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AN EXAMINATION OF THE MARITIME NUCLEAR SMUGGLING THREAT AND OTHER PORT SECU-RITY AND SMUGGLING RISKS IN THE UNITED STATES

Committee on Transportation and Infrastructure Serial No. 114–48

Committee on Homeland Security Serial No. 114–79

JOINT HEARING BEFORE THE

SUBCOMMITTEE ON COAST GUARD AND MARITIME

TRANSPORTATION,

COMMITTEE ON TRANSPORTATION AND

INFRASTRUCTURE AND THE

SUBCOMMITTEE ON BORDER AND MARITIME

SECURITY,

COMMITTEE ON HOMELAND SECURITY

HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES ONE HUNDRED FOURTEENTH CONGRESS

SECOND SESSION

JULY 7, 2016

Printed for the use of the Committee on Transportation and Infrastructure and the Committee on Homeland Security

( Available online at: http://www.gpo.gov/fdsys/browse/

committee.action?chamber=house&committee=transportation

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COMMITTEE ON TRANSPORTATION AND INFRASTRUCTURE

BILL SHUSTER, Pennsylvania, Chairman

DON YOUNG, Alaska JOHN J. DUNCAN, JR., Tennessee,

Vice Chair JOHN L. MICA, Florida FRANK A. LOBIONDO, New Jersey SAM GRAVES, Missouri CANDICE S. MILLER, Michigan DUNCAN HUNTER, California ERIC A. ‘‘RICK’’ CRAWFORD, Arkansas LOU BARLETTA, Pennsylvania BLAKE FARENTHOLD, Texas BOB GIBBS, Ohio RICHARD L. HANNA, New York DANIEL WEBSTER, Florida JEFF DENHAM, California REID J. RIBBLE, Wisconsin THOMAS MASSIE, Kentucky MARK MEADOWS, North Carolina SCOTT PERRY, Pennsylvania RODNEY DAVIS, Illinois MARK SANFORD, South Carolina ROB WOODALL, Georgia TODD ROKITA, Indiana JOHN KATKO, New York BRIAN BABIN, Texas CRESENT HARDY, Nevada RYAN A. COSTELLO, Pennsylvania GARRET GRAVES, Louisiana MIMI WALTERS, California BARBARA COMSTOCK, Virginia CARLOS CURBELO, Florida DAVID ROUZER, North Carolina LEE M. ZELDIN, New York MIKE BOST, Illinois

PETER A. DEFAZIO, Oregon ELEANOR HOLMES NORTON, District of

Columbia JERROLD NADLER, New York CORRINE BROWN, Florida EDDIE BERNICE JOHNSON, Texas ELIJAH E. CUMMINGS, Maryland RICK LARSEN, Washington MICHAEL E. CAPUANO, Massachusetts GRACE F. NAPOLITANO, California DANIEL LIPINSKI, Illinois STEVE COHEN, Tennessee ALBIO SIRES, New Jersey DONNA F. EDWARDS, Maryland JOHN GARAMENDI, California ANDRE CARSON, Indiana JANICE HAHN, California RICHARD M. NOLAN, Minnesota ANN KIRKPATRICK, Arizona DINA TITUS, Nevada SEAN PATRICK MALONEY, New York ELIZABETH H. ESTY, Connecticut LOIS FRANKEL, Florida CHERI BUSTOS, Illinois JARED HUFFMAN, California JULIA BROWNLEY, California

SUBCOMMITTEE ON COAST GUARD AND MARITIME TRANSPORTATION

DUNCAN HUNTER, California, Chairman DON YOUNG, Alaska FRANK A. LOBIONDO, New Jersey BOB GIBBS, Ohio MARK SANFORD, South Carolina GARRET GRAVES, Louisiana CARLOS CURBELO, Florida DAVID ROUZER, North Carolina LEE M. ZELDIN, New York BILL SHUSTER, Pennsylvania (Ex Officio)

JOHN GARAMENDI, California ELIJAH E. CUMMINGS, Maryland CORRINE BROWN, Florida JANICE HAHN, California LOIS FRANKEL, Florida JULIA BROWNLEY, California PETER A. DEFAZIO, Oregon (Ex Officio)

(II)


COMMITTEE ON HOMELAND SECURITY

MICHAEL T. MCCAUL, Texas, Chairman LAMAR SMITH, Texas PETER T. KING, New York MIKE ROGERS, Alabama CANDICE S. MILLER, Michigan, Vice Chair JEFF DUNCAN, South Carolina TOM MARINO, Pennsylvania LOU BARLETTA, Pennsylvania SCOTT PERRY, Pennsylvania CURT CLAWSON, Florida JOHN KATKO, New York WILL HURD, Texas EARL L. ‘‘BUDDY’’ CARTER, Georgia MARK WALKER, North Carolina BARRY LOUDERMILK, Georgia MARTHA MCSALLY, Arizona JOHN RATCLIFFE, Texas DANIEL M. DONOVAN, JR., New York

BENNIE G. THOMPSON, Mississippi LORETTA SANCHEZ, California SHEILA JACKSON LEE, Texas JAMES R. LANGEVIN, Rhode Island BRIAN HIGGINS, New York CEDRIC L. RICHMOND, Louisiana WILLIAM R. KEATING, Massachusetts DONALD M. PAYNE, JR., New Jersey FILEMON VELA, Texas BONNIE WATSON COLEMAN, New Jersey KATHLEEN M. RICE, New York NORMA J. TORRES, California

BRENDAN P. SHIELDS, Staff Director JOAN V. O’HARA, General Counsel

MICHAEL S. TWINCHEK, Chief Clerk I. LANIER AVANT, Minority Staff Director

SUBCOMMITTEE ON BORDER AND MARITIME SECURITY

MARTHA MCSALLY, Arizona, Chairman LAMAR SMITH, Texas MIKE ROGERS, Alabama CANDICE S. MILLER, Michigan JEFF DUNCAN, South Carolina LOU BARLETTA, Pennsylvania WILL HURD, Texas MICHAEL T. MCCAUL, Texas (Ex Officio)

FILEMON VELA, Texas LORETTA SANCHEZ, California SHEILA JACKSON LEE, Texas BRIAN HIGGINS, New York NORMA J. TORRES, California BENNIE G. THOMPSON, Mississippi (Ex

Officio) PAUL L. ANSTINE, Subcommittee Staff Director

JOHN DICKHAUS, Subcommittee Clerk ALISON NORTHROP, Minority Subcommittee Staff Director

(III)


(V)

CONTENTS Page

Summary of Subject Matter from the Subcommittee on Coast Guard and Maritime Transportation of the Committee on Transportation and Infra-structure ............................................................................................................... vi

TESTIMONY

PANEL 1

Rear Admiral Linda L. Fagan, Deputy Commandant for Operations, Policy, and Capabilities, U.S. Coast Guard .................................................................... 4

L. Wayne Brasure, Ph.D., Acting Director, Domestic Nuclear Detection Office 4 Todd C. Owen, Executive Assistant Commissioner, Office of Field Operations,

U.S. Customs and Border Protection .................................................................. 4 Anne Harrington, Deputy Administrator for Defense Nuclear Nonprolifera-

tion, National Nuclear Security Administration ............................................... 4

PANEL 2

Jennifer A. Grover, Director, Homeland Security and Justice, U.S. Govern-ment Accountability Office .................................................................................. 24

Gregory H. Canavan, Ph.D., Senior Fellow, Los Alamos National Labora-tories ...................................................................................................................... 24

David A. Espie, Director of Security, Maryland Port Administration, Port of Baltimore, on behalf of the American Association of Port Authorities ....... 24

James H.I. Weakley, President, Lake Carriers’ Association ................................ 24

PREPARED STATEMENTS SUBMITTED BY MEMBERS OF CONGRESS

Hon. John Garamendi of California ....................................................................... 45

PREPARED STATEMENTS SUBMITTED BY WITNESSES

Rear Admiral Linda L. Fagan ................................................................................ 49 L. Wayne Brasure, Ph.D. ........................................................................................ 53 Todd C. Owen ........................................................................................................... 59 Anne Harrington ...................................................................................................... 69 Jennifer A. Grover ................................................................................................... 78 Gregory H. Canavan, Ph.D. .................................................................................... 96 David A. Espie ......................................................................................................... 104 James H.I. Weakley ................................................................................................. 109

SUBMISSIONS FOR THE RECORD

Rear Admiral Linda L. Fagan, Deputy Commandant for Operations, Policy, and Capabilities, U.S. Coast Guard, responses to requests for information from the following Representatives:

Hon. Bob Gibbs of Ohio .................................................................................... 17 Hon. Carlos Curbelo of Florida ........................................................................ 22

Article entitled, ‘‘U.S. Ports Want More Action on Dirty Bomb Prevention,’’ Maritime Executive, July 6, 2016, submitted by Hon. Sheila Jackson Lee of Texas ................................................................................................................. 116

Letter of July 1, 2016, to Hon. Jeh Johnson, Secretary, Department of Home-land Security, from 47 Members of Congress, submitted by witness David A. Espie ................................................................................................................. 118


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(1)

AN EXAMINATION OF THE MARITIME NU-CLEAR SMUGGLING THREAT AND OTHER PORT SECURITY AND SMUGGLING RISKS IN THE UNITED STATES

THURSDAY, JULY 7, 2016

HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES, SUBCOMMITTEE ON COAST GUARD AND MARITIME

TRANSPORTATION, COMMITTEE ON TRANSPORTATION AND INFRASTRUCTURE,

JOINT WITH THE SUBCOMMITTEE ON BORDER AND MARITIME SECURITY,

COMMITTEE ON HOMELAND SECURITY, Washington, DC.

The subcommittees met, pursuant to notice, at 10:08 a.m. in room 2167, Rayburn House Office Building, Hon. Duncan Hunter (Chairman of the Subcommittee on Coast Guard and Maritime Transportation) presiding.

Mr. HUNTER. The subcommittee will come to order. The subcommittee is meeting today to examine the efforts of the

Department of Homeland Security to prevent the smuggling of nu-clear materials in U.S. ports and other port security risks. This hearing follows last year’s hearing which examined the prevention and response to a dirty bomb at a U.S. port. And we had a classi-fied hearing yesterday. We are going to make sure and skirt around those topics which we talked about yesterday and we are not going to talk about today in an open hearing.

It seems clear that Islamic extremists aspire to carry out a radio-logical or nuclear attack, so this is a threat that we obviously need to take seriously. If anybody succeeds even once, the consequences would be catastrophic. To be prepared, we must ensure that we have the proper screening and response protocols in place.

Today we will continue to review these efforts as well as the broader governmental efforts to reduce threats to our ports and our borders. I want to thank Chairwoman Martha McSally, who will be here momentarily, and the House Committee on Homeland Secu-rity for agreeing to explore this important topic in a joint hearing.

The security of our maritime ports and borders remains a serious concern for the United States. Our Nation relies on the commerce that flows through our ports including the more than 41 percent of foreign trade that is moved on vessels every year. Providing ade-quate security requires an innovative, multifaceted approach which has to begin far from U.S. shores and has to be flexible enough to keep pace with the ever-changing threats to our national security.


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After 9/11, security measures were enacted to better protect our homeland by expanding efforts to detect and deter threats over-seas. These efforts include screening cargo manifests before con-tainers are loaded onto a U.S.-bound ship, scanning shipping con-tainers that have been determined to be high-risk, screening ship personnel data, and tracking ships and their cargo as they make their way to our shores. Despite these efforts, we want to make sure that we are still employing the best technology to detect the presence of nuclear or radiological material in containerized cargo.

However, containers are not the only avenue for smuggling harmful materials and weapons into the U.S. ports. Small vessels pose an equally devastating threat and are just as difficult as con-tainers to determine legitimate uses from potential threats. Com-mercial and recreational small vessels can easily blend into the daily activity of U.S. waterways and can be converted to stand-off weapons platforms, or used as direct attacks to deliver a water-borne IED [improvised explosive device].

We will hear from our witnesses today on how the Federal Gov-ernment deploys a whole-of-government, layered approach includ-ing law enforcement, technology, and intelligence to detect, deter, and interdict potential threats. These internal measures are com-bined with treaties and agreements with foreign governments to conduct cooperative enforcement efforts overseas. That is one of the things that I found most interesting about what we are going to hear about today, is how far out we reach and the nations that work with us to make us safe back here at home.

I look forward to continuing our discussion from last year and learning more about the ongoing efforts to keep our ports and Na-tion safe.

With that, I yield to Chairwoman McSally. Ms. MCSALLY. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. And thanks for our

witnesses’ comments today on this very important topic. We had a good discussion in the classified realm yesterday, and look forward to a good discussion today on this very serious threat.

We know that terrorist organizations, in my lifetime, in 26 years in the military, have been plotting and wanting to do the maximum amount of harm to our country and our way of life and our inter-ests. The worst-case scenario that both my colleague and I, as we served in the military, was always a combination of terrorist orga-nizations and weapons of mass destruction of various kinds. And in my role in homeland security we have addressed some of these other biological, chemical threats. Today I appreciate that we are highlighting the radiological and nuclear potential threats of that nexus between terrorist organizations getting access to these dead-ly weapons.

We learned in my time in the military that threat equals capa-bility plus intent. We have seen, through open-source reporting, that they clearly have the intent, you know, to maximize harm against America, the West, and our way of life. Certainly they have declared that intent through whatever means possible, and the devastation that would come from having such a capability in an attack would be severe, as we know, not just for the death and the loss of life and the impact on the economy, but also the fear that


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it would invoke, which is, you know, certainly a motivation of the terrorists.

So, as we look at now the capability—and I know we are in an unclassified realm—I look forward to hearing from our experts today about what the threat is. Now, we don’t want to be tipping our hand or highlighting to the enemy any of our vulnerabilities, so we need to be very careful as we are highlighting what these threats are, so that we can make sure that we are doing everything we can through a whole-of-society, whole-of-government, with our partners, in order to address and mitigate and detect and interdict these threats.

We need to make sure that we highlight this in hearings like today so that we are doing all that we can to make sure that we are stopping any sort of attack from a radiological or a nuclear weapon from a terrorist organization like ISIS [Islamic State of Iraq and Syria].

There are many pathways that these individuals could use in order to bring a weapon like this into our country. I live in a south-ern border district. That is certainly one pathway. Coming in through air, coming in through maritime, through our seaports of entry, small boats, all these types of things are ones that—we have seen the drug supply come through. And so I am interested to, you know, hear from our witnesses specifically about the threat. And again, to the maximum extent possible in the unclassified realm, you know, what we are doing about it and what more we could do about it.

We do know that there has been just, again, recent reports re-vealing radiological nuclear material being lost or stolen several times a year, especially in Russia and other former Soviet States. Just as an example, several years ago FBI [Federal Bureau of In-vestigation] was involved in a sting operation that disrupted the sale of cesium which would have been enough to contaminate sev-eral city blocks. So this is the type of threat.

