Journal of Management lYY3. Vol. 19, No. 4, 749-773

An Empirical Assessment of the Multidimensionality of

Union Participation Aaron Cohen

University of Hat&

The purpose of this urticle is to explore empirically some similarities und differences among six forms of union participation: union commit- ment, participation in decision making, participation in union activities, uttitudinul milituncy, serving in elected offices und the propensity to strike. The study examines five models of union participation: the social background model, the work dissatisfaction model, the economic model, the structural model, und the socialization model. The research sumple consisted of 603 employees from white collar occuputions, members of locul unions in Israel. The findings demonstrate that the forms of union purticipation are independent constructs. They also show that different theoretical explanutions upply to different forms of participation. The conclusions indicate thut u fundumental direction for future research should be to develop und test hypotheses that refer to spectfic forms of union participation.

Union participation is a concept that has received widespread attention from theorists, researchers, and policy makers. A substantial body of literature has de- veloped around this issue, stressing several reasons for its importance. Huszczo (1983) argued that although attitudes of union members toward their union are of- ten favorable, a relative lack of participation by members in union activities has been of great interest to union leaders and researchers over the years. Anderson (1978) emphasized the importance of union participation as an indicator of the quality of union democracy. It was concluded by Child, Loveridge and Warner (1973) that a generally low proportion of members actively participating in union meetings and elections indicates inadequate operation of union democracy. Ra- maswamy (1977) argued that participation has two clear consequences. First, it cre- ates a sense of community in the rank-and-file. This sense is particularly pronounced among those sections of the membership which are drawn into the union for reasons other than job interest. Secondly, participation has the capacity to generate its own defence against oligarchy. There is consensus in the literature that participation in unions may take many forms (Klandermans, 1986).

Direct all correspondence to: Aaron Cohen, University of Haifa, Department of Political Science. Mount Cannel. Haifa 3 I 905. Israel.

Copyright 0 1993 by JAI Press Inc. 0149-2063

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However, the term union ~ffr~icip~~~~~ has been used to denote many differ- ent forms of participation within the union. For example, McShane (1986a; 1986b), Glick, Mirvis and Harder (1977) as well as Hoyman and Stallworth (1987) have used the term to refer to participation in union activities, while Anderson (1978) used it to refer to other forms of participation such as perceived participa- tion in decision-making and actual participation at meetings. Klandermans (1984a; 1984b; 1986) used the term in measuring the willingness to take part in moderate/ militant action. The ambiguity of the term and the differences among forms of union participation has led to concern by some researchers in this area. Martin (1986) argued that there is an overlap in the literature among the concepts of mili- tancy, striking and participation in union activities. Klandermans (1986) argued that union participation is multidimensional. Not only is union participation made up of several dimensions, he claimed, but the various forms require different expla- nations. Strauss (1977) maintained that it is difficult to provide systematic accounts of which determin~ts pertain to which forms of pa~icipation, as deter- minants of one form of union participation may not be determinants of another. The purpose of this research is to explore empirically the multidimensionality of union participation. This article examines similarities and differences among six common forms of union pa~icipation: union commi~ent, participation in deci- sion making, participation in union activities, attitudinal militancy, service in elected offices and propensity to strike. At this stage of the research on union par- ticipation, the need is to develop a clear taxonomy of forms of union participation (Klandermans, 1986). There is a need to validate empirically whether or not the various forms previously examined are independent constructs. The next step is to explore the different mechanisms and processes that affect the independent forms of union participation because characteristics and circumstances that motivate and constrain one form may have little or no effect on others. If research regarding union participation is to remain valid, the nature of the relationships among the various forms needs to be clarified.

From a practical viewpoint, McShane (1986a) argued that developing a model of union participation would have significant ramifications for union gov- ernment research. From the organizational approach, the survival and strength of a union come from the motivation, ability and opportunity of members to fill the established roles and to perform the acts required by the organization. By specify- ing these acts in terms of multidimensional constructs and measures, researchers will be able to understand the dynamics of union participation more clearly and, possibly, assist unions in their quest for greater membership involvement and increased organizational strength. Moreover, this knowledge co&d assist union leaders in plans for increasing union participation by applying different tactics to different forms of participation.

From a managerial perspective, a better understanding of tke forms and sources of union participation has several potential implications. First, some forms of participation, such as striking, have a direct effect upon productivity. Second, understanding whether union participation is a result of union structure and effec- tiveness or dissatisfaction with management operation will enable management to

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UNION PARTICIPATION 751

improve its methods in employee management. Third, exploring how unions deal with their attempts to increase participation (despite the fact that unions do not compensate their members for participation) can assist managers in their search for ways to increase positive attitudes and behaviors of their employees. Finally, relat- ing union participation to organizational performance measures might well assist management in resolving the question of whether active union members are more or less effective than nonactive members. The concept of dual versus unilateral commitment to union and organization can exemplify this point. Union participa- tion research can deal with questions such as the implications of being committed to the union on commitment to the organization and whether unions cause a reduc- tion in the level of organizational commitment. A broader question is whether there is a conflict between union participation and organizational performance? Could involvement in union activities lead to less effort on behalf of the organiza- tion and to a lower level of performance. All these issues are, no doubt, relevant to managers and management scholars; and the increased interest in the concept of dual versus unilateral commitment to union and organization (Gordon & Ladd, 1990; Gallagher & Strauss, 1991) support this contention.

Past Research: A Literature Review

Major Forms of Union Participation

Klandermans (1986) classified the forms of union participation into four cat- egories. The first was membership which included the following forms: joining the union, commitment to the union, and resignation. The second category included holding a position in the union and participation in union decision making. The third category was participation in union activities, and the fourth was participa- tion in industrial action, namely, striking. What follows is a brief review of the forms of union participation focusing on each form’s unique characteristics. The forms of participation can be divided into active or passive. Active participation refers to forms that represent ongoing processes that involve the employee in which there is an investment of a considerable amount of time and/or other per- sonal contributions. Passive participation refers to forms that reflect supportive attitudes or ad hoc behaviors in which investment by the employee is minimal. While active participation generally refers to behavioral forms of participation, and passive participation to attitudinal forms of participation, there are some exceptions. For example, joining and/or withdrawing from a union is a behavior but, according to the above definition, can be regarded as a passive form of partic- ipation because the investment of time on the part of the employee is minimal.

