IAEA and regional facilities safeguards

agreements can be found in reports of the Argentine-Brazil Agency for Accounting and

Control (ABACC).10

No fresh nuclear fuel should be sold or leased without the country owning this fuel

(either the buyer or the leasing country, either through a national or a private utility)

issuing a spent fuel management plan leading to the eventual disposal of that fuel.

Storage and disposal do not have to take place within the territory of the country owning

the fuel and could take place in a third country, within a multi-country or regional fuel

cycle center, or under other arrangements facilitated by the IAEA.11

Another aspect of nondiscrimination proposed here is that fuel supplied under this

model be provided at competitive prices over the lifetime of the supply guarantee, and

preferably over the lifetime of the nuclear power plant involved. This will further the

concept of fuel guarantee coupled with appropriate safeguards on a ‘‘cradle to grave’’

basis. Such requirement goes beyond conventional fuel supply guarantees embedded in

current supply contracts. It implies lifting any supplier-state sanctions, insofar as the

sanctions pertain to NPT Article IV obligations, once the proposed guarantee is given.

While there are difficult practical problems in guaranteeing fuel supplies at competitive

market prices tens of years into the future, this problem can be partially finessed with

appropriate choice of price escalation indices. In the end, however, the most effective way

governments can assure supply at a competitive price may be to ensure that the supply

market is not cartelized.


Guaranteed Fuel Supplies

Commercial supply activities at the front end of the fuel cycle*uranium mining and

milling, conversion, and fabrication*have been, until now, considered of low prolifera-

tion concern and relegated to private sector or quasi-governmental corporations. In some

countries, fuel enrichment has also been carried out by government corporations or

private companies operating under strict governmental supervision. Several international

vendors (not all of them reactor vendors) are ready to sell fuel assemblies for each type

(and enrichment level) of commercial nuclear power plant now in operation. Since each

fuel cycle corporation operates within a national territory and is registered under that

country’s laws, it must apply to its government for export license for nuclear fuel before it

can deliver any front-end service to any client located within the territory of that country

or elsewhere. This requirement holds true whether the fuel is sold directly to the user

nuclear plant or is leased to the user.

DIRECT FUEL PURCHASE

An international fuel vendor corporation (supplier) could sell a nuclear fuel load to any

national or private electric utility (user). The user then owns the fuel, which it will load into

its nuclear plant(s). Under the proposed concept, prior to the transport of the fresh fuel

from the vendor to the utility, the country where the user is located will deposit with

the IAEA a plan for the management of that fuel once it is discharged from the reactor. The

plan would cover the fate of the spent fuel from storage at the plant site through

any subsequent long-term storage, disposal, or reprocessing. Neither the supplier’s

country nor the utility’s country will approve the fuel sale contract unless the fuel owner

and its related national spent fuel management authority have produced a plan for the

disposition of the fuel once it is discharged, and have deposited that plan with the IAEA.

The IAEA would then monitor compliance with the provisions of that plan and would have

to approve any deviations.

FUEL LEASE-TAKE-BACK ARRANGEMENT

In a lease-take-back arrangement, a country leases fuel to a (publicly or privately owned)

nuclear plant from another country. The lessee does not own the fuel and thus is not

legally obligated to file a plan for ultimately disposing of it. Rather, the lessor has legal title

to that fuel and will be responsible for filing with the IAEA a plan for the management of

that fuel once it is discharged from the reactor and then removed from the country where

it was used. The lessor will provide the fuel it promised through an arrangement it will

separately enter into with its own nuclear fuel vendor. When the government of the lessor

country issues an export license to its fuel vendor corporation to send fresh fuel to a client

reactor, it will also file a plan with the IAEA for the management of that fuel once

discharged. The leased fuel, once removed from the reactor and cooled down, could either

be returned to its country of origin which has title to it, or, through an IAEA-approved deal,

could be sent to a third country or to a multi-country or a regional fuel cycle center

located elsewhere for storage, reprocessing, and/or ultimate disposal.


The country leasing the fresh fuel may wish to ensure adequate fuel supplies by

contracting with more than one lessor*whether a government (which will approach its

fuel cycle corporation) or an international vendor corporation (which will have to get

approval from its government)*under multiple lease deals, with each lease arrangement

covering a portion of its fuel supply needs. In this way the lessee country has greater

assurance that even if one lessor country and its related vendor corporation could not or

would not meet all its obligations in a timely manner, then only a portion of the reload

requirements would be affected, and that portion might still be provided by any one of its

other fresh fuel vendors having some spare flywheel capacity, given a pre-approved

agreement between the national governments involved. The various supply assurance

measures now proposed here and elsewhere would provide another level of guarantee of

timely and adequate fuel deliveries.12

In all cases, the country leasing the fuel must be in good standing with regard to its

safeguards agreement obligations (including those of the Additional Protocol), as attested

to by the IAEA (see detailed listing of requirements), in order for the IAEA to accept the

plan for either sale or lease and take-back.13 Three levels of agreement will be required

under this concept. A government-to-government agreement will specify the willingness

to enter into a fuel lease-take-back deal and will guarantee fresh fuel supplies once the

terms of the lease agreement are fulfilled. A utility-to-fuel vendor agreement will specify

the details of the lease-take-back deal, including quantity, characteristics, and all schedule,

financial, and legal obligations. Additionally, the country with clear title to the fuel will

deposit with the IAEA a plan for managing the spent fuel either at its own facilities or in a

third country facility or in an evolving international fuel cycle center.

Providing Guarantees of Spent Fuel Take-Back

The discussion in this section relates only to fuel lease-take-back deals. The most

important part of the proposed concept, outlined above, is the willingness* indeed the

political ability*of the lessor country to take back the spent fuel it has provided under

the lease contract. It may well be politically difficult for any country to take back spent fuel

not used in its own reactors for the direct benefit of its own citizens. Yet, to make any

lease-take-back deal credible, an ironclad guarantee of spent fuel removal from the

country where it was used must be provided. Otherwise the entire concept is moot.

THE HISTORIC RECORD

The merits of the generic case for spent fuel take-back were reviewed in detail by Deutch,

Kanter, Monitz, and Poneman in ‘‘Making the World Safe for Nuclear Energy.’’14 Various

schemes for international nuclear fuel cycle centers, with emphasis on back-end concepts

were reviewed by McCombie and Chapman.15 The concept of interim storage of spent fuel

with particular application to the U.S.-Japan situation was discussed in detail by Bunn

et al. in ‘‘Interim Storage of Spent Nuclear Fuel.’’16 Various schemes for international spent

fuel storage in the Krasnoyarsk-26 plant in Russia were proposed by Cochran, reviewed by

Dyer, and later supported by Dr. ElBaradei.17 Russia is one of the few countries that have

amended its laws to permit storage of foreign commercial spent fuel.


Spent nuclear fuel take-back arrangements have been carried out in practice in the

past, and some are in effect now. The U.S. Atomic Energy Commission (AEC) implemented

nuclear fuel lease arrangements in the early period of nuclear demonstration projects,

before allowing outright ownership of nuclear fuel by private sector corporations. During

that period, the AEC kept title to the fuel it supplied to the demonstration reactors and

then took back the discharged spent fuel. The United States has more recently taken back

hundreds of kilograms (kg) of highly enriched uranium (HEU) fuel from research reactors it

has provided under the 1954 Atoms for Peace program, in connection with the program to

convert research reactors around the world to low-enriched uranium fuel use (RERTR).18

The United States accepted 500 kg of weapons-useable HEU from Kazakhstan under

project Sapphire in 1994.19 These HEU quantities, while far more dangerous in terms of

nuclear proliferation than spent power reactor fuel, are also far smaller than what would

be needed for a take-back program and can much more easily be justified on national

security grounds. Absent a more immediate security justification, the United States is

probably not in the first tier of candidate countries for commercial spent fuel take-back.