The weapons-grade nuclear capability and the radiological threat that we are very interested in investigating further today, we ap-preciate the expertise and the service of our witnesses. And I yield back.

Mr. HUNTER. I thank the gentlelady. Mr. Garamendi is recog-nized. You are all lucky. You get four opening statements instead of two today. You’re welcome.

Mr. GARAMENDI. Reviewing my statement earlier today and real-izing there are four opening statements, Mr. Chairman, I would ask unanimous consent that my statement be in the record, and I will simply summarize very, very quickly, so that we can get on with hearing from the witnesses.

We have got about 95,000 miles of coastal area in the United States. We have got 360 ports of various sizes around the Nation, and islands, and so forth, all of which present an opportunity for bad things to happen. We are going to talk about those nuclear issues, the biological issues, all of those, and I look forward to hear-ing from the witnesses.

A very complex issue in many, many ways, but one that we have to deal with. Dirty bombs, real bombs, biological issues, and quite possibly we are now learning with Zika and yellow fever that it


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may just be a human that is infected coming in from an African port or a South American port that could initiate a major public health crisis in the United States.

And so these threats are real, they have to be addressed. The witnesses are well versed in these issues, and I am looking forward to hearing from them. And with that I yield back.

Mr. HUNTER. I thank the ranking member. Mr. Vela is recog-nized.

Mr. VELA. I would essentially adopt the comments of my col-leagues and, for the sake of time, I would just say that I represent about 200 miles of the Gulf of Mexico along the—right along the U.S.-Mexico border in south Texas. But for the sake of time I would also yield back.

Mr. HUNTER. All right. We begin our first panel today with Rear Admiral Linda Fagan, the Coast Guard’s Deputy Commandant for Operations, Policy, and Capabilities.

Rear Admiral Fagan, you are recognized to make your statement.

TESTIMONY OF REAR ADMIRAL LINDA L. FAGAN, DEPUTY COMMANDANT FOR OPERATIONS, POLICY, AND CAPABILI-TIES, U.S. COAST GUARD; L. WAYNE BRASURE, PH.D., ACTING DIRECTOR, DOMESTIC NUCLEAR DETECTION OFFICE; TODD C. OWEN, EXECUTIVE ASSISTANT COMMISSIONER, OFFICE OF FIELD OPERATIONS, U.S. CUSTOMS AND BORDER PRO-TECTION; AND ANNE HARRINGTON, DEPUTY ADMINIS-TRATOR FOR DEFENSE NUCLEAR NONPROLIFERATION, NA-TIONAL NUCLEAR SECURITY ADMINISTRATION

Admiral FAGAN. Good morning, Chairman Hunter, thank you. Chairman McSally, Ranking Member Garamendi, Ranking Member Vela, and distinguished members of the subcommittees, it is my pleasure to be here today to discuss the Coast Guard’s efforts in preventing smuggling in U.S. ports. I thank you for your strong support of the Coast Guard and our men and women in uniform. It is a pleasure to be here alongside my Department of Homeland Security colleagues, Assistant Commissioner Owen, Director Brasure, as well as our Department of Energy partner, Deputy Ad-ministrator Harrington.

My complete statement has been provided to the subcommittee and I ask that it be entered into the record.

By leveraging our expansive legal authorities, offshore maritime presence, and utilizing a layered approach to maritime border secu-rity, the Coast Guard pushes maritime border security and enforce-ment out well beyond the Nation’s shoreline and exclusive eco-nomic zones. As a member of the intelligence community, and through strategic relationships with our interagency and inter-national partners, we detect, deter, and counter threats as early and as far from the U.S. shores as possible.

The persistent threats that we face include illegal migration, human trafficking, illicit flow of drugs, and smuggling of weapons of mass destruction. My testimony today will focus on the layered Coast Guard efforts to prevent smuggling of nuclear devices into U.S. ports. However, many of the initiatives, programs, and capa-bilities I will highlight enable the Coast Guard to prevent and re-spond to a multitude of threats we face.


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The Coast Guard’s efforts to prevent smuggling of nuclear de-vices into U.S. ports and shores begins overseas. By leveraging international partnerships, as well as the International Port Secu-rity Program, the Coast Guard performs in-country port security assessments to determine the effectiveness of security and antiterrorism measures of our foreign training partners.

Since the program’s inception in 2004, we have visited 150 coun-tries and evaluated 1,200 port facilities. The Coast Guard main-tains more than 40 maritime bilateral law enforcement agreements and 11 bilateral proliferation security initiative ship-boarding en-gagements. These agreements facilitate international cooperation and allow Coast Guard teams to board and search vessels at sea suspected of carrying illicit shipments of weapons of mass destruc-tion, their delivery systems, or related materials.

The Coast Guard’s membership within the intelligence commu-nity provides global situation awareness, analysis, interagency col-laboration, opportunities with various counterterrorism compo-nents, including the Central Intelligence Agency, National Counterterrorism Center, and the Federal Bureau of Investigation. Direct, timely intelligence is a key enabler across a broad spectrum of threats.

Cargo crosses the ocean and nears our shores. Coast Guard per-sonnel located with the Customs and Border Protection National Targeting Center screens ship, crew, and passenger information. In 2015 there were over 121,000 notice-of-arrivals and 32 million crew and passenger records screened by this team.

As ships arrive in American waters, our authorities through the Maritime Transportation Security Act provide a robust regime of security plan approval and compliance inspections for both mari-time facilities and vessels.

Area Maritime Security Committees provide a recurring forum for key agencies and partners to address risks at each port. Through these committees we have training programs that focus on preventing and responding to transportation security incidents, and these are regularly exercised in the ports. And, for example, since 2003 the Coast Guard has partaken or participated in over two dozen dirty bomb scenarios through this exercise program.

Focusing specifically on the nuclear threat, in 2004 the Coast Guard developed and implemented a Servicewide Maritime Radi-ation Detection Program, partnering with the Domestic Nuclear Detection Office. We use their standards in all of our ships, and boarding officers are equipped with detection devices.

Providing significant and unique maritime response capabilities, the Coast Guard’s Maritime Security Response Teams are able to detect and identify nuclear and radiological material and protect personnel in both routine and hostile situations. Should the coun-try face a—knowledge of a radiological or nuclear device being sus-pected of smuggling, we would use the interagency maritime oper-ational threat response protocols to bring in interagency coordina-tion together to ensure an appropriate Government response.

The Coast Guard’s response to a nuclear detonation in the mari-time domain would be part of a larger interagency effort to bring the most appropriate national resources and capabilities to bear. We focus on the safety of American lives and the swift restoration


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of commerce. Our unique maritime authorities, jurisdiction, and ca-pabilities ensure the Coast Guard can provide security, command- and-control, transportation, and support to other agencies that need to operate in the maritime today.

For over two centuries the U.S. Coast Guard has safeguarded our Nation’s maritime interests. A nuclear threat response scenario would require a whole-of-government coordinated interagency ef-fort. The Coast Guard’s layered security strategy, day-to-day oper-ations, and coordination across the Government ensure that we are well-positioned to address the broad range of offshore and coastal threats.

I have only touched on a few of these layers in my opening com-ments, and I look forward to discussing these and other vital work the men and women of the Coast Guard do every day during your questions.

Thank you for the opportunity to appear before you today, and thank you for your continued support of the United States Coast Guard. Thank you.

Mr. HUNTER. Thanks, Admiral. Our next witness is Dr. Wayne Brasure, the Acting Director of the Domestic Nuclear Detection Of-fice.

Dr. Brasure, you are recognized. Dr. BRASURE. Good morning, Chairman Hunter, Chairwoman

McSally, Ranking Member Garamendi, Ranking Member Vela, and distinguished members of the subcommittees. Thank you for the opportunity to be here with my colleagues from the Department of Homeland Security and the Department of Energy to discuss ef-forts to prevent smuggling at U.S. ports.

An attack on U.S. territory with a nuclear device or radiological dispersal device would have grave consequences. At the Domestic Nuclear Detection Office, or DNDO, we have a singular focus: pre-venting nuclear terrorism. It cannot be accomplished by any one agency. In fact, it takes a whole-of-enterprise approach. We work closely with our Federal, State, local, tribal, territorial, and inter-national partners, as well as those in the national laboratories, in-dustry and academia.

DNDO was established to develop, in coordination with the inter-agency, the Global Nuclear Detection Architecture, or the GNDA. The GNDA is a framework for detecting, analyzing, and reporting nuclear and other radioactive materials that are out of regulatory control.

In our work to enhance the GNDA we rely on a critical triad of intelligence, law enforcement, and technical capabilities. Our strat-egy is to provide effective technologies to well-trained law enforce-ment and public safety officials as they conduct intelligence-driven operations. Through a multilayered, multifaceted defense-in-depth approach, our objective is to make nuclear terrorism a prohibitively difficult undertaking for the adversary. We take into account the geographic layers of the GNDA, both international and domestic, as well as the pathways through which the material can be transited, such as the maritime and aviation pathways.

And so, our efforts to secure the homeland begin overseas, work-ing closely with our interagency partners which have responsibility for implementing the international component of the GNDA. With


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these partners and with multilateral organizations, the DNDO works to develop and share guidance, best practices, and training for the international community.

Ultimately, building a Global Nuclear Detection Architecture re-lies on sovereign foreign partners developing and enhancing their own national detection programs. The collective efforts abroad help ensure that illicit nuclear or other radioactive material or devices can be interdicted before they arrive at our shores.

As part of DNDO’s responsibilities to implement the domestic component of the GNDA, we equip DHS [Department of Homeland Security] operational components with radiation detection systems for use at our ports of entry, along our land and maritime borders, and within the United States. In particular, DNDO equips both U.S. Coast Guard and U.S. Customs and Border Protection with ra-diation detection equipment.

Today all Coast Guard boarding parties are equipped with detec-tion devices. At our seaports of entry, CBP [U.S. Customs and Bor-der Protection] scans nearly 100 percent of all incoming container-ized cargo for radiological and nuclear threats. DNDO has acquired systems for the Coast Guard and CBP to detect threats when en-countering small vessels. We recently procured a new technology called Human Portable Tripwire to enable our partners to more quickly detect, identify, and adjudicate alarms relating to nuclear and other radioactive sources.

Building operational capability across the Federal, State, and local enterprise is also critical. DNDO is presently working with 36 of the Coast Guard’s Area Maritime Security Committees. Through these committees we can share information and intelligence, assist with alarm adjudication, and provide technical support to our oper-ational partners as they build their nuclear detection programs.

In the event of an interdiction of radioactive materials or an act of radiological or nuclear terrorism, the U.S. Government would need rampant accurate attribution based on sound scientific evi-dence. For this reason, we enhance the Nation’s capabilities in technical nuclear forensics which, when coupled with intelligence and law enforcement information, support such determinations.

To bolster readiness of the U.S. Government’s nuclear forensics capability in the maritime environment, we recently led the plan-ning for and also participated in an exercise where an interagency task force coordinated the collection of simulated forensic evidence at sea.

Advancing the operational readiness of partners will ensure that leadership has the evidence so they can hold fully accountable any State, terrorist group, or other nonstate actor that supports or en-ables terrorist efforts to obtain or use weapons of mass destruction. An act of nuclear terrorism would have profound consequences for our Nation and the world. With your support, we will continue to work with our partners to bolster defenses to secure maritime ports and our homeland from nuclear terrorism.

Thank you for this opportunity, and I look forward to your ques-tions.

Mr. HUNTER. Thank you, Doctor. Our next witness is Mr. Todd Owen, Executive Assistant Commissioner of the Office of Field Op-erations for U.S. Customs and Border Protection.


8

Mr. Owen, you are recognized. Mr. OWEN. Thank you. Good morning, Chairman Hunter, Chair-

woman McSally, Ranking Members Garamendi and Vela, and es-teemed members of the subcommittees. Thank you for the oppor-tunity to testify here today to discuss the role of U.S. Customs and Border Protection in the prevention and detection of smuggling ac-tivities at our ports of entry, an important responsibility we share with our partners here today.

As the lead DHS agency for border security, CBP works closely with our domestic and international partners to protect the Nation from a variety of dynamic threats, including those posed by con-tainerized cargo arriving at our air, land, and sea ports. Before my appointment as the Executive Assistant Commissioner for the Of-fice of Field Operations in February of 2015, I served in numerous capacities within CBP, most recently as the Director of Field Oper-ations for the Greater Los Angeles area, including the L.A./Long Beach seaport. I have also served as the Executive Director over all of CBP’s cargo security programs, and I know firsthand how complex cargo security operations are, and how valuable our pro-grams and partnerships are to our national security.

Since the September 11 terrorist attacks, CBP has established security partnerships, enhanced our targeting and risk assessment programs, and invested in advance technology, all essential ele-ments to our multilayer approach to protecting the Nation from the arrival of dangerous materials, including radiological and nuclear materials, at our ports of entry. CBP has several key programs that enhance our ability to assess cargo for risk, examine high-risk shipments at the earliest possible point, and increase the security of the supply chain. And I would like to highlight just a few of these efforts today.

First, CBP receives advanced information on every cargo ship-ment, every vessel, and every person before they arrive at our ports of entry.

Second, our advance targeting techniques use the advanced data to enhance our ability to assess risk associated with these cargo shipments and with the entities involved. The National Targeting Center, using the Automated Targeting System, has developed state-of-the-art capabilities to assess cargo shipments before they are laid and on board vessels destined for the United States.

Third, our partnerships, those with DHS and our other Federal partners, private industry, and foreign counterparts, increase infor-mation-sharing and enhance our domain awareness, our targeting capabilities, and the ability to intercept threats approaching our borders.

Pushing our security efforts outward, the Container Security Ini-tiative, which was established specifically to prevent the use of maritime containerized cargo to transport a weapon of mass effect or destruction, enables CBP to work with foreign authorities to identify and examine potentially high-risk maritime containers at the first foreign ports, before they are laid and on board a vessel destined for the U.S. CBP now has 60 Container Security Initiative ports in 35 countries, and we screen over 80 percent of the mari-time containerized cargo before it heads to the United States.


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And finally, in partnership with DNDO, CBP has deployed nu-clear and radiological detection equipment, including radiation por-tal monitors, radio isotope identification devices, and personal radi-ation detectors, nationwide. Using radiation portal monitors at our ports of entry, CBP is able to scan 100 percent of all mail and ex-press consignment parcels, 100 percent of all truck cargo and per-sonally owned vehicles arriving from Canada and Mexico, and 100 percent of all arriving maritime containerized cargo for the pres-ence of radiological or nuclear materials.

CBP’s detection technology, targeting capabilities, and partner-ships are strategically aligned to prevent the arrival of dangerous materials or a dangerous weapon at a U.S. port. However, if such an event were to occur, CBP has established contingency plans and standard procedures to ensure a coordinated and effective response. In the event CBP detects a suspected radioactive source, all per-sonnel are trained in secure, isolate, and notify protocols. The cargo is secured, the immediate area is isolated, and the scientific ex-perts are notified. CBP scientists at the CBP Teleforensic Center in northern Virginia will confer with the Department of Energy, and, when necessary, refer the findings to the FBI to coordinate the appropriate response. All of these elements are part of a com-prehensive cargo security strategy that enables CBP to identify and address the potential use of containerized cargo to transport radiologic weapons before they arrive at our Nation’s ports of entry.

