an appraisal of the technologies of politidcal control

7/28/2019 An Appraisal of the Technologies of Politidcal Control

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Donate for the Cryptome archve of fles from June 1996 to the present

20 August 1999: Lnk to follow-up STOA reports on "Development of Survellance Technology and Rsk of Abuse of Economc

Informaton (an apprasal of technologes of poltcal control)," Aprl and May, 1999

19 October 1998

Source: Mare-Jose Klaver,NRC Handelsblad(WordPerfect format, 136K)

See also shorter European Parlment verson: http://www.europarl.eu.nt/dg4/stoa/en/publ/166499/execsum.htm

AN APPRAISAL OF THE TECHNOLOGIES OF

POLITICAL CONTROL

An Omega Foundaton Summary & Optons Report

For The European Parlament

SEPTEMBER 1998

CONTENTS

1. INTRODUCTION

2. THE ROLE & FUNCTION OF POLITICAL CONTROL TECHNOLOGIES

3. RECENT TRENDS & INNOVATIONS

3.1 Polcy Optons

4. INNOVATIONS IN CROWD CONTROL WEAPONS

4.1 Polcy Optons

5. NEW PRISON CONTROL SYSTEMS

5.1 Polcy Optons

6. INTERROGATION, TORTURE TECHNIQUES & TECHNOLOGIES

6.1 Polcy Optons

7. DEVELOPMENTS IN SURVEILLANCE TECHNOLOGY

7.1 Closed Crcut Televson (CCTV) Survellance Networks

7.2 Algorthmc Survellance Systems

7.3 Buggng & Tappng Devces

7.4 Natonal & Internatonal Communcatons Interceptons Networks

pprasal of the Technologes of Poltdcal Control http://cryptome.org/stoa-atp

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7.4.1 NSA Intercepton of All EU Telecommuncatons

7.4.2 EU-FBI Global Telecommuncatons Survellance System

7.5 Polcy Optons

8. REGULATION OF HORIZONTAL PROLIFERATION

8.1 Polcy Optons

9. CONCLUSIONS

NOTES

ANNEX 1 - BIBLIOGRAPHY

1. INTRODUCTION

Ths report represents a summarsed verson of an nterm study, "An Apprasal of the Technology of Poltcal Control" (PE 166.499),

(referred to throughout ths document as the Interm Report), prepared by the Omega Foundaton n Manchester and presented to the STOA

Panel at ts meetng of 18 December 1997 and to the Commttee on Cvl Lbertes and Internal Affars on 27 January 1998.

The Interm Report aroused great nterest and the resultant hgh-profle press comment throughout the European Unon and beyond,

ndcates the level of publc concern about many of the nnovatons detaled by the study. Ths current report s framed by the same keyobjectves as the Interm Report(1), namely:

() To provde Members of the European Parlament wth a succnct reference gude to recent advances n the technology of

poltcal control;

() To dentfy and descrbe the current state of the art of the most salent developments, further clarfyng and updatng the

areas of the nterm report whch have aroused the greatest publc concern and comment;

() To present MEP's wth an account of current trends both wthn Europe and Worldwde;

(v) To suggest polcy optons coverng regulatory strateges for the future democratc control and management of ths

technology;

(v) To provde some further succnct background materal to nform the Parlament's response to the proposed declaraton bythe Commsson on electronc eavesdroppng whch has been put on the agenda for the plenary sesson of the European

Parlament, on Wednesday 16 September 1998.

Ths report also has seven substantve sectons coverng (a) the role and functon of the technologes of poltcal control; (b) recent trends

and nnovatons; (c) crowd control weapons; (d) new prsoner control technology; (e) new nterrogaton and torture technologes; (f)

developments n survellance technology (ncludng the creaton of human recognton and trackng devces and the evoluton of new global

polce and mltary telecommuncatons nterceptons networks; (g) the mplcatons of vertcal and horzontal prolferaton of ths

technology and the need for an adequate EU response, to ensure t nether threatens cvl lbertes n Europe, nor reaches the hands of

tyrants.

Thus, the purpose of ths report s to explore the most recent developments n the technology of poltcal control and the major

consequences assocated wth ther ntegraton nto processes and strateges of polcng and nternal control. The report ends each secton

wth a seres of polcy optons whch mght facltate more democratc, open and effcent regulatory control, ncludng specfc areas wherefurther research s needed to make such regulatory controls effectve.

A bref look at the hstorcal development of ths concept s nstructve. Twenty years ago, the Brtsh Socety for Socal Responsblty of

Scentsts (BSSRS) warned about the dangers of a new technology of poltcal control. BSSRS defned ths technology as "a new type of

weaponry"..."It s the product of the applcaton of scence and technology to the problem of neutralsng the state's nternal enemes. It s

manly drected at cvlan populatons, and s not ntended to kll (and only rarely does). It s amed as much at hearts and mnds as at

bodes." For these scentsts, "Ths new weaponry ranges from means of montorng nternal dssent to devces for controllng

demonstratons; from new technques of nterrogaton to methods of prsoner control. The ntended and actual effects of these new

technologcal ads are both broader and more complex than the more lethal weaponry they complement." (2)

BSSRS recognsed that the weapons and systems developed and tested by the USA n Vetnam, and by the UK n ts former colones, were


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about to be used on the home front and that the mltary ndustral complex would n the future, rapdly modfy ts mltary systems for

polce and nternal securty use. In other words, a new technology of represson was beng spawned whch would fnd a poltcal nche n

Western Lberal democraces. The role of ths technology was to provde a techncal fx whch mght effectvely crush dssent whlst beng

desgned to mask the level of coercon beng deployed. Wth the advent of the Northern Irsh conflct, the gene was out of the bottle and a

new laboratory for feld testng these technologes had emerged.

There have been qute awesome changes n the technologes avalable to states for nternal control snce the frst BSSRS publcaton. Some

of these technologes are hghly senstve poltcally and wthout proper regulaton can threaten or undermne many of the human rghts

enshrned n nternatonal law, such as the rghts of assembly, prvacy, due process, freedom of poltcal and cultural expresson and

protecton from torture, arbtrary arrest, cruel and nhumane punshments and extra-judcal executon.

Proper oversght of developments n poltcal control technologes s further complcated by the phenomena of 'bureaucratc capture' where

senor offcals control ther mnsters rather than the other way round. Poltcans both at European and soveregn state level, whom ctzens

of the communty have presumed wll be montorng any excesses or abuse of ths technology on ther behalf, are sometmes systematcally

dened the nformaton they requre to do that job.

2. THE ROLE & FUNCTION OF POLITICAL CONTROL TECHNOLOGIES

Throughout the Nnetes, many governments have spent huge sums on the research, development, procurement and deployment of new

technology for ther polce, para-mltary and nternal securty forces. The objectve of ths development work has been to ncrease and

enhance each agency's polcng capactes. A domnant assumpton behnd ths technocratsaton of the polcng process, s the belef that t

has created both a faster polcng response tme and a greater cost-effectveness. The man am of all ths effort has been to save polcng

resources by ether automatng certan forms of control, amplfyng the rate of partcular actvtes, or decreasng the number of offcersrequred to perform them.

The resultant nnovatons n the technology of poltcal control have been functonally desgned to yeld an extenson of the scope,

effcency and growth of polcng power. The extent to whch ths process can be judged to be a legtmate one depends both on one's pont

of vew and the level of secrecy and accountablty bult nto the overall procurement and deployment procedures. The full mplcatons of

such developments may take tme to assess. It s argued that one mpact of ths process s the mltarsaton of the polce and the

para-mltarsaton of the army as ther roles, equpment and procedures begn to overlap. Ths phenomena s seen as havng far reachng

consequences on the way that future epsodes of sub-state volence s handled, and nfluencng whether those nvolved are reconcled,

managed, repressed, 'lost' or effcently destroyed.

What s emergng n certan quarters s a chllng pcture of ongong nnovaton n the scence and technology of socal and poltcal control,

ncludng: sem-ntellgent zone-denal systems usng neural networks whch can dentfy and potentally punsh unsanctoned behavour;

the advent of global telecommuncatons survellance systems usng voce recognton and other bometrc technques to facltate humantrackng; data-vellance systems whch can match computer held data to vsual recognton systems or dentfy frendshp maps smply by

analysng the telephone and emal lnks between who calls whom; new sub-lethal ncapactatng weapons used both for prson and rot

control as well as n sub-state conflct operatons other than war; new target acquston ads, lethal weapons and expandng dum-dum lke

ammunton whch although banned by the Geneva conventons for use aganst other state's solders, s fndng ncreasng popularty

amongst SWAT and specal forces teams; dscreet order vehcles desgned to look lke ambulances on prme tme televson but whch can

deploy a formdable array of weaponry to provde a show of force n countres lke Indonesa or Turkey, or spray harassng chemcals or dye

onto protesters. Such markng appears to be kd-glove n ts restrant but tags all protesters so that the snatch squads can arrest them later,

out of the pryng lenses of CNN.

Whlst there are many opposng schools of thought on why these changes are happenng now, few doubt that there are fundamental changes

takng place n the types of tactcs, technques and technologes avalable to nternal securty agences for polcng purposes. Yet many

questons reman unanswered, unconsdered or under-researched. Why for example, dd such a transformaton n the technology used for

poltcal control dramatcally change over the last twenty fve years? Is there any sgnfcance n the fact that former communst regmes n

the Warsaw Treaty Organsaton and contnung centralsed economc systems such as Chna, are begnnng to adopt such technologes?