Active forms of participation. Several forms of participation examined in the literature can be described as active. Snarr (1973, and Klandermans (1986) argued that striking should be viewed as an individual form of union participation. Strikes are undeniably the most spectacular form of industrial action. At the base of union power lies the threat to organize industrial action which can affect production. Strike behavior can vary from nation-wide to local work slowdowns, picketing, and petitioning management either verbally or in writing (Cohen & Jacobsen,

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1987). Another extensively researched form of participation is participation in union activities. This takes many forms, such as disseminating information, recruiting members, attending meetings, and reading the union newspaper. Several studies group union activities into a number of categories such as: formal activities (attending union meetings, holding office, voting in union elections), and informal activities (picketing or participating in political, community, recreational or union- sponsored training activities) (Hoyman & Stallworth, 1987); active participation (e.g., attending meetings, holding office, filing grievances, voting) and passive participation (e.g., reading the newsletter, knowing the contract) (Heshizer, Martin, & Wiener, 1990). An entirely different way of studying union participation is to ask what are the decisions in which employees actually participate? Anderson (1979) argued that there is a conspicuous lack of evaluation of the behavior of union members or its impact on the decision-making process in existing participa- tion scales. He suggested that union participation research should include not only union behavioral activities but also participation in, and influence over, a variety of decisions vital to the functioning of the local union. Serving in elected offices is sometimes analyzed as part of the participation in union activities form. The importance of separating and understanding the behavior and attitudes of officials and union members has led researchers to treat this as an independent form. Many studies have compared the differences between shop stewards and rank-and-file members in union-related attitudes, values and behaviors (e.g., Strauss, 1977; Anderson, 1979; Magenau, Martin, & Peterson, 1988); other studies have exam- ined the recruitment of shop stewards (Chinoy, 1950; Nicholson, 1976).

Passive forms of union participation. An individual’s decision whether to join the union or to resign from it is important to union survival. Extensive research was conducted in an attempt to explore the determinants of such a decision (e.g., Summers, Betton, & Decotiis, 1986; Youngblood, DeNisi, Molleston, & Mobley, 1984; Premack & Hunter, 1988). Although fall in membership can be caused by de-certification, little research has been done into this aspect of unionization (e.g., Klandermans, 1986; Mellor, 1990). Union commitment has received much atten- tion in recent years as a result of the Gordon, Philpot, Burt, Thompson and Spiller ( 1980) study in which a scale for union commitment was developed. Based on fac- tor analysis, union commitment was defined as a multidimensional construct which includes four dimensions: union loyalty, responsibility to the union, willing- ness to work for the union and belief in unionism. Several follow-up works have replicated the factor structure of Gordon et al. (e.g., Ladd, Gordon, Beauvais, & Morgan, 1982; Gordon, Beauvais, & Ladd, 1984; Thacker, Fields, & Tetrick, 1989; Thacker, Fields, & Barclay, 1990) although some have questioned and criticized the dimensionality of the measure of Gordon et al. (Friedman & Harvey, 1986; Klandermans, 1989; Mellor, 1990). While union commitment can be perceived as the attitudinal expression of staying with or resigning from the union, attitudinal militancy, which refers to the general attitude toward strikes (Martin, 1986) can be perceived as the attitudinal expression of the inclination to strike. However, Schutt (1982) and Martin (1986) have argued that the findings and theory relating to union participation support the proposition that individual support for collective

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goals operates differently than support for more personal goals, such as a pay increase. This argument explains the difference between attitudinal militancy (sup- port for a collective goal) and a propensity to strike (support for a more personal goal). The findings of Schutt (I 982) and Martin (I 986) emphasize the importance of measuring individual propensity to strike in relation to particular goals, as opposed to measuring attitudes toward striking in general.

Models for Union Participation

The main assumption behind union participation is that an individual will participate if the opportunities to participate are known, if the capability exists to use one or more of these opportunities, and if there is a willingness to do so (Klan- dermans, 1986). The reasons for union participation can, therefore, arise from two sources: the availability and the motivation to participate. Review of the literature has revealed five common approaches to union participation: the social back- ground model, the work dissatisfaction model, the economic model, the socialization model, and the structural model. This paper will argue that three of the models, namely, work dissatisfaction, economic reasons, and socialization, represent motivational considerations for union participation. The structural model represents the availability to participate. The social background model represents both motivational and availability sources for participation.

Motivational Models for Union Participation

Work dissatisfaction model. This model views union participation as a reac- tion to frustration, dissatisfaction, or alienation in the work situation. At the heart of this approach is the belief that unions are symptoms of incomplete integration within the company. Bacharach, Bamberger and Conley (1990) offer an explana- tion for the effect of work-related variables on the individual’s integration into the organization. A high level of “integration” is generally viewed as having been achieved when employees feel that they can have an impact on organizational deci- sions, when they have a sense of being treated fairly by the organization with respect to their careers, and when they receive job feedback. Research findings have demonstrated the effects of variables representing this approach upon forms of union participation. For example, job satisfaction and satisfaction with adminis- tration were found to be predictors of unionization (Premack & Hunter, 1988); job alienation affected union loyalty (Fullagar & Barling, 1989); job involvement and extrinsic satisfaction reduced administrative activity and meeting attendance respectively (McShane, 1986a).

The work dissatisfaction model is presented in this study by four variables: job satisfaction, role conflict, autonomy, and opportunities for promotion. Job sat- isfaction should affect participation: because of dissatisfaction with the work situation or alienation from it, union participation might increase. The greater the dissatisfaction, the more willing is the employee to participate. Role conflict and autonomy (e.g., more role conflict; less autonomy) are specific work situation characteristics that can lead to frustration on the job, which may lead employees to search for alternatives, such as the union. The variable, opportunities for promo-

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tion, was included based on Spinrad’s (1960) argument that those more oriented towards occupational advance, particularly toward a supervisory or managerial position, are less likely to be active in their unions. On the other hand, those who perceive that their future promotion opportunities in the organization are limited will direct their expectations toward the union and become more active in it.

Economic model. This model emphasizes low pay as a source of discontent and predicts additional effects of economic variables. The employees enjoying fewer rewards in the organization will become more militant in an attempt to improve their rewards through the union (e.g., Schutt, 1982; Martin, 1986). Ander- son (1979) suggested that union participation can be perceived within the “payoff for participation” argument which asserts that union members tend to exercise their right not to participate except when there is an important issue such as a potential payoff at stake. There are several findings in the literature that indicate a relationship between participation forms and variables representing the economic model. For example, meeting attendance was related to salary; voting participation was affected by employment status (McShane, 1986a); wage level and union instrumentality were related to unionization (Premack & Hunter, 1988; Wheeler & McClendon, 1991), black participation in union activities was less dependent on salary than was white participation (Hoyman & Stallworth, 1987). Salary is a com- mon indicator of the economic model and will be shown as such. Low salaried employees have greater potential payoffs at stake and should be more willing to participate in the union. Perceived union success in improving wages and social benefits will be included; this is based on the argument of Perline and Lorenz (1970) that the union member identifies with the union only when it achieves what it promises in terms of higher wages and better working conditions. Another vari- able that represents the economic model from the union perspective is permanence. According to the North American system “non permanence” refers to unionized employees who are hired initially into a “probationary” status during which they do not enjoy contractual protection that limits discharges to “just cause” reasons. Permanence is a benefit usually achieved by the union. Increased participation from permanent employees is expected because of greater security from management which often views union participation in a negative light. Union instrumentality was included in this research based on the Fullagar and Barling (1989) finding that this variable strongly affected union loyalty. Extensively employed in the literature that deals with union commitment (Heshizer et al., 1990) and unionization decision (Summers et al., 1986), this variable is a good indicator of the benefits of participation to the employees from the union perspec- tive.

