An Annotated Translation of the Madhyamakahṛdayakārikā/Tarkajvālā

Missing Verses 55-68

Paul HOORNAERT

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An Annotated Translation of

Madhyamakahrdayakuriku/Tarkajvulu V. 1-7

Paul HOORNAERT

Introduction

Nagarjuna (c. 150-250 A.D.) is generally regarded as the first Mahayana philosopher

and as the founder of the Madhyamaka school , because he was the first to develop

philosophical arguments to substantiate the truth of the Mahayana teaching on the

absence of inherent existence (nilJsvabhavata) or the emptiness (sunyata) of all things as

taught in the Prajiiaparamita sutras and other early Mahayana sutras. It is however

important to keep in mind that Nagarjuna only stated the fundamental principles of

Madhyamaka thought without elaborating a systematic doctrine. In particular, the

doctrine of the two truths, namely the conventional truth (saytlVJ:tisatya) and the

ultimate truth (paramarthasatya), is one of the important Madhyamaka tenets which

Nagarjuna has not discussed systematically. Nagarjuna briefly refers to the two

truths (Mulamadhyamakakarika, XXIV.8-10) , but he does not define them. And

although the distinction between the two truths is always present at the background of

his arguments, it is not explicated and therefore remains vague and liable to 'nihilistic'

misinterpretations. The same should be said about the two main post-Nagarjuna

Madhyamikas, Aryadeva (3rd ct.) and Buddhapal ita (c . 5th-6th ct.) , because neither of

them has formulated a systematic Madhyamaka doctrine.

Bhavaviveka (6th ct.) was the first to elaborate Madhyamaka thought into a system­

atic soteriology. He did so by formulating a systematic two-truths doctrine as the

cornerstone of his Madhyamaka thought. The transmitted texts give us indications as

to why Bhavaviveka committed himself to the task of systematization. There is

indeed textual evidence that the lack of an elaborated Madhyamaka doctrine, and

especially the ambiguity of the two-truths tenet, had resulted in nihilistic interpreta­

tions of Madhyamaka thought and had thus discredited Madhyamaka thought to the

extent that it had become the target of criticism by the Y ogacara. It was no doubt in

order to si lence this criticism that Bhavaviveka took it upon himself to systematize the

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Madhyamaka teachings.

Bhavaviveka not only systematized Madhyamaka thought, but he also used this

newly developed thought as the basis of an incessant and detailed refutation of other

systems of thought, both Buddhist and non-Buddhist. His main target was the

Y ogacara school which he criticizes in each of his works. The Y ogacarins had

succeeded in integrating the major tenets of Abhidharmic scholasticism, their own

interpretation of 'emptiness' in terms of the 'three natures' tenet, and the original

Y ogacara tenets of 'eight kinds of consciousness' and 'mind only' into a coherent

Mahayana soteriology. As a result, the Y ogacara school had established itself as the

main representative of Mahayana Buddhism in Bhavaviveka's day. Rivalry, envy, an

attempt to counter the dominancy of the Y ogacara school and the urge to vindicate

Madhyamaka thought against the critique by the Y ogacarins were no doubt important

factors that fueled Bhavaviveka's aversion for the Y ogacara school. The main reason

for his sustained critique must however have been his sincere conviction, as a

Mahayana Buddhist and teacher, that the Yogacara doctrine was based on a mistaken

interpretation of Reality (tattvam), of the knowledge of Reality (tattvajfiana), and of the

path (marga) leading to the knowledge of Reality or to Buddhahood. In short,

Bhavaviveka must have been convinced that the Y ogacara soteriology did not teach

the true way to Buddhahood.

Bhavaviveka's most extensive critique of the Yogacara is found in the Fifth Chapter

of his Verses on the Essence of the Middle Way (MadhyamakaJlJ:dayakclrika, abbreviated

as MHK hereafter) with the commentary called The Flame of Reason (Tarkajvcllii,

abbreviated as TJ hereafter) . The central chapter of MHK/TJ is the third chapter in

which Bhavaviveka sets forth his own view of Reality in terms of his two-truths

doctrine and explains the Madhyamaka path of reasoning (vicara) that needs to be

followed in order to attain the knowledge of Reality. Based on his own view of

Reality, Bhavaviveka in the subsequent chapters discusses and refutes the views of the

Sravakayana (Chapter 4), the Y ogacara (Chapter 5), the Sarpkhya (Chapter 6), the

Vaise$ika (Chapter 7), the Vedanta (Chapter 8) and the Mlmarllsa (Chapter 9)

I here present the edited Tibetan text and an annotated English translation of verses

1-7 of Chapter Five of MHK/T J. These verses constitute the pz2ruaj){zk:ja or the

introductory part in which Bhavaviveka briefly presents the basic Y ogacara tenets.

The remainder of Chapter Five (verses 8-114) consists of a detailed refutation of these

tenets.

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Up to date, only one comprehensive study of the entire Fifth Chapter of MHK/TJ

has been made, namely Bukkyo ni okeru u to mu to no tairon by Susumu Yamaguchi.

This excellent study (considering that it was made more than fifty years ago!)

contains a Japanese translation of all the verses of Chapter Five and of large portions

of the commentary, accompanied by explanatory comment and references to the

relevant Madhyamaka and Yogacara literature. Yamaguchi's work remains an indis­

pensable instrument for the study of Chapter Five of MHK/TJ and of the

Madhyamaka-versus-Yogacara dispute in general. I have therefore made extensive

use of this work in my notes to the translation. In addition, I have made special efforts

to explain the background and to identify the exact text sources of the Y ogacara

tenets as they are presented and criticized by Bhavaviveka.

The following brief outline of the content of the purvapakfia shows that Bhavaviveka's

presentation of the Y ogacara tenets is focused on the fol lowing three interrelated

themes, which are also the central themes in Bhavaviveka's own thought : (1) What is

Reality (tattvam)?, (2) What is the knowledge of Reality (tattvajntina)? (3) Which path

(mtirga) should be followed in order to attain the knowledge of Reality and thus

achieve Buddhahood? Bhavaviveka's main contention throughout Chapter Five can

then be summarized as follows: "The Y ogacara understanding of Reality is wrong.

Hence, the Yogacara understanding of the knowledge of Reality is also wrong. Hence,

the Y ogacara path is not a true means to attain the knowledge of Reality (or

Buddhahood). In sum, the Yogacara soteriology is not Mahayana Buddhism."

Synopsis of the Yogacara Doctrine (MHK/TJ Chapter Five, vv. 1-7) :

The basic assertion of the Y ogacara: "Our doctrine is the only true means to lead

people to the knowledge of Reality or to Buddhahood." (v. 1)

1. Definition and synonyms of Reality (vv. 2-3)

2. The path leading to the knowledge of Reality (vv. 4-5)

2.1 The path leading to the non-apprehension of imagined entities (v. 4)

2.2 From the non-apprehension of imagined entities to the knowledge of Reality (v. 5)

3. The Y ogacara doctrine agrees with reason (yukti) and scripture (tigama) (vv. 6-7)

3.1 Rational arguments for the existence of the dependent nature (v. 6)

3.2 Only the Yogacara doctrine is in accordance with the teachings of the Pra­

jntiptiramitti sutras. (v. 7)

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List of abbreviations used in the footnotes to the translation

AK L 'Abhidharmakosa de Vasubandhu, traduit en annote par Louis de la Vallee

Poussin, Paris-Louvain, 1923-1931.

BBh Bodhisattvabhumi (U. Wogihara ed., Tokyo 1936, repr . 1971).

DDVV Dharmadharmatavibha1Jgam:tti (]. N ozawa ed., Studies in In do logy and Bud­

dhology, Kyoto 1955, pp. 9-49.)

Eckel M. David Eckel , "Bhavaviveka's Critique of Yogacara Philosophy in Chapter

XXV of the Prajiiapradzpa," in Chr. Lindtner ed. , Indiske Studier V, Miscellanea

Buddhica, Copenhagen 1985, pp. 25-75.

MHK Madhyamakah;:dayakarika (Y. Ej ima ed.).

MS, Lamotte Mahayanasarrzgraha, E. Lamotte ed. and trsl . , La Somme du Grand

Vehicule d'Asahga, Louvain 1938.

MSA Mahayanasutralarrtkara, S. Levi ed., Paris 1907.

MVBh Madhyantavibhagabha$ya, G. M. Nagao ed., Tokyo 1964.

MVK Madhyantavibhagakarika, G. M. Nagao ed., Tokyo 1964.

MVT Madhyantavibhagatzka, S. Yamaguchi ed., Nagoya 1934.

PP Prajiiapradzpamulamadhyamakav;:tti, Tib. D. Nr. 3853, Tsha 45b4-259b3 (DBU MA

2); P. Nr. 5253, Tsha 53b3-326a6 (vol . 95, pp. 153-262) .

Schmithausen Lambert Schmithausen, Alayavzjiiana, On the Origin and the Early

Development of a Central Concept of Yogacara Philosophy, The International Institute

for Buddhist Studies, Tokyo 1987.

Siddhi Vijiiaptimtitrattisiddhi. La Siddhi de Hiuan-Tsang. Traduite et Annotee par

Louis de la Vallee Poussin, Paris 1928.

SNS, Lamotte Sarrzdhinirmocanasutra, E. Lamotte ed., Louvain 1935.

T. Taisho Shinshu Daizokyo, ]. Takakusu and K. Watanabe ed., Tokyo 1924-1935.

TJ Tarkajvala, Tib. D. Nr. 3856, Dsa 40b7-329b4 (DBU MA 3); P. Nr. 5256, Dsa

43b7-380a7 (vol. 96, pp. 19-154).

TrrK Trirrz§ikavijiiaptikarika, S. Levi ed., Paris 1925.

TrBh Trirrz§ikabha$ya, S. Levi ed., Paris 1925.

Yamaguchi Susumu Yamaguchi , Bukkyo ni okeru u to mu to no tairon, Tokyo 1941,

rev. ed. 1964.

YBh Yogacarabhumi, T. D. Nrs. 4035-4042, Tshi Ibl - H i 68b7 (SEMS TSAM 5-10) ;

P. Nrs. 5536-5543, Dsi la - Yi 70bl (vols. 109-111).

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1. Edited Tibetan text of MHK/TJ V. 1-7

[Editions used : Cone (C.) Dbu-ma Dsa 199a6-202b4; Derge (D.) Dbu-ma Dsa 199a6-

202b4; Peking (P.) Dbu-ma Dsa 218b8-223a2J

de nas da ni rnal 'byor spyod pa'i de kho na nyid gtan la dbab pa la 'jug pas le'u lnga

pa brtsam par bya stel

rang gi lugs kyi nga rgyal gyisl I

mkhas par rlom gzhan 'di skad smral I

de nyid bdud rtsir 'jug pa yangl I

rnal 'byor spyod pas legs bstan zer1 I I (1)

[anye pracak$ate dhlral; svanltav abhimaninal;1

tattvamrtavataro 'pi yogacarail; sudesital;II(1)J

theg pa chen poz nyid kyi slob dpon thogs3 med dangl dbyig4 gnyen la sogs pa gzhan

dag ni de bzhin gshegs pas lung bstan cingl sa rab tu brnyes pa'i 'phags pa klu sgrub

kyis yang dag par rtogs pa'i theg pa chen po'i don gyi lugs gzhan du 'dren par byed cing

ngo tsha dang khrel med pa don rnam par mi shes pa de bzhin du rnam par5 shes shing

mkhas par nga rgyal byed pa dag 'di skad smra stel de kho na nyid kyi bdud rtsir 'jug

pa stel rab tu 'jug pa de ni bdag cag kho nas legs par bstan pa yin gyi/ dbu mar smra

ba pa rnams kyis ni ma yin zhes zer roll de'i mtshan nyid ni 'di yin tel

dngos po gnyis po med pa' i phyir I I

gnyis dngos med pa'i yod pa nil I

yod la sogs pa'i6 blo yi yul/ I

dam pa'i don du 'dod do loll (2)

[dvayabhavasya sadbhavad abhavad va dvayasya cal

1 Based on the Tibetan version of MHK (verses only) which accords with the Sanskrit (yogacarailj).

The MHK/T J version reads: mal 'byor spyod par legs par bstan.

2 P : theg pa chen po pa

3 P : thog

4 P : dbyigs

5 C, D, P : pa

6 P : pa

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sadadibuddhivi�ayal) paramartho matal) ki lall(2) J

[D. 199b2, C. 199b2, P. 219a5J gnyis ni gzugs la sogs pa gzung ba dangl mIg gI rnam

par shes pa la sogs pa 'dzin pa'ol I de gnyis kyi med pa'i ngo bo nyid med pa'ol I med

pa'i dngos po de'i ngo bo nyid du rtag tu yod pa nyid kyi phyir dangl gzung ba dang

'dzin pa zhes bya ba gnyis su ni med pa nyid kyi phyir nal ji Itar gnyis kyi dngos por

med pa'i ngo bo yin pa de 'i phyir ni yod pa'i blo yul yin lal gang gi phyir gnyis kyi ngo

bor med pa yin pa de 'i phyir na 1 med pa'i blo 'i yul yin tel rnam pa de Ita bu'i don dam

pa ni bdag eag rnal 'byor spyod pa pa rnams 'dod do zhes bya ba ni de'i bsam pa bstan

pa yin noll 10 zhes bya ba'i sgra ni bstan beos byed pa bdag nyid kyis mi 'dod pa bstan

pa yin tel de lta bu'i don dam pa ni phyis 'byung ba'i dpyad pa dag gis bsgrub par dka'

ba yin pa'i phyir roll

de dag gi don dam pa de'i grangs kyi tshig ni 'di yin tel

med pa'i dngos po bdag med pal I

de bzhin nyid dang ehos gnas dangl I

rnam par mi rtog blo' i gzung ste2 I I

de shes par ni bya ba yangl I (3)

[abhavabhavo nairatmyarp tathata ea tathasthitil)1

nirvikalpamatigrahyarp tasyaivadhigamal) punal)1 I (3) J

[D. 199b6, C. 199b5, P. 219b2J zhes bya ba la med pa'i dngos po zhes bya ba ni gzung

ba dang 'dzin par btags pa gnyis med pa nyid3 kyi dngos po'ol I bdag med pa zhes bya

ba ni ehos dang gang zag bdag med pa nyid dol I de bzhin nyid ees bya ba ni phyin ci

ma log pa nyid dol I ehos gnas zhes bya ba ni rtag par de lta bu'i tshul nyid du gnas

pa nyid d04 I I rnam par mi rtog pa'i blo' i gzung ba stel zhes bya ba ni gnyis med pa

ni rnam par rtog pa thams cad dang bral ba'i phyir rnam par mi rtog pa'i blo gros kyi

gzung ba yin tel de nyid don dam pa'ol I de shes par ni5 bya ba yang zhes bya ba nil

dmigs pa Ia ni brten byas nasi I

I P : gang gi phyir dngos por me d pa yIn pa de 'i phyir ni 2 B ase d on the Tibe tan ve rsion of MHK The MI- IK/TJ ve rsi on has 'de' .J p. 'me d pa nyid' omitte d 4 p. 'chos gnas zhe s . gnas p a nyid do' omitte d 5 P : mi

- 1:32-

mi dmigs pa ni rab tu skyel I

mi dmigs pa la brten byas nasi I

mi dmigs pa ni rab tu skyel I (4)

[upalabdhirp samasritya nopalabdhil). prajayatel

nopalabdhirp samasritya nopalabdhil). prajayatell(4)J

[D. 200a1, C. 200a1, P . 219b5J zhes bya ba stel 'di la kun gzhi rnam par shes pa zhes

bya ba de ni thog ma med pa'i dus nas zhugs pal thog ma med pa'i dus kyi spros pa' i

bag chags kyi gzhir gyur pal dmigs pa dang rnam pa yongs su ma chad pa yongs su

'dzin pal rgyun ma chad pa dangl rdzas dpag tu med pal rigs du ma dang lhan cig

skye zhing 'gag pa dang ldan pal nus pa'i bye brag mthar thug pa med pa thob pal

sngon po la sogs pa'i yul dpag tu med pa snang ba'i cha dang 'breI ba'i rnam par shes

pa'i tshogs drug bskyed nus pa'i mthu dang ldan pal nyon mongs pa can gyi yid kyis2

skye ba dang 'j ig pa dang bral ba'i gnas pa'i3 rnam pas bdag tu yongs su btags pal bsod

nams dangl bsod nams ma yin pa dangl mi gyo ba'i sa bon yod pa'i phyir I khams

dang 'gro ba dangl skye gnas thams cad kyi sa bon dang ldan pal rnam par smin pa

dangl ngar sems pa dangl rnam par rig pa gsum yongs su 'gyur ba'i rjes su 'gro ba de

la dngos po skye ba dang ldan pa rnams 'bras bu'i dngos por kun du sbyor bar byed pa

stel len pa'i rnam par shes pa zhes bya ba yang de nyid yin tel reg pa dangl yid la

byed pa dangl tshor ba dangl sems pa dangl 'du shes btang snyoms kyi rnam pa dang

ldan pa 'di'i zhe'aml 'di na'o zhes 'j ig rten pa'i mkhas pa rnams kyi yul yang ma yin

pas rnam pa yang dag par mi rig pa'ol I

[D. 200a6, C. 200a5, P. 220a3J de yang rnam pa gnyis tel 'phen pa dang 'bras bur gyur

pa'ol I de la 'phen pa ni rnam par shes pa'i dbang gis4 'phen pa'ol I 'bras bur gyur pa

ni rnam par smin pa'i 'bras bur mngon par grub pa stel dper na chu'i yan lag gzhan

dang gzhan gyi rgyun las chu bo'i klung 'bab pa de bzhin du bsod nams dangl bsod

nams ma yin pa dangl mi gyo ba'i bag chags kyis bsgos5 pa'i kun gzhi rnam par shes

pa'i rgyun kyang 'khor ba j i srid pa'i bar du 'jug par 'gyur roll de la gnas pa'i las kyi

bag chags dangl gzung ba dang 'dzin pa'i bag chags dangl lhan gcig tu6 lha dang mi'i

1 C, D: 'dang' omitted

2 P : kyi

3 P : 'gnas paT omitted

4 P : gi

5 P : bgos

6 C, D, P : lha dang gcig tu

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Ius la sogs pa'i rnam par smin pa l ci rigs pa dag skyed par byed pa'ol I len pa'i rnam

par shes pa'i rgyun de yang dgra be om pa nyid thob pa na nyon mongs pa'i sa bon

thams cad spangs pas ldog par 'gyur tel de ltar de ni re zhig rnam par smin pa zhes

bya ba dangl de 'i yongs2 su 'gyur ba ste gcig gol I

[D. 200b2, C. 200bl, P. 220bl] gzhan yang sems can rnams de la bdag tu sbyor bar

byed pas kun gzhi rnam par shes pa zhes bya stel bdag dang bdag gi zhes bya bar

dmigs pa'i phyir roll rtag tu bdag tu rmongs pa dangl bdag tu Ita ba dangl bdag tu

nga rgyal ba dangl bdag la chags pa zhes bya ba nyon mongs pa bzhi po dag dangl

rang gi sa nas skyes pa'i reg pa dang yid la byed pa la sogs pa dag dang ldan pa yin

nol I nyon mongs pa can gyi yid de de yang dgra3 bcom pa la med del nyon mongs pa

thams cad spangs pa'i phyir roll de ltar de ni ngar sems dang zhes bya ba dangl de' i 4

yongs su 'gyur ba stel gnyis pa'ol I

[D. 200b4, C. 200b3, P . 220b4] gzhan yang de ni 'jug pa'i rnam par shes pa thams cad

kyi nus pa 'dun pa dang mos pa la sogs pa sems las byung ba thams cad dang bcas pa

kun gzhi yin pas kun gzhi rnam par shes pa zhes bya stel rtsa ba'i rnam par shes pa

zhes bya ba yang de nyid yin noll de las mig dangl gzugs dangl snang ba dangl nam

mkha' dangl yid la byed pa la sogs pa'i rkyen j i ltar nye bar gyur pa nal 'jug pa'i rnam

par shes pa'i tshogs drug po dag 'byung stel dper na rgya mtsho las chu'i rlabs dag

rlung dang chu srin gyis bskyod pa la sogs pa'i rkyen gyis 'byung ba bzhin noll kun

gzhi rnam par shes pa de yang 'j ug pa'i rnam par shes pa de dag dang gcig pa nyid

kyang rna yin lal tha dad pa nyid kyang rna yin tel rgya mtsho dang chu rlabs bzhin

nol I yul la nye bar dmigs pa de dag kyang 'du shes med pa dangl 'du shes med pa pa

dangl 'gog pa'i snyoms par 'jug pa dangl gnyid l og pa dangl my os pa dangl brgyal

ba dag gi gnas skabs na ni med dol I de ltar de ni rnam par rig pa zhes bya ba dangl

de ' i yongs su 'gyur ba stel gsum pa'ol I

[D. 201al, C. 200b7, P. 221alJ sems de nyid rnal 'byor pa de la rab tu snang ba 'dzin

pa'i rnam pa dangl yul du snang ba gzung ba'i rnam par yongs su gyur cing snang ba

stel phyi rol gyi don med pas5 sems tsam du dmigs pa la brten nas6 yul mi dmigs pa

rab tu skye lal gzung ba med na de 'dzin pa dag kyang med pas gzung ba mi dmigs

I C, D : m am par shes pa 2 C, D, P : phyogs , D ' dag 1 C, D, P . de 5 C, D : pa 6 C, D : dmigs pa pa 7 P : ' de' omitted

� 134�

pa la brten nasi 'dzin pa'i rnam par shes pa rnam pa drug po dag mi dmigs pa rab tu

skye tel ji srid du kun gzhi rnam par shes pa rang gi sems kyi chos nyid rnam par rig

pa zhes bya ba nyid la mi gnas shing dmigs pa la gnas pa de srid du gzung ba'i sa bon

mi ldog cingl mtshan mar Ita ba'i sa bon rna spangs pa'i phyir gnyis kyi bag chags mi

spong ngol I gang gi tshe gzugs la sogs pa dmigs pa dag sems las phyi rol du mi dmigs

pa de'i tshe nal rang gi chos nyid la nges par gnas pa yin tel gnas gyur pas sgrib pa

thams cad bsal ba'i phyir dangl chos thams cad la dbang sgyur ba nyid kyis1 rnam par

mi rtog pa'i chos nyid thob boll

[D. 201a4, C. 201a4, P. 221a5J rnam par rig pa tsam nyid ces bya ba de bzhin gshegs

pa'i ye shes don thams cad la rnam par mi rtog pa de ni ngo bo nyid gsum yongs su

mi shes na mi rtogs pas2 de'i phyir I

brtags pa nye bar mi dmigs shingl I

gzhan gyi dbang yang gzung med pasl I

de nyid mthong ba yongs grub pa'i/ I

ngo bo nyid la Ita ba yinl I (5)

[kalpitanupalabdhis ca paratantrasya cagrahal)1

svabhavarp parini$pannam ik$ante tattvadarsinal)II(5)J

[D. 201a6, C. 201a6, P. 221a7J zhes bya ba smras tel 'di la kun brtags3 pa dangl

gzhan gyi dbang dangl yongs su grub pa'i ngo bo nyid gsum po dag ni kun gzhi rnam

par shes pa nyid kyi khongs su 'dus tel de la nang dang4 phyi rol gyi dbye bas tha dad

pa'i rnam par rtog pa gang dang gang gis gzugs dang byang chub kyi bar gyi dngos po

gang dang gang rnam par brtag par bya ba de ni de bzhin du yod pa rna yin tel yod

pa rna yin par sgro 'dogs pas brtags pa yin pa'i phyir tel de ni kun brtags pa'i ngo bo

nyid dol I khams gsum nas skyes nas5 sems dang sems las byung ba yang dag pa rna

yin pa kun rtog pa dge ba la sogs pa'i dbye bas tha dad pa ni gzhan gyis bskyed cing

dbang bya ba yin pa'i phyir gzhan gyi dbang ngol I yang na gzhan skyes pa la dbang

byed pas gzhan gyi dbang stel kun brtags pa dangl yongs su grub pa gnyis de'i gzhi

las kun brtags pa dangl yongs su grub par 'gyur ba'i phyir tel de ni gzhan gyi dbang

1 P : kyi

2 P : mi rtog pa

3 P : btags

4 P : 'dang' omitted

5 P : 'nas' omitted

- 135 -

gi ngo bo nyid dol I gzhan gyi dbang de nyid gzung ba dang 'dzin pa'i ngo bo nyid du

kun brtags pa dang bral ba nyid gang yin pa de ni yongs su grub pa'i ngo bo nyid dol I

de yang gzhan gi dbang dang1 gcig pa nyid kyang rna yin la tha dad pa nyid kyang rna

yin tel gal te tha dad par gyur na ni chos nyid tha dad par 'gyur roll ci ste gcig pa

nyid yin par gyur na ni des na kun nas nyon mongs pa'i bdag nyid du gyur pas rnam

par byang ba'i rgyur mi 'gyur roll

[Do 201 b3, C. 201b3, Po 221b5] gal te ngo bo nyid gsum po dag yod na j i ltar dngos po

thams cad ngo bo nyid med pa zhe nal kun brtags pa ni rang gi mtshan nyid stong pa

nyid kyi mtshan nyid ngo bo nyid med pa yin pas nye bar mi dmigs shing gzhan gyi

dbang yang de la rang gi bdag nyid kyis skye ba med pa'i phyir skye ba ngo bo nyid

med pa yin pas gzung du med dol I yongs su grub pa'i ngo bo nyid ni kun brtags pa'i

chos rnams kyi don dam pa yang yin la ngo bo nyid med pa nyid kyang yin tel 'phags

pa'i ye shes dam pa'i spyod yul gyi don yin pas don dam pa ngo bo nyid med pa nyid

kyis ngo bo nyid med pa yin tel de nyid mthong ba don dam par shes pa dag yongs su

grub pa'i ngo bo nyid de la dmigs par bya ba dangl dmigs pa'i dngos po mnyam pa nyid

kyis2 Ita ba yin tel 'jig rten las 'das pa'i ye shes rnam par mi rtog pa skyes pa'i phyir

ro zhes bya bar sbyar roll gnas gyur pa'i mtshan nyid de yang nyan thos rnams kyi

ni rnam par grol ba'i Ius yin tel zag pa thams cad dang bral zhing nyon mongs pa'i

sgrib pa spangs pa'i phyir roll de nyid de bzhin gshegs pa'i ni chos kyi sku yin tel las

dang gzung ba dang 'dzin pa'i bag chags thams cad dang bral zhing shes bya'i sgrib pa

spangs pa'i phyir roll

[Do 201b7, C. 201b7, Po 222a2] gal te kha cig 'di skad ces kun brtags pa'i ngo bo nyid

ni 'j ig rten dang thun mong pa'i shes pa'i yul yin la yongs su grub pa'i ngo bo nyid ni

so so rang rig pa stel thub pa 'j ig rten las 'das pa'i ye shes kyi yul yin na gzhan gyi

dbang gi ngo bo nyid de shes pa gang gi yul yin zhing de3 yod par j i ltar shes zhes zer

na de 'i phyir I

btags pa rgyu mtshan be as phyir dangl I

gzhan du gnyis po med phyir dangl I

kun nas nyon mongs dmigs pa'i phyir I I

gzhan dbang yod pa nyid du 'dodl I (6)

1 P: ' dang' om itted 2 po kyi 3 P: 'de ' om itte d

� 136 �

[prajfiaptel; sanimittatvad anyatha dvayanasatal;1

sarpklesasyopalabdhes ea paratantrastita matall(6) J

ees bya ba smras tel 'di ltar sems dang sems las byung ba dag yod pa nyid du btags

pa gang yin pa de ni phyin ei log gi rgyu mtshan dang beas pa snang ba'i phyir tel

mtshan nyid des gzhan gyi dbang yod pa nyid du rjes su dpag gol I gzhan du gal te

gzhan gyi dbang med par gyur na btags pa dang rgyu mtshan nam kun brtags dang

yongs su grub pa gnyis po med par thaI bar 'gyur ba'i phyir tel de gnyis ni gzhan gyi

dbang la rag Ius pa'i phyir roll gzhan yang gal te gzhan gyi dbang gi ngo bo nyid med

par gyur na kun nas nyon mongs pa dmigs par mi 'gyur ba zhig na de dmigs pa'i phyir

tel kun nas nyon mongs pa ni sems dang sems las byung ba dag la brten pa yin lal de

dang bra 1 ba nyid ni thar pa yin pa'i phyir roll de'i phyir gzhan gyi dbang yod pa nyid

du 'dod dol I

[D. 202a5, C. 202a5, P. 222a8J de yang 'j ig rten las 'das pa'i shes pa rnam par mi rtog

pa'i yul yin pas yongs su grub pa'i ngo bo nyid mngon sum du byas nas mthong stel

gzhan gyi dbang ni de'i rjes la thob pa dag pa 'j ig rten pa'i ye shes kyis rtogs par bya

ba yin pa'i phyir roll

shes rab pha rol phyin tshul 'di/ I

thams cad mkhyen nyid thob pa yinl I

skye dang 'gag la sogs pa dag1 I I

dgag pa lhur len rna yin noll (7)

[prajfiaparamitanitir iyarp sarvajfiataptayel

na tutpadanirodhadiprati$edhaparo nay al;I 1(7)J

zhes bya ba ni ehos 'di dag nyid kyis ehos rnams mngon par rlan par byedl yongs su

rdzogs par byedl yongs su gsal bar byedl yongs su dpyod par byed kyang2 'di la bdag

gam bdag gir bya ba med do zhes gsungs pa des ni bdag dang bdag gi rnam par 'dzin

pa dangl de la mngon par zhen pa med pa'i sgo nas kun gzhi rnam par shes pa'i yongs

su 'gyur ba bstan to I I sems de ni sems rna yin no zhes gsungs pa des ni gzung ba dang

'dzin pa med par bstan toll sems med pa nyid gang yin pa de ni bsam gyis mi khyab

1 C, D : dang 2 P: kyis

-137 -

bo zhes gsungs pa des ni rnarn par rig pa tsarn nyid bstan toll de bzhin du gzugs ni

rntshan rna'ol I byang chub kyi bar du yang rntshan rna'o zhes gsungs pa des ni rning

dang brdar btags pas kun brtags pa'i ngo bo nyid bstan toll skur pa gdab pa dangl

nye bar blang ba dangl gdags pa'i chos dangl byang chub kyi phyogs kyi chos bstan

pas ni gzhan gyi dbang bstan toll de bzhin nyid dangl yang dag pa'i rntha' dangl

dben pa dangl 'bras bu dangl rnarn pa tharns cad rnkhyen pa nyid la sogs pa brjod pas

ni yongs su grub pa'i ngo bo nyid bstan toll de ltar kho bo cag gisl bstan pa'i shes rab

kyi pha rol tu phyin pa'i tshul 'di ni tharns cad rnkhyen pa nyid thob pa'i thabs yin gyil

dbu rna srnra ba rnarns kyi skye ba dang 'gag pa la sogs pa dag dgag pa lhur len pa

ni rned pa nyid du Ita ba dang rnthun pa nyid du 'gyur bas tharns cad rnkhyen pa nyid

'thob pa'i thabs rna yin no zhes zer tel de ni rnal 'byor spyod pa pa dag gis sbyar ba'i

phyogs snga rna yin noll [D. 202b4, C. 202b4, P. 223a2]

1 P: gi

- 138 -

2. Translation

Let us now begin the Fifth Chapter in which the Yogacara [doctrine of] Reality

(tattvam) will be closely examined in order to ascertain its truth or falsity.l

Others, proud of their own doctrine and boasting of their erudition, say:

"The entrance into the nectar of Reality is surely explained well by the

Yogacarins [only] ." (1)

Others, such as Asanga, Vasubandhu, and so forth2 , who are teachers of the same Great

Vehicle, erroneously (anyatha) interpret the meaning of the Great Vehicle, which was

correctly understood by the noble Nagarjuna whose future enlightenment was predict­

ed (vytikrta) by the Tathagata and who entered the [first] bodhisattva-stage.3 They

know neither shame nor embarrassment.4 Although th.ey do not know the [true]

meaning [of the Great Vehicle]'

they nevertheless boast that they are experts who

I The Sanskrit title of Chapter 5 ( Yogacaratattvaviniscayavatara) means "Entrance into (avatara) an

ascertained and hence conclusive judgment (viniscaya) [on the truth or falsity] of the Y ogacara [doctrine of] Reality."

'tattvam', here translated as 'Reality', literally means 'being just that' (de kho na nyid). Sthiramati

explains the etymology of this term as follows: "[The abstract term] tattvam is construed as

follows. Since this is just that, it is 'that' ( tat ) . The being (bhava) of 'Gust) that' is 'being just that'

( tattvam)." (MVT 7.8-9: tattvam iti tad evedarrz tat, tasya bhavas tattvam ity arthaJ:t; de kho na zhes

bya ba ni 'di nyid de yin pas de 'o/ de 'i dngos po ni de kho na ste . . . ). See also Candrakirti's

explanation of 'tattvam' in Yuktisa5tikavrtti (C. A. Scherrer-Schaub, Yuktisa5tikavrtti, Melanges

Chinois et Bouddhiques, Vol. 25, Bruxelles 1991, pp. 237-238.)

Reality, or the true nature of things, is misunderstood when one apprehends the unreal as real and

asserts that things are 'more than just that' or more than what they really are ( = samaropa), or

when one apprehends the real as unreal and asserts that things are 'less than just that' ( = apavada).

2 Yamaguchi (pp. 86-88) remarks that Bhavaviveka here does not mention Maitreya among the

Y ogacara teachers, although he quotes from MVK further in the text (for example, MVK 1.6 is

quoted as MHK V. 4). This indicates that Bhavaviveka, unlike the later Tibetan tradition, did not

recognize Maitreya as the historical Yogacara author of MVK, etc. It also indicates that

Bhavaviveka, unlike his contemporary Sthiramati (d. MVT, 2.3-9), did not regard MVK as a work

of which Maitreya was the heavenly promulgator (pranetr) or creator (kart r) and Asanga the

human transmitter (vakt r). It must have been unacceptable to Bhavaviveka that Maitreya, a

tenth-stage bodhisattva and future buddha, would have been the creator, or even the inspirator, of

Yogacara treatises which Bhavaviveka vehemently rejected as heterodox.

3 A<tcording to the Lankiivatarasutra (v. 165-166), Nagarjuna entered the first bodhisattva-stage called

'the stage of joy' (muditabhumi).

4 Shame (hri) and embarrassment (apatrapya) are two good mental factors (kusalacaitta) that keep a

person from evil actions either out of self-respect or because of fear of being blamed by others.

They are therefore necessary accompaniments of all good states of mind (d. AK II. 25). Their

counteragents, non-shame and non-embarrassment, are secondary defilements (upaklesa) which

accompany all bad states of mind (d. AK II. 26cd, II. 32ab). Bhavaviveka thus passes a severe judgment upon the Yogacarins: they lack the restraints of shame and embarrassment and are

therefore unable to control their impulses to do evil.

- 139 -

know [ i ts true meaning] and say : "The ful l entrance into the nectar of Reality IS

correctly taught by us alone, not by the Madhyamikas. "

The definition of Reality [as understood by them] i s as follows :

Because [for them, Reality is] the nonexistence of the two and is also the

existence of the nonexistence of the two l , they think that the Ultimate2 is

the obj ect of a mind [that perceives] existence, and so forth. (2)

'The two' refers to the objects apprehended by consciousness (grahya), such as visible

form (ntpa) and so forth, and to the apprehending consciousnesses (grahaka), such as

visual perception and so forth . 'N onexistence' is the inherent nonexistence of these

two.3 [Reality is] the permanent existence consisting in the inherent existence of this

nonexistence (abhavabhavasvabhava), and [Reality is also] the nonexistence of the

duality of apprehended objects and apprehending consciousnesses. Therefore, inas­

much as [Reality] is the inherent existence of the nonexistence of the two (dvayabhava­

bhavasvabhava), [Reality] is the object of a mind [that perceives] ex istence. And

because [Reality] is [also] the inherent nonex istence of the two, it is [also] the object

of a mind [that perceives] nonexistence. The purport [of the verse] is: "We Yogacar­

ins assert that the Ultimate is like that." The word "10" (kila) [ in the verse] indicates

that I [ Bhavaviveka] , the author of this treatise, do not assert this. The Ultimate as

understood in that way is indeed difficult to be established, as will be shown by means

of the reasonings that wil l be adduced later.

The synonyms of the Ultimate, as understood by them, are the following :

'Existence of nonexistence ' , 'absence of self-existence', ' [a lways] being

thus ' , 'remaining as it is'4 , and 'what is apprehended by the )ransworldlyJ

1 Base d on the definition of 'e mptiness' in MVK I l3abc (cf Yamaguchi , p. 81): " Emptiness is indee d

de fine d as the none x iste nce of the two and as the existe nce of this none xi ste nce . It is nei ther [simpl y ] e xiste nce nor [simpl y ] none xiste nce " (dvayilbhiil'o hy abhill 'as�va bhilva�z sifn.vasya lak:;a·

;;wm / na bhilz;o nilpz abh ilva�l)

2 'parmnilrtha' or ' obje ct of the highest knowle dge ' . He re use d as a synonym of 'Re ality' ( tat tv{lm) . " Lite rally : "Nonexistence is that the se two have the nature of none xiste nce "

None xiste nce by nature is ab solute . inhe rent none x iste nce (alyantilbhilva) or nonexi ste nce through­out the three pe riods of time . It is to be dist ingUIshe d from rel ative none xistence , which is e i the r none xiste nce prior to e Xiste nce (= the none xiste nce of future thl11gs) or none xiste nce afte r having e xiste d ( = the none x iste nce of past thl11gs) (See MVT. 47. 13-20. ) According to the Yogacara the ory of the three natures, the im agl11e d n ature is ab sol utely or inherently none xiste nt and therefore lacks all individuating properties (lak:;mJani�ISVabhilL'a), the de pende nt nature e xists, W ith ItS I11 dl viduat­ing prope rties, in the prese nt only , and the pe rfectly establ ishe d nature e x ists pe rmane ntl y (See ve rse 5 bel ow.)

4 tathllsthiti�l (Sansknt ve rsion) . The Tibe tan ve rsi on re ads dharmasthitl�l.

-- 140 -

nonconceptual awareness'.l

Further, as for the realization of that same [Reality] 2, (3)

'Existence of nonexistence' (abhavabhava) is the existence of the nonexistence of the

two which are conventionally designated as 'apprehended object' and 'apprehending

consciousness'. 'Absence of self-existence' (nairtitmyam) is the absence of self­

established existence in things and persons. ' [Always] being thus' (tathatti) is irrever­

sibility (aviparitata)3. 'Remaining as it is' means 'permanently existing in that way'.

'What is apprehended by nonconceptual awareness' means that the nonexistence of the

two is the object apprehended by the [transworldly] nonconceptual awareness, because

it is inaccessible to conceptual cognitions (vikalpa). As such it is [also] the object of the

highest awareness (paramartha).

That [Reality] is also to be realized, as follows :

The non-apprehension [of objects] arises as a result of perceiving [everything

as phenomena appearing only in the mind] . And the non-apprehension [of the

mind as an apprehender of objects] arises as a result of the non-apprehension [of

I To be compare d with MVK 1 1 4 -1 5 (d. Yamaguchi, p . 81) whe re the following synonyms of 'Emptiness' ( = Re ality) are liste d and e xp lained : tathaM (always be ing thus) , bhutakoti (that which is fully re al and can the re fore ne ve r be the cause of e rrone ous knowledge or viparyiisa ) ; animittam

(without app re he ndable prope rtie s) , paramiirthatii (obje ct of the ultimate awareness of the aryas) , dharmadhiitu [ that which, when re alize d, functions as the base or cause ( dhiitu = hetu) of all the

sup re me qualitie s of the aryas]

The te rm nirvikalpamatigriihyam sugge sts that the Yogacara conce ive s Re ality as a hyp osthatize d entity with app rehendable p rope rties (nimittam ). It then follows that the awareness of Re ality ( tattvajJiiina) , although nonconceptual , wil l st il l be an apprehe nding (griihaka) or obje ctifying

(upalambha) cognition of Re ality and will in that se nse not diffe r at all from any ordinary pe rcep tual cognition. This Yogacara understanding of Re ality and of the awareness of Re ality is the ultimate target of Bhavavive ka's criticism throughout Chap te r 5 of MH K/T] .

2 A n alte rnative interp re tation would be that the last me mbe r o f this ve rse me ntions another synonym of the U ltimate according to the Yogacara. The me aning would then be that the re aliza ­tion of Re al ity is nondistinguishable from Re ality itse lf and is in that se nse also the U ltimate (paramiirtha). I here follow the commentary in TJ whe re the l ast me mber of ve rse 3 is inte rp re ted as an introduction to verse 4 which e xp lains the basic step s to be followe d in order to re alize Re al ity.

3 'tathatii' is usually glossed as 'unchange ability' (ananyathii, 'ne ve r be ing othe rwise ') or 'always be ing thus' (TrK 25c : sarviikiila'Y(l tathiibhiiva) . Be cause Re al ity is unchange able , i t is also irre ve rsible (aviparita) in that it always manifests itse lf e xactly the way it is, and ne ve r as othe r than what it is. O nly change able things are ap t to manifest themse lves in differe nt ways at differe nt time s. Re ality is the refore by de finition nonde cep tive (avitatha, amrsii): it is neve r the cause o f misapp re­hensions (viparyiisa) that would mistake it as some thing e lse than what it is. Also, whe ther it is

re alize d or not, Re ality (the mind's be ing e mp ty of the app rehe nde d-app re he nding dual ity) always re mains the same Re ality, be it at the le ve l of the unle arned (P rthagjana), the le arne rs (saik:;;a) or the fully le arned (asaik:;;a) (d. TrBh 41. 29 ad TrK 25c) . Re ality is the re fore 'absolute ' in the se nse that it is absolved from and unaffecte d by its be ing re alize d or not be ing re alize d.

- 141 -

objects].1 (4)

In this world (iha) , the so-cal led 'store-consciousness' (ttlayavz;nana) has been active

from time immemorial. 2 This consciousness is the receptacle-support (gzhi) of the

residual impressions (vttsana) of the conceptual and verbal differentiations (prapanca)

[that people have been making] from time immemoriaP Both its object (ttlambana)

1 Quot at Ion of MVK 1 .6 (d. Yamaguchi , pp 85-86). This verse exp l ains t he maj or st ep s o f t he

Yoga cara-p at h by whIch the nonexistence of the app rehended-apprehending dua lity can be realized

( nilJlak:Yl1:zaprave.�a-upaya), provided one reasons correct ly (ymll.�omanasikara) in accordance with t he

fundament al Y oga cara tenet s of the t hree nat ures, the corresp onding three absences of intrinsic

existence ( nl�",)vabh{IV(l), and t he nondual nat ure of the mind ( cz ttanultra)

As wil l be sho'v vn in the notes that foll ow, the p resent at ion of the Y oga ca ra tenet s 111 the TJ

comment ary on v erses 4 and 5 (t he eight k1l1 ds of conSCIOusness, the ult imate nature of the m111d as

free frorn the app rehended-app rehending dual ity , t he three nat ures , the three absences of 111t nns ic

ex istence) i s almost ent irely based on TrK/ TrBh Yamaguchi (pp 13 2 - 13-! ) P01l1t s out that

Bha vaviveka's present at i on of t he Y ogacara t enet s mainly draws up on the Dlgnaga-Dharm apa la

l ine of t hought (emphasis on the subst ant I al exist ence of consciousness, the 's(l/dim' nat ure of

consciousness, et c ) Y amaguchi therefore excl udes any dI rect dep endence on St hiramatI's Tr1l11-

.�i/;:ablza!))la . This may be true, but it IS also true that the focus o f Y oga ca ra thought in Bhavav iv eka's

day was the TriJ!1§,z'i?rl, as IS eVIdent from the 10 commentanes that were rep ort edly writ ten on

V asubandhu's t reat ise, two of which were wntt en by Bhavaviveka's contemp oraries Dharmapal a

and St hiramat i It is o f course possible that St hiramat i 's blza:;ya was not yet available in writt en

form at the time when TJ was comp osed, but the ideas and even the phrases of TrBh were cert ainly

well known to t he author of T J. as is evident from the p arallel word1l1g of many p assages (see the

notes below)

Comp are WIt h the charact eriz at ion of the st ore-consciousness as "t he beginm ngless element and the

supp ort of all dharmas" in t he Mahayanablzzdlzanna:-,i7tra (quoted 111 MS, Lamott e II, p. 1 2 , TrBh 37

1 2 -13 , S iddhi, p 1 69) See also YamaguchI , p 9 0

The T J -comment ary st arts wit h a not very syst ematic exp lanat i on o f the st ore-conscIOusness in

general This is fol lowed by a more systemat ic expl anat i on of the eight k inds of consciousness

based on Vasubandhu's theory of the 'three transformati ons' of t he st ore-consciousness in TrK and

on Sthlramatl 's comment ary in TrBh

j S NS defines the ment al imp ressions or traces which are app ropriat ed by the st ore-conscio usness as

"t he imp ressions of the concept ual and verbal di fferent iat ions (jJrapanca) which are the habit ual way

( vyavahara) of [i dent i fyi ng] t he characterist ic p rop ert I es ( nirnitta) of t hings and [ associat ing them

wit h] names ( naman) and concepts ( vi/lalj)(z) (Lamott e, S NS V 2 , p 184 , Tib t ext p 55 mtslzan ma

dang mzng dang mam jJar rtog pa la tlw snyad 'dogs pa 'i spros pa 'z bag chags). 'prapai'iw' thus

refers t o the habIt ual construct ion or superimp osit ion of the different i ated \v orld of everyday

experience , al l the percept ions, emot I Ons and cogmt ions of ordinary peop le are affected by t he

ingra1l1 ed habIt of conceiving the worl d as consist i ng of sep arate, enduring subjects (I versus ot hers)

and sep arate, enduring obj ect s (d TrBh 1 9 1 2 rltmadivzkalpavasana rfipadldharmavikaljJav{l!>ana cal

These same impressions are called " i mp resslOns of att achment t o the im agined nature of thi ngs"

(parikalj)ltasvabhava-abhinivesa-vasana) in YBh Vin. Samgr. (D. S ems Tsam 8, S hl 4a 1 , d. a lso TrBh

19 7 , Schmithausen, p 73 and not es) The ment a l habit of concept ual and verbal di fferent Iat ion not

only construct s a nonexist ent world, but is always accomp anied by att achment t o t he reality and

ult i mate value of t he t hus construct ed, different i at ed worl d

-142 -

and its mode of apprehending its object (iikiira) are indistinct (aparichinna).l It is an

uninterrupted stream and an unfathomable (aprameya) real entity (dravya).2 It originates

and perishes simultaneously with [the birth and death of sentient beings] in the

manifold forms of existence (jiiti). It acquires an endless variety of potencies (sakti) and

has the power to produce the six consciousnesses which apprehend3 the innumerable

objects of perception that [uninterruptedly] appear in it, such as blue and so forth. The

defiled mind (kli!itamanas) conceives it as a self (iitman) in the sense of a [mental ] basis

(iisraya) [of personal existence] which is free from birth and annihilation.4 Because

[this store-consciousness] exists as [the support of] the seeds (bija) of virtuous (pw'Jya),

nonvirtuous (apu1Jya) and immovable (iinifijya) actions, it contains the seeds of [rebirth in]

all the [three] realms of samsaric existence (dhiitu), the [five] states of migration

1 L iter all y: " It compr ise s (yongs su 'dzin pa, parigrhUa) an in dist in ct obje ct an d [ an indist in ct ] mode of apprehen ding ." On 'parigrhUa ' as used in t he act ive sen se, see Schmithausen, n ote 147. The ter m 'parigrhUa ' indicates that ' having its own object and it s own, un ique mode of apprehen ding

that obje ct' is an intr in sic pr operty of t he st ore- con sciousness (d. TrB h 1 9.3- 4: na hi niralambanaYtl

nirakarattt va vijiianattt yujyate). The st ore -con sciousne ss is theref ore a gen uine consciousness on it s own, different fr om t he tr adit ion al six con sciousne sse s. The obje ct of the st ore -consciousness is def ine d in var ious ways in t he Y oga car a te xt s (see Schmithausen, pp. 89 ff.). Accor ding t o the full y de vel oped t he or y (e .g . TrBh ad Tr K 3ab), the st ore -consciousne ss is aware of t he f ol lowing obje ct s: (1) An intern al obje ct con sist ing of (a) the impre ssion s of one's att achment t o the imagine d n ature

of t hing s, (b) t he sen se org an s (subt le matter) an d t he ir supp ort (gr oss matter = t he body), (c) the four non -mater ial aggreg ate s ( = naman, on ly in TrB h 1 9 .8, 1 9 .1 8-20 ; d. Schmithausen, p . 10 5) .

(2) An extern al object: the surr oun ding e xtern al world (bhajanaloka = sthana) .

Be cause t he intern al obje ct s of t he st ore -consciousne ss are e xtre me ly subtle (atisukfima), it s awarene ss (vijiiapti ) of t he se obje ct s is in dist in ct (asatttvidita = aparichinna); that is, t hese intern al obje cts are n ot kn own by a mode of appre hen sion (akara) t hat discerns t hem as "t his is that" (TrBh 1 9.1 4-1 5: so 'sminn idaYtl tad iti pratisatttvedanakareJJO asatttvidita). As f or t he e xtern ­al wor ld, it s vastness e xcl ude s an y dist in ct awarene ss by t he st ore -consciousne ss (d. YB h, D. Shi 3b7) . In sum, t he st ore -consciousne ss is t he un interr upte d but dim awarene ss of one' s habitual pr opensit ie s (viisana), one' s body, one' s ment al st ate s an d one's U mwelt .

2 Yamag uchi (p. 90) refer s t o SN S where the st ore -con sciousness is said t o be "pr of ound (gatttbhira)

an d subtle (sukfima)" (zab cing phra ba) and " an un interr upte d stre am." (SN S, T. vol. 16, 6 92c21 -23 ; L amotte V. 7; quoted in Tr B h 3 4.3 -4, Siddhi p. 173) ; a lso Tr K 4d: tac ca variate srotasa oghavat).

Asvabha va quotes t his passage fr om SN S in his comment ar y on MS (T. vol. 31, 3 83b29-c9; D. Ri 196 al ; MS, L amotte 1. 4, p . 1 4) an d e xp lains 'pr of oun d' as "diff icult to f at hom by t he inte l l igen ce of le arned pe ople," an d ' subt le' as " diff icult t o kn ow e ven by the Sra vakas." B ha vavive ka here e mp hasize s t hat the Yogacar ins vie w t he st ore -con sciousne ss as a sep ar ate, re al consciousne ss (dravya). H is own p osit ion is t hat on ly t he inst ant ane ous occurren ce s of con sciousness are re al an d that 'c itt a' is j ust a n ame or designat ion of t he un interr upte d stre am (sattttana) of t hese inst ant ane ous occurren ce s (see MH K V.46 ff .) .

3 L iter ally: ' which are conne cte d or j oined wit h' (dang 'breI pa). The me an ing seems t o be t hat t he six consciousne sse s (t he f ive sen se per ceptions p lus the sixth ment al per cept ion) are pr oduced as dist in ct appre hen sion s of some of t he innumer able images of t he e xtern al world which cont in uously appe ar an d re appe ar in t he st ore -con sciousness but are on ly indist in ctl y appre hen de d by the st ore -consciousness it self (d. n ote 1 above).

4 On t he st ore -con sciousness con ceived as 'titman' in the sen se of 'iisraya ', see Schmithausen p . 11 9-1 20.

-14 3 -

(gati) and the [four] modes of birth (yoni),l Its actualization [consists of eight different kinds

of consciousness] in accordance with2 the following three transformations (parifJama) :

the transformation into [the consciousness that is the result of the] maturation (vipaka)

[of previous actions] , the transformation into the 'ego' thinking [consciousness] (manana),

and the transformation into the [six] object-manifesting [consciousnesses] (vijiiajJti).3

All the things that originate stick to that [store-consciousness] in the sense that they

[continue to] exist there as results [ in the form of stored impressions] (phalabhavena).

The store-consciousness is therefore also called 'the appropriating consciousness'

(adanavijiiana).4 It is accompanied by [the five omnipresent mental factors, namely,]

1 Compare with TrBh 1 8 .26-19 .1 ( Yamaguchi , p. 90) : sarvadhiitugatiyonzjatz�'U kusaliikusalakarmavipii­katviid Vlpiika�z: d also MS , Lamotte 1 .21 with Asvabhava's commentary The three re alms and the five state s of migration are : (1 ) The realm of desire or of impure matter (kiimadhiitu) which includes hell -beings, hungry ghosts, animals and human beings, ( 2 ) the realm of pure, subtle matter (niPadhiitu) and (3) the immaterial realm (iirupyadhatu) where the gods dwell (d. AK I I I , p. 11 ff.) . The four modes of birth are : (1 ) birth from an egg, ( 2 ) birth from a womb, ( 3) birth from exudation and ( 4) sudden apparitional bi rth (d. AK I I I , p. 26 ff) V irtuous and nonvirtuous actions accomplished in the realm of desire are the causes of rebirth in respectively a good migration (either in the realm of desire or in the realm of pure matter) or a bad migration. ' Immovable acti ons' are vi rtuous actions accomplished in the realm of pure matter or in the immaterial realm; they are called ' i mmovable' because their retribution is always a rebirth in the same samsaric realm. (S ee AK IV , pp. 1 06-1 08.)