The Soviet Union took back spent fuel from the reactors it exported, and Russia still

takes back spent fuel from Ukraine, Bulgaria, Hungary, Slovakia, Finland, and other

countries. Russia has also taken back spent HEU fuel from Soviet-supplied research

reactors in the former Yugoslavia, Romania, Libya, and other countries. Other countries are

not ahead of the United States and Russia in terms of their willingness to take back spent

fuel. Finland and Sweden have small disposal programs for once-through fuel, but those

are probably not expandable to a larger scale, and neither country has an incentive to take

spent fuel, since neither is a major reactor or fuel services exporter. A tie-in with reactor

exports or fuel services, if one could be negotiated, would provide an economic incentive

for some countries to engage in take-back agreements. In this regard, both France and

Japan have disposal programs in the research stage, but again it is unclear whether those

programs could be expanded from either a technical or political point of view.

Reprocessing could considerably alleviate storage and disposal capacity requirements

but poses problems of its own. Considerable political spadework is clearly needed before

lease-take-back, with the attendant security advantages, can become the norm.

FUTURE POSSIBILITIES

Fortunately, some spent fuel storage facilities with additional capacity for fuel take-back

and storage purposes could become available in the near term in few large-scale

reprocessing centers such as the Thermal Oxide Reprocessing Plant (THORP) in Windscale,

United Kingdom, the Rokkasho-Mura plant in Japan, and the partially completed RT-2

plant in Krasnoyarsk, Russia. A portion of the existing spent fuel storage pools, or new dry

cask storage areas in these large facilities, could be used for the international interim spent

fuel storage mission. In time, other activities conducted in these facilities, such as

reprocessing, could be brought under the international spent fuel management regime

discussed here and proposed in greater detail by Dr. ElBaradei, and reported in the IAEA

document INFCIRC 640.20 A hybrid program may be envisioned whereby spent reactor fuel

from East Asian countries will be removed and stored for a fixed time period in the


Rokkasho-Mura facility which would be operated, in part, as a regional center under the

auspices of an IAEA program. That spent fuel could later be transferred to the RT-2 plant in

Krasnoyarsk, Russia, for longer-term storage, and eventually for either reprocessing and

recycling or for direct disposal, as to be determined by the relevant governments at a

future date. The use of such existing facilities could be highly attractive as the required

infrastructure*safeguards, safety features, physical security, health physics, and chemical

storage*and a cadre of trained personnel are already in place. These facilities would need

additional financing from international interim spent fuel storage arrangements to

complete necessary construction and to remain commercially viable.

Reference to a specific facility as host for an international spent fuel storage scheme

could be used to delay further the completion or operation of that facility or other similar

facilities in different countries. Spent fuel storage facilities under construction as national

facilities in Finland and Sweden, or in advanced planning stages such as in the United

States, France, United Kingdom, Canada, and elsewhere should be allowed to proceed and

be incorporated into an international fuel storage regime at a later stage, should the

national governments agree to do so. The proposed concept in this article, in fact,

encourages the completion of national spent fuel storage facilities, which could later be

brought, in part, into an international regime.

A role may be identified for the IAEA as the facilitator of multi-country or regional

interim spent fuel storage facilities or of full-fledged fuel cycle centers, where spent fuel

owned by lessor countries and used elsewhere could be sent.21 The IAEA would not only

review and pass judgment on the credibility of national spent fuel management schemes

but also become an active participant in promoting regional spent fuel storage facilities, or

third-party spent fuel disposal schemes, which will make lease-take-back fuel supply

arrangements more credible propositions. The IAEA must carry out a safeguards function

for that spent fuel from the time of discharge until final disposal, regardless of where

storage and disposal occur.

The IAEA, in part through various remote monitoring techniques, would provide

adequate safeguards measures to guarantee that the leased fuel, once discharged, is

kept in the temporary spent fuel storage pond at the reactor site where it was used and

is not surreptitiously removed or diverted. In general, the expanded roles and

responsibilities suggested for the IAEA under this proposal will require a commensurate

increase in the IAEA’s budget and staffing levels, to be borne by all member states of that

organization.

In any case, the general political climate regarding take-back of spent fuel will not

change unless political leadership is exercised by several key countries. The central political

and economic message is that the future of the global nuclear power industry as a whole

will be jeopardized unless transparent, enforceable ‘‘birth-to-death’’ international safe-

guards over nuclear fuel are accepted. If it is in the national interest of a specific country,

or a group of countries such as the Nuclear Suppliers Group (NSG), to promote fuel lease-

take-back arrangements as proposed by the United States, then these countries must find

a politically acceptable way to take back the fuel they have leased once it is discharged

from the reactors where it was used, and once the spent fuel has sufficiently cooled.22 The


responsible governments should strive to educate their publics of the need to and

benefits of doing so.

It is also favorable to establish, in cooperation with other exporting countries, a

country-by-country road map delineating the technical, economic, safety, security, legal,

and political problems (and opportunities) hindering the sort of international fuel supply

regime discussed here. Such an effort would take time when the need for a secure supply

system is now, but it is difficult to see how the present obstacles to securing the back-end

of the fuel cycle could be otherwise alleviated or resolved.

Equitable Economic Arrangements

The economics of leased fuel differ considerably from that of fresh fuel purchase, which

has been the norm since the inception of commercial nuclear power. In current nuclear

fuel transactions, the utility owning a nuclear power plant contracts directly with private

sector vendors to purchase natural uranium, transport it to a conversion plant, convert it

to gaseous form, have it shipped to an enrichment plant, and fabricate the low-enriched

uranium (LEU) into fuel rods and assemblies ready to be loaded into the reactor. The

combined cost of all these front-end services is estimated to be about $1,000 to $1,400 per

kg of heavy metal (kgHM). Front-end fuel costs are not strongly influenced by economies

of scale as most industrial activities here*particularly centrifuge enrichment of

uranium*could be carried out in modular-sized facilities.

Once the fuel is discharged from the reactor, it remains for several years in wet

storage in the spent fuel pool adjacent to that reactor. It can then be packaged and

removed to a dry storage facility at the reactor site or transported to a centralized spent

fuel storage facility elsewhere. Ultimately, the stored spent fuel can be sent to a national

repository for final disposal or be reprocessed, the energy values recycled, and the waste

stream solidified and readied for final disposal.

The cost of activities at the back end of the nuclear fuel cycle ranges from $600 to

$1,800/KgHM of fuel. The larger range here reflects an uncertainty about the fuel disposal

strategy, the cost of reprocessing in specific facilities under specific contracts, the types of

facilities required, and the sitting, licensing, and constructing of national or international

repositories of different capacities. Economies-of-scale factors may apply to back-end costs

depending on the design and capacity of the reprocessing plant and spent fuel disposal

facilities. Thus reprocessing plant capacities range from the current values of 800 to 1,100

metric tons of heavy metal per year (MTHM/yr) to the projected values for future plants

now on drawing boards of 2,400 to 3,000 MTHM/yr. Final repositories such as the planned

Yucca Mountain facility in Nevada, USA, could range in size from less than 70,000 MTHM to

more than 120,000 MTHM, depending on the type of waste, overpacking, and

emplacement distances. The greater dependency of back-end facilities on economies of

scale compared with front-end plants militates for international fuel cycle centers dealing

first with spent fuel management issues.