The socialization model. The main argument behind the socialization model is that the climate which union members are exposed to, both on and off the job, may influence their participation. Perline and Lorenz ( 1970) argued that the extent of newcomer orientation is dominant in maintaining and increasing levels of activ- ity. They also proposed that participation is inextricably bound up with group culture and that the individual’s decision to participate is influenced by the group to which s/he belongs. The socialization model can be integrated with interaction-

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ism theories that relate participation to the networks and groups inside and/or outside the company in which the employee works (Klandermans, 1986). Conse- quently, variables such as individual and parental political sympathies, class consciousness, image of society, and political economic ideology are clearly related to the degree of activism in the union (Lockwood, 1966; Nicholson, Urseil, & Blyton, 1981; Perline & Lorenz, 1970 ).

Research on union commitment (e.g., Gordon et al., 1980; Fullagar & Bar- ling, 1989) and union militancy (e.g., Schutt, 1982; Martin, 1986) has supported the importance of socialization variables upon forms of participation. Moreover, community-political activities, philosophy of unionism, and socio-political liberal- ism were found to be important predictors of participation in union activities (Huszczo, 1983); voting was related to social integration (McShane, 1986a); and union attitudes and training satisfaction were the major important predictors of union loyalty (Fullagar, McCoy, & Shull, 1992).

The socialization model is represented in this study by four variables. One of them, political affiliation, may have special significance regarding the Israeli sam- ple. Unions in Israel are controlled by the Labor party in coalition with other left- oriented parties. It was expected that employees who identified with the left-wing parties would demonstrate higher levels of militancy and a greater propensity to strike. Socialization to the union was proposed as another variable by O’Reilly, Bloom and Parlette (1977) who found that contextual conformity to group norms was one of the most prominent influences on members’ attitudes toward, and par- ticipation in, a strike of public health nurses. This variable was found to affect union commitment strongly (Gordon et al., 1980). Union activity of relatives was included as the third variable based on Spinrad’s (1960) argument that the intensive interaction with union activists affects pro-union attitudes and behaviors. The fourth variable, attitudes of “significant others” was included following the find- ings of Gordon et al. (1980) and Martin (1986) who assert that support from this group was a strong predictor of union commitment and willingness to strike for the union.

The Availability Model of Union Participation

Structural model. The argument of the structural model is that, while the decision or the motivation to participate may be in the members’ domain, the struc- ture of both the union and the organization can limit or increase the ability of active members to actually participate. Perline and Lorenz (1970) argued that organiza- tional properties of the union directly affect the levels of participation. They mentioned structural determinants such as size, leadership and perceived control. The size of the union influences participation by its effect upon the environment in which the member participates. As the size of the union grows, the atmosphere for individual participation diminishes. Once the local union becomes an organization devoted to large numbers of people, much of the direct relation between leaders and members dies as it does among the members themselves. Anderson (1978) suggested three structural characteristics: (1) environmental factors that refer to the external setting in which the union operates (e.g. union-management relations

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and environmental uncertainty); (2) structural factors, which refer to the bureau- cratic structure within union organizations, such as complexity and control mechanisms (e.g. centralization of decisions, standardization of procedures for handling problems), and (3) internal factors which include electoral and communi- cation processes.

Research findings have shown structural variables relating to various forms of union participation. For example, the union-employer relationships variable was found to be related to the union commitment of the union’s stewards and the rank- and-file (Fullagar, McCoy, & Shull, 1992; Magenau, Martin, & Peterson, 1988); objective organizational characteristics such as those related to size of the local union, the composition of the work force it represents, and some facets of its inter- nal political life were found to be the most powerful predictors of attitudinal militancy (Shirom, 1977).

The structural model in this study includes both union and organizational structural characteristics. Organizational size is included because it can be expected that smaller locals and/or organizations facilitate participation. It is worth noting that in the Israeli setting the size of the organization reflects the size of the local union. Sector is included with the expectation that the availability for partic- ipation is greater in public sector organizations because of increased job security and more formalized arrangements between unions and management regarding participation. Union and organizational communication, as indicators of more spe- cific structural characteristics, should also positively affect the accessibility of participation.

Social background model. The impact of background variables on forms of union participation has been extensively analyzed. This model predicts that the background characteristics of employees may influence their perceptions of events and provide a frame of reference in situations for which no clear occupational norms exist. However, it seems that this model combines both motivational and availability considerations of union participation. For example, gender has been found to be related to militancy. Males are, in general, more willing to strike than females (Alutto & Belasco, 1974; Black, 1983). As second earners in many cases, females are less motivated to participate than males (Anderson, 1979). This may also be explained by lower availability to participate because of stronger family responsibilities and commitments.

The same argument can be applied to tenure and age. Researchers have found that younger employees are more militant than older employees (e.g., Alutto & Belasco, 1974; Black, 1983; Shirom, 1977). Younger and less tenured employees may perceive the union as one of the means to achieve their goals more quickly. In the early stages of their careers, young employees may be unaware of the opportu- nities for participation and be more hesitant to participate because of job security considerations. Similar logic can be applied to the education variable. Better-edu- cated employees may have lower motivation to participate than their less educated colleagues as they can achieve better rewards because of their higher education. The less educated employees, however, have fewer opportunities for participation in the workplace because of limited autonomy and increased supervisory control.

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In this research, the employee background model includes the education variable in addition to the more common background variables of age, gender, and tenure, based on the assumption that better-educated employees tend to rely more on their education than on the union for increased rewards. Negative relationships will therefore be expected between education and forms of union participation.

Research Hypothesis

The research model is presented in Figure 1. Based on the literature review, the proposed classification of the union participation forms, and the research model, the following hypotheses will be examined: The first hypothesis, namely, that the concept of union participation is multidi-

mensional, is the main argument of this paper. Thus:

Hypothesis I: Forms of union participation will exhibit discriminant

validity (e.g., low intercorrelations, distinct fuctor anulysis, differing

determinunts).

The above-mentioned literature has demonstrated that each of the explanatory

models, as represented by its variables, was related to at least some forms of union

participation. Thus:

Hypothesis 2: Each of the explanutoty models should contribute to the explanation of all or some forms of union participation.

While each of the models is expected to affect some forms of union partici- pation, the magnitude of this effect is expected to vary. As different from the active forms, the passive forms do not rely on structural characteristics that can facilitate participation but rather depend upon motivational considerations. Consequently, the structural and the social background models are not expected to be important determinants for the passive forms of participation as they are for the active forms. Moreover, the active forms demand from the union members not only supportive attitudes and sentiments but also time, both during and after working hours, which will sometimes put their jobs at risk. It follows that both motivational and struc- tural considerations are expected to be of equal importance in affecting the active forms of participation while motivational considerations are expected to be the dominant explanatory variables for the passive forms. Thus:

Hypothesis 3a: The structural und sociul background models will

relate to the uctive forms more than the passive forms.

Hypothesis 3b: The active forms of union purticipation will relate to the motivational models (work dissatisfaction, economic, sociulizution), as well us the structurul und social background models. The passive

forms will relute mainly to the motivutional models.