2 Literally: 'It moves on ( or attains different actuali zati ons) (gam) in accordance with (anu) . ' . 3 B ased o n TrK I d-2ab: jJamJiimalj sa ca tndhiil I Vlj)iiko mananiikhyasca uijiiaptir ui,)(1yasya ca (Cf

Yamaguchi , p 91 ) Although the TIbetan text continues wi thout a paragraph break here (ljes su 'gro ba de la . ) , it is better to insert a break between rjes su 'gro ba and de lao

4 A l l the actual instances of consciousness produce impressions or traces (viisanii) by which their seeds or potencies in the store-consciousness are reinforced. After these instances of consciousness have perished, they 'stick' (kun du sbyor bar byed pa = ii-li) to the store-consciousness in the sense that theIr impressi ons ( = their result) remain stored there. When the store-consciousness functions as the cause of actual instances of consciousness, the store-consciousness is said t o ' stick' to them as their cause. On the etymol ogi cal explanation of 'a laya' as ' sticking', see Schmithausen, notes 1 81 -1 83 The textual sources of this etymology are the following (see Schmithausen, notes 1 36-1 37) .

(1 ) A verse from the Abhidharmasutra ( quoted in MS , Lamotte I .2 and I .27 ; S anskrit text i n MVT 34.1 -2 , S iddhi p 1 72) saying that this consciousness is the 'store' (iilaya) of al l dharmas because " al l dharmas always stick to this consciousness (chos kun rnam par shes la sbyor, sarvadharmii hi iilinii uijiiiine) and in its turn this consciousness sticks to them, because they al ways exist as the result and as the cause of each other."

( 2) MS , Lamotte 1.3 . " It is called 'iilayavijiiiina' because al l the impure dharmas that originate (skye ba can) stick (sbyor ba) to it in the sense that they [ continue to] exist there as results, and it sticks to them as their cause." See a lso MVT 33 8-9 : iiliyante sarue siisravii dharmiis tatra phalabhiivena lac ca te'5u hetubhiivenety iilayah.

( 3 ) TrBh 18.24-25 ( ad TrK 2cd) . " It is cal led 'iilaya' because al l dharmas 'stick' (iiliyante, 'jug cing) to it or are closely united with it (upanibadhyante, 'brel ba) in the sense that they [conti nue to] eXIst there as results (kiiryabhiiuena), or because it itself sticks to all dharmas or is closely united with them in the sense that it is their cause (kiiralJabhiivena)."

( 4 ) YBh-Vyiikhyii (based on MS 1 .3 ; d. S chmithausen, note 81 7) explains 'alaya' as follows : 'byung ba dang ldan pa'i 'du byed rnams de la 'bras bu'i dngos por sbyor bar byed pa 'ami de dag la de rgyu 'i dngo� por sbyor bar byed pa 'z phyir kun gzhi zhes bya ba ... .

The store- consciousness was originally also called 'appropri ating consciousness' because it appro­priates corporeal matter at the m oment of conception (pratisandhi) and keeps it appropriated throughout lifetime, especially also during unconsci ous states (Schmithausen, p. 49). The account of the 'appropriating consciousness' here in T J follows S NS V.2 [the store-consci ousness also appro­priates the impressions of al l the instances of conceptual and verbal differenti ation (j)rapaiica)] or TrBh 1 9. 11 ff. [ the impressions are the appropri ated content (upiidi) of the store- consciousness]

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contact (sparsa), attention (manasktira), feeling (vedana), volition (cetana) and concep­

tualization (sarrzifiti) which are all neither painful nor pleasant (upekfjti).! The way in

which [these mental factors] apprehend (tiktira) [their objects] is not distinctly known

(asarrzvidita) [through clear cognitions] such as "it belongs to this" or "it exists there, "

because it i s beyond the scope of [the knowledge of] even learned people.2

Further, that [store-consciousness] is twofold: it is the projection (tikfjepa) [of a new

existence] and it is the transformation into the result [of the maturation of previous

actions] (phalapari1Jtima).3 'Projection' is the projection [of a new existence] through the

power of the [store-] consciousness.4 'Transformation into the result' is actualization

1 Cf. YB h Yin. Samgr ., D. Shi 4b2 ff. ; TrK 3cd (the store-consciousne ss is always accomp anie d by sparsa, manaskara, vit, sarrzifiia and cetanii) ; TrK 4abc (the fee ling that accomp anie s the store ­consciousne ss is ne ithe r p ainful nor p le asant, and the same is true of the othe r four omnipre se nt mental factors) . Sthiramati (TrB h 21.1 5 ff.) e xp lains that the fee l ing associated with the store ·consciousne ss is ne ither p ainful nor p le asant be cause it is an indistinct (aparichinna) fee ling, just l ike the awarene ss prope r to the store ·consciousne ss itse lf, and is the refore unable to disce rn the favorable and disfavorable characte ristics of its obje ct. M oreove r, p ainful or p le asant fee l ings are accomp anied by dislike ( dve$(1) or de sire (raga). The se two root· de filements cannot p ossibly accomp any the store · consciousness and its me ntal factors, because the l atter are morally ne utral (avyakrta) . The y are moral ly neutral be cause the y originate e xclusive ly a s the sp ontane ous and uninte rrup te d re sult of the maturation (vipakaphala) of actions that we re pe rformed during one' s previous life time . Painful or p le asant fee lings only occur i n association with the six consciousne sse s, be cause the se originate or do not originate depe nding on the prese nce or absence of agreeable or disagree able objects during one' s present lifetime.

2 Since the author of TJ has alre ady me ntioned that the 'akiira' of the store · consciousness is not cle arly disce rnible (see p 1 43 above), the p resent statement is be st understood as re lating to the 'akara' of the five mental factors that accomp any the store ·consciousness. Comp are for e xamp le with YB h Yin. Samgr ., D. Shi 4b3 -4 : chos de dag kyang rnam par smin par bsdus pa dang / 'jig rten

gyi mkhas pa rnams kyis kyang rtogs par dka ba'i phyir phra ba ... ["These me ntal factors are also subtle, be cause the y are fully included in maturation (vipakasarrzgrhita) and be cause even le arned pe op le can hardly know them." ]

3 The e xp lanation o f the first o f the e arlie r mentioned ' three transformations' starts he re . 4 The store- consciousne ss is the p rojecting cause (ak$epa, phen pa) of a ne w, future e xistence be cause

it stores and p rese rve s the ne wly produced impressions of all one' s actions accomp lishe d during one's pre se nt l ife time. It is also the proje cted (ak$ipta, 'phangs pa) re sult of the maturation (vipakaphala) of the actions accomp lished during one' s p re vious life time . 'ak$ejJa ' and 'vipaka ' are e xp laine d togethe r in M S ( L amotte 1.59) a s fol lows: (1) 'ak$epa' stands for the ne wly p roduced vipakavasana; if these imp ressions we re not store d in the

store- consciousne ss, the re could be no future rebirth of a new store -consciousne ss ( = vijiiana as the third membe r of the twe lve -me mbe red chain of depe nde nt origination) as conditioned by one' s pre sent actions ( = sarrzskara as the se cond me mbe r) .

(2) 'vipaka' is the uninte rrup ted p re sent e xiste nce of the store- consciousne ss in one of the states of migration (gati); this p resent e xiste nce is the re sult of the maturation of the actions accom­p lished during a pre vious life time.

The Y ogacara te xts inte rpre t the twe lve me mbe rs of dependent origination as a single proce ss of rebirth consisting i n the p roje ction (ak$epa) and actualiz ation (abhinirvrtti ) of k armic impressions. For furthe r de tails, see the p ape rs by R. Kritze r in Journal of Indian and Buddhist Studies 42. 2 (1 994), pp . (28) - (33) and 45.1 (1 996), pp. (1 5) - (20).

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(abhinirm:tti) as the result of the maturation [of previous actions] (vipakaphala). ! Just

as a river continuously flows because of the contiguity of the different parts of the

water, just so the continuous flow of the store-consciousness -permeated (paribhavita)

by the impressions of virtuous, nonvirtuous and immovable actions- continues to exist

as long as samsara lasts . 2 The impressions of [previous, not yet retributed] actions

(karmavasana) and the impressions of [the erroneous notions] of apprehended objects

and apprehending consciousnesses (grahyagrahakavasana) together produce a [new]

retribution in the form of a corporeal existence (lus = atmabhava) as a god, a human

being, and so forth, as it convenes in each case.3 This continuous flow of the appropriating

consciousness ceases to exist when one obtains arhatship, because all the seeds of the

defilements are then destroyed.4 So much for the so-called 'maturation' and the way it

develops [from the store-consciousness] ' This is the first [transformation of the

store-consciousness] .

Further, [the store-consciousness] is also called 'alayavijnana ' in the sense that

sentient beings stick or cling to it (a-ll, sbyor bar byed pa) as their self (atman) , because

1 Yamaguchi (p . 93) refers to Tr Bh 18.7-8 (ad TrK Id) : phalapariJ'pima/J ( 'bras bur gyur p a) punar

vipttkavttsanttvrttilttbhttd ttlayavzjiittnasya purvakarmttk$epaparisamttptau (snong gyi las kyis 'p hangs p a

yongs su rdzogs la) ytt mkttya;,abhttgttntare!iU abhinirvrttih (mgnon p ar 'grub p a) . ("The transforma­

tion into the result is the actualization of the store-consci ousness in other hom ogeneous existences

when the p rojective power of p revi ous actions has been fully consumed and the imp ressions of

maturation acquire their op erational efficiency ")

Comp are also with TrBh 18 . 16 - 17 (ad TrK 2ab) tatra kusalttkusalakarmavttsanttparipttkavasttd yathtt­

k$eparrz U i ltar 'p hangs p a) phalttbhimrvrttir ( 'bras bu mngon p ar 'grub p a) vipttkal;.

2 The store-consciousness is not a unitary, nondiscrete entity (ekam, abhznnam), but is a continuum

(sarrztttna) of discrete, momentary (k;xllJika) mental events (cf TrBh 2 1 25- 26).

The comp arison with a river is found in TrK 4d (lac-ca vartate srotastt oghavat ) There are close

p arallels between the text of TJ here and Sthiramati's commentary on TrK 4d : tatra sroto (rgyun)

hetuphalayor nazrantaryelJa pravrtti/J. udakasamuhasya (chu'i tshogs) purvttparabhiigttvicchedena pravttha

( 'bab p a) ogha (chu bo) ity ucyate yathtt hy oghas trlJttktt:;thagomayttdin ttkar:;ayan gacchati evam

ttlayavzjiittnam api PUlJyttpulJyttnenjyakarmavttsanttnugatarrz sparsamanaskttrttdin akarYlyat srotastt saY}'l­

sttram avyuparatarrz pravartata iti. (TrBh 22 1- 5)

3 Comp are with TrK 19, TrBh 36.23-37.3 (cf Yamaguchi , p. 94) : The impressions of the erroneous

notions of app rehended objects and app rehending consciousnesses (grtthyagrtthakagraha) ( = the

mistaken idea that the objects of consciousness exist in their own right sep arately from conscious­

ness and that consciousness app rehends such sep arately existing objects) coop erate with (sahakarin,

lhan cig byed pa) the imp ressions of p revi ous actions (karmavasanti) in the p roduction of a new

existence (tttmabhava, Ius ) , just as water is a necessary condition for the origination of a sp rout from

its seed. The imp ressions of p revious actions cannot p roduce their result , unless they are assisted

(anugrhita, zin pa) by the imp ressions of the two erroneous notions (grtthadvayavttsana).

4 Comp are WIth TrK 5a tasya vyavrttir arhatve.

� 146 �

[their defiled mind (kli�tamanas)] objectifies it as 'I' (aham) and 'mine' (mama).l [That

defi led mind] is always accompanied by the following four defilements : the ignorance

regarding the [nonexistence of the] self (iitmamoha), the erroneous view [that the

store-consciousness is] the self (tttmadr�ti), the pride of self (iitmamttna) and the love

of self (tttmasneha).2 It is [also] accompanied by [the five omnipresent mental factors,

namely,] contact, attention, and so forth, which originate from the same stage (bhumi)

as that where the defiled mind itself exists.3 The defiled mind also does not exist in an

arhat, because [ in an arhat] all the defilements are eradicated. 4 So much for the

so-called 'ego' thinking [consciousness] and the way it develops [from the store­

consciousness] . This is the second [transformation of the store-consciousness] ' 5

Further, that [store-consciousness] is also called ' ttlayavijflttna' because it is the

receptacle (gzhi, ttlaya) of everything in the sense that it contains the potencies of all

the forthcoming consciousnesses (pravrttivijflttna) and [hence also the potencies] of all

the mental factors such as aspiration (chanda), determination (adhimok$a) and so

1 Compare with TrK 5bcd : tadasritya pravartate tadalambanaJfl manonama vijiitinaJfl mananatmakam.

("The consciousne ss which is called 'thinke r' (manas) comes forth with that [st ore -consciousne ss]

as it s supp ort and has it as it s obje ct . It has 't hinking' as it s nat ure .")

TrBh 22.23 -24 : satkayadr:;(yadibhi/:t saJflPrayogad ahaJfl mama ity alayavijiianalambanatvat . . . (" . . .

be ing [const ant ly] accomp anie d by the view of se lf and so fort h, [t he defiled mind] obje ct ifies t he

st ore -consciousne ss as 'I ' or 'mine ' .")

O n the et ymological me aning of 'alaya' as that t o which one st icks or clings, see Schmithausen, pp .

24-26 , 57 . According t o Schmithause n (note 137) , the olde st te xt source in which the st ore ­

consciousne ss is e xp laine d this way is M S (Lamotte I.3): "O r it is calle d 'alayavijiiana ' because

se nt ie nt be ings st ick t o it (sbyor ba, aliyante) as the ir se lf."

2 Comp are with TrK 6. St hiramat i (TrBh 23 . 1 4 - 17) comme nt s that the se four de fileme nts are inte rre ­

late d as follows. First , the ignorance o f the true nature o f t he st ore -consciousness i s the cause of

vie wing the st ore -consciousne ss as the se lf. This misconcept ion of the se lf le ads to se lf-p ride ( = t o

consider onese lf supe rior t o ot he rs) . Finally, these three de file ments produce att achme nt t o what is

imagined to be one 's se lf.

3 Compare wit h TrK 7a: the four de file ment s bel ong to the same samsaric re alm (dhatu) or st age

(bhumi) as that whe re the defiled mind originate s (The re are nine samsaric st age s: the re alm of

de sire , the four me dit at ions of the re alm of p ure matte r, and t he four me dit at i ons of the immate rial

re al m.) The same is true of the five me nt al fact ors of the de filed mind (TrB h 24 .6 : etair ( = sparsa,

etc.) api yatra jatas tanmayair eva saJflPrayujyate nanyadhatubhumikai/:t; Siddhi, p . 266) . Note that the

re alm or st age in which t he de filed mind originate s is the same as t hat in which the st ore ­

consci ousne ss prese nt ly e xist s, be cause t he de file d mind i s p roduced from it s see ds in the st ore ­

consci ousne ss (TrBh 22.20 -2 1) .

4 Comp are with TrK 7b : arhato na tat; TrBh 24 . 14 : arhatas tavad ase;;aklesaprahalJat klis(aJfl mana

naivasti.

5 Comp are with TrK Sa: dvitfya/:t parilJamo 'yam.

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forth. l It is [therefore] also called 'the root-consciousness' (mulavijnana) . The SIX

forthcoming consciousnesses originate from it [either successively or simultaneously]

depending on the presence of [cooperating] conditions such as the visual sense organ,

visible form, light , space, mental attention, and so forth, just as waves arise from the

ocean depending on condi tions such as the wind, the stirring up of the water by the

seamonster, and so forth.2 The store-consciousness is neither identical with nor sepa­

rate from these forthcoming consciousnesses, just as the ocean and the waves [are

neither identical nor apart from each other] 3. These [six] apprehensions of objects

(vi:;ayasya upalabdhayaJ:z)4 do not exist in the following special states (avastha) [ of the

store-consciousness] : existence as a divine being without conception (asaYfli;zika) , the

meditative state of non-conception (asarrz,jnisamajJatti) , the meditative state of cessation

[of all conceptions and sensations] (nirodhasamapatti), deep [dreamless] sleep (midd-

1 O n the etymol ogy of 'alaya ' as meaning 'recep tacle' or 'abode' ( i ts standard Sanskrit meaning). see

Schmithausen. notes 1 38- 1 40

Comp are \i\'ith TrK 9-14 : Dep ending on the conditions, the si x forthcoming consciousnesses can be

accomp amed by any of al l the existent mental factors . the five omnipresent mental factors, the

mental factors which are determined ( vznzyata) as to their sp ecific object ( chanda, adhirnokYl, etc ) ,

the eleven virtuous mental factors. the six fundamental defilements, the twenty secondary def!le­

ments ( upaklesa) , and the four morally indetermined (aniyata) mental factors

N ote that the store-consciousness is here exp l a ined as the 'basis of everythmg' in the sense that It

contains the seeds of all the instances of mind and of al l the mental factors only, and not a lso the

seeds of the material sense-faculties and their corp oreal basis (the body) nor the seeds of the

surrounding world According to Schmithausen (pp . 6 2 -65) , the store-consciousness was originally

conceived as the 'seed of mind' only , the idea that i t a lso contains the seeds of corp oreal matter

and of the external world is a later development.

2 Comp are with TrK 15 (the store-consciousness is the root of the five sense consci ousnesses) and

TrBh 33 2 0 ff. (cf Yamaguchi , pp 100- 10 1 ) The store-consci ousness is the 'root' in the sense that it

is the seed or the ever-p resent cause ( hetupratyaya) of the SIX forthcoming consciousnesses Depend­

mg on the conditI Ons. the latter arise either successively or simultaneously (in the case of two or

more heterogeneous consciousnesses) .

For the comp arison of store-consciousness /forthcoming consci ousnesses with ocean/waves. see also

Lankauatarasl�tra as quoted in Siddhi , p. 1 75 (T. vol 31 , 1 4cEl)

'1 The neither- one-nor-different relati onship between the store-consci ousness and the forthcoming

consciousnesses is not mentioned in TrK/TrBh. It IS however discussed m Siddhl, p . 4 14 (T vol 31 ,

38c4 ad TrK 16) as an app lication of the ocean/waves comp arison in the Lankauatclrrtsfttra (cf

Yamaguchi . p . IOn

4 Comp are with TrK 8c (the si x forthcoming conSCl Ousnesses are 'vz:;ayasya l(Palabdhi�I ' ) Sthiramati

glosses 'upalabdhz ' as 'grahafJarn ' (,dzin p al or pratipatti ' (rtog p al (Tr Bh 25 2 -3) The six are also

defined as 'uz�ayauzjnal)tl ' (TrK 2b) because each of them lets its own sp ecific object app ear in the

mind ( vi:;ayapra(vauabhasatvat , TrBh 1 8 1 8)

- 1 48 -

ha), insanity (mada?) and swoon (murcha) . l So much for the so-called 'object­

manifesting consciousnesses' (vijiiapti) and the way they develop [from the store­

consciousness] . This is the third [transformation of the store-consciousness] 'z

In the practitioner of yoga, these six consciousnesses3 [habitually] manifest themselves

as transformed into [two] aspects (ilkilra) : that of an illuminating4 apprehender of objects

(grilhaka) and that of an apprehended object (grilhya) or object-appearance (vi�ayilbhtisa).

N ow, because external objects (bilhyilrtha) do not exist, the non-apprehension of objects

arises [in the yogin] as a result of (samilsritya) apprehending [everything] as mind only

(cittamiltra). And if the apprehended objects do not exist, then the [consciousnesses as]

apprehenders of these objects do not exist either. Hence, the non-apprehension of the six

kinds of apprehending consciousness arises as a result of the non-apprehension of objects.5

1 TrK 16 me ntions five of the se six states (e xcep t insanity) as states in which only the sixth me ntal consciousne ss doe s not originate. N ote that the TJ commentator is ve ry unp re cise he re , be cause it is onl y in the state of asarrziiiika and in the two samapatti states that all the six consciousne sse s do not e xist anymore (see Siddhi, pp . 400, 403). DDVV (N oz awa ed. , 37. 13 - 16 ) me ntions 'myos pa ' , togethe r with deep sleep and swoon, as one of the state s whe re concep tual thought (vikalpa) is absent, but which should not be identified with the highe st nonconcep tual awarene ss (nirvikalpajnana). See also YB h Vin. Samgr . XV, T. 30, 70 6b26 (D. Zi 27 a1 , P. Hi 29a5) : deep sleep , madne ss (myos pa) and intoxication (rab tu myos pa) are state s whe re me ntal attention (manasikara) i s absent, but which are not nirvikalpajnana. According to the Yogacara, asarrzjnika and the two kinds of samapatti are states which qualify the store- consciousne ss ; they are not sep arate ly existing factors dissociated from the mind (cittavi­prayuktasarrzskara) as the Sarvastivadins hold.

2 The commentary has thus far e xp lained the Y ogacara the ory of e ight kinds of consciousne ss in te rms of the three transformations of the store -consciousness. As Yamaguchi (pp. 10 2-103) observe s and as has been shown in the notes, the entire account thus far was based on TrK 1 - 16. The ne xt se ction of the commentary goes on to e xp lain mind-only (vijnaptimiitra) as the the oretical basis of the process of re asoning and meditation to be followed in order to re alize Re ality as it is. This se ction corresponds to the conte nt of TrK 17 -19 (e stablishing the princip le of vijnaptimiitra) and TrK 26-30 (e xp laining the maj or step s of the Y ogacara p ath as based on the guiding p rincip le of vijnaptimiitra).

3 The te xt has "that same mind (citta ) " , but the context shows that 'mind' he re re fe rs to the six forthcoming consciousne sses that we re discussed in the pre vious paragrap h.

4 rab tu snang ba (prabha?). It is also p ossible that 'rab tu snang ba ' nee ds to be corre cted into 'rang du snang ba ' (svabhasa) in p aral le l with 'vi:)flyabhasa '.

5 This paragraph summarize s TrK 26-28. (1) The yogin, whose mind doe s not ye t dwel l in its true non-dual nature ( vijnaptimiitratvam), has

not ye t re moved the prope nsitie s (anusaya) of the two mistake n concep tions ( graha) (TrK 26). TrBh (42 . 16) says that such a yogin sti l l has 'grahyagrahaka-upalambha ' . N ot having abandoned (apraha;:ta) the pe rcep tion of e xte rnal things ( bahir-upalambha), he has a lso not abandoned the obje ctification of his own mind as a pe rceive r (adhyiitmika-upalambha) of exte rnal things. He the refore thinks : "1 pe rce ive color with my e ye s, e tc. " (TrBh 42. 2 1 -23 ). This stage corresp onds to the 'Stage of Accumulation' (sambharavastha) of the Y ogacara path.

(2) In the ne xt stage , the yogin abandons the pe rcep tion of exte rnal obje cts , but he still obje ctifie s mind-only (vijnaptimiitra), that is, he stil l thinks that the mind re ally e xists as a n app re he nder of obje cts (grahaka) (TrK 27 ). This corresp onds to the first substages of the 'Path of Sustai ned Effort' (prayogamarga) during which the yogin engages in correct re asoning (yonisomanasikara) and as a re sult acquires the ce rtain knowledge that e xternal objects (including the se lf) do not e xist and that all the obje ct-images that appe ar in his mind are the re sult of an inte rnal de ve lopment of the mind itse lf.

(3) During the later substages of the 'Path of Sustained Effort', the yogin re alizes that "when the apprehended obje cts do not e xist, the n consciousne ss as an app re hende r of obje cts does not e xist eithe r." He consequently abandons the app rehe nsion of the mind as an app re he nder of obje cts (vijnanagraha) (TrK 28). N ot app rehe nding any obje ct at all , he then dwe lls in the true nature of his own mind ( vijnaptimiitratvam, svacittadharmata) . He then for the first time obtains the highe st nondual awareness (nirvikalpajnana) in the 'Path of See ing' (darsanamarga) .

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As long as the store-consciousness does not stand firm in its own true nature which

is called ' [merely] letting appear' (vifnapti [ matra]), but sti l l dwells in the perception

[of apprehended objects and apprehending consciousnesses] 1 , just as long are the

impressions of the [apprehended-apprehending] duality (dvayavasana) not destroyed,

because the seeds [of the appearance of] apprehended objects are then not yet removed

and the seeds of the perception of the characteristics (nimittadarsana = grahaka) [of

these objects] are consequently also not yet destroyed.2 But when [the mind] no longer

apprehends objects, such as visible form and so forth, as existing outside the mind, then it

stands firm in its own true nature (svadharmata).3 All the obstructions (avaraJJIl) are then

indeed removed because of the fundamental change of the mental basis (asrayaparavrtti).

The mind then obtains its true nonconceptual nature (nirvikalpadharmata) together

with the mastery (vibhutvam) over all dharmas.4

[The mind's true nature of] merely letting appear [the apprehended-apprehending

duality] (vifnaptimatrata)5, or the awareness of the Tathagata which is free from dual

apprehension (nirvikalpa) with respect to all things, cannot be realized unless one fully

understands the three natures. Therefore, [the Y ogacarins] say :

When the imagined [nature] is not perceived at all and the dependent

[nature] is not [erroneously] apprehended, then the seers of Reality see

the perfectly established nature [of the mind] . (5)

1 Compare with TrK 26ab : yavad vijnaptimiitratve vzjnanalfl na avati!)thatz. TJ here follows TrBh almost word by word : yavac cittadharmatayalfl vijnaptimiitrasaJ1;lsabdztayan.1 vljniinalfl navati!)thatz

kim tarhi grahyagrahakoj)alambhe carati . . . (TrBh 42 .16 - 18 ad TrK 26ab). Since the true nature of the mind consists in 'merely letting appear' a nonexistent apprehended·

apprehending duality, the meaning here is that the mind as vijnaptimiitra is intrinsically empty of this duality (d. the expression 'advayalak:;;afJe vijnaptimatre' in the fol lowing note)

2 Compare with TrK 26cd : grahadvayasya anu,�ayas tavan na vznivartate The text again closely follows TrBh . yiivad advayalak.5afJe viJnaptimiitre yogin as cittaJ1;l na prati:;thitaJ1;l bhavatl. tavad

grahyagrahakanusayo na vinivartate (mi ldog) na prahiyata (mi spong) ity arthalJ. (TrBh 42 . 19 -21 ad

TrK 26cd) 3 Compare with TrBh 43 12 - 15 (ad TrK 28) . yasmin kale .. rupasabdadyalambanaJ1;l j1'iiinaJ1;l bahi,�czttiit

nopalabhate na pasyatz na grhfJiitz nabhinivisate . . tasmin kale vzjnanagrahasya prahiilJOlfl sV(lcitta­

dharmatayan:z ca prati:;(hito bhavati.

4 Compare with TrK 29 -30 and the commentary in TrBh TrK 29 ' The supreme (niruttara) change of the store-consciousness is its change mto nondual awareness, which is fully real ized in the Buddhas ; this change is attained when all the seeds (bzja =

dau:;thulya) of the two obstructions (the obstruction consisting in the defilements and the obstruc­tion of the attainment of omniscience) are removed. TrK 30 : To obtain the nondua l nature of the mind is to 'obtain the mastery over all dharmas' (TrBh 45 . 1 . sarvadharmavibhutvalabhatas ) . This is also cal led 'the dharmakaya of the Buddhas' See note 1 above. Also TrK 25d : 'vijnaptimiitrata' is used as a synonym of 'tathata' (the unchange­able nature of the mind) and of 'parini:;pannasvabhava' (the ful ly accomplished nature of the mind)

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The three natures that are mentioned here -the imagined, the dependent, and the

perfectly established- are all included in the store-consciousness . l

Any thing (vastu) whatsoever, from visible form up to enlightenment (bodhi), which

is apprehended by any of the dual apprehensions (vikalpa) of either internal or external

things, does not exist the way it is apprehended. This is because it is [merely] a

construct (kalpita), produced by superimposing (samiiropa) a nonexistent [on that which

really exists] . That is the imagined nature (parikalpitasvabhiiva). 2

The erroneous apprehensions (abhutaparikalpap -that i s to say, [al l ] the instances

of mind and [all] the mental factors which originate from [the store-consciousness in]

the three samsaric realms and which vary (bhinna) according to the distinction (bheda)

into good, [bad, morally neutral] and so forth- are dependent on others (paratantra)

1 This idea is most p robably borrowe d from Asanga' s Mahayanasarttgraha (MS) in which the maj or Yoga ca ra tene ts (the e ight kinds of consciousness, the vijiiaptimiitra p rin cip le and the three n ature s)

are for the first time in te grated in to a syste matic sote riology. Chap ter 1 of MS discusses the store -consciousness as the 'basis of e ve rything that can be kn own' (jiieyasraya), that is, as the

p roducing cause of al l the depen den tly origin ated instan ces of consciousne ss. Chap ter 2 discusse s

the three nature s a s three ' characteristics' o f everything that can be kn own (jiieyalak;;alJa) . It is p robably in that sense that the three n atures are he re said to be ' include d in the store -consciousne ss' .

2 The exp lan ation of the three n atures he re an d in the following p aragrap hs is base d on TrK 20- 25.

The presen t passage is base d on TrK 20 an d on the commentary in TrB h (d. Yamaguchi, p. 113) .

TrK 20 : yena yena vikalpena yad yad vastu vikalpyate! parikalpita eva asau svabhavo na sa vidyate/ / .

TrB h 3 9.10-1 2 : adhyatmikabiihyavikalpyavastubhedena vikalpyanam anantyartt pradarsayannaha, yena

yen a vikalpena iti. yad yad vastu prakalpyate, adhyiitmikartt biihyartt va antaso yavad buddhadharma

api . . .

3 The comp oun d 'abhutaparikalpa' can be in te rpre ted in two ways. (1) First, when it is inte rp re te d as a de scrip tive comp ound (karmadharaya), i t me an s 'con sciousne ss

which is errone ous'. In this in te rp retation , 'abhuta' does not me an 'n one xisten t, nothing' , but me ans 'untrue, false , de cep tive' (abhuta, attatva, vitatha) . Consciousness is n ot true to re ality

(vitatha) because it doe s n ot exist the way it appe ars (yatha pratibhasate tatha na vidyate). The Tibetan tran slators have followed this in te rpretation (yang dag pa ma yin pa kun rtog pa).

One p roble m on which the Y oga cara school even tually got divided, con ce rns the e xact n ature of the falsity of consciousne ss. Is consciousne ss intrin sically n ondual (nirakara) an d does its falsity con sist in the fact that it appe ars as a duality ( = as a consciousne ss of some thing) ? Or is

con sciousness intrin sically dual and doe s its falsity con sist in the fact that its subje ctive aspe ct

false ly appe ars as a se lf-identical kn ower while its obje ctive aspe ct false ly appe ars as the image of an exte rnal world that see ms to e xist indepen dently of con sciousne ss? According to the first the ory, liberation is achieved when consciousne ss has reje cted its errone ous, but adven titious, appe arance as a duality an d has re cove red its true n on dual n ature . According to the se con d

the ory, l iberation i s attaine d when consciousness has reje cted its false duality (or its false akara) .

(2) When 'abhutaparikalpa' i s in terp rete d a s a dependen t comp ound (tatpurusa), i t means ' the conscious­ness in which n one xisten t duality (abhutam) appe ars or by which n one xisten t duality is imagine d to e xist'. See e.g. MVT 22.10-11 : abhutam asmin dvayam parikalpyate 'nena va ity abhutaparikalpalJ;

MVT 46.20 -22 : dvayasya grahyasya grahakasya ca. abhutaparikalpe 'bhiltaparikalpena va parikalpitiit­

makatvad vasturupClJiibhavalJ. In this inte rp retation, 'abhuta' me ans 'n one xisten t' (abhava, asat )

(e.g. Trisvabhavanirdesa ve rse 5 : asatkalpa).

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because they are under the power (dbang bya ba) of others in the sense that they are

produced by others.l Or, [the samsaric mind and its mental factors] are paratantra ' in

the sense that they exert power with respect to the origination of others, because they

are the basis (gzhi) from which the [other] two [natures] -the imagined and the

perfectly established- come into existence as the imagined and the perfectly estab­

lished [natures of the mind] . 2 That is the dependent nature (paratantrasvabhava).

The fact that the dependent [nature of the mind] is devoid of (rahitata) what IS

imagined (parikalpita) to be its apprehended object and its nature as apprehender, is the

perfectly established nature [of the mind] (parini:;pannasuabhava).3 This perfectly

established nature is neither identical with (ekatuam) nor separate from (p�,thaktvam)

the dependent [nature of the mind] .4 If it existed separately, it would follow that the

true nature (dharmatil) [of the dependently originated mind] exists separately [from

the mind itself] . 5 On the other hand, if the perfectly established nature were identical

[with the dependent nature] , the former could not be the cause of the purification

(vyavadana) [of the mind] because it would then have defilement as its nature (sa'Y(l­

klesatmakatvat). 6

1 Compare with TrK 21ab . paratantrasvabhzluas tu uikalpal; pratyayodbhaval; ' TrBh 39.23-26 : tatra pankalpal; fmsalakui5alauyakrtabhedabhinnas traidhiitukascittacaittal; ( . . J parair hetujJratyayclls tantryata itz paratantra utpadya/a ity artha�l. ( rgyu dang rkyen gzhan gYI dbang bya bas gzhan gyi dbang ste/ skyed ces bya ba' i tha tshig ste) (Cf Yamaguchi , pp. l l4 - l l5)

2 As Yamaguchi (p. l l 5) points out, this etymological explanatIOn of paratantra ' is not found in any extant Y ogacara text. The idea that the dependent nature of the mind is the basis of the other two natures IS however one of the central ideas 1 11 for example the MahayanasaY(lgraha ( MS). Asanga there explains that the dependent nature is the basis of defi lement (s(lJ?�klesa as the appearance of the imagined nature in the dependently originated mind or as attachment to the imagined nature by the dependently originated m1l1d , see note 3 on the previous page) and of purificat IOn ( vyavadana as the non-attachment to and the non-appearance of the Imagined nature in the dependently origi nated mind or as the real i zation of the fully established nature of the mind) There is no doubt that the commentator of TJ here refers to this central idea of MS

3 Compare with TrK 21cd . n i,�pannas tasya purve'f}a sada rahztata tu ya , TrBh 40.2-5 : tasmin vifwlpe grahyagrahakabhaua parikalpita�l ( .J tena grahyagrahake'f}a paratantrasya sada sarvakalaY(l atyantara­hitata ya sa parinz$pannasvabhauah

4 Compare with TrK 22ab : ata eua sa nazva anyo nananyal; jJaratantratal;. The neither- identical -nor­different relation between the dependent and ful ly established natures is also taught in the fol lowmg passages : SNS, T. vol. 16. 690a27-69 1b9 , MVK I I , I 13d, V . 19 , MSA VI 1 , XI 77 ; YBh Vzn Samgr , T. vol. 30 , 696c lO-697a4 , DDVV 24-25 (VI) ; Siddhi , T. vol 3 1 . 46b14-2S

5 Compare with TrBh 40 8- 1 0 . rahitata ca dharmatcz dharman nanya nananya YUJyate. parzni}pannasca j)aratan tradharmata ity atal; paratantriit parzni,�panno nanyo nananya zti boddhauya�l , MVBh 23 8 :

Prthaktve sati dharmad anycI dhannata iti na _vuivate. 6 Compare with TrBh 40 . 1 1 - 12 : atha ananya evam apz parin i$panno na uisuddhyalambanal; syiit

paratantravat saY(lklesatmakatuiit ; MVBh 23.9 - 1 0 : ekatue sati vi.�uddhyalambanam [fnana1?�J na s�vat Sthiramati (MVT 48.24-25) expl ains 'vi.�uddhl · as 'that which punfies' and identifies i t with the marga. Accordingly, 'cause of purification' in this context means the following : If the perfect ly establ ished nature were IdentIcal with the dependent nature, the former could not be the cause (in the sense of functi oning as the object) of the purifying consciousnesses that arise during the marga.

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You may ask : "If the three natures exist, what then about [the Prajiiaparamitasutra

teaching that] all things lack inherent existence (sarvabhiivani/:tsvabhava)?"l [We

answer : ] The imagined [nature] lacks inherent existence with regard to individual

characteristics (lak$alJani/:tsvabhava), because it has no characteristics of its own (svalak­

$alJasunyata). It is therefore not perceived at all (anupalabdhi ) .2 The dependent

[nature] lacks inherent existence with regard to its origination (utpattini/:tsvabhiiva)

because it does not originate as a nature which is its very own (svatmana) [but as a

nature produced by others] ' It does therefore not exist the way it is apprehended.3

Because the perfectly established nature is the ultimate nature (paramartha) of all the

dharmas that are erroneously imagined (parikalpita) and is also the absence of intrinsic

existence (ni/:tsvabhiivata),4 and because it is the object (artha) of the supreme (parama)

awareness of the Superiors (aryajiiana),5 it lacks inherent existence in the sense of

being the ultimate absence of inherent existence (paramiirthani/:tsvabhavata).

Those who see Reality and know the ultimate nature [of the mind] are those who

see that perfectly established nature [of the mind] by means of [an awareness in

which] the perceived (alambya) and the perceiving (alambaka) are exactly the same

(samata). The reason [why they see it that way] is that the transworldly nondual

awareness (lokottaranirvikalpajiiana) originates [in them] .6 This [transworldly nondual

1 Comp are with TrBh 41 .2-3 : yadi dravyam eva paratantralJ katharrz satre sarvadharma nilJsvabhava anutpanna aniruddha iti nirdisyante.

2 Compare with TrK 24a : prathamo lak$alJena eva nilJsvabhavo. 3 Comp are with TrK 24bc ; TrBh 41.17 -1 9 : na svayarrz bhava etasya mayavat parapratyayena utpattelJ.

ataSca yatha prakhyati tatha asya utpattir nasti iti 'sya utpattinilJsvabhavata ity ucyate. The me aning he re is that the depe ndent nature of the mind conce als its own depe ndency on othe r conditions by appe aring as if it existe d in its own right. This is one of the re asons why ignorant pe ople misapp rehe nd it as an inherent e xistence .

4 Comp are with TrK 24d-25a: apara nilJsvabhavatal I dharmalJam paramarthaSca sal ; TrBh 41 .22-24 : sa yasmat parini$pannalJ svabhavalJ sarvadharmalJarrz paratantratmakanarrz paramarthalJ taddharmata iti krtva tasmat parini$panna eva svabhavalJ paramarthanilJsvabhavata parini$pannasya abhavasva­bhavatvat. Where as TrBh says that the pe rfe ctl y establ ished nature is the ul timate nature ( 'paramartha' or 'dharmata ' ) of all p aratantra-dharmas and consists in their none xiste nce (abhavasvabhava) as imagined (parikalpita) dharmas, the comme ntary in TJ inste ad says that the pe rfectl y establ ishe d nature is the ultimate nature of all p arikalp ita-dharmas. The me aning is howe ver the same, be cause the dharmas that are imagined (parikalpita) to e xist as app re he nde d obje cts and app re he nding consciousne sse s are the depe ndentl y originated (paratantra) instances of mind.

5 Comp are with TrBh 41.1 9-20 : paramarrz hi lokottarajfianarrz niruttaratvat tasyarthalJ paramarthalJ. 6 Comp are with TrB h 43 .17 -1 8 (ad TrK 28) : grahyabhave grahakabhavam api pratipadyate, na kevalarrz

grahyabhavam. evarrz hi samasamalambyalambakarrz nirvikalparrz lokottararrz jfianarrz utpadyate. S. L evi's te xt re ads 'samam analambyalambakarrz jfianam . . . ' , but the manuscrip t sugge sts 'samasama-alambya . . . ' as an al ternative re ading [S o L evi, TrB h, note (5) p 43 : corre ct 'samamama­alambya . . . ' into 'samasama-alambya . . . ' ] . Comp are with the e xp ression 'samasamalambyalamba [ kaJ ­jfiana ' in Abhidharmasamuccayabha$ya 85A, p . 76 (T. vol . 31, 682c8-9) . See also Siddhi, T vol . 31, 49c21 .

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awareness is] the defining characteristic of the fundamental change of the [mental]

basis (asrayaparam:tti) [and] is also the state of liberation (vimuktikaya) of the Srava­

kas, because they are free from all the contaminations (sarvasmvavigata) [produced by

the defi lements] and have thus removed the obstruction of the defi lements (klesavarar;a).

This very same (sa eva) is also the 'body that is the cause of al l the supreme dharmas '

(dharmakaya) of the Tathagata because the Tahagata is free from al l the impressions

of samsaric actions (karmavasana) and of the [grasping of] apprehended [objects] and

apprehending [consciousnesses] (grahyagrahakavasana) and has thus removed the

cognitive obstructions UfieyavamlJa).l

Some may ask : "If the imagined nature is the object of worldly knowledge and the

perfectly established nature is the object of a personal realization (pmtyatmavid) ,

namely the transworldly awareness of the Muni , of which knowledge is the dependent

nature then the object, and [if it is not the object of any knowledge] how can its

existence be ascertained?"2 To answer this question, [the Yogacarins] say :

There are valid reasons to think that the dependent [nature] exists,

because conventional designations have a cause ,

because otherwise the two will not exist ,

and because [the existence of] defilements is observed.3 (6)

The conventional designations (pmjfiapti) of existence [of the self or of consciousness

as an apprehender of external objects, and so forth] with respect to the mind and the

mental factors,4 do not occur without having [the mind and its mental factors] as the

causal base of erroneous imputation (viparyasa).5 Because [conventional designations]

have this property (lak$alJa) [of necessarily having the mind as their causal base] , it is

J Compare with TrK 29-30 and the following passages in TrBh. TrBh 44 .24·27 : klesavaralJapraha1:ult sravaka;:tartl vimuktikaya�l. sa eva asrayaparavrtti1ak;;a1;lO dharma­khyo 'py ucyate. mahamuner bhiimiparamitadibhavanaya kle.5ajiieyavaralJaprahalJat asrayaparavrtti­samudagamat mahamuner dharmakaya ity ucyate . . . TrBh 4 4 19 .21 ' anasravo dhatur ity ucyate. nirdaU{)thulyatvat sa tv asravavigata ity anasraval:z aryadharmahetutvat dhatu�l hetvartho hy atra dhatui{abdal:z. TrK/TrBh distinguishes between the surpassable ( sottara) change of the menta l basis of the Sravakas and the unsurpassable ( niruttara) one of the Bodhisattvas and Buddhas 'anasrava ' applies to both the Sravakas and the Tathagatas 'dhatu ' in the sense of 'cause of al l supreme dharmas' applies to the dharmakaya of the Tathagata only.

2 Compare with TrBh 40 .18-20 . yadi grahyagrahakabhavarahital:z paratantral:z katham asau grhyate, agrhyamano va katham astiti vijiiayaie. (d. Yamaguchi , p. 146)

1 Quotation of a verse from Asanga's Xian-yang-sheng-jiao-lun (T. vol . 31, 558c25-26) . See Yamaguchi , p 137 This verse i s also quoted i n P P (D. Tsha 243a1 , P. Tsha 304b2·3) , see Eckel, p . 52.

4 Yamaguchi ( p 1 36) refers to TrK 1 and translates this sentence as follows : "The designations [of the nonexistent self and things] which are superimposed on the existent mind and mental factors ". Literal ly ' " . . appear [only] together with [or as the result produced by] the causal base of erroneous imputation "

� 154 �

inferred that the dependent [nature of the mind] exists . l Otherwise, if the dependent

[nature] did not exist, it would follow that the two, that is to say conventional

designations and their causal base, or the imagined [nature] and the perfectly esta­

blished [nature] , do not exist either, because these two depend on the dependent

[nature] .2 Further, if the dependent nature did not exist, the existence of defilements

1 This argument is stated more explicitly in MHK V.S2·S3ab. Bhavaviveka refutes it in M H K V.

S3cd·S4. H is own account of 'conventional designation' (prajnapti) is found i n M H K V.74 and SOab.

The same argument is formulated as an inference (anumilna) in PP (see Eckel , pp 53·54).

I interpret 'mtshan nyid des ' ( 'because of [having] this property') as a predicate of 'conventional

designati ons' . This interpretation agrees with the formulation of this argument by Asanga him­

self : "It should not be taught that all things are only conventional existences (prajnaptisat) . Why?

Because conventional existences necessarily have a causal base ( nimitta) If there exist no rea l

entities (vastu), conventional existences cannot exist either." (T. vol 3 1 , 55Sc27-2S) PP presents the

argument in the same way : "The dependent nature exists, because conventional designations have

a cause." Bhavaviveka replies that the argument is invalid as it stands, because the logical reason

('having a cause') is a property of 'conventional designation', and not of the subject of the inference

('the dependent nature') , as it should be. (See Eckel, p. 53.)

When 'mtshan nyid des ' is construed as a predicate of 'the dependent nature' [ 'Because the

dependent nature has this property (of being the causal base of erroneous imputation) . . . J , the

argument becomes the fol lowing 'prasahga ' : "Conventional designation cannot exist if its cause

does not exist. The dependent nature [of the mind] is the cause of conventional designation.

Hence , the dependent nature necessari ly exists."

2 Four different interpretati ons of 'the two' are found in the texts (MHK, TJ, PP, PPtlka) .

(1) The first interpretation of 'the two' ( = conventional designations and their causal base) in TJ

is based on Asanga's Xian-yang-sheng-jiao-lun (T. vol. 31 , 55Sc2S-29). Bhavaviveka refutes this

argument in M H K V.S4.

(2) The second interpretation of 'the two' (= parikalpita and parini$panna) is based on the idea that

the dependent nature functions as the base of the other two natures. This idea occurs already in

embryonic form in the Bodhisattvabhumi (BBh 46 . 14 -21 ; Tib. D. Wi 26a4-b3 ; Chin. T. vol. 30,

4SSc3- 10) : vastumiltra ( = paratantra) necessarily exists ; otherwise the nihil istic view of the

nonexistence of prajnapti ( = parikalpita) and of tattvam ( = parin i$panna) will follow. The

clearest statement of the central role of the dependent nature is found in the opening verse of the

Madhyilntavibhilgakilrikil (MVK 1 . 1 ) : False consciousness (abhutaparikalpa = paratantra) exists as

the substratum in which imagined duality (= parikalpita) appears and in which emptiness ( =

parini$panna) exists. Similarly, the Yogilcilrabhumi (T. vol. 30, 705cS-9) and the Xian-yang-sheng­

jiao- lun (T. vol 3 1 , 50Sb16 - 17) define the function ( las ) of the dependent nature as 'acting as the

support of the imagined and perfectly established natures.' The pivotal role assigned to the

dependent nature is moreover one of the characteristic features of the three-natures tenet in the

M ahilyilnasarrzgraha.

Bhavaviveka does not explicitly refute this argument in his reply (uttarapak!$a) in M H K/TJ.

Strictly speaking, this is not a real argument, because it is based on the premise that the

Y ogacara doctrine of the three natures is a sound doctrine. We can therefore assume that

Bhavaviveka refutes this argument indirectly in his refutation of the three natures in M H K V.

55- 1 12.

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should not be observed. But their existence is observed. And since defilements have the

mind and the mental factors as their base, and since l iberation consists in the absence

of defilements, the dependent nature is thought to exist . l

(3) A third interpretation o f 'the tvw' a s referring t o "defi lement (s(l}rzlde/{a) and purification

( vyavadana)" is found in PP (see Eckel, pp 54-56) The idea that the dependent nature of the mind

is the substratum of both defi lement and purification is not found 1 1 1 the early Y ogacara texts

(YBh, SNS, MVK, MSA. DDV) According to these early texts, the dependent nature is the baSIS

of defi lement only as opposed to the perfect nature (sunyatti, tathatti, dharmadhatu) which is

identIfied with intrinsic purity (prakrtivi.i{uddha, prak�,tiprabhasvam) , the intri nsically pure and

perfect nature of the mind is then seen as the locus of both adventiti ous ( agan tulw) defi lement and

adventiti ous re-punficati on , in this view. liberation is atta ined by the elimination of the depen­

dent nature and not by ItS purification [see e g. SNS, T vol 16. 693cl -2 : vyauadr7J/a is reali zed

by the elimination of jHlratantm ; MVK 1 . 4 : mok0a IS achieved through the elimination ( I.:::;aya) of

abI1l7taj)unlwlj){l ] The MalzayllnasW!lg mlza l I1augurates a majOr shIft m the Yogacara doctrine by

assigning the central role in the process of defJ lement and punfication to the dependent nature

o f the mind whIch is now said to have two aspects , namely a defi led aspect and a pure aspect

(MS, T vol 3 1 , 140cl ff. ) LIberation IS then primari ly seen not as a transform ation (extnnsic

punflcation) of the perfect nature of the mind , but as a transformation (parawtti) of ItS dependent

nature . Asanga defines this transformation as follows . " vVhen the counteragents [of the defile­

ments] (jnn tipak:;a = lo/wttaramaJga) arise, the dependent nature of the mmd rejects its defi led

aspect and appropriates its pure aspect " (MS, T vol 3 1 , 1 4Sc l7 - 1S )

Bhavaviveka refutes this argument and states h is own view regarding the eXIstence of defil ement

and punficatlOn in M I l K V SOcd-S1

(4) Avalokitavrata's commentary on PP adds a fourth mterpretation of 'the two' which is based on

MVK I 1 : The dependent nature exists because, alth ough the erroneously (anyath(7) imagined

apprehended- apprehending dual ity does not exist, abhz7taj)(lrikalpu should eXIst as the basis of the

appearance of thIS duality See Eckel . p 53, note 1 .

1 The prose commentary i n the Xiang-yang-sheng-jiao-Iun connects thIS thIrd argument with the

second argument. as follows "If the two (that is, conventIOnal designati ons and their causal base)

do not exist, defilement also wil l not exist. But the existence of defi lement is clearly perceived.

Hence, the dependent nature necessarily exists " (T vol. 31, 55Sc29-559a2)

As menti oned in the previous note, this argument is typi cal of the early Y ogacara texts. It is for

example found in the Yogacarabhztlni ( Vin Samgr. IS) where it is asked what the undesi rable

consequence would be if the dependent nature did not exist The sastra answers that no effort would

then be needed to eradicate defi lement . simply because the latter would then not exist , and If

defi lement does not exist, purification will not exist either (YBh. T vol 30, 705b2S-c l , Tib D Zi

24a4-5) Another example IS Vasubandhu's commentary on MVK I 4. Vasubandhu there argues that

the erroneous consciousness (abhataparikatj)a), a lthough nonexistent 1 11 the way in which it appears,

nevertheless exists as a mere deceptive appearance ( bhn7n tiJ/1(/tra). The exi stence of the mmd as a

mere deceptive appearance cannot be denied because ' l iberatIOn is attained by the el imination of

this erronous consciousness' (MVK 1 .4) . If the erroneous consci ousness did not eXIst. there would be

no bondage ( bandha = ')a�/desa) and hence al so no l iberation ( Jnoh::;a = vyav(!d(7na) (MVBh 19 .7 - 12 ,

i dem in MS, T vol . 3 1 , 1 3Sb26-c4).

For the refutation of this argument i n pp, see Eckel pp 57-59 The refutation m MHK is found at

MHK V SOcd-SI (treated together with the refutatIOn of argument two)

� 156 �

The [dependent nature] is seen (drsyate) [as it is] after one has directly realized

(sak$atkr) the perfectly established nature which is the object of the transworldly

nondual awareness (lokottaranirvikalpajnana).l This IS because the dependent

[nature] is adequately known by the subsequently attained pure worldly knowledge

(tatPr:;t halabdhasuddhalaukikajnana). 2

This doctrine of the Prajfiaparamita [siltras] , [as set forth by us]

is the means to achieve omniscience. Not so the [Madhyamaka] doctrine

which is intent on negating the [real] origination, cessation, and so forth

[of things] .3 (7)

I Compare with TrK 22d : na adr!ite 'smin sa drsyate/ / (d. Yamaguchi , pp . 1 44 -145). To see t he depe nde nt nat ure of t he mind as it is , is t o see it as similar t o a magical cre at ion (maya), a fat a

morgana (marici ) , a dre am (svapna), an e cho (pratisrutka) , et c. (TrBh 40.27 -28) , that is, as e mpt y of the app re he nded-app re hending dualit y which appe ars in it . I follow Yamaguchi (p. 1 44) who re ads ' . . . which is the obje ct of t he transworldly nondual awareness' as a qualificat ion of the pe rfe ct ly e st ablishe d nat ure , and not of t he depe ndent nature as the Tibet an te xt sugge st s. The latte r re ading can howe ve r not be e xclude d in view of t he Tibet an t ranslat ion of t he commentary in TrBh (see the fol lowing note).

2 Comp are with TrBh 40 .23-25 : nirvikalpalokottarajiianadrsye parini$Panne svabhave adr;;te apratividdhe

(rna rt ogs p a) asak;;atkrte, tatpr!ithalabdhasuddhalaukikajiianagamyatvat paratantro 'nyena jiianena na

grhyate. The underlined p ort ion diffe rs in the Tibet an t ranslat ion : 'de ' i rje s la thob pa dag p a 'jig rte n pa dang 'j ig rte n las ' das p a' i ye shes kyi sp yod yul yin p as' (D. 16 8b6) .