Thank you for the opportunity to testify today, and I will be happy to answer your questions.

Mr. HUNTER. Thanks, Mr. Owen. Our next witness is Ms. Anne Harrington, the Deputy Administrator for Defense Nuclear Non-proliferation at the National Nuclear Security Administration.

Ms. Harrington, you are recognized. Ms. HARRINGTON. Thank you. Chairman Hunter, Chairwoman

McSally, Ranking Members Garamendi and Vela, and distin-guished members of the subcommittees, thank you for giving me the opportunity to discuss the Department of Energy’s National Nuclear Security Administration’s efforts to detect, deter, and in-vestigate the illicit smuggling of nuclear and other radioactive ma-terials. My full statement has been provided and I ask that it be entered into the record.

I am also very pleased to be appearing today with colleagues from the Department of Homeland Security. You should look at the four witnesses in front of you as a team, because that is, indeed, how we work.

Securing nuclear and radiological materials from theft, diversion, or trafficking is a critical element of U.S. national security strat-egy. Despite significant progress over the last 20 years by inter-national cooperative programs, gaps remain and interest in acquir-ing these materials persist.

The threat landscape as we see it today includes over 30 coun-tries with weapon-usable nuclear material stored at hundreds of sites, with the largest inventory in Russia; more than 100 countries with radiological material stored at thousands of sites, many of which lack adequate security; a demonstrated black market for nu-clear and radiological materials, as shown by recent interdictions in Georgia and Moldova; and terrorist groups that have taken root


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in ungoverned or undergoverned spaces, compounded by the emer-gence of Daesh or ISIL [Islamic State of Irag and the Levant], a pseudostate with demonstrated capability to conduct international terrorist operations and an expressed interest in acquiring and using radiological and possibly nuclear materials against Western interests.

We take our job seriously because the consequences are so high. The use of a high-yield, improvised nuclear device, or IND, in a major U.S. city would cause hundreds of thousands of fatalities. The use of a radiological dispersal device, or RDD, would not cause the same loss of human life, but would be highly destabilizing, with broad physical, economic, and psychological consequences, demand-ing significant resources and a multifaceted response.

To counter this threat, the U.S. Government uses multiple means to prevent terrorists from obtaining nuclear and radiological mate-rials. Within my organization, the Office of Defense Nuclear Non-proliferation, our Global Material Security program specializes in collaborating with partners worldwide to build sustainable capacity to secure nuclear weapons, weapons-usable materials, and radio-logical material, and to detect and investigate illicit trafficking of those materials.

We serve as the farthest exterior ring of protection for the United States. Our approach is simple: our first line of defense is to secure nuclear and radiological material at the source, and not allow it to be removed from regulatory control. Recognizing that this may not be enough, we have a second line of defense: our Nuclear Smug-gling Detection and Deterrence program, or NSDD.

NSDD is a critical component of the Global Nuclear Detection Architecture. We deploy radiation detection systems internationally at official crossing points along rugged, unofficial borders in dis-puted territories which we call green borders, and along maritime borders, or blue borders, and at internal locations for law enforce-ment operations, working with our foreign partners, much the way the Department of Homeland Security works within the United States.

More importantly, our goal is to build the capacity, infrastruc-ture, and relationships necessary to sustain these efforts into the future, and to cooperate with us in those efforts. The GNDA is predicated on a layered defense of law enforcement, intelligence, and technology to maximize a system of detection and deterrence capability. In the words of DHS’s Domestic Nuclear Detection Of-fice, NSDD is the largest single program in the exterior layer, and provides significant potential to stop a U.S.-bound terrorist attack outside our borders.

We have equipped 585 sites, including 46 large-container sea-ports, have provided 104 mobile radiation detection vans, and countless other handheld equipment. With this technology comes training, exercises, and sustainment support.

We also focus on sustainability, and have already transitioned 85 percent of our installations to full support by the host countries. We have taken important steps in countering the nuclear and radi-ological smuggling threat by developing a range of technologies, as already mentioned by our friends in DNDO, and we work closely together to establish the standards for those technologies.


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NSDD’s ability to adapt to an evolving threat, engage diverse international partnerships, and its ongoing collaboration with the interagency and with international organizations uniquely position this program to remain a leader in deploying and sustaining core elements of the Global Nuclear Detection Architecture, with the ul-timate goal of preventing the use of a nuclear weapon or dirty bomb in the United States.

Thank you for your attention, and I will be happy to respond to your questions.

Mr. HUNTER. Thank you, Ms. Harrington. I am now going to rec-ognize Members for questioning.

I guess the one thing that I am going to comment on is this. With terrorism and Islamic extremism where it is now, and the ability for nonstate actors to get ahold of nuclear weapons, or to get ahold of radiological weapons, or let’s just say weapons of mass de-struction of any kind, to have it nonattributable to any State, so there is no reciprocity, there is no mutually assured destruction, there is no deterrent for a nonstate actor to do something bad to the United States on a grand scale, because we would have no an-swer. If they came from Syria, we are not going to nuke Syria. If they came from a bad part of the world and they were nonstate ac-tors, there is nothing we can do back to them as a deterrent. And these are people that will kill themselves and blow themselves up to kill 20 Americans, let alone 20,000 Americans.

So I guess my question is this. Do you see—and this is for every-body—do you see a weapon of mass destruction going off in the United States as inevitable in the next 25 years? Do we need to get right of the boom, as opposed to left of the boom? We talk about getting left, going out as far as we can for the materials and every-thing. But do you think that it is inevitable that you will have a device go off at some point in the United States by a nonstate actor, and there is nothing we can do about it? So that is my ques-tion.

Dr. BRASURE. I will begin to attempt to answer that question. I would say my answer focuses on we are doing everything we can to prevent that from happening. So in my world, my strategy, our teamwork is designed to prevent that by taking a holistic, risk- based, and multifaceted approach to securing the materials domes-tically and abroad, as well as setting up the detection and interdic-tion infrastructure to preclude that from actually occurring.

I would also say that I cannot speak for the consequences, but what I can speak to are the technical capabilities in the national technical nuclear forensics arena, and I will assure you we are de-veloping and we have a capability that we continue to improve to attribute the either interdicted materials or, with our interagency colleagues and some of the other programs, a post—you know, right-of-boom event to actually do the attribution to find out the source of the material.

And so, I would say between those two elements, with respect to the prevention as well as the very real threat of an attribution through various means, including technical nuclear forensics, that again we strive to avoid that scenario from happening in the next 25 years and beyond.


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Ms. HARRINGTON. If I could add briefly to that, Mr. Garamendi mentioned the biological threat in his opening remarks, and that certainly is a very serious one. But unlike biological and chemical and even conventional explosive threats, where the material to make a weapon is so ubiquitous that it is difficult to control, in our universe it is all about the material. Without the material, nothing happens.

And you can have all the expertise and all the accompanying technology you want, but without the material, the damage doesn’t happen. So our focus is, first and foremost, identifying where the material is—and that, as we discussed yesterday, is an issue be-tween us and the intelligence community, but that is a very close collaboration; identify what the opportunities are to either elimi-nate the material, preferably, all together, or if not eliminate it, se-cure it.

If we can’t secure it, then make sure we have a detection ring around that material or around that country to give us the highest level of confidence that we will see that material move if it is out of regulatory control. It doesn’t necessarily mean it always will be stopped, but as long as we know that something is in motion, then we can work with our partners, you know, in the United States in ports around the world, because of the partnerships we have devel-oped, for that early warning system to kick in.

But that is why it is so absolutely critical to push this protective ring that we are developing as far beyond our borders as humanly possible.

Mr. HUNTER. That is all I have got. If no one else has an answer to that one, I am going to recognize Ms. McSally.

Ms. MCSALLY. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. So I just want to scope the threat again, just—based from your testimonies. So we know there is, you know, basically 30 countries that we are working with, or are available for nuclear material as source, 100 with radi-ological is what you mentioned. We have got a very active black market, as you all mentioned. According to some open source re-ports, since December 31, 2014, there have been 2,700 cases re-ported to the IAEA [International Atomic Energy Agency] volun-tarily by 100 countries of illicit trafficking of nuclear and radio-logical material. So those are the ones that are voluntarily re-ported.

Just, you know, one example, again, from an article in Moldova, in 2011 an informant was able to buy a highly enriched uranium in a green sack out of a Lexus parked near a circus in Moldova’s capital. This is just an example of the challenge that we are deal-ing with.

ISIS is now present in—with affiliates, organized affiliates—in at least 20 countries, with foreign fighters coming from 120 different countries from all over the world. So this is just scoping the chal-lenge.

You talk about partnering with countries in order to make sure we are preventing on the outer ring. So, in my mind, if—who are the—I guess I would think Russia would be a big challenge. I think Moldova is a country of concern. So, in your expertise, who are the most challenging countries for either lack of capacity, lack of posi-


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tive control, or lack of partnership that we are talking about here for source of material?

And I don’t know if—whoever wants to answer it, Ms. Har-rington or Dr. Brasure.

Ms. HARRINGTON. Well, let me try to answer that in an unclassi-fied way.

One of the big challenges that we confront is, again, the shifting nature of the challenge. So in the past, we have been extremely fo-cused, for example, on the very large stockpile of defense-related material in Russia. And we invested over 20 years of cooperative activity. We feel that, as a result of that cooperative activity, the standards and the practices were improved significantly.

We don’t have insight into how those are being sustained any longer, and that causes us concern. But in response to that we have significantly accelerated—and I would say done so with a number of other partners, our European colleagues, Japan, Australia—we have an organization called the Global Partnership, where we bring funds and pool funds in order to improve these capabilities, for example, in Moldova, in Georgia, Ukraine, et cetera. So those activities are underway, and——

Ms. MCSALLY. So if I hear you, I mean, Russia is a concern now due to lack of cooperation, mostly, lack of insight into what is real-ly going on, whether there is positive control or not. Is that fair?

Ms. HARRINGTON. That is a fair statement. Ms. MCSALLY. OK. And other countries of concern in the unclas-

sified realm—I mean Moldova—I mean, just looking at an article why Moldova might be the most dangerous place on earth, because of this issue. That is a concern to me. I mean can you just share some other perspectives, whether you can in the unclassified, of the countries of concern?

Ms. HARRINGTON. Well, I would say, in general, we have excel-lent cooperation, for example, with countries like Moldova, like Georgia, like Ukraine, those perimeter countries, because they don’t want this——

Ms. MCSALLY. Right. Ms. HARRINGTON [continuing]. Material passing through them,

either. Ms. MCSALLY. So that is a good cooperation, but maybe lack of

total positive control. But at least they are cooperating with us, right?

Ms. HARRINGTON. Absolutely. Ms. MCSALLY. OK. Ms. HARRINGTON. Absolutely. Ms. MCSALLY. Great. Mr. Owen, could we clarify? In your testi-

mony you talked about 100 percent of containers, 100 percent of ve-hicles are scanned when they are coming in to the country. But you are talking about the radiological scanning. But the physical, the x-ray scanning, is more like 3 or 4 percent, is what I understand. And concerns about shielding or false positives, and what are we doing to maybe close the gap between what is actually being phys-ically scanned versus, you know, what is being radiologically scanned, I just want to clarify it.

Mr. OWEN. Right, and that is correct, 100 percent of the cargo does pass through a radiation portal monitor at whichever border


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crossing it is coming through. So we do have 100 percent coverage for the radiation scanning. A much smaller subset of those con-tainers that we determine to be higher risk are then sent for an x ray, if you will, a large-scale—different types of intrusive systems to see what is inside the containers.

Those decisions are based on the targeting information that we receive, and our National Targeting Center has a very strong pro-tocol, if you will, where we take not only the manifest information that the shipper provides, the importer information that the im-porting company will provide, we marry that up with our law en-forcement databases, our trade databases, and most importantly, the information that we have from our intelligence community, as well as our international partners. All of those factors will deter-mine that smaller subset, which is about 3.7 percent right now of those containers that we look at for highest risk.

Now, overseas we look at—of that 3.7 percent, about 1 percent of that is actually inspected overseas as part of our Container Secu-rity Initiative.

Ms. MCSALLY. Of the 3 percent, 1 percent—— Mr. OWEN. Of the 3 percent, so it is about 1.1 percent overseas

before it heads our way, and about another 2.6 upon arrival, so about 3.7 in total.

Ms. MCSALLY. OK, great. My time has expired. Thanks, Mr. Chairman.

Mr. HUNTER. I thank the gentlelady. The ranking member from California is recognized.

Mr. GARAMENDI. I want to thank the witnesses for all of their testimony. There are so many pieces to this puzzle. The outer ring, Ms. Harrington, and the work that you have done there—my col-league, Congresswoman McSally, went into the Russia issue in some detail. Just one additional question on that.

What efforts, if any, are being made to reengage with Russia on this issue?

Ms. HARRINGTON. Thank you for that question. We have never completely disengaged from Russia, particularly in the non-proliferation, disarmament, threat reduction sphere. We have kept some of that interaction alive, mostly through technical exchanges, best practices exchanges, because if the geopolitics ever permit, we, of course, would want to be working with Russia again, not only in Russia but perhaps teaming with Russia to work in other chal-lenging places of the world. We are the two big players in the nu-clear world.

Mr. GARAMENDI. Well, having said that, it appears as though the engagement is at a very low level. That is, not terribly active. Is that the case?

Ms. HARRINGTON. It is at a marginal level right now, yes. Mr. GARAMENDI. What steps are being made to—are being under-

taken to enhance the engagement? Ms. HARRINGTON. In—— Mr. GARAMENDI. Like, when is your next trip to Russia? [Laughter.] Ms. HARRINGTON. I have not been to Russia in a while. But we

have staff on the ground in Russia, literally, every week. So it is not that we are not present. We——


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Mr. GARAMENDI. This issue of engagement with Russia goes way beyond this particular set of concerns. And it seems to me that it is in the interest of Russia and the United States to enhance our engagement at every level: parliamentarian, military, nuclear, and the rest. And so I would encourage you to get on the airplane.

Next question, Mr. Owens. And maybe this goes beyond you to Dr. Brasure also, and that has to do with the secure freight initia-tive, which was at one point in six ports, and now appears to be only one port. Could you describe that situation, and why it has gone from six to one? And should it be more than just the port in Pakistan?

Mr. OWEN. Yes, absolutely. Back in 2006, 2007, we began to ex-plore the idea of 100 percent scanning, where you would have the radiation screening as well as the x-ray screening before the con-tainer was put on the ship. We piloted this in six locations. We were in Qasim, Pakistan; we were in a terminal in South Korea; a terminal in Hong Kong; Port of Cortes, Honduras; Salalah, Oman; and in Southampton in the U.K.