JOURNAL OF MANAGEMENT, VOL. 19. NO. 4. 1993

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UNION PARTICIPATION 759

Research Design

Sample. Some unique characteristics of the Israeli industrial relations system should be explained for a better understanding of similarities and differences between the results of this study and Western findings. First, more than 80 percent of the workforce in Israel is unionized. All unionized employees are affiliated with Israel’s all-embracing labor federation, the “Histadrut”, which represents the national level of unionization. Any unionized employee can also be a member of an occupational union which represents the intermediate level of unionization in Israel. Every union member also belongs to a local union. Most union members in Israel belong to all three union levels. Some members do not belong to the “Hista- drut” but only to the local unions. Unlike the decentralized North American industrial relations system in which local unions have most of the influence on bar- gaining issues, the more centralized Israeli system, by means of the national “Histadrut”, exerts a major influence on wage issues. A typical bargaining process in Israel will start with negotiation at the national level between the “Histadrut” and the national representatives of the employers, followed by further bargaining between the occupational unions and the employers and will end with negotiations between the local unions and management. Like the North American system the locals take care of many of the issues for the members they represent but unlike the North American system, some relevant wage issues are already negotiated in the former negotiation levels, and this limits their bargaining power for wage issues (For a comprehensive picture of the Israeli system, see Shalev, 1992).

This study surveyed members of eleven local unions from public and private organizations in Israel. The research sample consisted of 603 employees (80 per- cent response rate) from white-collar occupations such as engineers, practical engineers, nurses, and technicians. 55.2 percent of the respondents were female. Their mean age was 41, mean tenure in the profession and organization was 15.9 and 11.9 years respectively. Forty seven point four percent of the respondents were university graduates, 30 percent had some college education, and 9.1 percent had completed high school. Data collection was conducted by means of a questionnaire.

Measurement and Analysis Procedures

Forms ofparticipation. The measure of union commitment is based on the approach suggested by O’Reilly and Chatman ( 1986) in which organizational com- mitment is defined as a psychological attachment to the organization. Accordingly, union commitment is defined as an affective attachment to the union. This affec- tive attachment can be one or more of the following three dimensions: (1) Identification-adoption as one’s own, of the goals and values of the union; (2) Affiliation-feelings of belonging to the union, being “part of it”; and (3) Moral involvement-internalization of the roles of the union demonstrated by feelings of care and concern for their own union. Dimensions (“1”) and (“3”) are similar to the identification and internalization dimensions developed by O’Reilly and Chatman (1986). However, their compliance dimension overlaps with the calculative or con- tinuance commitment as proposed by the side-bet theory (Becker, 1960) and its advocates (Meyer & Allen, 1984). Although continuance commitment is consid-

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ered to represent psychological attachment, it tends instead to measure intentions to withdraw (e.g., O’Reilly & Chatman, 1986; Mathieu & Zajac, 1990). The present research proposes the affiliation dimension which is seen as more consis- tent with the definition of commitment as a psychological attachment. The union commitment scale was measured by a sum of agreements to nine statements, each scored from 1 = strongly disagree to 5 = strongly agree.

The measure of propensity to strike is similar to that used by Martin (1986). Respondents were asked how many days they would participate in: ( 1) any strike called by their union, regardless of the issue (or issues); (2) a strike for a low (10 percent) wage increase; and (3) a strike for a high (25 percent) wage increase. The response scale for each question was: 1 = zero days; 2 = for one week; 3 = for two weeks; 4 = for one month; 5 = for two months; 6 = for more than two months.

Attitudinal militancy was defined and measured by four items. Respondents were asked to predict their behavior if their union should strike: (1) I would never be a \‘strikebreaker’; (2) I would participate in a strike even if I knew that it was an illegal strike; (3) I would not hesitate to picket for the union; (4) I would be ready to warn strikebreakers. The respondents were asked to indicate their degree of agreement with each question on a scale ranged from 1 = strongly disagree to 5 = strongly agree.

Union activity was measured using six items partly based on the measure of Gordon et al. (1980). Respondents were asked how active they were in six activi- ties related to their union: voting, attendance at general membership meetings, knowledge of the union contract, reading the union’s newsletter, giving any assis- tance to union activities, and applying to the union for any support. Three possible responses were provided for each item, most of which used the following scale: 1 = never, 2 = sometimes, 3 = most of the time.

Participation in decision-making was measured by an index consisting of the sum of responses to four items, each scoring from 1 = no influence to 5 = a great deal of influence. The respondents were asked to describe their level of influence in determining: (1) union policy; (2) who the union leaders would be; (3) whether or not the union would strike; (4) whether the union would sign a contract. Serving in elected offices was measured by one item that asked whether the respondent had served in any elected office(s) of the union (0 = no; 1 = yes).

Scales of participation forms were presented in different sections of the ques- tionnaire with the exception of participation in union activity and serving in elected offices which were presented in the same section.

Independent Variables

Employee background. The following variables were included in this model: age, and organizational tenure (measured in actual years), gender (male = 0; female = I), and education (elementary = 1, incomplete high school = 2, high school = 3, higher education, non-academic = 4, incomplete academic education = 5, B.A. = 6, M.A. or Ph.D. = 7).

JOURNAL OF MANAGEMENT, VOL. 19. NO. 4. 1993

UNION PARTICIPATION 761

Economic. The variable, salary, was measured in shekels (Israeli currency) paid per month. Perceived union success in improving wages and social benefits was measured by one item on a scale from 1 (not successful) to 5 (very successful). Permanency in the organization was either no = 0 or yes = 1. The measure of union instrumentality was based on the assumption that what is most important to mem- bers is what the union is most effective in achieving (Kochan, 1979). The measure used in this study is similar to that of Fullagar and Barling (1989) who based their measure on the same assumption. Respondents were presented with three possible benefits of membership in their union: professional protection, wages and working conditions, union services and fringe benefits. They were asked to indicate the importance of each as a reason for becoming a union member on a scale from I

(not important) to 5 (very important).

Socialization model. The variable denoting attitudes of “significant others” toward the union was measured using an index consisting of the sum of responses to three items. How do the following perceive the union: your friends and neigh- bors? co-workers? relatives? Each was scored from 1 = very hostile to 5 = very supportive. Socialization to the union was measured by an index consisting of the sum of responses to five items, each scored from 1 = never to 5 = very often. Sam- ple items: During my first year of membership in the union (a) I was personally invited to the union meetings (b) One of the union activists assisted me personally with a problem that I had. Political affiliation was measured as follows: Right- wing political parties = 0 and Left-wing political parties = 1. Union activities of relatives were measured by one item which asked the respondents whether their relatives had served or were still serving in elected offices of any of the unions in Israel (no = 0; yes = 1).

Work dissatisfaction. Job satisfaction was assessed using the overall job sat- isfaction measure of Warr, Cook and Wall (1979). The scale was designed to cover both extrinsic and intrinsic job features. Respondents were asked to indicate on a seven-point scale their satisfaction or dissatisfaction with each of fifteen features of their job. A total score (ranging from I5 to 105) was taken with a high score rep- resenting greater overall satisfaction. Role conflict was assessed by a five-item index from the Rizzo, House and Lirtzman (1970) measure. Autonomy was assessed by an index of three items adopted from the Hackman and Oldham ( 1975) measure. The variable, opportunities for promotion, was measured by a sum of agreement to two items: What are your chances of receiving promotion during the next five years? (1 = not at all to 5 = high) and how numerous are the opportunities for promotion within the organization? (I = very few to 5 = many).