What are the reasons behnd a global convergence of the technology of poltcal control deployed n the North and South, the East and West

What are the factors responsble for generatng the adopton of such new polcng technology - was t technology push or demand pull?

What new tools for polcng le on the horzon and what are the dynamcs behnd the process of nnovat on and the need for a vast arsenal of

dfferent knds of technology rather than just a few? Are the many ways ths technology affects the polcng process fully understood? Who

controls the patterns of polce technology procurement and what are the corporate nfluences?

The technology of poltcal control produces a contnuum of flexble optons whch stretch from modern law enforcement to advanced state

suppresson. It s mult-functonal and has led to a rapd extenson of the scope, effcency and growth of polcng power, creatng polcng

revolutons both wth Europe, the US and the rest of the world. The key dfference beng the level of democratc accountablty n the

manner n whch the technology s appled. Yet because of a process of technologcal and decson drft these nstruments of control, once


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deployed quckly become "normalsed." Ther secondary and unantcpated effects often lead to a paramltarsaton of the securty forces

and a mltarsaton of the polce - often because the companes whch produce them servce both markets.

3. RECENT TRENDS & INNOVATIONS

Snce the "Technology of Poltcal Control" was frst wrtten (Ackroyd et al.,1977) there has been a profuson of technologcal nnovatons

for polce, paramltary, ntellgence and nternal securty forces. Many of these are smple advances on the technologes avalable n the

1970's. Others such as automatc telephone tappng, voce recognton and electronc taggng were not envsaged by the orgnal BSSRS

authors snce they dd not thnk that the computng power needed for a natonal montorng system was feasble. The overall drft of ths

technology s to ncrease the power and relablty of the polcng process, ether enhancng the ndvdual power of polce operatves,

replacng personnel wth less expensve machnes to montor actvty or to automate certan polce montorng, detecton and

communcaton facltes completely. A massve Polce Industral Complex has been spawned to servce the needs of polce, paramltary

and securty forces, evdenced by the number of companes now actve n the market.. An overall trend s towards globalsaton of these

technologes and a drft towards ncreasng prolferaton.

One core trend has been towards a mltarsaton of the polce and a paramltarsaton of mltary forces n Europe. In some European

countres, that trend s reversed, e.g. n 1996, the Swss government (Federal Councl and the Mltary Department) made plans to re-equp

the Swss Army Ordungsdenst wth 118 mllon Swss Francs of less-lethal weapons for acton wthn the country n tmes of crss. (These

nclude 12 tanks, armoured vehcles, teargas, rubber shot and handcuffs). The decson was made by decree preventng any dscusson or

nterventon. Ther role wll be to help polce large scale demonstratons or rots and to polce fronters to 'prevent streams of refugees

comng nto Swtzerland.(3)

There has also been an ncreasng trend towards convergence - the process whereby the technology used by polce and the mltary fornternal securty operatons, converges towards beng more or less ndstngushable. The term also descrbes the trend towards a unversal

adopton of smlar types of technologes by most states for nternal securty and polcng. Securty companes now produce weapons and

communcatons systems for both mltary and the polce. Such systems ncreasngly represent the muscle and the nervous system of publc

order squads. (4) Gven the potental cvl lbertes and human rghts mplcatons assocated wth certan technologes of poltcal control,

there s a pressng need to avod the rsks of such technologes developng faster than any regulatng legslaton. MEP's may wsh to

consder how best t should develop approprate structures of accountablty to prevent undesrable nnovatons emergng va processes of

technologcal creep or decson drft. Towards that end, members of the European Parlament may wsh to consder the followng polcy

optons:-

3.1 POLICY OPTIONS

() Acceptng the prncple that the process of nnovaton of new systems for use n nternal socal and poltcal control should

be transparent, (.e. open to approprate publc and parlamentary scrutny and be subject to change should unwanted and

unantcpated consequences emerge;

() Gve consderaton to what commttee and procedural changes mght be needed to ensure that Members of the European

Parlament are adequately nformed on ssues relatng to technologes of poltcal control and can effectvely act should the

need arse;

() Consder f there s a need to amend the terms of reference of the Cvl Lbertes and Internal Affars Commttee to nclude

powers and responsbltes for matters relatng to for example, the cvl lbertes and human rghts mplcatons of

developments n poltcal control technologes such as:

(a) new crowd and prson control weapons and technologes, lethal and less lethal weapons and ammunton;

(b)developments n survellance technologes such as data-vellance, electronc eavesdroppng, CCTV, humanrecognton and trackng systems;

(c) prvate prsons and related equpment and tranng;

(d) torture and nterrogaton of detanees;

(e) any class of technology whch has been shown n the past to be excessvely njurous, cruel, nhumane or

ndscrmnate n ts effects.

4. INNOVATIONS IN CROWD CONTROL WEAPONS


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The Interm Report crtcally evaluated the so called safety of these allegedly 'harmless crowd control weapons. (5) Usng earler US

mltary data and emprcal data on the knetc energy of all the commonly avalable knetc weapons such as plastc bullets, t found that

much of the bomedcal research legtmatng the ntroducton of current crowd control weapons s badly flawed. All the commonly

avalable plastc bullet ammunton used n Europe breaches the severe damage zone of knetc energy used to assess such weapons by the

US mltary scentsts. (Over 100,000 plastc bullets were wthdrawn n the UK n 1996 for possessng excessve knetc energy but

accordng to ths report ther replacements are stll excessvely njurous). The prce of protest should not be death, yet gven that these

weapons are frequently used aganst bystanders n zone clearance operatons, ths aspect s partcularly mportant.

Lkewse there s a need to consder haltng the use of peppergas (OC) n Europe untl ndependent evaluaton of ts bomedcal effects sundertaken. Specal Agent Ward, the FBI offcer who cleared OC n the USA, was found to have taken a $57,000 kckback to gve t the

OK. Other US mltary scentsts warned of dangerous sde effects ncludng neurotoxcty and a recent estmate by the Internatonal

Assocaton of Chef Polce Offcers suggested at least 113 peppergas lnked fataltes n the US - predomnantly from postonal

asphyxa.(6)

Amnesty Internatonal has sad that the use of pepper spray by Calfornan polce aganst peaceful envronmental actvsts, s 'cruel,

nhuman and degradng treatment of such delberateness and severty that t s tantamount to torture." (Polce deputes pulled back

protesters heads, opened ther eyes and "swabbed" the burnng lqud drectly on to ther eyeballs).(7)

Sometmes when technologes are transferred, ther characterstcs also change. For example CS Sprays authorsed for use by the polce n

the UK from 1996 were fve tmes the concentraton of smlar MACE products n the US and have dsperson rates whch are fve tmes

faster. Ths means that they dump twenty fve tmes as much rrtant on a targets face as do US products yet were justfed as beng the

same. In practce ths meant that one former Metropoltan polce nstructor Peter Hodgknson lost between 40-50% of hs corneas after hevolunteered to be sprayed at the begnnng of trals. Most polce forces n the UK have now adopted the spray whch was authorsed before

fndngs on ts alleged safety were publshed.(8)

In the early Nnetes, much to the dsbelef of serous researchers, a new doctrne emerged n the US - non-lethal warfare. Its advocates

were predomnantly scence fcton wrters such as (Toffler A., & Toffler,H., 1994) and (Morrs, J., & Morrs, C., 1990, 1994), who found a

wllng ear n the nuclear weapons laboratores of Los Alamos, Oak Rdge and Lawrence Lvermore. The cyncs were quck to pont out

that non-lethal warfare was a contradcton n terms and that ths was really a "rce-bowls" ntatve, dreamt up to protect jobs n

beleaguered weapons laboratores facng the challenge of lfe wthout the cold war.

Ths nave doctrne found a champon n Col. John Alexander (who made hs name n the rather more lethal Phoenx assassnaton

programmes of the Vetnam War) and subsequently pcked up by the US Defence and Justce Departments. After the controversal and

overly publc beatng of Rodney Kng (who was subdued by an electro-shock "taser" before beng attacked); the excessve frepower

deployed by all sdes n the Waco debacle (where the polce used chemcal agents whch faled to end the sege); and the humlatons of

the US mltary mssons n Somala - Amerca was n search of a magc bullet whch would somehow allow the powers of good to preval

wthout anyone beng hurt. Yet US doctrne n practce was not that smple, t was not to replace lethal weapons wth "non-lethal"

alternatves but to augment the use of deadly force, n both war and 'operatons other than war', where the man targets nclude cvlans. A

dubous pandora's box of new weapons has emerged, desgned to appear rather than be safe. Because of the "CNN factor" they need to be

meda frendly, more a case of nvsble weapons than war wthout blood. Amerca now has an ntegrated product team consstng of the

US Marnes, US Ar Force, US Specal Operatons Command, US Army, US Navy, DOT, DOJ, DOE, Jont Staff, and CINCs Offce of

SecDef. Brdgeheads for ths technology are already emergng snce one of the roles of ths team s to lase wth frendly foregn

governments.

Last year, the nterm report advsed that the Commsson should be requested to report on the exstence of formal lason arrangements

wth the US, for ntroducng advanced non-lethal weapons nto the EU. (9) The urgency of ths advce was hghlghted n November 1997

for example, when a specal conference on the "Future of Non-Lethal Weapons", was held n London. A flavour of what was on offer was

provded by Ms Hld Lbby, systems manager of the US Army's Non-lethal Materal Programme.