Lots of different challenges that came up from the diplomatic, to having our personnel overseas. There were environmental issues, there was the biggest, which was the throughput of the cargo and the impact at having 100 percent x raying would take place.

The way these two systems work, the passive scanning of radi-ation is very—quite simple. The container passes through. If there is any radiation emitting, the technology will detect that. The chal-lenge becomes with the x raying of the cargo, because that is a very manual process. Using the different technologies, an operator has to do different things to try to see if there is a threat. And that will slow down the process of the cargo flowing through the ports.

When you have gate traffic—and some of these ports we piloted in it was all gate traffic, so the cargo all arrived at an entry gate in—you can set up a suite of technology that will allow you to per-form 100 percent scanning, realizing there will be some impact.

However, in most of your largest container ports around the world, it is transshipment ports. You have ship-to-ship, barge-to- ship, rail-to-ship, which presents a whole other challenge in terms of the flow of the cargo. So, after 4 years of testing this, we docu-mented all of the different challenges, again, along the diplomatic, the operational, the impact, the limitations to the technology, and we decided that we would continue in the places that offer the greatest strategic benefit, that being Qasim, Pakistan—68,000 con-tainers last year that came out of Qasim. Every one of those was scanned for radiation and an x ray was performed, the data being sent to our National Targeting Center here, in Virginia, where a U.S. CBP officer makes that go/no-go decision if that cargo is load-ed on the vessel.

In the last year we have also expanded that same operation to Port of Aqaba in Jordan for obvious reasons. So that is the ap-proach that we are taking. Where can 100 percent scanning add the greatest value to enhance our overall security overseas?

Mr. GARAMENDI. And that takes us to yesterday’s hearing on the classified——

Mr. OWEN. Yes, sir. Mr. GARAMENDI [continuing]. Piece of it. Good.


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A question to all of you, and that is resources, as in money. And I would like all of you to address this issue of funding, which is our problem. Do you have adequate funding to carry out the tasks that you have been assigned? Let’s start with the Coast Guard.

Admiral FAGAN. Thank you. As you know, the Coast Guard par-ticipates in this mission from a layered approach. And as you go from the overseas international arena into the offshore, the ap-proach is in the transit zone, and you know we are engaged in a major recapitalization of some of our aging cutter fleet designed to deploy exactly into those approaches in the—thinking specifically of the offshore patrol——

Mr. GARAMENDI. I don’t need to hear all the task of the Coast Guard. The question was do you have adequate funding for this specific task that we are discussing today?

Admiral FAGAN. We are doing everything that we can within the mission zone with the resources that we have today.

Mr. GARAMENDI. Well, you danced around the answer. The an-swer is not appreciated. Either you have adequate funding or you do not. If you do not, we need to know. I mean that is our job. It is our job to provide the funding necessary to protect America, and your job is to carry it out. And right now your job is to answer the question. Do you have adequate funding to carry out this specific task?

Admiral FAGAN. We have adequate funding to carry out the task——

Mr. GARAMENDI. Very good. Admiral FAGAN [continuing]. As Coast Guard. Dr. BRASURE. Yes, sir. We also apply the resources we have. And

in DNDO we apply them using a risk-based strategy across all areas. And we support the President’s budget submission.

Mr. OWEN. And we have a workload staffing model that identi-fies the resources that we need, and the resource staffing model shows that we are 2,107 officers below what we need to carry out the resources. About 500 of those are directed towards seaports. So, on the personnel side, we do have a model that has been validated by independent groups that show we need additional resources, about 500, for the seaports.

Also concerned about the aging technology that we have in our ports of entry, as well.

Mr. GARAMENDI. Thank you. Ms. HARRINGTON. We have adequate funding for the mission re-

quirements, but I would point out that affecting the budget of one piece of this layered defense affects how everybody is able to imple-ment, because this is really that integrated. So, if the Coast Guard or Customs and Border Protection, or particularly DNDO is af-fected in the budget world, then that has an impact on our ability to execute.

Also, I don’t want to get into this—it is as painful for Congress as it is for us—but CRs [continuing resolutions] are not a good way to plan and execute programs.

Mr. GARAMENDI. Thank you. I yield. Ms. MCSALLY [presiding]. Thank you. The Chair now recognizes

Mr. Gibbs from Ohio.


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Mr. GIBBS. Thank you, Chairwoman. I represent the Great Lakes region, and I realize ports are their major economic drivers, and understand it is important to make sure of port security.

I want to talk a little bit about container security. In 2010 there was a GAO [U.S. Government Accountability Office] report that said that some countries are reluctant to comply with the inter-national port security code due to concerns over sovereignty. And can you kind of give us—any one of you, I guess—this international port security is now—is it uniformly followed by our U.S. trading partners, or is there still concerns with sovereignty?

Admiral FAGAN. The—as I mentioned in my opening comments, the—one of the programs the Coast Guard operates is the Inter-national Port Security Liaison Officer Program, where we have vis-ited 150 countries and 1,200 ports, and have generally found quite good compliance as we have made those visits. There have been a small number of ports that have not adequately met that inter-national standard, and we have protocols in for identifying those countries and increasing the scrutiny, the inspection, and the screening regime for ships that would have called from those par-ticular ports.

But generally, compliance is generally good with a few small ex-ceptions.

Mr. GIBBS. What kind of numbers on an annual basis that, you know—that—ships been refused entry or—you know, what is kind of—how often has this occurred, it is a problem that they are not in compliance?

And then also, you know, what—is there a particular country or area that has been more of a problem for clients?

Admiral FAGAN. I will get you the specifics on which countries and what numbers of ship arrivals we experienced from those coun-tries. This is part of the advance notice of arrival screening process. The last five ports of call we look at crew, you know, passengers, containers, part of the National Targeting Center—the Customs and Border Protection mentioned we have a Coast Guard contin-gent over there. It becomes part of a seamless screening process, looking at the risk profile of a vessel before it comes to the United States, and decisions are made as to whether that vessel needs to be boarded offshore, allowed in port. Again, looking at the totality of the risk profile.

I can get you specifics on what number of ship calls we have had, particularly from the countries that have had a port that is prob-lematic from a compliance——

[The information follows:]

If a country is found to have poor implementation of the ISPS code’s secu-rity recommendations, it may be considered by the Coast Guard as having inadequate antiterrorism measures and as authorized by law, the Coast Guard may impose conditions of entry (COE) on vessels arriving from that country or a particular port or facility. Such vessels are subject to a range of port State control actions, beginning with a COE verification of their se-curity measures to mitigate risks, up to and including denial of entry. In 2015, 8,925 individual foreign vessels from 81 different flag administra-tions made 73,752 port calls to the United States. The Coast Guard con-ducted 1,712 COE verifications. In 2015, the bulk of the COE verifications were aboard vessels that visited Venezuela, Nigeria, Cote d’Ivoire, and Equatorial Guinea in their last five ports of call before arriving in the


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United States. Of the 1,712 COE verifications, 24 vessels were issued ‘‘de-nial of entry’’ operational controls. None of the 24 were issued due to the vessels’ noncompliance with the COEs, or due to noncompliance with the ISPS code.

With regards to ISPS compliance (not COE), there were 15 ‘‘IMO-related’’ denial of entry operational controls since the ISPS code was adopted. Only one was recorded as being issued to a vessel for failure to implement the ISPS code. That occurred in 2011.

Mr. GIBBS. But you feel pretty comfortable that the program is working, that compliance with our trading partners is improving? Or is there something we can do more to enhance that?

Admiral FAGAN. No, the program is quite mature and is working quite well, and I am very comfortable with the interagency coordi-nation and communication that occurs as that vessel approaches the United States, and that there will not be a—sort of no surprise when a ship actually arrives then in the U.S. waters with regard to what the potential risk profile—be it from a last port of call that may have had a compliance issue.

Mr. GIBBS. Thank you. I yield back, Chairman. Ms. MCSALLY. The gentleman yields back. The Chair now recog-

nizes Ms. Hahn from California. Ms. HAHN. Thank you. I appreciate us holding this hearing

today. Port security has really been my top issue since I have come to Congress. I represent the Port of Los Angeles and the complex of Long Beach in Los Angeles is within my backyard. So, as Amer-ica’s port, you know, representing almost—you know, it depends. Using around 42 percent of all the trade coming into this country comes through our ports; Todd and I have worked together on a number of issues.

But I will tell you, since 9/11 my concern has really increased in terms of something happening at one of our ports. Because of the nature of 9/11, certainly Congress has been more focused on avia-tion security because that was the nature of the attacks that day. And I think we have done a pretty amazing job at really changing the way we behave, and changing the way people fly.

But I really believe that we have not done the same for the ports in this country. I take it very personal and very—I am very respon-sible about keeping the people of my district safe, but also under-standing what an attack at one of our ports would mean to our na-tional and, dare I say, global economy.

I was happy 2012 that my legislation called the GAPS Act [Gaug-ing American Port Security Act], which would have required DHS to identify remaining gaps in our Nation’s port security, passed the House. And in last year’s appropriations bill, my amendment re-quiring an assessment of cybersecurity risks at our Nation’s most at-risk ports was included and passed. And I am looking forward to seeing the findings that are going to come out in August of that report.

And I am hoping, after today’s hearing, Congress will also seri-ously take into consideration my other bill called the SCAN Act [Scan Containers Absolutely Now Act], which would create a pilot program to test the implementation of 100 percent scanning tech-nology at two selected ports in this country.


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And Todd, I am going to direct my questions to you. It is a little disturbing when you keep saying 100 percent scanning, because that is really not the intent of the law that Congress passed in 2006 called the SAFE Port Act [Security and Accountability for Every Port Act]. That was 100 percent scanning using radiation and x ray. So for you to keep saying 100 percent scanning of all containers coming in our ports is really not accurate, and I wish you wouldn’t say that, because it makes people believe that we are following what Congress intended.

And it was unfortunate that Secretary Jeh Johnson has said 100 percent screening and scanning is not the best use of taxpayer re-sources, and they are delaying yet again Congress’ will by another 3 years.

You know, the CBO [Congressional Budget Office] estimated that meeting that mandate would cost about $22 billion to $32 billion over the course of 10 years, but we know—and that seems like a lot of money, but we know in 2002, when the west coast ports locked out the workers, we finally quantified that it was a $1 billion- to $2 billion-per-day hit to our economy. That lockout lasted 10 days, so there is your $20 billion right there. And if something were to happen at one of our ports, I think the economic risk, not to mention the loss of lives, would be enormous to this country.

Let’s say—you know, I really want to know what you think about—because people say—you are included—most everybody here said it would slow down commerce if we did 100 percent scan-ning the way Congress intended. But I have never seen that to be proven, one way or another. And my bill would say, fine, let’s test it at two ports. Let’s have 100 percent scanning, radiation and x ray. Let’s see. Because I believe there is technology that exists today that will accomplish both, that will keep us safe but will not slow commerce down.

If Congress decided to pass my bill, and we had a pilot program at two ports, what do you think—is there—do you think there is equipment that you would recommend that we could purchase or could use in testing this thing? I want somebody to prove me wrong, because I don’t think I am wrong on this one.

Mr. OWEN. Well, again, with the—the way the law defined 100 percent scanning, it was the radiation and the x ray.

Ms. HAHN. Right. Mr. OWEN. The radiation piece is doable, we are already doing

that. Ms. HAHN. Right. Mr. OWEN. We are doing that all around the world. It is the x-

ray piece. Ms. HAHN. Right. Mr. OWEN. I have not seen a piece of x-ray technology that has

yet to offer automatic anomaly detection. Every piece that I have seen still requires intervention from an operator to identify where the anomalies are, and that takes time.

As you know, Los Angeles, Long Beach, 13,000 containers a day. Under your act we would scan and x ray 13,000 containers a day. U.S. Customs and Border Protection currently has 10 pieces of non-intrusive inspection equipment to do that. We cannot do 13,000 containers a day in Los Angeles with the equipment that we have.


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So I think it is still an issue of the technology—— Ms. HAHN. Do you think there is technology out there that could

solve this problem that maybe you have not tried yet? Mr. OWEN. I have not yet seen technology that can solve the

problem. I know the vendors are working towards technology that can solve the problem, but I have not yet seen it deployed or in an operational setting, where it would not add to the further conges-tion of the ports. So I think that is something we need to keep in mind, too.

You mentioned the $22 billion to $32 billion that the CBO report last month mentions. That does not include the reciprocal costs if foreign governments require the same actions in our ports. So if we had to scan every container leaving the U.S. to go foreign—because that is the requirement we have placed on them—I would argue there would be a detrimental impact on the throughput of the com-merce through our ports, as well.

Ms. HAHN. You know, and I know my time is up, and—but, you know, I will tell you I just don’t buy that. And I am sorry, and I will say every single day that I think our ports are some of our most vulnerable entryways into this country. And until we act on what Congress decided, 100 percent scanning, I don’t think we are going to have the safety and security we need. And I think slowing down commerce is certainly not my first option, but the alternative, what would happen to slow down commerce in this country, nation-ally and globally, if one of our major ports were to have an incident that shut them down, is unthinkable to me.

And I hope we move forward with 100 percent scanning some day. I think that that should be our goal. I think we should move toward it. And I think there is technology out there. And the more, by the way—and this is my last statement—but the more, by the way, we begin to agree to that goal, we are opening up a great op-portunity for entrepreneurs and businesspeople to begin developing technology. But as long as we are shutting the door on that mar-ket, I don’t think we are going to see the kind of technology that I know we are capable of creating to do both, keep us safe and move commerce.

Thank you very much for the extra time. You know my passion about this.

Mr. HUNTER [presiding]. I thank the gentlelady. And our next panel is going to be a bunch of super-smart people on technology. So I hope you will stick around for that.

With that, Mr. Curbelo is recognized. Mr. CURBELO. Mr. Chairman, thank you for this opportunity, and

I thank all the witnesses for coming this morning. Admiral, a question for you. What is the Coast Guard doing to

monitor potential risk from small-vessel attacks in U.S. ports, and distinguish between legitimate vessel operators and those engaged in illicit activities? This is of particular interest to us in south Flor-ida. We have many small vessels in our waters. Please, go ahead.

Admiral FAGAN. Thank you. As you know, the small-vessel threat is exceedingly complex, and there is no one single agency that can, you know, counter the threat from small vessels and, you know, constant vigilance is a—is an important element in the small-vessel threat realm.


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Within the ports—and I can speak specifically from my time as the captain of the port in New York—there are a number of, you know, coordinating and communicating mechanisms through the Area Maritime Security Committee and others that help bring the other entities together to look at and understand what the risk and the threat streams may be.

I am confident that within the law enforcement and the intel-ligence information flow into those coordinating communicating mechanisms, that we have got a whole-of-government, including Federal, State, and local partner, look at this threat stream, as well as others that may confront a port community in the United States.

