an exit strateg

8/9/2019 An Exit Strateg

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Strategy and Stratagem

Lt Gen (retd) Asad Durrani

Yes, I have heard that the British forces have entered Kabul, and now I am wondering, how they

would get out

The Khan of Kalat

y That was hundred and fifty years ago. We should have in the meantime learnt a bit more,also about getting out from Afghanistan- this eastern version of Bermuda Triangle, only this

one sucks in empires and anyone who happens to be in the neighbourhood.Just the other

day, Obama spelt out a framework that has all the ingredients of precisely such a strategy.

Some confusionis understandable: if the idea is to leave, then why the surge; or, conditions

that could not be created in 8 years, how could they now be in one & a half. But then exit

strategy is not merely a matter of packing ones bags and hitting the road. Like a declared

doctrine, it hides more than it reveals. And indeed, it must provide sufficient space for

freedom of manoeuvre. How would we have evolved one if we were asked to?

y I suppose one would have started with a review of the situation.o The opposition, call it The Taliban, undefeated and gaining momentum.o The government in Kabul- though not in control of important levers of power,

money and military, and therefore not entirely to be blamed for the mess- losing

ground.

o The state security apparatus-the Army and the Police- whatever its size and evenwhen trained, cannot ensure security. Considering the geography, demography, and

history of the Country, it can only be done with the help of regions and tribes.

o Public support to continue the war diminishing, at home as well as amongst theallies, some of them even raring to pullout.

o Economy, own and of the allies, under stress.o Powerful domestic groups, the Republicans and the Military for example, building-

up pressure for more troops to Afghanistan.

y A surge for a last Hurrah was indeed an option. The mightiest country on earth,supported by the most powerful alliance ever, should be able to prevail, militarily. But what

if did not; or, what was more likely, could not restore stability before people at home ran

out of patience, or the governments out of money they would spare for an elusive victory?

An orderly withdrawal in that case might be nearly impossible.

y A surge was still needed, even if as a stratagem. It would serve multiple ends.o If the good Taliban could be persuaded to cooperate by non-military means-

money, share in future power structure, commitment to withdraw- additional

troops would be needed to bring the bad ones in line.


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o In case the non-military manoeuvre failed, additional troops would be readilyavailable to resume battle. (That is what a strategic cycle is all about: alternating use

of battle and manoeuvre.)

o Since a victory of arms best serves a nations ego, the military must be seen to haveplayed a significant part in the ultimate outcome.

oMost importantly, if t

he Afg

han mission was aborted wit

hout

having employed all

available military means, for the incumbent government it would be politically fatal.

y The exit should ensure the following.o It must not be seen as a retreat. One should be able to, if not declare victory, at least

claim mission accomplished. Some order therefore must be restored before

quitting. Remember, it is not only American prestige but also NATOs credibility,

perhaps even survival, which are at stake!

o The successor government in Kabul if not exactly friendly should not be a hostileone.

y Since a number of channels are working to bring the Taliban on board, and assuming thatsome progress has been made, a public policy statement can be spun around the core

concept. Its salient points can be rationalised as follows.

o Induction of more troops, besides serving the (already discussed) multipleobjectives, would help pacify the political opposition, the military, and the corporate

lobbies (military-industrial complex/ motley crowd of private contractors).

o A dateline for the thinning out of troops can be given, not only to placate the evergrowing anti-war constituency, put Karzai on notice to get his act together, but also

as a gesture to the Taliban, whose only pre-condition for a serious dialogue is an

assurance that the occupation would be vacated. Its adherence would naturally

take into account conditions on the ground.

o To help the main thrust- the negotiating track- most of the additional troops shouldnot be employed on combat missions. Mercifully, the revised COIN doctrine-

protecting key population centres- even though it surrenders the countryside to

the Taliban (could become part of an arrangement), provides the reinforcements a

defendable (saleable) role. And undoubtedly, force in being is a sound concept.

o Training of Afghan security forces by private companies, who would rather not trainto get their contracts extended, is a waste of time and money. But even if duly

trained, they cannot take over from the allied troops. As part of the overall exit

strategy, it was still a sound project.

y Indeed, all that Obama said was neither subterfuge nor hot air. His reference to a clearlydefined mission, refusal to set goals that went beyond their means, and need to retain

balance between national security and economy were the more substantial parts of the

policy statement. America will have to show our strength in the way that we end wars


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and prevent conflict -- not just how we wage wars, can be read both ways: rhetorically, or

literally.

y Evolving this framework must have taken plenty of doing. (Dithering, too, was essential,not so much for its evolution, but more to condition the audience.) Implementing it would

take much

more. Since most of th

e stakeh

olders want Afgh

anistan free of foreign forces,there are good chances of success. However, there are also a few stumbling blocks.

o Taliban are hard negotiators. Tribesmen are suspicious by nature: the key to survivalin harsh environments. Americans, not used to roughedges, are impulsive.

o All militaries have a problem restraining the use of force. The American militarycannot resist using its abundant resources. Collateral Damage is a concept, it had

to therefore perforce invent and formalise. Whereas it may sabotage a peaceful

transition by design, it was more likely to force the Taliban abandon the talking track

simply by using its natural instincts.

y Indeed, nothing of the above may see the light of the day if this analysis is based on faultyassumptions.

y But if it is not, Pakistan need not have any fears. Protesting about the US not havingsufficiently consulted us, more violence along the Pak-Afghan borders due to the surge, and

Indians gaining more influence if an unfriendly government was installed in Kabul, may

keep everyone on toes (thoughI doubt if anyone would be much impressed). The fact is that

Pakistans cooperation is so vital to this process, especially in bringing important Taliban

factions on board, that we should be able to take care of our core interests.

y And it is also a fact, proven by history, that regardless of who ruled Afghanistan; Kabul wascompelled to find at least a Modus Vivendi wit

hPakistan. No favourites is a policy t

hat

could always serve us well.

an exit strateg

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