3 The terms 'niti ' and 'naya ', he re t ranslate d as ' doct rine ' , de rive from t he root ni (le ad, guide) and

thus have t he connot at ion of 'a doct rine inte nded to le ad pe op le t owards l ibe ration' . In t he p resent conte xt , anot her p ossible connot at ion might be 'a doct rine t hat has bee n fait hfull y e xt racte d from (nita) the authorit at ive Script ures. ' In addit ion, 'niti ' and 'naya ' are close ly re late d t o 'neyartha ' and 'nitartha ' . As is known from the

famous p assage on t he ' Three Turnings of the Whee l of Dharma' in the Sartzdhinirmocanasutra

(SN S, T. vol. 16 , 6 97a23 -b9 ; Lamotte , VII.30) , the Yoga ca ra inte rp ret s t he Prajiiaparamitasutra

te aching that all t hings lack inhe re nt e xiste nce as a non-de finit ive te aching which re quires e xp lica­

t ion (neyartha) , and claims that it s e xp licate d or definit ive me aning (nitartha) is provide d by the Yogaca ra te net s of t he t hree nat ures and t he three absence s of inhe rent e xiste nce. The Yoga ca ra thus claims that it s own doct rine is not only in agree ment wit h t he te aching on e mpti ness in the

Prajiiaparamitasutras but also re ve als t he true , de finit ive me aning of that te aching. (See also note 4 on p . 1 59 and the comment ary t o MH K V.2Scd in TJ.) In a re late d passage (SN S , T. vol . 16 , 6 95cl2-696 a2 ; Lamotte , VII .20) , the sut ra crit icize s ce rt ain Maha yana followe rs in t he following ve in : Some Maha ya nists cling to t he l ite ral me aning (yatha­

ruta) of the Prajiiaparamita te aching on e mpt i ness and asse rt t hat al l t hings lack inherent e xiste nce in e ve ry re spect and do not originate or pe rish at all ; the y adhe re t o t he nihilist ic vie w that nothing re ally exist s and that all t hings are dep rive d of individuat ing characte rist ics (nil;lak:;aJJa) ; the y de ny the e xiste nce of the depe nde nt and the pe rfe ct l y est ablishe d nat ures of things and can the refore not e xp lain why t he imagined nat ure is errone ously taken for re al by the ignorant . Paralle l p assages are found in the Bodhisattvabhumi (BBh 45 .22 ff.) and t he corresp onding comment ary in Viniscaya­

saY[lgraha';Ji 1 5 (T. vol. 30 , 713b2-1 S ; Tib. D. Zi 42b5-43 a4) . As H . Ui ( Yugaron Kenkyu, Tokyo 1 958, pp . 60 f.) has argued, t he re are st rong re asons to be lie ve that these p assage s against the 'nihi list s' are not inte nded as a crit icism of Na ga rjuna's thought or of Madhyamaka t hought in ge ne ral, but are aime d at the nihilist ic inte rp ret at ion of e mpt iness by some p ost -Na ga rj una or p ost -Aryade va Ma dhyamik as.

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[The Yogacara here asserts the following.] The transformationl of the store­

consciousness [which is accomplished] by not apprehending anything as 'I' ( aham) or

'mine' (mama) and by the [resultant] absence of attachment to 'I' and 'mine' , is taught

in the following words from scripture : "Although these very dharmas moisten, fully

develop (pariptlrayanti), make manifest and set in motion (paricarayanti) all kinds of

dharmas, there exists nothing in them that can be conceived as ' I ' or 'mine ' . " 2

The scriptural statement "That mind is a non-mind" ( tac cittam acittam)3 teaches the

nonexistence of the apprehended ( grahya) and the apprehending (grahaka) [aspects of

the mindJ .

The scriptural statement "The state of non-mind ( acittata) is inaccessible to thought

( acintya)"4 teaches that only the mind [as empty of duality] exists (vijiiaptimatratvam). s

The scriptural statement "Just so , visible form is an apprehendable property

(nimitta) and [a l l things] up to enlightenment (bodhi) are also apprehendable

properties" 6 teaches about the nature which is imagined (parikalpitasvabhava) by

designating (btags pa, prajiiapti) [these apprehendable properties] by means of names

and semantic conventions ( san:zketa) .

1 The Tibetan �v()ngs Sl£ gyur ba ' suggests pam Jilnw ' as the original Sanskrit equiva lent (cf

Yamaguchi , p. 1 4 8) , but the meaning here seems to be closer to 'panlurtti ' (fundamental change)

2 I could not identi fy this quotatIOn, but It is no doubt ta ken from one of the Prajnaparamita sutras.

Here and in the fol lowing paragraphs, the Y ogacarins quote SIX scriptural statements to show that

the six tenets expla ined thus far (the store· conscI Ousness and its transformations ; the nonexIstence

of the apprehended· apprehending duality , the existence of the m ind as empty of dual ity ; the three

natures) are al l in agreement wIth teachings found in the Prajnaparamita sutras.

Yamaguchi (pp. 1 53· 155) explains the meaning of the present quotatIOn as fol l ows. DhaI-mas (or

instances of conscIOusness) , which habItually function as apprehenders of apprehended obj ects.

moisten the store-consciousness by leaving their impressions there. These Impressi ons mature and

develop into seeds From these seeds new dharmas ( = instances of consciousness) originate which

again produce impressi ons. and so forth. This whole process is however only the cause-effect

transformation of the momentary instances of the mi nd and no substant ia l self nor things possessed

by the self exist in it .

, Found for example in the Ji:;tasahasri/;:a Prajnaparamitasfltra (ed. P L Vai dya. p 3 1 8) : tathiJ hi tac

cittam acittan:z prakrtzs cz ttasya /Jrabha:, uara

4 Found in Satasclizasri/ca and Panwvi111Satzsajzasn/;:a (see E Conze. The Large Sutnt of Pe1fect Wzsdom,

Moti la l , Delhi 1979, p 97 note 8)

'i According to the Sutra, 'not acceSSIble to thought' means that the true nondual nature of the mind

cannot be concei ved as ei ther 'existent ' or 'nonexistent ' (see E. Conze, ibidem ) . The Yogacara

111terpretation, as presented here by Bhavaviveka . clearly deVI ates from the original intent of the

Sutra For the Yogacara , ' i naccessible to thought' means that the true nature of the mind is not

conceIvable as an apprehended· apprehending dual ity The Yogacara affirms however that the

mmd, as empty of that dual ity, exists and is mdeed the only ful ly established (parin i,spanna) rea li ty

6 From the Panwvi111Satzsajzasri/;:a (see E Conze. o.c . . p. 1 0 1 )

� 1 58 �

The dependent [nature] is taught in the teachings about "the [real of which the

existence is] mistakenly negated" (apavadita?), "the [real] substratum [of

superimposition] " (upadana)! , "dharmas which are [bases of] designation" (gdags

pa 'i chos, prajiiaptidharma)2 and "dharmas which are members of enlightenment"

(bodhipak�adharma) .

The perfectly established nature is taught in terms such as "being thus" (tathata),

"limit of Reality" (bhutakoti), "void of" (vivikta), "the fruit [of the Path] " (phalam),

"omniscience" (sarvakarajiiata), and so forth.3

Thus, the doctrine of the Prajiiaparamita [sutras] , as set forth by us, is the means

(upaya) to achieve omniscience. But [the doctrine of] the Madhyami kas which is intent

on negating the origination, cessation, and so forth [of things] , is equal to a nihil istic

view (nastitadr�ti) and is therefore not a means to achieve omniscience.4

So much for the viewpoints and objections (purvapak�a) of the Yogacarins.

1 Cf. Yamaguchi , p. 159 : Just as a rope is the substratum or material cause of the illusive appearance

of a snake, just so the dependent nature of the mind is the real substratum of the illusive appearance

of the apprehended-apprehending duality.

2 Cf. Yamaguchi, p. 159. The mind and the mental factors are erroneously hypostatized and designated

as 'self' or as enduring subj ects apprehending enduring objects.

3 All these terms are frequently used in the Prajiiiipiiramita sutras.

4 There is textual evidence that the Yogacarins actually claimed that their doctrine was in conformity

with the teachings of the Prajiiiipiiramitii sutras. The main texts are the following (see a lso

Yamaguchi, pp. 150-1 53).

(1) In his commentary on MS, Asvabhava quotes two passages from the MaitreyapariPrcchii chapter

of the Paiicavir¢atisiihasrikii as a scriptural source or endorsement of the 'three natures' doctrine

(T. vol. 3 1 , 383c2-1 0 and 399b28-cl3) . See also the TJ commentary on M H K V.28cd.

(2) In his commentary on MVK 1 . 1 -2 , Vasubandhu states that the Y ogacara teaching that everything

is neither empty (because the dependent and perfectly established natures exist) nor non-empty

(because the imagined nature does not exist), is in conformity with the Prajiiiipiiramitii teachings.

(3) In verse 27 of his PrajiiiipiiramitiipilJrjiirthasarrzgraha, Dignaga says that the Prajiiiipiiramitii

teachings are based (samiisritya) on the tenet of the three natures (d. G. Tucci , "Minor Sanskrit

Texts on the Prajfiaparamita," JRAS 1947, p. 57).

(4) Sthiramati remarks that, according to some Yogacarins, the three natures are taught to convey

the essence of the Prajiiiipiiramitii without error. (MVT, 1 1 2.5-7)

(5) In the concluding lines of MVT (263.3-4 ; not found in the Tibetan translation), Sthiramati writes

that the core of the Paiicavir¢atisiihasrikii is taught in MVT.

According to Yamaguchi (p. 152) , the reason why the Y ogacarins traced their doctrine back to

the Prajfiiipiiramitii sutras (the main scriptures of the Madhyamikas) , was probably that they

wanted or needed to show that their doctrine had a broader scriptural basis than just the Salfl­

dhinirmocanasutra, and that they wanted to convince the Madhyamikas that the Yogacara

doctrine was a true Mahayana doctrine.

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{t/R*�X�:g:�lffifl� 1TJJJH�' tg-�� �20� 2000� 75-111

An Annotated Translation of Madhyamakah!dayakiirikii / TarkajviiJii V.8-26

Paul HOORNAERT

Bhavaviveka first briefly introduces the major Yogacara tenets in MHK/T] V.

1-7 and then devotes the remainder of his work to a detai led refutation of these tenets

(MHK/T] V . S -114) . The following is a short outline of the content of MHK/T] V. S -

114.

Synopsis of Bhavaviveka's refutation of the Y ogacara (uttarapaksa) In

MHK/TJ V.8-114

Basic method: The refutation of the Yogacara tenets will be based primari ly on infe­

rential reasoning (yukti). (V. S - 9 )

1. Refutation of the Yogacara understanding of 'Reality' (tattvam) (V.10-13) and

'awareness of Reality' (tattvajnanam) (V.14-16) . (Refutation of V. 2 - 3 )

2. Refutation of the vijnaptimatra tenet (V.17-3S) . (Refutation of V.4ab)

(2.1) 'vijnaptimtitra' conflicts with scripture and with common sense. (V.17)

(2.2) Refutation of the argument from dream consciousness. (V.1S-19)

(2.3) Refutation of four theories of consciousness as a twofold appearance (dvayii-

bhiisa). (V.20-26)

(2.4) Refutation of the samanantarapratyaya argument. (V.27-2Sab)

(2.5) Refutation of scriptural arguments. (V.2Scd-30)

(2.6) Refutation of the negation of the existence of atoms. (V.31-3S)

3. Refutation of the Yogacara path (marga) (V. 39-54) . * * (Refutation of V.4)

[** Although MHK V.39-54 is included in the vijiiaptimtitra section of MHK V, these verses are better treated as a separate section dealing with the Yogacara marga. ]

( 3.1) 'vijnaptimatra' cannot explain how the awareness of Reality (nirvikalpajnana)

could ever originate. (V.39)

(3 .2) Reply by the Yogacara and Bhavaviveka's rejoinder that the Yogacara theory of

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consciousness is an iitmaviida. (V.40-42)

(3 .3) The awareness of Reality, as taught by the Yogacara, is not different from an or­

dinary direct perception (pratya�a). (V.43-44)

(3 .4) Bhavaviveka's own theory of consciousness can account for saJ?lklesa (bandha)

and vyavadiina (mok�a). (V.45-50)

(3 .5) nirvikalpajiiiina can be accounted for if the existence of objects outside con­

sciousness is accepted, but ' v ijnaptimiitra, cannot account for it. (V.51-53) .

(3.6) Reply by the Yogacara and Bhavaviveka's rej oinder that the Y ogacara path de­

viates from the straight path to Buddhahood. (V. 54)

4. Refutation of the Yogacara tenet of the 'three natures' (V .55-112) . (Refutation of V.

5 )

4.1 Refutation of the imagined nature (parikalpitasvabhiiva) (V. 55-6S)

(1) Refutation of the nonexistence of the imagined nature. (V .55- 56)

(2) The origin of our attachment to the imagined nature . (V.57-5S)

(3) Proof for the existence of obj ects outside consciousness. (V. 59)

(4) Refutat ion of Dignaga 's 'apoha' theory. (V.60-6S)

4.2 Refutation of the dependent nature (paratantrasvabhiiva) (V.69-S4) . (Refutation of

V. 6 )

(1) The Y ogacara position: the imagined nature does not exist, but the dependent na­

ture exists . (V.69-70a)

(2) General refutation: ex istence of the dependent nature is acceptable saJ?lvrtyii but

not paramiirthata�. (V.70bcd)

(3) Refutation of utPattini�svabhiiva. (V.71-73)

(4) The dependent nature is the object of thought and speech. (V. 7 4-75)

(5) The dependent nature does not exist paramiirthata�. (V.76-79)

(6) The Madhyamikas can account for conventional designation (prajiiapti). (V.SOab)

and final l iberation (mok�a) (V.SOcd-S1) , and are therefore not nihilists. (V.S2-S4)

4.3 Refutation of the perfectly established nature (parin�annasvabhiiva) (V.S5-112)

(1) Reality, as taught by the Y ogacara, is not the true Reality because it is not incon­

ceivable (V.S5) , not inexpressible (V.S6) and not the object of the true awareness of

Reality (V.S?) .

(2 ) Refutation of the theory of the intrinsic purity and the adventitious defi lement and

purification of Reality. (V.SS-90)

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(3) Refutation of the Yogacara understanding of 'awareness of Reality' and 'Reality' .

(V.91-98)

(4) Bhavaviveka's understanding of 'Reality' (V.99-100) and 'awareness of Reality'

(V.I0I-I03) .

(5) Inferential reasoning (anumana) is indispensable for the elimination of false views

regarding Reality. (V.I04-110)

(6) Conclusion: the Yogacara doctrine of 'Reality' and 'awareness of Reality' deviates

from the teachings of the Buddha. (V.I11-112)

5. General conclusion: Our Madhyamaka doctrine, as explained in Chapter Three of

MHK/T], withstands the test of reason (yukti) . (V.113-114)

Note about the footnotes to the translation

For the abbreviations used in the footnotes, see the List of Abbreviations included in

my translation of MHK/T] V. 1 - 8 in Studies and Essays, Behavioral Sciences and Phi­

losophy, Faculty o/Letters, Kanazawa University, No. 19 (1999) , p. 130. The following ab­

breviations should be added to the list.

AP Alambanaparzk:;a/-vrtti, E. Frauwallner ed. , "Dignagas AlambanaparIk�a . Text,

Ubersetzung und Erlaliterungen," WZKM 37 (1930) , pp. 176-179.

MA (Bh) Madhyamakavatara(b�a), L. de La Vallee Poussin ed. , Madhyamakavatara

par Candrakirti. Traduction Tibetaine. (Bibliotheca Buddhica IX) , St-Petersbourg, 1912.

Tib. D. Nr. 3862, Ha 220bl-348a7 (DBU MA 7) ; P. Nr. 5263, Ha 264b8-411bl (vol. 98, pp.

108-166) .

PS (V) Prama1}asamuccaya (vrtti) , Tib. D. Nrs. 4203-4204, Ce Ibl-85b7 (TSHAD MA 1) .

ViK (ViV ) Vi'¥satikakarika (vrtti), Sanskrit text included in TrBh; Tib. D. Nrs. 4056-

4057, Si 3a4-10a2 (SEMS TSAM 14) , P. Nrs. 5557-5558, Si 3bl-11al (vol . 113, pp. 233-236) .

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1. Edited Tibetan text of MHK/T J V.8-26

[Editions used: Cone (C.) Dbu-rna Dsa 202b4- 207a6; Derge (D.) Dbu-rna Dsa 202b4-

207a6; Peking ( P.) Dbu-rna Dsa 223a2-228b4J

'dir bshad de bzhin gshegs bka' kunl I

kho bo cag gi tshad rna yinl I

tshad rna yid ches lung yin phyir I I

bzang po dag ni sgrub par byedl I ( 8)

[atrocyate prarna�arp na� sarvarp tathagatarp vaca�1

aptopade§aprarna�yad bhadro hi pratipadyatel I ( 8) J

ces bya ba ni bde bar gshegs pa'i bka' tharns cad ni kho bo cag gi tshad rna yin tel de

dag ni de nyid gzigs pa rnarns kyis gsungs pa yin pa' i phyir roll dge legs kyi bsarn pa

can nyid dag ni de sgrub par byed cing rni rnthun par rni byed dol I

lung gzhan dag gis1 the tshorn dangl I

log pa'i blo can gzhan rni byedl I

de phyir de dag sgrub gzhug phyir I I

rigs pa ldan pa'i tshul btsal byal I ( 9)

[nagarnantarasarpdigdha vi paryastarna ti� para�1

tasrnat tatpratipattyartharp tanrnfgyo yuktirnannaya�1 I ( 9) J

[Co 202b6, D. 202b6, P. 223a4J zhes bya ba la lung las gzhan pa'i lung ni lung gzhan dag

gol I de dag gis2 the tshorn du gyur pa ni de yin narnl ' on te rna yin snyarn du the tshorn

za bar gyur pa'ol I log pa zhes bya ba ni grub pa'i rntha' 'di las gzhan pa dag la rnarn

par gyengs shing 'di la3 rni ltos pas de ni 'di Ita bu nyid rna yin no zhes log par zhugs

pa'ol I gang dag la de Ita bu 'i blo yod pa de dag ni lung gzhan dag gis the tshorn dang

log pa'i blo can dag stel sun 'byin par byed pa byung rgyal du srnra ba gzhan dag gol I

de dag gis tshad rna de sgrub par rni byed pas de'i phyi r de dag sgrub tu gzhug pa'i

phyir I srnra ba po rigs4 pa dang ldan pa' i tshul phyogs dangl gtan tshigs dang dpe 'i

1 P . gi 2 p. gi 3 C : Ita 4 P rig

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skyon med pa gzhan gyis smras pa'i nyes pa'i gnas su ma gyur pa'i mtha'i rigs pa'i lam

btsal bar bya'ol I

khyed kyis brtags1 pa'i gsung rab dangl skur pa 'debs pa j i skad smras pa dag gis ni

rigs pa mi bzod pas de'i phyir I

gnyis med pa yi dngos po nil I

rigs pa ma yin 'gal ba' i phyirl I

nam mkha'i me tog med dngos saml I

de dngos yin par brtag mi byal I (10)

[dvayabhavasya bhavo hi virodhitvan na yujyatel

khapu?pabhavasatta va na va tadbhavakalpanal I (10) ]

[C. 203a3, D. 203a3, P. 223bl] zhes bya ba smras tel gal te re zhig gnyis med pa dngos

po yin na ni j i ltar med pa yinl ci ste med pa yin na ni '0 na de Ita ni2 dngos po ma yin

nol I de'i phyir gnyis med pa'i dngos po ni r igs pa ma yin tel rang gi tshig dang 'gal ba'i

phyir roll gal te gnyis med pa'i tshul kho nar rtag tu nges par gnas pa'i phyir med pa

nyid dngos po yin no zhe nal de Ita na nam mkha'i me tog med pa yang dngos po yin

par thaI bar 'gyur rol I gal te nam mkha'i me tog med pa dngos po yin par mi 'dod na ni

gnyis med pa de yang dngos po yin par brtag par mi bya'ol I

ci ste 'di snyam du kho bo cag gi tshul nil rnam par rtog pa gang gang gisl I dngos po

gang gang rnam brtags pal I de ni kun brtags kho na stel I ngo bo nyid ni yod ma yinl I

gzhan gyi dbang gi dngos nyid nil I rnam rtog rkyen las 'byung3 ba yinl I de la rtag tu

snga ma shos4 I I bral ba nyid gang yongs grub yinl I zhes bya ba stel gzhan gyi dbang

gi ngo bo nyid de la rtag tu snga ma shos zhes bya ba kun brtags pa'i ngo bo nyid kyi

gzung ba dang 'dzin par brtags pa'i 5 dngos po dang bral ba nyid gang yin pa de ni yongs

su grub pa'i ngo bo nyid yin tel kun brtags pa dang gzhan gyi dbang la ltos nas med pa

gang yin pa de nyid yongs su grub pa la ltos nas dngos po yin pas de ltar na med pa

dang dngos po zhes bya ba gnyis dbyer med pa'i phyir tha dad pa nyid ma yin pas de'i

phyir 'gal ba med do snyam du pha rol p06 dag sems pa la brtags nas de dgag pa'i Ian

1 P: btag s 2 " 0 na de I ta ni ' omi tted i n P.

3 P: byung 4 C: shes 5 P: mam par btag s pa'i 6 ' po' omi tted i n P.

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yang gdab pa'i phyirl

gal te yang dag brtag med phyir I I

de la dbye ba med snyam nal I

mtshan gzhi mtshan nyid rnam gzhag lall

de ni mtshungs phyir Ian rna yinl I (11)

[tattvata� kalpitabhavat tadabhedo mato yadil

lak?yalak?avyavasthayarp tattulyatvad anuttaraml I (11) J

[c. 203b1, D. 203b1, P. 223bSJ zhes bya ba smras tel kun brtags pa dang gzhan gyi dbang

dag med pa nyid kyis yongs su grub pa la dbyer med du zin kyang gang gi tshe mtshan

nyid kyi gzhi dang mtshan nyid rnam par gzhag pa byed pa na mtshan nyid kyi gzhi de

nyid ces bya ba de'i mtshan nyid ni gnyis med pa'i dngos po yin no zhes bya ba de'i tshe

nal gal te re zhig gnyis med pa'i dngos po yin na ni j i ltar med pa yinl ci ste med pa yin

na ni '0 na de Ita na dngos po rna yin no zhes 'gal bar sngar bstan pa de mtshungs pa'i

phyir pha rol po dag gis smras pa'i Ian de ni bzang po rna yin noll gzhan yangl

gal te de'i dngos rna btang gangl I

de ni de dngos yin ' dod nal I

de ltar dngos nyid mi gtong bal I

de phyir de ni dngos rna yinl I (12)

[svarupatyagita yasya sa cet tadbhava i?yatel

na ca bhavo 'ta evasau svaruparp na jahati cetl I (12 ) J

[C. 203b4, D. 203b4, P. 224a4J zhes bya ba ni gal te pha rol po dag 'di skad ces gnyis med

pa'i dngos po nyid yongs su mi gtong ba gang yin pa de nyid dngos po zhes bya'i ngo bo

nyid gnyis pa ni med do zhes zer nal de la 'di skad ces de ltar ngo bo nid mi gtong na

de'i phyir dngos po de ni med pa kho na yin pas de Ia dngos por brtag par mi bya'o zhes

brj od par bya 'ol I de'i phyirl

des na de nyid gzigs rnams kyi/ I

mkhyen pa dngos med dmigs par ' gyur I I

de yang chos bdag med min tel I

med pa'i bio yi rgyu phyir rol I (l3)

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[abhavalambanarp jfianam evarp syat tattvadarsina�1

na casau dharmanairatmyam asadbuddher nimittata�1 I (13) ]

[C. 203b6, D. 203b6, P. 224a6] zhes bya ba ni theg pa chen po'i grub pa'i mtha'i1 tshul

gyis na sangs rgyas kyi ye shes ni dngos po yod pa dangl med pa'i mtha' gnyis las rnam

par grol ba yin par bzhed nal khyed 'dod pa ltar na de dnos po med pa l a dmigs pa yin

par 'gyur bas lung dang 'gal lol I gal te mi 'gal te gang gi phyir zhe nal kun brtags2 pa'i

chos rnams kyi bdag med pa'i dngos po ni bdag med pa nyid yin lal de la3 dmigs pa

nyid yin par khyed kyang 'dod pa'i phyir ro zhe nal chos bdag med pa ni mtshan rna

thams cad dang bral ba yin par 'dod na de yang med pa nyid kho nas med pa'i blo'i yul

yin pa'i phyir chos bdag med pa nyid du mi rung ngol I bdag gi sgra ni ngo bo nyid du

smra ba'i phyir dangl bdag med pa ni dngos po'i ngo bo nyid dangl dngos po med pa'i

ngo bo nyid gnyi ga'i ngo bo nyid med pa nyid yin pa'i phyir rol I

'dir pha rol po dag rnam par rtog4 pa ni 'ching ba yin par gsungs pas de dang bral na

grol bar sems shingl

gal te dngos med dmigs pa'i bIoi I

rnam par mi rtog yin 'dod nal I (14ab)

[abhavalambana buddhir avikalpa yadi?yatel (14ab) ]

[C. 204a2, D. 204a2, P. 224b3 ] zhes bya ba ni 'di skad ces chos thams cad ni dngos po

med pa'i ngo bo nyid du ro gcig pa'i phyir dngos po med pa la dmigs pa'i bIos ci zhig la

rtog par byed na rnam par rtog pa dang bcas par 'gyurl rnam par rtog pa med pa'i

phyir de ni don j i Ita ba bzhin yin no zhes zer na'ol I slob dpon gyis bshad pal

des na gzugs5 blo mi rtog pa 'angl I

dam pa yin pa nyid du 'gyurl I (14cd)

[tata evavikalpapi riipabuddhi� samibhavetl I (14cd) ]

[C. 204a3, D. 204a3, P. 224b4] zhes bya ba ni gal te rnam par mi rtog pa nyid kyi blo don

1 'mtha'i' omitt ed in P.

2 P: bt ag s 3 P: ya ng 4 P: rt og s 5 P: gzung

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ji Ita ba nyid yin par 'gyur na nil de Ita na 'j ig rten pa'i bIo gzugs la sogs pa rkyen las

byung ba rtog pa dang rj es su dran pa'i rnarn par rtog pa dang bra I ba yang don ji Ita ba

bzhin nyid thob 1 par 'gyur rol I ' dir srnras pal gzung ba dang 'dzin pa'i rnarn par rtog

pa dang bral ba'i blo gang yin pa ni yang dag par na don ji Ita ba bzhin yin2 par 'dod kyi

I gzugs la sogs pa'i blo ni rnarn par rni rtog pa yin du zin kyang yang dag pa rna yin tel

gzung bar snang ba'i phyir zla ba gnyis la sogs pa rnthong ba'i blo bzhin no zhe na 'dir

bshad pal

gal te gzung bar snang 'dod pasl I

gzugs blo yang dag rna yin nal I

des na gtan tshigs 'khrul 'gyur zhingl/

dam bcas pa yang nyarns par 'gyur I I (15)

[grahyabhasataya ce?ta yadi bhiita na riipadhl�1

hetu� syad vyabhicary evarp pratijfia cavahiyatel I (15) ]

[c. 204a6, D. 204a6, P. 224b8] zhes bya ba la 'khrul zhes bya ba ni 'gal zhes bya ba'i tha

tshig stel ' di ltar gzugs kyi blo ni gzung bar snang ba nyid rna gtogs par logs shig ni3

ngo bo nyid rned pas gzung bar snang ba nyid du rjes su dpag pa yang dag pa rna yin pa

nyid kyis yang dag pa bsal ba 'i phyir chos can gyi ngo bo nyid log par bsgrub pas 'gal lo

I I ' d ir dam bcas pa ni gzugs kyi blo yang dag pa rna yin pa' 01 I ' di la gzugs kyi blo

gang yin pa de j i ltar na yang dag pa rna yin par 'gyur tel rnngon sum dangl lung dangl

' j ig rten la grags pas gzugs kyi blo yang4 dag pa nyid yin par yang dag pa nyid rna yin

pa bsal ba'i phyir rjes su dpag pa dang 'gal lol I

de nyid rnthong ba yongs grub pa'i/ I ngo bo nyid la Ita ba yinl I zhes j i skad srnras pa

de la yang skyon 'di yod dol I

ngo bo nyid la drnigs yin nal I

ston pa'i byang chub rtog can dangl I

drnigs pa can du 'gyur ba dangl I

rnarn par rni rtog blor rni 'gyurl I (16 )

[savikalpa ca bodhi� syac chastu� salarnbanapi val

I P: 'thob 2 C, D : rna yin 3 P . na 4 P: yang dag pa nyid rna yin pa gsal ba'i phyir rjes su dpag pa dang 'gal l a.

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nirvikalpapi dhlr na syat svabhavalambika satl/ I (16) J

[C. 204b2, D. 204b2, P. 225a4J zhes bya ba ni de bzhin gshegs pas so so rang rigl par bya

ba yongs su grub pa'i ngo bo nyid ces bya ba 'i dmigs pa sgra j i bzhin rna y in pa'i ngo bo

nyid gang yin pa de Ita bu cung zhig yod cingl ngo bo nyid de la dmigs pa yin na ston pa

de bzhin gshegs pa'i byang chub kyi ye shes rtog pa can du 'gyur tel byang chub ni rtog

pa mi 2 mnga' bar bzhed dol I dmigs pa de la dmigs par byed pa yin na dmigs pa can du

yang 'gyur bas dmigs pa med pa nyid du yang mi 'grub stel byang chub ni dmigs pa

med pa nyid du bzhed dol I de nyid la ngo bo nyid med pa nyid du rnam par rtog par

byed na rnam par mi rtog pa'i blor yang mi 'gyur ro zhes bya ba'i tshig sbyar rol I

'di Ita ste khams gsum pa 'di ni sems tsam stel phyi rol gyi don med do zhes dam bcas

pa gang yin pa de la yangl

sems tsam du ni dmigs pa dangl I

gzugs la sogs pa mi 'dzin nal I

khas blangs pa dang grags pa yisl I

dam bcas pa la gnod par 'gyurl I (17)

[cittamatropa lambhena rupadyagraha�arp na cal

abhyupetapra tltibhyarp pratij fia badhyate yata�1 I (17) J

[C. 204b5, D . 204b5, P. 225bl] zhes bya ba la khas blangs pas gnod par 'gyur ba ni mig

dang gzugs rnams la brten nas mig gi rnam par shes pa 'byung ngo zhes gsungs pa'i

lung dang 'gal ba'ol I grags pas gnod par 'gyur ba ni 'j ig rten na gzugs la sogs pa'i don

med par mig la sogs pa'i rnam par shes pa mi skye bar grags pas gnod par 'gyur ba'ol I

'dir smras pal gzugs la sogs pa'i don med par yang rnam par shes pa skye bar mthong

stel de Ita bur snang ba 'byung ba'i phyir dper na rmi lam na gzugs la sogs pa'i blo skye

ba bzhin no zhe nal de dgag pa'i phyir bshad pal

de ltar snang ba skye ba'i phyir I I

rmi lam gzugs sogs blo bzhin dul I

gzugs la sogs pa don med par I I

rnam par shes zhes byar mi rungl I (18)

1 P: rig s 2 'mi' omit ted in P.

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[napi rupadivijfianarp vinartheneti yuj yatel

tadabhasodayad yatha svapne rupadibuddhayatIl I (18)]

zhes bya ba ni de'i phyir pha ro1 po dag gis smras pa'i rj es su dpag pa de bzang po ma

yin nol I ei 'i phyir zhe nal

gang phyir rmi lam 1a sogs pa 'i f I

rnam shes ehos 1a dmigs pa'i phyir I I

de phyir dpe yang med pa dangl I

yu1 1a skur pa 'debs par 'gyurl I (19)

[yasmat svapnadivij fianarp dharma1ambanam i?yatel

df?�antanyuna ta hy evarp ea vi?ayapavadital I (19) ]

[C. 205a2, D. 205a2, P. 225b5] zhes bya ba ni thog ma med pa'i dus nas gzung ba dang

'dzin pa'i bag ehags kyis bsgos1 pa'i shes pa dang 1dan pa 'i mig gis rmi lam na mthong

ba nyid kyi gzugs 1a sogs pa dag mthong ba yin gyi ma mthong ba ma yi n tel rmi lam 1a

sogs pa'i rnam par shes pa dag ni dmigs pa dang be as pa nyid yin tel sngon mthong ba

1a sogs pa mngon par brjod pa'i phyir2 dran pa 1a sogs pa bzhin nol I dmus long gi mig

gi mthu gtan nyams pa 1a yang tshe rabs gzhan na mthong ba'i bag ehags kyi shugs

kyis3 rmi lam na kha dog dang dbyibs4 tha dad pa'i gzugs du ma dag snang bar 'gyur

bas de'i shes pa de 1a yang dmigs pa med pa ma yin tel ' di 1tar bzang skyong dmus long

des rmi lam na shes pa dang 1dan pa'i mig gis gzugs de dag mthong stel sha'i mig gis ni

ma yin no zhes gsungs pa Ita bu'ol I shes pa'i mig gis ni ehos 1a dmigs pa'i phyir rmi lam

1a sogs pa'i rnam par shes pa yang dmigs pa dang beas pa nyid yin pas khyed eag gi

sgrub pa 1a dpe med pa'i skyon nyid du 'gyur roll gzugs 1a sogs pa'i don gyi dngos po

se1 bar byed pa'i phyir yu1 1a skur pa 'debs pa nyid kyang yin nol I

khyed 'di skad ees rnam par shes pa nyid gnyis su snang bar skye stel rang du snang ba

dang rnam par shes pa yu1 du snang ba'i phyi ro1 gyi yu1 gyi rnam par yongs su gyur pa

de rnam par shes pa rang du snang ba'i yu1 nyid yin no zhes zer na de'i phyir bshad pal

gal te yu1 du snang ba nyidl I

1 P: bgos 2 P 225b7 : la sog s pa 'l don pa r brjod pa'i phyir 3 p. kyi 4 C: dbyings

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sems kyi dmigs pa yin 'dod nal I

yul du snang ba ma gtogs par I I

sems kyi bdag nyid gzhan ci yodl I (20)

[visayabhasata cet syac cittasyalambanarp. matal

vi?ayabhasa tarp. projjhya cittatmanyo 'sti kld�§a�1 I (20) ]

[C. 205a7, D. 205a7, P. 226a5] zhes bya ba ni 'di ltar kho bo cag gis ni gzugs la sogs pa'i

yul du snang bar skyes pa nyid rnam par shes pa'i ngo bo nyid yin par mthong gi yul du

snang ba ma gtogs par rang du snang ba gzhan ma mthong ngol I gal te yul du snang ba

nyid las gzhan pa rnam par shes pa'i ngo bo nyid gnyis pa zhig yod na de gang yin ston

cigl gal te de bstan pa'i phyir 'di skad ces rnam par shes pa la rang du snang ba dangl

yul du snang ba zhes bya ba 'i ngo bo nyid gnyis yod del rang gi ngo bor gnas pa'i phyir

dangl gzhan Ita bur skyes pa'i phyir shel gyi nor bu bzhin tel dper na shel gyi nor bu'i

ngo bo nyid las ni rang gsal lal sngon po la sogs pa'i nye bar gzhag1 pa ' i khyad par las

ni sngon po la sogs par2 snang bar3 mtshon du rung ngol I de bzhin du sems rang4 du

snang ba' i yul gyi rnam par yongs su gyur pa las yul du snang ba nyid du 'gyur ro zhe

nal de Ita na bsgrub par bya ba dang dpe nye bar gzhag pa mi mthun tel gang gi phyir

zhe nal

gzhan ltar skyes phyir de gnyis snangl I

shel dang ' dra bar mi 'dod del I

nye bar gzhag pas5 der skye bal I

shel gyi skad cig min phyir rol I (21)

[ne?�a spha�ikavat tasya dvyabhatanyanibhodayatl

upadhanat tatha jato yato na spha�ikak?ana�1 I (21) ]

[C. 205b4, D. 205b3, P. 226b2] zhes bya ba ni shel gyi nor bu sngon po la sogs pa nye bar

gzhag pa'i khyad par gyis6 rang gi ngo bor gsal ba nyid yongs su btang bas sngon po la

sogs pa'i ngo bo nyid du yongs su 'gyur ba ni bden mod kyi/ shel gsal ba'i skad cig ma

I P: bzhag 2 P: pa 3 P: ba 4 C, D : ra ng ra ng 5 P: bzhag la s 6 p. g yi

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snga rna gang yin pa de ni 'gags par gyur pas sngon po la sogs par gyur pa rna yin nol I

de 'gags gzhan ni skyes pa lal I

de yi blo ni 'khrul par 'dodl I (22ab)

[tadapaye 'nyathotpatter bhrantata tanmater matal (22ab) J

[C. 205b5, D. 205b5, P. 226b4J ees bya ba ni shel gsal ba 'i skad eig rna de 'gags pas na

nye bar gzhag pa'i khyad par gyis sngon po la sogs pa'i ngo bo nyid skyes pa la shel yin

par dmigs pa'i blo ni 'khrul pa nyid yin nol I ngo bo nyid gnyis ni med del gang gi phyir

zhe nal shel nye bar gzhag pa dang bral ba na snga ma'i ngo bo nyid kho nar snang ba

ltar shes pa ' i 1 rnam par shes bya'i rnam pa dang bral ba shel gyi rnam pa nye bar gzhag

pa dang bral ba Ita bu ni nam yang gzung du med pa'i phyir rol I rnam par shes pa rang

du snang ba 'i bdag nyid nyams su myong ba med kyang de yul gyi rnam pas nye bar2

kha bsgyur ba'i dmigs par snang ba 'i yul du snang ba nyid yin par rigs3 pa dang ldan pa

rna yin noll dper na shel gyi nor bu nye bar gzhag pa'i tshon dang phrad pa na de Ita

bur snang bar mtshon du rung yang shel gyi nor bu yang nye bar gzhag pa'i ngo bo nyid

du mi 'gyur la nye bar gzhag pa'i ngo bo nyid kyang shel gyi nor bu'i ngo bo nyid du mi

'gyur tel shel gyi nor bu tshon yin pa 'ami tshon kyang shel gyi nor bu nyid yin par thaI

bar 'gyur ba'i phyir roll de bzhin du rnam par shes pa yang rkyen ji ltar nye bar gyur

pa'i yul du snang bar skye yangl rnam par shes pa yang rnam pa thams cad du gzugs la

sogs pa'i ngo bo nyid du mi 'gyur lal gzugs la sogs pa'i ngo bo nyid kyang rnam par

shes pa'i ngo bo nyid du mi 'gyur tel sa la sogs pa'i sems dang beas pa nyid daml sems

kyang4 sa la sogs pa bzhin du sems med pa nyid du thaI bar 'gyur ba 'i phyir/ rnam par

shes pa nyid gzung ba dang 'dzin pa nyid yin no zhes bya bar rang la byed pa 'gal ba'i

phyir de shel bzhin du gnyis su snang ba nyid du mi rigs sol I

[C. 206a3, D. 206a3, P. 227a4J ' dir smras pal yul du snang ba des5 rang dang rjes su

mthun pa'i 'bras bu bskyed par bya ba'i phyir rim gyis rnam par shes pa'i rgyun nus pa

dang ldan par byed eing Ian 'ga' ni de'i rnam pa'i nus par gnas sol I Ian 'ga' ni nus pa

yongs su smin pa las rnam par shes pa yul du snang ba' i rnam par skye'ol I rnam par

shes pa ni nus pa dang yul du snang ba de gnyis las geig pa nyid dang tha dad pa nyid

1 C. shes bya'i 2 'nye bar' omitted in P.

3 P. rig 4 P kyi 5 C, D. der

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du1 brj od par mi 'dod del rnam par shes pa nyid nus pa dang yul gyi ngo bo nyid gnyis

su snang ba yin no zhe nal ' di r bshad pal

gnyis su snang med nus pa nil I

tha dad min phyir yul snang bzhinl I (22cd)

[ saktyabhedan na ca dvyabha vi?ayabhasatatmavatl I ( 22cd) J

[C. 206a5, D. 206a5, P. 227 a 7J zhes bya ba la rnam par shes pa nyid gnyis su snang ba rna

yin zhes bya ba ni phyogs yin lal nus pa tha dad pa rna yin pa'i phyir zhes bya ba ni

gtan tshigs yinl yul du snang ba'i rnam par shes pa'i bdag nyid bzhin no zhes bya ba ni

dpe yin tel rang du snang ba'i rnam par shes pa gzhan yin zhes bya bar yang de skye ba

na yul du snang ba kho na'i rnam par shes pa skye stel yul gyi rnam pa tha dad par

snang ba'i phyir dangl yul du snang ba 'khrul pa med pa'i phyir roll de 'gag pa na yang

rnam par shes pa'i rgyun dang ldan pa'i nus pa yul du snang ba nyid kyi rnam par shes

pa bskyed pa'i mthu dang ldan pa bzhag nas 'gag cing de yongs su smin par gyur pa las

yang yul du snang ba'i rnam par shes pa nyid skye bar zad kyi/ rang du snang ba'i

rnam par shes pa'i nus pa gang gis de bskyed par 'gyur ba bzhag pa ni 'ga ' yang med

pas yul du snang ba nyid kyi rnam par shes pa la rang du snang ba nyid brtags2 pas ci

byal

[C. 206bl, D. 206b2, P. 227b4J ci ste yang 'di snyam du rnam par shes pa nyid gnyis su

snang ba yin tel lhan cig tu 'dra bar 'byung ba' i phyir gzugs dang gzugs brnyan bzhin te

I gang la lhan cig 'byung ba 'i ngang tshul yod pa de ni lhan cig tu 'byung ba stel cig car

'byung ba zhes bya ba'i tha tshig gol I gang lhan cig 'byung ba dang 'dra ba'i ngang

tshul yod pa de ni 'dra bar 'byung ba stel lhan cig tu 'dra bar 'byung ba'ol I dper na

gzugs dang lhan cig tu gzugs brnyan 'dra bar 'byung ba bzhin3 tel de la gzugs Ita bu ni

rang du snang ba nyid yin lal gzugs brnyan Ita bu ni yul du snang ba nyid yin par sems

nal ' dir bshad pal

sems ni rang dang gzhan snang bal I

lhan cig 'dra bar 'byung ba' i phyirl I

gzugs brnyan bzhin d u mi ' dod del I

1 'du' omitted in P.

2 P: btags 3 P: bzhin no

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de phyir gnyis su snang rna yinl I (23)

[svaparabhasata ne?�a cetasa0 pratibirnbavatl

sahakaryanukaritvat tasrnad dvyabhasatasatfl I (23) J

[C. 206b4, D. 206b4, P. 227bSJ zhes bya ba ni lhan cig tu 'dra bar 'byung ba nyid yin du

zin kyang gnyis su snang ba nyid du rni 'grub pa kho na yin tel gzugs brnyan ni dngos

po rned pa'i phyir dangl de'i blo yang 'khrul pa yin pa'i phyir roll

'dir srnras pal rnarn par shes pa ni gnyis su snang ba kho na yin tel tshad rna dang

'bras bu yin pa'i phyir rol I de la tshad rna ni 'dis rj es su dpog pa'i phyi r tshad rna stel

rang du snang ba'i rnarn par shes pa' 01 I ' bras bu ni de'i yul so sor rtog pa stel yul du

snang ba nyid dol I yul du snang ba'i rnarn par shes pa 'ba' zhig la ni tshad rna dang

'bras bu dag 'thad par dka'o zhe nal ' dir bshad pal

gal te tshad rna 'bras yod phyir I I

gnyis su snang bar ' dod ce nal I

gzhan du 'ang1 de dag 'grub pa'i phyirl I

brtag pa de yang rni 'dod dol I (24)

[prarna�aphalatabhavad i?�a dvyabhasateti cetl

anyathapi hi tatsiddhes tatkJptir api ne?yatel I (24) J

[C. 206b7, D. 206b7, P. 22Sa4J zhes bya ba ni gnyis su snang ba nyid rna yin par gzhan du

yang tshad rna dang 'bras bu de dag 'grub pa' i phyir brtag pa de yang rni 'dod dol I de j i

ltar na gzhan du tshad rna dang 'bras bu dag 'grub par 'gyur zhe nal de'i phyirl

yul du snang ba 'dzin pa yi/ I

rnarn par shes pa skye bzhin pasl I

gzhal bya gang yin 'j al byed pal I

des na de ni tshad mar 'dodl I (25)

[bibhrata j ayarnanena jfianena vi?ayabhatarnl

prarnfyate prarneyarp yat prarna�arp tena tan rnatarnl I (25) J

ces bya ba srnras tel 'di la2 yul du snang ba'i rnarn par shes pa zhes bya ba'i rnarn par

1 " ang' omitted in P

2 P: yid la

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'dzin par skye bzhin pa nyid kyis yul rnarn par rtog par byed pa'i phyir/ shes pa skye

bzhin pa nyid gang yin pa de tshad rna yin par 'dod dol I

de skyes pa na rnthong ba 'i phyir I I

de grub pa ni 'bras bur 'dodl I (26ab)

[tannirvrttau ca dr?tatvat tannirvrtti� phalarn rnatarnl (26ab) ]

ces bya ba ni rnarn par shes pa de skyes pa na yul rnthong ba'i phyir shes pa des rnngon

par grub pa ni 'bras bu yin pas yul du snang ba 'i rnarn par shes pa nyid la tshad rna

dang 'bras bu gnyis yod par 'dod del dper na shing la sta res gzas pa dang btab pa'i

rkyen gyis1 gnyis su gcod par byed pa nyid dangl de dum bu gnyis su chad par gyur pa

nyid bzhin noll

bstan du rned pa'i ngo bo nyidl I

de bzhin rtog pa gang thob pal I (26cd)

[anidarsanarupasya tathaivadhigarno yata�1 I ( 26cd) ]

[C. 207a4, D. 207a4, P. 228b2] zhes bya ba ni rnngon sum gyi shes pa dngos po'i rang gi

rntshan nyid tsarn la drnigs pa rtog2 pa dang rjes su dran pa'i rnarn par rtog pa dang

bral basi gzugs la sogs pa sngon po la sogs pa'i bdag nyid du bstan du3 rned pa'i ngo bo

nyid lal de bzhin du rned pa'i ngo bo nyid kho na bzhin du rang rig pa'i rnarn pas rtogs

par byed pa gang gi phyir de'i phyir yul nyid du snang ba'i rnarn par shes pa gcig pu

kho na la tshad rna dang 'bras bu gnyi ga yod pa'i phyir gtan tshigs kyi don rna grub

pas rnarn par shes pa nyid gnyis su snang bar rtogs4 pa ni dgos pa5 rned dol I

I p. gyi 2 P: rtogs 3 'bstan du' omitted in P. 4 P: rtog 5 P: dngos po

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2. Translation

We reply : "All the words of the Tathagata are autho ritative for us, because the

teachings of a reliable person are authoritative. Good people accept that these

are true. " (8)

All the words of the Sugatas are authoritative for us, because they are spoken by those

who see things as they really are Uattvadarsin). People who strive after excellence ac­

cept these words as true and do not contra dict them.

Others who have doubts and erroneous ideas from other scriptures, do not [ac­

cept the truth of the Tathagata's words] . Therefore, in order to induce [such

people] to accept them as true, one should follow the path of reason. (9)

'Other scriptures' are scriptures which are other than [our Buddhist] scriptures. 'To

have doubts' is to entertain doubts as to whether it is so or not. 'Erroneous' means that

[one's mind] is confused by other [non- Buddhist] doctrines (siddhanta), so that one

does not rely on this [Buddhist doctrine] and thus commits the error of thinking that

this [Buddhist] doctrine is not right. People with this kind of mind are those who 'have

doubts and erroneous thoughts because of other scriptures '. They are 'the others' who

refute [the Buddhist doctrine] as they please. They do not accept the authority [of the

words of the Tathagata ] . Therefore, in order to induce them to do so, the [Buddhist]

teacher should follow the path of reason. That is, the [Buddhist] teacher should pursue

the path of relentless reasoning [by adducing arguments] consisting of impeccable

propositions (pak�a), logical reasons (hetu) and examples (dr�.tanta) which are free

from the errors that might be pointed out by others.l

1 It is not clear from the context who 'the others' are. According to the interpretation I have followed in the translation, Bhavaviveka has the non-Buddhists in mind and admonishes the Buddhist teachers to use independent inferences (svatantranumana) to convince non-Buddhists of the truth of the Bud-dhist teachings. �

'The others' could also refer to the Sravakas who, according to MHK IV.7, argue that the Maha­yana scriptures were not taught by the Buddha himself because they are not included in the three 'baskets' (siUra, vinaya, abhidharma) or because they teach a different path similar to that of the Vedanta [see V. V. Gokhale, "The Vedanta-Philosophy described by Bhavya in his Madhyamakah�­daya," Indo-Irantan Journal, 2 (1958) p 179J. Mahayana Buddhists should use logical arguments to prove that their scriptures are the ipsissima verba of the Buddha (buddhavacanam). This interpreta­tion has the advantage of explaining why the verse emphasizes that all the words spoken by the Tathagata, including the Mahayana scriptures, are true

Verse 8 can also be read as a direct reply to verse 7. ' The others' would then refer to the Yoga­dirins only. The purport of verse 8 would then be that the Miidhyamikas should use logical argu­ments to prove the truth of their interpretation of emptiness as taught in the Prajfi.aparamita sutras Moreover, the scriptural statements quoted by the Yogacara in the commentary to verse 7 should be

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Since the doctrines put forward by you, as well as the accusation [that we

Madhyamikas commit the error] of overnegation (apaviida) 1, do not withstand reason,

we say :

[Your tenet of] 'the presence of the absence of duality' goes against reason, be­

cause it is contradictory. Is the absence of flowers in the sky a presence? If not,

stop thinking that this [absence of duality ] is a presence! (10)

submitted to the test of reason in order to ascertain whether they can serve as valid corroborations (pramii!la) of the Yogacara tenets. Bhavaviveka thus starts his uttarapak�a with a general observa· tion on methodology: his analysis and refutation of the Yogacara tenets will be based primarily on reasoning (yukti) and secon darily on scripture (agama) corroborated by reasoning.

Bhavaviveka's basic stand regarding the probative value of scriptural statements in philosophical debates is as follows.

(1) Scripture is not a means of valid knowledge in its own right, because all the knowledge conveyed in scriptural statements is ultimately inferential knowledge. The MlmaI!lsa argues that scripture (sabda = agama) is an independent mean s of valid knowledge, because scripture alone gives us knowledge about objects beyond the reach of the sense organs, such as heavenly bliss (svarga) and final liberation (apavarga) (MHK/TJ IX. 8 ·9; S. Kawasaki ed., Issaichi Shis6 no Kenkyii, Tokyo: Shunju·sha,1992, pp. 376, 409). Bhavaviveka refutes this by arguing that the existence of heavenly bliss can be inferred as being a special retribution produced by special causes (karman), and that the existence of final libera­tion can be inferred as being the absence of rebirth due to the extinction of the causes of rebirth (MHK /TJ IX.50·54; S. Kawasaki ed., pp. 383-384, 423·424).

(2) If scripture were an independent means of valid knowledge, all the scriptures of all the philosophi· cal schools would be true simply because of their being 'agama', that is, simply because of their having been handed down (agata) by tradition. If that were the case, when it comes to reasoning (vicara) about the ultimately real (in distinction from conventional realities), it would be impossible to determine the truth or falsity of scriptures which teach mutually incompatible doctrines. Reason (yukti) is therefore the only reliable means to decide on the truth or falsity of the various scriptures. Hen ce, only scriptural statements in agreement with reason are acceptable as means of valid knowledge (pramii!la). (MHK/ TJ IX.19·20; see also MHK/TJ V.107.)

(3) Only the scriptural statements which can be corroborated by means of an unmistaken inference (anumana) are in accordance with reason. All the words of the Tathagata meet this requirement, be· cause they were spoken by somebody who sees things the way they really are (MHK V. 8 ) .To be empty of inherent existence is the way things really are, as the Tathagata has taught in the Praji'ia· paramita sutras. Hence, the emptiness of all thin gs can and should be proven by means of inferences, provided that these are 'paramarthatah' inferences a la Bhavaviveka, because emptiness cannot be known by direct perception, nor by 'conventional' inferences (which do not inquire about the ultimate nature of things), nor by mere scriptural statements.

(4) Bhavaviveka is willing to accept the scriptures of other schools (for instance, the Vedanta) as means of valid knowledge, provided that they do not contradict the teachings of the Tathagata. All other scriptural statements are liable to doubt. Reason should be used to investigate whether they are true or not. [MHK IV.56 replyin g to MHK IV.7; see V.V. Gokhale, "The Vedanta·Philosophy described by Bhavya in his Madhyamakah�daya," Indo·lranianJournal 2 (1958), pp. 179·180]. In short, Bhavaviveka subordinates scripture to reason. Strictly speaking, for Bhavaviveka, inferences (qualified as 'paramiirthatah' ) are the only means of valid knowledge when it comes to reasoning about ultimate reality. 1 See MHK V.7.

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If the absence of duality is a presence (bhliva), how can it be an absence (abhava) ?

Or, if it is an absence, then it is not a presence. Accordingly, [your tenet of] 'the pre-

sence of the absence of duality' does not accord with reason, because it is a contradic­

tion in terms (svavacanavirodha). You might reply that the absence [of duality in the

mind] is [the true mode of] existence [of the mind] , because that absence of duality is

always and invariably there. If that is so, then the absence of flowers in the sky also

will necessarily be a presence. If you do not accept that the absence of flowers in the

sky is a presence, you have no reason to think that the absence of duality [in the mind]

is a presence.