Mr. CURBELO. So it seems a daunting task to track small-vessel activity. Can you get into the degree of coordination you have with local authorities to help extend the Coast Guard’s reach and really monitor this as much as possible?

Admiral FAGAN. Yes. So the Coast Guard coordination—you know, we have talked about at the international level, I will talk very specifically now at the port level. And again, to my personal experience in the Port of New York, there were over 200 agencies that we were regularly coordinating and communicating with. There are daily phone calls with some of the key law enforcement partners and agencies to get at and share information exactly on threat streams, small vessels or otherwise.

That level of information and collaboration and coordination has never been better. There are other—you know, whether AIS [auto-matic identification system] and other technical means that then also allow insights into the number of vessels that are out there, and where that threat stream may be. Intelligence and law enforce-ment information really become powerful enablers as we look to counter threats from small vessels.

Mr. CURBELO. Also your testimony states the Coast Guard con-ducts over 400 routine inspections in general law enforcement boardings every day to ensure vessels comply with international maritime law and safety standards, applicable U.S. law and regula-tions, and any control procedures required to access the Nation’s ports.

Well, what are the infractions that are typical of one of these boardings or inspections?

Admiral FAGAN. So if it is a large commercial vessel, we have talked about the screening, the advance notice screening. The in-fraction could be denial of entry into the United States of the ves-sel. The captain of the port has a broad range of authorities and responsibilities, and would be well within that individual’s author-ity to prevent a vessel from entering, to hold a vessel in port re-quiring certain safety and security and environmental compliance regulations be met before that vessel moves, all the way down to— and in the small recreational vessel community it could be a viola-tion for failure to carry lifejackets. It runs the full breadth of safe-ty, security, environmental, and the sort of follow-on actions are commensurate with what——

Mr. CURBELO. Do you have a rough estimate of how many of these approximately 400 daily boardings are small vessels?

Admiral FAGAN. I do not have it, but I can get that for you——


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Mr. CURBELO. Sure. Admiral FAGAN [continuing]. Exactly what, you know, the num-

ber of large-vessel boardings, the small-vessel—what we call a 4100 boarding, how many of those are occurring each day. And I will provide you a more detailed breakdown.

[The information follows:]

The Coast Guard averaged over 400 boardings or inspections per day in FY15. The below table includes confirmed boardings of small (less than 300 gross tons) and/or recreational vessels, large (greater than 300 gross tons) vessels, and Safety/Security/Compliance Inspections of U.S.-flagged or for-eign-flagged vessels.

FY2015 Total Large Vsl Boardings

Small Vsl Boardings

U.S.-Flagged Vsl Inspections

Foreign- Flagged Vsl Inspections

Annual 157,169 15,512 52,495 56,378 33,079

Daily Avg. 434 42 144 156 92

Mr. CURBELO. Thank you, Admiral. Mr. Chairman, I yield back. Mr. HUNTER. I thank the gentleman. Mrs. Torres is recognized. Mrs. TORRES. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. I want to associate my-

self with the comments given by my colleague that represents the Port of Los Angeles and Long Beach. I represent the 35th Congres-sional District. Everything that comes through those two ports makes its way to my district. We have lots of warehouses. Logistics is the business of the district.

So, yes, I am very, very concerned about containers coming through, whether it is coming through the Alameda corridor or it is coming through by truck on the I–10 or the Route 60 freeway, which are regularly overcrowded with commuters trying to make their way to and from their jobs in Los Angeles to the Inland Em-pire.

It is alarming to me that we have continued to ask for exten-sions. In this last request to extend this 100-percent check, is this your last request? I mean what assurances do we have that you ac-tually have the technical expertise to deliver on your promise to Congress that you could meet the requirement given?

Dr. BRASURE. So what we are doing in response to the Sec-retary’s new look at the legislation is to—we have put out an RFI, request for information, to look broadly at both material and non-material solutions to the 100-percent overseas scanning. And we re-ceived—we targeted not just technology solutions, but broadly look into the private sector, for instance, to gain their insights, port op-erators, trade unions, just broadly and innovatively across the over-all enterprise.

We received approximately 30 responses back last month, and my team at DNDO is right now evaluating those responses. And indeed, they came from not only technology companies, but all the entities I just mentioned, they responded.

So, once we evaluate those, we expect to hold meetings in ses-sions with the successful respondents in the August-to-September


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timeframe, and we would be happy to come back and brief you on——

Mrs. TORRES. So these 30 new responses, they are different from what previously you have received? And how are they different?

Dr. BRASURE. So they are different because we looked, again, more broadly beyond technology companies. And I would like to point out that, with respect to technology companies, we are cur-rently piloting and evaluating technologies that could be applied to 100 percent scanning, and we are in various stages of evaluation in pilots for such technology solutions.

But again, the RFI is addressing more broadly inputs from, again, the private sector and looking to them for their solutions, and they are sharing in this 100-percent scanning activity.

Mrs. TORRES. Rear Admiral, in your testimony you state that the Coast Guard conducts foreign port assessments and have visited more than 1,200 port facilities. Does the Coast Guard share those results of the security assessments with U.S. ports, such as the Port of Los Angeles and the Port of Long Beach?

Admiral FAGAN. So the outcome of those port visits and port as-sessments factor into our risk-based screening, as we determine what the risk portfolio around a large commercial—presenting to the United States from a passenger and cargo and crew standpoint, and that is then factored in to, you know, the decisions on whether you are going to do boarding offshore at the anchorage, or into the port.

In cases where there is a particular concern, say, with a crew-member that you are concerned may get off the ship, there are then, you know, additional security measures that are coordinated, you know, through the Coast Guard and the captain of the port au-thorities. I am not sure how much is publicly shared in the unclas-sified realm, but I do know it is very fundamental to our valuation of risk associated with a ship because of having called at one of those——

Mrs. TORRES. I am more concerned—— Admiral FAGAN [continuing]. A port that might not—— Mrs. TORRES [continuing]. Ma’am, about sharing lessons learned,

you know, what you are learning about potential risks, not nec-essarily attached to, you know, personnel, but logistics types of risks, where we could do a better job sharing information with the port authorities, as well as—I want to make sure that you are in-cluding—and this is for all of you—don’t forget that, you know, the shipments that you are not inspecting eventually make their way to districts like myself, putting millions and millions of people at risk.

And I think, you know, we really need to look at and consider what is the life—the cost of the lives of these millions of people that are being put at risk when we fall down and continue to ask for extensions? I understand, you know, that there are technical challenges, but at some point we need you to deliver on what Con-gress has asked you to do.

And with that I yield back. Mr. HUNTER. I thank the gentlelady. And I would like to point

out, too, to Ms. Hahn, we have the RFI that the Department of Homeland Security has put out to—an open RFI that said, ‘‘Hey,


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come one, come all, bring your technology, bring your best stuff, we want to see it, we want to do this,’’ right? It is right here. If any-body would like to see this, too, we have it on hand.

Ladies and gentlemen, thank you very much for your time, for your service to our Nation, and for doing what you do. Because without you we wouldn’t have—we would not be as safe as we are now. And I just hope that you are always seeing the new chal-lenges coming up and—especially when, once again, when people will kill themselves to kill 20 Americans, they will happily sacrifice their lives to Allah to kill thousands of Americans. I think that that raises the stakes. Like Ms. McSally said, when you put in— when you combine terrorists with weapons of mass destruction, it is a whole new ball game. And that is where we are right now.

So thank you very much, and we can have our next panel of wit-nesses come up. Thank you. And I will go ahead and introduce them now.

On our second panel of witnesses, Ms. Jennifer Grover is the Di-rector of Homeland Security and Justice for the U.S. GAO. She will be the first to present testimony. Then we have Dr. Gregory Canavan, a senior fellow of the Los Alamos National Laboratories; Mr. David Espie, the director of security at the Port of Baltimore; and the final witness, Mr. James Weakley, president of the Lake Carriers’ Association.

And I would like to preface this next panel. I would hope that everybody that was on the next panel was present here during the first panel. And if you could, let’s talk about what we just heard. We had a classified hearing yesterday, we just had this hearing now, and you just heard how our Government offices are trying to treat any kind of weapons of mass destruction, from the far-flung areas of Moldova and Georgia and Ukraine all the way to our shores, checking small boats and also checking with other countries and having them help us by checking stuff as it leaves their na-tions.

So, Ms. Grover, if you would start, and I don’t necessarily have any questions specifically for this panel, but I would like you to comment on what you just heard. Because, I mean, that is the American security system you just saw for weapons of mass de-struction. They were just here, they just talked, so I am curious what your take is. Thank you.

TESTIMONY OF JENNIFER A. GROVER, DIRECTOR, HOMELAND SECURITY AND JUSTICE, U.S. GOVERNMENT ACCOUNT-ABILITY OFFICE; GREGORY H. CANAVAN, PH.D., SENIOR FEL-LOW, LOS ALAMOS NATIONAL LABORATORIES; DAVID A. ESPIE, DIRECTOR OF SECURITY, MARYLAND PORT ADMINIS-TRATION, PORT OF BALTIMORE, ON BEHALF OF THE AMER-ICAN ASSOCIATION OF PORT AUTHORITIES; AND JAMES H.I. WEAKLEY, PRESIDENT, LAKE CARRIERS’ ASSOCIATION

Ms. GROVER. Yes, sir. Good morning, Chairman Hunter, Chair-woman McSally, Ranking Member Garamendi. I will focus most of my comments today on the perspectives that you heard from CBP.

With about 12 million cargo shipments arriving each year, the U.S. maritime ports do indeed remain vulnerable to smuggling. CBP has determined that it does not have the resources to examine


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every shipment. So, instead, what they are doing is counteracting the smuggling threat by identifying and examining the high-risk shipments. Yet, ensuring that this approach functions properly is indeed still a work in progress.

So, I will focus on two points. First of all, how does—how well does CBP do in identifying those high-risk shipments for examina-tion? And then, secondly, how well do they do in actually exam-ining the high-risk shipments that have been identified?

So, the automated targeted system is the heart of CBP’s ability to identify those high-risk shipments that could contain weapons of mass destruction, illegal drugs, counterfeit goods, or other prohib-ited items. The system works by designating every shipment as low, medium, or high risk, based on a broad range of information that is submitted by importers, vessel carriers, intelligence, and other Government and public sources. It is used to identify the high-risk cargo before it is loaded onto vessels at the foreign ports, as well as to identify high-risk shipments approaching the U.S. ports. Thus, it is essential that the system be accurate.

In 2012, GAO found that CBP updated this system without eval-uating the impact of the update on the accuracy of the targeting. At the time, CBP’s data on its targeting accuracy suggested consid-erable room for improvement. Specifically, of all the shipments found during examination to include contraband, such as guns or drug shipments, only 6 percent had been identified by the targeting system as high risk. Now, this is data from 2011 and 2012, because this was from a 2012 report.

In other words, the remaining 94 percent of shipments that were actually found to have contraband during examination had been identified as low or medium risk by the system. Also, at the time, CBP did not have a target accuracy rate, which was limiting their ability to monitor progress in the area.

Now, last year, CBP responded to GAO’s recommendations by setting a target accuracy rate, and by requiring that future system updates should evaluate the impact that it would have on accuracy, as well as on workload. And therefore, they are in a better position to monitor the accuracy, going forward. And I can tell you that the targeting accuracy rate now is significantly improved over where it was in 2012, and the component continues to refine the targeting and the method for analysis.

So now let me just take a minute or two and talk about how well CBP does at ensuring that those high-risk shipments are actually examined after they have been identified. So CBP’s policy is that every high-risk shipment must be examined, unless the exam has been waived by a CBP officer. In a 2015 report we found that, of the roughly 120,000 high-risk maritime shipments that are proc-essed each year—that were processed each year, 2009 through 2013, most, about 90 percent, were actually examined.

But CBP did not have good data on the disposition of the other 10 percent that should have been waived. Our review of the data showed that some of those shipments weren’t actually high risk, so they would not have needed to be examined. Some were examined and recorded improperly, but there were some that were not waived, but also not examined, in violation of CBP policy. And among those that had been waived, we found that the CBP officers


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varied in their understanding of the waiver categories and criteria, which could lead some shipments to be examined unnecessarily in a waste of resources, and other shipments waived that should have been examined.

So, we made several recommendations which CBP has addressed. They have new guidance and policy that should enhance consist-ency across CBP officers, thus leading to greater assurances that all of the high-risk cargo will either be examined or waived, as ap-propriate.

So just one or two other points on some of the issues that came up today, and that is to acknowledge that maritime ports are in-deed vulnerable to smuggling by means other than cargo con-tainers.

Small-vessel securities was one of the topics that was discussed by the previous panel; that does indeed remain a challenge because small vessels are unregulated. They are just hard to track.

Another example of a different type of vulnerability besides the cargo containers is that ports remain vulnerable to illegitimate ac-cess through weaknesses in the TWIC [Transportation Worker Identification Credential] access card program, which is the way that—the system that is used to control access to the ports.

So DHS does have multiple initiatives in place to address both of those issues. They are aware of the concerns, and they are mak-ing progress, although more work needs to be done.

So, to conclude, DHS does indeed have multiple systems in place intended to ensure port security, to identify and examine cargo shipments at high risk for smuggling, but in this area of Govern-ment operations, as in many others, it is essential that the Depart-ment implement the programs as intended and, very importantly, monitor outcomes to maximize security.

Thank you for the opportunity, and I look forward to any ques-tions you may have.

Mr. HUNTER. Thanks, Ms. Grover. Dr. Canavan, good to see you again. You are recognized. Dr. CANAVAN. It is nice to be back. I am here to talk about the

detection of clandestine nuclear weapons. The last time I was here I made the argument, which I think has

held up pretty well, that fast neutrons could be used to detect bare nuclear weapons in things of the size of, say, a TEU [twenty-foot equivalent unit] or two TEU, for weapons that were in with a manifest of ordinary things, normally in one of those containers. This time I want to extend that to say I believe that the same ap-proach can be used to detect nuclear weapons which are in TEUs, but instead of just the bare core itself, something with a basketball size of moderator or absorber around it to minimize its signatures to make it harder to detect.

I am talking about nuclear weapons rather than the dirty bombs which have been primarily discussed up to this point. And I am emphasizing weapons, because nuclear weapon material—uranium or plutonium—has essentially no useful and reliable signature that can be detected passively. Uranium and plutonium have a few gammas that are easily screened out by a thin layer of lead. So you really do need to do something to excite the system in order to get


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a signal out—in this case a fission, a unique and discernable signa-ture that leads to high-confidence detection.

I am sorry Ms. Hahn left, because it is also a very fast detection system. It has a very low false alarm ratio. Therefore, it would be suitable to inspection of everything that goes through a port, rather than just a fraction of it, because it is fast and doesn’t have the false alarm problems for reasons that I will come back to in just a minute.

It is largely the same story as the previous testimony. Fast neu-trons scatter around inside the container. If they encounter nuclear material, they produce fission. The fission neutrons diffuse out as a distinct and pervasive signal that is easily detected.