Under fuel lease arrangements, since the lessee country does not own the leased fuel

and must return it after use, it does not pay any of the above costs. The costs of fabricating

the fuel to be leased, as well as the costs of disposing of it once it has been discharged, are


borne by the lessor country that owns title to it. That country would also be able to recover

and recycle any energy values remaining in the fuel or those bred into it while in the

reactor. The country leasing the fuel reload pays the lessor country a percentage of the

monetary value of energy generated by the fuel while in the reactor. The percentage of the

generated electricity value paid back as lease price is computed such that the lessor country

receives an adequate return for expenses incurred in preparing and fabricating the fuel to

be leased and in disposing of it after it is removed (taking into account the time value of the

expenses tied in with the leased fuel). In cases of reprocessing and recycling, a credit for the

energy value of the fissile materials separated out may be due to the lessee country, after

deducting reprocessing costs. In some cases a limited up-front payment will be required to

help defray some of the cost of fabricating the fuel to be leased. While the principle here is

simple, many details need to be worked out as to the cost to the lessor country of

fabricating the fuel and disposing of it. Then there is the procedure to derive the value of

the electricity generated by the fuel and the portion thereof paid as lease price. Finally,

there is the duration of the lease payments, possible arrangements for up-front payment,

and the value of the recycled fissile elements (if any).

In this regard, the resolution of the Russian-Iranian contract for spent fuel take-back

from the near-completed Bushehr nuclear plant in Iran is of interest from both an

economic and a political point of view. The development of the contract terms was

influenced by the tension between Russia’s demands to be adequately compensated for

its front-end expenses in providing and fabricating fuel elements and its expenses in

storing and disposing of the Bushehr spent fuel on the one hand, and Iran’s demands to

be compensated for the remaining energy values in the spent fuel the Russians will take

back on the other. Russia has apparently agreed to compensate Iran for the energy values

contained in the Bushehr reactor spent fuel (regardless of the cost of reprocessing that

fuel). Russia, however, has managed to increase the price of its front-end fuel supply

services to make up for these additional payments.23 As the Bushehr issue is still an

evolving situation, it is not certain that this particular resolution (assuming no further

modifications are made related to fuel enrichment) will set a modern-day precedent for

pricing future spent fuel take-back commercial deals.

New Small-Sized National Uranium Enrichment Plants

The discussion thus far has dealt with existing international commercial fresh fuel suppliers

at the front end of the nuclear fuel cycle. A new issue has arisen recently regarding small-

scale national enrichment plants whose proponents claim are required to provide a

secured supply of enriched uranium to their domestic national nuclear power program

and/or allow export of hard-currency-earning enriched nuclear fuel. The increased ubiquity

and availability of centrifuges for uranium enrichment have made any fresh uranium

supply, even for commercial power reactors, a prospective source of weapons-grade fuel

in a national breakout scenario. The danger of this situation is particularly acute with small

national enrichment plants where a portion of an operating centrifuges cascade can be

configured to take a slightly enriched uranium feed and turn it within a period of weeks

into significant quantities of highly enriched uranium.


Particular concerns have been raised regarding the Iranian enrichment plant in

Natanz and the Brazilian enrichment plant in Resende. Iran claims it needs domestic

enrichment capacity for secured energy supplies and has embarked on a new ‘‘R&D

program’’ related to the Pilot Enrichment Plant in Natanz and possibly elsewhere.24 Brazil

has developed domestic enrichment technology, originally planned as part of a military

program to provide fuel for nuclear submarines or for part of a weapons program. With

the transition to a democratic regime in 1987 and the termination of the Brazilian weapons

program, the enrichment plant in Resende has evolved into a civilian plant aimed at

providing LEU fuel to commercial nuclear power plants.25 Brazil would like to export its

LEU fuel to global markets. Issues of concern are that the proposed plants are too small for

the officially stated use, may be clandestinely reconfigured in a very short time for

the production of HEU for weapons production in an NPT breakout scenario, and may

provide a shield (and support) for a separate clandestine enrichment facility for military

purposes.26 The small size of each of these two national enrichment plants in relation to

their declared function is considered an indication that the true purpose of constructing

them is different from the declared proposed use.

The international community views these two plants as ‘‘proliferation loopholes’’

and is attempting to bring about their full closure and replacement with internationally

provided and guaranteed enriched uranium supplies through direct sale or lease-take�back deals.27 The U.S. position on the Iranian enrichment plant is clear and unyielding: the

plant should not operate and should be dismantled given the proliferation risk it poses,

given the history of Iranian misstatements and evasions regarding the full scope of Iran’s

nuclear programs, and considering the negative precedent it creates regarding NPT Article

IV. The United States has a similar position regarding the putative North Korean

enrichment plant and, in fact, the entire nuclear military program of that country,

demanding its complete verifiable and immediate dismantlement (CVID).

The U.S. position on the Brazilian plant is more nuanced. The United States would

like Brazil to agree to allow the IAEA to conduct detailed safeguards inspections of the

plant and to sign and ratify the Additional Protocol to its safeguards agreement with

the IAEA. Washington, despite some concerns about the intentions behind the

construction of the Resende plant, does not call for its complete and immediate

dismantlement. This position raises the issue of equity in the application of international

norms of conduct. Iran and Brazil, on the other hand, declare their good intentions

regarding nuclear proliferation and refuse to give up their ‘‘inalienable’’ right to develop

domestic fuel-cycle manufacturing capabilities, which they believe is enshrined in Article

IV of the NPT.

These situations could head toward an impasse, particularly in the Iranian case.

Diplomatic intervention by the United States and by members of the European Union

resulted in sending the Iranian ‘‘file’’ to the IAEA special meeting of the Board of Governors

in February 2006, and in a referral of Iran’s noncompliance with its agreements with the

IAEA and with the EU3 countries (Britain, France, and Germany) to the UN Security Council.

Members of the Security Council are now reviewing possible council actions, which could

include the imposition of international sanctions on Iran.28


In an effort to resolve the conflict, Russia has offered Iran partnership in a joint

enrichment venture to be located in the operating enrichment plant at Angarsk, Russia.29

Iranian uranium hexafluoride produced in the Iranian conversion plant in Esfahan would

be transported to Angarsk (near Irkutsk, Siberia) where it would be enriched. Manufactur-

ing of fuel elements would take place in Russia, and the LEU fuel would be sent to the

Iranian reactors as required. The EU3 countries and the IAEA have supported the Russian

proposal and were willing to provide further fuel supply guarantees in case Russia could

not meet its obligations to Iran.30 President Putin has generalized the Iran-specific

proposal and suggested establishing international nuclear energy centers for fuel

enrichment (in Angarsk), for spent fuel reprocessing (in Krasnoyarsk), and for plant

licensing and nuclear safety research.31 These proposals are considered the Russian

equivalent of the U.S. GNEP Program, and their implementation is expected to be

coordinated with the U.S. proposals.32

Iran, in turn, has expressed reluctance to accept the Russian offer as is; insisted that a

small-scale ‘‘R&D-type’’ enrichment activity will be carried on in Iran, in parallel with any

foreign-based industrial scale joint-venture enrichment activity on its behalf; demanded

that a supply of several reloads worth of LEU fuel elements will be stored in Iran under

IAEA supervision; and, further, demanded that other countries join the Russian proposed

Joint Venture, particularly China and possibly South Africa.33 Additionally, at various times

Iran has offered a share of ownership of its Natanz enrichment plant to the EU3 countries

and/or to the United States.34

The IAEA, some European diplomats, and some U.S. political scientists have

counseled recognition of the fact that Iran already operates a small-scale ‘‘research’’

enrichment facility in exchange for strict IAEA safeguards, ratification, and unhindered

implementation of the Additional Protocol by Tehran, and that Iran will refrain from

industrial-scale enrichment.35 A detailed analysis of the limited Iranian enrichment

program under international supervision was prepared by the International Crisis Group

(ICG) in February 2006.36 The ICG, in its Delayed Limited Enrichment option, has called for

recognition in principle of Iran’s right to enrich fuel; suggested full implementation of all

safeguards agreements and obligations by Iran, the start of limited enrichment activity in

Iran within three to four years, and the extension to industrial-scale enrichment with

international participation within seven years; and the provision of extensive energy

support programs to Iran.