You might reply that your basic doctrine is as follows : "All the things which are

conceived by any of the manifold constructive consciousnesses, are merely imagined

[things] . The own-nature [of such things] does not exist [at all] . The dependent nature,

on the other hand, is the constructive consci ousness [itself] which originates from con­

ditions. The perfectly established [nature] is the permanent absence of the former

[imagined nature] in that [dependent nature] ."1 The permanent absence of the ima­

gined nature [of the mind] -that is, the permanent absence of the imagined existence

of the apprehended and the apprehending [aspects of the mind] - in the dependent na­

ture [of the mind]' is the perfectly established nature [of the mind] . In other words,

what is an absence as far as the imagined and the dependent [natures] are concerned,

that very same is a real presence as far as the perfectly established [nature] is con­

cerned. Thus, [in this case] absence and presence are inseparable from each other (a­

bhinna) and are therefore not two different things. Hence, there is no contradiction.2

Having explained the view of our opponents, we refute i t again as follows:

1 Quotation of TrK 20·21. "yena yena vikalpena yad yad vastu vikalpyate/ parikalpita eva asau svabhiivo na sa vidyate / / paratantrasvabhavas tu vikalpah pralyayodbhavah/ ni�pannas tasya parve'(la sada rahitata tu ya / / " . Cf. Yamaguchi, p. 182.

2 There would be contradiction if the two contradictory attributes (la�a'(la)' nonexistence' (or ' ab­sence') and 'existence' (or 'presence') were predicated of the same thing (lak sya) in the same respect Such would be the case if the Y ogacara for example asserted that the perfectly established nature both exists and does not exist, or is both the existence and the nonexistence of the imagined nature There is however no contradiction if one says that the perfectly established nature of the mind is its permanent existence or presence as devoid of the imagined nature or of the dependent nature as ha­bitually misconceived by the ignorant.

The Yogacara position, as Bhavaviveka presents it here, is close to verses 18-21 of Vasubandhu's Trisvabhavanird& (cf Yamaguchi, p 183) . Vasubandhu says there that the nonexistence of the imagined nature, and the nonexistence of the dependent nature as it appears in the mmd of ignorant people (yathiikhyanam), are not different (abhinnala�ana) from the presence of that nonexistence (=the perfectly established nature), and vice versa Verse 13 of the same treatise puts it as follows: " The perfectly established nature of the mind is both a presence (sat) and an absence (asat), because

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If you think that there is no difference [between absence and presence] because

the absence of the imagined [nature ] is the [ever-present] Reality l , the same [er­

ror of contradiction] stil l occurs when one distinguishes between a definable [en­

tity] and its defining characteristic. Your reply is therefore not correct. (11)

Granted that the absence of the imagined and the dependent natures is not different

from the [presence of the] perfectly establ ished [nature] . Nevertheless, if one intro­

duces the distinction between a definable entity and its defining characteristic, then the

definable entity here is "Reality" (tattvam) and its defining characteristic is "presence

of the absence of duality ." Now, if [the thus defined Reality] is the presence of the ab­

sence of duality, how can it be an absence? Or, if it is an absence, then it is not a pre­

sence. Hence, the above contradiction occurs. The reply of the opponents is therefore

not to the point.2 Moreover,

Suppose you argue as follows : "When something never rejects a certain iden-

it is both the presence of nonduality (advayatvena asti) and the absence of duality (dvayasya abhiiva)." MSA IX.78ab phrases the same tenet as follows: "The very nonexistence [of the imagined nature] is the highest mode of existence." (ya avidyamiinata saiva parama vidyamanata). Similarly, MSA XI. 41ab defines the perfectly established nature of the mind as "absence, presence, an d the sameness of presence and absence" (abhavabhavata ya ca bhiivabhiivasamanata). Vasubandhu comments: "The perfectly established nature is the unchangeable nature (tathata) [of the mind]. And that is the abo sence (abhavata) of all imagined things. It is also presence (bhavata) because it is the presence (bhiiva) of the absence [of imagin ed things]. And it is also the sameness of presence and absence be· cause [in this case] absence and presence are not separate from each other (abhinnatvat)." (MSABh, 65. 8 ·10)

The Yogacara tenet of the quasi· identity of the absence of the imagined nature on the one hand and the presence of that absence on the other hand, is based on the following two premises: (1) The absence of the imagined nature is an absolute and permanent absence (atyantabhava); (2) The abso· lute negation of the existence of the imagined nature is an affirming negation (paryudasaprati;;edha); that is, the permanent absence of the imagined nature of the mind is affirmed as the only perma· nently present, true nature of the mind; in other words, the absolute absence of the apprehended/ ap· prehending duality in all conditioned instances of mind is the beginningless and en dless presence of the true nature of mind in each and every single instance of mind.

I Literally: " ... because the absence of the imagined [nature of the mind] pertains to the real nature (tattvam) [of the mind]" (tattvata� kalpitabhavat). This means that the permanent absence of the imagined duality of the mind is the truly permanen t, noncontingent nature of the mind and is in that sense the ever-present Reality (tattvam) itself.

2 The Y ogacara has argued that "the presence of an absence" is not a contradiction because the per­fectly established nature of the mind is the permanent absence of the apprehended/apprehending du­ality in the mind. But to view the true nature of the mind that way is, at least in Bhavaviveka's opin­ion, a reification of the true nature of the mind. Reality itself is then seen as an entity (bhi'iva) which can be known (jiieya) and objectified (alambya). And if Reality is an entity, it will necessarily have an identity (svabhava, svariipa) which differentiates it from all other entities. Reality will then neces­sarily be a conceivable, definable and expressible thing (la�ya). That is the reason why Bhavavive­ka here introduces the distinction between a definable entity and its defining characteristic. This dis­tinction has also been used by the Yogacarins themselves, for example in MVK 1.13 where "the presence of the absence of duality" is said to be the defining characteristic (la�a1!a) of Emptiness.

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tity, then it is [always] present as [not rejecting] that [identity] . " [We reply: ]

"If it does not rej ect that kind of identity [consist ing in an absence], it can for

that very reason not be a presence. " (12)

Our opponents might argue as follows : "That which never ceases to be the presence of

the absence of duality, is [truly] a presence. It does not have [another] second identity. " l

We reply : "If it does not reject that kind of identity, then for that very reason that [hy­

pothetical] presence will be a mere [reified] absence. Hence, you should not conceive

it as a presence. " Accordingly2 ,

[From your view of Reality] it fol lows that the awareness of those who see Rea­

lity will be a perception of [a reified] absence. Moreover, [Reali ty as conceived

by you] will not be the absence of self-existence, because it wil l function as the

cause of a perception of [reified] nothingness. (13)

According to a fundamental tenet of the Mahayana, the awareness of the Buddhas is

free from [apprehending] the two extremes of [ inherent] existence and [ inherent]

nonexistence. But your doctrine contradicts [the Mahayana ] Scriptures, because it as­

serts that the Buddha-awareness is a perception of [inherent] nonexistence. Perhaps

you will say : "There is no contradiction [with the Scriptures] because the 'absence of

self-existence' (nairiitmyam) is the presence (bhiiva) of the absence of the self-existence

of all imagined things (parikalpitadharma). Moreover, you [Madhyamikas] also teach

that [the awareness of the Buddhas] apprehends that [absence of self-existence]."

We reply : "[The Mahayana] maintains that the absence of self-existence (dhar­

manairiitmyam) [is a mere absence and therefore] lacks all apprehendable character­

istics (nimitta) [such as 'exists, 'does not exist', and so forth] . [But in your view] this

[absence of self-existence] is actually a [reified] nothingness and consequently func-

But if Reality is a real entity and hence possesses an identity, it surely cannot have contradictory at­tributes such as 'nonexistence' ('absence') and 'existence' ('presence'). It should then either exist or not exist and cannot simultaneously possess two contradictory natures 'Presence of an absence' is therefore a plain contradiction.

Bhavaviveka explains his own view of Reality on many occasions further in the text. He insists that Reality is a pure absence and should therefore not be conceived as an entity. As a non-entity, it has no apprehendable characteristics (animitta) and is therefore non·definable (ala!?:;ya) and attri­buteless (nihlaksana).

1 In the preceding verse, Bhava viveka has pointed out that the Y ogacara understanding of Reality im· plies that Reality will have two contradictory natures or identities, namely existence (presence) and nonexistence (absence). The Yogacara replies here that Reality, as they conceive it, has only one identity, namely that of a permanent presence in the sense of a permanently present absence (paryud­iisa negation) .

2 "Accordingly" here means " just beca use you conceive Reality as a reified absence . . "

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tions as the obj ect-cause (vi�aya) of a perception of nothingness. Hence , [your view]

does not agree with the [true meaning of] 'absence of self-existence' . As a matter of

fact, 'self-existence' (iitman) means 'inherent existence ' (svabhiiva). And the absence

of self-existence (nairiitmyam) is the absence of inherent existence with respect to both

presences (bhiiva) and absences (abhiiva) 1."

In this connection, our opponents think that l iberation (mok�a) consists in the ab­

sence of all conceptual grasping (vikalpa) because Scripture says that conceptual grasp­

ing is bondage (bandha). [Regarding that , ]

If you maintain that the [Buddha- ] mind, when perceiving the absence [of al l

imagined entities] , is free of conceptual grasping, (14ab)

They argue as follows. All [dependently originated] instances of mind2 have an 'identi ­

cal taste' (ekarasa) [in that they all have] the same nature consisting in the absence

(abhiivasvabhiiva) [of imagined duality] ' If the [Buddha- ] mind, when perceiving that

absence, apprehended [it as] something [ in differentiation from other things] , then it

would be accompanied by conceptual grasping (savikalpa) . But no such conceptual

grasping exists [in the Buddha-mind] . That [mind] is therefore in accordance with Re­

ality (yathiibhiUiirtha).3

The teacher replies4 :

Then, for the same reason, the nonconceptual perception of visible forms will

also be the highest [transmundane awareness] 5 . (14cd)

If the [Buddha-] mind is in a ccordance with Reality just because it is free of conceptual

grasping, then any ordinary Uaukika) perception, originating from conditions such as

[the presence of] visible forms and so forth and free of conceptualization (nirupa1}iivi­

kalpa) and recollection (anusmara1}avikalpa), wil l also be in accordance with Reality.6

[The Yogacarins] could obj ect as follows : "We maintain that a mind which has

I The presence or existence of dependently originated things (bhava) should not be conceived as an in­herent existence. But neither should the absence of inherent existence (abhiiva) in all dependently originated things be conceived as an inherent, reified absence.

2 The text has 'all dharmas', but for the Yogacara 'all dharmas' means 'all instances of mind'. 3 The Yogacara replies to the previous objection by denying that the enlightened Buddha-mind per­

ceives a reified nothingness. Although the Buddha-mind perceives the absence of the imagined nature of mind, an d hence sees Reality as it is, it does not objectify that absence as 'non existence' or 'no­thing'.

4 The occasional occurrence of sentences like this, where Bhavaviveka apparently refers to himself as 'the teacher' (iiciirya), is one of the reasons why Bhavaviveka's authorship of TJ has been doubted. See Y. Ejima, Chilganshiso no Tenkai - Bhiivaviveka Kenkyu, Tokyo 1980, pp. 13-15 ; id., "Additional Note" in Chr. Lindtner, "Adversaria Buddhica," WZKS XXVI (1982), pp. 182-184.

5 Based on the Tibetan text. The Sanskrit text reads: " ... will be equal [to the highest awareness of a Buddha in that it will perceive things as they really are.]"

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freed itself from all conceptua l grasping of apprehended obj ects and apprehending con­

sciousnesses (grilhyagrilhakavikalpa) is truly in accordance with Reality. But a percep­

tion of visible forms and so forth, although it is nonconceptual, does not accord with

Reality because images of [nonexistent, external ] obj ects appear in it, as is the case

6 According to the Abhidharma (Vaibha:oika) theory, the five perceptual cognitions are free from con­ceptualization and recollection. These two forms of apprehending belong to the sixth mental con­sciousness (manovijiiana) only Perceptual cognition perceives its object as it is, without conceptu­ally differentiating it from other objects (nirupa:zavikalpa) and without identifying it with previously perceived objects (anusmara:zavikalpa). But perceptual cognition is still an objectifying and differen­tiating cognition (vikalpa) in as much as it grasps the individual identity (svala�a:za =svabhava) of its object exactly as it is. [On these three kinds of vikalpa, as distinguished by the Vaibhasikas, see AK 1. 33ab (pp 60-61), Siddhi p. 390.]

If Reality is conceived as a reified absence, as is the case in the Y ogacara doctrine according to Bhavaviveka, Reality will be an entity capable of acting as the producing object-condition of a knowledge in its own right. The awareness of Reality (nirvikalpajiiiina) will then be a caused know­ledge (saY(lSk-:ta). And whether the Yogacarins accept it or not, that knowledge will necessarily have to appropriate a visual image (abhasa, akiira) of Reality in order to perceive Reality as it is As a re­sult, that knowledge will be accompanied by svabhavavikalpa, just like any ordmary visual percep­tion. It will therefore not be the true non-objectifying awareness of Reality

The inference in MHK V. 14 is a prasanga inference. It reoccurs in the form of an independent syl­logism in PP, as follows : "K nowledge which apprehends an object cannot be called 'non­objectifying' (nirvikalpa), because it contains an image of an object (visayabhasa), even when it does not identify [that object-image] through concepts, as in the case of visual cogmtion." (PP, D Tsha 247b2-3, P. Tsha 310b2-3, Eckel, p. 72.)

Bhavaviveka also criticizes the Yogacara view of the nonconceptual awareness of RealIty (lokotta­ranirvikalpajiiana) in his Karatalaratnasastra ( II *-*1trt]jiUJJ , T. vol. 30, 268a-278b) According to the Yogacara, the transmundane awareness of Reality arises when the conceptual apprehensions of ob­ject and subject (grahyagrahakavikalpa) are completely eliminated (T. vol. 30, 276cl7 -19) Bha­vaviveka criticizes this position as follows: "Granted that, when that knowledge arises, it will be free from conceptual apprehension in the sense just explained. Nevertheless, because that knowledge produces an image of its formless object (=Reality), and because it is accompanied by a [nonconcep­tual] objectification of its object (svabhavavikalpa), and because it is conditioned (samsk-:ta) , it can­not be the [true] transmundane non-objectifying awareness [of Reality], just like any other [ordi­nary] sense perception (pratyaksa) which is accompanied by objectification (savikalpa) " (T vol 30, 276cl9-22; L de La Vallee Poussin, Madhyamaka, III. Le Joyau Dans La Main, MCB II (1932-33), p. 128)

These texts clearly show that Bhavaviveka's understanding of nirvikalpajiiana is fundamentally different from that of the Y ogacara. For Bhavaviveka, nirvikalpajiiana is not a nonconceptual awareness, a direct perception or a vision of Reality, but is merely the non-perception (anu­palambha) of everything that is not Reality. In other words, the negative term nirvikalpa functions as a non-affirming (prasajya) negation, in which case it means "absence of each and every kind of obJec­tification." In contrast, in the Yogacara view of Reality - as Bhavaviveka understands it - nirvikalpa functions as an affirming (paryudilsa) negation It then means "the nonconceptual vision of Reality which arises as a new knowledge in its own right after all the conceptual or nonconceptual apprehen­sions of things that are not ultimately real have been eliminated from the mind." The Yogacara un­derstanding of nirvikalpajiiiina is one of the main targets of Bhavaviveka's critique of the Yogacara doctrine not only in Chapter Five of MHK /TJ, but in PP (see Eckel, pp. 72-73) and Karatalaratna as well. As for Chapter Five of MHK /T], see also especially verses V 16, 43-44, 91-94, 97-98, 101-102, 111

-ll2.

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with the perception of a [nonexistent] second moon. " l

We reply :

If you argue that a perception of visible forms does not accord with Reality be­

cause it contains an image of [nonexistent, external ] objects, then the logical rea­

son [in your argument] is mistaken and your thesis also collapses. (15)

'Mistaken' (vyabhiciirin) means 'contradictory' (viruddha). A [veridical] perception

of visible forms never occurs unless the image of the perceived object appears in the

mind.2 But you deny the veracity [of al l perceptions of external objects] by inferring

that [any cognition in which] images of [ external] objects appear is not veridical .

Hence, [your logical reason] is contradictory because the reality of the subject of your

thesis (dharmin) is not properly established.3

The thesis (pratijfiiii) of your inference is : "A perception of visible forms does

not accord with reality. " But how could a [veridical] perception of visible forms not be

1 The Y ogacar a ad mi ts that an ordi nar y vi sual perce pti on i s i ndeed free fr om the c once ptual gr aspi ng of the re al e xi ste nce of i ts objec t and of i tself as the appre he nder of that objec t. I t i s ne ver thele ss a fal se (abhuta) cogni ti on, bec ause i mage s of none xi stent e xter nal objec ts appear i n i t. I n c ontr ast, the nonc onceptual aware ne ss of Re ali ty i s not onl y free fr om the c onceptual gr aspi ng of none xi ste nt e x­ter nal objec ts b ut al so fr om the i mage s of nonexi stent exter nal objec ts.

2 Li ter all y : " A [ veridic al ] percepti on of vi sible f or ms has no sub stance or re ali ty ( ngo bo nyid ) apar t from the appe ar ance of the i mage of the percei ved objec t [i n the mi nd] ."

3 Thi s paragr aph e xpl ai ns why the l ogic al reason in the Y ogac ar a i nference i s mi staken As f ar as the c onve nti onal truth ( saYj'lv;tisatya ) i s c oncer ned, Bhavavi veka f ol l ows the Sautr anti ka the or y of per­ce pti on. Acc ordi ng to that the or y, a veridical perce pti on occur s onl y when the i mage of the percei ved objec t appe ar s i n the mi nd . Hence, the re ali ty or sub stance (ngo bo nyid ) of a veridic al vi sual perce p­ti on i s " appear ance i n the mi nd of the i mage of the e xter nal objec t b y whic h that percepti on i s pr o­duced ." The l ogic al re ason i n the Y ogac ar a i nfere nce assume s howe ver that all the c ogni ti ons which c ontai n an i mage of exter nal obj.ec ts are fal se bec ause e xter nal objec ts d o not e xi st. And that l ogic al reason i s i n c ontradic ti on wi th the subjec t of the pr oposi ti on (" perce pti on of vi sible for ms" ), bec ause i t e xcl ude s the re ali ty or sub stance ( ngo bo nyid ) of vi sual perce pti on whic h c onsi sts i n " havi ng the i mage whic h i s pr od uced b y and agree s wi th the percei ved e xter nal objec t. " By assumi ng that e xter­nal objec ts do not e xi st and that all c ogni ti ons i n whic h i mage s of exter nal objec ts appe ar are c onse­quentl y not i n acc ord ance wi th re ali ty, the Y ogacara si mpl y de nies the re ali ty of valid vi sual perce p­ti ons. The fir st of the three rule s of the l ogic al re ason, whic h sti pul ate s that the l ogic al re ason should be a pr oper ty of a real subjec t, i s thus vi ol ated.

One c ould al so say that the i nfere nce of the Y ogac ar a i s mi stake n bec ause i t is tautol ogic al . I t si m­pl y says: "All the percepti ons of vi sible for ms are fal se, because all the c ogni ti ons whic h c ontai n an i mage of e xter nal objects are fal se [ gi ve n the f ac t that e xter nal objec ts do not exi st]. " Bha vavi veka' s rej oi nder i n MH K V. 15 i s e xpl ai ned i n that se nse b y the Ge-I uk sc hol ar Jang-gya (17 17 -17 86): " . . . i t i s not a c orrec t reason bec ause the subjec t -an aware ne ss [ apprehe ndi ng] for ms- and the re ason ­a percei ver of objec ts- are not different bec ause when the me ani ng of the reason i s e stabli shed, the enti ty of the subjec t i s alre ad y e stabli shed as fal se [bec ause the e stabli shme nt of the subjec t must be separ ate fr om the e stabli shme nt of the re ason] ." ( see D. S. Lope z, A Study ojSviitantrika, Snow Li ons Public ati ons, I thac a, New Y or k, 1987, p. 30 6). Correc t re asoni ng require s that the l ogic al re ason i s a ge nui ne predic ate of the subjec t of the the si s and doe s not per mi t that the subjec t and the re ason are ide ntic al . If the ide nti ty of subjec t and re ason we re al l owed, Bhavavi ve ka c ould si mpl y i nver t the ar-

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in accordance with [conventional] reality ? As a matter of fact, your thesis "visual per­

ception is not in accordance with reality" is contradicted by inference (anumiina) be­

cause it can be refuted in virtue of direct perception (pratyak:;a), scripture (agama) and

the general opinion Uokaprasiddha) according to which any [veridical] perception of

visible forms is certainly in accordance with reality.]

Your sta tement "The seers of Reality see the perfectly established nature [of the

mind] ,, 2 is also wrong for the fol lowing reason:

If the enl ightened mind of the Teacher perceives an inherent nature, it will per­

ceive a definite entity. It wil l then also have an object and will consequently not

be [the true] non-objectifying awareness [of Real ity] . (16)

That inexpressible nature, which [according to you] is the object to be realized person­

ally (pratisvasa'f!lvedya) by the Tathagata and which you call 'the perfectl y established

nature [of the mind] ' (parini�annasvabhava) , must be something that exists. Accor­

dingly, if the enlightened knowledge of the Teacher-Tathagata perceives that nature, it

will apprehend a definite entity (savikalpa) .3 But it is stated [in scripture] that an en­

l ightened mind does not apprehend anything. Further, if the enlightened mind takes

that [nature] as i ts obj ect, i t wil l also have an object (salambana) and wi l l consequently

not be without obj ect . But i t is stated [in scripture] that the enl ightened mind has no ob­

ject. And if the enlightened mind identifies that same object as 'absence of the [ima­

gined] nature' , it will also not be [the true] non-objectifying awareness [of Reality] .

Likewise, regarding your thesis that "The three [samsaric] realms are mind only

gu me nt and say . " [Conve ntionally spe aking] , a ve rid ical visu al pe rce ption accord s with reality, be ­cau se the image of the pe rce ived object appe ars in it "

1 T his paragraph explains w hy the the sis is mistake n. T he Yogac ara the sis can be re fu ted by the fol­low ing infe re nce . "A [ ve rid ical] pe rce ption of visible forms is in accord ance w ith re ality, be cau se the contrary assertion violates d ire ct pe rce ption, scriptu re and the ge ne ral opinion. " Or, the Yoga­cara the sis is mistake n ( pak�abhiisa), becau se it is contrad icted by d ire ct pe rce ption and the ge ne ral conse nsu s (see Nyayamukha, T . vol 32, 1a15 -21, Prama1!osamuccaya III. 2).

For Bhavaviveka, an y pe rce ption w hich has the image of the object that produ ced it, is in accor­d ance with conve ntional re ality. Follow ing the Sau trantika the ory of knowled ge , Bhavaviveka ar­gues that the existe nce of su ch an object can be established by an infe re nce which reasons from the occu rre nce of an e ffe ct to the existe nce of its cau se . T he pre se nce of the image of an exte rnal object in the mind at a particu lar time and place cannot be e xplained unle ss the e xte rnal object to which that image corre spond s actu ally e xists ou tside the mind and has acted as the produ cing cau se of that particu lar image (see MHK V.5 9). T he the sis of su ch an infe re nce is valid be cau se it is not contra­d icted by d ire ct pe rce ption, scriptu re and the gene ral conse nsu s. As for scriptu re , Bhavaviveka mu st have the follow ing state me nt in mind . " Visu al pe rce ption originate s in de pende nce on the visu al or­gan and the pre se nce of visible forms." (Qu oted in the commentary to ve rse 17 be low)

2 See ve rse V.5 cd . 3 T hat is, a s a pe rce ption of a de finite entity, it w ill ne ce ssarily be accompanied by svabhavavikalpa

(see note 6, p 96).

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(cittamiitram) . Obj ects outside the mind (biihyiirtha) do not exist." :

It is also not correct that there is no perception of vi sible forms and so forth as a

result of perceiving [everything as] phenomena appearing only in the mind. 1

That thesis is refuted because it confli cts with the accepted [Buddhist] doctrine

and with common sense. (17)

[That thesis] is refuted by reason of the accepted [Buddhist] doctrine because it con­

tradicts the following teaching from scripture: "Visual cognition originates in depen­

dence on the visual sense organ and the [presence] of visible forms. "z It is also refuted

by common sense, because people in general agree that visual cognitions and so forth

do not originate when obj ects such as visible forms and so forth are not present [outside

the mind] .3

At this point [the Yogacarins] obj ect : " [Perceptual ] cognitions originate even

when [external ] objects such as visible forms and so forth are absent, because the im­

ages of such objects appear in the mind [even when these objects are absent] , as is for

example the case when we perceive visible forms and so forth in a dream. ,, 4

To refute this, we say:

It is also not correct to argue as follows: "There is perception of visible forms

and so forth in the absence of [ external] objects, because images [of visible forms

and so forth] appear in the mind [even when external objects are absent] , as is

the case when we perceive visible forms and so forth in a dream." (18)

This inference of our opponents is not correct. Why not?

[Your inference] lacks a correct example, because consciousness in a dream and

so forth apprehends [real ] phenomena. Moreover, you mistakenly negate [the

existence of] obj ects [outside the mind] . (19)

1 See verse V.4 ab. 2 Samyukta 9, 6 (qu oted in AK IX, p . 24 1) . 3 See note 1, p. 98. The thesi s i s mi stak en becau se i t con tradi cts an other accepted Budd hi st ten et and

the gen eral con sen su s. Bhava vi vek a here chall enges the Y ogacara to come up wi th valid argu men ts to p rove the ' mind onl y' ten et becau se that ten et i s manif estl y in confli ct wi th Budd hi st d octrin e and common sen se. In PP al so, Bhavavi vek a p oin ts ou t that the n on exi sten ce of ex tern al obj ects i s n ot evid en ced by di rect percep ti on ( pratya�a) and should therefore be establi shed by scrip tu ral argu­men ts (iigama) and inf eren ti al reasonin g ( anumiina) (see Eck el, p_ 61) .

4 The argu men t f rom d ream con sci ou sn ess i s found in MS (T. vol. 3 1, 13 8a20-25) and ViK 15 . The cl o­sest parall el to the p resen t argu men t i s ViK 1, ex cep t that the mi stak en p ercep ti on s of a 'tai mi rik a' are there u sed as the ex amp le in stead of d ream con sci ou sn ess: " Thi s [en ti re tripl e world ] i s merel y an app earance in the mind, becau se i mages of n on -p resent obj ects app ear [in the mind] , as i s the case when someon e who suff ers f rom cataract sees [n on -p resen t] sli n gs of hai r and so forth." ( vijfiapti­miitram eve dam asadarthiivabhiisaniit / yadvat taimirikasya asatkeso'!r!rakiididaiSanam/ /) A si mi lar argu men t i s in trodu ced and refu ted in PP (see Eck el, p. 61) .

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It is not so that visible forms and the like are not perceived in a dream. In fact, they are

perceived by the cognitive eye (jniinacak�us ) 1 which has been permeated (paribhiivita )

from time immemori al by the impressi ons (viisanii) of apprehended [external ] objects

(griihya ) and [their corresponding] perceptual cognitions (griihaka ) . Dream conscious­

ness and the like do therefore have a [real ] object (siilambana ) . What is seen [heard,

smelt, etc . ] in a dream is a reappearance (abhidhiina) [of the objects] that have pre­

viously been perceived [heard, smelt, etc. ] [during waking life] . Dream cogniti ons are

therefore simil ar to recollections (smrti ) and the like.

Even in the dreams of people who are blind from birth and whose power of vi­

sion is entirely impaired, many kinds of visible forms --colors as well as shapes- ap­

pear by the power of the impressions (viisanii) of what was perceived by them in their

previous lives. Thus, even the [dream] consciousness of persons who are blind from

birth is not without object. This accords with the foll owing words from scripture:

"Protector of Virtue (Bhadrapala) , in his dreams a person who is blind from birth per­

ceives these visible forms with his cognitive eye and not with his fleshy eyes. " Thus, be­

cause [ in dreams] the cognitive eye perceives phenomena (dharma ) , even dream con­

sciousness and the like do have an object [that exists separately from the mind] . Hence,

your argument (siidhana) is defective because it lacks a correct example . 2 And since

1 The cognitive eye is the mental organ ( maJUlS) . It acts as the support (asraya) of mental perceptions (manovijiiiina) which have mental phenomena (dharma) as their object. See Yamaguchi, p 23l.

2 Bhavaviveka here argues that, from the point of view of the conventional truth, the perception of visible forms in a d ream is a mental cognition which has a real mental object (dharma) and is only possible as a recollection of previous perceptions of real external objects in the waking world Bha­vaviveka thus uses the d ream simile to show that, conventionally speaking, both consciousness and its object are real enti ties, each being a prod uct of its respective causes and each having a d e­pend ently originated own-being (paratantrasvabhiiva) In PP ( see Eckel, p 62) , he refutes the same ar­gument from the point o f view of both truths. First, if the Yogacara reasons about what is ult imately the case (paramiirthatah) , the example of d ream consciousness is not established, because d ream con­sciousness - or any consciousness for that matter - ultimately d oes not originate from itself, from others, etc And if the Yogacarin reasons conventionally, his ' mind only' thesis conflIcts with the common-sense view (prasiddhabiidhii) that perceptual cognitions originate in depend ence on cond i­tIO ns which are not of the nature of mind such as external objects and sense organs

People with normally functioning sense organs perceive colors, shapes, sound s and so forth while they are awake. According to Bhavaviveka, when such people perceive images of external objects in their d reams, they perceive real mental phenomena (dharma) T hese phenomena have an existence of their own because they originate from the impressions (viisanii) prod uced by the perceptions that occurred d uring waking life. They are replicas of prevIO usly perceived objects. As real entities, they act as the prod ucing object-cond ition of the mental cognition t hat cognizes them. Even the d ream consciousness of people who are blind from birth perceives images of colors and the like Although blind people cannot perceive colors while they are awake d uring their present existence, their stream of consciousness has retained the impressions of the visual perceptions that occurred d uring theIr previous existence ( s) when their visual sense organ was functioning normally. Hence, the example of d ream consciousness is no evid ence for the nonexistence of objects outside the mind . On the contrary,

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you deny the existence of [external ] objects such as visible form and so forth, you also

mistakenly negate (apavada) the existence of the obj ects (vi�aya) [of perceptual cog­

nitions] . 1

You might argue as follows : "Consciousness itself originates as the [simultane-

the appe ar ance o f i mage s of co lor s and shape s in dre am co nscio usne ss is based o n reco llectio n and canno t be ex plai ne d unle ss re al ex ter nal o bjects have bee n per ce ive d duri ng wak ing li fe ei ther in this exi ste nce or in a pre vio us exi ste nce .

Sthiramati di scusse s the same pro ble m i n MVT 25 . 20-26.18 (d. Yamaguchi, pp. 231-232). He intro­duce s and re fute s three o bje cti o ns agai nst the Yo gacar a ar gument that wak ing co nscio usne ss is si mi­lar to dre am co nsciousne ss i n that it ori gi nate s without a real exter nal o bje ct. The thir d o bje ctio n (26. 8 - 10) says that the dream co nscio usne ss o f peo ple wi th nor mal e ye si ght doe s have an o bje ct, name ly the o bje ct that has been per ce ive d (anubhiltartha ) dur ing their wak ing life . I f the Yo gacar in re fuse s to acce pt this, he will be unable to ex plain why the dre am co nsciousne ss o f peo ple who are bli nd fro m bir th (jatyandha ) doe s no t per ce ive co lor s and shape s. Sthiramati re futes this o bjectio n as fo llo ws (26. 10- 18). Fir st, image s o f co lor s and shape s appear also in the dream co nscio usne ss o f per­so ns who are bli nd fro m bir th. Ho we ver , since the se per so ns canno t per cei ve re al co lor s dur ing their wak ing li fe , the y are no t fami li ar with the li ngui sti c co nve ntio ns (saJ?'lketa ) . That is to say, the y do no t k no w that the i mage s o f the co lor s they perce ive in their dre ams are co nve ntio nally de signate d as "red" , " blue" , and so for th. The y are there fore unable to co mmuni cate the ir per ceptio ns o f co lor s to o ther peo ple . Thi s ex plains why i t i s mistake nly tho ught that per so ns who are blind fro m bir th do no t per ce ive image s o f co lor s i n their dreams. Se co nd, the o ppo ne nt' s pre mise that o nly" pre vio usly per ce ive d o bjects are see n duri ng a dream, also applie s to the dre ams o f per so ns who are blind fro m bir th, be cause such per so ns have had per ceptio ns o f co lor s and the like dur ing the ir previo us ex is­te nce (s). Sthir amati thus use s the same ar gument as Bhavavi vek a, but he use s it to e stablish ' mind o nly' where as Bhavavi veka use s it to refute ' mi nd o nly' . For Bhavavivek a, o nly per ceptio ns in a dre am or igi nate fro m impre ssio ns that were pro duced by per ce ptio ns dur ing wak ing li fe , where as all the per ce ptio ns dur ing wak ing life or iginate fro m ex ter nal co ndi tio ns and no t fro m i mpre ssio ns i n the mi nd. For Sthir amati , all our perce ptio ns ori ginate fro m impre ssio ns i n the mi nd ; all the se i m­pre ssio ns are pro ducts o f an intr a- me ntal pro ce ss o f tr ansfor matio n, and no ne o f them i s the pro duct o f pre vio us per ce ptio ns o f re al ex ter nal o bjects.

Candraklrti di scusses the ' dre am simi le' ar gume nt i n MA V VI . 48-55 . On that o ccasio n, he also cr iticize s Bhavavivek a' s i nterpretatio n o f the dre am si mi le i n MHK V. 19. Accor ding to Candrakir ti, a Madhyamik a sho uld no t refute the ' mind o nly' tene t by ar gui ng that, co nve ntio nally speak ing, ex­ter nal obje cts are as re al as co nscio usne ss i tse lf. A true Madhyamik a sho uld ar gue that bo th co n­scio usness and its obje ct are ulti mate ly unreal. He voi ce s hi s cri tici sm o f Bhavavi veka as fo llo ws: "So me bo dy [ = Bhavavi vek a] re aso ns as fo llo ws: ' [I mage s] o f visi ble for ms are pre sent i n dre am co nscio usne ss. The y are me ntal phe no mena and are appre he nde d by a me ntal co gni tio n (manovi­jfiiina ) . A co nscio usne ss wi tho ut o bje ct doe s there fore no t exi st anywhere .' This reaso ni ng [i s no t o nly i nappro pr iate for a Madhyamik a, but i t] i s also wro ng, be cause in dre am co nscio usne ss the three [ = o bject, se nse or gan, co nscio usne ss] do no t ex ist [ as se lf-e stabli she d e ntities] . He mi ght say that he affirms [the ex istence o f o bjects] for the pur po se o f re futing the do ctri ne o f o ther s [ =o f the Y o gacara] . I n that case , ho we ver , the ex ample will be meaningle ss [for the pur po se o f re futi ng the Y o gacar a and e stabli shing the Madhyamak a the si s that all thi ngs lack inherent exi stence] . Why? Be cause yo u canno t sho w that the e ntitie s [o f the waki ng world] are unre al (alika, mrsa ) by me ans o f an ex ample [ = dream co nscio usne ss] o f which [ yo u assume] the o bject to be re al."

· (Co mmentar y o n MA VI .5 1cd-5 2a in MABh 143. 5 -13, D . Ha 265 a3-5 )

1 Thi s i s an e pi ste mo lo gi cal o bje ction. Ho w can per ceptual co gnitio n origi nate witho ut o bje ct? For the Madhyamak a, e pi ste mo lo gical que stio ns deal wi th co nve ntio nal truths, i n casu the ori ginatio n o f per ce ptual co gni tio n. Bhavavivek a' s po int is that the ' mind o nly' te ne t canno t account for the ori gi­natio n o f per ce ptual co gni tio ns be cause it de nies the co nve ntio nal truth that per ce ptual co gnitio ns ar ise o nly whe n ex ter nal o bje cts are pre sent.

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ous] appearance of two things (dvayabhasa) , namely the appearance of [conscious­

ness] itself ( svabhasa) [as an apprehender of objects] and the appearance of an image

of an [external ] object ( vi�ayabhtisa) due to an [ internal ] causal process (pari;:tama)

by which consciousness assumes the form (akara) of an external object (bahyavi�aya) .

Just this latter appearance is the obj ect ( v�saya) of consciousness as self-appearance." l

1 The Yogacara replies to Bhavaviveka' s objection that the ' mind only' t enet cannot explain how per· ceptual cognitions originate Bhavaviveka adheres to the Sautrantika position that we never per­ceive external objects directly. What we perceive directly are only images of external objects (see note 1, p. 98) The Yogacara says the same. But the Yogacara does not accept that the appearance of these images in the mind is caused by the presence of real objects outside the mind For the Yoga­cara, both the perceiving consciousness and the images it percei ves originate simultaneously as the outcome of a strictly internal causal process (vijiianapari1:ziima. see TrK 1 ) by which their respective seeds in the store- consciousness obtain causal eff iciency Hence, f or the Yogacara, perceptual cogm­tions do have an object, but their objects are all of the nature of mind.

The terms svabhiisa and visayiibhiisa are most probably borrowed from D igna ga's Pramii:zasamuc ­caya [PS] 1 . 9-10 (see M. Hattori, Dignaga, On Perception, Harvard U niversity Press, 1968, p. 28-29) But D ignaga' s theory of knowledge in PS diff ers in three important respects f rom the theory which Bhavaviveka introduces here First, D ignaga does not adhere to the 'mind only' tenet in PS. Second, he does not teach that the subjective and objective aspects of consciousness are two separate entities, each being produced by their own causes (see PS 1 . 10) Third, he distinguishes a third aspect of con­sciousness, namely that of self -awareness (svasa'J'!lvzttz ) . Strictly speaking, only D harmapala' s theory of consciousness, as explained in the Vijnaptimatrataszddhz, seems to f it with the content of MHK/TJ 20ab.

S. Yamaguchi (pp. 237 -238) mentions MVK /MVBh/MVT as another possible text source of the theory presented here. According to these texts, consciousness is intrinsically f ree from the subject­object (grahaka, grahya) duality. Nevertheless, as long as it is aff ected by def ilements and cognitive obstructions (klesajiieyavara:za) , consciousness originates as a dualistiC subject-object appearance (grahyagrahakapratibhasa). Perceptual cognition then not only has an image of external objects (grahyapratibhasa = grahyiikilra = arthasattvapratibhii.')a), but it simultaneously manif ests itself as the perceiver of such an image (grahakapratibhasa = grahakakilra = iltmavijiiaptipratibhasa) (MVK I 3 , see also MSA X1 . 40) .

It is important to note that, at least prior to D ignaga, the doctrine of consciousness as a dual ap­pearance was taught as a purely soteriological doctrine and was not concerned Wi th epistemological issues. The purpose of the doctrine was not to explain how perceptual cognitions originate, what their object is, how their object is cognized, and so forth. The purpose was to explain what def ile­ment (sa'J'!lklesa) is, how it originates and how it can be eliminated. Sthiramati, in particular, empha­sizes the point that any instance of def iled consciousness (abhillaparikalpa) necessarily (avas yam, MVT 26. 1-2) originates as the appearance of an unreal subject-object duality, because one could oth­erwise not explain why and how people mistake the unreal f or real and thus become attached to the imagined nature of the self (iltman ) and other things (dharma) If consciousness did not originate as the appearance of unreal duality, the origination of sa'J'!lklesa simply could not be explained. The f ol­lowing passages from Sthiramati's MVT illustrate this point: (1) The nature of def iled consciousness (vijnanasvabhava) consists in being a false consciousness (a­bhiUaparikalpa l , that is, a consciousness which produces images of unreal objects and simultaneously manif ests itself as the apprehender of these images. (MVT 17 .7 -8) (2) Because external objects do not exist, consciousness itself does not exist as the knower (vijnilt!) of such objects. But consciousness does exist as the real cause and locus both of the appearance of images of unreal objects and of the appearance of itself as the unreal apprehender of such objects. This is because the nature of def iled consciousness (vijnanasvabhava) consists in ' appearance of un­real subject-object duality' (MVT 20. 1-5)

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We rejoin :

If you say that the images of [external] objects [ in the mind] are the object ap­

prehended by the mind, we ask you what other nature (iltman) the mind could

have in addition to [just] being the appearance [of images] of [external] ob­

jects? (20)

To us [Madhyamikas] it is evident that, [conventionally speaking] , the nature (sva­

bhilva) of consciousness consists in its origination as the appearance of [images of] ob­

jects such as visible forms and so forth. But except for the appearance of object­

images, we do not see any other appearance [of consciousness] as itself (svilbhiisa). If

there exists a second nature of consciousness, other than the appearance of object­

images, you should tell us what it is. l

To show [what that second nature is] , you will perhaps argue as follows.2 Con­

sciousness has two natures: it is the appearance of i tself (svilbhilsa) and the appearance

of object- images (vi�aYilbhilsa) . This is because consciousness not only continues to ex­

ist with its own nature but also originates [in various ways] as resembling other

[things] (anyanibha) , just like a crystal jewel (sjJha.tika) . A crystal j ewel is by nature

(3) The appea rance of t he un real sub ject -ob ject dual it y in con sc iou sne ss is t he ba sis or cau se ( kiira1!a, nibandhana ) of t he m istaken ident if icat ion ( niyama) o r de signat ion ( abhilapanam) of and attachment to ( abhinivesa) t he ima gined e xistence of ob ject s and of it self a s t he selfsame app rehen­de r/o wne r of suc h ob ject s. ( MVT 17. 4-5, 17. 10-11, 26 . 1-2, 2 18. 18-2 0).

I Acco rd in g to Bhava viveka, t he natu re (svabhiiva) of con sc iou sne ss, o r t he spec if ic qual it y in virtue of whic h somet hin g is a con sc iou sne ss a s d ist in gu ished f rom non-con sc iou s t hin gs, is t hat it o rigi­nate s a s an ent it y whic h po sse sse s an ima ge o r fo rm of an ob ject ( v�sayiibhiisa) . 'To kno w an ob ject' mean s 'to ha ve an ima ge of that ob ject' . But in add it ion to t hat, con sc iou sne ss doe s not ha ve an y ' second' natu re in virtue of whic h it would al so man ife st it self (svabhiisa) a s t he app rehend in g sub ject of t hat ob ject -ima ge .

Sthiramat i appa rentl y a gree s wit h Bhava viveka on the natu re of con sc iou sne ss : "In add it ion to it s o riginat ion a s t he po sse sso r of an ima ge of an ob ject, con sc iou sne ss pe rfo rm s no othe r act [of kno wled ge] in virtue of whic h it would app re hend t hat ob ject . . . " ( MVT 2 4. 14-16 : na ca v�ayaprati­bhiisatmanotpattiY(l muktva vijiianasya anya kriya 'sti, yam kriyaY(l kurvat vijiianaY(l v�sayam alam­bate . . . . ) .The a greement is ho we ve r onl y appa rent . T rue, Sthiramati sa ys t hat con sc iou sne ss doe s not reall y app re hend it s ob ject -ima ge s. But he al so sa ys t hat con sc iou sne ss man ife st s it self (sviibhiisa) as if it we re the app re hende r of it s ob ject -ima ge s ( see note 1, p . 102) .

2 In t he ve rse s t hat follo w, Bhava viveka d iscu sse s and refute s fou r theo rie s of con sc iou sne ss a s a dual appea rance . T he o rde r of d iscu ssion is a s follo ws. T heo ry 1: Con sc iou sne ss, alt hou gh int rin sicall y fo rmle ss ( niriikiira = sviibhiisa) , a ssume s t he fo rm of d ifferent ob ject s ( vi�aYiibhasa) (2 1ab ). Refutat ion of t his t heo ry (2 1cd -22ab ). T heo ry 2: Con sc iou sne ss is bot h t he capac it y (sakti = sviibhiisa) to p roduce ob ject -ima ge s and the ac­tual appea rance of ob ject -ima ge s ( vi�aYiibhiisa) (22cd ). T heo ry 3: Con sc iou sne ss simultaneou sl y man ife st s bot h it self ( bimba = sviibhiisa) and an ima ge p ro­duced by it self ( pratibimba = vi�ayiibhiisa) ( 23) . T heo ry 4: Con sc iou sne ss is bot h t he in st rument of kno wled ge ( pramii1!a = svabhiisa) and the con st i­tuted kno wled ge it self ( pramii1!aphala = vi�ayabhiisa ) . Int roduced in 2 4ab and refuted in 2 4cd-26 .

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self-transparent (svaprakas a ) [and hence intrinsi cally colorless] ' but it can assume the

appearance of a blue thing and so forth, depending on the different [ colors of the]

things that are placed near to it. Similarly , the mind, whi le continuing to be the appear­

ance of itself (sviibhiisa) , also becomes an object-appearance (vi!iayiibhiisa) by assuming

the form (iikiira) of [various] objects. l

[We reply: ] If you a rgue like that, your example i s not similar to the proposi-

tion you want to prove (siidhya). Why not?

It is wrong to assert that [consciousness] is a twofold appearance because it

originates as similar to other things, just l ike a crystal. The moment at which [a

crystal] originates as a colored thing because some colored object is placed near

to it, is in fact not the [same as the previous] moment of that crystal. (21)

It is true that a crystal jewel , because of the special property of the obj ect that is placed

near to it, such as a blue object and so forth, loses its own transparent nature and

changes into a blue thing and so forth. But it is not the case that the previous moment

of the transparent crystal changes into a blue thing, because that previous moment has

then already ceased to exist.

1 Accordi ng to Yamaguchi ( p. 241 ), thi s the ory i s aki n to Di gnaga' s the ory of the three aspe cts of con­sci ousne ss i n PS. Yamaguchi i s wrong. The theory i ntroduce d he re i s i n fact just the O ppOSI te of Di g­naga's the ory. Di gnaga holds that consci ousne ss i s i ntri nsi cally sakara (= vz�ayabhiJ1)a) The pre se nt the ory howe ve r says that consci ousne ss i s i ntri nsi cally transpare nt, si mi lar to a crystal, and he nce i ntri nsi cally free from obje ct-i mage s ( nirakara). Consci ousne ss be come s an obje ct-appearance as long as i t i s affecte d by defi le me nts and cogni ti ve obstructi ons, but all that whi le i ts i ntri nsi cally pure nature re mai ns unaffe cte d by the se ex tri nsi c appearance s. Thi s theory i s thus close to the theory of the i ntri nsi cally pure but adve nti ti ously de fi le d nature of consci ousne ss, as taught i n MVK , MSAL and DD V Bhavavi ve ka re fute s thi s theory i n de tai l i n MHK V 88-9l .

Bhavavi ve ka's most li kely tex t source i s the SaY(ldhinzrmocanasutra whe re the compari son of the crystal i s used to ex plai n the relati onshi p between the three nature s (SNS, Lamotte VI. 8 -9, pp. 61 -62; T. vol 1 6, 693b2-20) . Just as a crystal appears as i f i t we re a sapphi re , a ruby or an emerald, de ­pe ndi ng on whe the r the object i t comes i n contact wi th i s blue , re d or gree n, just so the de pe nde nt na­ture of thi ngs appe ars as i f i t we re an i nde pe nde ntly establi she d nature. And just as a crystal re tai ns i ts i ntri nsi cally transpare nt nature i n spi te of I tS colored appe arance , just so the de pe nde nt nature i s i ntri nsi cally e mpty of inhe re nt exi ste nce i n spi te of the fact that i t appe ars not to be e mpty of i t.

When re ad i n the li ght of the above passage from SNS, the pre se nt theory says that consci ousne ss i s i ntri nsi cally e mpty of object-i mages (nirakara = svabhiJ1)a) but ne ve rthe less be comes the locus whe re object- i mage s appe ar (sakara = vi:;ayabhasa) as long as the condi ti ons of thi s false appearance are pre sent.

The compari son wi th a crystal i s also use d in a di ffe rent contex t by Sthi ramati i n hi s commentary on MVK V. 15 cd (MVT 217 . 20-218 1) (d. Yamaguchi , p 242). Sthi ramati says that false consci ous­ne ss (abhutapan'kalpa) ori gi nates as a subject-object appe arance (grahyagrahakakara), but not i n the same manne r as a crystal whi ch assume s a colored appe arance whe n a colore d object i s placed near to i t. The purport of Sthi ramati ' s state me nt i s the followi ng. U nli ke a crystal whi ch be come s colore d by an object exi sti ng i n i ts own ri ght apart from the crystal, the subject- object appe arance of con­sci ousne ss i s not caused by ex te rnal obje cts but i s the re sult of i nte rnal cause s ( bija) present i n con­sci ousne ss i tse lf

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It is a mistake to think ' the same transparent crystal is stil l there' with respect to

a different thing that originates after that [crystal as a transparent thing] has al­

ready ceased to exist. (22ab)

It is a mistake to think that the [same transparent] crystal is [stil l] there when, due to

the special property of an object that is placed nearby, something having the nature of

blue and the like originates after that moment of the transparent crystal has ceased to

exist . l

The two natures [of consciousness, asserted by you,] do not exist for the follow­

ing reason [also] . When nothing is placed nearby the crystal, only the former [trans­

parent] nature of the crystal appears. But, whereas the form (iikiira) of the [transpar­

ent] crystal can be observed [even] when nothing is placed nearby, one can never ob­

serve the form of [consciousness as a] knower (jfiiiniikiira) unaccompanied by the form

of a known obj ect (jfieyiikiira) . And it is against reason to think that, although its na­

ture as a self-appearance (svabhiisa) is [never] experienced [in isolation from an object

-appearance] , consciousness could [at some time exist as a mere self-appearance and

subsequently] come to exist as an object-appearance (v�aYiibhiisa) by assuming the ap­

pearance of a known object (alambanabhiisa) after the form of that obj ect (vi�ayakara)

has been approached.2

I Th e poi nt of Bh avavi vek a' s r efutati on i s as foll ows. Th e i nstant at which a cr ystal turns bl ue b e­c ause of th e presenc e of a bl ue obj ec t i n i ts vici ni ty, i s diff er ent fr om th e pr ec edi ng i nstant at which th e cr ystal exi sted as a c olor less, tr ansp ar ent enti ty. Simil arl y, th e i nstant at which c onsci ousness manifests onl y i tself (sviibhasa) and th e i nstant at which i t contai ns th e im age of an obj ec t (v�ayii­bhasa) ar e two diff er ent i nstants of c onsci ousness and ar e th er ef or e two diff er ent enti ti es. C onse­quentl y, one c annot say that one i nstant of c onsci ousness has th e twofold natur e of sViibhasa and vi�ayiibhasa. Bh avavi vek a th us sub stanti ates hi s own p osi ti on th at th e nature of c onsci ousness c on­si sts onl y i n 'h a vi ng im ages of obj ec ts' (vi�aYiibhasa). Ap art fr om th at, consci ousness d oes not have any sec ond natur e i n vir tue of which i t would m anif est i tself (sviibhasa).

2 After havi ng excl ud ed th e possibili ty th at c onsci ousness c ould at one and th e sam e i nstant have th e twof old nature of app eari ng as i tself and appeari ng as an ob jec t, Bh avavi vek a now c onsider s wh eth er such i s p ossibl e at two c onsec uti ve i nstants. A s f or a crystal, w e c an ob ser ve i t as tr ansp ar ­ent at one i nstant and as c ol or ed at th e next i nstant. But c onsci ousness, i n as f ar a s i t i s th e k nower of somethi ng and h enc e excl udi ng th e non- obj ec tif yi ng awar eness of Reali ty, can never b e an obj ec t­less k nower at one i nstant and sub sequentl y appr eh end an ob jec t at th e next i nstant. In oth er word s, c onsci ousness i s always obj ec t- app ear anc e (vi�ayiibhiisa = siikiira) and that i s i ts onl y natur e acc ord ­i ng to Bh avavi vek a.

J ang- gya (see D . Lop ez, A Study of Sviitantrika, p . 311) has i nterpr eted th e pr esent passage as a r efu­tati on of self- awar eness (svasaJ?1vitti) . Th at, h owever, d oes not seem to b e th e tr ue purp or t of th e text. Th e text says th at a c onsci ousness wi thout obj ec t- im ages i s never exp eri enc ed, b ut i t d oes not sp ecif y wh eth er such a c onsci ousness i s never exp eri enc ed b y anoth er c onsci ousness or b y th at c on­sci ousness i tself. Th e pr esent passage c ould b e i nterpr eted as an explici t deni al of self- awar eness only if i t exp lici tly stated th at c onsci ousness i tself c annot exp eri enc e or appr eh end i tself as an ob ­jec tl ess k nower . Mor eover, th e stand ard th eor y of self- awar eness, as d evelop ed b y Di gnaga, d efi nes self -awar eness as th e c apaci ty of c onsci ousness to exp eri enc e not onl y i tself as a k nower but al so i ts k nown ob jec t!