Ms Lbby descrbed the M203 Ant-personnel blunt trauma crowd dspersal grenade, whch hurtles a large number of small "stngng"

rubber balls at roters. The US team also promoted acoustc wave weapons that used "mechancal pressure wave generaton" to "provde

the war fghter wth a weapon capable of delverng ncapactatng effects, from lethal to non-lethal"; the non-lethal Claymore mne - a

crowd control verson of the more lethal M18A1; ground vehcle stoppers; the M139 Volcano mne whch projects a net (that can cover a

football szed feld) laced wth ether razor blades or other "mmoblsaton enhancers" - adhesve or stng; canster launched area denal

systems; stcky foam; vortex rng guns - to apply vortex rng gas mpulses wth flash, concusson and the opton of quckly changng

between lethal and non-lethal operatons; and the underbarrel tactcal payload delvery system - essentally an M16 whch shoots ether

bullets, dsablng chemcals, knetc muntons or marker dye.

One of the unantcpated consequences of these weapons s that they offer a flexble response whch can potentally undermne non-volent

drect acton. Used to nflct nstant gratutous punshment, ther flexblty means that f offcal volence does tempt demonstrators to fght


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back, the weapons are often just a swtch away from street level executons.

At ther last conference n Lllehammer, the Nobel Peace Prze wnnng organsaton Pugwash came to the concluson that the term

'non-lethal should be abandoned, not only because t covers a varety of very dfferent weapons but also because t can be dangerously

msleadng. "In combat stuatons, 'sub-lethal' weapons are lkely to be used n co-ordnaton wth other weapons and could ncrease overall

lethalty. Weapons purportedly developed for conventonal mltary or peacekeepng use are also lkely to be used n cvl wars or for

oppresson by brutal governments."

Weapons developed for polce use may encourage the mltarsaton of polce forces or be used for torture. If a generc term s needed "less-

lethal or pre-lethal weapons mght be preferable."

(10)

Such msgvngs are certanly borne out by recent developments. US expert BllArkn has warned that the new generaton of acoustc weapons can rupture organs, create cavtes n human tssue and produce shockwaves

of 170 decbels and potentally lethal blastwave trauma.(11) Pugwash consdered that "each of the emergng less-lethal weapons

technologes requred urgent examnaton and that ther development or adopton should be subject to publc revew."(12) Informed by

prncple 3 and 4 of the Unted Natons Basc Prncples on The Use of Force & Frearms (13), MEP's may wsh to consder the followng

optons:-

4.1 POLICY OPTIONS

() Reaffrm the European Parlamentary demand of May 1982, for a ban on the use of plastc bullets;

() Establsh objectve crtera for assessng the bomedcal effects of so called non-lethal weapons that are ndependent from

commercal or governmental research;

() Seek confrmaton from the Commsson that: Member States are fully aware of ther responsbltes under Prncples 3

and 4 of the Unted Natons Basc Prncples on the Use of Force & Frearms by Law Enforcement Offcals and to ask for

clarfcaton of exactly what steps ndvdual Member States are takng to ensure that these are fully met, gven the power of

"less-lethal weapons" changes and whether consstent standards apply;

(v) Request the Commsson to report on the exstng lason arrangements for the second generaton of non-lethal weapons to

enter European Unon from the USA and call for an ndependent report on ther alleged safety as well as ther ntended and

unforeseen socal and poltcal effects.

(v) Durng the nterm perod, consder restrctng the deployment by the polce, the mltary or paramltary specal forces, of

US made or lcensed 2nd. generaton chemcal rrtant, knetc, acoustc, laser, electromagnetc frequency, capture,

entanglement, njector or electrcal dsablng and paralysng weapons, wthn Europe.

(v). Establsh the followng prncples across all EU Member States:

(a) Research on chemcal rrtants should be publshed n open scentfc journals before authorzaton for any

usage s permtted and that the safety crtera for such chemcals should be treated as f they were drugs rather

than rot control agents.

(b) Research on the alleged safety of exstng crowd control weapons and of all future nnovatons n crowd

control weapons should be placed n the publc doman pror to any decson towards deployment.

(c) that deployment of OC (peppergas) should be halted across the EU untl ndependent non-FBI funded research

has evaluated any rsks t poses to health.

5. NEW PRISON CONTROL SYSTEMS

Some of the equpment descrbed above, such as the survellance, area denal and crowd control technologes, also fnds ready use nsde

permanent prsons and houses of correcton. Other devces such as the area denal, permeter fencng systems, portable cols of razor wre,

prson transport vehcles wth mn cage cells, to create temporary holdng centres. Permanent prsons are however, lterally custom bult

control envronments, where every act and thng, ncludng the archtecture, the behavour of the prson offcers and daly routnes, are

functonally organsed wth that purpose n mnd. Therefore many of the technologes dscussed above are bult n to the prson structure

and ntegral to polcng systems used to contan ther nmates. For example, area denal technology, ntruder detecton equpment and

survellance devces are nstrumental n hermetcally sealng hgh securty prsons. If dsturbances develop wthn a prson, the rot

technologes and tactcs outlned above, are also avalable for use by prson offcers. The trend has been to tran specalzed MUFTI

(Mnmum Force Tactcal Interventon) squads for ths purpose. Outsde Europe, rrtant gas has been used not only to crush revolt but also

to punsh poltcal detanees or to eject retcent prsoners from ther cells before executon. The Interm Report descrbes prson restrant

technques usng stratjackets, body belts, leg shackles, padded cells and solaton unts, some of whch nfrnge the European Conventon


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aganst Torture.(14)

Apart from mechancal restrant, prson authortes have access to pharmacologcal approaches for mmoblsng nmates, colloqually

known as "the lqud cosh." These vary from psychotropc drugs such as ant-depressants, sedatves and powerful hypnotcs. Drugs lke

largactl or Seranace offer a chemcal strat-jacket and ther usage s becomng ncreasngly controversal as prson populatons rse and

larger numbers of nmates are "treated". In the USA, the trend s for punshment to become therapy: "behavour modfcaton" - Pavlovan

reward and punshment routnes usng drugs lke anectne, producng fear or pan, to recondton behavour. The possbltes of testng new

socal control drugs are extensve, whlst controls are few. Prsons form the new laboratores developng the next generaton of drugs for

socal reprogrammng, whlst mltary and unversty laboratores provde scores of new psychoactve drugs each year. (15)

Crtcs such as Llly & Knepper (1992, 186-7) argue that n examnng the nternatonal aspects of crme control as ndustry, more attenton

s needed to the changng actvtes of the companes whch used to provde supples to the mltary. At the end of the cold war, "wth

defence contractors reportng declnes n sales, the search for new markets s pushng corporate decson makng, t should be no surprse to

see ncreased corporate actvty n crmnal justce." Where such companes prevously profted from wars wth foregn enemes, they are

ncreasngly turnng to the new opportuntes afforded by crme control as ndustry.(Chrste, 1994).

Several European countres are now experencng a rapd process of prvatsaton of prsons by corporate conglomeratons, predomnantly

from the USA. Some of the prsons run by these organsatons n the US have cultures and control technques whch are alen to European

tradtons. Such a process of prvatsaton can lead to a brdgehead for mportng U.S. correctons mentalty, methods and technologes nto

Europe and there s a pressng need to ensure a consensus on what consttutes acceptable practce. There s a further danger that such

prvatsaton wll lead to cost cuttng practces of human warehousng, rather than the more long term benefcal practce of prsoner

rehabltaton.

In some European countres, partcularly Brtan, where changes n penal polcy are leadng to a rapd rse n prson populaton wthout

addtonal resources beng appled to the sector, the mperatve s to cut costs ether through usng technology or by prvatsng prsons. (16)

Already, the UK Prson Servce has compled a shoppng lst of computer based optons wth exstng CCTV survellance systems beng

complemented by geophones, dentty recognton technology and forward lookng nfra-red systems whch can spot weapons and

drugs..(17) Alongsde such proactve technologes, UK prsons wll face ncreasng pressure to tool up for trouble. Much ths weaponry

ncludng the contract for between 950,000 and 2,500,000 of sde handled batons, kubotans, rot shelds etc. made by the Prson Servce n

March 1995, are lkely to be orgnally manufactured n the Unted States. (18)

The U.S.A. adopts a far more mltarsed prson regme than anywhere n Europe outsde of Northern Ireland. A massve prson ndustral

complex has mushroomed to mantan the strct control regmes that typfy Amercan Houses of Correcton. The future prospect s of that

alen technology comng here, wth very lttle n the way of publc or parlamentary debate. A few examples of US prson technologes and

prolferaton llustrate the dangers.

Many prsons n the U.S, use Nova electronc 50,000 volt extracton shelds, electronc stun prods and most recently the REACT remote

controlled stun belts. In 1994, the US Federal Bureau of Prsons decded to use remote-controlled stun belts on prsoners consdered

dangerous to prevent them from escapng durng transportaton and court appearances. By May 1996, the Wsconsn Department of

Correctons sad that no longer wll nmates be chaned together "but wll be restraned by the use of stun belts and ndvdual restrants."

Promotonal lterature from US company Stun Tech of Cleveland, Oho, clams that ts hgh pulse stun belt can be actvated from 300 feet.

After a warnng nose, the Remote Electroncally Actvated Control Technology (REACT) belt nflcts a 50,000 volt shock for 8 seconds.