This proposal was criticized by the Institute for Science and International Security

(ISIS) for not providing for delayed development of enrichment capability in Iran beyond

what Iran could achieve on its own even without the ICG proposals.37 James Doyle and

Sarah Kutchesfahani of Los Alamos National Laboratory (LANL), in March 2006, made a

proposal similar to the ICG’s delayed limited enrichment option suggesting a longer delay

of 10 years before the restart of enrichment activities and stressing political dialog with the

United States.38

Boureston and Ferguson and Maleki and Bunn made more far-reaching proposals to

provide Iran with conditional assistance aimed at containing the development of and the

nonproliferation risks associated with the Iranian nuclear enrichment program.39 The

second pair of authors, from Harvard University, offer the most comprehensive set of


proposals, including full implementation of all IAEA safeguards, acceptance of the Russian

Joint Venture agreement, political dialog with the United States, establishment of an LEU

fuel bank inside Iran, and construction of a Urenco (British-Dutch-German private comp-

any) enrichment plant in Iran under joint ownership, with the centrifuges enclosed in

‘‘black boxes.’’

This last concept is based on the proposal of another Harvard researcher, Geoffrey

Forden.40 Forden and Thomson have called for constructing a Urenco enrichment plant in

Iran based on the most advanced (not yet commercially deployed) Urenco enrichment

centrifuges*the TC-21 machines operated under strict security measures*so as to

satisfy Iran’s supply assurance requirements without providing it with centrifuge

technology data. This last concept brings us back to the proposal in this article, which

is more comprehensive in terms of its universal applicability to other prospective national

situations. However, it is less technologically ambitious than the Forden and Thomson

suggestion.

The distinction between the Brazilian and Iranian enrichment plants may lie in the

fact that the Resende plant ownership is partnered by Argentina and Brazil, while

the Natanz ownership structure does not include any international partner. Yet these

situations might be defused if each nation were to agree to take an international equity

partner into its domestic enrichment plant. Clearly, Iran and Brazil will not voluntarily close

down their domestic enrichment plants unless a very comprehensive set of nuclear fuel

supply guarantees and inducements is offered. A potential international partner could be

one of the large existing commercial uranium enrichment corporations. Thus, for instance,

Brazil could bring the British-German-Dutch concern Urenco as an equity partner in the

Resende plant, and Iran could bring the (mostly) French concern EURODIFF as an equity

partner in the Natanz plant. Other combinations are also possible. The active participation

of an international equity holder, in addition to comprehensive IAEA safeguards, can help

assure that the plant in either country, based on its local enrichment technology, is not

used as a part of a clandestine weapons program. At the same time, this proposal allows

equal treatment of various small-scale national enrichment plants and may obviate

concerns over double standards in the application of nonproliferation measures to

different countries.

The foreign equity partner would inject funding into the plant it partially acquires. In

addition, the international partner would provide ‘‘contributions in kind,’’ including

engineering support for the local enrichment technology, equipment maintenance and

problem-solving help, quality assurance (QA) assistance, and most importantly interna-

tional channels for the import and export of enrichment products. The international

partner would also provide a materials protection control and accounting (MPC&A)

system, incremental safeguards services to the plant (complementary to IAEA safeguards)

and assure through its active work on-site that no fissile material diversion for illicit

use takes place. The amounts of direct capital investment and contributions in kind that

the international partner provides in exchange for taking a significant equity share in the

plant would be determined through negotiations among the involved parties. Initial

contributions might be provided when the agreement takes effect and the foreign

enrichment corporation assumes its expected role on site.


There is an economic justification for such partnership arrangements. It is clear, and

the Iranian authorities have admitted, that their planned domestic fuel-cycle facilities

could not be justified on economic considerations alone.41 By bringing in an international

participant, these facilities become a formal part of the international enrichment market,

reduce their production costs, gain an assured market for their product, and guarantee an

eventual export revenue stream. If Brazil would like to export its enriched uranium, it

might find the marketing and sales services of an international partner useful. When Iran

will need to import uranium for the six large nuclear plants it has stated it wants to build

(the full capacity of the Natanz plant being insufficient for this task), it might find the

procurement services of an international partner useful.42 The Iran case is more

complicated by its claims for compensation for various nuclear fuel-related contracts

paid for by the previous regime, which were abrogated by European contractors following

the Islamic revolution in Iran in 1979 and never fulfilled.43 These issues will have to be

resolved before new nuclear deals with Iran can be signed.

This proposal might prove attractive to international commercial uranium-

enrichment corporations, in that they would gain additional enrichment capacity, even

if of lower efficiency, at relatively low, up-front costs. They could also delay the installation

date of a tranche of their own more expensive machines, find additional market for their

products (in the case of an enrichment services importer such as Iran), and might eliminate

a potential enrichment services competitor who could otherwise start a price war to gain a

market share.

A point of concern in this proposal is that a recipient country could transfer the

trouble-shooting technology and operating procedures provided by the international

enrichment partner to the domestic plant into a parallel clandestine weapons

development program. Foreign technical support to the ‘‘open’’ domestic plant could

inadvertently also provide ‘‘a shot in the arm’’ to an otherwise inoperable clandestine

program and accelerate weapons acquisition. Thus, only a shortened period would be

available during which to effect a political change in the country and stop its weapons

program, than would have been available had the country had to rely only on its own

resources.

It could be argued that, should international partners be ordered out of a plant by

the host country, the partners might try to install a ‘‘software mine’’ in the plant operating

system that could disable the plant. This possibility might provide some level of assurance

that the host country will not abrogate its agreement with the international partners once

the enrichment plant has become operational. On the other hand, it is safe to assume that

software engineers of the host country would suspect the existence of such a device and

try to disable it. This situation could become a battle of wits between the international and

host-country engineers, with uncertain results.

The above proposal could work only with countries interested in peaceful nuclear

applications and not engaged in a clandestine nuclear weapons program. The

development of full indigenous fuel-cycle capabilities endows a country with facilities,

resources, and trained personnel that could, in part, eventually be diverted to a clandestine

program. The more effective ways to address this issue are not to hope the project is

delayed or look for an elusive technical fix. Rather, the solution should be found in


addressing the root cause of the problem by providing the country in question the right

mix of political, economic, and technical incentives to desist from illicit weapons

development and delay the construction of new sensitive fuel-cycle facilities. Thus, in the

case of Iran, depending on a better understanding of the purposes of the Iranian nuclear

program, the solution might be a combination of the Russian proposal to transfer the bulk

of the actual enrichment program to Russia, a dedicated Iranian fresh fuel stockpile under

IAEA supervision located in a third country, and the proposal in this article calling for a

small-scale domestic enrichment program, run under equal ownership with international

partners and operated under strict safeguards supervision by the IAEA and the international

partners.