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[Further] , although it is true that a crystal j ewel obtains the quality of appearing

as a colored thing when it is placed near a colored object, it is not the case that the [na­

ture of the] crystal jewel actually changes into the nature of the nearby placed object,

nor does the nature of the nearby placed object change into the nature of the crystal

jewel. If that were the case, it would absurdly follow that the crystal jewel is a colored

object or that the colored object is identical with the crystal jewel. Simi larly, although

a consciousness originates as the appearance of a nearby object (visayiibhilsa) when the

[other necessary] conditions [of perception] are present, that consciousness in no way

changes into the nature of a visible object and so forth, nor does the nature of the vis­

ible obj ect change into the nature of consciousness. Otherwise, it would absurdly follow

that earth and so forth are sentient, or that the mind is insentient l ike earth and so

forth. [Moreover' ] to say that one and the same consciousness is both the apprehended

object (griihya) and the apprehending subj ect (griihaka) , is to state the contradiction

of 'a thing acting on itself' (sviitmani kriYiivirodha). It is therefore not right that con­

sciousness is a twofold appearance just l ike a crystal . )

At this point, the Yogacara objects as follows. [Consciousness as an actual ]

object-appearance gradually provides the stream of consciousness with the capacity

( sakti) for producing an effect similar to itself, and thus continues to exist for some

time as the capacity of such a [future] obj ect-appearance . At a [ later] time, when that

capacity has fully matured, consciousness actually originates as having the form

(iikiira) of that object-appearance. Now, one cannot say that consciousness is either

identical with or different from both the capacity and the [actual ity of] object­

appearances. One and the same consciousness is therefore a twofold appearance [in

that it appears both] as the capacity and as the actuality of object-appearances. 2

1 This paragraph again exclu des the simu ltaneou s coexistence of two natu res In consciou sness. The crystal jewel and the colored object are two different things Similarly, the object apprehended by consciou sness cannot have the natu re of consciou sness, nor can consciou sness ever exist in the mode of an object. Bhavaviveka adheres to the Sau trantika position t hat consciou sness and its object are two different things, each having its own natu re and existing independently of each other The na­tu re of consciou sness is to apprehend objects. That is, its natu re is to originate as object-appearance Wh en there is no object-appearance, there is no consciou sness, as is the case du ring dreamless sleep or non-objectifying awareness of Reality_

2 This is the second theory of consciou sness as a twofold appearance. The commentator in TJ intro­du ces it as a Yogacara reply to the objection that the theory of consciou sness as a du al appearance implies the error of consciou sness being simu ltaneou sly su bject and object and thu s ' acting on itself' ( sviitmanz kriyal . That objection is obviou sly based on the premise that the object of consciou sness, as one of the produ cing cau ses of consciou sness, shou ld exist prior to the consciou sness it produ ces The Yoga cara reply focu ses on this prior-posterior relationship between the object of consciou sness as a cau se and consciousness itself as its effect.

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We reply :

[Consciousness] does not exist as a twofold appearance, because the capacity is

not different [from consciousness itself] , just as the nature (atman) of being an

object-appearance [is not different from consciousness itself] . (22cd)

"Consciousness is not a twofold appearance" is the thesis (pak�a) [of our inference] .

"Because the capacity [of an object-appearance] is not different [from consciousness] "

is the reason (hetu). " Just as the nature of [actually] being an obj ect-appearance [is

not different from consciousness itself] " is the example (d!.s.tanta) . You assert that con­

sciousness as an appearance of itself (svabhasa) is different [from consciousness as an

object-appearance] . However, when a consciousness originates, it originates as an

object-appearance only, because it appears in various ways [in accordance with] the

form (akara) of its object, and because [such] an object-appearance is not erroneous

(avyabhicarin). l And when that consciousness [as object-appearance] perishes, it pe­

rishes after having deposited in the stream of consciousness a capacity or power to pro­

duce a [new] consciousness which will be an object-appearance only. When that capa-

As S. Yam aguc hi ( p. 25 0) has pointed o ut, the pre sent t heor y i s fo und in Di gn aga' s Alambanapank?a. After havin g demon strate d t hat t he o bject -con dition ( alambanapratyaya) o f a perce pt ual co gnition i s t he object -image appearin g in con scio usne ss (AP, ver se 6 ) , Di gn aga con si der s t he followin g o bjec­tion : "How can t he im age in con scio usne ss, w hile bein g a part o f con scio usne ss an d ari sin g sim ult a­neo usl y wit h it, be the o bject -con dition o f con sciousne ss?" Di gn aga gi ve s t he fol lowin g two an swer s.

Fir st, one c an say t hat a c ause an d it s e ffect are sim ult aneo us in t he sen se t hat t he y always occ ur to get her . Thus, altho ugh t he o bject -im age ari se s simult aneo usly wit h it s e ffect (that i s, with t he per­ce pt ual co gnition it pro duces), one can say t hat it i s one o f the c ause s o f perce pt ual co gnition be­cause percept ual c o gnition never ori ginate s unle ss an o bject-im age i s pre sent (AP, ver se 7 a).

Secon d, one can also say that t he o bject -im age an d it s effect ( =t he perce pt ual co gnition it pro­duce s) do not e xi st simult aneo usl y but succe ssi vel y ( krame1!a, AP ver se 7 b). Thi s t heor y, fol lowe d by Di gna ga him sel f, correspon ds exact ly to t he secon d t heor y con si dered here . Di gn a ga expl ain s it as fo llow s. The o bject -im age ( arthavabhlisa = v�ayabhlisa) appe arin g in a pre sent perce ptual co gnition depo sit s a capacit y ( nus pa, sakti) in the stre am of con scio usne ss from w hic h anot her perce pt ual co g­nition, havin g a simil ar o bject-im age, wil l ari se later . The o bject-im age o f t he initi al percept ual co g­nition i s t herefore t he o bject -condition - vi a t he c apacit y it has de po site d in t he store -con scio usne ss - o f a simi lar percept ual co gnition ari sin g at a later time .

In the concl udin g ver se s o f AP (vv. 7 c d- 8 ) , Di gn aga i denti fie s the c apacities, from which t he di f­ferent perce pt ual co gnition s act uall y ori ginate, with t he sen se or gan s ( indriya) . The se capacities an d t he o bject -im age s o f act ual perce pt ual co gnition s mutual ly cause e ac h ot her . Di gn aga adds t hat the c apacitie s and t he o bject-im age s c an be re gar de d eit her as di fferent from con scio usne ss or as not di f­ferent from con scio usne ss.

In short, t he second theor y says t hat con scio usne ss i s a two fo ld appe ar ance bec ause it exi st s both as a capacit y ( s akti = svabhlisa) of perce pt ual co gnition an d as an act uali zed perce pt ual co gnition in w hic h o bject -im age s appear ( vi�ayabhlisa).

1 For Bhavavi veka, t he con vention al truth i s t hat external o bject s e xi st and t hat an y perce ption in w hic h an im age of an e xtern al object appear s i s non -erroneous. Error occ ur s w hen t hat im age i s con­ce pt uall y an d verball y mi si denti fie d, as i s t he c ase w hen we imagine to see a sn ake w hen t he im age o f a ro pe act uall y appe ar s in o ur con scio usne ss. See al so MH K V. 15 abo ve .

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city has fully matured, a [new ] consciousness which is only an obj ect-appearance origi­

nates. That is all there is to it. A capacity from which consciousness could originate as

an appearance of i tself is never deposited [in the stream of consciousness] . It is there­

fore useless to imagine an addi tional aspect of self-appearance in a consciousness

which is only an object-appearance.

The Y ogacara might again object as follows. Consciousness is a twofold appear­

ance because [the obj ect-appearance] or iginates together with and in resemblance to

[the self-appearance] , as is the case with an original object (bimba) and its reflected im­

age (pratibimba). When something has the natural tendency (sila) to originate together

[with something else] , then it originates together with it; that is to say, it originates si ­

multaneously. And when something has the natural tendency to originate together with

and in resemblance to [something else] , then it originates as similar to it. Thus, it origi­

nates together with and in resemblance to [another thing] , as is for example the case

when a reflected image originates together with and in resemblance to an original ob­

ject. In the case of consciousness, its appearance as itself (svilbhiisa) is comparable with

an original object, and its appearance as obj ect (visayilbhiisa) is comparable with the re­

flected image [of an original object] . 1

We reply :

We do not assent to [ your argument that] "Consciousness is both appearance of

itself and appearance as another, because [the latter] occurs together with and

in resemblance [to the former] ' as is the case with a reflected image [and an

original obj ect] . " Consciousness is therefore not a twofold appearance. (23)

Even if i t were granted that [consciousness as an object-appearance] occurs together

1 Whereas theories 1 and 2 explam the su bject- aspect and object- aspect of consciou sness as consecu ­tive instants of consciou sness, this third theory says that these two aspects arise simu ltaneou sl y_ Ju st as an object (bimba) in front of a mirror simu ltaneou sly manifests both itself and a mirrored image of itself (pratibimba) , ju st so consciou sness manifests itself as a knower (svabhiisa) and simu ltane­ou sly produ ces an image of the known object (vi�ayabhasa) _

This theory seems to be saying that the object-image produ ced by consciou sness is an off- print or copy of consciou sness itself. It is not clear from which Yogacara text sou rce Bhavaviveka has bor­rowed this third theory The bimba/ pratibimba simile is used m the vijfiaptimiitra section of the Sar;rdhznirmocanasutra (SNS, T. vol. 16, 698a27 -bI 3, Lamotte, T ib. ed. , pp. 90-91 ) , bu t the context in which it is u sed there is not that of the simu ltaneou sness of the two aspects of consciou sness The S I­mu ltaneou s origination of the two aspects of consciou sness is tau ght explicitly in AP (verse 7 a, see note 2, p. 106-107) and in Asvabhava's commentary on the Mahiiyanasar;rgraha (T vol . 31 , 4 01c5 -7) . bu t the bimba/ pratibimba simile is not u sed in either of these texts. The most likely sou rce of this third theory is perhaps DharmapaJ a' s theory that the object- images we perceive in ou r perceptu al cognitions are copies of the original images of the ' objective' world which are constantly bu t only dimly perceived by ou r store- consciou sness (see Siddhi, p. 445 and 44 7, T. vol. 31 , 4 0cl4 -21, 27ft . ) .

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with and in resemblance to [consciousness as an appearance of itself] , consciousness

would still be unestablished as a twofold appearance. This is because a reflected image

is not a real entity (avastu) and because consequently also the perception of such a non­

entity is erroneous. l

[The Yogacarins] object [again] : "Consciousness is certainly a twofold appear­

ance because it is [both] the instrument of knowledge (pramii;:za) and the resultant

knowledge (pramii;:zaphalam) itself. The instrument of knowledge is that through which

[new, certain knowledge] is acquired (anumii) ; this is consciousness as the appearance

of itself (sviibhiisa). The resultant knowledge is the distinct apprehension of an object

by consciousness; this is [consciousness as] an object-appearance (visaYiibhiisa) . It is

difficult to account for [both] the instrument of knowledge and the resultant know­

ledge if consciousness were merely an object- appearance.,,2

We reply :

If you assert that [consciousness] is a twofold appearance because it exists

[both] as the instrument of knowledge and as the resultant knowledge itself,

[we reply that] this theory also is unacceptable because [these two] are esta­

blished even if it is otherwise. (24)

The instrument of knowledge and the resultant knowledge are established even if it is

otherwise, that is, even if [consciousness] is not a twofold appearance. H ence, this the­

ory also is unacceptable. If you ask us how the instrument of knowledge and the resul-

1 The me ani ng o f Bhav avive ka's re fut atio n here is not cle ar and is per haps not to t he poi nt . The Yog a­cara wo uld i n fact agree t hat object -images are not im ages o f real obj e cts o utside t he mi nd and t hat all our perce pt ual cognitio ns are co nseque ntl y ill usio ns ( bhriinti, 'khrul pa) .

2 Accordi ng to Dig nag a (PS/PSV I . 8cd and I . 9cd ; M. H attori, Digniiga. On Perception, pp. 28-31) , t he i nstr ume nt o f kno wledge and t he result ant or constit uted kno wledge are o ne and the s ame e ntit y. On Dig nag a's theor y, a co nstituted kno wledge is a kno wledge whi ch possesses the image o f an object . It is kno wledge o f t his or t hat parti cul ar object, because it possesses t he im age o f t his or t hat parti cul ar object . W he n a co nscious ness possesses t he image o f a b lue object, t his i pso facto me ans t hat it per­ceives a bl ue object and not a red or yello w object . I f 'to kno w an obj e ct' t hus means 'to possess the im age of t hat object', it follo ws t hat t he i nstrument o f kno wledge ( pramii":la) cannot be anyt hi ng else but t he act b y means o f whi ch co nscio usness appro pri ates t he im age o f an obj e ct . Accordi ngl y, the co ns cious ness whi ch as a co nstit uted kno wledge (pramii":laphalam ) possesses t he im age o f an object, is also the i nstrume nt o f kno wledge be cause it itsel f has acquired kno wl edge o f t hat object b y appro­pri ati ng t he image o f t hat object . The co nscio us ness i n whi ch t he image o f an obj e ct appears is t here­fore bot h t he co nstit uted kno wledge and t he i nstr ume nt al cause o f t hat kno wledge .

Dig naga adds ho wever that t hese t wo as pe cts of cognitive co nscio us ness are disti ng uished for the s ake o f expl anatio n o nl y. I n realit y, each i nstance o f a cognitive co ns cio us ness is a unitar y e ntit y. It does not co nsist o f t wo i nde pe ndent parts . Si nce the t heor y i ntrod uced i n MH K V. 24 ab hypost ati zes t he pramii":la and pramii":laphalam as pe cts i nto t wo real parts o f cog nitive co ns cio us ness, it does not corres pond to Dig nag a's t heor y i n PS/PSV. The most l i kel y t arget o f Bhav avive ka's critique is t herefore ag ai n D harmapal a's t heor y as set fort h in the Vijnaptimiitrafiisiddhi (d. p. 1 02, note 1 ) .

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tant knowledge are establ ished when [consciousness exists ] otherwise, we say :

The act of apprehending a knowable obj ect is performed by consciousness when

it assumes [the form of] an obj ect-appearance at the very moment of its origina­

tion. Hence, that [nascent consciousness] is considered to be the instrument of

knowledge. (25)

At the very moment of its origination, consciousness assumes the form (akara) of [con­

sciousness as] an object-a ppearance and in doing so it makes an object distinctly

known. We therefore hold that consciousness at the very moment of its origination is

the instrument of knowledge (prama;:za).

And when that consciousness has originated, [the object] is actually perceived.

We therefore hold that [the actual perception of the object] which is thus accom­

plished, is the resultant knowledge. (2 6ab)

When that consciousness has originated, the object is perceived. Hence, that which has

been produced (abhinirv!tta) by that [nascent consciousness] is the result (prama;:zapha­

lam). We therefore hold that both the instrument of knowledge and the resultant

knowledge exist in one and the same consciousness which is an obj ect-appearance

[only] . This is simi lar to the cutting of a tree with an axe: there is the act of cutting

the tree into two halves through the downward movement of the axe, and there is [the

result consisting in the tree 's ] having been cut into two halves. 1

[ It is the resultant knowledge] because [consciousness] has [then] acquired

knowledge of the nondefinable nature [of its object] exactly as i t is. ( 26cd)

A perceptual cognition (pratya�ajfiana) apprehends only the individual characteristics

(svalak�a;:za) of i ts object and is free from conceptual ization and recollection.2 Thus, by

means of a strictly individual and direct awareness (svasaJ?1vedanakara) 3 , it knows the

1 Bhavaviveka's position is in short as follows. Cognitive consciousness is object-appearance only. Wh en a cognitive consciousness originates (jayamana), it appropriates the image of an object and thus acts as the instrument of knowledge (prama':la) (V 25 ). And when that consciousness has origi­nated, it possesses an object-image, which is to say that it knows an object and is thus a constituted knowledge (prama1!aphalam) (V. 26ab). Hence, consciousness as object-appearance (vi�ayabhasavi­jnana) only is both the instrument of knowledge and the constituted knowledge itself (V. 26cd).

2 See p 96, note 6. 3 For Bhavaviveka, 'svasar:zvedana ' does not mean 'self-awareness' in the sense that a cogn itive con­

sciousness would be directly aware of its own act of apprehending an image of an object It rather means that consciousness is the dir ect and strictly individual (sva ) awareness of the image of the ob­ject itself. Just because consciousness is object-appearance only according to Bhavaviveka, the ap­pearance of an object-image is itself already the awareness of that object- image. T here is no sepa­rate act of awareness of an object in addition to the appearance of the image of that object And con­sciousness certainly has no awareness of itself as an apprehender of object-images For Bha­vaviveka' s rejection of 'self-awareness', see also MHK V. 95

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[ individual] nature of visible forms and so forth, which cannot be identified as 'blue'

and so forth, exactly as such a non-identifiable nature. H ence, both the instrument of

knowledge and its result exist in one and the same consciousness which is object­

appearance [only] . Since the meaning of the reason [in your argument] 1 is thus not es­

tablished, your theory of consciousness as a twofold appearance is unfounded.

1 Re fe rence to the logic al reas on of the ar gu ment in ve rse 24.

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�¥R*�j(�{j�MB #! 1TJh�4�· ��*i �21-f} 2001if. 149-190

An Annotated Translation of

Madhyamakahrdayakiirikii/Tarkajviilii V .27 -54

Paul HOORNAERT

1. Edited Tibetan text of MHK/TJ V.27-54

(Editions used: Cone (C.) Dbu-rna Dsa 207a6-214bl; Derge (D.) Dbu-rna Dsa 207a6-

214bl; Peking (P.) Dbu-rna Dsa 228b4-237b8)

yang pha rol po dag gi bsarn pa gzhan bsal ba'i phyir bshad pal

gal te srnra 'dod bsgrub bya ball

phyi don serns kyi dngos nyid del I

rnarn par shes pa'i yul yin phyir I I

dper na de rna thag bzhin noll (27)

(cittasvabhavo bahyartho yadi sadhyo vivakl?italfl

vijiianavil?ayatvena tad yatha sarnanantaralfll(27»)

zhes bya ba 'di la phyi rol gyi don ni chos can noll de serns kyi ngo bo nyid yin par

sgrub pa ni de' i chos sol I rnarn par shes pa'i yul yin phyirl zhes bya ba ni gtan tshigs

kyi don du phyir zhes srnos sol I dper na de rna thag pa'i rkyen bzhin no zhes bya ba

ni dpe stel serns dang serns las byung ba rntshungs pa de rna thag tu 'gags pa rnarns

ni de las gzhan pa'i serns dang serns las byung ba rnarns skye ba'i rkyen gyP dngos por

'gyur bas de rna thag pa'i rkyen zhes bya'ol I gal te de yang rnarn par shes pa'i yul yin

pa'i phyir serns kyi ngo bo nyid yin pa de bzhin du phyi rol gyi don yang rnarn par shes

pa'i yul yin pa'i phyir serns kyi ngo bo nyid yin no zhe nal

des na serns byung so so yis2 I I

gtan tshigs 'khrul pa nyid du 'gyurl I (28ab)

(pratyekacaitasair hetolf syad eva� vyabhicarital (28ab»)

1 P : gyis 2 P : yi

- 149 -

zhes bya ba ni des cF re zhig rnarn par shes pa'i yul yin pa'i phyir de rna thag pa'i rkyen

bzhin du phyi rol gyi yul yang serns kyi ngo bo nyid yin par 'gyur rami 'on te rnarn par

shes pa'i yul yin pa'i phyir tshor ba la sogs pa serns las byung ba so so dag serns kyi

ngo bo nyid rna yin pa bzhin du phyi rol gyi yul yang serns kyi ngo bo nyid rna yin par

'gyur ba'i gtan tshigs rna nges pa nyid dol I

Cc. 207b4, D. 207b4, P. 229a3) ci ste yang 'di snyarn du de ni lung gis 'grub stel 'di Ita

stel kharns gsurn pa ni serns tsarn rno zhes gsungs par serns nal 'dir bshad pal de ni

rigs pa rna yin tel lung gi don yongs su rna shes pa'i phyir roll gang gi phyir zhe nal

rndo las serns tsarn gsungs pa nil I

byed po za po dgag phyir roll (28cd)

Csutre ca cittarnatroktil). kart�bhokt�ni�edhatal).1 I (28cd))

zhes bya ba ni gzhan rnu stegs can dag gis rnarn par shes pa las gzhan gyi byed pa po

dang za ba po yod par brtags2 pa sel bar rndzad pa'i phyir sangs rgyas dangl byang

chub serns dpa' rnarns kyis serns tsarn zhes bstan pa rndzad pa yin gyi/ phyi rol gyi yul

bsal pa'i phyir ni rna yin nol I gang gi phyir zhe nal sa bcu pa'i rndo sde lasl byang chub

serns dpa'i sa drug pa la byang chub serns dpa' rten cing 'breI par 'byung ba lugs su

'byung ba dangl lugs su 'byung ba rna yin pa la rnarn par blta ba 'di snyarn du serns

tel rna rig pa la sogs pa yan lag bcu gnyis pa las3 sdug bsngal gyi phung po 'ba' zhig

pa byed pa po dangl tshor ba po dang bral ba 'di 'byung zhing sdug bsngal gyi shing

Ijon pa rnngon par 'grub par 'gyur ro snyarn du de Itar nges pasl kye4 rgyal ba'i sras

dag 'di Ita stel kharns gsurn pa 'di ni serns tsarn stel serns kyis rnngon par 'dus byas

pa dangl serns kyis bris pa yin gyi5 I serns las gzhan pa'i byed pa po dangl za ba po ni

'ga' yang rned do zhes gsungs pas phyi rol gyi yul rned pa nyid du rni 'grub boll

Cc. 208a1, D. 208a1, P. 229b3) 'dir srnras pal de ni shes rab kyi pha rol tu phyin pa las

kyang gsungs tel byarns pa byang chub serns dpa' gzugs kyi bye brag gdags pa ni rnarn

pa gsurn gyis6 khong du chud par bya stel 'di Ita stel 'di ni kun brtags pa'i gzugs sol I

'di ni rnarn par brtags pa'i gzugs sol I 'di ni chos nyid kyi gzugs so zhes bya bas sol I

1 "ci" omitted in P. 2 P : btags 3 P : pas 4 P : kya 5 P: gyis 6 P : gyi

- 150 -

de la kun brtags pa'i gzugs gang zhe nal gzugs zhes bya ba ni rning dangl 'du shes

dangl gdags pa dangl tha snyad la brten nas gzugs kyi ngo bo nyid du rtog pa gang

yin pa del de ni rdzas su rned dol I de la rnarn par brtags pa'i gzugs gang zhe nal rnarn

par rtog pa la brten nas gang la rning dangl 'du shes dangl gdags pa dangl tha snyad

kyi gzugs zhes bya ba la sogs par rnngon par brjod pa nyid del 'di ni rnarn par rtog pa

rdzas su yod pa nyid la brten nas rdzas su yod pa yin gyi/ rang dbang du 'jug pa las

ni rna yin noll de la chos nyid kyi gzugs gang zhe nal kun brtags pa'i gzugs des rnarn

par brtags pa'i gzugs de la rtag tu ngo bo nyid rned pa nyid dangl chos bdag rned pa

nyid dangl yang dag pa'i rntha' la sogs pa gang yin pa stel de la rdzas su yod pa yang

rna yin lal rdzas su rned pa yang rna yin tel rnarn par brtags pa'i don gyis stong pa nyid

dangl rnarn par shes pa yod pa'i phyir ro zhes gsungs so zhe nal bshad pal

gal te rnarn brtags don stong pasl I

rnarn par shes pa sgrub byed nail

brtags pa rna yin don yod phyir I I

yul rned par ni rni 'gyur roll (29)

(vikalpitarthasunyarp. ca vijfianarp. yadi sadhyatel

akalpitarthasadbhavan na syad arthanirakriyal I (29)J

(c. 208a7, D. 208a7, P. 230a2J zhes bya ba ni rnarn par shes pa la rnarn par brtags pa'i

don gyis stong pa nyid yin yang de bzhin gshegs pas so so rang rig par bya ba'i chos

nyid kyi gzugs kyi don yod pa'i phyir sgra ji bzhin gyi ngo bo nyid rna yin pa'i dngos

po gang yin pa de yod pas brtags pa rna yin pa'i don yod pa'i phyir yul yod pa kho na

yin par rnarn par shes pa tharns cad du yul gyisl stong pa yin par rni rigs sol I

dbu rna'i snying po'i 'grel pa rtog ge 'bar bal bam po bco brgyad pal

gzhan yangl

rrni lam la yang brtags min pa'i/ I

ngo bo nyid bIos rna nges 'gyurl I (30ab)

(svapne buddhisvabhavenakalpitenapi saf!1saya!:t/ (30ab))

(C. 208b2, D. 208b2, P. 230a5J zhes bya ba ni kharns gsurn pa ni serns tsarn ste/ .gzugs

1 P: gyi

- 151 -

la sogs pa'i don gyis stong pa 'i phyirl rmi lam la sogs pa'i rnam par shes pa bzhin no

zhes bya ba de la 'di ltarl rmi lam la yang brtags pa rna yin pa'i ngo bo nyid kyi blo'i

cha yod pa'i phyir des na ci re zhig rmi lam la sogs pa'i rnam par shes pa bzhin no zhes

bya ba de rmi lam gyi rnam par shes pa brtags pa'i ngo bo nyid kyi skyes bu la sogs

pa'i don gyis stong par 'gyur rami 'on te rang! gi cha la dmigs pa brtags pa rna yin pa'i

don gyis mi stong par 'gyur ba'i gtan tshigs rna nges pa nyid du 'gyur roll

dmigs pa med par2 mi 'dod del I

dpe ni rab tu rna grub phyir I I (30cd)

Cna niralambanapI�ta d��tantasyaprasiddhita!:I1 I (30cd)J

Cc. 208b4, D. 208b4, P. 230a8) zhes bya ba ni brtags pa'i don gyis stong pa'i phyir ro

zhes bya ba 'i dpe rmi lam blangs pa der yang brtags pa 'i don sel bar byed kyi brtags

pa rna yin pa'i don gyi cha sel bar mi byed pa3 des kyang sems tsam nyid du mi 'grub

pa'i phyirl dmigs pa med par mi 'dod del dpe bsgrub par bya ba'i phyogs gcig dang mi

ldan par rab tu rna grub pa'i phyir roll rmi lam gyi shes pa'i chos nyid kyi gzugs kyi4

don la dmigs pa'i phyir dmigs pa med pa nyid rna yin noll 'di ltar rmi lam ni yang dag

pa rna yin pa'i phyir gtan la dbab par na de dpe nyid du mi rung ngo zhes bya bar bsams

soil

'dir smras pal

ci ste blo yul rnam pa gnyisl I

gcig dang 'dus pa yin snyam nal I

rigs pas yongs su brtags pa nail

de ni gnyi gar mi rigs sol I (31)

Catha syad vi�ayo hy eka!:I samuho va bha ved dhiya!:I1

yuktya parIk�yamal!as tu sa dvidhapi na yujyatel I (31))

Cc. 208b6, D. 208b7, P. 230b4 ) zhes bya ba ni pha rol po dag na re ci ste phyi rol gyi

don yod par smra ba dag blo'i yul rnam pa gnyis su 'dod del rdul phra rab gcig pu 'ba'

1 P: gang 2 C, D : pa 3 P: pas 4 "gzugs kyi" omitted in P.

- 152 -

zhig yul du 'dod darnl 'on te rdul phra rab 'dus pa yul du 'dod do snyarn nal gnyi ga

yang rigs pas yongs su brtags pa na 'gal ba'i phyir de ni gnyi gar rni rigs tel bzang po

rna yin no zhes zer roll rigsl pa de yang gang zhe nal de'i phyir srnras pal

de la gzugs rdul gcig pu nil I

gzugs blo'i spyod yul rna yin tel I

de snang nyid du rni 'gyur phyir I I

dbang gzugs spyod yul rna yin bzhinl I (32)

CtatraI).uruparn ekarp tu rupabuddher na gocaraJ:11

atadabhataya yadvad ak�aruparp na gocaraJ:11 I (32»)

Cc. 209al, D. 209a2, P. 230b7) zhes bya ba la gzugs kyi phra ba nyid kyi rnthar thug pa

ni rdul phra rab boll gcig pu zhes bya ba ni 'ba' zhig ces bya ba'i tha tshig gol I gzugs

kyi rdul gcig pu ni zhes bya ba ni chos can yin lal de gzugs kyi blo'i spyod yul rna yin

te zhes bya ba ni de'i chos tel chos can dang chos bsdus pa ni phyogs yin noll de snang

nyid du rni 'gyur phyir zhes bya ba ni gtan tshigs tel de snang nyid du zhes bya ba ni

yul gyi dngos po nyid du snang ba zhes bya ba'i tha tshig gol I de snang ba nyid du rni

'gyur zhes bya ba ni de blo la snang ba nyid du rni 'gyur zhingl yul gyi dngos po nyid

du rni 'gyur ba stel gtan tshigs kyi don gyi phyir zhes bya ba srnos so I I dbang gzugs

spyod yul rna yin bzhin2 zhes bya ba ni dpe stel dbang po zhes bya ba ni dbang po lnga

rnarns tel de rnarns kyi ngo bo nyid yul kha dog gzugs dang ba nyid du yod pa yin yang

de snang ba nyid du rni 'gyur ba'i phyirl dper na de gzugs kyi blo'i yul rna yin pa de

bzhin du rdul phra rab kyang gzugs kyi blo'i spyod yul rna yin noll

phra rab gzugs ni du rna stell

serns kyi spyod yul yin rni 'dodl I

rdzas su yod pa rna yin phyir I I

dper na zla ba gnyis bzhin noll (33)

Canekarn api cittasya naiva tad gocararp rnatarnl

ruparp hi pararnaI).unarn adravyatvad dvicandravatl/ (33»)

Cc. 209a5, D. 209a6, P. 231a5) zhes bya ba ni rdul phra rab kyi gzugS du rna de dag 'dus

I P: rig 2 "bzhin" omitted in P.

- 153 -

pa de yang serns kyi spyod yul yin par rni 'dod del ci'i phyir zhe nal rdzas su yod pa

rna yin pa'i phyir roll 'di ltar rdul phra rab k yi gzugs 'ba' zhig pa ni rdzas su 'dod lal

de dag 'dus pa ni drnag1 dang nags tshal la sogs pa bzhin du rdzas su yod pa rna yin

pas de snang bar 'gyur du zin kyang serns kyi spyod yul yin par rni rigs tel dper na rab

rib can gyi mig skyon gyis nyarns pas zla ba gnyis pa2 la sogs pa yang dag pa rna yin

par rnthong ba bzhin no3 I I 'dir bshad pal

de la gal te pha rol pol I

bsags pa rnin4 pa'i gzugs serns kyi/ I

spyod yul min par sgrub byed nail

der ni grub pa nyid sgrub 'gyur I I (34)

Ctatrasarp.citarupasya cittagocarata yadi/

prasadhyate pareJ)api siddha eva prasadhyatel I (34))

cc. 209bl, D. 209bl, P. 231blJ zhes bya ba ni gal te pha rol po dag bsags pa rna yin pa'i

gzugs rdul phra rab gcig pu serns kyi spyod yul nyid rna yin par sgrub par byed na

phyogs snga rna der grub pa nyid la sgrub par 'gyur tel kho bo cag kyang de ltar 'dod

pa'i phyir roll

ci ste bsags pa'i gzugs la nil I

gtan tshigs rna grub nyid 'gyur tel I

gzugs gzhan dag gi bsags5 pa nil I

der snang blo ni skye phyir roll (35)

Catha sarp.citarupasya hetor evarn asiddhatal

rupantarair upak�tais tannirbhasodayad dhiya!:tl I (35))

Cc. 209b2, D. 209b2, P. 231b3) zhes bya ba ni ci ste rdul phra rab kyi rigs rnthun pa

bsags pa'i gzugs phyogs su byas nas de la rdzas su yod pa rna yin pa nyid gtan tshigs

su brjod na nil de Ita na gtan tshigs gang yang rung ba la rna grub pa nyid du 'gyur

1 P: dmags 2 "pa" omitted in C, D. 3 "zhe na" added in P.

4 C, D : med 5 P: bsams

- 154 -

tel ci'i phyir zhe nal 'di Itar rdul phra rab rigs mthun pa'i gzugs gzhan dag gis de la

bsags shing kun nas sbyar ba na1 de yul gyi dngos por khas blangs shing der snang ba'i

blo rdul phra rab 'dus pa'i rnam par skye ba'i phyir roll kho bo eag ni rdul phra rab

rigs mthun pa'i bsags pa bum pa la sogs pa nyid dang phra rab kyang kun rdzob pa'i

rdzas su 'dod del 'di ltar rdul phra rab ni rdzas brgyad 'dus pa'i bdag nyid yin pasl de

yang rdzas nyid yin par 'dod lal de bzhin du bum pa la sogs pa 'dus pa'i bdag nyid

kyang 'rdzas nyid yin tel 'ba' zhig pa ni rdzas su rna grub pa'i phyir roll

de ni dmigs nyid yin 'dod del I

der snang blo yi rgyur 'gyur phyirl I

'dod ehags bzhin te de yi phyir I I

khyod dam beas la rjes dpag gnodl I (36)

Ctasyalambanata ee�ta tadabhamatihetutal).1

ragavad badhyate tasmat pratijiia te 'numanatal)1 I (36))

Cc. 209b5, D. 209b6, P. 23lb8) ees bya ba ni rdul phra rab rigs mthun pa bsags pa'i gzugs

de ni dmigs pa nyid yin par 'dod del ei'i phyir zhe nal 'di ltar rdul phra rab bsags pa

de ni bsags pa'i gzugs der snang ba'i blo'i rgyu'i dngos po nyid du 'gyur ba'i phyir tel

gang dang gang der snang ba'i blo'i rgyur 'gyur ba de dang de ni bsags pa la dmigs pa

yin tel dper na 'dod ehags yul la ehags pa'i mtshan nyid de2 ni bud med kyi gzugs la

sogs pa bsags pa nyid la dmigs par 'dod pa bzhin tel de'i phyir khyod kyis bsags pa'i

gzugs ni dmigs pa rna yin no zhes dam beas pa de la rjes su dpag pa 'dis gnod par 'gyur

rol I rnam par shes pa'i tshogs lnga'i gnas dangl dmigs pa ni bsags pa yin no zhes

gsungs pa'i lung3 dang yang 'gal 101 I

CC. 210al, D. 2l0al, P. 232a4) 'dir smras pal blo ni dmigs pa med pa kho nar skye stel

rang du snang ba'i rnam par shes pa'i sa bon las skyes pa'i phyir yid kyi blo bzhin no

zhe nal 'dir bshad pal

gal te rang blo dmigs med del I

rang gi sa bon las skye'i phyirl I

yid blo bzhin 'dod btags min phyir I I

1 C : ni 2 "de" omitted in P. 3 P : Ius

- 155 -

khyod kyP drnigs bcas nyid du 'gyurl I (37)

Cyady analarnbata svasyalf svabljad udayad dhiyalfl

rnanodhlvad akalpatvat syat te salarnbata nanul I (37)J

zhes bya ba ni yid kyi rnarn par shes pa la 'ang btags pa rna yin pa'i rang gi don du

snang ba'i cha yod pa'i phyir khyod kyi blo drnigs pa dang bcas pa nyid du 'gyur ro

gzhan yangl

drnigs pa rned pa rjes dpog pas I I

de ni blo nyid rna yin 'gyur I I

'dus pa dam ni rna bcas pas I I

de 'gog pa ni gnod pa medii (38)

Canalarnbanurnanad va taddhltvasya nirakriyal

sarnuhasyapratijfianat tanni�edho na badhakalfl I (38)J

CC. 210a4, D. 210a4, P. 232a8J ces bya ba ni drnigs pa rtogs par byed pas blo zhes bya

ba yin na drnigs pa rned pa nyid rjes su dpog pas blor 'dod pa de blo rna yin pa nyid

du gyur pas blo de ni blo nyid rna yin par bsal ba'i phyir chos can gyi rang gi ngo bo

log par bsgrubs pas dam bcas pa nyarns par 'gyur roll khyod kyis 'dus pa ni drnigs pa

rna yin no zhes srnras pa gang yin pa de la yang kho bos kyang 'dus pa drnigs pa yin

par dam rna2 bcas tel '0 na j i !tar dam bcas she nal rdul phra rab bsags pa ni drnigs

pa yin par dam bcas pas khyod kyis 'dus pa drnigs pa rna yin par de 'gog pa ni kho bo

la gnod pa rned dol I bsags pa dang 'dus pa zhes bya ba gnyis la khyad par ci yod ce

nal rdul phra rab rigs rnthun pa dag gzhi gcig la brten pa ni tshogs pa zhes bya'ol I

glang po che dangl rta la sogs pa dangl skyer pa dangl seng ldeng la sogs pa'i rdzas

rigs rni rnthun pa gzhi tha dad pa 'dus pa la drnag dang nags tshal la sogs par gdags

pa ni 'dus pa zhes bya'ol I

'dir srnras pa I '0 na kho bo cag gi drnigs pa brtag pa'i skabs sui

phyi rol don ni rned par yangl I

nus pa3 dang ni yul gyi dngosl I

1 P: kyis 2 "rna" omitted in P.

3 "pa" omitted in P.

- 156 -

gnyis po phan tshun rgyur 'gyur basi I

thog rna med pa'i dus nas 'jugl I (39)

(asaty api ea bahyarthe dvayam anyonyahetukaml

saktir vi�ayariiparp. ea tannivrttil). kuto matal I (39)J

ees bya bas phyogs 'di brtan1 por bzhag zin to zhe nal bshad pal tshig le'ur byas pa

de'i rtsa ba bzhi pal ji ltar de ni ldog par 'dodl ees bya ba 'dis rjes nas brgal zhing brtag

par bya stel phyi rol gyi don yod pa la ni yul du snang ba'i rnam par shes pa skye ba

de'i dag pa tshol ba'i rnal 'byor pas yul ngo bo nyid med pa nyid du rtogs par gzung

ba dangl 'dzin pa ldog pa'i phyir 'jig rten las 'das pa'i ye shes rnam par mi rtog pa skye

ba rigs2 pa kho nar 'gyur gyi/ khyed yul med pa la ni dang po nas kyang phyi rol gyi

don med lal phyis kyang med pa bzhin du gzung ba dang 'dzin pa'i ngo bo nyid du 'jug

par 'gyur ba de3 phyis rgyu gang gis ldog cing 'j ig rten las 'das pa'i ye shes rnam par

mi rtog pa skye bar 'gyur ba'i thabs ei yang med dol I yul med par smra ba la ni 'jig

rten las 'das pa'i lam skye ba'i thabs med pas nus pa dang yul gyi ngo bo nyid kyi rnam

par shes pa thog rna med pa'i dus nas 'jug pa de ji Itar ldog pa'i rigs pa brjod par bya

dgos sol I

(C. 210b4, D. 210b4, P. 233a3J gal te khyod 'di snyam dul

mi rtog blo ni4 spang min tel I

'phags phyir rnam par mi rtog phyirl I (40ab)

(aryatvad avikalpatvad aheya nirvikalpadhIl).1 (40ab)J

zhes bya bar sems na zhes bya ba ni gal te 'khor bar 'jug pa'i rgyu gzung ba dang 'dzin

pa'i rnam par rtog pa gnyis spangs su zin kyang rnam par mi rtog pa'i blo ni spang ba

rna yin tel 'phags pa'i phyir dangl rnam par mi rtog pa'i phyir skye bar 'gyur ba nyid

yin tel ldog par mi 'gyur bar sems na'ol I de Ita nal

de skye thar pa ga la yodl I

de yi sa bon rna be om phyir / / (40ed)

1 P : bstan 2 P : rig 3 P : de'i 4 P : na

- 157 -

Ctadutpadat kuto mok�as tadbljanupaghatatal).1 I (40cd)J

zhes bya ba ni 'di ltar rnam par shes pa'i sa bon 'jug pas ni 'khor bar 'dod lal de bcom

pas ni thar par 'dod pa yin na ji srid du rnam par rtog pa dang bcas pa 'ami rnam par

mi rtog pa'i shes pal skye ba yod pa de srid du thar pa ga la yodl de'i phyir sems tsam

du smra ba khyod la thar pa yang mi 'thad par 'gyur roll

Cc. 210b7, D. 210b7, P. 233a7J ci ste 'di snyam du rnam par rtog pa dang bcas pa'i shes

pa skye ba ni 'ching ba yin lal rnam par mi rtog pa'i shes pa skye ba ni thar pa yin

par sems tel ci 'i phyir zhe nal 'di ltarl

gnyis kyi 'du shes 'jug pa nail

sna tshogs snang ba rab tu skyel I

de yi sna tshogs snang gang dangl I

de rang sa bon las skye'i phyirl I (41)

Cdvayaprav�ttau saITljnaya visvabhasal). prajayatel

visvaITl tadabhata yasyal). tadutpadat svabljatal).1 I (41)J

zhes bya ba stel gzung ba dang 'dzin pa gnyis kyi rnam par shes pa 'jug pa nal gzugs

la sogs pa yul sna tshogs kyi rnam par snang ba rab tu skye stel de'i rnam pa sna

tshogs snang ba de yang gang zhe nal rnam par shes pa yul gyi rnam par yongs su 'gyur

ba gang yin pa' 01 I de dang rang du snang ba'i rnam par shes pa de yang rang gi sa bon

yul du snang ba'i rnam pa de las skyes pa'i phyir roll

zha ba de la nus phul dangl I

rang bdag nyid dang gzhan las sol I (42ab)

Dayal). saktyarpaI?-at tasya svatmany evanyato 'pi val (42ab)J

Cc. 211a3, D. 211a3, P. 233b3J zhes bya ba ni 'jug pa'i rnam par shes pa de dag 'gag cing

bag la zha ba na yang rtsa ba'i rnam par shes pa de la 'jug par 'gyur tel gang gi nus

pa phul ba'i ngo bo nyid du gnas pa yin noll rang gi cha la dmigs pa rang gi bdag nyid

dangl yul du snang ba'i rnam par shes pa gzhan 'gag pa las kyang de la zha bar 'gyur

ro zhes bya bar sbyar bar sems nal 'dir bshad pal de ni 'jig rten yid ches par bya ba

1 P: adds "de" after "pa".

- 1 58 -

tsam la bden mod kyi/ skyon 'di yod del

rnarn par shes pa'i rning gis nil I

de la bdag tu btags par 'gyurl I (42cd)

Cnanu vijfianaparyayad atrnaivayarp niriipitaJ:11 I (42cd)J

zhes bya ba ni bdag tu srnra ba dag kyang yul sna tshogs 'byin pa'i bdag gcig pu la

thams cad kyi 1 nus pa rab tu bsags par sems pas2 khyod kyis kyang rnarn par shes pa

zhes bya ba'i rning tsam gyi rgyu thabs kyis de nyid la bdag tu btags par 'gyur tel des

na bdag med pa nyid du smra ba yang nyams sol I

CC. 211a6, D. 211a6, P. 233b8J khyed kyis3 rnam par grol bar btags pa yang 'khor ba

las khyad par rned pa nyid du 'gyur tel ji Ita zhe nal 'di la serns tsam du srnra ba'i rnal

'byor pa 'khor ba dang thar pa'i sems tshul la serns pa nal

gnyis yod sgyu rna Ita bu dangl I

zad can rna zhi bdag rned dangl I

gnyis med rni zad yang dag4 dangl I

'chi med go 'phang rnchog rtogs nasi I (43)

de la 'dra bar med pa'i phyirl I

rnarn par rtog pa rnam ldog pas I I

rni rtog bIos ni dmigs byas5 pa'i/ I

grol ba khyad par rned par 'gyurl I (44)

Cdvaitarp mayopamarp matva k�ayy asantam anatma cal

advaitarp cak�ayarp bhiitarn am�tarp paramarp padarnl I (43)

samanyabhavatas tatra kalpanavini�ttitaJ:11

nirvikalpadhiyalambyo rnok�abhedo 'pi vidyatel I (44))

zhes bya ba stel gnyis yod ces bya ba ni gzung ba dang 'dzin pa rnarn pa gnyis kyi

dngos por gnas pa stel de ni sgyu rna Ita bu dangl zad pa can dangl rna zhi ba dangl

bdag rned par rtogs so zhes bya bar sbyar rol I sgyu rna Ita bu zhes bya ba ni yang dag

1 C, D : kyis 2 P : dpas 3 P : kyi 4 C, D, P : yang yang 5 C, D, P : byed. Corrected into "by as" according to the commentary in T].

- 159 -

pa rna yin pa'i rnam par rtog pas skyed pa'i phyir roll zad can zhes bya ba ni de la

zad pa yod pas zad can noll rna zhi zhes bya ba ni skye ba dang 'chi ba la sogs pa'i

bya bas 'phangs pa'i phyir roll bdag med ces bya ba ni gzhan mu stegs byed pa dag

gis yongs su btags pa'i bdag med pa'i phyir dangl rang yang ngo bo nyid med pa'i phyir

rol I gnyis med ces bya ba ni gang gi tshe gzugs la sogs pa dmigs pa rnams sems las

phyi rol las mi snang ba de'i tshe nal rang gi sems kyi chos nyid la nges par gnas pa'i

sems ni gnyis med ces bya stel de ni mi zad pa dangl yang dag pa dangl 'chi ba med

pa dangl go 'phang mchog yin par rtogs nas zhes bya bar sbyar roll mi zad ces bya

ba ni de la zad pa yod pa rna yin pa'ol I yang dag ces bya ba ni mi slu ba'ol I 'chi med

ces bya ba ni skye ba dang 'chi ba la sogs pa dang bral ba'ol I go 'phang mchog ces bya

ba ni mthar thug pa'i gnas sol I rtogs nas zhes bya ba ni gnyis yod pa dangl gnyis med

pa dag tshul de ltar rtogs nas sol I de la 'dra bar med pa'i phyirl I zhes bya ba ni gnyis

med pa de la gzung ba dang 'dzin pa dag ji ltar 'khor ba'i gnas skabs na med pa bzhin

du thar pa'i gnas skabs na yang de dang 'dra bar ngo bo nyid med pa'i phyir roll rnam

par rtog pa rnam ldog pasl I zhes bya ba ni de la gnyis po 'dra bar med par rtogs pa'i

phyir rnam par rtog pa rnam par ldog pas so I I mi rtogl bIos ni dmigs byas pa'F I I zhes

bya ba mngon sum gyi shes pas sgra j i bzhin gyi ngo bo nyid rna yin pa dangl rnam

par mi rtog pa'i bIos kyang yongs su grub pa'i ngo bo nyid dmigs par byas pa'i rnal

'byor pa la'ol I de lal grol ba khyad par med par 'gyurl I zhes bya ba'i skyon 'dir 'gyur3

tel de la skye ba dang dmigs pa dang bcas pa nyid sngon dang 'dra bar yod pa'i phyir

sngon gyi shes pa rnam par rtog pa dang bcas pa las thar pa khyad par med pas beings

pa dangl thar pa gnyis khyad par med par 'gyur roll

(C. 212al, D. 212al, P. 234b6J gzhan yangl

yang na sems tsam bsgrub pa'i phyirl I

sems las byung rnams sems las nil I

tha dad med par khas blang byal I

yang na rnam rig tsam mi 'grubl I (45)

(cittamatraprasiddhyartharp na eittad vyatirekh:lalfl

caitta vabhyupagantavya na va viji'iaptimatratal I (45)J

1 C, D, P: Idog 2 P: bcas pa 3 C : 'byung

- 160 -

ces bya ba ni yang na khyed sems tsam nyid du 'dod pas sems tsam nyid sgrub pa'i

phyir sems las byung ba dmigs pa rnam pa sna tshogs tha dad rnams kyang sems las

tha dad pa med par khas blang bar bya'ol I yang na sems las byung ba rnams sems las

tha dad par rtog na ni sems las byung ba rnams mang ba'i phyir rnam par rig pa tsam

nyid du mi 'grub pol I

yang na tshor sogs 'dus pa lal I

sems su gdags par 'dod par gyisl I

des na gzhan gyi rjes smra dangl I

rang gi gzhung yang btang bar 'gyur I I (46)

C vedanadisamuhe va cittaprajiiaptir if?yataml

tatha paranuvada� syat svanltityagitapi cal I (46))

Cc. 212a4, D. 212a4, P. 235aI) zhes bya ba ni yang na khyed kyis tshor ba dangl sems

pa dangl reg pa dangl yid la byed pa la sogs pa 'dus pa mdung khyim Ita bu dangl sa

dang chu dang me dang rIung dang 'dus pa la sogs pa Ita bu dangl gzugs dang dri dang

ro dang reg pa dang ldan pa'i bum pa la sogs pa Ita bu la sems su gdags par khas blang

bar bya'ol I gal te de Ita bu nyidl yin no zhe nal des na khyed gzhan dbu rna smra ba'i

rjes su smra ba dangl rang gi gzhung yang btang bar 'gyur tel kun gzhi rnam par shes

pa gcig pu kho na las rkyen j i Ita ba las rnam par shes pa'i tshogs lnga 'byung ba dangl

sems las byung ba rnams kyi yongs su 'gyur ba yang khas blangs pa'i phyir roll

gal te 'di snyam du 'di la tshor ba la sogs pa 'dus pa nyid la sems su brtags na sems

rdzas su yod pa nyid rna yin par 'gyur zhing des na kun nas nyon mongs pa dangl rnam

par byang ba dag gi gzhi ci yang med par 'gyur bas tshor ba la sogs pa tha dad pa dag

la ni re re las de rdzas su yod pa nyid yin pas kun nas nyon mongs pa dang rnam par

byang ba dag gi gnas nyid du rigs tel ji skad dul thog rna med pa'i dus ldan khamsl I

sa bon kun gyi gnas gyur pal I de yod pas na 'gro kun dangl I my a ngan 'das pa thob

par 'gyurl I zhes gsungs pa Ita bu'o zhe nal 'dir bshad pal

kun nas nyon mongs rnam byang lasl I

gal te sems ni rdzas 'd od nail

tshor sogs de bzhin skye ba'i phyir I I

de grub pas na gnod pa medii (47)·

1 "nyid" omitted in P.