Structural model. Organizational size was measured by the number of employees in the organization. Sector was categorized as Public = 0 or Private = I. Organizational communication was measured by a five-item index adopted from the measure of Cammann, Fichman, Jenkins and Klesh ( 1979). Union communica- tion was measured by one item that asked the respondents about the accessibility of their steward (very difficult = 1 to very easy = 5).

JOURNAL OF MANAGEMENT. VOL. 19. NO. 4. 199.7

762 COHEN

Data Analysis

Hypothesis 1 which tests the discriminant validity of the participation forms will be examined by three methods. First, the correlations among the forms of par- ticipation should indicate whether there is an overlap among the different forms. Secondly, all the items of union participation forms will be subjected to a principal component factor analysis and varimax rotation. A factor analysis of all 27 items of participation would indicate whether the six forms of participation examined in this study represent different dimensions and distinct constructs. Thirdly, regres- sion analysis of variables from the five models proposed in this study on the six forms of union participation would indicate whether different theoretical mecha- nisms and models become activated and/or are more valid for different forms of union participation. Differences in the effects of the independent variables would verify the existence of independence among the different forms of union participa- tion. Regressing the independent variables as a block from all the models of the participation forms would also indicate whether there is empirical support for Hypothesis 2 which tests the relationship between the research models and union participation forms. It will also indicate whether there is support for Hypothesis 3a, which compares the relationship between the structural and the social background models with the active versus the passive forms of participation.

Hypotheses 3a and 3b will be examined by three steps of hierarchical regres- sion. This regression will be the main test of Hypothesis 3b which compares the relationships between the research model and the active versus the passive forms of participation. As a first step, the variables of the structural model will be entered into the equation as a block; in the second step, the variables of the social back- ground model will be added and, in the third step, the variables of work dissatisfaction, socialization and economic models will be added. This order fol- lows the logic of the assumption of the reasons for participation presented earlier. First, one must be capable of participating, therefore the structural model was entered first. The social background model still containing some of the availability and structural considerations, as well as some motivational considerations, was then entered. Finally, the motivation to participate model, as presented by work dissatisfaction, motivation and economic concerns, was entered into the equation.

Results

Table 1 presents the inter-correlations among all the research variables, including descriptive statistics and reliabilities for the dependent and independent variables. The measures demonstrated good reliabilities for the research scales with a good spread of responses along the scales and research variables. The cor- relations among the six forms of union participation were all significant and positive, but relatively modest given that the highest r = .43 (between attitudinal militancy and propensity to strike). Of the twelve correlations among the forms of union participation, only two others were higher than r = .3.

A principal component of factor analysis of all 27 items of the six forms of union participation was performed. Results in Table 2 revealed six factors. The first

JOURNAL OF MANAGEMENT, VOL. 19, NO. 4, 1993

Tab

le 1

. D

escr

iptiv

e St

atis

tics,

R

elia

bilit

ies

and

Inte

rcor

rela

tions

A

mon

g R

esea

rch

Var

iabl

es

(Rel

iabi

litie

s in

Par

enth

eses

)

Varia

bles

Mea

n S.

D. .I

.2

.3

.4

.5

.6

.7

.8

.9

.I0

.I1

.I2

.I3

.I4

.I5

.I6

.I7

.18

.I9

.20

.21

.22

.23

.24

.25

41

For

ms

of P

artic

ipat

ion

3 1.

Uni

on

com

mitm

ent

%

2.

Part

icip

atio

n in

dec

isio

n m

akin

g

E;

3. U

nion

A

ctiv

ity

4. A

ttitu

dina

l m

ilita

ncy

!z

5. S

ervi

ng

in e

lect

e of

fice

?!

6. P

rope

nsity

to

str

ikea

So

cial

bac

krou

nd

-7

I. A

ge

8. T

enur

e 9.

Gen

derb

5 10

. E

duca

tion

8 W

ork

diss

atis

fact

ion

Il.

Job

satis

fact

ion

P

12.

Rol

e co

nflic

t

G

13.

Aut

onom

y

s 14

. Pr

omot

ion

oppo

rtun

ities

Soci

aliz

atio

n 15

. Po

litic

al

aftil

iatio

nC

16.

Soci

aliz

atio

n to

the

un

ion

17.

Atti

tude

s of

“si

gnif

ican

t ot

hers

” to

war

d th

e un

ion

18.

Uni

on

activ

ity

of r

elat

ives

E

cono

mic

41.0

2 11

.94

0.55

5.

15

47.0

8 11

.55

10.9

0 5.

10

0.4

I 9.

78

9.59

0.19

19.

Inco

me

1181

.66

20.

Uni

on

succ

ess

in w

ages

2.

24

2 1.

Per

man

ence

d .8

2 22

. U

nion

in

stru

men

talit

y 11

.10

38.9

6 13

.64(

.93)

8.

21

3.71

.3

3 (.

66)

11.2

9 2.

88

.29

.38(

.66)

10

.93

4.17

.2

5 .2

3 .2

7(.7

4)

0.07

0.

25

.16

.20

.25

.09

1.46

3.

66

.19

.25

.I4

.43

.04(

.87)

9.46

.1

4 -.

02

.35

.03

.16

-.14

7.

67

.15

.04

.30

-.02

.1

5 -.

12

.68

0.50

.O

l -.

12

-.09

-.

16

-.08

-.

14

-.02

.0

8 1.

40

-.15

-.

06

.I1

-.05

.O

l -.

07

.06

-.23

.0

6

8.54

.1

7 .I

0 .0

9 -.

04

-.02

.ll

.0

6 .0

3 -.

09

.04(

.86)

3.

91

-.O

l .0

6 -.

04

-.O

l .0

9 .0

3 -.

05

.Ol

-.12

-.

16

-.15

(H)

2.80

.0

5 .I

3 .0

6 -.

02

.03

-.07

.0

6 .1

3 -.

03

.10

.51

-.16

(.71

) 1.

79

.05

.12

.04

..02

-.04

-.

OO

-.I

9 -.

24

-.I6

.1

4 .4

8 -.

03

.29(

.55)

,049

.0

6 .0

7 .0

9 .ll

.0

2 .0

4 .1

3 .0

9 .0

5 .lO

.I

2 -.

05

.05

.09

4.22

.4

1 .4

0 .3

5 .3

3 .0

5 .2

0 .0

9 .1

2 -.

I9

-.ll

.I2

.03

.06

.09

.04(

.77)

2.

04

.40

.37

.24

.26

.07

.18

.05

.05

-.03

-.

12

.I3

-.07

.0

3 .O

l .0

4 .4

0(.7

9)

0.39

.0

8 .0

7 .l

I .0

9 .2

3 .0

2 .0

9 .l

I .0

3 -.

03

-.02

04

-.

Ol

-.05

-1

30

.02

.Ol

369.

09

-.O

l .I

6 .2

4 .0

7 .0

5 .0

4 .2

2 .I

5 -.