Ths hgh pulsed current enters the prsoners left kdney regon then enters the body of the vctm along blood channels and nerve

pathways. Each pulse results n a rapd body shock extendng to the whole of the bran and central nervous system. The makers promote

the belt "for total psychologcal supremacy ... of potentally troublesome prsoners." Stunned prsoners lose control of the bladders and

bowels. "After all, f you were wearng the contrapton around your wast that by the mere push of a button n someone's hand, could make

you defecate or urnate yourself, what would you do from the psychologcal standpont?"

(19)

Amnesty Internatonal wants Washngton toban the belts because they can be used to torture, and calls them, "cruel, nhuman and degradng." Some offcals say the belts can save

money because fewer guards would be needed. But human rghts actvsts and some jalers oppose them as the "most degradng new

measure n an ncreasngly barbarc feld." (Klborn,1997) Already, some European countres are n the process of evaluatng stunbelt

systems for use here. (Marks, 1996)

Wthout proper lcensng and a clear consensus on what s expected from prvate prsons n Europe, multnatonal prvate prson

conglomeratons could act as a brdgehead for smlar sorts of technology to further enter the European crme control ndustry. Proper

lmts need to be set when a lcence s granted wth a comprehensve account taken of that company's past track record n terms of cvl

lbertes, rehabltaton and crss management rather than just cost per prsoner held. Amnesty Internatonal n the USA s currently askng

the large mult-natonal prson corporatons to sgn up to the Unted Natons Declaraton on Human Rghts and a smlar approach wth

assocated contractual oblgatons, mght prove to be a useful way forward here n Europe. Members of the European Parlament may wsh

to consder the followng optons:


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5.1 POLICY OPTIONS

() To let commercal requrements to make profts from prsoners become the prmary crteron n runnng Europe's prvate

jals;

(). Further examne the use of kll fencng and lethal area denal systems n all prsons wthn the European Unon, whether

prvate or publc, wth a vew to ther prohbton;

() That the European Parlament establsh a rgorous ndependent and mpartal nqury nto the use of stun belts, stunguns

and shelds , and all other types and varants of electro-shock weapons n Member States, to assess ther medcal and other

effects n terms of nternatonal human rghts standards regulatng the treatment of prsoners and the use of force; the nqury

should examne all known cases of deaths or njury resultng from the use of these nstruments, and the results of the nqury

should be publshed wthout delay;

(v) That the European Commsson be asked to:

(a). Ensure that the UN Mnmum treatment of prsoners rules bannng the use of leg rons on prsoners are

mplemented n all EU correctonal facltes.

(b). Implement a ban on the ntroducton of n-bult gassng systems nsde European gaols on the bass of the

manufacturers warnngs of the dangers of usng chemcal rot control agents n enclosed spaces. Restrctons

should also be made on the use of chemcal rrtants from whatever source n correctonal facltes wherever

research has shown that a concentraton of that rrtant could ether kll or be assocated wth permanent damage tohealth.

(c). Explore legal mechansms to ensure that all prvate prson operatons wthn the European Unon should be

subject to a common and consstent lcensng regme by the host member. If adopted, no lcence should be granted

where proven human rghts volatons by that contractor have been made elsewhere. Consderaton mght be gven

to provdng a contract mechansm whereby any falure to secure a lcence n one European state should debar that

prvate prson contractor from bddng for other European contracts (pendng evdence of adequate human rghts

tranng and approprate mprovements n standard operatng procedures and controls by that corporaton or

company).

(v). Seek agreement between all Member States to ensure that:

(a) All rot control, prsoner transport and extracton technology whch s n use or proposed for use n all prsons,

(whether state or prvately run), should be subject to pror approval by the competent member authortes on the

bass of ndependent research.

(b) Automated systems of ndscrmnate punshment such as bult n baton round frng mechansms, should be

prohbted.

(c). The use of electro-shock restranng devces or other remote control punshment devces ncludng shock-

shelds should be mmedately suspended n any prvate or publc prson n the European Unon, untl and unless

ndependent medcal evdence can clearly demonstrate that ther use wll not contrbute to deaths n custody,

torture or other cruel, nhuman or degradng treatment or punshment.

6. INTERROGATION, TORTURE TECHNIQUES & TECHNOLOGIES

The Interm Report on the varety of hardware, software and lveware nvolved n human nterrogaton and torture. (20) Mllenna of

research and development have been expended n devsng ever more cruel and nhumane means of extractng obedence and nformaton

from reluctant vctms or achevng excrucatngly panful and long-drawn-out deaths for those who would queston or challenge the

prevalent status quo. What has changed n more recent tmes s () the ncreasng requrement for speed n breakng down prsoners'

resstance; () the adopton of sophstcated methods based on a scentfc approach and () a need for nvsble torture whch leaves no or

few marks whch mght be used by organsatons lke Amnesty Internatonal to label a partcular government, a torturng state. Today, the

phenomena of torture has grown to a worldwde epdemc. A report by the Redress Trust, 1996, found that 151 countres were nvolved n

torture, nhuman or degradng treatment, despte the fact that 106 states have ratfed, acceded to or sgned the Conventon Aganst Torture.

Helen Bamber, Drector of the Brtsh Medcal Foundaton for the Treatment of the Vctms of Torture, has descrbed electroshock batons

at "the most unversal modern tool of the torturers" (Gregory,1995) Recent surveys of torture vctms have confrmed that after systematc

beatng, electroshock s one of the most common factors (London, 1993); Rasmussen, 1990). If one looks at the country reports of


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Amnesty Internatonal, (whch recently publshed a survey of ffty countres where electrc shock torture and ll treatment has been

recorded snce 1990)(21), confrm that electroshock torture s the Esperanto of the most repressve states. Snce publcaton of the Interm

Report, one news story has uncovered evdence suggestng that Tawan made electroshock weapons are beng sold wth the EC "mark of

qualty", despte the resoluton passed by the European Parlament seekng a ban on such devces. There s an urgent need to establsh

whether ths s a bogus clam or whether there really are people n the Commsson buldng whose job s to make sure the electro-shock

weapons produced by foregn manufacturers can produce the requste level of paralyss & helplessness beloved of torturers every

where.(22) Members of the European Parlament may wsh to consder the followng polcy optons:

6.1 POLICY OPTIONS

(). That the Cvl Lbertes Commttee should receve expert evdence to determne whether:

(a) New regulatons on the nature of n-depth nterrogaton tranng should be agreed whch prohbt export of

such technques to forces overseas known to be nvolved n gross human rghts volaton.

(b) All tranng of foregn mltary, polce, securty and ntellgence forces n nterrogaton technques, can be

subject to lcence, even f t s provded outsde European terrtory.

(c) Restrctons on vsts to European MSP related events by representatves of known torturng states can be

effectvely mplemented.

() The Commsson should be requested to acheve agreement between member States to:

(a) Carry out an nvestgaton of clams that the EC "mark of qualty" s beng used to endorse electroshock

devces and Immedately prohbt the transfer of all electroshock stun weapons to any country where such

weapons are lkely to contrbute to unlawful kllngs, or to torture or cruel, nhuman or degradng treatment, for

example by refusng any export lcence where t s proposed that electroshock weapons wll be transferred to a

country where persstent torture or nstances of nstances of electrc shock torture and ll treatment have been

reported.

(b) Introduce and mplement new regulatons on the manufacture, sale and transfer of all electroshock weapons

from and nto Europe, wth a full report to the European Parlament's Cvl Lbertes commttee made each year.

[Specal consderaton should be gven to controllng the whole procurement process, coverng even the makng of

contracts of sale, (to prevent a purchase deal made n a European country beng met by a suppler or subsdary

outsde of the EU, n an effort to obvate extant controls)].

(c). Ensure that the proposed regulatons should cover patents and prohbt the patentng of any devce whose soleuse would be the volaton of human rghts, va torture or the creaton of unnecessary sufferng. The onus should

be on the patent seeker to show that hs patent would not lead to such outcomes.

(v) The European Parlament should look at commssonng new work to nvestgate how exstng legslaton wthn member

states of the EU, can be brought to bear to prosecute companes who have been complct n the supply of equpment used for

torture as defned by the UN conventon of torture. Ths new work should examne, n conjuncton wth the Drectorate of

Human Rghts:

(a) The extent to whch such technology produced by European companes s beng transferred to human rghts

volators and the role played by nternatonal mltary, polce and securty fars organsed both nsde and outsde

European Borders;

(b)The possble measures that could be set n place to montor and track any technology transfer wthn ths

category and any potental role n ths endeavour that mght be played by recognsed Non-Governmental

Organsatons.

7. DEVELOPMENTS IN SURVEILLANCE TECHNOLOGY

Survellance technology can be defned as devces or systems whch can montor, track and assess the movements of ndvduals, ther

property and other assets. Much of ths technology s used to track the actvtes of dssdents, human rghts actvsts, journalsts, student

leaders, mnortes, trade unon leaders and poltcal opponents. A huge range of survellance technologes has evolved, ncludng the nght

vson goggles; parabolc mcrophones to detect conversatons over a klometre away; laser versons, can pck up any conversaton from a

closed wndow n lne of sght; the Dansh Ja stroboscopc camera can take hundreds of pctures n a matter of seconds and ndvdually

photograph all the partcpants n a demonstraton or March; and the automatc vehcle recognton systems can tracks cars around a cty


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va a Geographc Informaton System of maps.