- 161 -

Csa!!lklesavyavadanac ced dravyasac cittam i9yatel

vedanadeh tathotpadat tat prasiddher na badhakaml I (47)J

Cc. 212b1, D. 2 12b2 , P. 235a8J ces bya ba ni 'di ltar nyon mongs pa dangl nye ba'i nyon

mongs pa'i yid la byed pa dang bcas pa dag sems dang lhan eig 'byung ba nyid na beings

pa yin par 'dod lal nyon mongs pa dang bral ba na1 shes rab mtshungs par ldan pa dang

bcas pa sems dang lhan eig nyid du grol bar 'dod pas sems nyid kyi gnas skabs gzhan

dangl gzhan dag la sems las byung ba dag tu gdags pa yin gyi/ gang gis2 sems 'ba' zhig

pa yin na rdzas su yod pa nyid du 'gyur pa'i sems dang sems las byung ba phan tshun

tha dad par gnas pa ni med dol I de'i phyir tshor ba la sogs pa dag nyid beings pa'i rnam

pa dangl thar pa'i rnam par de bzhin skye ba'i phyir tshogs pa las 'byung bas sems

dang sems las byung ba dag 'dus pa'i ngo bo nyid du yod pa de rab tu grub pas na khyed

sems rdzas su yod pa nyid du rtogs pa des kho bo cag la gnod pa med dol I

Cc. 212b5, D. 212b5, P. 235b5 J gal te de ltar sems 'dus pa'i bdag nyid yin pas rdzas su

yod pa nyid rna yin nal j i ltar de las srid pa'i rgyun dang thar pa 'thob par 'gyur zhe

nal de'i phyir bshad pal

utpala rtsa ba nus mang lasl I

10 rna la sogs rgyun 'byung ltarl I

de bzhin sems rdzas med pa lasl I

rgyun rnams sna tshogs 'byung bar 'gyurl I (48)

Cyatha parJ)adisa!!ltana!!l saluke bahusaktikatl

tathadravyasatas eittac eitrasa!!ltativ�ttayal:I1 I (48)J

zhes bya ba lal utpala rtsa ba zhes bya ba ni utpala'i rtsa ba la stel de la rtsa ba'i 'breI

pa gzhan med par yang nus pa mang po dang ldan pa las mtsho ei tsam du rgya che

ba dag 10 rna dang me tog la sogs pa'i rgyun gyis kun du khyab pa 'byung bar 'gyur

ba ltar de bzhin du sems rdzas su med pa las kyang sems can rnams kyi 'khor ba'i

rgyun gyi bye brag 'khams dangl 'gro ba sna tshogs kyi rnam pa tha dad pa dag3

'byung bar 'gyur roll

Cc. 212b7, D, 212b7, P. 235b8J rgyun gyi bye brag de dag kyangl

1 C, D : bral na 2 P: gi 3 P: mam pa tha dad pas tha dad pa dag ...

- 162 -

gnyen pos skye bar mi 'gyur zhingl I

byed rgyu yod na skye bar 'gyurl I (49ab)

(pratipak�ad anutpattir utpattii:t karal].e sati/ (49ab)J

zhes bya ba la gnyen po zhes bya ba ni 'phags pa'i lam yan lag brgyad pa stel de skyes

pa na rgyun rnams skye bar mi 'gyur zhingl byed rgyu zag pa zhes bya ba dag yod na

skye bar 'gyur roll yang nal lnga po'i rtsa ba'i rnam shes lasl rkyen1 bzhin du ni

'byung bar 'gyurl I zhes khyod kyis gang smras pa de la rtsa ba'i rnam par shes pa med

par yang sems 'dus pa'i bdag nyid kyi rkyen gyi mi mthun pa'i phyogs kyi gnyen po yod

pas ni skye bar mi 'gyur lal byed rgyu gzugs dangl snang ba dangl nam mkha' dangl

yid la byed pa la sogs pa'i rkyen yod na ni skye bar 'gyur roll

'di las2 sna tshogs skyes la sogsl I

btags pa mi 'dod rdzas med phyir I I (49cd)

(adravyatvan na catre�ta visvotpadadikalpanal I (49cd)J

zhes bya ba ni khyed kyi rnam par shes pa yongs su gyur pa 'di las rnam par smin pa

dangl ngar sems pa dangl rnam par rig pa zhes bya ba gsum po dag gi sna tshogs skye

ba la sogs par btags pa ltar ni kho bo cag mi 'dod dol I gang gi phyir zhe nal sems

rdzas su med pa'i phyir roll 'di ltar sems kyi gnas skabs kyi bye brag las de dag tu

gdags par3 ni mi 'dod dol I

(C. 213a4, D. 213a4, P. 236a6J gzhan yangl

de la dmigs pas mi 'grol tel I

blo 'gag4 med pa 'ang rna yin pas I I

de phyir kun rdzob don dam du 'angl I

bdag tu smra dang 'dra mi 'gyurl I (50)

(na tad alambya nirmok�o napi noparatir dhiyai:tl

satp�tya tattvato vapi natmavittulyatasty atai:tl I (50)J

1 C, D, P : rgyun. Correction in accordance with TrK 15a. 2 P : la 3 P : pa 4 P : 'ga'

- 163 -

zhes pa la de la drnigs pa zhes bya ba ni rang gi serns snang ba tsarn nyid du rtogs pas

sol I rni 'grol te zhes bya ba ni srid pa'i rgyun las sol I blo 'gag rned pa 'ang rna yin

pas I I zhes bya ba lal '0 na ci zhe nal blo 'gag par 'gyur ba 'ang yod pa kho na yin tel

dngos po'i rang gi ngo bo yongs su rna grub pa nyid du rtogs pa'i phyir dangl kun gzhi

rnarn par shes pa la rni rtog pa'i phyir roll de'i phyir kho bo cag serns rdzas su yod

pa rna yin zhing 'dus pa'i bdag nyid yin par srnra ba ni kun rdzob dangl don dam par

yang bdag tu srnra ba dang ' dra ba nyid du rni 'gyur gyi/ de las bzlog pas khyed serns

tsarn du srnra ba dag la ni skyon de dag 'byung ba nyid du 'gyur roll

Cc. 213a7, D. 213a7, P. 236b3J khyed kyis11 drnigs pa la ni brten byas nasi I rni drnigs

pa ni rab tu skyel I rni drnigs pa la brten by as nasi I rni drnigs pa ni rab tu skyel I zhes

gang srnras pa de la yang kho bo cag rni drnigs pa gorns par byas2 pa nyid gzhan du

rni 'dod del ji Ita zhe nal

gzugs la sogs pa stong pa stell

ngo bo nyid kyis3 rna skyes phyir I I

rdzas su rned phyir 'jig pa'i phyirl I

sgyu rna bzhin gorns chags rned 'gyurl I (5 1)

Csvabhavato 'py ajatatvad adravyatvad vinasatai:I1

rupadi sunyaf!1 rnayavad i ty abhyasad araktatal I (51)J

zhes bya ba tel gzugs la sogs pa phyi rol gyi yul rgyu dang rkyen du snang ba las byung

ba yod pa kho na yin pa rnarns ni stong pa stel rgyu dang rkyen gyi tshogs tha dad

pa dag la yod pa rna yin pas ngo bo nyid kyis rna skyes pa 'i phyir 'dus pa'i bdag nyid

yin pas rdzas su rned pa'i phyir dangl yun ring du rni gnas pas 'jig pa'i phyir I dper na

sgyu rna bzhin du drnigs su rned par gorns par byas pas chags pa rned pa nyid du 'gyur

ba4 yin gyil phyi rol gyi yul rnarn pa tharns cad du rned pa ni rna yin noll

Cc. 213b4, D. 213b4, P. 236b7J gzhan yangl

gzugs la sogs pa yod kyang nil I

yang dag ji bzhin rtogs gyur pal I

de yod rna yin de yi tshel I

I P : kyi 2 P : bya 3 P : kyi 4 C, D, P : mi 'gyur ba

-164 -

log 'dzin ci phyir mi ldog 'gyur/ / (52)

Csadbhave 'pi ca rupader yathabhutavabodhatal:I1

vyavartate hy asadgrahas tadabhave na kilTl tadal I (52))

zhes bya ba ni dper na sngar sgyu rna byung ba lasl skyes bu'i ngo bo nyid yod par

btags pa la phyis 'di ni sgyu rna byas pa yin tel 'di la ngo bo nyid ci yang med do zhes

bya bar rtogs pa'i tshe nal skyes bu'i blo Idog par rigs kyi ri bon gi rva sngon dang

phyis kyang gtan med pa la ni de Ita bur 'gyur ba ni mi rigs sol I de bzhin du gzugs la

sogs pa yod kyang kun rdzob kyi shes pas gzugs la sogs pa 'di dag ni ngo bo nyid yod

pa yin no snyam du btags pa lal phyis yang dag pa'i ngo bo nyid med par yang dag pa

ji Ita ba bzhin rtogs par gyur pas ngo bo nyid de2 yod pa rna yin par shes pa de'i tshe

log par 'dzin pa ci'i phyir Idog par mi 'gyur tel Idog pa kho nar 'gyur ba yin pas khyed

kyis3 so so'i4 skye bo de nyid shes pa rna skyes pa dag la dang po kho nar gzugs la sogs

pa phyi rol gyi yul med par btags pas don ci zhig 'grub par 'gyurl de bzhin dul

gnyis su rnam par rtog pa dagl I

sems dang sems byung s pyod yul na 5 I I

gzugs la sogs pa dgag byas kyangl I

'jug par mi 'gyur mi rigs sol I (53)

Cnaiva dvayavikalpas ca cittacaitasagocaral:I1

pratil?edhe 'pi rupadau na pravartitum arhatil I (53))

cc. 214al, D. 214al, P. 237a5) zhes bya ba ni gzung ba dang 'dzin pa gnyis su rnam par

rtog pa gang dag yin pa de dag khyed sems dang sems las byung ba'i spyod yul yin par

'dod cing gzugs la sogs pa'i phyi rol gyi yul rnams dang 'breI ba yin par mi 'dod nal

de la khyed kyis6 gzugs la sogs pa phyi rol gyi yul rnams rnam pa thams cad du dgag

pa byas kyang gnyis su rnam par rtog pa de dag 'jug par mi 'gyur bar mi rigs sol I '0

na j i Ita zhe nal 'jug par 'gyur ba kho nar rigs tel sngon dang phyis kyang gzugs la sogs

pa phyi rol gyi yul rnams la mi Itos par khyad par med pa'i phyir roll

1 P : la 2 "de" omitted in C, D. 3 P: kyi 4 P : so 5 P : ni 6 P : kyi

- 165-

gal te 'di skad ees gzugs la sogs pa phyi rol gyi yul rnams dang ma 'breI ba' i rnam par

rtog pa gnyis po dag spang ba kho na'i phyir kho bo eag gis rnam 1 grangs gzhan gyis2

phyi rol gyi yul rnams rnam par shes pa'i eha nyid yin par rnam par bzhag stel de'i 'og

tu rnam par mi rtog pa'i ye shes skyes pa na rang dang gzhan du snang ba'i eha bsal

bas yul de dang de la 'dzin pa dag 'gag par 'gyur ro zhe nal 'dir bshad pal

gal te de ni dgag pa'i phyir I I

sgrub gzhan yongs su 'dzin 'dod nail

'dam rdzab 'khru bar byed pa basi I

ma reg par ni bsrings na bzangl I (54)

Ctanni�edhaya saeed i�to vidhyantaraparigraha�1

prak�alanad dhi pankasya durad asparsanarp varaml I (54)J

cc. 214a5, D. 214a5, P. 237b3J zhes bya ba ni gal te khyed snying nas phyi rol gyi yul

med par 'dod na nil de rnam par shes pa'i eha nyid yin par btags pas kyang ci bya stel

gal te de3 rnam par shes pa'i eha nyid yin par rnam par bzhag nas phyis de dgag pa'i

phyir rnam par shes pa'i eha nyid yin par sgrub pa gzhan yongs su 'dzin par 'dod na

nil des nal 'dam rdzab 'khru bar byed pa basi ma reg par ni bsrings pa bzangl zhes

bya ba'i dpe 'di don mthun pa nyid du 'gyur tel mi smyon pa blun po 'ga' zhig gis lam

gtsang rna bor tel mi gtsang ba'i 'dam rdzab kyi klung du zhugs pa na gzhan dag gis

de la dris pal ei'i phyir khyod lam bor te 'dam rdzab tu zhugs4 I des smras pal yang

bkru bar bya'ol I gzhan gyis smras pal glen pa gal te gdon mi za bar bkru bar bya dgos

na snga nas 'dam rdzab kyis ma reg pa thag bsrings na ehes bzang ngo zhes bya ba Ita

bur 'gyur roll

I P : rnams 2 P : gyi 3 "de" omitted in P. 4 P : zhugs pa

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2. Translation

N ext, to refute another reasoning1 of our opponents, we say:

If you want to prove that a (so-called) external object has the nature of mind,

because it is an object of consciousness, just like the immediately preceding

(condition) , " (27)

In this inference, 'external object' is the subject of the proposition (dharmin). Its

property to be proven (dharma) is that it has the nature of mind (cittasvabhtiva).

'Because it is an object of consciousness' is stated as the reason (hetu). 'Just like the

immediately preceding condition' is the example (d1."�!llnta). An instance of mind

(cittam) together with its accompanying mental factors (caittll) which perishes in the

immediately preceding moment (tadanantara) becomes a real condition for the (pre­

sent) arisal of another but similar (sama) instance of mind with its mental factors.

The former is therefore called 'the immediately preceding condition' (samanantara­

pratyaya). If you Yogacarins argue that, just as this (immediately preceding condi­

tion) is of the nature of mind because it is an object of consciousness, just so external

objects are of the nature of mind because they also are objects of consciousness,2

1 Another reasoning (bsam pa) by which the Yogacara attempts to prove that all the objects of consciousness, including the so-called 'external objects' or objects of the sense consciousnesses, are themselves mental phenomena.

2 This inference says that the immediately preceding condition of a consciousness is of the nature of mind because it is an object of consciousness . Neither the commentary in TJ nor the parallel passages in PP (Eckel, pp. 64 -65) and in Avalokitavrata's commentary elaborate on this point; they apparently treat it as an established tenet, accepted by both the proponent and the opponent. Yamaguchi (p. 365) refers to the Abhidharma tenet that any instance of consciousness which functions as the immediately preceding condition (samanantarapratyaya) of the next instance of consciousness is also the object-condition (iilambanaPratyaya) of that new instance of consciousness (see MahiivibhiisaSiistra, T. vol. 27, 109a10-11) . This is the same as saying that all the instances of consciousness are accompanied by an awareness of the immediately preceding past.

Note that this general tenet takes on a different meaning in the Yogacara doctrine. According to the Y ogacara, the store-consciousness functions at each instant as the immediately preceding condition and as the obj ect- condition of all the other kinds of consciousness which originate in the next instant (see TrBh 34.5-11 ad TrK 15). The store-consciousness is the uninterrupted, indistinct awareness of the 'objective' world of which it constantly creates the images within itself. These images are the primordial objects of our sense perceptions and of the conceptual apprehensions proper to the mental consciousness (manovijfiiina). The defiled seventh consciousness (kli!'ftamanas), on the other hand, has the uninterrupted world-awareness of the store-consciousness as its object and misconceives this awareness as an enduring subject or self. The store­consciousness thus functions as both the immediately preceding condition and the object-condition of all the other kinds of consciousness. This specific Yogacara understanding of samanantarapratyaya/ iilambanapratyaya is however not applicable to the present inference because it is not approved by the Madhyamaka.

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Then the reason (in your inference] is erroneous, because mental factors exist

separately (from the mind] . (28ab)

Your inference either proves that external objects have the nature of mind, because

they are obj ects of consciousness, just like the immediately preceding condition; or it

proves that external objects do not have the nature of mind, because they are objects

of consciousness, just as separately existing mental factors (caittii) such as feeling

(vedana) and the like do not have the nature of mind. Hence, the reason (in your

inference] is inconclusive (anaikiintika).l

You may think that (your thesis that external objects have the nature of mind]

is established by scripture, since it is in fact taught that "The threefold world is mind

only."2 We reply that this is not correct, because you do not understand very well the

meaning of this scriptural statement. If you ask us why, we say:

"Mind-only" is taught in the Sutra in order to negate the existence of an agent

or enjoyer (other than the mind] . (28cd)

The Buddhas and bodhisattvas have taught "mind-only" in order to refute the theory

of other non-Buddhists (tfrthika) who maintain that there exists an agent and enjoyer

other than the mind. They have not taught it in order to negate the existence of

I Bhavaviveka's rej oinder is based on the Yogacara tenet that an instance of mind (cittam) and its accompanying mental factors (caitta) are separate entities, each having its own nature. See also the parallel passage in PP (Eckel, pp. 64-65). As Yamaguchi (pp. 367-369) remarks, the Yogacara was divided on this issue. In his introductory commentary on MSAL XI. 34 -35 (D. No. 4034, Mi184al-3) Sthiramati says that, according to some Yogacarins, "vijiiaptimtitra" means that only the mind and its mental factors exist as separate entities whereas external objects do not exist as separate from the mind; according to others, "vijiiaptimtttra" means that only the mind exists and that neither ment al factors nor external objects exist as separate entities apart from the mind. The first position is explained as follows in MVK I. 8cd: the mind apprehends the substance of the object, while the mental factors apprehend special qualities of the obj ect (ttitrarthadr:?tir vijiianarrt tadvise�e tu caitasa�). The Vijiiaptimatratttsiddhisttstra, representing the view of Dharmapala, also defends the first position that mental factors have their own na ture (svabhava) different from that of the mind itself, but specifies that this is true from the point of view of the conventional truth only. From the point of view of the highest truth, the mind and the mental factors are neither different nor identical. (T. vol. 31, 36c22-37all; Siddhi, pp. 395- 397).

Bhavaviveka's position on the ontological status of the mind and the mental factors is explained in MHK/T] V. 45-46. Bhavaviveka follows the Sautrantika thesis that cittam and caitta are not separate real entities, but are only names or design ations (upadaya prajiiapti) of the different mental functions that occur within the unitary stream of consciousness of a person.

2 cittamtitram idarrt yad idarrt traidhatukam (DaSabhumikasutra, J. Rahder ed., p. 49, E). This statement is quoted for the first time as a scriptural argument for the mind-only tenet in the Mahayanasarrtgraha (MS, T. vol. 31, 138b3-4). Vasubandhu quotes it in a slightly different form in his Virrtsatika (as restored into Sanskrit by S. Levi in ViV 3.2-3 : cittamtitrarrt bho jinaputra yad uta traidhatukam). The Vijiiaptimtttratttsiddhisastra also quotes it as one of the scriptural arguments for the mind-only tenet (T. vol. 31, 39a6-7).

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objects outside the mind. This can be known from the following passage in the

DaSabhumikasiUra: "A bodhisattva in the sixth bodhisattva-stage reflects on dependent

arising in forward (anuloma) and reverse (pratiloma) order and thinks as follows: 'Only

the aggregates of suffering, devoid of an agent (karaka) and an experiencer (vedaka),

arise from the twelve limbs (of dependent arisingJ , starting from ignorance and so

forth, and thus the immense tree of suffering (dul}khaV1:k�a) is brought into existence. '

o Sons of the Conqueror, because it is definitely that way, it is thus: these three

(samsaricJ realms are mind only; they are produced and constructed by the mind and

nowhere does there exist an agent or enjoyer other than the mind." l Thus, (this SutraJ

does not establish the non-existence of external objects.

At this point (the YogacarinsJ object: "But (the non-existence of external

objectsJ is also taught in the Prajnaparamitii(sutra), as follows: "Maitreya! A bo­

dhisattva should realize that perceptible form (riipam) is (correctlyJ conceived (pra­

jnapti) by distinguishing the following three aspects: "This is imagined form (pari­

kalpitariipam)," "This is form as it appears in consciousness (vikalpitarupam)2" and

"This is the true nature of form (dharmatariipam)." What is imagined form? It is

that which is (mistakenly J imagined to be the nature of form in dependence on the

name, the concept, the designation and the conventional term "rupam". That

imagined form is not a real entity (adravyam). What is form as it appears in con-

1 Cf. DaSabhumikasutra (J. Rahder ed., p. 49.5-9) : "evam ayartZ kevalo du�khaskandho du�khav,,:"k�o 'bhinivartate karakavedakavirahita iti. tasyaivartZ bhavati karakabhinivesata� kriya� prajiiayante. yatra karako nasti kriyapi tatra paramarthato nopalabhyate. tasyaivartZ bhavati cittamatram idartZ yad idartZ traidhtitukam." Parallel text in PP, D. Tsha 245b4-7, P. Tsha 308a3-bl (Eckel, pp. 63-6 4).

Bhavaviveka quotes the context of the "mind-only" statement in the DaSabhumikasutra to show that the Sutra teaches "mind-only" in order to negate the existence of an enduring self as the agent of actions and the experiencing subject of karmic retribution. Accordingly, "mind-only" in the Sutra means that only the mind as a non-enduring entity is the agent and enj oyer of a person's actions. The Sutra does not intend to say that external objects do not exist and that only the mind exists. Bhavaviveka is no doubt right here, because the context shows indeed that the Sutra teaches "mind-only" in order to negate the existence of atman (see also section "N" on page 52 in Rahder's edition).

2 E. Conze translates vikalpitarupam as "discerned form" (The Large Sutra on Per/ect Wisdom, p. 648) and R. Thurman as "constructed form" (The Speech 0/ Gold, p. 356). The terms 'discerned' and 'constructed' do however not clearly indicate howvikalpita differs from pan·kalpita which both Conze and Thurman translate as 'imagined'. vikalpa is a dual consciousness, bifurcated into a perceiving subject and a perceived object (in this case, the image of an external form or rilpam). vikalpitarilpam is therefore the image (abhasa, pratibhasa) of a seemingly external form as it appears in a consciousness which is habituated to the dualistic apprehension of such images. According to the Yogacara, people in general misapprehend these internal object-images as replicas of real external objects outside the mind ( = parikalpitarilpam) due to their familiarity with names, concepts and everyday language.

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sciousness? It is that to which verbal expressions such as the name, the concept, the

designation and the conventional term "rupam" are applied in dependence on the

(dual) consciousness (vikalpa) Gn which images of perceptible form appear) . Since

this (aspect of form) is supported by the reality of the consciousness (in which it

appears) , it itself is a real entity, but not in the sense that it originates through its own

power. What is the true nature of form? It is the permanent absence of the reality

of imagined form in form as it appears in consciousness. It is the absence of self­

existence (dharmanairiltmyam), the limit of reality (bhatako!i), and so forth. It is

neither a real entity nor mere non-existence, because (consciousness) is empty of

imagined objects and because consciousness itself (as empty of such objects) exists."l

I Quotation from the Maitreyapariprcchii (The Questions of Maitreya) section of the Paficavi'J?'!­satisahasrikaprajfiaparamitiisutra. See S. !ida, "Agama (Scripture) and Yukti (Reason) in Bhavaviveka, " Kanakura-hakushi Koki-kinen, Indogaku-bukkyogaku Ronshu, Kyoto 1966, pp. 85-91. Sanskrit text in E. Conze, S. !ida, "'Maitreya's Questions' in the Prajfiaparamita," Melanges d'Indianisme Ii la Memoire de Louis Renou (Publications de l'Institut de Civilisation Indienne, Fasc. 28), Paris 1968, pp. 229-242; English translation in E. Conze, The Large Sutra On Peifect Wisdom, University of California Press, Berkeley-Los Angeles 1975, repr. Motilal Banarsidass, Delhi 1979, pp. 644-652; japanese translation by N. Hakamaya, "Mirokushomonsho Wayaku," Komazawadaigaku Bukkyogakubu Ro nshu (1975), pp. 190-210. For Tsong-kha-pa's discussion of this passage, see R. Thurman, The Speech 0/ Gold: Reason and Enlightenment in the Tibetan Buddhism, Princeton Univ. Press 1984, repr. Motilal Banarsidass, Delhi 1989, pp. 355-363.

The Sanskrit text of this passage can be reconstructed as follows (based on the Sanskrit text edition by E. Conze and S. I ida, pp. 237-238) : "tribhir M aitreya akarair bodhisattvena riipaprabhedaprajfiap tir an ugantavya, yad uta ida'J?'! parikalpita'J?'! riipam, ida'J?'! vikalpita'J?'! riipam, ida'J?'! dharmatarupam iti. tatra katamat parikalpita'J?'! riipa'J?'!. ya riipam iti namasamjfiaprajfiaptivyavahiira'J?'! nisritya riipasvabhavataya parikalpana. ida'J?'! parikalpita'J?'! riipam. idam adravya'J?'!. tatra katamad vikalpita'J?'! riipa'J?'!. yasmin vikalpapratftya abhilapanata namasamjfiaprajfiaptivyavahiiro riipam ityadi. ida'J?'! vikalpasya sadravyatam upadaya sadravya'J?'! na tu svatantravrttita�. tatra katamad dharmatariipa'J?'!. yat tena parikalpitariipe1'}a tasya vikalpitariipasya nitya'J?'! ni�vabhavata dharmanairatmya'J?'! bhutakotyadi. tan naiva adravya'J?'! na sadravya'J?'! vikalpitarthaSunyatvad vijfianasattvac ca (rnam par brtags pa'i don gyis stong pa nyid dang rnam par shes pa yod pa'i phyir ro)"

There are three Y ogacara texts in which the three aspects of rupam are discussed in a very similar way as in the Maitreyapariprcchii. They are the following: (1) MVK III. 16cd, MVBh 44.15-19 (Teaches that one should develop the skill (kausalya) to distinguish these three aspects for each of the five" aggregates (skandha) as an antidote (pratiPak�a) against the mistaken belief in the existence of an enduring self (titman). (2) A bhidha rmasamuccaya , T. vol. 31, 672b20-27 (Says the same as MVK III.16cd and is most probab ly based on it). (3) Asvabhava's commentary on Mahiiyanasamgraha, T. vol. 31, 399b29-c13 (Commenting on the definition of the three natures, Asvabhava quotes a text, identical with the Maitreyapariprcchti passage quoted in Tj, and identifies it as a quotation from the Mahiiprajfiaparamitasutra.) It is clear that these three texts deal with the three natures, and not with mind-only (cittamtitra, vijfiaptimtitra). The same should be said about the Maitreyapariprcchii passage quoted in Tj, except for the last line (underlined in the Sanskrit version above). That last line is however not found in the original text which reads "paramarthaprabhavitam" instead. My assumption is therefore that the author of Tj (Bhavaviveka?) has added the last line to the original text in order to relate this passage to the

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We reply:

If you argue that (only) consciousness (exists) because it is empty of imaginary

objects, then the existence of objects is thereby not refuted,

because a non-imaginary object (of consciousness) really exists (according to

you) . (29)

Although consciousness is empty of imaginary objects, the true nature of perceptible

forms (dharmatarapam) which is the object (artha) to be realized by the strictly

individual awareness (pratylitmasarrzvedanfya) of the Tathagatas, does exist (according

to you) . Since this inexpressible (ayathtiruta) reality exists (according to you) , a non­

imaginary object (akalpitartha) exists. Hence, an object (of consciousness) actually

exists and it is not correct that consciousness is in every respect empty of objects.l

topic of MHK V.28cd-30 which is "mind-only" and not "the three natures." Furthermore, the commentary in TJ interprets MHK V.29-30 as Bhavaviveka's reply to the use of the Maitreyaparipr­eehii passage as a scriptural argument by the Yogacara. Although the content of MHK V.29-30 is not entirely unrelated to the Maitreyaparipreeha passage, it does not fit in well as a reply to the use of this passage as a scriptural argument by the Yogacara, as will be shown below. The general impression therefore is that the Maitreyapariprechii passage does not fit in the context of MHK V. 28-30 and may have been added by a later author who has revised and expanded Bhavaviveka's original TJ (this would corroborate Y. Ejima's thesis about the existence of an "Ur-Tarkaj vala" that was later expanded into the present TJ).

1 Verse 29 can be interpreted in the following two different ways. (1) In verse 29, Bhavaviveka rejects the opponent's thesis of "mind-only" by arguing that a non­imaginary object of consciousness, also called 'the true nature of form', really exists and is the object apprehended by the Tathagata's unmistaken awareness of Reality. S. Yamaguchi (pp. 397-398) follows this interpretation, but rightly observes the problem it involves. It is indeed hard to accept that Bhavaviveka, who throughout Chapter Five of MHK/TJ insistently rejects the idea that the true nature of things is itself an entity capable of functi oning as the object-condition of the Tathagata's knowledge, would be saying here that the 'true nature of form really exists' and is the object apprehended by the awareness of the Tathagatas. Jang-gya focuses on the same problem in his interpretation of verse 29, but he uses an obscure reasoning (see D.S. Lopez, A Study of Svatantrika, p. 313) in an attempt to rescue Bhavaviveka from literally saying that 'the ultimate nature of form really exists'. (2) The problem can be avoided by assuming that the reason of the inference in verse 29 ("because

a non-imaginary object really exists") is not asserted by Bhavaviveka himself, but by the Y ogacara. I have added " (according to youJ" in my translation to indicate that I favor this interpretation of verse 29. On this interpretation, Bhavaviveka uses the Y ogacara premise about the real existence of the true nature of things against the Yogacara argument for the non-existence of objects outside consciousness. His reasoning in verse 29 is that the Yogacarins contradict their own doctrine if they argue that objects outside consciousness do not exist while maintaining at the same time that the inexpressible, ultimate nature of things is an objective reality and functions as the object apprehended by the non-conceptual awareness of the Tathagatas.

This interpretation of verse 29 is substantiated by the important observation that the textual basis of MHK V.29 is not the Maitreyapariprcchii, as the quotation in TJ leads us to believe, but is rather Vasubandhu's Vimsatikakarika/-vrtti (ViK/ViV). This can be argued as follows; (i) The idea that imaginary objects (kalpitartha) do not exist, but a non-imaginary object

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(Eighteenth section of the MadhyamakahrdayaV'}:tti-tarkajvala]

Moreover,

(The reason in your inference] is uncertain, because even in dreams conscious­

ness (has an object of which] the nature is non-imaginary. (30ab)

As for (your inference,] "The threefold world is mind only, because (consciousnessJ

is empty of (external] objects such as perceptible form, as is the case with the

consciousness in a dream and the like," the truth is that, even in dreams, there exists

an (objectiveJ aspect of consciousness which has a non-imaginary nature. Thus,

when you say "as is the case with the consciousness in a dream," you argue either that

the consciousness in a dream is empty of (external] objects which are merely imagi­

nary, such as a (real] man and the like, or that consciousness - as the perceiver of its

own (objectiveJ aspect- is not empty of objects which are non-imaginary. Your

reason is therefore inconclusive.l

(Your proposition that consciousness] has no object is not acceptable, because

the example (of your inferenceJ is not established. (30cd)

Even if (the consciousness inJ a dream is approved as an example of ( the reasonJ

"because (consciousnessJ is empty of imaginary objects," (that example] negates (the

existence ofJ imaginary objects (only J , but it does not negate that part (of conscious­

nessJ which is its non-imaginary object. Thus, that (exampleJ also does not prove

that only the mind exists. (Your propositionJ that (consciousnessJ has no object is

(akalpitiirtha) exists, is explicitly stated in the following passage of Vi V: "na khalu sarvathii dharmo nasty ity evaJ!l dharmanairiitmyapraveso bhavati. api tu kalpitiitmanii yo btllair dharmiifJiiJ!l svabhiivo griihyagriihakiidi� parikalpitas tena kalpitena iitmanii te�iiJ!l nairiitmyam. na tv anabhiliipyena iitmanii yo buddhiiniiJ!l vi�aya iti." (ViV, 6.14-18 ad ViK 10d) ("One does not understand the absence of self­existence in things by claiming that things do not exist in all respects, but Cone understands it correctly by seeing that they do not existJ with respect to their imagined nature. Things lack self­existence in the sense that they lack the imagined nature which ignorant people identify as 'apprehended object', 'apprehender' and so fo rth. But things are not empty of the inexpressible nature which is the object Cof the awarenessJ of the Buddhas. ") ( ii) The reasonings in the verses preceding and following MHK V.29 are all refutations of tenets which are found in ViK/ViV. MHK V.28: Refutes the Yogacara interpretation of the 'cittamiitra' teaching in the Dasabhumi­kasiitra. This agama is quoted in ViV 3.2-3. MHK V.29: Inference based on ViV 6. 14- 18. MHK V.30: Refutes the 'dream simile' argument found in ViK 3a/4a. MHK V.31-38: Refutes the arguments for the non-existence of atoms found in ViK 1 1-15.

1 According to Bhavaviveka, the consciousness in a dream perceives real mental phenomena which are its internal 'objective aspect' (see MHK/TJ V. 19). One such real phenomenon is for example the image of a man seen by the consciousness in a dream. This image is the non -imaginary object of that dream consciousness. Its imaginary, nonexistent object is a real man of flesh and blood.

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therefore not acceptable. This is because (your J example is not correctly established,

since it lacks a part of what you want to prove. 1 The consciousness in a dream is not

without object, because it has the true nature of form (dharmaflirilpam) as its object.2

In short, the meaning here is that (the consciousness in] a dream is not a correct

example and should therefore not be used as an example when it comes to correct

reasoning.

(The Y ogacara] objects again as follows:

The object of a (sense] perception is thought to be either a single (atom] or an

aggregation (of many atoms] . But when one examines this by means of

correct reasonings, ( the existence of] such an object is in both cases not

possible. (31)

Some (Y ogacara] opponents object as follows: "Those who claim that external objects

exist, conceive the object of a (sense] perception in two ways. They say that the

object (of a sense perception] is either a single atom or an aggregation of (many]

atoms. But when one examines this by means of correct reasonings, both propositions

appear to be against reason, and are therefore not correct, because both contradict

(what is actually the case] ." To show what these correct reasonings are, they say:

(First,] a single atom is not the actual object of a sense perception, because it

does not appear as that, just as a physical sense organ is not the actual object

(of a sense perception] . (32)

An 'atom' is the smallest particle of matter. 'Single' means 'alone' (or 'all by itself'] .

(In this inference] , 'a single atom' is the subject of the proposition (dharmin). Its

property to be proven (dharma) is that it is not the actual object of a sense perception

(rapabuddhi). The combination of this subject and its property is the proposition (pa­

�a). 'Because i t does not appear as that' i s the reason (hefu). 'Appear as that' means

'appear as the actual object On a sense consciousness] '. 'It does not appear as that'

means 'It does not appear in a (sense] consciousness and is (therefore] not the actual

object (of a sense consciousness] .' 'Because' indicates that this is stated as the rea­

son. 'Just as a physical sense organ is not the actual object (of a sense perception] '

is the example (dr�!iinfa). 'Physical sense organ' (indnya) stands for the five sense

1 That is, you intend to prove that consciousness has no object at all, but your example proves only that it has no imaginary object.

2 Bhavaviveka uses the same strategy as in verse 29 (see note 1, p.23). As in verse 29, it is again the Yogacarins, and not Bhavaviveka , who assert that the non-imaginary, true nature of the objects of dream consciousness exists as a reality in its own right, independent of consciousness itself.

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organs. Although the sense organs are objects of knowledgel and are colored, trans­

parent matter (rilpaprasttda), they do not appear (in a sense consciousnessJ as the

actual object (of that consciousnessJ and are therefore not the actual object of a sense

perception. In the same way, a (singleJ atom is not the actual obj ect of a sense

perception.

It is also not right that (an aggregation of] many atoms is the actual object of

a (perceivingJ mind, because (such an aggregationJ is not a real entity, just like

a double moon. (33)

It is also not right that an aggregation (samaha) of many atoms is the actual object of

a (perceivingJ mind. This is because (an aggregationJ is not a real entity. In fact,

although it is held that individual atoms are real entities (dravya), aggregations of

atoms are not (considered to beJ real entities, just as an army, a forest and the like

(are not real entitiesJ . Therefore, although the form of an aggregation (of atomsJ

certainly appears (in a sense consciousnessJ , an aggregation cannot be the actual

object of a (senseJ consciousness. This is similar to the mistaken perception of a

double moon and so forth by somebody who suffers from cataract (taimirika).2

I According to the general Abhidharma theory, the sense organs are objects of knowledge (yul =

vi�aya), but they are not objects of sense perception because they are invisible, inaudible, intangible, etc. Their existence is known by inferential knowledge.

2 The two main Yogacara texts in which it is argued that atoms, either one by one or in aggregated form, cannot be the actual object of a sense perception are Vasubandhu's ViK 11-15 (ViV 6.25-8.22) and Dignaga's Alambanapan-k�ii (A P). Other Yogacara texts which discuss the same issue, but depend on ViK/ViV and AP, are: PS/PSV I ; TrBh 16.18-17.7 ; MVT 25.1-17 ; Siddhi, T. vol. 31, 4a10-b25. Bhavaviveka's exposition of the Yogacara arguments in MHK V.32-33 is based on AP.

In AP, Dignaga examines whether external objects function as the object-condition (iilambanapratyaya) of the sense perceptions. His discussion is based on the following definition of 'object-condition' : " COnly) the entity which produces the perception in which the form of that entity appears can be said to be the actual object of that percept ion" (AP, 176.17-18 : don gang zhig rang snang ba 'i rnam par rig pa bskyed pa de ni dmigs pa yin par rigs te . . . ). This definition stipulates that an entity should meet the following two conditions in order to Qualify as the actual object of a sense perception. First, that entity must be one of the producing causes of that particular sense perception. This implies that the entity must really exist, because unreal things cannot function as causes. Second, the form (iikiira) of that entity must appear in the consciousness it produces. If this second condition were not stipulated, other producing causes of the sense perceptions, such as the immediately preceding instant of consciousness or the sense organs, would also be objects of the sense perceptions.

The theory considered in verse 32 says that single atoms are real entities and that each single atom of a gross object functi ons as the object- condition of the perception of that object. Kuei -chi attributes this theory to the o ld Vaibha�ika school (see his commentary on Siddhi, T. vol. 43, 270c4). Dignaga refutes this theory as follows (verse 1 of AP). Single atoms, in as far as they are thought to be real entities, can produce a sense perception. But they cannot be the object-condition of a sense perception because they do not meet the second condition mentioned above. That is to say, the form or image which appears in a sense consciousness is never an image of individual atoms one by one, but is always an image of a gross object.

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We reply:

If the opponent intends to prove that non-aggregated matter is not the actual

object of a (perceivingJ mind, he ends up proving what is already proven. (34)

If the opponents intend to prove that a single atom of non-aggregated (bsags pa rna yin

pa, asa'f!Zcita) matter is not the actual object of a (perceivingJ mind, then their thesis

(purvapa�a) will (have the error ofJ proving what is already proven (siddhasadhana),

because we also assert this.

But if (the opponents intend to prove thisJ with respect to aggregated matter,

the reason Un their inferenceJ will not be correctly established, because an'

aggregation of different atoms (of the same kindJ produces (a consciousness in

whichJ the form of that (aggregateJ appears. (35)

If the subject of the proposition Un verse 33J is matter as an aggregation of atoms of

the same kind (sajati) and you state as the reason that it is not a real entity, then that

reason will not be established for both parties. In fact, when different atoms of

matter of the same kind are accumulated and conj oined, that (aggregateJ is acknow­

ledged as an actual object (of perceptionJ because the consciousness in which it

appears originates as having the form (akara) of aggregated atoms. We assert that

The second theory (verse 33) says that aggregations of atoms, and not single atoms, are the object of the sense perceptions. Kuei -chi attributes this theory to the Sautrantika (T. vol. 43, 267a8-13, 270a13-bll). This theory is refuted (AP, verse 2ab) on the ground that aggregations of atoms do not have the power to produce a sense perception because they are merely nominal things (prajiiaptisat) and not real entities (dravyasat), just as a non-existent second moon cannot be the producing cause of the mistaken perception of two moons.

Dignaga introduces a third theory (AP, verse 3ab) which says that each single atom of a gross object possesses the form of the gross object of which it is a constituent part. This gross form, inherent in each atom, is a real entity (dravyasat). Hence, individual atoms as parts of a gross object meet the two conditions for being the object-condition of the consciousness which perceives that gross object. Kuei -chi attributes this theory to Sarpghabhadra and the new Vaibha!?ika school (T. vol. 43, 271a9-10). (See also Siddhi, T. vol. 31 , 4b16-18; T. Tillemans, Materials for the Study of Aryadeva, Dharmapala and Candrakfrti, Wiener Studien zur Tibetologie und Buddhismuskunde Heft 24.1, Wien 1990, note (227), pp . 247-249.) The main point of Dignaga's refutation of this third theory (AP, verses 3cd-5) is the following. If the form of a gross object, as perceived by a sense consciousness, inheres in each of the atoms of that object, the absurd consequence will be that all the objects which consist of atoms of the same kind (for instance, a pot and a cup) will be perceived as identical (AP, verse 4ab) because the gross form inherent in each of their atoms is identical.

Bhavaviveka does not mention this third theory in his presentation of the Yogacara arguments in MHK V.31-33. According to S. Yamaguchi (pp. 404-405), this indicates that Bhavaviveka's target in MHK V.31-38 is not Dignaga's epistemological theory as set forth in Alambanapan�a (although the phrasing of MHK V.31 -33 follows AP), but is rather Vasubandhu's argumentation of the ontological issue of 'mind-only' in ViKiViV where only the first two theories are explained and refuted. However that may be, another and perhaps a better explanation of Bhavaviveka's silence about the third theory might be that his own position on this issue, as explained in verses 35-36, is very close to this third theory.

- 1 75 -

both an aggregation of atoms of the same kind, such as a pot and so forth, and the

CindividuaU atoms (of such an aggregateJ are real entities (dravya) for conventional

thought (sa'f!Zvrti). In fact, just as we assert that an atom is a real entity because it is

an aggregation of eight real entities, just so (we assert thatJ aggregations (of atomsJ ,

such as a pot and so forth, are real entities (for conventional thoughtJ because isolated

atoms are not approved as real entities (by conventional thoughtJ . 1

Just that (aggregation of atoms of the same kindJ is the actual object (of a

sense perceptionJ , because it functions as the cause of a consciousness in which

its form appears, as is the case with desire.

Your thesis is therefore refuted by (thisJ inference. (36)

We assert that matter, as an aggregation of atoms of the same kind, is the actual

object (of the sense perceptionsJ . Why? Because such an aggregation of atoms

functions as the actual cause of the consciousness in wich the image of that aggregated

matter appears. Whatever functions as the cause of a consciousness in which its

image appears, is observed to be an aggregate, just as it is agreed, for example, that

desire which has the character of attachment to an object perceives indeed an aggre­

gate, such as for instance the body of a woman. Your thesis, "Aggregated matter is

not the actual object (of a sense perceptionJ ," is thus refuted by this inference.2

1 Bhavaviveka follows here the Abhidharma theory that each atom is an aggregation of at least eight particles: four elementary particles (mahabhiltiini; earth, water, fire, wind) and four composite particles (bhautikii; color/shape, odor, taste, tangible) (see AK II. 22, p. 145). These eight particles are real entities but they never exist in isolation. Atoms, as aggregations of real entities, are themselves real entities. Atoms also never exist in isolation (AK, 1. 13, p. 25) but only in aggregated form. Bhavaviveka's 'conventional' reasoning here is that, just as atoms themselves are real entities because they are aggregations of particles which are real entities, just so aggregations of atoms of the same kind are real entities because their constituent atoms are real entities. An aggregation of atoms of the same kind thus meets the first condition for being the actual object of a sense perception; that is to say, such an aggregation is a real entity and is therefore capable of functioning as one of the producing causes of a sense perception. And it also meets the second condition, because its form appears in the consciousness it produces.

2 Verse 36 is an inference based on conventional thought or common sense, premised on the general belief that both atoms and aggregations of atoms are real entities. The Yogacara's denial of the existence of external objects is thus refuted on the ground of contradicting common sense.

Bhavaviveka's position, as explained in verses 35-36, is close to the third theory rejected by Dignaga in AP (see note 2, p. 27). It is however not stated clearly in verses 35-36 that the form of a gross object which appears in a sense consciousness belongs to each of the constituent atoms of that object. The parallel text in PP is much clearer in this respect (see Eckel, p. 66). Bhavaviveka explicitly states there that all the atoms of an aggregate cooperate to produce a consciousness in which the form of that aggregate appears, so that one may also say that each single atom of an aggregate produces a consciousness in which the form of that atom itself appears (gcig pu yang rang gi bdag nyid snang ba 'i blo bskyed pa yin pa 'i phyir).

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Moreover, (your thesis) also contradicts the scripture which says that the supporting

facultiesl and the objects of the five (sense) consciousnesses are aggregations (of

atoms) .2

(The Yogacara) replies : "A (perceiving) consciousness certainly originates

without (apprehending an externaIJ object, because it originates from the seeds

(produced by) a (past) consciousness which had an object-image similar to its own,

just like a mental perception. " We reply :

If you argue that a (sense) consciousness apprehends no (externaIJ object,

because it originates from its own seeds just like a mental perception, then (your

reasoning implies that) a (sense) consciousness will surely apprehend an

(externaIJ object because (a mental perception also apprehends its own) non­

constructed (object) . (37)

Because a mental perception also has an (objective) aspect which is the appearing of

its own non-constructed object, the (sense) consciousness you are arguing about will

(consequently also) apprehend (its own externaIJ object. 3

Also, by inferring that (a sense consciousness) has no (externaIJ object, you

deny that it is a (sense) consciousness.

Since we do not assert that an aggregation (is the object of a sense perception) ,

your refutation of that does not damage us. (38)

Something is called 'consciousness' because it makes an object known. But since you

infer that (a sense consciousness) has no (externaIJ object, that which you assert to

be a (sense) consciousness will not be a (sense) consciousness. ' (Sense) conscious­

ness' (in the thesis of your inference in verse 37) is thus negated in that it does not have

I asraya ( = the five physical sense organs) 2 See AK I. 35d (scriptural source not mentioned). 3 For the Y ogacara, mental perceptions are produced from the seeds that were deposited in the store­

consciousness by previous mental perceptions. They are not produced by mental objects that would exist independently of the mind and would function as their object-condition. The mental perceptions of non- Buddhas are conceptual cognitions which identify/differentiate the internal object-images of the five sense perceptions and misconceive them as images of real objects outside consciousness. Similarly, the five sense perceptions are not produced from real external objects but from seeds that were produced by previ ous sense perceptions of the same type. The sense perceptions are non-conceptual cognitions. Hence, unlike mental perceptions, they are not misconceptions. Nevertheless, the sense perceptions of non- Buddhas are misrepresentations of reality because they perceive images of unreal external objects.

According to Bhavaviveka, however, mental perceptions apprehend mental phenomena which are real entities in their own right, and not just constructs or fabrications of the mind itself (see the commentary on MHK/TJ V.19). And just as mental perceptions apprehend real mental objects, just so the sense perceptions apprehend real externa l objects.

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the nature of a (senseJ consciousness. Hence, your thesis (pratijfitt) is invalid because

the reality of the subject of the thesis (dharmin) is not correctly established.l

Regarding your thesis (in verse 33J "An aggregation is not the object of a sense

perception," we also do not assert that an aggregation (samaha, 'dus pa) is the object

(of a sense perceptionJ . What we assert is that a conglomeration (sarrzcita, bsags pa)

of atoms is the object (of the sense perceptionsJ . Hence, when you argue that an

aggregation is not an object of perception, you do not inflict any damage on us. What

then is the difference between a conglomeration and an aggregation? When many

atoms of the same kind have the same supporting base, we call it 'a conglomeration'.

When dissimilar things with different supporting bases, such as elephants and horses

or harita trees and khadira trees, are gathered together and are called 'an army' or 'a

forest', then that is what we call 'an aggregation'.

(The Y ogacaraJ objects: "The thesis (that a sense consciousness does not

apprehend any external objectJ is firmly established by what is said in our

Alambanaparfk�ti: "

Even though external objects do not exist,

(the sense perceptionsJ have been originating from time immemorial,

because the capacities (of perceptionJ and the forms of objects (appearing in

actual sense perceptionsJ mutually cause each other.

(We reply : J (If so,J how will the cessation of these (sense perceptionsJ ever be

possible?2 (39)

1 The inference in verse 37 sets out to prove that a sense consciousness does not apprehend any external object. Bhavaviveka points out that the thesis of this inference is self-contradictory because the property to be proven ("does not apprehend any external object") annuls the reality of the subject ("sense consciousness"). Self-contradiction or self-annulment (for example : "All statements are false.") is mentioned as one of the five fallacies of the thesis (pak�iibhiisa) in the Nyiiyamukha (T. 1628, vol. 32, 1a19-20).

2 This verse is not found in the Tibetan translations of MHK (verses-only text) which are presumably based on a Sanskrit manuscript in which this verse was lacking. (On the Sanskrit manuscripts of MHK, see Y. Ej ima, Chugan Shiso no Tenkai - Bhavaviveka Kenkyu, Tokyo 1 980, pp. 261-264.) Since this verse occurs in the Sanskrit manuscript of MHK discovered by R. Sank:�tyayana, as well as in the Tibetan version of T], it should be counted as verse 39 of the fifth chapter of MHK (see y. Ejima, "Daij 6-sh6 -chinron no Yugagy6-gakusetsu-hihan," in Takasaki Jikido Hakushi Kanreki­kinen- ronshu. Indogaku Bukkyogaku Ronshu, Tokyo 1988, p. 21 1 note 1.)

Verse 39 is an adapted version of verse 8 of AP. Bhavaviveka has substituted the first line of verse 39 ("Even though external objects do not exist") for the first line of AP 8 ("It is not a contradiction to say that the capacity Cof future sense perceptions] resides in consciousness (itself] ") in order to relate verse 39 to the topic discussed in the previous verses. As the commentary in T] says, the last line in the Sanskrit version of verse 39 (" How will the cessation of these ever be possible?") was substituted for the original in AP 8 ("have been originating from time immemorial") as an immediate rej oinder to the opponent's argument. For the meaning of AP 8, see the commentary and notes to MHK V.22cd.

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We reply. The fourth line of this verse "How will the cessation of these (sense

perceptions) ever be possible?" is an immediate rejoinder (to the opponent's argument)

and should be understood as follows.

When external objects are present, (sense) consciousnesses originate in which

images of these objects appear. The yogin who aims at the purification of conscious­

ness, comes to realize that these objects lack inherent existence. Because he thus

(gradually) removes (all) apprehended objects (grahya) and (all) apprehending (graha­

ka) (from his mind) , it is but right that the transmundane non-dual awareness (of

reality as it is) (lokottaranirvikalpajfliina) will originate ( in him) .

But for you, who assert that objects (outside consciousness) do not exist (at

all) , external objects do not exist at first and also not later. 1 In that case, there exists

no cause by which one could later eliminate the (habitual) functioning (of conscious­

ness) as an apprehended-apprehending (duality) , and there exists thus no means

(upaya) by which the transmundane non-dual awareness could ever originate. Since a

means for the origination of the transmundane non-dual awareness does not exist if

one asserts that (external) objects do not exist, you should explain how that beginning­

less functioning of consciousness (based on the mutual causation) of capacities and

object-forms will ever cease!2

1 According to Bhavaviveka's view, which is based on the Madhyamaka tenet of 'two truths', external objects exist 'at first' but do not exist anymore 'later'. That is to say, external objects exist for the conventional thinking (sa'f?'lvrti) which does not inquire into the ultimate-reality status of things. But they no longer exist for those who have become Madhyamaka yogins and are using Madhyamaka reasonings to examine whether things are ultimately real in the sense of having an inherent existence (svabhiiva). Bhavaviveka's position on this i ssue is explained in detail in MHK/ TJ V.51-52.

2 The Y ogacara distinguishes the following stages in the path that leads to the attainment of the transmundane non-dual awareness: (1) Through correct reasoning one can acquire the certain knowledge that external objects do not exist and that all the sense data are products of the mind itself. (2) In accordance with this knowledge, the concentrated mind of the yogin gradually empties itself of all the images of external objects. (3) Finally, the mind of the yogin ceases to exist as an apprehender of objects. (For the details of this process, see the commentary and notes to MHK/TJ V. 4.)

The point of Bhavavivek a's objection here, and also in verse 53 below, is that the non­apprehending of external objects will never come about if, as the Yogacara says, the content of all our sense perceptions is determined by the mind alone and not also by real external objects. Because the Y ogacarins teach that the appearance of object-images in consciousness is the result of a beginningless intramental process and is not conditioned at all by the presence of real objects outside the mind, they cannot reasonably argue that the knowledge of the non-existence of external objects will lead to the non-perception of external objects or to the non-appearance of object­images in consciousness. The knowledge of the non-existence of external objects is therefore not a true means ( upiiya) by which the yogin could ever eliminate the perception of external obj ects. In short, the yogin who follows the Y ogacara path will never succeed in emptying his mind of the images of external objects and will therefore never attain the true non-dual awareness of reality as it is.

- 1'Z9 -

You might argue as follows:

N on-dual consciousness [itself) is not abandoned, because it is (the awareness)

of the superiors and because it is (consciousness as) free of dual apprehension.

(40ab)

You may think as follows. (Only) the dual apprehension of a perceived object and a

perceiving subject, which i s the cause of one's existence in samsara, is abandoned.

But consciousness as free of that dual apprehension is not abandoned. (On the

contrary) , it truly originates and does not cease to exist because it is (the awareness

of reality) proper to the superiors (arya) and because it is (consciousness as) free of

dual apprehension.

(We reply: ) If so,

As long as (that consciousness) originates, how can there be liberation?

(Liberation will be impossible) because the seeds (of consciousness) are not

subdued. (40cd)

It is agreed that samsara is caused by the activity of the seeds of consciousness, and

that liberation (from samsara) is attained when these seeds are subdued. If so, how

can there be liberation as long as consciousness, either with or without dual apprehen­

sion, originates? l Therefore, you who assert 'mind-only' cannot account for (the

possibi lity of) liberation either.

You may object as follows: "In our view, the origination of a consciousness

which is accompanied by dual apprehension is bondage (bandha) and the origination of

consciousness as free of dual apprehension is liberation. Let us explain why that is so.

When the dual apprehension is active, diverse object-appearances originate (in

consciousness) . This is because these diverse object-appearances and

(consciousness) itself originate from the own seeds (of consciousness) . (41)

When consciousness functions as having both an apprehended aspect and an apprehen­

ding aspect (grahyagrahakavijiiana), appearances (abhasa) representing the forms

(akara) of various objects, such as colors and shapes (rupa), originate (in conscious­

ness) . Now, what is this appearance of diverse forms in consciousness? It is an

[internal) causal process (parir;ama) whereby consciousness assumes the form (akara)

of (diverse) objects. This is because both this (appearance of object-images) and

1 This reasoning is based on the Y ogacara theory that an actual consciousness, upon perishing, leaves its own impression or trace (viisana) behind in the store-consciousness; these impressions mature into seeds (bfja) from which new instances of the same kind of consciousness will originate later.

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consciousness as the appearance of itself (svllbhitsa) originate from (consciousness']

own seeds (which were produced by previous instances of consciousness as] an

appearance of object-images. 1

In fact, when (a consciousness] perishes, it deposits a potency in that (store­

consciousness] . (This happens through the perishing] of (both consciousness]

itself and (consciousness as the appearance ofJ an other (than itself] . (42ab)

When these active consciousnesses (pravrttivijflllna) perish and disappear, they enter

into that root-consciousness which is the place where their potency remains deposited.

The meaning here is that (their potency J gets hidden2 in that (store-consciousness]

through the perishing of (consciousness'J own-nature (svlltman) as a perceiver of its

own object3 and also through the perishing of 'an other (than itselfJ ' (anya), that is to

say, also through the perishing of consciousness as an appearance of object-images (vi­

�aYllbhitsa). "

We reply. That may be true only as a theory which pleases the ears of common

people (loka) 4 , but it succumbs to the following error:

What you designate by the name 'consciousness' is really conceived as a 'self'.

(42cd)

Those who say that the 'self' exists also think that the potencies of everything are

accumulated (pracita) in a single self which generates a variety of objects. You also,

under the guise of5 what is merely the name 'consciousness', end up conceiving that

(consciousnessJ as a 'self'. Thus, you also negate the (BuddhistJ doctrine of no-self.6

1 For the meaning of this paragraph, see the commentary and notes to MHK/TJ V.20 ff. 2 zha ba (Sanskrit : l'i). 3 rang gi cha la dmigs pa (equivalent with consciousness as svabhiisa). See also MHK/TJ V.22cd. 4 Bhavaviveka insinuates here that the Y ogacara is trying to attract common people to Buddhism by

softening the radical 'no self' stance of Buddhism. Commoners will be pleased to hear that the Buddhists affirm the existence of a 'store-consciousness' as the enduring basis of a personal existence both in samsara and in nirvana!

5 rgyu thabs kyis (Sanskrit : vyajena). 6 The Yogacara teaches that the store-consciousness contains all the seeds of defilement (sa'f!'lklesa,

siisrava) and of purification (vyavadana, aniisrava). When the seeds of defilement are subdued and the seeds of purification have fully matured, the store-consciousness is transformed (paravrtti) into a pure mental substratum fro m which the non-dual awareness of reality uninterruptedly originates. According to Bhavaviveka, this theory of consciousness is not different from the titmavada of the non-Buddhists. Just as the non-Buddhists teach that the eternal, unchangeable self (titman) is the subject of bondage and liberation, just so the Y ogacara affirms the existence of the store­consciousness as the selfsame subj ect of defilement and purification. Bhavaviveka explains his own theory of consciousness in MH K/TJ V.45-50.

In fairness to the Yogacara, it should be added that the store-consci ousness differs from the 'self' of the non- Buddhists because the former is conceived as an uninterrupted but continuously changing stream of consciousness. The Y ogacarins were in fact aware that, especially because of

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Moreover, what you conceive as 'liberation' (vimukti) will not be different from

samsara. Why? Because, when the yogin who follows the 'mind-only' teaching

reflects on what the mind is like in sam sara and on what it is like in the state of

liberation, then:

(That yogin] understands that the duality (of consciousness] is similar to a

deception (maya), perishable, not appeased, and without self-existence.