43

.15

.27

.07

.25

.22

.06

.17

.04

.Ol

1.01

.2

9 .2

7 .2

4 .2

0 .0

3 .1

2 -.

05

-.08

-2

4 -.

04

.18

.09

.07

.23

.Ol

.39

.31

.OO

.2

5 .3

8 .0

7 .0

5 .2

1 .O

l .0

5 -M

I .1

9 .2

5 .0

5 .0

3 .0

3 -.

I2

.09

.02

.08

.04

.03

-.02

.ll

.O

l 3.

35

.46

.26

.21

.31

.06

.23

.02

.07

.08

-.I3

.0

6 -.

04

-.02

-.

02

.07

.32

.38

.Ol

.24

.05

.13(

.79)

St

ruct

ural

23

. Org

aniz

atio

nal

size

20

09.1

9 16

72.5

3 .0

6 -.

lO

-.lO

-.

03

-.03

-.

I0

-.05

.0

4 .0

4 .0

5 -.

Ol

-.02

.0

5 -.

OO

.lO

-.

Ol

-.08

.0

2 .0

7 .O

l .0

2 .0

5 24

. S

ecto

r’

0.2

I 0.

41

-.04

.2

0 .lO

.I

8 -.

06

.24

-.08

-.

18

-.37

-.

03

-.O

l .1

4 -.

06

.I4

-.lO

.2

2 .1

2 -.

05

.30

-.04

-.l

l -.

02

-.47

25

. O

rgan

izat

iona

l co

mm

unic

atio

n 9.

07

2.51

.1

7 .1

4 .lO

-.

02

.03

-.03

-.

03

-.05

.0

6 .0

8 .5

7 -.

22

.35

.34

.05

.08

.07

-.02

.I

3 -.

17

-.O

l .0

6 .0

2 -.

10(.

65)

26.

Uni

on

com

mun

icat

ion

3.93

1.

14

.20

.32

.34

.I7

.09

.I0

.08

.lO

-.05

.0

6 .I

6 -.

12

.15

.09

.07

.24

.21

.08

.I3

-.17

.lO

.1

7 -.

07

.ll

.09

Not

es:

N =

472

-603

du

e to

mis

sing

va

lues

. C

orre

latio

ns

equa

l to

or

grea

ter

than

.13

. .I

1. a

nd .

05 a

re s

igni

fica

nt

at t

he .

OO

l. .O

l. an

d .0

5 al

pha

leve

ls

resp

ectiv

ely.

. a.

O

=no

I=

yes;

b.

O

=m

ale

I=fe

mal

e:

c.

0 =

“ri

ght”

1

= “

left

.“:

d.

0 =

non

per

man

ence

I =

perm

anen

ce;

e.

0 =

pub

lic

1 =

pri

vate

. *p

< .

05;

**p

< .

Ol;

***p

< ,

001.

8 E

764 COHEN

Table 2. Results of Factor Analysis of Union Participation Items _-______-_.~-..._-

Factor Loudings’

Union Commitment 1, I talk to my friends about how greatit is to belong to this union .73 2. I find that many of my values arevery similar to the values of my .78

union

3. 1 take personally any problems thatoccur in my union .70 4. I am proud to be a member of my union 34 5. Most of the things f believe in arebeing exemplified by my union 33 6. I feet depressed when things are notworking out as they shmdd in .70

my union 7. I feel myself to be part of the union .79 8. There is a lot of silimarlty betweenmy goals and the goals of my .I9

union

9. I really care about everything that happens rn my unittn

Participation in Decision Making IO. The amount of influence that 1 have in determining the union

.70

policy

I 1, The amount of influence that I have in determining who will be the unionleaders

12. The amount of influence that I have in determining whether the union willstrike

13. The amount of influence that I huve in determining whether the union willsign u contract

Participation in Union Activities 14. Voting

15. Attendance at general membership meetings

16 Km&edge of the union contract

17. Reading the union’s newsletter

18. Giving any assistance to union activites

19. Applying to the union for any support

Attitudinal Militancy 20. I would never be a ~‘strikebreaker”

2 I. 1 would participate in a strike even if I knew that it was an illegal strike.

22. I would not hesitate to picket for the union

23. I would be ready to warn “strikebreakers

Serving in Elected OfI’hs 24. 0. No 1. Yes Propensity to strike

.I6

25. The number of days I would participate inany strike called by my union

26. The number of days I would participate init strike for B low (10%) wage increase

27. The number of days I would participate ina strike for a high (25%) wage increast:

Eigenvalue 1.17

37

3s

.74

.64

34

.83

39

.51

.58

.62

.60

31

.75

.79

34

2.80 2.01 I .28

.hO

.61

.7h

SO

.31

1 .OO .48 % Common variance accounted for 26.6 10.4 7.4 4.7 3.1 I .R _.._~

NNW 1. Only facmr loadings higher than 3 are ahown

factor included all the union commitment items; the second factor, participation in

decision making items, and the third, propensity to strike items. The fourth factor

JOURNAL OF MANAGEMENT. VOL. 19, NO. 4, 1993

UNION PARTICIPATtON 765

included all the participation in activities items including serving in elected offices which was expected to appear as a single dimension. The fifth factor included all the attitudinal militancy items. The sixth factor included two items from the union commitment scale and was not considered sufficiently well- defined for interpretation.

The modest correlations among the participation forms, along with the factor analysis findings, demonstrated independence among the participation forms and, in general, support Hypothesis 1. It should be noted that the factor analysis result does not discriminate between serving in elected offices and participation in union activities and this does not support the expectation in Hypothesis 1. This finding may be a result of presenting these two forms in the same section of the question- naire.

Table 3 shows the regression results of the dependent variables from all five models on the six forms of union participation. The explained variance ranged from 38 percent (union commitment) to 12 percent (serving in elected offices). In support of Hypothesis 2 the findings demonstrate that, in general, forms of union participation were affected by variables from most of the models. Hypothesis 3a was only partly supported by the regression results. The limited effect of variables from the social background and the structural models upon the passive forms of participation was expected. Also as expected, variables from the structural and the social background models had a strong effect upon participation in union activities. However, the data did not show as strong an effect as expected of variables from these two models upon the two other active forms: participation in decision-mak- ing and serving in elected offices.

Table 4 shows the results of the hierarchical regressions. In general, the findings of Table 4 provide moderate support for Hypotheses 3a and 3b. Variables based on the structural model does, however, affect two of the active forms (activ- ity and participation in decision-making) more than the passive forms. This finding supports Hypothesis 3a. Variables based on the social background model significantly added to the variance, beyond that already explained by the struc- tural model, in the case of union activity and serving in elected offices but not for participation in decision-making. Regarding Hypothesis 3b as expected, variables based on the motivational models added most of the explained variance beyond the structural and the social background models to the passive forms of participa- tion. In the active forms, Hypothesis 3b was strongly supported by the findings regarding participation in decision-making and union activity. The strongest sup- port was for union activity in which all sets of variables contributed similarly to the explained variance. Moderate support was found for participation in decision- making in which variables based on the structural model contributed significantly to the explained variance, but not variables based on the social background model. Variables from the structural model had no effect upon serving in elected offices, while those based on the social background model had a significant con- tribution to the explained variance, although less than the motivational set of variables.