New technologes whch were orgnally conceved for the Defence and Intellgence sectors, have after the cold war, rapdly spread nto the

law enforcement and prvate sectors. It s one of the areas of technologcal advance, where outdated regulatons have not kept pace wth an

acceleratng pattern of abuses. Up untl the 1960's, most survellance was low-tech and expensve snce t nvolved followng suspects

around from place to place, usng up to 6 people n teams of two workng 3 eght hour shfts. All of the materal and contacts gleaned had

to be typed up and fled away wth lttle prospect of rapdly cross checkng. Even electronc survellance was hghly labour ntensve. The

East German polce for example employed 500,000 secret nformers, 10,000 of whch were needed just to lsten and transcrbe ctzen's

phone calls.(23)

By the 1980's, new forms of electronc survellance were emergng and many of these were drected towards automaton of

communcatons ntercepton. Ths trend was fuelled n the U.S. n the 1990's by accelerated government fundng at the end of the cold

war, wth defence and ntellgence agences beng refocussed wth new mssons to justfy ther budgets, transferrng ther technologes to

certan law enforcement applcatons such as ant-drug and ant-terror operatons. In 1993, the US department of defence and the Justce

department sgned memoranda of understandng for "Operatons Other Than War and Law Enforcement" to facltate jont development

and sharng of technology. Accordng to Davd Bansar of Prvacy Internatonal, "To counteract reductons n mltary contracts whch

began n the 1980's, computer and electroncs companes are expandng nto new markets - at home and abroad - wth equpment orgnally

developed for the mltary. Companes such as E Systems, Electronc Data Systems and Texas Instruments are sellng advanced computer

systems and survellance equpment to state and local governments that use them for law enforcement, border control and Welfare

admnstraton."(24)What the East German secret polce could only dream of s rapdly becomng a realty n the free world." (25)

7.1 Closed Crcut Televson (CCTV) Survellance Networks

In fact the art of vsual survellance has dramatcally changed over recent years. Of course polce and ntellgence offcers stll photograph

demonstratons and ndvduals of nterest but ncreasngly such mages can be stored and searched. Ongong processes of ultra-

mnatursaton mean that such devces can be made to be vrtually undetectable and are open to abuse by both ndvduals, companes and

offcal agences.

The atttude to CCTV camera networks vares greatly n the European Unon, from the poston n Denmark where such cameras are

banned by law to the poston n the UK, where many hundreds of CCTV networks exst. Nevertheless, a common poston on the status of

such systems where they exst n relaton to data protecton prncples should apply n general. A specfc consderaton s the legal status of

admssblty as evdence, of dgtal materal such as those taken by the more advanced CCTV systems. Much of ths wll fall wthn data

protecton legslaton f the materal gathered can be searched, e.g., by car number plate or by tme. Gven that materal from such systems

can be seamlessly edted, the European Data Protecton Drectve legslaton needs to be mplemented through prmary legslaton whch

clarfes the law as t apples to CCTV, to avod confuson amongst both CCTV data controllers as well as ctzens as data subjects. Prmary

legslaton wll make t possble to extend the mpact of the Drectve to areas of actvty that do not fall wthn communty law. Artcles 3and 13 of the Drectve should not create a blanket coverng the use of CCTV n every crcumstance n a domestc context.

A proper code of practce such as that promoted by the UK based Local Government Informaton Unt (LGIU, 1996) should be extended to

absorb best practce from all EU Member States to cover the use of all CCTV survellance schemes operatng n publc spaces and

especally n resdental areas.(26) As a frst step t s suggested that the Cvl Lbertes Commttee formally consder examnng the practce

and control of CCTV throughout the member States wth a vew to establshng what elements of the varous codes of practce could be

adopted for a unfed code and an enforceable legal framework coverng enforcement and cvl lbertes protecton and redress.

7.2 Algorthmc Survellance Systems

The revoluton n urban survellance wll reach the next generaton of control once relable face recognton comes n. It wll ntally be

ntroduced at statonary locatons, lke turnstles, customs ponts, securty gateways etc. to enable a standard full face recognton to take

place. The Interm Report predcted that n the early part of the 21st. century, facal recognton on CCTV wll be a realty and thosecountres wth CCTV nfrastructures wll vew such technology as a natural add-on. In fact, an Amercan company Software and Systems

has traled a system n London whch can scan crowds and match faces aganst a database of mages held n a remote computer. (27) We are

at the begnnng of a revoluton n "algorthmc survellance" - effectvely data analyss va complex algorthms whch enable automatc

recognton and trackng. Such automaton not only wdens the survellance net, t narrows the mesh. (See Norrs, C., et. al, 1998)

Smlarly Vehcle Recognton Systems have been developed whch can dentfy a car number plate then track the car around a cty usng a

computersed geographc nformaton system. Such systems are now commercally avalable, for example, the Talon system ntroduced n

1994 by UK company Racal at a prce of 2000 per unt. The system s traned to recognse number plates based on neural network

technology developed by Cambrdge Neurodynamcs, and can see both nght and day. Intally t has been used for traffc montorng but

ts functon has been adapted n recent years to cover securty survellance and has been ncorporated n the "rng of steel" around London.

The system can then record all the vehcles that entered or left the cordon on a partcular day. (28)


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It s mportant to set clear gudelnes and codes of practce for such technologcal nnovatons, well n advance of the dgtal revoluton

makng new and unforeseen opportuntes to collate, analyze, recognse and store such vsual mages. Already multfunctonal traffc

management systems such as "Traffc Master", (whch uses vehcle recognton systems to map and quantfy congeston), are facltatng a

natonal survellance archtecture. Such regulaton wll need to be founded on sound data protecton prncples and take cognzance of

artcle 15 of the 1995 European Drectve on the protecton of Indvduals and Processng of Personal Data. Essentally ths says that :

"Member States shall grant the rght of every person not to be subject to a decson whch produces legal effects concernng hm or

sgnfcantly affects hm and whch s based solely on the automatc processng of data." (29) There s much to recommend the European

Parlament followng the advce of a recent UK House of Lords Report (Select Commttee Report on Dgtal Images as Evdence, 1998).

Namely: ()that the European Parlament . ..."produces gudance for both the publc and prvate sectors on the use of data matchng, and npartcular the lnkng of survellance systems wth other databases; and () That the Data Protecton Regstrar be gven powers to audt the

operaton of data matchng systems".

Such survellance systems rase sgnfcant ssues of accountablty, partcularly when transferred to authortaran regmes. The cameras

used n Tananmen Square were sold as advanced traffc control systems by Semens Plessey. Yet after the 1989 massacre of students, there

followed a wtch hunt when the authortes tortured and nterrogated thousands n an effort to ferret out the subversves. The Scoot

survellance system wth USA made Pelco cameras were used to fathfully record the protests. The mages were repeatedly broadcast over

Chnese televson offerng a reward for nformaton, wth the result that nearly all the transgressors were dentfed. Agan democratc

accountablty s only the crteron whch dstngushes a modern traffc control system from an advanced dssdent capture technology.

Foregn companes are exportng traffc control systems to Lhasa n Tbet, yet Lhasa does not as yet have any traffc control problems. The

problem here may be a culpable lack of magnaton.

7.3 Buggng & Tappng Devces

A wde range of buggng and tappng devces have been evolved to record conversatons and to ntercept telecommuncatons traffc. In

recent years the wdespread practce of llegal and legal ntercepton of communcatons and the plantng of 'bugs' has been an ssue n

many European States.(30) However, plantng llegal bugs s yesterday's technology. Modern snoopers can buy specally adapted lap top

computers, and smply tune n to all the moble phones actve n the area by cursorng down to ther number. The machne wll even search

for numbers "of nterest" to see f they are actve. However, these bugs and taps pale nto nsgnfcance next to the natonal and

nternatonal state run nterceptons networks.

7.4 Natonal & Internatonal Communcatons Interceptons Networks

The Interm Report set out n detal, the global survellance systems whch facltate the mass supervson of all telecommuncatons

ncludng telephone, emal and fax transmssons of prvate ctzens, poltcans, trade unonsts and companes alke. There has been a

poltcal shft n targetng n recent years. Instead of nvestgatng crme (whch s reactve) law enforcement agences are ncreasnglytrackng certan socal classes and races of people lvng n red-lned areas before crme s commtted - a form of pre-emptve polcng

deemed data-vellance whch s based on mltary models of gatherng huge quanttes of low grade ntellgence.

Wthout encrypton, modern communcatons systems are vrtually transparent to the advanced nterceptons equpment whch can be used

to lsten n. The Interm Report also explaned how moble phones have nbult montorng and taggng dmensons whch can be accessed

by polce and ntellgence agences. For example the dgtal technology requred to pnpont moble phone users for ncomng calls, means

that all moble phone users n a country when actvated, are mn-trackng devces, gvng ther owners whereabouts at any tme and stored

n the company's computer. For example Swss Polce have secretly tracked the whereabouts of moble phone users from the computer of

the servce provder Swsscom, whch accordng SonntagsZetung had stored movements of more than a mllon subscrbers down to a few

hundred metres, and gong back at least half a year. (31)

However, of all the developments covered n the Interm Report, the secton coverng some of the consttutonal and legal ssues rased by

the USA's Natonal Securty Agency's access and faclty to ntercept all European telecommuncatons caused the most concern. Whlstno-one dened the role of such networks n ant terrorst operatons and counterng llegal drug, money launderng and llct arms deals,

alarm was expressed about the scale of the foregn nterceptons network dentfed n the report and whether exstng legslaton, data

protecton and prvacy safeguards n the Member States were suffcent to protect the confdentalty between EU ctzens, corporatons and

those wth thrd countres.