Support and Enhancement of Existing and Proposed Nonproliferation Measures

The main purpose of the global nonproliferation regime is to improve the national security

situation of each member country, as well as to enhance the security of the world

community at large. Each new element of a comprehensive nonproliferation regime

should provide an extra measure of security on a national as well as international level, by

addressing a problem not recognized before or by providing an additional ‘‘security

patch’’ to plug holes in the nonproliferation regime’s edifice. The proposal in this article for

tying fuel sales to concrete plans for spent fuel disposal and for encouraging fuel supply

on lease-take-back arrangements addresses the ‘‘NPT loophole’’ noted by President Bush

and others and complements other measures now being proposed. These measures

include the following:

. NPT Article IV

. Additional Protocol

. Existing and proposed enhanced nuclear export regulations

. UNSC Resolution 1540

. Proliferation Security Initiative (PSI)

. Bush and ElBaradei proposals to limit spread of enrichment facilities.

This section notes briefly how the measures proposed here would support and enhance

those nonproliferation initiatives.

NPT ARTICLE IV

Article IV of the NPT calls for the rights of all parties to the treaty to develop,

research, produce, and use nuclear energy for peaceful purposes without discrimination.

The proposal in this article would regulate the flow of fuel supplies to operating nuclear

power plants while providing assurance that the spent fuel would be securely disposed

after discharge and not be an indefinite burden on the plant operators. It would

implement these requirements on a nondiscriminatory basis, in conformity with the

intention of Article IV. The equity partnership concept is congruent with the intent of

Article IV in that it allows continued operation of a domestic enrichment plant to meet

domestic and/or foreign needs under adequate safeguards and material accounting

arrangements.


THE ADDITIONAL PROTOCOL TO THE SAFEGUARDS AGREEMENTS

The Additional Protocol to the safeguards agreements that each member country to the

NPT signs with the IAEA (INFCIRC 540), requires that member states allow unhindered

inspections to all known and suspect nuclear facilities within the country.44 The Additional

Protocol further requires each member country to provide the IAEA with a detailed 10-year

development plan for its entire national nuclear fuel cycle, on which the IAEA will plan an

inspection schedule. The proposal here, requiring further specification of the disposal

plans for spent fuel generated within that country, is an extension of the reporting

requirement already included in the Additional Protocol. The equity partnership suggested

here would also be subject to Additional Protocol requirements, further guaranteeing

compliance with safeguards and material accounting practices.

EXISTING AND PROPOSED ENHANCED NUCLEAR EXPORT REGULATIONS

The discovery of the activities of A. Q. Khan’s nuclear material and technology smuggling

network has resulted in various initiatives related to improving and strengthening nuclear-

related export control regulations. This proposal is related to export controls in that an

approved disposal plan for spent fuel supplements the export control requirements of the

countries involved in nuclear fuel manufacturing, use, and disposal. The equity partnership

concept would help ensure that the two plants in question operate under a strict nuclear

import/export control regime.

UNITED NATIONS SECURITY COUNCIL RESOLUTION 1540

UNSC Resolution 1540 requires tightening WMD export controls and making them more

universal in order to prevent the spread of such technologies to sub-national terrorist

organizations.45 The resolution is to be implemented by all member states of the United

Nations. The proposals outlined in this article would strengthen the global export controls

regime ultimately envisioned in UNSC Resolution 1540*particularly the plant equity

partnership concept.

PROLIFERATION SECURITY INITIATIVE

The PSI calls for voluntary checks of marine cargo carried in ships registered with member

countries to this initiative, as well as cargo carried by ships registered to other countries,

to ensure that no WMD-related material and equipment are clandestinely smuggled

to problem countries or to terrorist organizations.46 The proposal in this article does

not involve ship interdictions on the high seas and so is unrelated to the specific mission

of the PSI. To the extent that both this article’s proposal and the PSI are meant to

enhance the security of global nuclear trade, they are congruent in purpose. The equity

partnership concept is not directly related to the PSI; however, its implementation

may obviate the need for the PSI to track shipments into or out of the two plants in

question.


PRESIDENT BUSH’S PROPOSALS ON NUCLEAR TRADE

In his speech to the National Defense University (NDU) of February 2004, President Bush

proposed to limit nuclear fuel-cycle facilities to countries that already have such facilities in

operation.47 This proposal was further amplified by recent DOE initiatives.48 Countries now

owning fuel cycle facilities will provide services to all other countries with commercial

nuclear plants, given their compliance with NPT obligations.49 The proposal in this article

to tie-in fresh fuel supplies with plans for spent fuel disposal is a direct extension of

President Bush’s proposal. The proposal is nondiscriminatory in nature in that it equally

applies to all countries*those that have nuclear fuel cycle facilities and those that do not.

The actual disposal of the spent fuel could occur in the supplier country, in the recipient

country, or in a third country, depending on arrangements worked out among the

involved parties prior to committing to fresh fuel supplies. The second part of the proposal

dealing with fuel lease-take-back arrangements also represents a more explicit elaboration

of some of the ideas suggested by the president and later by the DOE GNEP initiative

based on the concept of lease rather than on direct commercial sale. In both proposals a

limited number of supplier countries will provide the fresh fuel. Our proposal requires fuel

take-back tied to all supply cases and to fuel leases where appropriate.

DIRECTOR GENERAL ELBARADEI’S PROPOSAL

IAEA Director General ElBaradei has proposed in the October 2003 issue of the Economist,

and elsewhere, that spent fuel management and eventually fresh fuel supply should be

conducted from regional nuclear fuel-cycle centers under strict safeguards, material

accounting, and security arrangements.50 In his London presentation to the IISS, Dr.

Elbaradei suggested a four-step process leading to the full implementation of his

concept.51 The proposal outlined here is in general agreement with the director general’s

in stressing the need for stronger security for commercial nuclear trade. The proposals

herein do not require the establishment of multinational or regional fuel cycle centers

prior to their implementation, though the establishment of such centers is the logical

extension of all the proposals. Fuel supply and spent fuel take-back arrangements should

be left to the discretion of the involved parties, supported and encouraged by the IAEA

with the understanding that they may lead to the emergence of multinational and,

ultimately, regional centers.52 The director general rightly believes that spent fuel disposal

is best carried out on a regional basis with the active involvement of the IAEA. Certainly,

the establishment of multinational or regional nuclear fuel cycle centers could enhance

the fuel lease-take-back arrangements proposed here.

Conclusions

This article proposes a new nonproliferation regime based on a tie-in between fresh

nuclear fuel supply and the obligation to define a waste management strategy for that fuel

once it is discharged from the reactor. No new fuel should be purchased without a report

to the IAEA by the country in which the fuel purchasing entity operates on its plans to

dispose of that fuel after it has been discharged. With more concrete spent fuel


management plans spelled out, it will be more difficult to divert such spent fuel in order to

produce plutonium for an illicit nuclear weapons program. The proposal in essence calls

for agreed, verified, birth-to-death controls over nuclear fuel before any can be sold

domestically or exported.

An extension of the base proposal is the concept of spent fuel take-back to regional

or multinational interim spent fuel storage facilities or repositories. Because of lack of sites,

public opposition, or nonproliferation concerns, the issue of spent fuel disposal cannot, in

all cases, be solved on a national basis. Implementation of the basic concept could help

open the door to the evolution of regional spent fuel storage facilities and ultimately to

the establishment of nuclear energy centers. An important role is suggested for the IAEA

as a facilitator of international arrangements for spent fuel storage and as a provider of

important safeguards and material accounting functions. The arrangements proposed

here will require a change of national perceptions regarding the importance of fuel take-

back from foreign countries and the amendment on national laws to permit such schemes.

In this respect, the passage of appropriate legislation in Russia permitting the importation

of foreign-origin spent fuel is an important precedent.