JOURNAL OF MANAGEMENT. VOL. 19. NO. 4. 1003

Tab

le 3

. R

egre

ssio

n R

esul

ts

(Sta

ndar

dize

d C

oeff

icie

nts)

of

Var

iabl

es

From

al

l th

e M

odel

s in

the

ir

Rel

atio

ns

to F

orm

s of

if!

U

nion

Pa

rtic

ipat

ion

(t T

est

in p

aren

thes

es)

UN

ION

P

AR

TIC

IPA

TIO

N

Pas

sive

F

orm

s A

rriv

e F

orm

s

g 2 V

aria

bles

$ So

cial

Bac

kgro

und

I 9 A

ge

Tenu

re

in O

rgan

izat

ion

Gen

derh

-

Educ

atio

n W

ork

Dis

sati

sfac

tion

Jo

b Sa

tisfa

ctio

n Ro

le

Conf

lict

Auto

nom

y

Prom

otio

nal

Opp

ortu

nitie

s So

cial

izat

ion

Polit

ical

Af

filia

ti&

Soci

aliz

atio

n to

the

Uni

on

Attit

udes

of

“Si

gnifi

cant

O

ther

s”

Tow

ard

the

Unio

n’

Unio

n Ac

tiwty

of

Rel

ativ

es

Eco

nom

ic

Inco

me

Unio

n Su

cces

s in

Im

prov

ing

Wag

es

Petm

anen

ced

Unio

n In

stru

men

talit

y S

truc

tura

l O

rgan

izat

iona

l Si

ze

sect

ore

Org

aniz

atio

nal

com

mun

icat

ion

Unio

n Co

mm

unic

atio

n R’

(A

djus

ted)

St

anda

rd

Erro

r

F

.12(

2.32

*) .0

8( I .

33)

.00(

0.07

) -.

ll(-

1.71

) .0

0(0.

05)

-.13

(2.7

4**)

-.0

8(-1

.78)

-.

02(-

0.51

)

-.13

(-2.

27*)

-.03

(-0.

54)

-.l

l(-2

.35*

) -.

02(-

O/w

-.lO

(-1.8

3)

.07(

1.12

) -.

05(-

1.09

) .0

1(0.

17)

.17(

3.13

**)

.18(

3&I*

*)

-.04

(-0.

94)

.16(

3.91

***)

.09(

1.4

6)

.07(

1 .O

O)

-.15

(-3.

00**

) .0

5( 1

.06)

.05(

0.92

) .0

4(1.

01)

-.03(

-0.7

7)

.03(

0.57

)

-.15(

-2.7

2**)

-.03(

-0.8

2)

.04(

0.76

)

.01(

0.23

)

-.18(

-3.0

5**)

-.Ol(-

0.16

) .0

2(0.

41)

-.02

(-0.

32)

-.15

(-2.

77**

) .1

0(2.

42*)

.1

1(2.

48*)

JM

(O.9

3)

-.09

(-1.

71)

.01(

0.24

) -.

06(-

1.26

) .0

5( 1

.02)

-.Ol(-

0.16

)

.20(

4.58

***)

.17(

3.90

***)

.05(

1.41

)

.12(

2.89

**)

.17(

3.68

***)

.09(

2.04

*) .0

9(2.

36*)

.08(

2.02

*)

.08(

1.7

0)

.07(

I .43

) .0

4(0.

87)

.06(

1.68

) .1

9(4.

35**

*)

.20(

4.56

***)

.0

6( 1

.56)

.01(

0.18

) .1

8(4.

07**

*) .0

6(

I .45

) .0

6( 1

.67)

-.12

(-l.%

*)

.12(

2.71

**)

.04(

0.88

) -.O

O(-.

Ol)

8 .0

1(0.

17)

%I

-.02(

-0.3

1)

z

.06(

1.16

) .2

0(4.

87**

*)

-.07(

- 1.

43)

.I 1(

2.60

*)

.00(

0.07

) .2

6(6.

36**

*)

-.04(

-0.7

3)

-.OO

(-0.0

5)

-.OO

(-0.0

9)

.21(

4.79

***)

-.02

(-0.

29)

-.04

(-0.

84)

.02(

0.47

) .2

0(4.

34**

*)

-.O

O(-

0.06

) .0

4(0.

98)

.02(

0.59

) .0

9(2.

08*)

SM(O

.82)

.1

3(2.

85**

)

.10(

2.51

*) .0

7(1.

68)

-.03(

-0.5

9)

.02(

0.46

)

.02(

0.49

) .0

3(0.

73)

.01(

0.23

) -.

lO(-

1.93

)

.10(

2.25

*)

.06(

I .6

6)

.38(

.36)

10

.95

14.8

3***

.02(

0.39

) .1

2(2.

10’)

.02(

0.47

)

.07(

1.6

9)

.23(

.20)

3.

73

7.69

***

-.03

(-0.

69)

.18(

3.10

**)

.06(

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Discussion

timitations. Before reviewing the findings of this study, it is necessary to dis- cuss some of its limitations. First, not all the forms of union participation were examined in this study; striking and joining and/or resigning from the union were not included. Joining and/or resigning from the union requires a longitudinal research design for the collection of data because, in the case of a strike, a specific research design is needed which can collect data from the union during, or after, the strike. Conclusions of this study can, therefore, be generalized only to the forms examined here. A second limitation of this study is that the ability to gener- alize these findings is limited by the types of unions and organizations involved. Only white-collar employees participated which rendered extrapolation of the results to blue-collar unions somewhat tenuous. Future research is needed to explore whether the findings of this study would differ for a blue-collar sample. Variables representing the work dissatisfaction and the economic models can be expected to have a stronger effect upon blue-collar employees than was found in the white-collar sample of this research. Lower levels of work satisfaction and rewards among blue-collar employees may increase the effect of these models on union participation forms in an attempt to increase rewards through the union (eco- nomic model) and as an alternative object of expectation, or as a form of protest (work dissatisfaction). Finally, some of the determinants of union participation are moderately correlated with each other. In a few cases the correlations are quite high, such as the relationship between age and tenure. While most of the correla- tions are not extremely high-none of them exceeds r > .70-some muIticollinearity may be present. ~ulticol~inearity typically inflates standard errors leading to conservative tests for effects of individual variables thus the results are most likely not biased toward rejection of null hypotheses, but toward failure to reject (Cohen & Cohen, 1983). The results of this study should be inter- preted with such Iimitations in mind.

The question of generalization is of particular importance given that the data for this study was obtained, nut from a Western industrial relations system, but from an industrial relations system of a different country and culture, namely, Israel. This cross-cultural aspect is of interest in light of a recent paper of Arthur and Dworkin ( I99 1) which identifies and emphasizes international industrial rela- tions as a major research area in industrial relations. They argued that there is a need for further research and exploration of the similarities and the differences between different systems within tbe discipline. Moreover, Ramaswamy ( 1977) argued that a comparative theory of union democracy which spans experience across cultures can be built only around participation. Ramaswamy continues that few have analyzed their data from a comparative perspective and, not surprisingly, the theories fail when extended beyond the context in which they evolved. Simi- larly, Gallagher and Strauss ( I 99 1) maintain that there has been almost no research comparing members’ attitudes in different countries.