Snce there has been a certan degree of confuson n subsequent press reports, t s worth clarfyng some of the ssues surroundng

transatlantc electronc survellance and provdng a short hstory and update on developments snce the Interm Report was publshed n

January 1998. There are essentally two separate system, namely:

() The UK/USA system comprsng the actvtes of mltary ntellgence agences such as NSA-CIA n the USA subsumng GCHQ & MI6

n the UK operatng a system known as ECHELON.


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() The EU-FBI system whch s lnkng up varous law enforcement agences such as the FBI, polce, customs, mmgraton and nternal

securty.

Although the confuson has been further compounded by the ttle of tem 44 on the agenda for the Plenary sesson of the European

Parlament on September 16, 1998,(32) n ntellgence terms, these are two dstnct "communtes." It s worth lookng brefly at the

actvtes of both systems n turn, encompassng, Echelon, encrypton; EU-FBI survellance and new nterfaces wth for example to access

to nternet provders and to databanks of other agences.

7.4.1 NSA INTERCEPTION OF ALL EU TELECOMMUNICATIONS

The Interm report sad that wthn Europe, all emal, telephone and fax communcatons are routnely ntercepted by the Unted States

Natonal Securty Agency, transferrng all target nformaton from the European manland va the strategc hub of London then by Satellte

to Fort Meade n Maryland va the crucal hub at Menwth Hll n the North York Moors of the UK.

The system was frst uncovered n the 1970's by a group of researchers n the UK ( Campbell, 1981). A recent work by Ncky Hager, Secret

Power, (Hager, 1996) provdes the most comprehensve detals to date of a project known as ECHELON. Hager ntervewed more than 50

people concerned wth ntellgence to document a global survellance system that stretches around the world to form a targetng system on

all of the key Intelsat satelltes used to convey most of the world's satellte phone calls, nternet, emal, faxes and telexes. These stes are

based at Sugar Grove and Yakma, n the USA, at Wahopa n New Zealand, at Geraldton n Australa, Hong Kong, and Morwenstow n

the UK.

The ECHELON system forms part of the UKUSA system but unlke many of the electronc spy systems developed durng the cold war,

ECHELON s desgned for prmarly non-mltary targets: governments, organsatons and busnesses n vrtually every country. TheECHELON system works by ndscrmnately nterceptng very large quanttes of communcatons and then sphonng out what s

valuable usng artfcal ntellgence ads lke Memex to fnd key words. Fve natons share the results wth the US as the senor partner

under the UKUSA agreement of 1948, Brtan, Canada, New Zealand and Australa are very much actng as subordnate nformaton

servcers.

Each of the fve centres supply "dctonares" to the other four of keywords, Phrases, people and places to "tag" and the tagged ntercept s

forwarded straght to the requestng country. Whlst there s much nformaton gathered about potental terrorsts, there s a lot of economc

ntellgence, notably ntensve montorng of all the countres partcpatng n the GATT negotatons. But Hager found that by far the man

prortes of ths system contnued to be mltary and poltcal ntellgence applcable to ther wder nterests.

Hager quotes from a"hghly placed ntellgence operatves" who spoke to the Observer n London. "We feel we can no longer reman slent

regardng that whch we regard to be gross malpractce and neglgence wthn the establshment n whch we operate." They gave as

examples. GCHQ ntercepton of three chartes, ncludng Amnesty Internatonal and Chrstan Ad. "At any tme GCHQ s able to home

n on ther communcatons for a routne target request," the GCHQ source sad. In the case of phone taps the procedure s known as

Mants. Wth telexes ts called Mayfly. By keyng n a code relatng to thrd world ad, the source was able to demonstrate telex "fxes" on

the three organsatons. Wth no system of accountablty, t s dffcult to dscover what crtera determne who s not a target.

Indeed snce the Interm Report was publshed, journalsts have alleged that ECHELON has benefted US companes nvolved n arms

deals, strengthened Washngton's poston n crucal World Trade organsaton talks wth Europe durng a 1995 dspute wth Japan over car

part exports. Accordng to the Fnancal Mal On Sunday, "key words dentfed by US experts nclude the names of nter-governmental

trade organsatons and busness consorta bddng aganst US companes. The word 'block' s on the lst to dentfy communcatons about

offshore ol n area where the seabed has yet to be dvded up nto exploraton blocks ..." It has also been suggested that n 1990 the US

broke nto secret negotatons and persuaded Indonesa that US gant AT & T be ncluded n a mult-bllon dollar telecoms deal that at one

pont was gong entrely to Japan's NEC.(33)

The Sunday Tmes (11 May, 1998) reported that early on the radomes at Menwth Hll (NSA staton F83) n North Yorkshre UK, were

gven the task of nterceptng nternatonal leased carrer (ILC) traffc - essentally, ordnary commercal communcatons. Its staff have

grown from 400 n the 1980's to more than 1400 now wth a further 370 staff from the MoD. The Sunday Tmes also reported allegatons

that conversatons between the German company Volkswagen and General Motors were ntercepted and the French have complaned that

Thompson-CSF, the French electroncs company, lost a $1.4 bllon deal to supply Brazl wth a radar system because the Amercans

ntercepted detals of the negotatons and passed them on to US company Raytheon, whch subsequently won the contract. Another clam

s that Arbus Industre lost a contract worth $1 bllon to Boeng and McDonnell Douglas because nformaton was ntercepted by

Amercan spyng. Other newspapers such as Lberaton (21 Aprl 1998) and Il Mondo (20 March 1998), dentfy the network as an

Anglo-Saxon Spy network because of the UK-USA axs. Prvacy Internatonal goes further. "Whlst recognsng that "strctly speakng,

nether the Commsson nor the European Parlament have a mandate to regulate or ntervene n securty matters ... they do have a

responsblty to ensure that securty s harmonsed throughout the Unon."

Accordng to Prvacy Internatonal, the UK s lkely to fnd ts "Specal relatonshp" tes fall foul of ts Maastrcht oblgatons snce Ttle V


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of Maastrcht requres that "Member States shall nform and consult one another wthn the Councl on any matter of foregn and securty

polcy of general nterest n order to ensure that ther combned nfluence s exerted as effectvely as possble by means of concerted and

convergent acton." Yet under the terms of the Specal relatonshp, Brtan cannot engage n open consultaton wth ts other European

partners.(34) The stuaton s further complcated by counter allegatons n the French magazne Le Pont, that the French are systematcally

spyng on Amercan and other alled countres telephone and cable traffc va the Helos 1A Spy satellte. (Tmes, June 17 1998)

If even half of these allegatons are true then the European Parlament must act to ensure that such powerful survellance systems operate

to a more democratc consensus now that the Cold War has ended. Clearly, the Overseas polces of European Unon Member States are not

always congruent wth those of the USA and n commercal terms, esponage s esponage. No proper Authorty n the USA would allow a

smlar EU spy network to operate from Amercan sol wthout strct lmtatons, f at all. Followng full dscusson on the mplcatons ofthe operatons of these networks, the European Parlament s advsed to set up approprate ndependent audt and oversght procedures and

that any effort to outlaw encrypton by EU ctzens should be dened untl and unless such democratc and accountable systems are n

place, f at all.

7.4.2 EU-FBI GLOBAL TELECOMMUNICATIONS SURVEILLANCE SYSTEM

Much of the documentaton and research necessary to put nto the publc doman, the hstory, structure, role and functon of the EU-FBI

conventon to legtmse global electronc survellance, has been secured by Statewatch, the wdely respected UK based cvl lbertes

montorng and research organsaton.(35)

Statewatch have descrbed at length the sgnng of the Transatlantc Agenda n Madrd at the EU-US summt of 3 December 1995 - part of

whch was the "Jont EU-US Acton Plan" and has subsequently analysed these efforts as an ongong attempt to redefne the Atlantc

Allance n the post-Cold War era, a stance ncreasngly used to justfy the efforts of nternal securty agences takng on enhanced polcngroles n Europe.(36) Statewatch notes that the frst Jont Acton 'out of the area" survellance plan was not dscussed at the Justce and Home

Affars meetng but adopted on the nod, as an A pont (wthout debate) by of all places, the Fsheres Councl on 20 December 1996. (37)

In February 1997, Statewatch reported that the EU had secretly agreed to set up an nternatonal telephone tappng network va a secret

network of commttees establshed under the "thrd pllar" of the Mastrcht Treaty coverng co-operaton on law and order. Key ponts of

the plan are outlned n a memorandum of understandng, sgned by EU states n 1995. (ENFOPOL 112 10037/95 25.10.95) whch remans

classfed. Accordng to a Guardan report (25.2.97) t reflects concern among European Intellgence agences that modern technology wll

prevent them from tappng prvate communcatons. "EU countres t says, should agree on "nternatonal ntercepton standards set at a

level that would ensure encodng or scrambled words can be broken down by government agences." Offcal reports say that the EU

governments agreed to co-operate closely wth the FBI n Washngton. Yet earler mnutes of these meetngs suggest that the orgnal

ntatve came from Washngton. Accordng to Statewatch, network and servce provders n the EU wll be oblged to nstall "tappable"

systems and to place under survellance any person or group when served wth an ntercepton order.

These plans have never been referred to any European government for scrutny, nor to the Cvl Lbertes Commttee of the European

Parlament, despte the clear cvl lbertes ssues rased by such an unaccountable system. The decson to go ahead was smply agreed n

secret by "wrtten procedure" through an exchange of telexes between the 15 EU governments. We are told by Statewatch the EU-FBI

Global survellance plan was now beng developed "outsde the thrd pllar." In practcal terms ths means that the plan s beng developed

by a group of twenty countres - the then 15 EU member countres plus the USA, Australa, Canada, Norway and New Zealand. Ths group

of 20 s not accountable through the Councl of Justce and Home Affars Mnsters or to the European Parlament or natonal

parlaments.(38) Nothng s sad about fnance of ths system but a report produced by the German government estmates that the moble

phone part of the package alone wll cost 4 bllon D-marks.