A link between fresh fuel supplies and spent fuel management is especially well

suited to the implementation of the other concept elaborated in this article*the revival

of fuel lease-take-back arrangements. These two concepts are complementary in nature.

The fuel lease concept may become useful in the future because of both economic and

nonproliferation considerations. Proposed here is a three-tier fuel lease-take-back

arrangement that includes the following components:

. A government-to-government agreement guaranteeing fresh fuel supplies and

spent fuel take-back

. A utility-fuel vendor agreement specifying the commercial and scheduling terms of

the deal

. A report to the IAEA by the leasing country on the specific plans for fresh fuel

supply, spent fuel take-back, and ultimate disposition.

The possible benefits of fuel lease-take-back arrangements should be reevaluated as part

of the global process for rethinking and strengthening the nonproliferation regime, now

under way. The concepts outlined here in combination with other proposals now

considered, could provide a multilayered and effective response to the shortcomings of

the current nonproliferation regime which have been exposed over the last decade.

The fuel supply assurance concepts proposed here are more suitable to nuclear

commerce, where proliferation concerns are not as acute as are the situations with

problem countries like Iran or North Korea. By clarifying the rules of the game and

providing a firmer guarantee of fuel supply assurance in exchange for good nonprolifera-

tion behavior, the concepts outlined here could enhance the viability of the overall nuclear

nonproliferation regime and prove economically advantageous as well. Indeed, the various

ideas proposed here and by other authors for a secure and guaranteed international

nuclear fuel supply are most likely to succeed in the countries where considerations of

long-term economic benefit and civilian development have political priority over

considerations of national pride and reciprocal lack of trust between the country of


concern and the international community. Those countries giving priority to economic

sustainability and development have been in the main East Asian and Southeast Asian so

far, although the situation in other countries may well change in time.

An expanding nuclear power sector worldwide necessitates a secure international

fuel supply system that can be made acceptable even in countries where lack of trust and

national pride trump purely economic considerations. To that purpose a practical

approach is suggested to resolve the escalating standoff between countries that insist

on their right to deploy domestic fuel-cycle facilities for peaceful purposes and members

of the international community that are concerned that these plants could be used for

clandestine diversion of fissile material to illicit nuclear weapons programs. This proposal

calls for existing international fuel-cycle corporations to assume significant equity stake in

these domestic small-sized fuel-cycle plants, troubleshoot their technical performance,

supervise their safeguards and materials accounting practices, and provide channels for

export or import of nuclear material as required by the countries in question. It would

allow countries to operate the plants in which they have invested money and national

pride, provide these countries economic incentives for good nonproliferation behavior,

assure the international community that these plants are used for their declared peaceful

purpose only, and provide further incentives against maintaining parallel clandestine

weapons programs. This comprehensive proposal is complementary to the proposals

outlined by President Bush, the DOE, and the IAEA. Clearly, it would be better to limit the

construction of sensitive fuel-cycle facilities to countries that now already possess them. In

cases where this option might not prove feasible, this proposal could be the next best

alternative.

NOTES

1. The White House, Office of the Press Secretary, Feb. 11, 2004, ‘‘President Announces New

Measures to Counter the Threat of WMD*Remarks of the President on Weapons of Mass

Destruction Proliferation,’’ National Defense University, Washington, D.C.; Statement by

Paul Longsworth, Deputy Administrator of the National Nuclear Security Administration,

‘‘U.S. Mulls Global Commercial Consortium to Control Nuclear Fuel,’’ Kyodo; News/Yahoo!

News, Kyodo, Japan, July 21, 2005. See also, ‘‘U.S. Offers Reactor Fuel as Nonproliferation

Measure,’’ NTI: Global Security Newswire, Sept. 26, 2005; Remarks Prepared for U.S.

Energy Secretary Samuel Bodman at the 49th Session of the General Conference of the

IAEA, No. R-95-228, Vienna, Austria, Sept. 26, 2005.

2. Mohamed ElBaradei, ‘‘Towards a Safer World,’’ The Economist , Oct. 16, 2003; ‘‘Saving

Ourselves from Self Destruction,’’ New York Times , Feb. 17, 2004; Alistair Buchan,

‘‘Reflections on Nuclear Challenges Today,’’ Lecture to the International Institute for

Strategic Studies, London, U.K., Dec. 5, 2005; International Working Group on Multilateral

Approaches, Multilateral Approaches to the International Nuclear Fuel Cycle , International

Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) Report INFCIRC 640, Vienna, Austria, Feb. 2005; David

Holley, ‘‘Nuclear Chief Offers a Nonproliferation Plan: Promise Them Fuel,’’ New York

Times , Oct. 6, 2005; and Joe Fiorill, ‘‘ElBaradei Eyes Fuel-Supply Assurance by Next Year,’’

NTI: Global Security Newswire, Nov. 4, 2005.


3. IAEA, Model Protocol Additional to the Agreement(s) between State(s) and the International

Atomic Energy Agency for the Application of Safeguards , Report INFCIRC/540 (Corrected),

Vienna, Austria, Sept. 1997; U.S. House of Representatives, Committee on Foreign

Relations, John R. Bolton, Under Secretary of State for Arms Control and International

Security, ‘‘The Bush Administration’s Nonproliferation Policy: Successes and Future

Challenges,’’ March 30, 2004; United Nations Security Council, 4956th Meeting,

Resolution 1540 (2004), April 28, 2004.

4. John Deutch, Arnold Kanter, Ernest Monitz, and Daniel Poneman, ‘‘Making the World Safe

for Nuclear Energy,’’ Survival 46 (Winter 2004�2005), pp. 65�80. B/www.world-

nuclear.org/opinion/survival.pdf�/; see also, Stephen A. LaMontagne, ‘‘Multinational

Approaches to Limiting the Spread of Sensitive Nuclear Fuel Cycle Capabilities,’’ Report

Submitted to Ambassador Linton Brooks, NNSA, in partial fulfillment of the requirements

for a Master in Public Policy Degree, John F. Kennedy School of Public Policy, Harvard

University, April 8, 2005 (unpublished). Chaim Braun, ‘‘The Energy Security Initiative*A

Re-examination of NPT Article IV,’’ Center for International Security and Cooperation

(CISAC), Stanford University, forthcoming.

5. For discussion of the GNEP Program, see Official Kremlin International News Broadcast,

‘‘Remarks and Press Briefing by US Energy secretary Samuel Bodman,’’ Moscow, Russia,

March 15, 2006; DOE Office of Public Affairs, ‘‘Platt’s Nuclear Energy Conference*Remarks prepared for Energy secretary Samuel Bodman,’’ Washington, DC, Feb. 13,

2006; DOE Office of Public Affairs, ‘‘Department of Energy Announces New Nuclear

Initiative,’’ Washington, DC, Feb. 6, 2006; DOE GNEP Web Page, ‘‘The Global Nuclear

Energy Partnership,’’ B/www.gnep.energy.gov�/, Washington, DC, Feb. 7, 2006. All the

above references can be found on the GNEP Web Page. For an additional proposal on

how to implement an international fuel bank, see Pierre Goldschmidt, ‘‘Mechanisms to

Increase Nuclear Fuel Supply Guarantees,’’ presentation at the Carnegie Nonproliferation

Conference, Washington, DC, Nov. 8, 2005.

6. Lilla Pahares and Ruben Nicolas, ‘‘Approval of the IAEA/ABACC Procedures for the Joint Au-

diting of Records,’’ ABACC News , Aug. 2004, B/http://www.abacc.org/engl/publications _

speeches/publications_articles_article.asp?artigo_id�/7�/; see also, Louis Rovere and

Hugo Vicens, ‘‘INB’s Uranium Enrichment Plant: Testing and Installation of the DMOSS

Surveillance System by the ABACC,’’ ABACC News , Sept. 2005, B/http://www.abacc.org/

engl/publications_speeches/publications_articles_article.asp?artigo_id�/9�/.