The reactions that produce the fission neutrons produce a big separation in energy between the source neutrons and the fission neutrons, which is the basis for high signal-to-noise ratio detection. Filtering between the two energies detects the signal.

A couple of quick points. One is that the fast neutrons penetrate a large portion of material to produce this direct signal. Even when something is buried in an enormous amount of moderator, the high signal return from the moderator itself still reveals the composition and thickness of that moderator, which signals the object’s in-tended purpose.

A related point that I thought would have come up the last time, but didn’t, is that when someone puts additional moderator around a weapon to hide its signature from the weapon, that increases its signature and criticality.

As an example, if you take a solid-core device, the kind Pakistan has put into international commerce now, back off about 10 percent margin for safety, but then add another 15 centimeters of moder-ator around it for signature reduction, you return it right back up to criticality. That won’t hurt us, but might be a problem for the person who assembles it at the point of origin.

A related point is that when you put fast neutrons into a nuclear assembly, it produces fewer fast neutrons than you put in. So you cannot generate a critical assembly, or a nuclear explosion, by nu-clear interrogation itself of a subcritical device. So that is not an additional concern.

A related point is that when you interrogate a nuclear assembly with a moderator around it, the neutrons bounce back and forth be-tween the core and moderator and produce fission many times. The net result is that you get a signal that persists many—10, 100— times longer than the length of the exciting pulse. It is a distinct signal with high energy that persists for long times and propagates long distances from the device.

A technical point is that the detection on the basis of energy de-pends on the ratio of the difference in energy between the fission and the source neutrons divided by their variance. I am sorry, this is statistics 101, I can see you are not appreciating this, sir. No more math, no more math.

[Laughter.] Dr. CANAVAN. But the point is that fission produces a big energy

separation, and for fundamental reasons, the variances of the fis-sion neutrons become smaller in time as they go down in energy. Their signal-to-noise ratios get to be 100, 1,000, 10,000. With very


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high signal-to-noise, you have very low false alarm ratios, which is what Ms. Hahn was alluding to.

And so, it is everything that you would like to have. Plus, as it turns out, the way the statistics go together, the high signal-noise ratios that you generate are quite insensitive to the statistics of the noise, so the signals remain exceedingly high.

To put this into context, x rays can tell you that there is mass, but can’t tell you what it is. Passive sensors can’t detect nuclear materials with low signals. There is nothing to detect. And thermal neutrons, which is what the DOD [Department of Defense] spent most of its money on after 9/11, produce complicated detection schemes with low statistics that are easy to counter measure.

Overall, fast neutron interrogation offers an approach that would fit well with the sensors and mountings for these existing systems, and would produce what I think is an exceedingly high signal noise, low false alarm, high throughput system, based on fairly straightforward physics that is used in reactors and experiments every day, sensors that are used today for down-hole well-hole log-ging, and detectors that are used for reactors and experimental physics for measurements are made at fairly low and benign ener-gies.

Thank you very much, sir, and I am sorry about the math. Ms. MCSALLY [presiding]. Thank you, Dr. Canavan. I am having

flashbacks to my physics classes at the Air Force Academy. I won’t sleep well tonight. But we got some good questions based on the technology that you discussed.

And Mr. Espie, you are now recognized for 5 minutes. Mr. ESPIE. Thank you, Chairmen Hunter and McSally, and

Ranking Member Garamendi, for convening this hearing today. I am testifying today through your invitation, and on behalf of the American Association of Port Authorities, where I am a member of the Security Committee. This is a vital topic, which could ulti-mately impact the safety and security of the United States if not addressed in a cohesive and expedited manner.

In my role as director of security for the Port of Baltimore, the prevention of maritime nuclear smuggling into the United States is a top priority, and it requires a multifaceted approach. It requires the input of diplomatic resources, technical assets, human capital, and appropriate funding to facilitate subsequent preventative methodologies. All this requires a strong partnership with the Fed-eral Government.

As a retired FBI agent and former special agent with the Na-tional Security Agency, I also view our security from a national and international perspective that must empower ports to be more en-gaged in our national security apparatus. In my experience, it is vital that our Government have sound diplomatic relationships with countries that will cooperate with the United States in not only applying necessary security measures to secure their own nu-clear materials, but will also assist in countering a neighboring country or one in the certain region that may possess such material and may have negative intentions against our country and others.

Global diplomacy and policies impact local port security enforce-ment. Positive measures currently in play are the State Depart-ment’s Counter Nuclear Smuggling Unit, the Department of Ener-


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gy’s partnership with nearly 50 countries providing radiation detec-tion and nuclear forensics equipment, and the recent Nuclear Secu-rity Summit held here in Washington.

I cannot emphasize enough the importance of technical aspects of our intelligence and Federal law enforcement agencies that must be continually deployed and refined.

Existing capabilities and resources must be deployed and fully capable in order to maximize our country’s opportunity to readily identify and neutralize potential threats. Development and tasking of domestic and international sources must remain a priority for in-telligence agencies and services and our local State and Federal law enforcement agencies. In some cases I believe it would be bene-ficial for our port security directors in the United States to receive FBI briefings.

The threat of maritime terrorist smuggling appears to be increas-ing, possibly in correlation with the flight of Syrian refugees to and from Europe. Recently, a stowaway on a roll-on, roll-off vessel des-tined for the Port of Baltimore was located by a ship’s crew and taken into custody by CBP and HSI [Homeland Security Investiga-tions]. The stowaway admitted that he boarded the vessel while it was docked at a German port. Approximately 1 week prior to this event, a shipping lines manager in Baltimore advised me that his lines had experienced several stowaway attempts by Syrian nation-als in Germany, as well.

Directors of port security in the United States are not routinely granted a security clearance with the Federal Government, and hence are not provided classified briefings regarding threats to their ports. In addition, port security directors are unaware of any type of unique intelligence centers wherein maritime nuclear smug-gling intelligence is specifically received and analyzed in an effort to connect the dots, if you will, and prevent such an incident.

The suspects of maritime nuclear smuggling efforts are numer-ous. The actions and aggressiveness of ISIL, for example, are chal-lenging all aspects of our port security procedures. The threat from ISIL emerges on several fronts. First, the size of ISIL’s force is sub-stantial. Secondly, ISIL is not a congruent entity. Its leadership re-mains in a fractured state and, subsequently, subfractions form that are very difficult to identify or even trace. Third, ISIL’s use of the Internet and related systems to recruit both actual soldiers or lone wolves has proven to be extremely successful.

As a former police officer, now as a port security director, re-sources that can be utilized at the local level are vitally important. FEMA’s [Federal Emergency Management Agency’s] Port Security Grant Program has been instrumental in coordinating port-specific security needs with national and global threats.

The AAPA [American Association of Port Authorities] encourages Congress to continue to fund the Port Security Grant Program, but also insist that grant funding be directed to ports and not diluted to other law enforcement entities that are not associated specifi-cally with ports.

Cybersecurity is also a prime example of emergency security con-cerns since 9/11. Ports are working with stakeholders in addressing this very complex issue. For example, in a recent survey conducted by the AAPA, it was found that 52 percent of our ports have con-


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ducted a cybersecurity assessment within the last 3 years and 67 of our ports’ Area Maritime Security Committees have formed a cybersecurity working group.

Cargo containers have been identified as the most plausible mechanism for smuggling nuclear material into the United States. Over 11 million containers are shipped to our Nation’s 300 sea and river ports on an annual basis. With the recent completion of the Panama Canal expansion, the number of containers from foreign ports will dramatically rise.

Congress previously mandated that all incoming containers to the United States be screened overseas. To date, this law has not procedurally been incorporated wherein exemptions have been em-ployed by the Department of Homeland Security. Recently, an ex-tension of the law’s implementation was again approved by DHS with the support of the AAPA and by also 100 supply chain indus-try stakeholders. It has been estimated that it would cost approxi-mately $20 billion to deploy scanning procedures and technology at the 700 foreign ports which ship cargo to the United States.

And I mentioned containers. This does not cover what we call roll-on, roll-off cargo—RoRo cargo—vehicles. In the Port of Balti-more we receive over a half million vehicles a year. They are not scanned as they come to the United States.

In sense of time, I would just like to go to the conclusion to whereas—again, our—in summary, our Nation’s strategy to pre-vent maritime nuclear smuggling must utilize a holistic approach. This strategy should continue to incorporate diplomatic engage-ment; utilize the intelligence community, human and technical as-sets; continue the examination of port security protocols to include those which are federally mandated and those imposed by port op-erators themselves; increase funding of the Federal Emergency Management Agency’s Port Security Grant Program to ensure ports are and remain in Federal compliance; and the investment of appropriate funding levels for Federal agencies, particular CBP, in order for current and future legislative mandates to be properly im-plemented.

Again, I thank you for this opportunity, and I am glad to answer any questions directly and explicitly.

Ms. MCSALLY. Thank you, Mr. Espie. The Chair now recognizes Mr. Weakley for 5 minutes.

Mr. WEAKLEY. Good morning. There is a tremendous interest in the intersection between our maritime industry and homeland se-curity. Our Nation’s water borders far exceed our land borders.

The Great Lakes demonstrate the importance of marine home-land security. The southern land border of the United States is about 2,000 miles long. However, the Canada-U.S. border is three times as long, and much of that is water. I represent 14 American companies who operate 56 vessels on the Great Lakes. We carry the raw material that drives our economy: iron ore and flux stone for steel, aggregate and cement for construction, coal for power, and other cargoes. We transport 100 million tons of cargo a year, and employ 1,600 Americans. Our cargoes generate 103,000 jobs with an economic impact of $20 billion.

I will focus the majority of my testimony on how my members transition their vessels from homeland security risks to resources.


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The Great Lakes are tied together by connecting channels and locks. The St. Lawrence Seaway connects us to global trade. The navigation channel crosses the U.S.-Canadian border 17 times in the Detroit-St. Clair River alone. Canadian and American fleets compete for the cross-lake cargo. In 2013 it was 37 million tons. Canadians carry 93 percent of it; Americans carried only 3 million tons.

Foreign-flagged vessels primarily import steel and export grain via the Great Lakes. DHS warns an interruption of domestic ship-ping through a single lock in Michigan would have catastrophic im-pacts on the regional and national economy, and would plunge North America into a severe recession. DHS estimates that 11 mil-lion Americans would become unemployed if this lock were inoper-able for 6 months. The resulting loss of 60 million tons of cargo would drive Michigan’s unemployment to 22 percent, exceeding its peak unemployment rate of 15 percent during the 2009 recession.

The Jones Act is the fundamental law of American maritime in-dustry, and also a fundamental law of American homeland secu-rity. It requires that any cargo moving between our ports be car-ried on U.S.-built, U.S.-owned, and U.S.-crewed vessels. In other words, American vessels. One of the most important benefits of the Jones Act is homeland security, which includes the prevention of smuggling and much more.

Former Senator Slade Gorton wrote, ‘‘helping to plug a porous border is a benefit of the Jones Act that is far too often overlooked.’’ The single most important thing you can do to promote maritime homeland security is to support the Jones Act. I have worked for the Coast Guard, for an American shipping company, and now for LCA [Lake Carriers’ Association]. I strongly believe the Jones Act is our best line of maritime homeland defense.

Risk is a combination of threat and vulnerability. The Coast Guard uses the MARSEC [Maritime Security Threat Level] system to relay threat levels. Once notified, we take action. The second as-pect of risk is vulnerability. LCA members use our Coast Guard- approved alternative security plan to minimize our vulnerability. We deploy many security measures, including access control, pe-rimeter expansion, personnel screening, vessel security sweeps, random baggage searches, inspections of cargo, and inspections of ship stores. We adjust our security profile based on threat level, vessel operations, and operational area.

Professional mariners recognize something afoul, and notify the Coast Guard via the Eyes on the Water program. Shipboard radars can detect and monitor uncooperative aircraft and vessels. We are partnering with a vendor to record radar screens and to allow re-mote access. Providing historical pictures can reveal suspicious ac-tivity. Remote access provides actionable information. These low- cost programs make our homeland more secure. We are proud to be full partners.

Threats to homeland security are daunting. Every day we exe-cute security plans, cooperate with law enforcement, implement in-novative programs, and defend the Jones Act.

Our goal, as Americans, is to transition from security risk to se-curity resource. Thank you.


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Mr. HUNTER [presiding]. Thanks, Mr. Weakley. It is kind of funny. We were talking about privateering, actually, when James Madison—and how he gave—he basically deputized American mer-chant mariners to go protect America’s shores and ocean, some-thing we are looking at, a little bit tongue in cheek, but not really. I mean, because that is what—in San Diego we had the same thing, where our sport fishermen are out there on the water every day, watching boats going in from Mexico, and they know who is good and who is bad. And CBP relies on them massively because a lot of these guys are former cops, former security specialists, mili-tary, and they are on the water every day. So thank you.

Two things. Ms. Grover, one, do you know—has GAO looked at— let’s look at this, let’s look at 90 percent of what the Coast Guard does in terms of interdicting drugs and stuff and people, compared to what would happen if you have a nuclear device go off. Have you looked at the percentage of resources, time, and assets that are used for a—for homeland security, meaning stopping a weapon of mass destruction, versus all the other stuff that the Coast Guard does?

Ms. GROVER. In terms of the Coast Guard’s assets, I believe that the intent was to dedicate about 18 percent of all of the asset re-source hours to the ports and coastal waterway security missions. So roughly 20 percent off the top. Now, that would include more than just port security, strictly.

So, for a $9 billion-a-year organization—that is just the entity part of it, not the personnel part of it, but the people go along with entity, so they—that is a significant area of work for the Coast Guard.

Mr. HUNTER. So 20 percent, then. Ms. GROVER. About 18 percent, yes, for 2016 was their intent for

the resource allocation for the assets. Mr. HUNTER. I am just trying to balance out the outcome of a

weapon of mass destruction going off versus what they—how much time they spend on this. Because if you combine all the other bad stuff that the Coast Guard stops coming in, I was just—in Colom-bia you have got cocaine flowing in like water to the U.S. Doesn’t seem to be any way to stop it. And a lot of the Members that were with us asked a question, ‘‘Well, hey, what if we took our focus off the drugs and put it on the weapons of mass destruction? What more could we interdict, and how much safer would we be?’’

I am curious if the GAO would look at that at some point in the future, saying if the Coast Guard spends 40 percent of its time interdicting weapons of mass destruction, or trying to, and keeping an eye out for those things specifically, how much does that de-crease the probability or likelihood of a weapon like that being put on U.S. soil?

Ms. GROVER. Yes, we would be happy to do that in the future. Mr. HUNTER. That would be great. I think that is important, be-

cause then the Coast Guard could look at what they are doing and say, ‘‘Hey, maybe we should spend more time on this.’’

Dr. Canavan, I guess the big question is this. Ms. Hahn asked— what is the gentleman’s name from CBP? Mr. Owens. He said that they have devices, they have technology right now to be able to


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look at everything, but not without a human person there, without a person there. And I have seen this stuff.