And he understands that the absence of duality is imperishable, true to reality

(bhuta), immortal and the highest abode. (43)

Because the absence (of dual ity] is the same (in both cases] , liberation will not

be different (from bondage in the yogin who] perceives (that absence of

duality] by means of non-dual awareness after (allJ the apprehensions of

duality have been removed. (44)

'Duality' means that (consciousness] functions as having two forms (akara), that

is to say, the form of an apprehended object and the form of an apprehender (grahyagra­

hakakara). The verse says that this (duality] is understood to be similar to a decep­

tion, perishable, not appeased, and without self-existence. This duality is similar to

a deception because it is produced by a deceptive consciousness (abhutavikalpa). l It is

perishable because it is subject to perishing. It is not appeased because it involves

birth, death and so forth which are the retribution of (past] actions. It lacks self­

existence because it does not exist as the 'self' conceived by the non- Buddhists, and

also because it itself has no inherent existence (nilJsvabhiiva).2

'Absence of duality' means that, when sense objects such as colors and shapes

are not perceived anymore as (objects] outside the mind, then the mind stands firm in

its own true nature (svacittadharmata). Such a mind is called 'non-dual' . The verse

says that this (absence of duality] is understood to be imperishable, true to reality,

immortal and the highest abode. 'Imperishable' means that it never perishes. 'True to

its characteristic of uninterruptedness, the store-consciousness was likely to be misunderstood as a kind of permanent self. This concern is for example expressed in the following verse from the Sa1?1dhinirmocanasiltra: "The consciousness which appropriates all existence (iidiinavijiiiina) is profound and subtle. Carrying all the seeds Cof existenceJ , it flows like a stream. I have refrained from teaching it to ignorant people for fear that they misconceive it as a 'self'. " (SNS, T. vol. 16, 692c21 -23 ; Skt. text in Tr Bh 34.3-4). In addition, the Y ogacara distinguishes a special kind of consciousness, ca lled the 'defiled thinker' (kli�tamanas), which has the store-consciousness as its object and misconceives it as a permanent, unchangeable self.

I On abhiltavikalpa or abhutapa rikalpa, see note 3 to my translati on of MHK/TJ V.5. 2 The apprehended object and consciousness as its apprehender are merely imaginary (parikalpita)

things and therefore lack inherent existence with regard to individual characteristics (lak�a1JaniJ:tsvabhiiva) .

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reality' means that it is not deceptive (am!$a). 'Immortal' means that it is free of birth,

death, and so forth. 'Highest abode' means that it is the state of consummation (ni ­

$thiivasthii) .

' (That yoginJ understands' means that duality and absence of duality are

understood that way. 'Because the absence (of duality J is the same On both casesJ '

means that, just as the apprehended and the apprehender do not exist in the state

(avasthii) of samsara, just so they do not exist in the state of liberation. 'After (allJ the

apprehensions of duality have been removed' means that (the yoginJ has removed the

apprehensions of duality by realizing that both (the apprehended and the apprehender J

do equally not exist. ' On the yoginJ who perceives (that absence of duality J by

means of non-dual awareness' refers to the yogin who through direct perception

(pratyak$ajiiana) perceives the inexpressible (ayathiiruta) nature (of the objects of

perceptionJ and who also perceives the perfectly established nature (parini$1Jannasva­

bhiiva) (of the mindJ through non-dual awareness. In that case, the error will be that

'in that (yoginJ liberation wil l not be different (from bondageJ .' This is because that

non-dual awareness originates and apprehends an object, just like the earlier (forms

of consciousness in samsaraJ . (Consciousness inJ the state of liberation will thus not

be different from the earlier forms of consciousness which were accompanied by the

apprehension of duality. Hence, there will be no difference between bondage and

liberation. l

1 A direct sense perception (pratyak�ajfiiina) is an instance of a samsaric consciousness which is free of the conceptual apprehension of its object. A direct sense perception does not conceptualize or identify and differentiate its object by means of names. It perceives the 'inexpressible' nature of its object as it is; that is to say, it produces an exact mental copy of i ts obj ect. It originates from conditions (in particular from the presence of a perceivable object in the vicinity of the sense organs) and it apprehends an object without subsuming it under a concept or name. Hence, it is still characterized by the apprehender-apprehended duality. It is still vikalpa. If the true nature of the mind, as the Yogacara conceives it, is an inherent existence (parini�annasvabhiiva) or is the permanent presence of the absence of duality (see MHK V.2), then the transmundane non-dual awareness which apprehends that presence, will not be different from a samsaric direct sense perception. That is to say, the transmundane non-dual awareness will be a consciousness which originates from the presence of an object and apprehends that object. In short, the transmundane non-dual awareness of the Yogacara may be non-dual (nirvikalpa) in the sense of 'without conceptual apprehension and without conceptually apprehended object', but it is still a dual consciousness (vikalpa) bifurcated into an apprehender and an apprehended object. It is therefore not truly non-dual in the sense of 'free of any apprehension whatsoever' (sarvopalambhopa§ama). See also MHK/T] V.14.

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Moreover,

In order to establish 'mind-only', you should admit that mental factors are not

separate from the mind. Or else, 'mind-only' will not be established. (45)

Since you assert that only the mind exists, in order to establish mind-only, you should

admit that the mental factors, even though their respective objects (dmigs pa) and

cognitive forms (rnam pa, akara) are different (from those of the mind itself] , do not

exist separately from the mind. Or else, if you think that the mental factors are

separate from the mind, 'mind -only' will not be established because the mental factors

are many. l

Or, if you assert that 'mind' (cittam) is [only] a name for a collection of [mental

factors] such as feeling and so forth, you will corroborate what others are

saying and you will forsake your own doctrine. (46)

Or else2, you will have to admit that the name 'mind' is used to designate a collection

of [mental factors] such as feeling, volition (cetanti), sensation (spar§a), mental atten­

tion (manaskar a) and so forth, similar to a frame for leaning spears against (mdung

khyim), or similar to an aggregation of [the four elementary particles] earth, water,

fire and wind, or similar to a pot and the like consisting of [the four composite

particles] color/shape, odor, taste and the tangible. If you admit that, you will

corroborate what others - in casu the Madhyamikas - are saying. And you will also

forsake your own doctrine, because your doctrine says that the five [sense] con­

sciousnesses originate from a single store-consciousness in accordance with the

conditions3, and that the mental factors are also transformations (parit:zama) [of the

store-consciousness] .

You may think as follows: "If 'mind' is [only] a name for a collection of [mental

factors] such as feeling and so forth, the mind will not be a real entity (dravyasat), and

a real basis of defilement (sarrzklesa) and purification (vyavadana) will consequently not

exist anywhere. But if feeling and so forth are separate [entities] , each of them will

be a real entity and will consequently be suited as the support of defilement and

purification. And that [position] agrees with the following words from Scripture:

. "The beginningless element is the support of all the seeds. Because this [beginning­

less element] exists, all the states of samsaric existence exist and there is also

1 See p. 20, note 1 to verse V.28ab. 2 That is, if you do not accept the two alternatives mentioned in verse 45. 3 Reference to TrK 15ab (paiictintiytz miilavijiitine (?) yathtipratyayam udbhava�).

- 184 -

attainment of nirvana." l

We reply:

If because of (the need to explain] defilement and purification, you assert that

the mind is a real entity, then (your thesis] does not refute our position. (Our

position] 2 is in fact established because feeling and so forth originate that way.

(47)

(We] hold that bondage (bandha) is the state where mental activities (manaskara)

(which produceJ primary and secondary defilements arise simultaneously with the

mind. And (weJ hold that there is liberation when these defilements are removed and

the associated wisdom (samprayuktaprajfiil) arises simultaneously with the mind.

Thus, different states (avastha) of the same mind are designated as (different] mental

factors. It is therefore not the case that the mind is a single (substratum] and that

the mind and the mental factors are real entities (dravyasat) which exist separately

from each other. Because mental factors such as feeling and so forth do themselves

originate that way, as associated with bondage or associated with l iberation, they

originate from the collection (kaya) (of mental and material aggregates] . (Our posi­

tion] that the mind and the mental factors exist as aggregates (samaha) is therefore

well-established. Hence, your theory of the mind as a real entity does not damage us.3

1 This verse from the Mahiiyiiniibhidharmasatra is quoted in MS (T. vol. 31, 133b15- 16), TrBh 37.12- 13, and Siddhi T. vol. 31, 8a24-25 and 14a13-14. It is also quoted in PP (see Eckel, p. 55). TJ has substituted 'all seeds' for the original 'all dharmas'. The Sanskrit version in TrBh reads as follows: aniidikiiliko dhiitu� sarvadharmasamiiSraya�1 tasmin sati gati� sarvii nirvii1'}iidhigamo 'pi viii I.

2 I follow the commentary in TJ where "tat" is explained as referring to Bhavaviveka 's position on the nominal existence of the mind and the mental factors. Alternatively, " tat" may also refer to 'defilement and purification'.

3 According to Bhavaviveka, only the individual, momentary instances of consciousness in the life­stream (samtiina) of what we call 'a person' or 'a self' are, conventionally speak ing, real entities

. (dravyasat) . 'Mind' is only a nominal existence (prajfiaptisat) , a name used to designate a homogeneous series or aggregate (samaha) of instances of consciousness. Depending on the object and the sense organ from which it originates, a particular instance of consciousness is designated as 'visual consciousness', 'aural consciousness' and so forth. Mental factors such as 'feeling', 'volition' and so forth are also mere names referring to particular mental functions that are abstracted from the individual instances of consciousness. 'Mind', 'sense consciousness', 'mental consciousness', 'mental factors', etc. are thus nominal existences, conceived in mutual dependence and in dependence on the real, inconceivable and inexpressible instances of consciousness.

Similarly, 'defiled' is merely a name for an instance of consciousness occurring in a stream of consciousness which is accompanied by defilements, and 'pure' designates an i nstance of consciousness in a stream of consciousness which is free of defilements. Defil ement and purification can thus be explained without postulating a real, individual mental substratum ( = store-consciousness) and mental factors as real entities proceeding from that substratum.

- 185 -

You may ask: "If the mind is thus an aggregate and not a real entity, how can

the stream of samsaric existence (bhava) and the attainment of liberation come forth

from such a mind?" We answer:

Just as the series of leaves and other series arise (from a lotus-rootJ because

many potencies are present in a lotus-root, just so a variety of series come forth

from the mind wich is not a real entity. (48)

'saluka' is the root of the lotus. Although the connection with the root is not different

(for all the effects that proceed from itJ , the entire surface of the lake gets covered

with series of lotus-leaves, lotus-flowers and so forth, because that root has many

potencies. In the same way, the diverse streams of samsaric existence of living

beings, which are of different kinds in accordance with the different realms (dhatu) and

states of migration (gati), arise from a mind which is not a real entity.

And these different kinds of life-streams

Do not originate when their counter agent is present, and do originate when their

producing cause is present. (49ab)

'Counteragent' refers to the eight-membered Holy Path. When that is born, the

samsaric life-streams do not originate anymore. But they do originate as long as

defilements (tis rava) , which are their producing causes, exist.

Or, regarding your theory that "the five (consciousnessesJ originate from the root­

consciousness in accordance with (the presence or absence of their J conditions" l , (we

say thatJ even if the root-consciousness does not exist, (the five consciousnessesJ do

not originate when their counteragent, which conflicts with the conditions for the

arisal of the mind as an aggregate, exists. And (the five consciousnessesJ do origi­

nate when perceptible form (rupa), which is their producing cause, and conditions such

as light, space, mental attention and so forth are present.

The idea that a variety (of consciousnessesJ originates from that (store-con­

sciousnessJ is not acceptable, because (the mindJ is not a real entity. (49cd)

We do not accept your theory that three different types (of consciousnessJ , which you

call 'the (consciousness which is the result 00 maturation', 'the 'ego' thinking (con­

sciousnessJ ' and 'the (sixJ object-manifesting (consciousnessesJ '2, originate from the

1 Quotation of TrK 15ab (see the commentary to MHK V.46). 2 See the commentary to MHK V.4.

- 186 -

transformation of (the store-J consciousness. Why? Because the mind is not a real

entity. And (the existence of] these (threeJ cannot be ascertained on the basis of the

different states of the mind (citttivasthii). l

Further,

(For us, unlike for you,J there is no non-liberation by perceiving that, and there

is also no non-cessation of consciousness. (Our doctrine isJ therefore not

similar, both conventionally and ultimately, to (the non-Buddhist doctrinesJ

which teach the existence of the self. (50)

'By perceiving that' means 'by understanding (that everythingJ is only an appearance

in one's own mind'. 'Non-liberation' means 'non-liberation from the stream of samsa­

ric existence'.2 'There is also no non-cessation of consciousness'3 means that con­

sciousness really ceases to exist (for one who follows our systemJ because one

understands that the inherent existence of things is not truly established

(aparini�anna) and because one does not affirm (the real existence ofJ a store­

consciousness. Therefore, our doctrine which says that the mind is an aggregate and

not a real entity, is both conventionally (sa'?'lvrfya) and ultimately (param[jrthata�) not

similar to the doctrine of those who affirm the existence of the self.4 But because you,

advocates of 'mind-only', assert the contrary, these faults really occur in your doctrine.

Next, regarding your statement "The non-apprehending (of external objectsJ

arises as a result of apprehending (everything as mind-only J . And the non-apprehen­

ding (of the mind as an apprehended arises as a result of the non-apprehending (of

1 As Yamaguchi (p. 383 ff.) observes, Bhavaviveka follows the Sautrantika view of consciousness. On this view, consciousness is a homogeneous series of causally connected instances or states of mind (cittilvasthii), in which each instance is different from the previous instance. A a result of this continuous transformation (pari:l}ilma), the causal potencies (sakti) of the instances of consciousness within a particular mental series keep on changing. The residues of defilements and actions are also accumulated as potencies until the last instant of a particular mental series acquires the special capacity (vis�a) to produce the first instant of a new mental series in another samsari c existence. Bhavaviveka does therefore not accept the Yogacara view that the liberati on from samsara consists in a fundamental transformation (parilvr!ti) of the selfsame store-consciousness into a pure mental substratum. For Bhavaviveka, liberation means that the transformation (pari1}ilma) of the stream of consciousness has come to an end, because the instances of consciousness have gradually lost their capacity to produce a new existence due to the presence of counteracting forces (pratipa­k�a, ilryamilrga).

2 Reference to MHK/TJ V.39. 3 Reference to MHK/TJ V.40cd. 4 Reference to MHK/TJ V.42cd.

- 187 -

external objects) " \ we also do not assert anything else but the necessity to cultivate

non-apprehending (anupalambha). How (do we understand this cultivation) ?

One becomes free of attachment (to external obj ects) by the repeated practice

of this (type of reasoning) : " (External objects) such as colors and shapes and

so forth are empty (of inherent existence) , because they do not originate as

inherent existences, and because they are not real entities, and because they

perish, j ust like a magical apparition." (51)

External objects such as colors and shapes and so forth, which do exist as things that

originate when their causes and conditions are present, are empty (of inherent exis­

tence) because they do not originate by their own nature since they do not exist apart

from the collection of their causes and conditions (hetupratyayasamagrl), and because

they are aggregates and not real entities, and because they do not continue to exist for

a long time but perish ( immediately) , just like a magical apparition. By repeatedly

learning not to apprehend them, one becomes non-attached. But it is not the case that

external objects do not exist in every respect!

Furthermore,

Although colors and shapes and so forth do exist, they do not exist (ultimately)

for someone who has come to understand things as they really are. Why would

the mistaken apprehension (of these things) at that time not be removed? (52)

When someone, upon seeing a magical apparition (of a man) , at first thinks that it is

a real man, but later realizes that this is (only) an illusory appearance (mayak1J;a)

without any reality to it, then it stands to reason that the perception of a man will

disappear (from that person's mind) . But such is impossible with respect to (the

perception of) the horns of a rabbit which do not exist at all, both at first and later.

The same is the case (with the perception of external objects) . Although colors and

shapes and so forth exist (as dependently originated things) , conventional knowledge

(sarrzv1J;ijflana) conceives them as inherently existing things. Later, when one comes

to understand correctly that there are no inherent existences, one knows that (external

objects) are not inherent existences. Why would the mistaken apprehension (of

external objects) at that time not cease to exist? The truth is that it really ceases to

exist. In contrast, what use is there in proclaiming from the very beginning, to

ordinary people (p1J;hagjana) in whom the knowledge of reality (tattvajflana) is not yet

1 See MHK V.4

- 188 -

born, that external objects such as colors and shapes and so forth do not exist?l

Similarly,

If the consciousness which functions as an (apprehended-apprehendingJ duality

is (entirely J confined to the range of the mind and the mental factors, then it is

impossible that that consciousness will cease to function even after one has

negated (the existence ofJ external objects. (53)

You argue that the consciousness which functions as an apprehended-apprehending

(grahyagrahaka) duality is (entirelyJ confined to the range (gocara) of the mind and the

mental factors and is not conditioned2 by external objects such as colors and shapes.

In that case, there is no reason why that dual consciousness will not continue to

function even after you have entirely negated (the existence ofJ external objects such

as colors and shapes. On the contrary, that dual consciousness will certainly continue

to function because there is no difference as to (how consciousness functionsJ indepen­

dently of external objects such as colors and shapes both before and after (one has

negated the existence of external objectsJ .3

You might object as follows. It is precisely in order to get rid of the dual

consciousness, which is not conditioned by external objects such as colors and shapes,

that we (firstJ proceed in another way (antarer;a paryayer;a) by teaching that the (so­

calledJ external objects are a part of consciousness itself. And later, when the non­

dual awareness (nirvikalpajfiana) originates, the (twoJ parts of consciousness as a self­

appearance (svabhiisa) and as an object-appearance (anyabhiisa) are removed so that

both that object4 and the apprehending of that object cease to exist.

1 For the Yogacara, external objects are similar to the horns of a rabbit in that they do not exist at all. Bhavaviveka questions here that position as follows. If external objects do not exist at all, it cannot be explained how the perception of external objects originates in the first place. And if external objects are not perceived, the issue of how their perception can be removed becomes irrelevant. Alternatively, if a non- entity can produce a perception, it will continue to produce that perception irrespective of whether the perceiver does or does not realize its non-exi stence. In other words, if one perceives non-existent external objects at first, one will never be able to get rid of that perception later. See also p. 31, notes 1 and 2 to MHK/T] V .39.

For Bhavaviveka, external objects are not similar to the horns of a rabbit. They are similar to a magical apparition. Like a magical apparition, they exist as the products of causes and conditions. Hence, they can act as the object-condition of a perception and can deceive a 'conventional' mind, wich does not inquire into the ultimate-reality status of things, into perceiving them as inherent existences. But when one follows the Madhyamaka path of reasoning ( vicara) and examines whether the perceived external objects exist ultimately (tattvatal}, paramarthatal}) or as inherent existences (svabhiivatah), one understands such not to be the case. As a result, one gradually eliminates not only the attachment to such objects but also the perception of such objects.

2 Literally : "is not connected with" (sambandh). 3 Bhavaviveka repeats here the same point as in MHK/TJ V.39. 4 'That object' refers to 'the object as a part of consciousness itself' (vi�ayabhiisa, anyabhiisa).

- 189 -

We reply:

If you think you should take a different course in order to negate that (later] ,

(we say that] you would be much cleaner by staying far away from the mud

than by washing it off (later] . (54)

If you really want to argue that external objects do not exist, then what's the use of

(first] arguing that (external objects] are a part of consciousness itself? If you think

you should take this different course of (first arguing that external objects] are a part

of consciousness in order to negate (that later] , then the following comparison applies

here: "One is much cleaner by staying far away from the mud than by washing it off

(later] !" Imagine an insane and stupid man who walks off the clean road and enters

a dirty, muddy swamp. Somebody else asks him: "Why did you get off the clean road

to enter into the mud?" He answers: "I 'll wash it off later." To which the other

replies: "You fool! If you really need to be clean, you'll be much cleaner if you don't

touch the mud and stay far away from it from the very beginning."l

1 Parallel passage in PP (see Eckel, p. 70) . The point of Bhavaviveka's criticism here is that the Yogacara path is a 'detour' from the straight and clean Madhyamaka path. The Yogacara path starts with the negation of external objects and the affirmation of 'mind-only'. The 'mind-only' tenet locates the object of the sense consciousnesses in the mind itself (vi�ayiibhasa) and thus claims to explain how the sense consciousnesses function as an apprehended-apprehending dua lity even in the absence of real external objects. This, according to Bhavaviveka, is the 'muddy swamp' to which the Y ogacara path leads people, under the pretext that the mud can be washed off at a later stage of the path (the time when the apprehended-apprehending duality disappears and the non­dual awareness of reality originates). The Yogacara path misleads people because the negation of external objects conflicts with the conventional truth, while the 'mind-only' dogma violates the ultimate truth by attributing ultimate-reality status to the mind as a single privil eged entity. The Madhyama ka path, in contrast, is straight and clean. It starts out by affirming the conventional truth: both external objects and consciousness exist as dependently originated things. The Madhyamaka follower then engages in a sustained reflection (viciira) in pursuit of ultimate existences (svabhtiva). Not finding any ultimate existences, the Madhyamaka follower negates both all the apprehending consciousnesses and all the apprehended objects as not ultimately real and consequently abandons all attachment to and all apprehending of these 'empty' thi ngs.

- 190 -

��*$�$$�. ��W$·�$= �22i} 2002$ 113 -137

An Annotated Translation of

MadhyamakahrdayakiirikaITarkajviilii V.69-84

Paul HOORNAERT

1. Edited Tibetan text of MHKIT J V.69-84

[Editions used: Cone (C.), Dbu-rna Dsa 2 1 8a4-22 1b7 ; Derge (D .), Dbu-rna Dsa 2 1 8a4-22 1 b7 ;

Peking (P.), Dbu-rna Dsa 242b4-247a6]

'dir srnras pal kho bo cag gi tshul ni rni rigs pa rna yin tel rigs pa dang rni ' gal ba'i phyir roll ji

Ita zhe nal kho bo cag ni dngos po marns ngo bo nyid rned del rning du rnngon par brjod pa'i

bdag nyid kyis stong pa' i phyir ro zhes bya bar 'dod del rnngon par brj od pa' i bdag nyid de nyid

rna skyes pa yin lal skye ba rned pa del kho na' i phyir rna 'gags pa yang yin noll rnngon par

brjod pa dang ldan pa'i dngos po gang yin pa de yang marn pa gang gis rnngon par brjod pa' i

marn pa de Itar yod pa rna yin tel brda tsarn du zad pa'i phyir roll 'di ltar gal te dngos po de

rnngon par brjod pa' i spyod yul du ' gyur du zin na rne2 zhes brjod pa kha tshig pa' i skyon du

'gyur roll de bzhin dul kun brtags dngos po yod rna yinll gzhan gyi dbang ni yod pa yinll zhes

bya bas gzhan gyi dbang yod pa nyid du khas blangs pa'i phyir ro3 II 'dir bshad pal

dngos marns ngo bo nyid rned dell

rnngon brjod bdag nyid stong phyir roll

de nyid kyis de skye rned phyirll

rna skyes pa dang rna ' gags nyidll (69)

gang phyir rnngon brjod ldan dngos nill

j i Itar brjod pa de ltar medii

de phyir chos marns dngos rned nyidll

ces bya la sogs rnang srnras dangll (70)

gzhan dbang yod pa nyid srnras pall

kun rdzob tu ni grub pa sgrubll

gal te don dam dpe rned cingll

gtan tshigs4 ' gal ba nyid du ' gyurll (7 1 )

[abhiHipiHrnasunyatvad bhavanarp nil).svabhavata!

I 'de' omitted In P. 2 P : mes 1 C, D : ... phYlf ro zhe naJ 4 p. tshlg

- 1 1 3 -

tena lva capy anutpadad anutpannamruddhataJl (69)

yato 'bhI lapavadva�tu na tatha kathy ate yathaJ

ava�tukatvarp dharmal,lam ltyadi bahu coditamll (70)

paratantrastitoktau ca �arpvrtya slddhasadhanaml

tattvatas cen na dr�!anto hetos capi vl ruddhatrt!1 (7 1 )J

[c. 2 1 8b2, D. 2 1 8b2, P. 243a2 J ces bya ba m de dag thams cad kun rdzob tu sgrub na ni grub pa

la sgrub pa ym tel kho bo cag kyang de dag thams cad kun rdzob kyi bden pa 'i tshul du 'dod

pa ' i phyir roll gal te de don dam par sgrub na ni don dam par gzhan gyl dbang yod pa nyld du

�grub pa la dpe med del de yang ngo bo nyid kyisl stong pa ' l phylr roll de bzhin nyid2 du

mngon par brjod pa ' i bdag nYld kyis stong pa ' i phYlr zhes bya ba ' i gtan tshigs ' gal ba nyid du

yang ' gyur tel mngon par bqod pa ' l bdag nyid kYIS' stong pa nyld du rjes I.,U dpog pas bljod du

med pa' i dngos po yod pa nYld kYlS dngos po mams ngo bo nyid med pa nyld bsal ba ' i phyir

chos can gyi rang gi ngo bo log par bsgrubs pa ' i phylr roll

ci ste yang 'di �nyam du kho bo cag gi gzhan gyl dbang g l ngo bo nyid ni skye ba ngo bo nyld

med pa ym tel yod par gyur pa las ma skyes pa 'i phyir "gyu ma bzhin tel de yang ngo bo nyid

kyis4 stong pa' i phYlr gtan tshigs kYI don ' gal ba nyid du mi ' gyur bar sems nal 'di r bshad pal

gal te gzhan dbang ngo bo nyidll

skye ba ngo bo nyld med dell

yod par gyur las ma -;kyes mill

skye ' gag la sogs 'gal sgrub yinll (72)

[ utpattiniQ�vabhavatvarp sadbhutajat l to yadll

nanutpadamrodhadl pratI�edhasamarthanaml I (72)]

rc. 2 1 8bS , D. 2 I 8bS , P. 243a7] zhes bya ba m de I ta na kho bo cag gi 'dod pa nyld bsgrubs pa

y in tel kho bo cag kyang rgyu dang rkyen ngs' mthun pa ' i bdag nyid las skyes pa mams ni rang

gi bdag nyid las ma �kyes pas ngo bo nyld kYll., stong pa dangl skye ba dang ' gag pa la sogs pa

med par 'dod pa'l phyir roll tshul 'dl ni l ung dang yang mi ' gal tel j l I ta zhe nal

rkyen mams las ni gang skyes pall

de skye med par thub pas gsungsll (73ab)

I 'kYl�' Ol1llttcd In P ' nYld' omitted In P P kYI

j P kYI C, D ng - 1 1 4 -

[pratyayair jayate yo hi tam ajatarp jagau munil).1 (73ab)]

zhes bya ba' i phyir roll rigs pa gang gis zhe nal

don dam du na dngos nyid lasl I

de yi skye ba dgag phyir roll (73cd)

[svabhavatas tadutpadani�edhat paramarthatal).11 (73cd)]

zhes bya ba stel gang rkyen mams las skyes pa de ni don dam par na skye ba med pa nyid yin

par thub pas gsungs tel rgyu dang rkyen gyi l tshogs tha dad pa' i dngos po dag la de' i ngo bo

nyid dmigs su med pa'i phyir roll de Itar yang 'di skad dul gang zhig rkyen las skyes pa de rna

skyesll de la skye ba'i ngo bo nyid med dell gang zhig rkyen la Itos2 pa des stong gsungsll gang

gis stong nyid shes de bag yod yinll zhes gsungs pa Ita bu' oll gzhan yangl

chos mams yang dag nyid min phyirll

de dag kun rdzob blo dang sgra311

sna tshogs rang spyi' i spyod yul dull

' gyur ba la ni ' gal ba medii (74)

[abhiltatvac ca dharma1)-arp te svasamanyagocaral).!

sarpvrtya na virudhyante citradhisabdavrttayal).! I (74)]

[C. 2 1 9a2, D. 2 1 9a2, P. 243b5] ces bya ba ni gang kho na' i phyir chos mams yang dag pa nyid

rna yin pa de kho na' i phyirl de dag kun rdzob tu blo dang sgra sna tshogs kyi rang gi mtshan

nyid kyi spyod yul dangl spyi' i mtshan nyid kyi spyod yul sngon po la sogs pa dangl gzugs la

sogs pa dangl bum pa dangl snam bu zhes bya ba la sogs pa dag tu ' gyur ba la ' gal ba med doll

gal te dngos po mams yang dag pa nyid yin par gyur na ni des na nam mkha' la sogs pa bzhin

du ngo bo nyid gcig pa kho nar4 gyur pas blo sna tshogs dangl sgra sna tshogs kyi yul du mi

' gyur ba zhig na de Ita rna yin noll

de la gzhung lugs gnyi ga la grags pa' i lung yang yod del gang zhe nal

ming ni gang dang gang dag gisll

chos mams gang dang gang brjod pall

de la de ni yod min pall

t P . gyis 2 P : las bltos 3 C, D . p. 'dra. The Tibetan version of the verses-only text has 'sgra' In accordance wIth the Sansknt. " C, D : bar

- 1 15 -

de ni eho� mams eho� nyid doll (75)

[ yena yena hi namna vai yo yo dharmo 'bhdapyatel

na �a sal11Vidyate tatra dharmaljarp sa ca dharmataJl (75)1

[ C. 2 1 9a5, D. 2 1 9a5, P. 244a I ] zhes bya ba yin tel mmg m gang dang gang dag glsll zhes bya

ba ni rang dang spyi ' i brjod pa'i mmg dangl yi ge sna tshogs kyi ngo bo nyid dag gis <;011 ehos

mams gang dang gang brJod pajl zhes bya ba ni gzugs la sogs pa mngon par brjod par bya ba

dag gi t�h lgl gi brjod pa'oll de la de ni yod min pajl zhes bya ba m chos de la mmg du mngon

par brjod pa de yod pa rna ym pa stel chos mams m y l ge med pa'i ngo bo nyid ym pa'i phyir

roll 'di I tar yu l gyi �kad dangl nges pa'i tshlg sna tshogs dag gis dngos po gcig kho na la mam

pa du mar mngon par brjod pa dper na chu la paniya dangl apa dangl sanila dangl m ra zhes bya

ba la sogs pa dag tu brjod pa de la gal te de sgra gCIg glS mngon par brjod pa'i ngo bo nyld yin

par gyur na ni de la �gra gzhan dag 'jug par ml ' gyur zhingl sgra de dag gis mngon par bljod

par yang ml nus pa zhlg na de Ita rna ym noll de ni ehos mams chos nyid doll zhes bya ba nJ

mngon par brjod du med pa de ni ehos mam� kYl don dam pa nyid yin pa' oil kun rdzob tu ni

ngo shes par bya ba'i phyir mmg du 'dog� pa dangl brda dag byed del de dag gis kyang dngos

po de'i khyad par l as 'di ni ba lang yin gyl2 Irta dang mi rna yin no zhes bya ba la �ogs par

yongs su shes par byed doll ngo bo nyid de m blo'i y u l yin tel gang g l phyir zhe nal Ikugs1 pa

dangl 'on pa la sogs pa yi ge dang brda mi shes pa de dag glS kyang bum pa la sogs pa'i dngos

po ngo she� pa dang ba l ang la sogs pas kyang dri dang mig gis rang dang gzhan gyi be' u la

sogs pa ngo shes pa' i phylr roll de I ta bas na don ni mam pa thams cad du mmg gis stong pa

nyid ym pas des dngos pO ' 1 ngo bo nyid mngon par rjod.J par mi byed pa ni yu bu cag gnyi ga l a

yang 'dra' oll

CI ste rkyen byung ngo bo yis'll

gzhan gyl dbang l as skye 'dod nail

sgyu bzhm yang dag nYld min pasll

'dod pa sgrub par byed pa yinll (76)

[atha pratyayasambhutasvabhavene�!asadhanaml

utpattl� paratantryae cen maya yadvad abhutata/I (76)1

[ C. 2 1 9b4, D. 2 1 9b4, P. 244b2] zhe� bya ba ni ci ste gzhan gyl dbang gi rkyen 'du� pa las byung

I P tS,hlg� P gyl� P I kog

I P brJod - 1 1 6 -, P y l

ba' i ngo bos ngo bo nyid yod pa kho na yin tel de ni gzhan gyi dbang las skye ba yin pas don

dam pa ni rna yin par 'dod nal 'dir bshad pal '0 na de ltar de gzhan gyi dbang las skye bar 'dod

na sgyu rna bzhin yang dag pa nyid rna yin pas de la ngo bo nyid ga la yod del de ltar na khyed

kho bo cag gi 'dod pa sgrub par byed pa yin noll de ltar sgrub pa ji skad bstan pa des nal

gzhan gyi dbang yang gzung rned pall

ngo bo nyid kyis rna skyes 'dodl I (77 ab )

[paratantragrahas capi svabhavajatito rnata!)1 (77ab)]

ji Ita zhe nal 'di ltarl

don dam du ni skyes pa lal I

log par snang ba rni rigs phyirll (77cd)

Uatasya paramarthena rnithyakhyanaIp na yujyatell (77cd)]

zhes bya ba ni khyed kyis gzhan gyi dbang ni gzung ba dang 'dzin pa' i ngo bo nyid dang bral

ba nyid kyi phyirl gzung du rned par srnras pa de yang gal te ngo bo nyid kyis skyes par gyur na

ni log par snang bar ' gyur ba rni rigs pa' i phyir tel gang gi phyir de' i ngo bo nyid kyis l rna

skyes pa de kho na' i phyir tel de log par snang bar ' gyur roll gzhang yangl

gal te j i Itar snang ba ltarll

der snang bdag nyid yod gyur nail

ji ltar snang ba de yod phyir211

chos marns j i ltar sgyu rna bzhinll (78)

[yatha khyanti tatha santi tadabhasatrnana yata!)1

yatha khyanti tatha sattvad dharma rnayoparna!) katham/I (78)]

[C. 220a l , D. 220a l , P. 244b8] zhes bya ba ni gal te dngos po 'di dag rgyu dang rkyen gzhan

gyi dbang gi bdag nyid las ji ltar dbang po' i yul nyid du snang ba ltar der snang ba'i bdag nyid

yod par gyur na ji Itar snang ba der yod pa'i phyir chos marns ji Itar sgyu rna Ita bu nyid yin par

' gyur tel 'di ltar sgyu rna ni skyes bu la sogs pa' i bdag nyid du snang yang de' i ngo bo nyid

drnigs su rned del sgyu rna ni skyes bu la sogs pa' i ngo bo nyid kyis' stong pa' i phyir roll de ltar

gzhan gyi dbang gi ngo bo nyid yod par rtogs4 pa yang rigs pa dang Idan pa rna yin noll

1 'kYlS' omItted In P. 2 P . spyod 1 P : kYI 4 P : rtog

- 117 -

de nYld kYl� de skye med phYlr// rna skyes pa dang rna 'gags nyid// ces gang smras pa de yang

'di Itar ches rigs par snang ste/

rna skyes pa dang rna 'gags dang//

dngos med ngo bo nyid med1 pa 'ang//

yod pa nyid l as rna skyes dang//

rdzas su yod pa rna y in phyir// (79)

[sadbhutenatmana-ajater anu tpannaniruddhata!

avastutvasvabhavatve drgasyadravyasattvatal)// (79)J

[ C. 220a4, D. 220a4, P. 245a4] zhes bya ba n i dngos po 'di dag n i rgyu dang rkyen ngs rnthun

pa'i bdag nyid las skye ba y i n gil yod pa nyid las2 skye ba n i rna y in tel rgyu dang rkyen gyl

tshogs tha dad pa'i dngos po gna� pa'i dus na' ngo bo nyid dU'1 rdu l phran tsam yang dmigs su

rned pa'l phyir roll de'i phyir rna skyes pa dang rna 'gags pa ny id dang/ dngos po rned pa nyld

dang/ ngo bo nyid rned pa nyid kyang yod pa nyld l as rna skyes pa'i phylr ro// dngos po 'di dag

gl ngo bo nyid dang rgyu dang rkyen rigs mthun pa'i bdag nYld l as snang bar drnigs par snang

ba gang yin pa de yang sa dang/ chu dang/ me dang/ r lung dang/ gzugs dang/ dri dang/ ro dang/

reg pa zhe-; bya ba'i rdzas brgyad 'dus pa yin tel de yang dmag dang/ nags tshal la sogs pa bzhin

du rdzas su yod pa rna yin pa'i phyir rna skyes pa dang rna 'gags pa nYld dang/ dngos po rned

pa nyid dang/ ngo bo nyid rned pa nyld kyang yin par khong du chud par bya' 0 zhes bya ba'i

tshig gi don toll

'dir gal te 'di s nyam du khyed la dngos po rned pa'i phYlr cho� gdags pa dang 'gal bar 'gyur ro

zhes bya bar serns n a 'dir bshad pal

gdags la skyon chag� nyid rned dell

marn rig tsam du rntshungs phyir ro// (80ab)

[vljfiaptirnatratu lyatvat prajfiapter nasti du�!ata! (80ab) 1

[C. 220bL D. 220bl, P. 245b21 zhes bya ba ni bdag dang bdag gi rtog pa dang bral ba'l marn

par rig pa tsam du y ang kho bo cag dang khyed du rntshungs pa nYld" y in la/ phyi rol gyi don

mam par shes pas bskyed pa'i la� kYlS" mngon par 'du s byas pa rdzas su med pa la yang phYI

nang gl chos 'dogs pa'l phyir kho bo cag gl phyogs la nyes pa rned doll khyod ky i phyogs la ni

j 'med ' omitted In C. D C, D la

l C . 0 na� 'du' omItted In P 'nYld' omitted In P

" p. kYI

�lIS�

spang ba dang spong byed yod pa'i phyirll

yongs shes sogs yod gang gir 'dodll (80cd)

[heyaprahatrsadbhavat kasye�taf!1 nirvidadi sat/I (80cd)]

ces bya ba ni gal te sdug bsngal l a sogs pa spang ba dangl spong bar byed pa lam skyes pa

bsgom pa goms par byed pa'i 'du byed kyi tshogs dag mam par shes pa'i cha nyid gzhan gyi

dbang gi cha nyid du yod pa nyid yin nal ngo bo nyid l a ni gzhan du 'gyur ba med pa'i phyir

dangl gnas ' gyur ba med pa'i phyir sdug bsngal yongs su shes pa l a sogs pa 'ji g rten las 'das

pa'i rkyen gzh an gyi dbang gi ngo bo nyid yod par 'dod pa de gang gi y in par 'dod del 'ji g rten

pa dang 'Ji g rten l as 'das pa'i gnas skabs la 'gyur ba med pa'i phyir gang l a ji l tar 'byung bar

'gyur zhes bya bar tshig khong nas drang ngoll

gal te ' di skad ces ' 0 na khyed l a yang rdzas su med pa'i phYlr thar pa med par mi ' gyur ram

zhe nal de'i phyir bshad pal

de ni gang phyir rdzas med kyangll

mam rtog bral bas thar par ' gyurl I

rdzas yod nyid na 'ang skye med phyirll

'di l as gzhan du brtagl mi 'dodll (81)

[vikalpoparaman m uktir adravyatve 'pi sa yatal)1

dravyasattve ' py ajatatvan nato ' nya kalpane�yatel I (81)]

[C. 220b6, D. 220b6, P. 245b8] ces bya ba ni dngos po mams rdzas s u yod pa rna y in pa kho na

yin pas 'jig rten pa'i shes pa mam par rtog pa dang bcas pa'i mju g thogs su 'ji g r ten l as 'das

pa'i ye shes mam par m i rtog pa 'phags pa skye bas thar par rigs kyil rdzas su yod pa ngo bo

nyid mi ' gyur ba mams la mi rigs pas thar pa de ni gang gi phyir dngos po mams rdzas su med

kyangl mam par rtog pa dang bral bas thar par ' gyur ba nyid doll

gal te mam pa 'ga' zhig gis de dag rdzas su yod pa nyid du2 'gyur yangl de Ita na 'ang ngo bo

nyid kyis' skye ba med pa'i phyir mam par rtog pa dang bral ba kho nas thar par rigs soil de'i

phyir tshul 'di las gzhan du yongs su grub pa'i ngo bo nyid la dmigs pa'i ye shes yod par brtags

pas ci bya stel sngar yangl ngo bo nyid la dmigs y in nail ston pa'i byang chub rtog can dangll

dmigs pa can du ' gyur ba dangll mam par mi rtog b lor mi ' gyurll zhes bstan zin pas de ni mi

'dod doll

I C, D, P rtag CorrectIOn based on TIbetan versIOn of the verses-only text. P ' du yang

1 P : kYI

- 119 -

'dir pha rol pos rang gi tshul nyes par smras pa'l gnad du bsnun pa� shIn tu 'khams1 nas gtum"

tshlg rtsub mo smras pal

dngos mam� ngo bo nyid med nal/

gdags pa 'ang yod par ml 'gyur basil

de nI med par Ita ba dag//

mi gleng bsten' par bya min dang// (82)

rang yang ngan song gzhol ba dang//

gzhan yang phung bar byed pa y in// (83ab)

[prajfiapter apy asadbhavo svabhave vastuno 'satJ/

taddr�!irnastiko 'kathyal) sa hy asarpvasya eva cal/ (82)

svayamapaYlkatve 'sau parqarpsca vipadakal)/ (83ab)]

rc. 22 1 a3, D. 22 1 a3, P. 246a7] zhes bya ba nil de dag na ref kho bo cag rnal 'byor �pyod pa pa

la ni phyi rol gyi y u l med du ZIn kyang rnam par shes pa t�am nyid't re zhig yod pas mam par

shes pa yong'" su gyur pa'i rnam par phyi rol gyi yu1 yang dmigs su yod lal yongs su grub pa'i

ngo bo nyid de de bzhin gshegs pas so so rang rig par bya ba yang yod kyi/ dbu rna smra ba la

ni re zhig kun rdzob tu yang sgyu ma I ta bu nyid du 'dogs pas 'j ig rten pa'i chos rnams la skur

pa 'debs pa dang/ don dam par yang rnam par ",hes pa yang med la1 mam par shes par' bya ba

yang med pas ci yang med del dngos po rnams ngo bo nyid med par skur pa 'debs pa'i phylf

chos gdags pa yang yod par mi 'gyur bas de med pa'i phyir de med par I ta ba nyid dang mthun

pa dang/ sus kyang mi gleng mi brJod pa dang/ l han cig 'grogs pa' i dngos pos brten par mi bya

ba yIn tel de'i phyir bcom ldan 'das kyis kyang dge s long dag khyed kyis deng phyin chad 'j ig

rten rgyang pan pa gsang tshig sna tshogs kyi spobs pa can dang bsten par mi bya b�nyen par mi

byal bsnyen bkur mi bya' 0 zhes gsungs pas khyed n i dam pa rna yin pash yongs su spang bar

bya ba' de'i gnas su shIn tu gyur pa dang/ dam pa'i cho� spong" ba'i p hyir rang yang ngan song

la gzhol ba dang/ I ta ba 'dZIn pa'i chu srin 'dzIn khn la mngon par zhen pa la mos par byed pa'l

phyir gzhan yang phung bar byed pa y i n no zhes zer ro// de la slob dpon gyis bshad pal

, P kham� C, D ' gtun

l C, D bqan, P brtan Correction ba�ed on the occurrence of "b5ten" In the TJ-commentary to thl<' ver�c The clme<,t equIvalent of the Sansknt '\ar)lva<," <,eem� to be "b<,nyen pa" (approach, a�<,oclate w Ith) whIch al�o occur� In the TJ-commentary

, P nJ - , P: pa " P pa

' ba' omItted In P , C, D �l()ng

- 1 20 -

zhe sdang sha rul sgregs pa dell

nga rgyal rna zhu ston pa yinll (83cd)

[iti dve�arni�odgaro 'bhirnanajlfl:tasucakal).11 (83cd)]

[C. 22 1 b2, D . 22 1 b2, P. 246b6] zhes bya ba ni khyod kyi khro tshig de ni dper na sha rul gyi

sgregs pas rna zhu ba nyid ston par byed pa de bzhin du zhe sdang gi tshig gis rnngon pa'i nga

rgyal can nyid du ston par byed pa yin no zhes bya ba' i tha tshig goll de la zhe sdang nyid sha

rul yin tel de' i sgregs pa Ita bu ni khyod kyi tshig de yin noll rnngon pa' i nga rgyal can nyid rna

zhu ba Ita bu yin tel sha rul gyi1 sgregs pas rna zhu ba nyid ston par byed pa2 de bzhin dul zhe

sdang gi tshig kyang khyod nyid rnngon pa' i nga rgyal can nyid du ston pa yin gyi kho bo ' i Ita

ba ni skyon ci yang rned pa kho na yin noll zhe sdang gi sha rul gyi sgregs pa des bdag nyid

rnngon pa' i nga rgyal rna zhu ba nyid du ston par zad kyil dbu rna pa la de Ita bu' i skyon yang

dag pa rned par') ji Itar nges par bya zhe naf de' i phyirl

chos marns sgyu rna bzhin 'dod dell

ngo bo nyid ni rned phyir dangl I

byis pa rrnongs pa' i rgyu phyir dangll

rna byung ba las 'byung phyir roll (84)

[asadbhutasvabhavatvad balasarprnohahetutal).1

abhutva bhavatvad vapi dharma rnayoparna rnatal).11 (84)]

[c. 221b5, D. 221b5, P. 247a2] zhes bya ba ni kho bos dngos po marns marn pa tharns cad du

rned pa nyid yin no zhes rna srnras tel 'di Itar kho bo cag ni kun rdzob tu chos marns rgyu dang

rkyen rigs rnthun pa las ' byung ba sgyu rna bzhin du yod pa nyid du 'dod de ngo bo nyid rned

pa'i phyir dangl skye bo byis pa Ita bur rrnongs pa' i rgyu yin pa'i phyir dangl sngon rna byung

ba las byung ba'i phyir ro zhes srnras pa de' i tshe ji ltar gdags pa yod par rni 'gyur tel gdags pa

yod pa kho na' i phyir kho bo la khyed kyis srnras pa'i skyon gyis gnas rni thod doll chos marns

ngo bo nyid rned pa gang yin pa de ni4 don dam pa yin par yod5 pa dangl rned pa'i rntha' gnyis

spongs6 pa' i phyir kho bo cag rned par Ita ba nyid dang rnthun par ga la ' gyur tel de' i phYlr

khyod kyj7 tshig de ni zhe sdang gi sha rul gyi sgregs pa nyid yin noll

I p. gYlS 2 P : rna zhu ba nYld du ston par byed pa .. 1 P : pa 4 p. nYld

P . 'dod 6 P : spangs

p. kY1S

-121-

2. Translation

The Yogacara obJect�: "Our doctri ne i � not incorrect, because it doe� not contradict reason

(yukti). Why is that so? We a�sert that things l ack i nherent exi'itence (niZ]sl'abhliva) because they

are empty of the identities (litman) [ expre��ed by ] the words that are used to name them. Tho�e

very identities [expressed by J words do not ongmate. And just because they do not onginate,

they do not peri sh e ither. Any thing with which a word I" associated, doe� not exi�t the way it is

expre��ed by that word, becau�e [ words] are only larbitraryJ conventions (s{//!lketamcltra). In fact ,

if thing� were the actual referents (gocanl) of words,1 one would get hurt by burning one\

mouth when uttenng the word ' fi re ' .2 Moreover, r our doctnne al"o agree� wi th �cnpture

(c7gama) ] because the eXI�tence of the dependent nature IS endor�ed by the fol lowing �tatement

lfrom scr ipture]: "ImagIned thing" do not eXist, but thIngs that depend on others do exist. ' "

We reply :

"Things l ack I nherent eXi stence because they are empty of the identItie�

[ expre�sed by] the word� [ that designate them]. And just because things do not

origi nate a� having that identity, thmgs neither orIgmate nor perish. (69)

Any thing with which a word i s as�ocIated, doe� not ex ist the way it i �

expressed [ by that word ]. Things are therefore not real [ i n that sense ]."

Thu� and In many other ways they argue. (70)

And they also say that the dependent [ nature] eXi sts.

If lthis I� arguedJ w ith reference to the conventIOnal [ truth ] , [ the error of] proVIng what I �

already proven wi l l occur. I f [ it i s argued J with reference t o the u lt imate ltruth J , then there

is no example and the reason i� contradictory. (7 1 )

I f you lIltend to prove all that as conventional ly rtrue ] , you wi l l prove what i � already proven, be­

cause we also a��ert al l that a� the conventional truth. B ut If you i ntend to prove it as the u l ti­

mate rtruth] , then there is no example to prove that the dependent lnature 1 exi�t" u lt imately, be­

cau�e that lnatureJ also IS empty of inherent existence [ u ltimately],4 Moreover, the logical reason

Or " 1 1' the real Identity of thll1g� were expres�ed by the word� that are u�ed to deSIgnate them "

For thl� example, �ee Mah(/vlbha�a,;'al'fm, T vol 27, 73a II fT. (Reference 111 C Cox, DlIpufed D/wl/l1m f(//-i) Buddhll'f Theollel O/l E>:l,lfel1c e, The Internat Ional I n�tltute tor Buddhl\l Studle�, Tokyo 1 995, p 40 I. note 23 )

, QuotatIon of L(I/,1kc7wlf(/ra,llllm I I. 19 1 ab /lell'tl I'm "a/pLf() bhavo/! 1)({rctt0l1tml co vldvOIe Al�o quoted In PP (Eckel, p 56)

" Paral le l tex t� 111 ) Koraf% raI110,1(/lfm " 1 1'. havll1g 111 mll1d the ll1herent eX I stence� that are known to the unedu­cated mll1d� of cowherd, and the l Ike. you argue WIth reference to the conventIonal )truth) that condItIoned thI ngs such as the VIsual sen�e organ and so forth have theIr own ll1herent eX I �tence, then you provc what IS al­ready proven B ut If you mgue WIth reference to the u l t Imate )truth ] . then there IS no accordant example (.lcI­dharmvodnicll1{(l)" (T vol. 30, 269c 1 -3 ): "If you argue that the dependent nature eXI,ts WIth reference to the conventIOnal )truth ] , you prove what IS already proven If you argue that It eXI�t� WIth reference to the u l t imate truth, then there IS no accordant example " (T vol 30, 272b 1 2-13 )

� 1 22�

"because [things] are empty of the identities [expressed by] words" is contradictory (viruddha).

In fact, by inferring that [things] are empty of the identities [expressed by] words, [you implicitly

affirm] the existence of their inexpressible nature and thus negate [your thesis] that things lack

inherent existence. The nature (svariipa) of the subject of your proposition (dharmin) is therefore

not correctly established. 1

You might argue as follows: "The dependent nature, as we understand it, lacks inherent

existence with respect to its origination (utpattini�svabhava) because it does not originate from

[itself as] already existent, just like a magical apparition (maya).2 Thus, because that [dependent

nature] also is empty of inherent existence, the meaning of the reason [in our inference] is not

contradictory."

We reply:

If [you say that] the dependent nature lacks inherent existence with respect to its origma­

tion because it does not originate from [itself as] already existent, isn' t it then clearly es­

tablished that its [ultimate] origination, perishing and so forth are thereby negated? (72)

If so, then exactly our view will be established. In fact, we also assert that things which [conven­

tionally speaking] originate from the nature (atman) of appropriate causes and conditions, are

[ultimately] empty of mherent existence and [ultimately] lack origination, perishing and so forth,

because they do not originate from their own nature (svatman). And this view agrees also with

The nature attnbuted to the subject of the Yogacara propositIOn ("thmgs") IS "lacking inherent eXistence [ulti­mately J." ThiS predicate is however contradicted by the logical reason which says that thing� lack the Identities that are Imputed to them by words, Without thereby excludmg that each thmg ultimately pos<;esses Its own eXIs­tence and ItS own inexpressible nature which are the products of ItS own causes and conditions. ThiS own-nature IS not imputed and cannot be imputed by words simply because it IS not expressible by words. As the Yogacara understands It, "dependent nature" means that each real thing is produced by causes and conditions that are other than itself (paratantra ) and nevertheless possesses an eXistence and an essence that are stnctly ItS own (sva-hhava ) precisely because each thing IS the product of causes and conditIOns that are exclUSively ItS own. ThiS strictly indiVidual nature cannot be mcluded Within a class, category or universal and IS therefore never the object of conceptual knowledge or speech. "To have a dependent nature" thus means "to own an inexpressible, other-produced mherent eXistence and essence" or "to be the exclUSive owner of an eXistence and an essence that were produced by others "

Although Bhavavlveka agrees to thiS as far a<; the conventional truth is concerned, he does not accept that such an other-produced existence IS an inherent existence (svahhava ) In the ultimate sense (paramarthata�) , be­cause only somethmg that is "unmade (akrtaka, akrtrima) and not dependent on others (paratrantrapek.�'a )" (MMK XY.2) can be an mherent existence In the ultimate sense for the Madhyamaka. Madhyamaka rea<;onings m search for ultimate eXistences should therefore exclude the dependent nature as non-ultimate. ThiS exclUSIOn of mdivldually owned eXistence, although at first theoretical, is foremost a matter of meditatlOnal practice (hha­vanii). Its final outcome IS an enlIghtened mind charactenzed by the non-perception (anupalamhha ) of indiVid­ual entities, that IS to say, of entities that would own a part of bemg in their own nght.

The cruCial problem in thl� connection ii> the fol lowmg. What exactly does Bhavavlveka mean when he says that the Yogacara attnbutes ultimate eXistence to the dependent nature of things? And is he nght In attnbuting this view to the Yogacara? I Intend to diSCUSS thiS problem on another occasIOn. For Tsong Khapa's approach to thiS problem, see R. Thurman, The Speech of Gold , Motilal Banarsldass 1 989, pp. 2 1 8-223 Thl� IS the standard definitIOn of utpattint�svahhava In the Yogacara texts (SN S , T. vol. 1 6, 694aI8-20; YBh, T. vol. 30, 702b21-23; Xiang-yang-sheng-jiao-lung , T vol. 3 1 , 557b 1 9-20, 559a8-9; TrBh 4 1 . 1 6- 1 7 ad TrK 24 Ina svayan:zhhiiva etasya (= paratantrasvahhiivasya ) miiyavat parapratyayena utpatte � 1. Paral lel text:;, In PP (Eckel, pp 59-60); *Karatalaratna,<;iistra , T vol. 30, 27 I c22-25.