Statewatch concludes that "It s the nterface of the ECHELON system and ts potental development on phone calls combned wth the

standardsaton of "tappable communcatons centres and equpment beng sponsored by the EU and the USA whch presents a truly global

threat over whch there are no legal or democratc controls." (Press release 25.2.97) In many respects what we are wtnessng here are

meetngs of operatves of a new global mltary-ntellgence state. It s very dffcult for anyone to get a full pcture of what s bengdecded at the executve meetngs settng ths Transatlantc agenda. Whlst Statewatch won a rulng from the Ombudsman for access on the

grounds that the Councl of Mnsters msappled the code of access, for the tme beng such access to the agendas have been dened.

Wthout such access, we are left wth "black box decson makng". The eloquence of the unprecedented Commsson statement on

Echelon and Transatlantc relatons scheduled for the 16th. of September, s lkely to be as much about what s left out as t s about what s

sad for publc consumpton. Members of the European Parlament may wsh to consder the followng polcy optons:

7.5 POLICY OPTIONS

() That a more detaled seres of studes should be commssoned on the socal, poltcal commercal and consttutonal

mplcatons of the global electronc survellance networks outlned n ths report, wth a vew to holdng a seres of expert

hearngs to nform future EU cvl lbertes polcy. These studes mght cover:


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(a) The consttutonal ssues rased by the faclty of the US Natonal Securty Agency (NSA) to ntercept all

European telecommuncatons, partcularly those legal commtments made by member States n regard to the

Maastrcht Treaty and the whole queston of the use of ths network for automated poltcal and commercal

esponage.

(b) The socal and poltcal mplcatons of the FBI-EU global survellance system, ts growng access to new

telecommuncatons medums ncludng e-mal and ts ongong expanson nto new countres together wth any

related fnancal and consttutonal ssues.

(c) The structure, role and remt of an EU wde oversght body, ndependent from the European Parlament, whch

mght be set up to oversee and audt the actvtes of all bodes engaged n nterceptng telecommuncatons made

wthn Europe.

() The European Parlament should reject proposals from the Unted States for makng prvate messages va the global

communcatons network (Internet) accessble to US Intellgence Agences. Nor should the Parlament agree to new expensve

encrypton controls wthout a wde rangng debate wthn the EU on the mplcatons of such measures. These encompass the

cvl and human rghts of European ctzens and the commercal rghts of companes to operate wthn the law, wthout

unwarranted survellance by ntellgence agences operatng n conjuncton wth multnatonal compettors.

() That the European Parlament convene a seres of expert hearngs coverng all the techncal, poltcal and commercal

actvtes of bodes engaged n electronc survellance and to further elaborate possble optons to brng such actvtes back

wthn the realm of democratc accountablty and transparency. These proposed hearngs mght also examne the ssue of

proper codes of practce to ensure redress f malpractce or abuse takes place. Explct crtera should be agreed for decdng

who should be targeted for survellance and who should not, how such data s stored, processed and shared and whether suchcrtera and assocated codes of practce could be made publcly avalable.

() To amend the terms of reference of the Cvl Lbertes and Internal Affars Commttee to nclude powers and

responsbltes for all matters relatng to the cvl lbertes ssues rased by electronc survellance devces and networks and to

call for a seres of reports durng ts next work programme, ncludng:

(a) How legally bndng codes of practce could ensure that new survellance technologes are brought wthn the

approprate data protecton legslaton.

(b) The producton of gudance for both the publc and prvate sectors on the use of data matchng, and n

partcular the lnkng of survellance systems wth other databases; and addressng the ssue of gvng Member

State Data Protecton Regstrars approprate powers to audt the operaton of data matchng systems.

(c) How the provson of electronc buggng and tappng devces to prvate ctzens and companes, mght be

further regulated, so that ther sale s governed by legal permsson rather than self regulaton.

(d) How the use of telephone ntercepton by Member states could be subject to procedures of publc

accountablty referred to n (a) above? (E.g. before any telephone ntercepton takes place a warrant should be

obtaned n a manner prescrbed by the relevant parlament. In most cases, law enforcement agences wll not be

permtted to self-authorse ntercepton except n the most unusual of crcumstances whch should be reported

back to the authorsng authorty at the earlest opportunty.

(e) How technologes facltatng the automatc proflng and pattern analyss of telephone calls to establsh

frendshp and contact networks mght be subject to the same legal requrements as those for telephone

ntercepton and reported to the relevant Member State parlament.

(f) The commsson of a study examnng what consttutes best practce and control of CCTV throughout themember States wth a vew to establshng what elements of the varous codes of practce could be adopted for a

unfed code and a legal framework coverng enforcement and cvl lbertes protecton and redress.

(v) Settng up procedural mechansms whereby relevant commttees of the European Parlament consderng proposals for

technologes whch have cvl lbertes mplcatons (e.g. the Telecommuncatons Commttee) n regard to survellance, should

be requred to forward all relevant polcy proposals and reports to the Cvl Lbertes Commttee for ther observatons n

advance of any poltcal or fnancal decsons on deployment beng taken.

(v) Settng up Agreements between Member States Agreement whereby annual statstcs on ntercepton should be reported to

each member states' parlament n a standard and consstent format. These statstcs should provde comprehensve detals of

the actual number of communcaton devces ntercepted and data should be not be aggregated. (To avod the statstcs only

dentfyng the number of warrants, ssued whereas organsatons under survellance may have hundreds of members, all of


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whose phones may be ntercepted).

8. REGULATION OF HORIZONTAL PROLIFERATION

The Interm Report warned of the potental of some of these weapons, technologes and systems to undermne nternatonal human rghts

legslaton - a consderaton partcularly pognant n ths the 50th. annversary year of the sgnng of the UN Declaraton on Human Rghts.

Many of the major arms companes have a paramltary/nternal securty operaton and dversfcaton nto manufacturng or marketng ths

technology, s ncreasngly takng place.

NGO's lke Amnesty Internatonal, have begun to catalogue the trade n specalsed mltary, securty and polce technologes, to measurets mpact on ndustralsng represson, globalsng conflct, undermnng democracy and strengthenng the securty forces of torturng

states to create a new generaton of poltcal prsoners, extra-judcal kllngs and "dsappearances". (Amnesty Internatonal, 1996). The key

ssue for Members of the European Parlament s how they wll deal wth the human and poltcal fall out of what s a systemc process of

exportng represson: ether mportng a tdal wave of dspossessed refugees, or keepng them n desperaton at the borders of Europe.

There s an urgent need for greater transparency and democratc control of such exports and a clearer recognton of ther frequent lnkage

wth gross human rghts volatons n ther recpent states.

The Interm Report catalogued n some detal , examples of how ths technology, ncludng electroshock systems, was beng suppled by

European countres to assst n acts of human rghts volaton abroad,despte the fact that a substantal body of nternatonal human rghts

oblgatons should theoretcally prevent such transfers .(39) The European Parlament made a resoluton on the 19 January 1995, whch

called on the Commsson to brng forward proposals to ncorporate these technologes wthn the scope of the arms export controls and

ensure greater transparency n the export of all mltary, securty and polce technologes to prevent the hypocrsy of governments who

themselves breach ther own export bans.(40) Members of the European Parlament may wsh to consder the followng polcy optons:

8.1 POLICY OPTIONS

() That new research should be commssoned by the European Parlament to explore the extent to whch European companes

are complcty supplyng repressve technologes used to commt human rghts volatons and the prospects of nsttutng

ndependent measures of montorng the level and extent of such sales whlst trackng ther subsequent human rghts mpacts

and consequences;

() Consder f there s a need to amend the terms of reference of the Commttee for Foregn Affars and Securty to nclude

powers and responsbltes for lasng wth Member States to:

(a) Enable the European Parlament to explore the possbltes of usng the Jont Acton procedures used to

establsh the EU regulatons on the export of Dual Use equpment to draw up common lsts of proscrbed mltary,securty, polce (MSP)technology and tranng, the sole or prmary use of whch s to contrbute to human rghts

volatons; senstve MSP technologes whch have been shown n the past to be used to commt human rghts

volatons; and mltary, securty and polce unts and forces whch have been suffcently responsble for human

rghts volatons and to whom senstve goods and servces should not be suppled.

(b) Enable Member States to montor and regulate all exhbtons promotng the sale of securty equpment and

technology to ensure that any proposed transfers such as electroshock weapons, wll not contrbute to unlawful

kllngs, or to torture or cruel, nhuman or degradng treatment or punshment.

(c) Explore mechansms to ensure that all mltary, polce and securty exhbtons are requred to publsh guest

lsts, names of exhbtors, products and servces on dsplay and no vsas or nvtatons should be ssued to

governments or representatves of securty forces, known to carry out human rghts volatons.

(d) Fnd more effectve means for ensurng that the sender should take legal responsblty for the stated use of

mltary, securty and polce transfers n practce, for example makng future contracts dependent on adherence to

human rghts crtera and that such crtera are central to the regulatory process.