7. Chaim Braun, ‘‘Nuclear Fuel Supply Assurance,’’ presentation at the Carnegie Non-

proliferation Conference, Washington, DC, Nov. 8, 2005.

8. The White House, Office of the Press Secretary, ‘‘President Announces New Measures to

Counter the Threat of WMD’’; Longsworth, ‘‘U.S. Mulls Global Commercial Consortium’’;

ElBaradei, ‘‘Towards a Safer World’’; INFCIRC 640; Holley, ‘‘Nuclear Chief Offers a

Nonproliferation Plan’’; Deutch et al., ‘‘Making the World Safe for Nuclear Energy,’’ pp.

65�80.

9. ElBaradei, ‘‘Towards a Safer World.’’

10. Pahares and Nicolas, ‘‘Approval of the IAEA/ABACC Procedures.’’

11. Holley, ‘‘Nuclear Chief Offers a Nonproliferation Plan.’’


12. ElBaradei, ‘‘Towards a Safer World’’; INFCIRC 640; Holley, ‘‘Nuclear Chief Offers a

Nonproliferation Plan’’; Deutch et al., ‘‘Making the World Safe for Nuclear Energy,’’ pp.

65�80; Braun, ‘‘The Energy Security Initiative’’; Goldschmidt, ‘‘Mechanisms to Increase

Nuclear Fuel Supply Guarantees’’; Braun, ‘‘Nuclear Fuel Supply Assurance.’’

13. Goldschmidt, ‘‘Mechanisms to Increase Nuclear Fuel Supply Guarantees.’’

14. Deutch et al., ‘‘Making the World Safe for Nuclear Energy,’’ pp. 65�80.

15. Charles McCombie and Neil Chapman, ‘‘Nuclear Fuel Cycle Centers*An Old and New

Idea, ’’World Nuclear Association Annual Symposium, London, U.K., Sept. 8, 2004.

16. Matthew Bunn, John P. Holdren, Allison McFarlane, Susan E. Pickett, Atsuyuki Suzuki,

Tatsujiro Suzuki, and Jennifer Weeks, Interim Storage of Spent Nuclear Fuel: A Safe, Flexible,

and Cost-Effective Near-Term Approach to Spent Fuel Management (Cambridge, MA:

Managing the Atom Project, Harvard University and Project on Sociotechnics of Nuclear

Energy, University of Tokyo, June 2001).

17. Tom Cochran, ‘‘The Non-Proliferation Trust Concept for Spent Nuclear Fuel Manage-

ment,’’ paper presented at the Livermore International Cooperation Meeting, Las Vegas,

Nevada, March 2000; R. Dyer, ‘‘Russian New Initiatives,’’ paper presented at the

International Conference on Irradiated Nuclear Fuel Management, Moscow, Russia,

Sept. 2002; Charles Diggs, ‘‘Moscow, IAEA Support Multi-National Nuke Waste Repository

for Russia,’’ June 30, 2004, Bellona Foundation Website, B/www.bellona.org/en/interna-

tional/russia/nuke_industry/co-operation/34647.html�/.

18. See references in Nuclear Threat Initiative (NTI) Website,B/www.nti.org/e_research/

cnwm/securing/convert.asp#_ftn.2�/.

19. For a brief account of this program, see NTI Website,B/www.nti.org/db/nisprofs/kazakst/

fissmat/sapphire.htm�/.

20. ElBaradei, ‘‘Towards a Safer World’’; Diggs, ‘‘Moscow, IAEA Support Multi-National Nuke

Waste Repository for Russia’’; INFCIRC 640.

21. ElBaradei, ‘‘Towards a Safer World’’; INFCIRC 640.

22. Longsworth, ‘‘U.S. Mulls Global Commercial Consortium to Control Nuclear Fuel.’’

23. Patrick Clawson, Washington Institute for Near East Policy and Pavel Podvig, CISAC,

Washington, DC, private communications with author, Nov. 2005.

24. For the latest on the status of the Iranian enrichment activities in Natanz, see Report by

the Director General to the Board of Governors Implementation of the NPT Safeguards

Agreement in the Islamic Republic of Iran, IAEA Report GOV/2005/87, Vienna, Austria, Nov.

18, 2005; see also, David Albright and Corey Hinderstein, Institute of Science and

International Security (ISIS), Press Release, Jan. 11, 2006, ‘‘Iran’s Next Steps: Final Tests and

the Construction of the Uranium Enrichment Plant.’’

25. Joseph Cirincione, Jon B. Wolfsthal, and Miriam Rajkumar, Deadly Arsenals: Nuclear

Biological and Chemical Threats , 2nd edition (Washington, D.C.: Carnegie Endowment for

International Peace, 2005), pp. 393�406. See also, Center for Defense Information,

‘‘Brazil’s Nuclear Ambitions,’’ May 6, 2004, Nuclear Issues Webpage,B/www.cdi.org/

friendlyversion/printversion.cfm?documentID�/2200�/ and Frank Braun, ‘‘Analysis:

Brazil’s Nuke Program,’’ TerraDaily , July 19, 2005,B/www.terradaily.com/news/nuclear-

doctrine-05zp.html�/.


26. David Albright, ‘‘Iran’s Nuclear Program: Status, Risks and Prospects,’’ paper presented at

the Conference on Iran’s Nuclear Program, Hoover Institute, Stanford University, Stanford,

CA, Nov. 11, 2004; Henry Sokolski, ‘‘Restraining a Nuclear-Ready Iran: Seven Levers Draft

Report of a Competitive Strategies Working Group,’’ Nonproliferation Policy Education

Center, Sept. 13, 2004.

27. Deutch et al., ‘‘Making the World Safe for Nuclear Energy,’’ pp. 65�80; The White House,

Office of the Press Secretary, ‘‘President Announces New Measures to Counter the Threat

of WMD’’; Longsworth, ‘‘U.S. Mulls Global Commercial Consortium’’; ElBaradei, ‘‘Towards a

Safer World’’; INFCIRC 640.

28. A sample of articles covering recent developments in Iran includes the following: Ian

Trainor, ‘‘Teheran Ends Freeze on Nuclear Fuel Research,’’ The Guardian , Jan. 4, 2006;

George Perkovich, ‘‘Carnegie Endowment Security Council Must Curb Iran,’’ International

Herald Tribune , Jan. 11, 2006; Jeffrey Fleishman, ‘‘Europeans Seek U.N. Intervention on

Iran,’’ Los Angeles Times , Jan. 13, 2006; and Richard Bernstein and Steven R. Weisman,

‘‘Europe Joins U.S. in Urging Action by UN on Iran,’’ New York Times , Jan. 13, 2006.

29. For reports on the Russian offer to Iran, see ‘‘Russia: Kirienko Says Site Chosen for Joint

Uranium Enrichment Venture with Iran,’’ ITAR-TASS, Jan. 21, 2006; ‘‘Russian Offer Means

No Access for Iran to Nuclear Fuel�Paper,’’ RIA- Novosti, Feb. 20, 2006; Steven Lee

Meyers, ‘‘Russian Talks with Iran on Nuclear Program Stall,’’ New York Times, Feb. 20,

2006; ‘‘IAEA Head Hails Russia’s Proposal to Supply Nuclear Fuel to Iran,’’ RIA-Novosti,

Dec. 6, 2005; Mark Heinrich and Louis Charbonneau, ‘‘Russian Nuclear Plan for Iran Unites

UN Watchdog,’’ Reuters, Nov. 24, 2005; and Brooks Tigner, ‘‘Officials May Discuss Russian

Offer to Make Nuclear Fuel for Iran,’’ Defense News , Nov. 29, 2005.

