an economic perspective on software licenses – incentives in open source software
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An Economic Perspective on Software Licenses – Incentives in Open Source Software. Kasper Edwards Department of Manufacturing Engineering and Management Technical University of Denmark. Outline. Point of Departure Properties of Software Three Licenses Two Types of Agents - PowerPoint PPT PresentationTRANSCRIPT
An Economic Perspective on Software An Economic Perspective on Software Licenses Licenses
– – Incentives in Open Source SoftwareIncentives in Open Source Software
Kasper Edwards
Department of Manufacturing Engineering and Management
Technical University of Denmark
Outline
Point of Departure
Properties of Software
Three Licenses
Two Types of Agents
Roles and Desired Use-Products
A Model
Point of Departure
Motivation Why is open source software being developed?
Raymond Geeks bearing gifts
Ego, social status and reputation
Lerner & Tirole Leadership
Reputation effects and spillover
Problems Explained incentives for individuals - not mechanisms and
dynamics
Too much emphasis on social status
Point of Departure
Interest The development process
Economics
There is special dynamic within the development process
Hypothesis Properties of software + Type of agent => A certain behaviour
(incentives and mechanisms)
Goal To develop a model of software development and consumption
Properties of Software
Two properties Technical properties
License properties
Technical Properties Software can be reproduced without loss of quality
The cost of copying is non-prohibitive
The cost distribution is non-prohibitive
License Properties The license set boundaries for possible behaviour
Focus on the economic issues rather than the political
Three Licenses
Three extremes Microsoft EULA
GNU GPL
BSD
Microsoft End User License Agreement The licensee may use in the intended way
The licensee may sell the program once
The license may NOT copy, distribute, modify, use on more than one computer etc. etc.
It the program eats your data the program may be refunded
- - - A capitalists dream come true
Three Licenses
GNU General Public License (GPL) The Licensee may copy, distribute and modify
Source code for modifications distributed must be available
Distributed copies carry same license
The viral effect…
- - - Protect the users
BSD License The Licensee may copy, distribute
and modify
Modifications and derived works may be distributed as closed source
- - - The liberal alternative
Two Types of Agents
Firms Command resources
Pay salaries
Profit maximizing
Individuals Only command personal time
Also driven by leisure
Utility maximizing
Roles and Desired Use-Products
Two Roles Developers
User-developers
Use-Products An agent’s particular use of a combination of features in a
program
A Model – Microsoft EULA License
Program is developed
User-developer
MaintainerDistribute
Private use
Agents whouse U-U assistance
Dynamics – Microsoft EULA License
Basic market situation Profit incentive for developing
Main dynamic is outside the model
Competition between maintainers
User-maintainer Feedback if desired use-product is not present
User-to-user assistance Cost effective way of obtaining information
Infoproviders derive a personal benefit i.e. reputation effect
A Model – GPL License
Program is developed
User-developer
MaintainerDistribute
Private use
Agents whouse U-U assistance
Modify theprogram
Keepmodifications
Distributemodifications
Agents whomodify
Discuss
modifications
Dynamics – GPL License
Why GPL? Personal beliefs
Evolutionary perspective: In beginning profit prospects are low
Why Make modifications? Desired use-product missing
Maintenance costs Maintaining a separate patch is costly
Lack of information User-developers cannot know if other user-developer are creating
a similar use-product
The cost of being too late No reputation effect
Maintenance costs
A Model – BSD License
Program is developed
User-developer
MaintainerDistribute
Private use
Agents whouse U-U assistance
Modify theprogram
Keepmodifications
Distributemodifications
Agents whomodify
Discuss
modifications
Closed sourcedistribution
A Model – BSD License
M ain tain er
P r o gr a m isde v e lo p e d
U se r - dev e lo p e r
M o d if y
P r iv a teu s e Keep
D is tr ib u te
A ge n t swh o use
c lo s eds o u r c e
A g en tsw h o
m o d i fy
N E WM ain t ain
er
P r o g r am isd ev e lo p ed
Us er - d ev elo p er
D is tr ib u te
A gen t sw h o u s e
U -U a ssis tan c e
P r iv a te u s e
Dynamics – BSD License
Identical to GPL
But Firms have a greater incentive to adopt BSD
Greater chance that modifications are kept private
Free riding becomes a significant problem
Effect limited at this level of focus Standards and compatibility issues are missing
Conclusion
A model based in economics Seems to offer a reasonable explanation for the phenomenon
The license shapes possible behaviour The three licenses exemplify different types of behavior
Licenses not only restrict behavior but also create incentives
Limitations Project as object of analysis
Consequences from standards and compatibility not included
Obvious implications for policy P-makers must consider which license is best for the economy
The End
Incentives and Costs
Incentives for individuals Ego – “LOOK What I have created!”
Peer reputation
Signaling effects – may spill into the real world
A desired use-product can be obtained at little cost
Incentives for firms A desired use-product can be obtained at little cost
Homemade modifications
Possible to create services without maintaining the software
Costs Time (adoption, programming, integration, etc.)
Firms: Wages
Individuals: Opportunity cost
Dynamics
Uncertainty Difficult to predict development path => Lowered free riding
The “Keep Private” Penalty Keep private => High maintenance costs
Always a work in progress Low initial commercial value => license lock-in (GPL)
The cost of being too late Development becomes a sunk cost
Risk of the “Keep Private” penalty
Aggregated benefit One agents small contribution result in large aggregated benefits
Does the Model Hold Up?
Henrik Individual, limited spare time
High opportunity cost
The modification was a one time investment
Paul Consultant, working for a firm
Obvious incentive for keeping private
Small firm, Paul charged extra for keeping private
No in-house programmers – no wish for extra maintenance
Number 1 to market the new product more important
BSD License
GPL License
MS EULA
The Model
Program is developed
User-developer
MaintainerDistribute
Private use
Agents whouse U-U assistance
Modify theprogram
Keepmodifications
Distributemodifications
Agents whomodify
Discuss
modifications
Closed sourcedistribution
Two examples of OSS development
Henrik – Need feature Programmer and Linux enthusiast
Interested in kernel development
Had to use windows for work
Linux was unable to read Windows’ file system
Gordon had a patch, which he maintained The patch was troublesome to obtain In frustration Henrik decides to fix the patch for integration
The patch is integrated and future versions of Linux can now read Windows’ file system
Two examples of OSS development
Poul – Paid modifications FreeBSD core developer, consulent
Small American ISP wanted to market a new product
The product: Individual hosting
Each customer was to obtain full control
The ISP already used FreeBSD, however functionality was needed
Poul was hired for the job
To prices: 1) Private 2) Open source
Added benefit: General increase in FreeBSD security