() That the Commsson should be requested to acheve agreement between Member States to undertake changes to ther

respectve strategc export controls so that:

(a) All proposed transfers of securty or polce equpment are publcly dsclosed n advance, especally

electroshock weapons, (ncludng those arranged on European terrtory where the equpment concerned remans

outsde Member States' borders) so that the human rghts stuaton n the ntended recevng country can be taken

nto consderaton before any such transfers are allowed. and that reports are ssued on the human rghts stuaton

n the recevng countres.


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(b) Member States Parlaments are notfed of all nformaton necessary to enable them to exercse proper control

over the mplementaton of ther legal oblgatons and commtments to nternatonal human rghts agreements,

ncludng recevng nformaton on human rghts volatons from non-governmental organsatons.

9. CONCLUSIONS

Wth proper accountablty and regulaton, some of the technologes dscussed above do have a legtmate law enforcement functon;

wthout such democratc control, they can provde powerful tools of oppresson.The real threat to cvl lbertes and human rghts n the

future, s more lkely to arse from an ncremental eroson of cvl lbertes, than t s from some conscous plan. As the globalsaton of

poltcal control technologes ncreases, Members of the European Parlament have a rght and a responsblty to challenge the costs, aswell as the alleged benefts of many so-called advances n law enforcement. Ths report has sought to hghlght some of the areas whch are

leadng to the most undesrable socal and poltcal consequences.

Members of the Parlament are requested to consder the polcy optons provded n the report as just a frst step to help brng the

technology of poltcal control, back wthn systems of democratc accountablty.

NOTES

1. The Interm Report on "An Apprasal of Technologes of Poltcal Control" (PE 166.499), s avalable free on request from the STOA

secretarat n Luxembourg. Where approprate, readers of ths summary report seekng further detal are referred to the relevant pages of

the nterm study.

2. Ackroyd C, Margols, K., Rosenhead, J., Shallce, T., (1977) The Technology of Poltcal Control, Pengun Books, Mddlesex, UK.

3. Statewatch, October, 1996, pp 6-7. A more recent related example concerns the proposed WEU creaton of an 800 strong armed

paramltary polce force drawn from exstng specalst squads at the natonal level, for nterventon n Central and Eastern Europe, to deal

wth publc order, rot control and terrorsm. (Statewatch, Vol 8, No.3-4, August 1998)

4. The Interm Report dscusses n further detal specfc nnovatons n area denal technology; survellance technology ncludng

bometrc systems such as face recognton; data-vellance; dscrete order vehcles; less-lethal weapons; lethal weapons; and executon

technologes (Interm Report, Sectons 3.1-3.6, pp 8-15).

5. Interm Report, pp 22-39

6. "Crtcs Queston Use of Pepper Spray,"Rutland Herald and Barre Tmes-Argus, 22.2.98, Vermont, USA.

7. Amnesty Internatonal Press Release, AI: "USA: Polce use of pepper spray s tantamount to torture," 7 November 1997.

8. No one from the polce or home offce has subsequently vsted ths nspector who remans partally sghted - See The Guardan, 29

January 1998.

9. Interm Report, p 39.

10.Pugwash Newsletter, November 1997, p. 276.

11. Bll Arkn wrtng nJournal of Medcne, Conflct and Survval, quoted n The Guardan, 9 December 1997.

12.Pugwash, Ibd.

13. Prncple 3 states that: "the development and deployment of non-lethal ncapactatng weapons should be carefully evaluated n order tomnmse the rsk of endangerng unnvolved persons, and the use of such weapons should be carefully controlled"; prncple 4 requres

governments to take steps to ensure that arbtrary or abusve use of force s not used by law enforcement offcers, and that force s used

"only f other means reman neffectve".

14. Interm Report, pp. 40-43.

15. Jessca Mtford's, The Amercan Prson Busness, Pengun 1977, provded a good dscusson of early behavour modfcaton

technques tested n US gaols.

16. For example n 1996, the UK treasury announced enforced cutbacks of some 3,000 prson jobs. Wth the UK prson populaton

expected to grow by 20,000 over the next 10 years due to the sentencng changes ntroduced by Home Secretary Mchael Howard, staffng

levels are sldng back to those prevalng at the tme of the prson rots n the late 1980's. In these crcumstances, the shortsghted prospect


19 7.6.20


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s one of expensve wardens beng replaced wth cheaper and more malleable technology, both passve and puntve.

17. Warren P, "Prsons go shoppng n face of staff cuts," Computng, 25 January 1996

18. Restrcted Contract Procedure (CC3160) for Her Majesty's Prson Servce, Supply and Transport Servces, Tenders Electronc Daly,

Luxembourg.

19. Quoted n Amnesty Internatonal, Unted States of Amerca - Use of electro-shock belts, June 1996.

20. Interm Report, pp 44-52; 54-57.

21. In ts reportArmng the Torturers (Amnesty Internatonal, 1997) Amnesty named the ffty countres where electroshock torture and ll

treatment had been carred out n prsons, polce statons and detenton centres. They are:

Afghanstan, Algera,Argentna, Austra, Bangladesh, Bolva, Brazl, Bulgara, Chad, Chle, Chna, Cyprus, Colomba, Congo, Ecuador,

Egypt, El Salvador, Ethopa, Greece, Guatemala, Hat, Inda, Indonesa/East Tmor, Iran, Iraq, Lebanon, Mexco, Morocco/Western

Sahara, Nepal, Netherlands Antlles, Ngera, Paraguay, Peru, Phlppnes, Russan federaton, Saud Araba, Senegal, Somala, South

Afrca, Sr Lanka, Sudan, Togo, Turkey, USA, Uruguay, Venezuela, Vet Nam, Yemen, Yugoslava - Kosovo provnce, Zare.

Amnesty recognses that the real fgure s probably hgher, "as the use of these weapons n torture can be very dffcult to detect."

22. Quoted n Sunday Busness, 30.9.98, London.

23. Speech by Hansjourg Geger, German Federal Commsson for the Stas Fles, Aprl 14, 1993.

24. Davd Bansar, Covert Acton Quarterly, No.56, Sprng 1996.

25. Davd Bansar, CAQ Quarterly, No.56, Sprng 1996.

26. The Interm Report (p 18) covers the mnmal elements of such a code.

27. Patrck Hook, "Puttng a Face to a Face," The Telegraph, 13.08.98.

28. "Your number may be up," Tmes, May 13, 1994.

29. Common Poston EC No/95, Adopted by the Councl on 20 February 1995, Drectve 95/EC of the European Parlament and the

Councl, "On the Protecton of Indvduals, Wth Regard to the Processng of Personal Data and on the Free Movement of Such Data."

30. Interm Report, p.18

31. Quoted fromReuters, 28 December 1997.

32. Commsson Statement - Transatlantc relatons/Echelon System. Transatlantc relatons followng 18 May EU-US Summt and the use

of montorng technques n the feld of communcatons. (It would be somewhat unusual f Echelon was actually dscussed at ths meetng,

apart from a context to neutralse current dsquet).

33. Fletcher, M., "Cook Faces Quz on Bg Brother Spy Net,"Fnancal Mal on Sunday, 1 March 1998.

34. Prvacy Internatonal, "Dvded Loyaltes: Revelatons About Amercan Spyng In Brtan Are Causng A Storm n Europe," Brefng

Paper by Smon Daves, 4 September 1998.

35. Statewatch can be contacted va 00-0181-802-1882 or va ther webste http//www.poptel.org.uk/statewatch/

36. Statewatch Vol 6, No.1 Jan-Feb 1996.

37. Statewatch Vol 7, No. 1 January-February 1997.

38. Statewatch, Vol 7, No. 4 & 5, July to October 1997

39. Interm Report p.53-57

40. Doc EN\RE\264264474

ANNEX 1


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AN APPRAISAL OF THE TECHNOLOGIES OF POLITICAL CONTROL

AN OMEGA FOUNDATION SUMMARY & OPTIONS REPORT

BIBLIOGRAPHY

* Note that ths bblography represents an abbrevated lst. Those requrng a more comprehensve set of references to ths topc arereferred to the detaled bblography provded provded n the Interm report, pages 74--100.

Ackroyd, C; Margols, K; Rosenhead, J; Shallce, T (1977) The Technology of Poltcal Control. 1st ed. Pelcan Books, Mddlesex, UK.

Amercan Cvl Lbertes Unon of Southern Calforna (1995)Pepperspray Update: More Fataltes, More Questons.ACLU.

Amercan Defense Preparedness Assocaton (1996) Non-Lethal Defense II Conference. Proceedngs and Updated Attendee Roster of a

Conference Held at the Rtz-Carlton Hotel, McClean, Vrgna, March 6-7,1996.

Amnesty Internatonal (1997)Armng The Torturers - Electroshock Torture and the Spread of Stun Technology. Amnesty Internatonal,

Internatonal Secretarat, campagn document, (ACT 40/01/97 London, 4 March, 1997.

Anon. (1993) "Phone-Tappers dream machne." Sunday Tmes, January 17, 1993.

Aubrey, C (1981) Who's Watchng You? Brtan's Securty Servces & The Offcal Secrets Act. 1st ed. Pelcan, Mddlesex, UK. 204 pages.

Ballantyne, R (1996) "Back On the Torture Tral."Fortress Europe, Letter No. 46, Aprl-May, 1996, pp. 5-6.

Ballantyne, R (1992) "At Chna's Torture Far." The Guardan, August 14, 1992.

Bamford, J (1982) The Puzzle Palace. Amerca's Natonal Securty Agency and Its Specal Relatonshp wth Brtan's GCHQ. Sdgwck &

Jackson, Ltd, London. pp 465.

Bansar, D (1996

an appraisal of the technologies of politidcal control

Documents