The present research is based mainly upon theory and concepts from Western literature. The findings of this study show similarity in the determinants of union

JOURNAL OF MANAGEMENT. VOL. 19. NO. 4. 1943

UNtON PARTICIPATION 769

participation between the Israeli and Western findings. Kuruvilla, Gallagher, Fiorito and Wakabayashi ( 1990) also found similarity in the determinants of partic- ipation in union activities between Western findings and the Japanese setting which they examined. It can therefore be argued that the Western concepts and the- ories remain valid when examined in different cultures and industrial relations systems. However, in a direct comparison of these present findings to those of Kuruvilla et al. (1990), when only participation in union activities can be com- pared, it seems that the Israeli sample is closer to the Western culture in terms of the determinants of participation in union activities. For example, as the Western findings show, age and education have a positive effect upon the Israeli sample, but a negative one upon the Japanese sample. The uniqueness of the Israeli sample might be demonstrated by the lack of effect of the work dissatisfaction model, which affected participation in decision- making in both the Japanese sample and the Western findings. The unique contribution of this study is in the examination of the effects of the determinants upon several forms of participation. In that regard, this study demonstrated the importance of such a comprehensive analysis by show- ing that a given determinant may affect one participation form in one direction and a different participation form in another. For example, in the Israeli sample, age has a positive effect upon participation in union activities and union commitment but a negative effect upon the propensity to strike. It is obvious that future research is required to establish more clearly the structure of union participation in other forms of participation and other types of unions which represent different kinds of workers in a variety of industrial relations systems.

Farms of participation as multidimensional constructs. The findings of this study support the argument that each form of union participation is an independent construct with its own mechanisms and processes. This conclusion is supported by the modest correlations among the forms of participation, by the factor analysis, and by the results of the regression analyses. This finding is also in accordance with Ramaswamy’s (1977) argument that participation is, of necessity, an impre- cise concept and can encompass a wide variety of behaviors. This present study demonstrates, moreover, that different forms of participation cannot be explained by one single theory. Different theoretical explanations can be applied to different forms of participation. There were strong differences in the effects of variables rep- resenting the models upon the six forms examined in this study which supports the argument that there are different processes behind each form of union participa- tion.

This research categorized the different forms of union participation into active versus passive forms. The results show that there are some important simi- larities in the determinants of union participation among the forms in each of the two categories. Variables from the structural and the social background models affect the active forms of union participation more strongly than the passive forms, whereas variables from the three motivational models (work dissatisfaction, eco- nomic and socialization) affect the passive more strongly than the active forms. These findings support the proposed view that participation should be categorized into active and passive forms; some problems, however, with this classification

JOURNAL OF MANAGEMENT, VOL. 19. NO. 4. 1993

110 COHEN

remain. First, the effect of variables from the structural and the social background models on two of the active forms (participation in decision-making and serving in elected offices) was not as strong as expected in the hypotheses. Second, there were some notable differences in the determinants of participation in each of the categories. Age affected union commitment positively, and propensity to strike negatively, even though both were classified as passive forms. There are many other differences between the specific determinants of the active and the passive forms of participation.

There are two possible explanations for such differences. The first is that each of the different forms of union participation is an independent construct with its own mechanisms and processes, therefore the forms of union participation can- not be categorized into subgroups. Accordingly, the proposed classification should be viewed as a general classification only, while each of the forms within the dis- tinctive categories should still be considered as an independent construct. A similar classification was proposed by Morrow (1983) with the work commitment concept being a supreme concept for the different commitment foci in the work environment. The second explanation is that there is at least one other dimension that can be used in classifying the different forms. This, or these dimensions would clarify the similarities and the differences between the forms of participation, their determinants and the processes behind these forms. Future conceptual and theoret- ical research is needed to explore and examine other dimensions for categorizing forms of union participation. Some suggestions in that regard can be found in Gal- lagher and Strauss (1991).

Implicationsforfuture research. While there is much current research deal- ing with the concept of union commitment, especially in the management and industrial psychology literature, it seems that research regarding other forms of union attitudes and behavior has been neglected. Although the common approach of examining union commitment is to adopt definitions and approaches from the work commitment literature (Morrow, 1983) and, in particular, the organizational commitment literature (e.g., Gordon et al., 1980) this paper suggests that another way to understand the concept of union commitment is to integrate it into union participation research and concepts by viewing it as one of the forms of union par- ticipation. A better understanding of the processes and determinants of union commitment might be accomplished by comparing it not only to other commit- ments in the workplace such as organizational commitment (Magenau et al., 1988), but also to other forms of union participation and by employing theoretical expla- nations and models from the union participation literature.

More recently, attention has been growing regarding the concept of dual ver- sus unilateral commitment to union and organization (Gordon & Ladd, 1990) based on the assumption that unilateral commitment to the union, as well as low dual commitment to union and organization, demonstrate attitudes of employees which, from the managerial point of view, are undesirable. This paper suggests that there is a need for an elaborated approach to the concept of dual versus unilateral commitment. Besides commitment, there are other forms of participation that may have similar or even more important implications upon management than union

JOURNAL OF MANAGEMENT, VOL. 19, NO. 4, 1993

UNION PARTICIPATION 771

commitment. The concept of unilateral versus dual commitment to union and orga- nization can be expanded to include forms of union participation as well as union commitment and other indicators of organizational effectiveness in addition to organizational commitment.

Another question that needs to be answered by future research is whether one form of union participation can be used as a predictor for another form. For exam- ple, a recent trend is to use union commitment as a predictor of union activity (Fullagar & Barling, 1989; Thacker, Fields, & Barclay, 1990). This present study has suggested that forms of union participation can be divided into active versus passive forms. It can be assumed that passive forms of participation, such as com- mitment and attitudinal militancy, mediate the relationship between determinants and active forms of union participation. Future research needs to provide a clear conceptual and theoretical rationale when employing forms of union participation as dependent or independent variables so that redundancy and overlap are reduced between the various forms, determinants and outcomes. The findings of this research support Klandermans’ (1986) conclusion that a good taxonomy of union participation is needed. A fundamental objective of future research could be to develop a theoretical framework for union participation. As Gallagher and Strauss (1991) have suggested, while no single theory can capture the diversity of factors which influence membership attitudes and participation, researchers should exam- ine existing theories to determine whether they really add to our understanding or merely duplicate other concepts using different terminology. In particular, it will be necessary to develop and test hypotheses that refer to specific forms of union participation. Moreover, theories that translate structural circumstances into deter- minants of individual participation are needed and these theories must be capable of discriminating among the different forms of participation in our taxonomy. Much more research on different forms of participation needs to be done before any conclusions can be drawn.

Acknowledgment: The author would like to thank two anonymous reviewers for their helpful comments and suggestions. The author would also like to thank Suzanne Kiely, Adrienne Murphy and Marion Lupu for their editorial assistance.

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