30. For International expressions of support for the Russian proposal, see David E. Sanger

and Elaine Sciolino, ‘‘Bush and China Endorse Russia’s Nuclear Plan for Iran,’’ New York

Times , Jan. 27, 2006; Mark Magnier, ‘‘Nuclear Fuel Plan Gets Support,’’ Los Angeles Times ,

Jan. 27, 2006.

31. For discussion of the Russian Nuclear Centers proposal, see ‘‘Russian Uranium Enrichment

Offers to Be Submitted to the Government Soon,’’ RIA-Novosti, April 6, 2006; ‘‘Foreigners

Interested in Enriching Uranium in Russia,’’ RIA-Novosti, April 5, 2006; Yuriy Humber,

‘‘Russia Picks Site for New Nuclear Center,’’ Moscow Times , March 29, 2006; ‘‘China backs

Russian Proposal on Nuclear Fuel Centers,’’ RIA-Novosti , March 17, 2006; ‘‘Russian

Regulatory Chief Outlines Proposals for Moscow Nuclear Conference,’’ ITAR-TASS, Feb. 28,

2006; ‘‘Russia to Propose Nuclear Licensing Centers at G8 Summit,’’ RIA-Novosti, Feb. 28,

2006.

32. Fred Weir and Howard LaFranchi, ‘‘Russia and U.S. as Global Nuclear Waste Collectors?’’

Christian Science Monitor , Feb. 7, 2006; Charles Digges, ‘‘Bush and Russia Wish to Join

Force in Making Nuclear Fuel,’’ Bellona Web site, Feb. 6, 2006, B/www.bellona.org�/;

Matthew L. Wald and David E. Sanger, ‘‘Bush’s Budget to Call for Nuclear Partnership with

Russia,’’ New York Times , Feb. 4, 2006. See also above references to the GNEP Program at

B/www.gnep.energy.gov�/.

33. There exists a large body of reports regarding Iran’s demand for independent research

activity on centrifuge enrichment. See, for instance, Associated Press, ‘‘Iran Proposes

Nuclear Facility,’’ Los Angeles Times , March 29, 2006; Barbara Slavin, ‘‘Iran Wants Nuclear


Independence,’’ USA Today , Feb. 7, 2006; Meg Clothier, ‘‘Iran to Pursue Atomic Research

Despite Russian Plan,’’ Reuters, Feb. 20, 2006; Michael Levi, ‘‘An Interesting Iran Proposal,’’

March 27, 2006, B/www.armscontrolwonk.com�/. See ‘‘Iran Offers to Bring Foreign Firms

into Nuclear Program,’’ Agence France Presse, United Nations, Sept. 17, 2005; ‘‘TEXT�Summary of Latest Round of EU-Iran Nuclear Talks,’’ Reuters AlertNet, Jan. 26, 2005.

34. See ‘‘Top Diplomats Agree on Action, but No Plan on Iran,’’ NTI Global Security Newswire,

Washington, DC, April 20, 2006; Nasser Karimi, Associated Press, ‘‘Iran Offers US Share in

Plant,’’ New York Times , Dec. 12, 2005; Kevin Morrison, ‘‘Iran Offers US Share in Nuclear

Program,’’ London Financial Times , March 16, 2005.

35. Louis Charbonneau, ‘‘EU Might Accept Nuclear Deal with Iran � Germany,’’ Reuters,

Berlin, March 28, 2006; ‘‘IAEA Warns May Need Compromise with Iran,’’ Feb. 17, 2006,

B/www.iranmania.com�/; ‘‘IAEA Warns May Need Compromise on Iranian Enrichment:

Diplomats,’’ Agence France Presse, Feb. 16, 2006. See also Charles D. Ferguson and

Ray Takeyh, ‘‘Making the Right Call: How the World Can Limit Iran’s Nuclear Program,’’

Arms Control Today , March 2006, B/www.armscontrol.org/act/2006_03/MARCH-Iran

Feature.asp�/.

36. International Crisis Group (ICG), ‘‘Iran: Is There a Way Out of the Nuclear Impasse?’’ Middle

East Report No. 51, Brussels, Belgium, Feb. 23, 2006, B/www.crisisgroup.org/home/

index.cfm?id�/3976&l�/�/.

37. David Albright, ‘‘ISIS Reaction to ICG Report on Iran,’’ Feb. 23, 2006, B/www.isis-online.

org�/.

38. James E. Doyle and Sara Kutchesfahani, ‘‘Time for a U.S./Iran Patch Up,’’ paper published

at the Carnegie Endowment Website, March 21, 2006, B/www.carnegieendowment.org/

publications/index.cfm?fa�/view&id�/18157�/.

39. Jack Boureston and Charles D. Ferguson, ‘‘Keep Your Enemy Closer: The Best Way to

Know the Full Extent of Iran’s Nuclear Doings Is to Offer It Help,’’ Bulletin of the Atomic

Scientists 61 (Nov./Dec. 2005), pp. 25, 76. See also Jack Boureston and Charles D.

Ferguson ‘‘Schooling Iran’s Atom Squad,’’ Bulletin of the Atomic Scientists 60 (May/

June 2004), pp. 31�35; Abbas Maleki and Matthew Bunn, ‘‘Finding a Way Out of the

Iranian Nuclear Crisis,’’ Belfer Center, Kennedy School of Government, Harvard University,

March 2006, B/http://bcsia.ksg.harvard.edu/whatsnew.cfm?program�/STPP&nt�/top&

pb_id�/523&pv�/yes�/.

40. ‘‘Multinational Facilities May Solve Iran’s Nuclear Stalemate,’’ Jane’s Intelligence Review,

April 1, 2006, B/www.janes.com�/. See also Jeffrey Lewis, ‘‘Centrifuges & Limited

Enrichment,’’ Feb. 23, 2006, B/www.armscontrolwonk.com�/. Both references include

discussions of Forden and Thomson’s proposal.

41. See ‘‘Iran Offers to Bring Foreign Firms into Nuclear Program,’’ Agence France Presse,

United Nations, Sept. 17, 2005; ‘‘TEXT*Summary of Latest Round of EU-Iran Nuclear

Talks.’’

42. Albright, ‘‘Iran’s Nuclear Program.’’

43. ‘‘Iran Officially Demands EU3 Deliver Uranium, UF6 and Nuclear Equipment,’’ Mehr News

Agency, Jan. 5, 2005. See also Doyle and Kutchesfahani, ‘‘Time for U.S./Iran Patch Up.’’

44. INFCIRC/540 (Corrected).

45. USNC, 4956th Meeting, Resolution 1540.


46. U.S. House of Representatives, ‘‘The Bush Administration’s Nonproliferation Policy.’’

47. The White House, ‘‘President Announces New Measures to Counter the Threat of WMD.’’

48. Longsworth, ‘‘U.S. Mulls Global Commercial Consortium.’’

49. See discussion of GNEP program above. Also Goldschmidt, ‘‘Mechanisms to Increase

Nuclear Fuel Supply Guarantees.’’

50. ElBaradei, ‘‘Towards a Safer World’’; INCIRC 640.

51. ElBaradei, ‘‘Towards a Safer World.’’

52. INFCIRC 640.


an international regime of fresh fuel …...an international regime of fresh fuel supply and spent...

Documents