SAIC in San Diego has got a system that they are selling all over the world—not to us, but all over the world, but it still takes a per-son there, trained to recognize that that thing—that there is some-thing shielded, that the neutrinos are acting weird around some circular device, or that there’s weapons or drugs or—it still takes a person. And I guess their answer is, if you have a person that slows things down massively—that was basically their answer to Ms. Hahn’s question was it makes things too slow, it is going to back it up. It is going to be like TSA [Transportation Security Ad-ministration] at the airport, but in our ports. And nobody wants that. Nobody wants a TSA in our ports, right? They are doing bad enough already, just with humans, right?

So I guess the question is what exists, if anything, right now, where it doesn’t take a person?

Dr. CANAVAN. Well, that is what I am saying. It is unfortunate Ms. Hahn stepped out, because that——

Mr. HUNTER. Turn your mic on, please. Dr. CANAVAN. Have I done it again, sir? The—that is exactly

what I was shooting for, was a system that had a—if you have a very high signal-to-noise ratio, which is what you can get from math that I won’t go into here——

Mr. HUNTER. Thank you. Dr. CANAVAN. Then you have a very low false alarm rate to

where you don’t have any need for a human intervention. So that is——

Mr. HUNTER. I see. Dr. CANAVAN. At the top level, that is the answer. The other an-

swer is that whether you use x rays or whatever, the—they are only sensitive to mass. They don’t know what the mass is. To them a bomb looks—has the same kind of material in it—as a ball bear-ing. The reason you have a human operator there to look at these from all different angles, having seen all this many times before, to add human experience, is because you have a lousy signal to start with. All you know is that something bounced a lot of x rays back. With fast neutron interrogation, you actually are stimulating the core of the thing you are looking for to release fission neutrons, which have a unique and specific and high signature, which can’t be confused with hardly anything else in the universe.

So you have a great signature to start with, a real signature, and not just some x rays getting bounced around. Plus you have a very high signal-to-noise ratio. That is why the goal that I had was not only to find a nuclear weapon, but to be able to candle everything that went through a port. And I think that is what I have tried to demonstrate in the testimony that I prepared.

Incidentally, I would like to ask that that be submitted for the record. I forgot to ask before.

Mr. HUNTER. Say again. Oh, without objection. So I think my last thing is I think what the Coast Guard is going

to do, and what DHS is going to do, is try to get the 100-percent perfect solution, which will take them a decade. It will take billions of dollars, and they are going to try to be able to find everything from weapons to cocaine to weapons of mass destruction, as op-


34

posed to just really narrowing it down to weapons of mass destruc-tion, which is what I think they should totally focus on to the det-riment of some of the other sectors, like drug interdiction and human smuggling and weapons.

But you are saying that it is possible to not have a human to check for weapons of mass destruction, nuclear devices, with a very low false positive rate, everything that comes in very quickly?

Dr. CANAVAN. Yes, sir. That is what I was shooting at. And like I say, there are two things. One thing is that there is a real nu-clear signature from a nuclear weapon. Nothing else looks like it when you hit it with fast neutrons. So the one thing is you have a real signature that you don’t with all the others. I am not criti-cizing what these other groups are doing. You do what you can. If they just have systems that have very indirect signatures, I think they are working very hard to get the very best they can out of that.

What I am saying here is that for reasons that nobody bothered to look at for some reason, there is a system that gives you the combination of a unique nuclear signature and a very high signal- to-noise ratio, low false alarm rate that sort of gets you away from reliance on all of these other signatures that are very indirect.

Mr. HUNTER. What system is that? Dr. CANAVAN. Sir? Mr. HUNTER. What system is that? Does that system exist? I

mean does a company make that? Dr. CANAVAN. No. This is my own little research project. Well,

maybe I should form a company. Mr. HUNTER. You want to talk to Gene Ray in San Diego. They

have a neutrino system that I have seen tested. They had a lead- encased nuclear device—not a nuclear device, but lead-encased nuke stuff in a car, and they have a system where it does exactly what you say. And they are selling it to other countries, not to us.

Dr. CANAVAN. Well, the neutrinos are nice, but they don’t inter-act very well, and the sources are terrible. But the thing that is popular right now, the closest thing, is muon detection, and that is what a company is testing in Freeport, in the Bahamas.

Mr. HUNTER. Yes. Dr. CANAVAN. And that works well. But again, it just measures

mass, it does not measure nuclear signatures. And so, you know, I don’t want to criticize what other people are

doing. You do—you try—everybody is trying to put together a good system, based on whatever we have, which ain’t much. After 9/11 it was basically nothing, right?

Mr. HUNTER. Right. Dr. CANAVAN. So people are trying very hard to do the right

thing. I am just saying I think this is a very nice system which, for some reason, we just skipped over. And I would like to see somebody pick it up and do it.

Mr. HUNTER. Thank you, Doctor. Ms. McSally? Ms. MCSALLY. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. Ms. Grover, CBP testified that they are scanning—although

there is limitations to that—3 to 4 percent of containers that are coming in, based on their high-risk designation. You just testified


35

that in the sample that you were talking about from a couple years ago, of the group that they called high risk, it only successfully identified 6 percent accurately to be high risk, missing 94 percent of the actual high-risk containers is what I understood. That is a pretty dismal number.

You since said that they have improved. Are we now at 7 percent and we are missing 93 percent, or where are we right now? That was very disconcerting to hear.

Ms. GROVER. So let’s take a minute and talk about this. The 3- to 4-percent scanning, I think what they were referring to is the percentage of containers that are ultimately subject to the x-ray exam, the nonintrusive inspection exam——

Ms. MCSALLY. Right. Ms. GROVER [continuing]. Right, that takes an image—— Ms. MCSALLY. But their whole briefing and everything yesterday

was based on them identifying high threat, high risk. Ms. GROVER. Right. So roughly 1 percent of the cargo shipments

are identified as high risk. And those are the ones that then are required to go through the NII [nonintrusive inspection] so that there is an image that is taken, and the image has to be read by a person.

Ms. MCSALLY. Right. Ms. GROVER. And the question is then do we unpack the con-

tainer to find out what this is, or does it look like it is OK and we can let it go through, right? And the procedure varies at the dif-ferent ports, based on what the rules are.

Ms. MCSALLY. Right. Ms. GROVER. So, I think we are all in agreement that that is, for

the most part, occurring as intended, right? Some room for im-provement in the accurate identification of high-risk——

Ms. MCSALLY. But you said previously—— Ms. GROVER. Right. Right, right—— Ms. MCSALLY [continuing]. It was 94 percent missed. Ms. GROVER. Right. So this is a proxy measure that CBP uses

to get a handle on how well does this ATS [Advanced Targeting System] do at identifying high-risk cargo, right? Because they don’t really know the true accuracy of that system, because you don’t know what you——

Ms. MCSALLY. What you missed. Ms. GROVER [continuing]. Have missed, right? Ms. MCSALLY. Right. Ms. GROVER. Because 99 percent of the shipments—— Ms. MCSALLY. Right. Ms. GROVER [continuing]. Are determined to be low or medium

risk, and generally speaking, moving on through. So we don’t actu-ally know what we have missed.

Ms. MCSALLY. So did I misunderstand—— Ms. GROVER. But—— Ms. MCSALLY [continuing]. That 6 percent and 94 percent? Ms. GROVER. So—well, of the containers that are unpacked,

right, of the shipments that are actually subject to physical exam, some number of those have contraband. And CBP keeps records of that. And then they go back and they look and they say, OK, this shipment was unpacked for whatever reason, because it was high-


36

risk or random or for some other reason. Of the ones that we actu-ally looked at, how many had contraband? And then let’s go back to the original designation and say was it originally designated as high risk by the system or not.

And so, yes, for the 9 months or so of data that we looked at in 2011, 2012, the system had only identified 6 percent as high risk. So 94 percent were not. Now, subsequent to that, in the process of responding to our recommendations, the last two quarters of data that I saw were somewhere more in the neighborhood of 25 to 50 percent, which is significantly better.

Ms. MCSALLY. Twenty-five to fifty correctly? There are 50 to 75 percent still missed?

Ms. GROVER. Yes, and that is data from the, you know, roughly late 2014——

Ms. MCSALLY. OK. Ms. GROVER [continuing]. Time period. So I don’t have current

data. But, yes, those are the last numbers we—— Ms. MCSALLY. So this is still a problem. If our whole model is

based on them identifying high risk, and we are still somewhere in, you know, less than 50 percent being correctly identified, then that is still a problem.

Ms. GROVER. They are still working on it. Ms. MCSALLY. OK. Mr. Espie, what you shared about not getting

access to classified information, you know, port directors not having a sense of what the risks are, we have heard similar things across the private sector in homeland security related to those running sports arenas and other potential targets and vulnerabilities for terrorist attack or terrorist activity. This has been of high interest to me.

So you have no access to fusion centers, no—I just want to make sure we clarify. No access to fusion centers. Would you be inter-ested in having access to fusion centers, you know, classified infor-mation briefings for appropriate people at the port? I mean this seems like a gaping hole. We have done better sharing information across Federal agencies, but where we are really missing is Federal down to State and local, and then with the private sector is the real gaping hole.

So, could you just clarify what you would desire, as a solution? Mr. ESPIE. Thank you, yes. I am fortunate, though. I will note

that I do have a secret clearance, and the only reason I do is be-cause I pushed for it through our Baltimore FBI office and through my previous holdings of certain clearances. So I am one of the for-tunate ones, probably one of the maybe three or four in the country that have a clearance, in terms of port security directors. So I would look for a model following 9/11 when you saw local police de-partments at the captain level or so gaining clearances through be-coming members of the executive JTTF [Joint Terrorism Task Force] structure within the FBI offices. I would certainly support that.

But overall, even though I have that clearance, I receive nothing. I do not—I am not invited to classified briefings, I do not receive classified information via DHS, Coast Guard. The Bureau, they have just recently offered me to come to classified executive-type


37

briefings. They are held once a month, so I am going to take advan-tage of that.

I am confident that if there was information I needed to know, that I would be provided that from our Maryland fusion center. However, I have been here 5 years and have received zero.

Ms. MCSALLY. So, Mr. Chairman, I think this is an area to follow up on. You know, we have been addressing this issue with trying to increase access for the private sector. I think we could probably work together across our committees to maybe work on some initia-tives on this.

Thank you, Mr. Chairman. I yield back. Mr. HUNTER. That is an easy fix. That is a quick, easy fix, fixing

that. Mr. Garamendi, you are recognized. Mr. GARAMENDI. Chair McSally, you seem to always anticipate

my questions. And you were on to one that is very important. I was just thinking as you were asking your question about the recent re-port that was produced by the French Government on the terrorist attack in France. And the one thing that was most prominent in that report and in other reports is the inability or the lack of shar-ing of information between the various elements of the safety net, the various police, the intelligence community, and the like. And this is a question that Mr. Espie just raised, and it is one that real-ly needs to have our attention. In all of these situations it comes back to the lack of information being passed on through the various organizations.

Leaving that aside, which does require our continued attention, I want to go to an issue that I know you raised, Mr. Espie, and that is the funding for port security. We heard from the earlier tes-timony from the Customs and Border Protection that they needed additional funding. I think they talked some 500 personnel. It wasn’t clear where they needed to use that. I suspect that—I hope that that is in the ports.

Mr. Espie, can you speak directly to that issue? Mr. ESPIE. Yes, sir. Two issues. CBP, first of all, at the Port of

Baltimore, particularly after the budget concerns a few years ago to whereas it appeared that DHS was negating some of their re-quests, we have a sense of feel at the Port of Baltimore that CBP is very strapped. In their inspections of cargo within the sheds at our marine terminal, number one, the—we see personnel working the RPMs [radiation portal monitors] during the day, it is a long day. I think they are very bored. I don’t think they have enough changeover during the day.

So basically, when these containers leave our ports through going through the RPMs, you are going to have a GS–11 or GS–12, in terms of their morale, motivation, to safeguard a potential nuclear weapon leaving our port and going out to Chicago or the Midwest or—as far as the way we ship.

And also we have had issues at our cruise terminal. We have over 115 cruises through Carnival and Royal Caribbean, through our cruise terminal there. And when there is a shortage, seemingly, when we have—we mandate more power, they advise that they do not have the overtime to pay their officers. So that is a concern. So that is where you see that CBP is going to start potentially


38

charging port operators for extra services, to include the RPMs. We have been advised that if the RPMs are replaced, that it will be the port operator paying for those and not CBP. So right now we are going through the maintenance phase. So those are concerns.

Secondly, the Federal Port Security Grant Program, we live and die by that. That is our physical security. We would have no phys-ical security at the Port of Baltimore, or at least not in the realm that we have now, which we feel we have one of the most innova-tive physical security programs in the country. We would be in des-perate needs. The State budgeting for that right now, we do—when we receive a match or a grant, it is 25 percent. So the State’s abil-ity to cover the physical security necessary is very difficult and short. So we would hope that that program would stay intact.

And also we see—— Mr. GARAMENDI. I am going to interrupt you. Mr. ESPIE. Yes, sir. Mr. GARAMENDI. Because I am out of time, literally out of time.

I would appreciate it if the—your association, the Port Security As-sociation, could develop a specific memo to us on those kinds of shortcomings, and it is nationally as well as with the Port of Balti-more.

Mr. ESPIE. Yes, sir. Mr. GARAMENDI. A final point is that the layer—the security

through layered operations, beginning way off in Kazakhstan all the way back home, becomes really important. There is a funding issue in each one of these layers, and we really need to get at the funding issues, as well as the efficiency of those particular units along the way.

And so, these kinds of hearings are very, very important, and particularly important that we do the combined hearing that the two chairmen have put together here. That is really an important piece of this, so that we are—at least we are coordinated and knowledgeable with what we are doing here. I want to really focus—and I will ask a series of questions, if the chairs would allow me to do so, to the various witnesses about specific funding short-falls and the efficiency of the programs that you are operating.

Final point is, Mr. Canavan, you have been here twice and you have talked about a specific type of detection advice—device.

We had earlier Ms. Harrington from NNSA [National Nuclear Security Administration] here. Now, as far as I know, Los Alamos is part of NNSA. And I am curious, and I will get into it from Ms. Harrington as well as from you, about your device and the applica-bility of that and the utility of that particular mechanism that you have talked about as a detection mechanism.

So, with that, I yield. Mr. HUNTER. I thank the gentleman. Mr. Gibbs? Mr. GIBBS. Thanks, Mr. Chairman. I represent the Great Lakes

region, so I want to talk to Mr. Weakley. Great to see you, Jim. In your testimony you talk about the

Great Lakes States, and the two Canadian provinces; if they were an entity in themselves, they would be the third largest economy. So we know how important the Great Lakes is, and all the com-merce you move. And I am really concerned.


39

And my other subcommittee, I am chairman of the Subcommittee on Water Resources and Environment. I have stressed so much with the Army Corps of Engineers about the importance of the Soo lock and the Poe lock, and that is—Poe lock is over 100 years old. And my understanding, they built cofferdams years ago and it is just sitting—seems like there is a reluctance with the administra-tion to want to, you know, build new locks there and replace them.

So there’s kind of two questions here, two themes. We have the infrastructure issue, and then we have security of the locks. I want to get both of that. But the first part of that is on the Poe lock or the Soo locks there, if that were to shut down, what happens to the Great Lakes?

Mr. WEAKLEY. Well, sir, according to the DHS report, if the lock, a single lock—the Poe, as you point out—is down for 6 months, North America is in a recession equal to or greater than the one that we just experienced.

And also in a resource-based recession there is no fiscal policy you can do to countermand that. So the closest thing we have expe-rienced as a Nation is the oil embargo from the 1970s. It will wipe out the automobile industry, it will wipe out the domestic steel in-dustry. And really, it is a—it is the most critical piece of infrastruc-ture——

Mr. GIBBS. I think we got the picture. I think during World War II they were so concerned about that I think they had, I don’t know——

Mr. WEAKLEY. I think it was 20,000 troops stationed in Michi-gan——

Mr. GIBBS. 20,000 troops regarding that. Mr. WEAKLEY. Yes, sir. Mr. GIBBS. So I have stressed so much on the Army Corps how

important this is, and there is this reluctance. Do you know if there has been any initial cost estimates to do

the work there? Mr. WEAKLEY. So where we are at now is the Corps is engaged

in a 2-year economic reevaluation report, basically to recalculate the benefit to cost ratio. To give the Corps credit, they have ac-knowledged that they made some egregious false assumptions in their latest 2004 report. That was a 10-year process for them to make that admission. And now they are recalculating the ratio. They said they could condense the 3-year process into 2 years, which means in December of 2017 they should be done with their math, which means probably December——

Mr. GIBBS. I told Secretary Darcy in my subcommittee hearing that we could sit down right now and in 15 minutes get a cost esti-mate benefit ratio. That should be a no-brainer.

Mr. WEAKLEY. Yes, sir. Mr. GIBBS. There is just a huge reluctance, I think, with the ad-

ministration to want to move forward on that. OK. So that is the infrastructure issue. We know what happens.

This ought to be a top priority for our national economic security and security in general.

What are your thoughts in the Great Lakes are, in the St. Law-rence and all that, on overall security of our—of those assets? We know if that lock breaks the economic catastrophe it would be to


40

the country. But are you satisfied with the security arrangements by the Coast Guard, whoever, to make sure that the lock isn’t at-tacked, or any of the locks?

Mr. WEAKLEY. Well, I think they could do more. I know the Coast Guard has a security zone in the area. The Corps owns the facility, so they have got primary responsibility. I was just up there a couple weeks ago. They are executing a new security contract.

They do, to their credit, make a distinction between the Amer-ican-flag vessels and the foreign vessels that go through. They don’t allow the foreign sailors off the ships. We are allowed off our ships to handle lines, and stuff like that. Clearly, they don’t have the 20,000 troops that they did in World War II.

I think the Corps is beginning to recognize the criticality of that piece of infrastructure. And from a—I am very excited about what we are doing with our radar to create more of a visibility and pro-vide real actionable material to the——

Mr. GIBBS. And my last question—we are out of time, but are you—your companies that you represent, I think you said 15 of them, I forget how many you represent, working with Customs and Border Protection, the Coast Guard, and all their law enforcement moving this commerce from the Great Lakes, are you satisfied with the relationship? What are your thoughts?

Mr. WEAKLEY. So, as a former Coast Guard officer, I will expose my bias. We work really well with the Coast Guard. I think with CBP it varies from port to port, and actually it varies from cargo to cargo, and sometimes the distance, whether you are within the Federal-recognized port, as well. I think that relationship could be better.

Giving the Coast Guard credit, they are more centralized. So if there is a problem with the Coast Guard, we can go to the district commander. With CBP there is no regional office. So there is a headquarters level and then they are very autonomous at the local level. I think there could be room for improvement along the CBP from the relationship aspect, as well as the ability to execute.

Mr. GIBBS. OK, thank you. Thank you, Mr. Chairman, I yield back. Thanks for your service. Mr. HUNTER. I thank the gentleman. For a minute I thought you

were talking about Polacks. [Laughter.] Mr. HUNTER. Now I know you weren’t. Poe lock. Mr. GIBBS. You know, I know San Diego is important, but Great

Lakes are really important, too. Mr. HUNTER. Ms. Jackson Lee, you are recognized. Ms. JACKSON LEE. I thank the chairman and ranking member for

their courtesies, and thank the witnesses as well as the witnesses on panel 1. I was delayed because of a markup in the Judiciary Committee, which fell under my subcommittee. But this is an im-portant hearing, and I want to acknowledge panel 1 and thank panel 2 for their testimony.

Let me start by just citing part of the words said by Director Dave Espie in his testimony, that the threat of maritime terrorist smuggling appears to be increasing, possibly in correlation with the flight of Syrian refugees to Europe. And he noted an incident, I


41

think, that occurred in Baltimore. But I believe that it is clearly an important hearing that we are addressing today in an examina-tion of the maritime nuclear smuggling threat and other port secu-rity and smuggling risks in the United States.

I think our challenge, as Members of Congress, is to find the how-to’s or how does, but also the solutions to protect the American people. I am particularly interested, of course, as a former ranking member of our Border and Maritime Security Subcommittee, but as well as a Member of Congress that has as part of her jurisdiction one of the major ports of the United States, and that is the Hous-ton port.

I am a strong supporter of the Securing the Cities program, and as well the monies that you all need, Mr. Espie, in doing your job. So let me start off first by saying we will not solve this problem by ignoring the fact that resources are needed, not throwing money away, but fully funding the potential of what our ports and what the Nation faces.

The Securing the Cities program mandated legislation to assist State, local, tribal, and territorial governments in creating and im-plementing and perfecting existing structures for coordinated and integrated detection and interdiction of nuclear or other radio-logical materials that are out of regulatory control, and to support a wide matrix to deal with identifying reporting on nuclear and other radioactive materials, provide resources for detection analysis communication, facilitate the establishment of protocol and proc-esses of effectively responding to threats—responding to threats is key—and designating participating jurisdiction from high-risk areas.

Our city has now received $30 million over a 5-year period, which I am very glad to advocate and secure under the Securing the Cities grant, and just received $3.5 million. And in his absence I want to thank Dr. Brasure, who was in my district, as we an-nounced this very important step by Houston, creating or working with the DHS Domestic Nuclear Detection Office to build a robust regional nuclear detection capability.

So, I am going to pursue a line of questioning in the time that I have remaining, and let me quickly do so—is to Dr. Canavan, if you can remember my questions, please, I would appreciate it. How accurately can the signature of radiological and nuclear material tell the source of that material? That is very important because we are talking about ships and smuggling.

To Ms. Grover, thank you for your work in the GAO. In your tes-timony you cite GAO’s 2013 report which concluded that CBP had not regularly assessed foreign ports for risk to cargo since 2005. It is my understanding that they have since developed a port risk ma-trix and priority map to help assess whether changes need to be made to contain a security in each of their ports. Is CBP utilizing this matrix and map to assess CSI [Container Security Initiative] ports? Are there other changes that should be made to ensure the CSI program is functioning as intended? There lies a source of po-tential nuclear material.

And finally, to Mr. Espie, you are one of the first responders out-side of the beltway. All across America you are dealing with port security, formerly with the FBI. Are resources going to local enti-


42

ties like yourself crucial in making sure that we have the cover, the resources, the detection that needs to be in place for something as particularly indicting, explosive, and, if you will, catastrophic, as a particular or potential nuclear incident by something being smug-gled into your port?

I would yield first to Dr. Canavan. Thank you. Dr. CANAVAN. To me, ma’am? Ms. JACKSON LEE. I yield first to you, sir, for the question. Did

you hear the question that I asked? Dr. CANAVAN. Well, I thought the question had to do with—— Ms. JACKSON LEE. Let me read your question, sir. How accu-

rately can the signature of radiological and nuclear material tell the source of that material?

Dr. CANAVAN. With radiological material, it is a little bit difficult, because that is just sort of nuclear garbage, and there is lots of it around the world. And you might get lucky, and you might make an attribution, but I find that unlikely.

With nuclear weapons material, attribution is a little bit clean-er—particularly if you intercept it before detonation—because with—particularly with plutonium, the different groups that make plutonium have different preferred ways of doing it, so there might be some intermediate group that got control of it or delivered it, but you have a fighting chance of knowing who made it in the first place.

So, the attribution is kind of all across the spectrum. I would say very little likelihood of attribution on the garbage side, reasonable chance on the plutonium. For uranium, which is a big problem right now, you know, it is just how long you want to spend your centrifuges, your—and they are all derivatives of Urenco’s. Some people try to argue that you can do an attribution there on the basis of their details. I kind of doubt it, although that last state-ment is just my personal guess.

Ms. JACKSON LEE. Not at all, Doctor, thank you. Just one fol-lowup. Can the trash that is hardest to detect provide major dam-age and danger?

Dr. CANAVAN. No, ma’am. I didn’t mean to say it couldn’t cause damage.

Ms. JACKSON LEE. No, I am just asking. Dr. CANAVAN. The thing is that the radiological threats, the dirty

bombs that we—— Ms. JACKSON LEE. Right. Dr. CANAVAN [continuing]. We have been working on for quite

some time, can cause a lot of economic damage because you can spread them on somebody’s street, or throw them in a building, and then that is a real cost problem. But once that happens, people will generally get the heck out of the way, so the loss of life is smaller for that kind of weapon.

I come from a place where we worry a little bit less about radio-logical insults than other places.

Ms. JACKSON LEE. Yes. Dr. CANAVAN. When I first went to Los Alamos, I think we had

the universe’s only known open pit plutonium mine. We dug up the old plutonium residue from the war, moved it out, and covered it with a thick layer of dirt. It took time and effort, but worked well.


43

So I may have a more casual attitude than others towards dirty bombs. They are a real problem because their materials are more accessible than those for weapons, but they are not as cata-strophic—particularly in terms of loss of life. But I have experts here, right?

Ms. JACKSON LEE. Mr. Chairman, thank you for your courtesy. If I can just—thank you, Doctor—if I could just allow both Ms. Gro-ver and Mr. Espie to finish, and I would be happy to yield back.

Ms. Grover, you heard my question? Ms. GROVER. Yes, your question was about CBP’s Container Se-

curity Initiative program? Ms. JACKSON LEE. Yes. Ms. GROVER. Which is an initiative under which CBP targeters

are placed at foreign ports, and it is operating at about 60 ports right now. And so your observation is that in 2013 GAO found that while those ports had initially been selected based on volume and other risk factors that, indeed, the circumstances across the world can change, and we found that CBP had not revisited the risk issues since around 2005.

And so, when GAO went in and looked at the situation, we found that there were—some of the ports participating were not high risk and, in fact, that there were not CBP targeters at other very high- risk ports.

And so, yes, as you noted, CBP has developed a port risk matrix and a map. They plan to update it every year, and to apply that knowledge against the locations of the 60 ports where they are working. And so if they follow through on that, and use it, then they will at least have a good understanding of the extent to which the program was operating at the highest risk ports. But that re-mains to be seen, going forward, and then to the extent to which they can make adjustments as appropriate.

Ms. JACKSON LEE. So we need to be monitoring that. And are you going to be assessing them again?

Ms. GROVER. We will continue to keep track of their use of that, yes.

Ms. JACKSON LEE. Thank you. Mr. Espie, on your—— Mr. ESPIE. Yes, ma’am. Thank you. Ms. JACKSON LEE [continuing]. Comments along with resources. Mr. ESPIE. Regarding funding—yes, ma’am. Regarding funding,

of course, at the port we have certain mandates we must follow, the Maritime Transportation Security Act, and then we have Fed-eral mandates that come under the CBP jurisdiction, specifically screening for nuclear smuggling, for example.

Do we have the resources, Port of Baltimore? No. You heard the percentages of the screening that takes place overseas, or once it comes to the port. I am there every day. I watch this. I see a con-tainer ship have 8,000 TEUs on it. How many do they screen a day? Twenty-five, thirty, maybe. You line up in a row, they go through the VACIS [Vehicle and Cargo Inspection System] ma-chine, the x-ray machine, and they—while the other ones are put into storage and units and they are shipped out the next couple days. So the only security device you have left is the RPM machine, which in some cases is 10 years old, the quality is a question, and so forth.


44

The manpower is certainly a question for CBP because, again, you watch the VACIS, the screening operation going on. You have usually two or three CBP personnel there, the rest are at the screening sheds. And then you will have one or two or three at the RPM exits out of the terminal. So it is a great problem for us and CBP, for the State of Maryland, and really, the citizens of the United States.

Ms. JACKSON LEE. On the overall issue, then, resources are need-ed across—you are talking about your State, but if you are an ex-ample, it would mean that it happens elsewhere, as well.

Mr. ESPIE. Yes, ma’am. I am a member of the AAPA Security Committee. It is consistent throughout the United States.

Ms. JACKSON LEE. Thank you. Mr. Chairman, I would like— thank you for your testimony—Mr. Chairman, I would like to ask unanimous consent to put into the record an article by MarEx dated July 6, ‘‘U.S. Ports Want More Action on Dirty Bomb Preven-tion.’’

Mr. HUNTER. Without objection. [The article is on pages 116–117.] Ms. JACKSON LEE. I thank you. I yield back. Mr. HUNTER. I thank the gentlelady. Well, here is what we are

trying to do here. We are trying to shape what we feel is going to be probably the most dangerous thing that we can encounter as a country, which is a nuclear device on American soil. It is worse than someone shooting up a mall, it is—I mean that is cata-strophic. We all agree on that. And I think we are on the precipice of a—let’s call it nuclear material being ubiquitous, much more than it is now. Once the Iranians start getting more material, once the North Koreans get better at creating more bad stuff, you are going to have nuclear devices, nuclear material, weaponized nu-clear material, I think, throughout the entire world.

And I think if we all focus on a lot of different stuff, but nothing that can affect the American people in the country like a nuclear device going off that is possibly attributable to a nation-state or possibly not. We have no retaliation, no way to get back at some-body—nonstate actors, of course—that will easily and happily throw their lives away to kill Americans.

Anyway, that is what we are doing here. That is why Ms. McSally and I are trying to shape this, because we are—I think we are still in a relative safe zone where there is not a lot of material out there, and we know who has it, we know where they have it, we know how to stop it in the furthest reaches of the world before it even gets to the U.S. or gets in the hands of bad actors, right? But I think that is coming to an end. I think we probably have a 5- to 10-year window, and then we need to have something where we check everything, because it only takes once, right?

And with that, thank you all for being here. Thanks for your tes-timony, thanks for traveling out here. And the hearing is ad-journed.

[Whereupon, at 12:32 p.m., the subcommittees were adjourned.]


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