- 1 23 -

Scripture, because

"The Lord of the world has taught that whatever originates from condit ions does not

origi nate [ u lt imatel y 1," (73ab)

Why IS that so?

Because its originatIon a<; an inherent existence In the ult imate seme is negated. (73cd)

The Lord has taught that someth Ing wh Ich originates from condition I> does not ongmate u lt i -

mately (paramarthata�l), because the nature of that thing I S not seen [to existJ m that thmg [it­

selfl apart from the collection of ItS causel> and conditions (hetupratyayasamagrl). Simi l arly, [ the

LordJ has taught: "Whatever ongmates from condItions does not originate. Origination m its

own right IS not found there. Whatever dependl> on conditions is I>aid to be empty. Whoever

knows emptmess IS free of deluslon."1 Furthermore,

A trcquently quoted vcr�e from the Anuvutuptahradapal({}!lkral11w.lc/llltra ")'a�l pratWlVatr layatl la h} allito, no talva utpcldll I vuhhclvato 'sfl }(l�1 pmtvayc7dhlnu IC/ Illl1ya ukto va�l l[ill.'yatcll?l Icll1atl so 'pramatta I}" (eL YamaguchI , p 5(7 ) Abo quoted I II K R (T. vol 30, 269a 1 1 - 1 2, L. de La Val lee POU��I Il . Le In,vall dal/I' ta MOln, p 74) The Sansknt text 1<., found III for exam ple Prwanl1apada. L. de La Val lee POU��1 Il ed . 239 10- 13 and Bodhicarvclv{[tlimpail/ika, P L Vmdya ed . 1 72 1 1 - 15)

There I� a fundamental dItlerence between the Yogacara and the Madhyamaka under'>tandlllg'> of "lIpattl­/u�l,1 vahhliva" The Yogacara �ays that the dependently ongl llated nature of each lIl<,tance of mllld I� not an 1 Il­herent or u l timate nature III the �en�e that It IS not a ,>elf-produced nature Neverthele��, an other-dependent na­ture I I1heres exclm,lvely 111 each partIcular mstance of mind, and I� III that sense an exclusively-owned Inherent nature or an ul t imate eX I�tence that must not be negated, but ,>hould be retall1ed a" a genull1e remall1der (ell'a­\z�l!am) of reality. hy and 1 11 the mll1d" of tho�e who de'>lre to know and �ee reality a'> It I�. I n �hort, for the Yo­gacara "ulpat1/111�l,lvabhclV([" mean� both ",IVa{([-lllpC/ttl-lll�lIVabhclV([" (ultllnate ab�ence of a �el f-produced II1he­rent nature) and "parala-Ulpaltz-salvabhava" (u ltI mate pre'>ence ot an other-produced mherent nature)

For Bhavavlveka. however. a nature that ongll1ates 111 dependence on others need" to be negated and excluded

a� non-ongmated and as ab�olutely non-exl"tent m the ultImate �ense B havavlveka therefore reJect� "ulpaf­lll71�lSVahlulva" 111 the Yogacara sense of "thll1g" u ltllnately lack mherent eX I<.,tence only to the extent that they do not ongll1ate from them�elve�

,. I n�tead, he a�,>er[<, the much more radical Madhyamaka POSItion of "onutpal­

tZI1l�svabhava" (thll1g� ult imately l ack IIlherent eX I�tence becau'>e u l tllnately they do not ongll1ate at al l) B ha­vavlveka\ vIew I!> mo�t clearly '>tated 111 hl<, reply to the fol lowll1g Yogacara objectIon 111 the �'Kamtatarafl1([�ii,l­tro

"You I Madhyamlka'> I argue that conditioned entities are ult imately (tattvata�l) empty lot I I1herent eXi stence I because they an'>e trom condltlon� I f you I I1tend to "ay that conditioned entltle� are empty 111 the �ense that they lack I Ilherent eX I<,tence WIth respect to their ongll1atlon (ulpatt/l71�1Svablulv(/) because they an�e from con­ditIons and do not eX I �t by them�elves, then your argument e<;tabll<,he,> the Yogacara POSItion and I'> perfectly 1 11 conformity W ith reason" (T vol. 30, 27 1 c22-25)

Bhavavlveka repl ies a" fo llow" "What do you mean when you �ay that condItIoned entitle:', are empty 1 11 the "en�e that they lack I I1herent ex­

I stence With re�pect to their ongll1ation becau�e they an<;e from conditIOns and do not eX i st by them�elves? I f you mean that condItIOned, dependently ongll1ated thll1g� such a, the VIsual �en"e organ and so forth arc

empty 1 Il the �en�e that the uncondItIoned, permanent and Impen<;hable nature (I vahhclva) of the vl�ual "en�e organ and '>0 forth IS ab,>olutely ab<;ent 1 11 them, then you attempt to prove �omethll1g that need� no proof (I/(Idh(/\(/dholla) Thl" I� Il1deed accepted by the B uddlmt �chool", the Samkhya, the Vat�qlka, and �o forth.

SlI1ce It I� taught that the V1'mal !>eme organ and �o forth are not made empty but are empty by nature (prakrtvcl .llill)'U )-"'", you <;hould �ay that th1l1gs are empty 111 the �en!>e of "ah�ence of II1herent eX I�tence hecau�e of non-ongll1atlon" (}lK ttJ1f:tt , C/1111tpatltn/�1SVubhal'Cl), and not 111 the sen'>e of "ab�ence of Il1herent eXI <;tence becau<;c of I other-dependent I ongll1atlon ('ct.:1!M"l, utpattznl�1SV{1bh(/va)" I f thll1g�, at the time of then ongllla­tlon, ongll1ate a� havll1g an I I1herent eXI'>tence 111 the u ltllnate <;en�e (p(/ramclrthota�l), how can you "ay that they lack Il1herent eXI5tence WIth re�pect to theIr onglllation (utpoflll1l�,1 vobl7(lv(/)'7 l You �hould be COlN<.,tent and say that they ongll1ate 111 the ultimate �en�e (litpattlsa,\ vabhava) I On the other hand, If they do not real ly ongll1ate and have no '>ub'>tance at all, you �houlcl not <;ay that their true nature I� 'mll1d on ly'. But I f you accept thl" al-

- 1 24 -

The fact that things are not ultimately real explains perfectly well why, conventionally

speaking, their individual and general [properties] function as the objects of different cog­

nitions and words. (74)

Just because things are not ultimately real, we can explain the fact that, conventionally speaking,

they function as the objects of different cognitions and words [which apprehend or designate]

their individual and general properties such as blue and so forth, form and so forth, or pot and

cloth and so forth. If things were ultimately real, then like space they would have just one undif­

ferentiated nature and could therefore not be the object of different cognitions and different

words. But that is not the case. l

In this connection, there IS also the following scriptural statement which IS approved by

both [the Yogacara and the Madhyamaka] systems:

Such and such a name is used to express such and such a thing, but these [names] do not

exist therein. That is the ultimate nature of things. 2 (75)

ternative, you wIll commit the error of contradlctmg your own doctnne (abhyupetabadha). If you mean that things are empty and non-existent because, arising in dependence on others, they lack a

self-produced nature, then you again commit the error of attempting to prove something that needs no proof. But you assert that things which depend on other condltlOns do ongmate [ultimately] and are really non-empty' Hence, you shouldn't say that they are empty' Our VieW IS different. How then can you suggest that [our view] corroborates the Yogacara pOSItion?" (T. vol. 30, 272aI4-26) l ** See Kasyapaparivarta, A. Von Stael-Holstem ed., Section 63, p. 94' yan na sunyataya dharma .�unya karotl dharma eva sunya.]

Accordmg to Bhavavlveka, the Yogacara argument that the dependent nature of things eXlst� as the substratum of conventlOnal knowledge and speech (cf. MHK y'6) imphes that the dependent nature is not ultimately real. In his view, the dependent nature of thmgs compnses stnctly mdlvldual propertIes (svalak�afJa ) whIch are the objects of non-conceptual and non-verbahzed direct perception (pratyak�a ), and general properties (samanyalak�afJa) which are the objects of conceptual knowledge and speech and are an integraL real part of the dependently produced Identity of each thmg (see MHK Y.62). If the dependent nature were an mherent eXIs­tence m the ultimate sense, as the Yogacara asserts accordmg to Bhavaviveka, it should be one, unchangeable and undIfferentiated, and could not functlOn as the object of many different cognitions and words See also Bhavavlveka's account of "prajfiapti" m verses 80ab and 82-84 below. From the Aryabhavasa'!lkrantzsutra (cf. YamaguchI, p 5 1 1 -5 1 2). Also quoted in PP (Eckel, p. 56) The pre­Bhavavlveka Yogacara texts where this ver�e I� quoted are BBh (48. 1 2- 1 3) and Vasubandhu's Vyakhyayuktl (D. Sems Tsam 14, Si 1 1 0b3 ff.).

The author of BBh quotes this verse to substantiate hiS view that the true nature of all things IS mexpresslble (mrabhilapyas vabhiiva ) and explams Its meamng as follows (BBh 48. 1 5-22). The Identity (atman) that I S ex­pressed by for mstance the name "rlipa" does not eXist in the real thmgs to which the name "rlipa" IS applIed (rupadlsa'!ljfiaka dharma� = prajfiaptlvadasraya = vastumatra). And the fact that things exist (vldyamanata) as mexpressible (that IS, as lacking the IdentIty which words attribute to them) IS their ultimate, true nature (paramarthata� svabhiivadharmata )

Vasubandhu's interpretatlOn of thIS verse m Vyakhyayukti focuses more on the necessary eXistence of "the real things that have an mexpressible nature" (brjod du med pa 'i mtshan nYld kYI dngos po, anabhzlapya lak�alJavastu ). These real thmgs are the substrata of Imagmed things (= the identitIes Imputed by words) and of an ultImate mexpressible nature (dharmata = parmi�pannasvabhava ). As Vasubandhu says, if tho�e real things did not eXIst, the verse would not say "na sa saf!1Vldyate tatra" nor would It say "dharmanam sa ca dharmata"

- 1 25 -

' S uch and ,>uch a name' mean� names that express the mdlvIdual and general [properties of

thing� 1 and consist of a number of sy l lable� (ak.yara)'. 'To express such and such a thing' refer�

to the verbal expression of the th mg� that are objects of speech (ahhidheya), �uch a� color� and

shapes (nipa) and so forth. ' These [ names 1 do not eXist therein ' means that the expression in the

form of a name doe,> not exi'>t in the thing [to which it is appl ied] because the nature of things

doe� not con�ist of �yl lables. I n fact, one and the same thing is expressed in many different way�

depending on the vanety of local l anguages (de�·ahha.ya) and word-derivat ions (niruktl). Water,

for mstance, IS called "paniya", "ap" , "sa l i la" , " nira", and so forth. Now, if water had the nature

of the verbal expression (abhidhana) effected by one of these words, then the other words woul d

not be app l icable to i t and could not express It. But that i s obviously not the case.

' That IS the u lt imate nature of thmg�' mean� that 'being mexpressible ' (l1irabhilapya) i� the u lt i­

mate nature (paramarthata) of thing�. People in the world C\W!lvrti) i nvent name� and estab l ish

connect ions between name� and th ings (sClI?1keta) for the sake of Identlfymg and recogl1lzing

(pratyahhljilci) lthings ]. Based on the characten�tic� (vI5e�'a) of a part icular thing, these name�

make it known that this thing is for m<;tance a cow, and not a horse or a human being. The iden­

tity [ of the thing designated as 'cow ' I IS an object of knowledge (buddhivi.yaya). Why? Because

even people who do not know syl lables and do not understand �poken language, such a� mute

and deaf peopl e, recogl1lze thmgs �uch a� pot� and the l ike, and even COW" recognize their own

and others' cal ves by mean:;, of �mel l and eye'>lght.1 B ecau�e things are thus in a l l respech empty

of [ the nature on names, both of u:;, agree that names do not express the nature of things.2

A� Yamaguchi (p 5 1 tl, note 6) ob�erve�, "the Identity (ngo /Jo 11."ld) [of the thIng de�lgnated a� 'cow'!" rerer�

to the general property (Ie/me/nya) 'cow' For B havavlveka. the general property 'cow' IS an objectIve reality In­herent 1 11 each partIcular cow Cd M H K/TJ V 62 tT) B ut the word ' cow' , coml�tll1g of �yl lable�, doe<; not eX I \t In any partIcu lar cow It I» therefore not necessary to know word" 1 11 order to be able to Identify and recogn17e a part icular ani mal a� a 'cow', Becau�e the general property 'cow' I I1here� 1 11 each partIcu lar cow, even deaf and mute people can Identi fy cow,> by eye\lght or touch (d TJ ad M H K V 63 on the perceptibility of general prop­ertIe�) and can entertall1 the notIOn or Idea 'cow' even though they are not able to connect that Idea With the word 'cow' S imI larly, al1lmal" have a recognIZIng and notional knowledge of 'my calf ' , 'food', etc (�ee al<;o TJ ad M H K V 58) "In al l re�pect�" mean� "both conventional ly and u l llmately " Although the text �ays that both the Yogacara and the Madhyamaka agree that thll1g� are 1 11 al l re�pect� empty of the nature ot name�. the way thl� I� under�tood by each I� fundamental ly different. For the Yogacara, the dependent nature of thll1g" I'> a real (dwvv(/.\ut), 111-qantaneou'> (k�{[JJl"-([), "tnctly I I1dlvldual (lVa/a"- �w.l([) and lI1expre<;�lble nature Word" refer to general proper­tle� or IdentltIe\ (lclmc/11\ C//ak.�(l/7a) that are Il1lagll1ed to be real (panka/plta) but are actual ly only nomll1al eX I �­tence� (pWji/aptl.l'at). The IdentltIe� that are de»lgnated by word" are therctore not only ulumately but abo con­ventional ly unreal (adw\,\({) In contra"t, for Bhavavlveka, dependent ly ongll1ated thll1g� are. convent ional ly �peakll1g, empty of the nature of the word� that de<;lgnate them for the qU Ite � Impll�llc reason that thll1g�, un l ike words, are not made up of <;yl lable� But thl� doe" not mean that the general propertle<; or IdenlltJe� (\e/I/1e/-11}([/ak)o '70) to which word� ref er are only n0Il1111al eX I �tence� or Imag1l1ed Identities A � we have ob,>erved agam and agall1 , Bhavavlveka hold� that general propertle� are dependently onglllated propertle'>, and are 111 that �en�e real propert Ie� , I Ilherent In and con�tltutlllg an lI1tegral part of the I I1dlvldual nature (I vohhav([) of each dependently onglllated thlllg But �mce the<,e llldlvidual nature" depend on cau�es and condltlon", they do not eX I �t ultlll1ately That I� to �ay, they are excl uded trom the true realtty a\ �een by an enl Ightened mll1d An en-

� 1 26�

If you argue that [the dependent nature] originates by the power of others because it IS an

inherent nature (svabhava) that arises from conditions, then like a magical apparition it is

not [ultimately] real (abhuta) and you end up proving our position. (76)

You might argue as follows: "The [dependent] nature exists only as a nature that arises from a

col lection of conditions in the power of others. Since it thus originates by the power of others, it

IS not the ultimate reality (paramartha )."

We reply: "If you argue that it originates by the power of others, then it is not [ultimately] real,

just like a magical apparition. How can it then be an [ultimate] inherent existence? Thus, you end

up proving our position. 1

If [our position] is thus proven, then

[Your statement that] the dependent [nature] does not exist the way it is apprehended2 also

implies that it does not originate as an inherent existence [ultimately] . (77 ab)

Why is that so? Because

Something that originates in the ultimate sense cannot be a deceptive appearance. (77cd)

You say that the dependent [nature of the mind] does not exist the way it is [normally] appre­

hended because it lacks the nature of an objective aspect and a subjective aspect (grahyagra­

hakasvabhavavirahitatvat). Again, if [the dependent nature of the mind] really originated as an

l Ightened mind remains necessanly silent, for It has elIminated all notIons and perceptIons of individual eXIs­tences that could have general propertIes (samanyavadvastu ) and could be expressed by words. It sees realIty as It is through a knowledge that IS non-conceptual, non-differentIating and non-dual (ntrvlkalpaJiiana )

If I understand the text correctly, the Yogacara pOSitIOn, as it IS rendered here, says that notwIthstanding its de­pendency on others the dependent nature eXists ultImately (paramarthata�) in the sense that, for the Yogacara, an enl Ightened mind st!ll has a differentiating perception of the individual, dependently ongInated nature of all thing�. But Since the dependent nature IS a condItIOned and Impermanent nature, It IS not the unconditIOned, un­changeable, ultimate realIty (paramartha ) Itself. "UltImate reality" In thiS context is a synonym of emptiness C sunyatii), absence of self-existence (nairatmyam, niJ:tsvabhavatvam ), perfectly established nature (parini��pan­na:,vabhava ) and other terms mentioned In MHK Y.3.

"abhitta" In verse 76 does not mean "nonexistent" or "unreal" It means "deceptive," "not eXisting the way It appears to eXist," "apparently non-empty but ultImately empty," "Inherently eXistent for a common non­enl Ightened mind, but absolutely non-existent for an enlightened mind." For Bhavavlveka, the dependent nature of things IS deceptive In that It so to speak hides its dependency on others and takes on the appearance of a i>elf-estabhshed, truly ultImate existence. The Yogacara asserts the same, but whereas Bhavavlveka excludes the indIVIdual, dependent nature of things from the realm of true reality, the Yogacara retaIni> It as a genuine reality to be known as It is by an enlightened mind. "paratantragraha" In verse 77ab IS a reference to "paratantrasya cagraha�" In verse 5ab.

- 1 27-

Inherent eXIstence, it could not be a deceptive appearance. Hence, it IS J ust because It does not

originate as an inherent existence that it IS a deceptIve appearance! I

Furthermore,

If [ th Ings] real ly had the nature they appear to have, they wou ld eXIst exact ly as they ap­

pear. How could they then be simi lar to a magical apparition?2 (78)

If the things whose nature depends on other causes and condItIons and which appear [ in our

mind] as objects of the senses, real ly had the nature they appear to have, they would ex ist ex­

act ly as they appear. How could things then be simi l ar to a magIcal apparition? A lthough a magi­

cal apparition appears to have the nature of a [real ] man and so forth, that nature IS not obser­

vable because the nature of a [reall man and <.,0 forth is absent In a magical apparition. I n the

same way, there are no valid reasons to believe that the dependent nature exists [u lti matel yJ.

Also, your statement "And J ust because things do not ongInate as having that ident ity,

things neIther onginate nor perish"] sounds much more reasonable [ If it is expl ained] as fol lows :

Because [these things 1 do not orIgInate from [their own nature as already] existent, and

also because they are not real entItles (adravya), they do not ongInate, do not perish , are

not real (avastu) and have no Inherent nature (asvahhava). (79)

The-.e thIngs.) onginate from the nature of appropriate causes and conditions and not from [theIr

own nature as already ] eXistent, because not any inherent nature -not even that of a single atom

- is seen to eXI st at the t ime when things are apart from the col lection of theIr causes and condi-

tions. Things do therefore not originate and do not perish. And because they do not ongInate

[ from their own nature as a lready] existent, things are al so not real and have no inherent eXls-

tence [u l timately ].

In add It ion, the nature of these things and also their form (ahhasa) which appears as an object

I The compan"on of the dependent nature o f thlng� With the deceptlve nature of magical phenomena I'; al<,o dl"­cu,,';ed In PP (Eckel , p 60) and In KR (T vol 30, 269a2-7; 27Ia9-bI9). The argument of ver"e 77 I" repeated a'> fol low� In KR " If magical phenomena I such a� the appearance� of a horse or an elephant created by a ma­

giC ian I real ly eXisted I n one way or another With that nature lof a real elephant or a real hor"e, they cou ld not deceive andl ml�taken perceptlOn� (vlparya.\a) of them would be I mpo�slbl e." (T vol 30,269a6-7) To an ord i nary percelVlng mind , a l l dependently ongInated th ings appear as If they were self-e<;tab l I "hed indi­Vidual eX I�tences, haVing their own border" and contour" that Isolate them from other thll1gs In that sen:-,e. de­pendently ongInated thlng� eXI�t as thll1g'> which do not have the nature they appear to have Accordll1g to B ha­vavlveka, to eXist that way disqual I fies them from bell1g ultimately real. Common mll1ds, percelvll1g Isolated, ll1dlvldual eX istences, perceive correctly a" far as common <,en<;e (lw!1vrfl) I" concerned. B ut when It comes to the u ltimate truth, one should say that common mll1d5 are bell1g deceived 111 that they are 5t1 1 l <;eemg unrealI tie5. To be compared With Catu�\ata"(/ XI I I 23cd (= 323cd). See J F Ti l leman5, Malenall 10/ the Studi' 01 An­ac!evo, Dhwmapll/a and CalldrakTrtl, Wlen 1 990, Volume I, pp 1 70- 1 7 1

Reference to ver"e 69cd " ''The5e thll1g"" refers to the " b/ulva" 111 the Yogacara argument 111 verse 69ab

- 1 2R -

[of perception] and originates from I the nature of appropriate causes and conditions, are aggrega­

tions (samuha) of the eight real entities (dravya) earth, water, fire, wind, color and shape, odor,

taste and the tactile. Because [such aggregations] also are not real entities [ultimately] , just as an

army, a forest, and so forth [are not real entities even conventionally] , one should realize that

they do not originate, do not perish, are not real and have no inherent nature [ultimatelyV Such

is the meaning of the verse.

Here you might object as follows: "Because in your view things do not exist [at all] , you cannot

account for the conventlOnal designation of things (dharmaprajfiapti)."

We reply:

We are not at fault as to the [real basis of] conventional designations, because we assert

the same as [you who advocate] consciousness-only. (80ab)

Regarding consciousness-only as free from the [mistakenly imputed] notions of "1" and "mine",

there is no difference between you and us . [In fact, we say that] the conventional designations of

external and internal things occur with respect to things that are not [ultimately] real (adravya)

and are created (abhisaf[lskrta) by actions originating from a consciousness that perceives exter­

nal objects. Hence, there is no fault in our view.3 But your view [involves the following prob-

lem] :

Since [consciousness] exists as the thing to be eliminated and as the eliminating agent as

well, where will the perfect knowledge [of suffering] and so forth (parijfianadit exist?

(80cd)

I Literally : "and appears from ... " ( .. . las snang bar). The present passage IS dIfficult to understand, unless one reads It m combmatIOn WIth the commentary on the verses Y.35-36 and 3S. These verses deal exclusively with the conventIOnal truth. They say that the fol lowmg are conventIOnal truths : ( l ) Atoms, as aggregations of the eight real entities, are themselves real entitles (dravy­asat), (2) An aggregatIOn, or rather a conglomeration (sa,!!cita ) of atoms of the same kmd m a single object, such as for instance a pot, is a real entity, (3) AggregatIOns of diSSimIlar object� at the same place, such as an army or a forest, are only nominal entIties (pra}fiaptisat).

It is therefore clear that in verse 79 Bhavavlveka is reasoning from the point of view of the ulti mate truth and m that sen�e negates what was Said m verses 35-36, 3S. The point of verse 79 is that a real entity m the ulti­mate sense cannot be compOSite, but should be strictly one. The same reasonmg could of course be used to ne­gate the ultimate eXIstence of the "elght real entIties" too.

1 S YamaguchI (pp. 527-529) apparently has not understood the meaning of verse SOab. His commentary mIsses the point. Bhavaviveka mtends to say the followmg The Yogacara teaches that the dependent nature of con­sciousness, although empty of a substantIal self (atman) and of self-establIshed mental factors (cmtta ) or exter­nal objects (vl,yaya ) that are habitually grasped as "mine", necessarily eXists as the substratum to which the false notIOns of "I" and "mme" are applIed But, says Bhavavlveka, we Madhyamlkas also pOSit conSCIOusness as the only onginal sub�tratum of conventIOnal deSignatIOns, except that consciousness for us IS also conscIOUS of real external objects. ConSCIOusness, being the only agent (cf. MHK Y. 2Scd), IS the origin of al l the actIOns by WhICh all thmgs are created The thus created things are not ultimately real (adravya = abhuta m verse 74) and can therefore functIOn as the objects of conventional deSIgnations.

4 Based on the Tibetan text. The Sansknt text reads mrvldadi ("dIsregard of the world and so forth")

- 1 29 -

[ In your v iew L both the th ings to be e l iminated, �uch a� suffering and so forth, and al l the ac­

tions (saJ?1skc7di) of cultivation (bhc7vanc7) from which the path of e l imination (praha '.1 a 111c7rga )

onginate�, exist a� parts of consciousness and as parts of the dependent [nature of conscious-

ness]. Now, since [thatl i nherent nature (svabhc7va) doe� not change and I S not �ubject to funda-

mental transformation (a,{nlyaparc7vrtti), where do you think wI l l the condit ions of transmundane

[ mental states ] �uch a� the perfect knowledge of <.,uffenng and �o forth, which in your opin ion

exi�t as the dependent nature rof consciou�ne5s1 , exi �t? The fol loWI ng IS meant here. S Ince [the

dependent nature of consciou�ness ] does not change in both its mundane (lauklka) and transmun­

dane state� (/okottarc7vasthc7), where and how wil l [the transmundane mental states] ever arise? l

In ca�e you object and ask: "Isn't It so that final l iberation (mukti) is nonexi stent for you al so,

becau�e [ in your V iew, thIngs] are not rea l entitles (adravya )?", we repl y:

It IS a l so Uust] because [th Ings I are not real entities that [true] fi nal l IberatIon I� attained

through the cessation of dual con�ciousne,,� (vikalpa). Even If [things ] are real entities ,

they [st i l l ] do not orig inate [by theIr own nature]. Any v iew [of final l Iberation] other than

ours IS therefore unacceptable. (8 1 )

Just because things are not real ent ities, the birth of the supenor transmundane non-dual know­

ledge (c7rya/okottaranirvlkalpqji1c7na) fol lowing upon [the e l Imination of a l l the form� of] mun­

dane dual knowledge (laukikasavikalpqjFic7na) i � fit to be the [true state of] l I berat ion. B ut that

wou ld not be the ca�e If there existed real entitie� with an unchangeable nature. Hence, It I� also

J ust because thIngs are not real entities that l iberation I S [ true] l iberation when dual consciousness

has been abandoned.

Even if thing� are In some way rea l entities, they [ �ti l l ] do not ongInate by their own nature.

Thus, in that case al so, only the absence of dual consciousness is fit to be the rtrue ] l Iberation.

So, what good i s there in adhering to a d ifferent view [ than our� 1 by assert1l1g the exi-,tence of a

knowledge that perceive� the perfectl y establ ished nature (parini,}palUUlSvabhc7va) [of thi ng� p2

Such [a view J is unacceptable also because of what we have �aid before, namely : "If the enhght-

I Thl� commentary �eem� to be l I1formcd by Mfilamadh)'omakakanka XXI V 26-27 where NagalJ una pomt� (lut that thc pcrfect knowledge of �u lTenng, the e l l ll1 1natlOn of Ih cau"e� (.lwJ/uda vupralul,!o ). the cultlValion of the path (margohhavol1a) and the reahzatlon of tinal hberatlon (I1 lrodha,lc7k )c7tkara '!CI ) Wil l be I Inposslblc If th l llg� eXI�t l l1hcrent ly ( lVahhc7vata� ) In Nagarjuna \ own word� " I f 1 con�Clou�ne�� 1 ha� [ at ti r�tJ by Ib own nature no perfect knowlcdge [of �unenng, etc I. how can It then cver 1 atta1 l1 1 that pcrfect knowledge') hn't It �o that an 1 I1herent nature I� unchangeablc')" ( M M K XX IY.26)

2 Ver�e 8 1 and Its commentary are one of the mo�t dlfticult pa��ages 111 Chapter 5 Othcr tran"latJon� than the one I offer here are certa1l1 1y pO��lble In my l llterpretal lon, B havav lveka cntlC1Les hcre the Yogacara under­�tandlllg of hberatlllg knowledge or "Iokottarall l rv ikalpajfiana" III connectIon WIth the Yogacara vIew that the dcpendent nature and the perfcctly e�tabhshed nature of thlllg� CXl st ultimately If the�e two nature� l eal ly eXht u lti mately, the h bcrat1l1g knowledge wt l l havc to know them a� they arc 111 order to bc the truly hbcrat1l1g knowledge of reahty a� It 1\ In that ca\e. howcver, the h beratlllg knowledge w t l l not bc non-dual (11 Irvlkalpo ) but wt l l �tt l l be a dual or object J 1Y l llg (.I([vlk.alpo ) knowledge of th l 11g, that CXI�t l l1herently I n contraq, the hb-

- 1 30 -

ened mind of the Teacher perceives an inherent nature, it will [still] be a dual consciousness

(savikalpa). It will then also have an object and will consequently not be [the true] non­

objectifying awareness [of reality as it is] ., ,1

Our opponent, extremely agitated because of [our] very cutting criticism of his views,

now utters these furious words:

If things have no inherent nature, conventional designations also will not exist. He [who

propounds this] IS a nihilist to whom one should not talk and with whom one should not

dwell together. (82)

Not only is such a [nihilist] himself destined for an unhappy existence, but he also leads

others to misery. (83ab)2

They say: "For us Yogacaras, objects outside consciousness do not exist. Nevertheless, because

consciousness alone really exists, the perception of external objects in the form of images

(iikiira) that are [internal] transformations (parifJiima) of consciousness [itself] also exists. And

the perfectly established nature [of consciousness] , which is realized individually (pratyiitmave­

dya) by the Tathagata, also exists. You Madhyamikas, however, first of all negate the existence of

the things in the world because you say that, even according to the conventional [truth] , [things

are] similar to magical apparitions. And when it comes to the ultimate [truth], nothing exists [for

you] because neither consciousness (vijiiiina) nor its object (vijiieya) exists. Since you thus ne­

gate the inherent nature of things [in all respects] , the conventional designation of things (dhar­

maprajiiapti) also will not exist. And since [even] that does not exist [for you] , your view is the

same as that of the nihilists, and nobody should talk or discuss with you, nor should any true fel­

low [Buddhist] (sahaciirin) rely [on you] . That is the reason why also the Blessed One has said:

"Monks, from this day forward, you should not rely on, not approach, and not respect the

Lokayatanas who are experts in all kinds of secretive language (mantra ) ." Accordingly, you, who

are evil (asat), ought to be shunned by all means.3 Because you reject the true teaching

erating knowledge of realIty will be truly non-dual If, as the Madhyamaka says, not a smgle mherent nature ex­Ists ultimately. The IIberatmg knowledge Wil l then consIst m the mere removal of all forms of dual objectifying conscIOusness and not m the birth of a new knowledge m its own right that would see or perceive an objectified absolute nature of things. See also note 6 to my translatIOn of MHK/TJ Y.14.

I Reference to MHK Y. 1 6 The content of verses 82-83ab IS repeated, almost word by word, m KR, T. vol. 30, 272a5-7. Ver�es 82-83ab are based on the fol lowmg passage agamst the ' nihIlists' in the Bodhisattvabhuml : "te,ya'!l pra]fiaptyadhi!j[hii­nasya vastumatrasya abhavat Salva prajiiaptl� sarvefJa sarva'!l na bhavatl. kuta� puna� prajiiaptlmatra'!l tattva'!l bhavLyyatl tad anena paryayefJa tais tattvam apl prajiiaptir apl tadubhayam apy apavadita'!l bhavatl prajiiaptltattvapavadacca pradhano nastlko vedltavya� sa eva'!l nastlka� sann akathyo bhavaty asa'!lvasyo Vl­jiiana'!l sabrahmacarifJam. sa atmanam api vlsa'!lpadayati loko 'pi yo 'sya d!!j!yanumata apadyate." (BBh 46. 1 4-2 1 ; T. vol. 30, 488c3- 1 O)

J Literally : "You are an extreme case (sthana ) of what needs to be avoided [accordmg to the jUi>t quoted words of the Blessed OneJ "

- 1 3 1 -

(saddharma) [of the B uddha] , you yourself are destined for an unhappy eX I�tence. And s ince you

Incite lathers ] to become attached to the evil demon (graha) of [extreme ] v iews, you make oth­

ers fal l i nto misery a� wel l."

The teacher repl ies :

Tho�e word� are the vomiting of the putrid meat of hatred. They betray your undigested

pride. (83cd)

Just a� the vomiting of putrid meat i ndicates an indigestion, ju�t so your hateful words i ndicate

that you are full of pride. S uch is the mean ing of the words lof the teacher]. Your hatred i !-' l I ikeJ

vomited meat. Your word� are l ike the vomiting of that [meatl. Your being fu l l of pnde I� l I ke

hav ing an indigeStion. Just as the vomiting of putrid meat indicates an indigestion, J ust so your

hateful words indicate that j ust you are fu l l of pnde, while there IS no fau lt at al l in our view.

The vomitll1g of the putnd meat of ] your ] hatred merely betrays ryour] Indigested pride of self.

If you ask why we are sure that the error lof n ih i l isml does not occur In the Madhyamaka, we

say :

In our V iew, things are S imi lar to a magical apparition, because they have no r Indepen-

dent] own-nature, and because they are the cause of the bewi lderment of ignorant people,

and because they come Into ex i stence after having been non-exi "tent. (84)

We [Madhyamika� 1 do not �ay that things do not ex ist In every respect. In fact, 111 our View,

thing� that arise from appropriate causes and conditions do eXist for conventIOnal thought in the

same way as a magical apparit ion, because they l ack an l independentJ own-nature, and because

they are the cause of the bewi lderment that is ob�erved in Ignorant people, and because they

onginate after hav ing been non-ex Istent. So, how could it be that the existence of conventional

des ignations I S not accounted for lin our doctri ne]? S ince conventional de�Ignations do indeed

exist lfor us 1 , the error you point out doe!-' not appl y to us. On the other hand, the fact that things

l ack an [ independent] own-nature IS the ult imate [truth for m]. S ll1ce the two extreme!-' of exi s­

tence and non-existence are thu!-' excluded [in our doctnne] , on what grounds could our v iew be

s imi lar to the n ih i l I stic view?' Those word!-' of yours are therefore merely the vomiti ng of the pu­

trid meat of [ your 1 hatred.

A more exten�lve defen�e agam�t the accu�atlon of ' nlhlh�m' I� found m '<KaraW/ora/1l0 ,1(/ I / U/ , T vol 30. 27 1 c 22-272c I 0 ( L d e l a Val lee Pou��m, Le Jovou DonI La Mom , MCB I I , 1 932-33. p p 93-99)

Thl� long "dlgre��lOn" , a� B havavlveka hlm�elf cal l � It. contaI n5 some crUCial pa��age� that I I1form u� about how the Yogacara and Bhavavlveka dl�agreed on the meanmg of "that of wh ich somethmg 1\ empty"( \,ella 1 [/­/1 )'0/11 ) and "that which I� empty" ( \,a/ lilIlYWI1 )

The Yogacara mterpret� "vena ,I [II1 Vam, yar Iltnmm " II1 term� 01 Ih three-nature� tenet II1 which the allirma­tlOn of the ultlmatc eX I �tence of thc dependent naturc play<, a pivotal role Bhav,lVlveka rendcr� the Yogacara pO�ltlon as fol low�

"The Yogacara� <,ay ( ) Moreover, the fol lowlI1g , <, taught 1 m �cnpture I "When thiS r =A 1 I� empty 01 that 1 =

B I . then that I =B I cloe� not eXI�t When tim I =A I I� cmpty. then th ,� I=A I real ly eX I\t<, It I� exactly thu\ that

- 1 3 2 -

the Teacher of gods and men has taught emptiness " Now, the meanIng of thIs statement is as follows. The imagIned nature does not eXIst at all In the dependent [nature of thIngs] , because the dependent [nature [ does not have that [lmagIned1 nature. Because things that are designated by words (abhidheya ) do not have the na­ture that IS expressed by words (abhldhana ), and because words do not desIgnate the nature of the things they refer to, the Imagined nature does not exist at all In the dependent nature. "Empty of that" (yena ,�unyam ) refers to lthese] mIstakenly ImagIned thIngs that do not eXIst at al l "This is empty" (yat sunyam) refers to the de­pendently ongInated entIties that are real natures If thIS does not eXIst, not anything wIll exist. What could then be empty of what? ThIS real thing that anses from conditions IS what we call ' the dependent nature'." (T. vol. 30, 27 1 c22-272a4)

Bhavavlveka's source for the above passage is obVIOusly the folloWIng text in the Bodhlsattvabhumi "How IS emptIness (.�unyata) Incorrectly understood (durgrhlta)? EmptInes� IS Incorrectly understood when a Sramal}a or Brahmal}a does not accept that of which somethIng is empty (tac ca necchatl yen a ,�unyam ) nor that which is empty (tad apl necchati yat ,�unyam). The reason IS the folloWIng. EmptIness IS [properly] estab­lI shed because of the non-existence of that of which somethIng IS empty and because of the real eXIstence of that whIch is empty. But If everything does not eXist, what WIll be empty of what'7 (sarvabhavac ca kutra ki'!1 kena sunya'!1 bhavl�yati ) It IS against reason that somethIng would be empty of Itself (na ca tena tasyaiva ,�unyata yujyate ). Therefore, emptiness is incorrectly understood If It IS understood that way How then IS emptiness correctly understood? When one correctly sees that this [=A1 is empty of that r=B1 be­cause that l =B I does not eXIst In thiS [=AJ (yataka yad yatra na bhavati tat tena £'unyam iti samanupa ,\'yati ) and when one correctly knows that what remains In thIS [=A] really eXIsts here (yat punar atrava,5l5!a'!1 bhavati tat ,sad lhastltl yathabhuta'!1 prajanati ) , then that IS called the correct and unmlstaken understandIng of empti­ness." (BBh 47 S-20)

The author of BBh defines the 'real remaInder' as the [dependently originatedJ real entIties (vastumatra ) whIch function as the support of conventional deslgnation� (prajiiaptlvadasvabhava ) and of the ultImate real Ity (tathata = mrabhilapyasvabhavata = sunyara). It IS easy to see that vastumatra, prajiiaptlvada,\ vabhava and tathata are the precursors of the three natures paratantra, partkalpita and parllll�panna respectIvely The most expliCIt definitIOn of 'the real remaInder' IS found in the later Madhyantavlbhaga texts. Vasubandhu quote� the B Bh-passage on the 'real remaInder' In hiS commentary to MVK 1. 1 -2 and clanfies its meamng as follows. " rEvery thing] IS not empty because emptIness and false conscIOusness (abhutapartkalpa ) eXIst. lEverything] IS not non-empty because the dualIty of object and subject does not exist." (MVBh IS. 1 0- 1 1 ) Sthiramati's sub­commentary puts It most clearly "What then IS the [real] remaInder here? [Answer:] False consciousness and emptIness." (MVT 1 4. i 2- 1 3)

Bhavavlveka gives us also hIS own Interpretation of "yen a sunyam, yat sunyam", as follows' "Next, as for the teaching "When this IS empty of that, then that does not exist When this IS empty, then thiS really eXists, etc.", rthe meaning IS as follows.1 When the thIngs that anse from conditions and are taken for real by all the people In the world, such as the eye� and so forth, functIOn as the object (gocara) of the minds of unIntellIgent people, then rto those people who perceive and thInk] according to the conventional truth (samvrtya), these thIngs ap­pear a� If they had an Inherent nature (sasvabhava). But when the [supenorJ mInd examines [these thIngs] as to their ultimate reality (paramarthasatya) , it is found that they have no real inherent nature at all, Just as a man created by magic (mayapuru,�a ) [does not have the nature of a real man 1. It IS therefore SaId "When thIS IS empty of that, then that does not exist." ThIS is taught to ward off the error of faIlIng Into the extreme of eter­nalism (Sa,\: va tan ta ).

And just as that is SaId to be nonexistent In order to ward off the error of eternalIsm, Just so it IS SaId that thi" eXIsts In order to aVOId the extreme of nihilIsm (ucchedanta). That I S to say, thIngs that anse from condi­tIons, such as the eyes and so forth, are Included among the conventional realItIeS (samvrtlsatya ) and do have an Inherent nature (svabhava). Unlike flowers in the sky, they are not completely nonexistent It is only from the POInt of view of ultImate reality (tattvata�) that they are said to be empty. It IS therefore SaId "When thl� IS empty [of an Inherent nature In the ultImate sense], then this real ly exists [for conventional thoughtJ. I t I S ex­actly thus that the Teacher of gods and men has taught emptiness." If you say that the dependent nature eXists In that sense, then I agree. Indeed, I also accept that such a r dependently ongInated] Inherent nature eXIsts "(T. vol. 30, 272a26-bS)

For Bhavavlveka, "yat sunyam" thus stands for all the dependently originated things that are real for com­mon sense Note that thIS also Includes the general propertIes of thIngs (samanya , see MHK Y.60 ff.) whIch the Yogacara dismIsses as ' Imagined' (partkalpita). Only imaginary thIngs, such a<.; flowers In the sky or any other thIng that common sense unammously rejects as unreal, are excluded from "yat ,5unyam". A conventIonal mInd, not concerned WIth questIOnIng things as to theIr u ltImate-realIty status, SImply thInks that dependently ongl­nated things have theIr own eXIstence and theIr own nature, and perceives them that way. A supenor mind, on the other hand, negates all "own existence" and "own nature" of conditIOned things because It searches for an ultImate realIty that would not be dependent on anythIng else For Bhavavlveka, "yena ,5unyam" refers to thIS ultImate-reality status of which conditIOned thIngs are empty in vIrtue of theIr beIng dependent on others. And the 'real remainder' for Bhavavlveka are those same condItioned things, stnpped of any "own(ed) nature", as they are seen by an enlIghtened mInd.

- 1 33-

APPENDIX : Notes on the Sanskrit text of MHK Chapter 5, verses 1-84

A lthough my translation of Chapter 5 of MHKlTJ is based on the Tibetan text, I have of

course also made use of the Sanskrit text of M H K Chapter 5. In the prevIous Insta l l ments, a�

wel l as I n the present one, I have inserted the Sansknt text for each of the ver�es In my edition

of the Tibetan text. For the Sansknt text of the verses 1 -68 , I have used the fol lowing two

�ources :

( 1 ) Shrikant S. B ahulkar, "The Madhyamaka- Hrdaya-Kiirikii of B havaviveka: A Photographic

Reproduction of Prof. y.y. Gokhale's Copy," Nagoya Studies In Indian Culture And Buddhism,

SUf[lbhii.yii , Vol. 1 5 , 1 994. (Chapter5 is on the pages 28-34.)

This is a photographic reproduction of Y.Y. Gokhale 's own handcopy of R. Sankrityayana's hand­

copy of the Sha- lu manu�cnpt. Gokhale's handcopy contains h l � own corrections and addition�

(in case of l acunae), for which he also made use of the Tucci photographs of the same manu­

script.

(2) An unpublished critical edition of the San�knt and Tibetan texts of M H K Chapter 5 by Y.

EJ ima, which he u sed in h is classes and distributed among his students. It bears the tit le

"Madhyamakahrdayakarika V: Yogacaratattvav imscayapanccheda of B havlveka. Sanskrit text

col lated with its Tibetan version." There are abundant textcntical notes, but there i� no I ntroduc­

tIOn (at l east not in the copy I have) S ince the notes refer to "Ms" and "SG", we can assume

that EJ i ma's main sources were the Tucci photographs ( Ms) and the Sankrityayana-Gokhale (SG)

handcopy. In case of l acunae in Ms or doubtful readIng'>, Ejl ma has fol lowed SG, the Tibetan

text and often also Gokhale 's emendations.

For the verses 1 -68 , I have mostl y fol lowed Eji ma's edItIOn. I am however not competent

to form a judgment on its accuracy, � ince I am not an expert in the reading of manuscripts nor In

verse metre. For the pre�ent instal l ment (verses 69 -84), I have al so consulted Chr. Li ndtner's edi­

tion of the Sansknt text of M H K Chapter 5 I n his article "Bhavya's M adhyamakahrdaya (Paric­

cheda Five) Yogacaratattvavin i scayavatara," The A dyar Library Bulletin 59 ( 1 995), pp. 37-65 . ( I

am very grateful to Annette Heitmann of the Un iversity of VIenna who informed me about thl�

edition and kindly sent me a copy of i t ). Lindtner 's edItion is based on the Chmese photographs

of the Sha- l u manuscript which were publ ished by Prof. Jiang ZhongxIn In h is "Sanskrit

Tarkajviilii-Sutra Manuscript Copy" ( in ChInese) m Papers in Honour of Dr. Ji Xianlin on the

Occasion oj' His 80th Birthday , Jiang Xi , ChIna, 1 99 1 .

I have compared Lindtner's edition ( L) of verses 1 -84 with the Sankrityayana-Gokhale

handcopy (SG) and With Ejima's unpubl Ished edition (E), and have compiled the below l ist of

� 1 34 �

variant readings. Without intending to make definitive judgments, I have in many cases indicated

the apparently correct or preferable reading in bold letters and have added an (x) after readings

that are in my judgment definitely incorrect. When none of the variants is indicated in bold, it

means that either reading is possible without significantly altering the meaning of the verse or

half-verse. Although the variants are many, they are on the whole not important enough to make

substantial changes necessary in the translation of the verses I have published thusfar.

Verse

l c E : 'pi (based on Tib. "yang") ; SG, L : hi

5ab SG, E : kalpitanupalabdhisca paratantrasya cagrahal)

L : kalpiUinupalabdhesca paratantrasya cagrahat (based on Tib.)

7d SG, E : . . . paro nayal); L : . . . paraya�a (based on Tib. "lhur len")

l Id SG, E : tattulyatvad; L : tattulyavad (x)

1 2ab SG, E : yasya sa; L : yasya sa

1 2c E : na ca (based on Tib.) ; SG, L : tacca

13b SG : tatvadarsanam (x) ; E : tattvadarsina� (x) ; L : tattvadarsinaIp (based on Tib.)

1 4c SG : na tveva ; E : tata eva (based on Tib.) ; L : nanvevam

14d S(?), E : samibhavet ; G, L : sati bhavet (based on Tib.)

15a SG: nai�a ; E : ce��a (based on Tib.) ; L : cai�a

1 8c (S?)G: tathabhasodayad yacca ; E : tadabhasodayad yatha ; L : tathabhasodayad

yadvat

19d E : ca vi�ayapavadita (based on Tib.) ; L : vastuno 'py apavadita

2 1 c SG, E : upadhanat tatha ; L : upadanat tatra

22c SG : canyaya (x) ; E : ca dvyabha ; L : dvyabhata

23c SG: sahakaryanukaritvat ; E : sahakaryanukaritvat ; L : sahakaranukaritvat

26ab SG: tannivrttau . . . tannirvrtti� ; E : tannirvrttau . . . tannirvrtti� ; L : tannivrttau . . . tannivrtti�

26c E : anidarsanariipasya; L : anirdesyasvarupasya

27a E : bahyartho ; SG, L : bahyo 'rtho

28c SG : sastreva(?) (x) ; E : siitre ca ; L : sutre�u

28d G, E : ni�edhata� ; (S?), L : ni�edhita�

30ab G, E : svapne buddhisvabhavena-akalpitenapi saIpsayal) ; S(?), L :

svapnabuddhisvabhavena-akalpitabhavasarpsaya�

34b SG, E : cittagocarata ; L : cittagocarata (x)

34d SG : siddhim eva ; E : siddha eva ; L : siddhir eva

- 1 35 -

37a E : yady anaI ambata �vasyal) ; SG, L : yady analambana sadhya

37d E : salambata ; SG, L : salambailla

38b E : va taddhitvasya nirakriya (based on Tib. ) ; SG, L : va na dhItvadin irakriya (x)

39a E : bahyarthe ; SG, L : bahye 'rthe

4 1 b E : v i�vabhasaJ:! ; SG, L : visvabhasaIp

4 1 cd E : yasyal) tadutpadat (based on Tlb. ) ; SG, L : ya�ya tadutpadal)

43b SG : krt�nasyadvaltasantata (x) ; E : k�ayyi asantaBp. anatma ca : L : k�ul)l!am a�anty

anatma ca

44cd E : dhiyalambyo mok�abhedo 'p i ; L ' dhiyalambya muktyabhedo 'p i

46c SG, E : paranuvadaJ:i syat ; L : paral)uvadal) syad

47a SG : sar!1klesavyavadana ced (x) ; E : sm:pklesavyavadanac ced ; L : sat!lkle�avyava­

dhanac ced (x)

47c SG : vedana vitathotpada (x) ; E : vedanadeJ:! tathotpadat ; L : vedanaditathotpadat

48ab SG : yatha parl) l)adisantana salil (ka) �akt lka (x) ; E : yatha parl)adisarrttanarrt saluke

bahusaktikat ; L : yatha parl.ladismptanai) saliikabahusaktital)

48cd E : tatha-adravyasatas cittac cltrasarrttativrttayal) ; L : tatha dravyasata� (x) clttac citral)

sarrttatIVrttayal)

49d SG, E : vi svotpadadlkalpana : L : citrotpadadikalpana

SOc SG, E : saIpvrtya ; L ' sarrtvrtya (x)

5 1 d SG : ara . . . ; E : araktata ; L : asanglta

53c SG, E : prat ls lddhe 'p l ; L : prati�edhe 'pi

54a E : tanl1J �edhaya saced igo vidhyantaraparigrahaJ:! ; SG(?), L : tannirasaya ceo i�to

v idyantaraparigrahal)

55ab SG : ne�!a bhuJagavac casarrtka1pltatvatal) (x) ; E : ne�tarp. bhujagavac disat kalpitaIp

kalpitatvatal) (based on Tlb.) ; L : ne��o bhujagavac casan Sat11kalpal) kalpitatvatal) (x)

55d E : pratTt lr vapi ; L : pratTtIr apl

57c SG, E : abhilapaparok�al.laIp : L : abh i lapaparok�aQarrt (x)

58a G : rOpadhTrJ anmato ; E : rupadher janmato ; L : rupadhTjanmato

5 8d SG, E : k�amam ; L : k�aQam (x)

59d SG, E : gocaram (x) ; L : gocarai)

60c E : nabhilapatmasunyatvam (based on Tlb.) ; SG, L : nabhI l apyatmasOnyatvam (x)

63a Correct "nasrayasyagrahe" in my text into "nasrayasyagrahe".

63d SG : ce�!arrt prthag bhave (x) ; E : ce��aIp prthag na ca (based on Tlb.) ; L : ne�!ar:l

prthag bhavet (x)

� 1 3 6 �

64ab SG : abhedasatvadravyabhyam ekato ' nekavrtyapi (x)

E : abheda-adravya-sattvabhyam ekam anekavrtty api

L : abhedasattvadravyabhyam ekato 'nekavrtyapi

65a SG, E : aniianutpalabhinnariipeJ)a ; L : anIlanutpalabhinnarupel).a (x)

67b E : kalpyatvavacyatve ; SG, L : kalpyatvavacyate

67d E : vacyatadi ; SG, L : vacyatvadi

68a E : tasyato bhinna . . . ; SG, L : tadanyabhinna . . .

68cd E : na yukta-evam ato 'yukta yogacaranayoditil).

SG, L : na yukt(y)aiva manoyukta yogacaranayaditi (x )

74b E : te svasamanya . . . (based on Tib.) ; SG, L : tatsvasamanya . . .

76b SG : svabhave ce�!asadhanam (x) ; E : svabhavene�tasadhanam ; L : svabhave

neHasadhanam (x)

76d SG : mayavan any[v?]abhutatal) ; E : maya yadvad abhutata (based on Tib.) ; L : ma­

yavan nanv abhutata

78b E : yadi (based on Tib.) ; SG, L : yatal).

79d SG : dr . . . vyasattvatal). ; E : dr�tasya-adravyasattvatal). (based on Tib. "snang ba") ;

L : tathapy adravyasattvatal)

80c E : heyaprahatrsadbhavat (based on Tib.) ; SG, L : heyaprahatryasadbhavat

82b SG : vastvabhave bhave sati ; E : svabhave vastuno 'sati (based on Tib.) ; L : vastv­

abhave bhavet sati

82c SG : na dr�!ir nastiko ; E : nastitadr�!iko (based on Tib.) ; L : taddr�tirnastiko

83ab SG : svayamapayikatvasau pare . . . padakal) ; E : svayamapayikas casau pare�arrs ca vi-

padakal) ; L : svayamapayikatve 'sau pare�arr ca vipadakal)

83d SG, E : ajirJ)a ; L : aclrl).a (x)

84c SG, E : bhavatvad ; L : bhavanad (x)

84d SG, E : mata(I).) ; L : matal) (x)

- 1 37 -

�m**�*$�. fi�W* · �*. *23-j} 2003if. 139- 170

An Annotated Translation of

MadhyamakahrdayakarikaITarkajvala V.S5- 1 14

Paul HOORNAERT

1. Edited Tibetan text of MHKffJ V.85-U4

[Editions used: Cone (C.) Dbu-ma Dsa 22 I b7-227a7 ; Derge (D.) Dbu-ma Dsa 22 Ib7-227a7 ; Pe­

king (P.) Dbu-ma Dsa 247a6-253b7]

khyod kyi' chos kyi de nyid ni nam mkha' dang mtshungs pa nyid kyis2 mam par mi rtog pa

nyid du 'dod pa de yang mi rigs tel ji Ita zhe naf

mam par mi rtog dngos po nil I

mkha' dang mtshungs pa nyid mi rigsll

mam rtog 'du shes sna tshogs kyill

go skabs rab tu ' byed phyir roll (85)

[nakasasamata yukta nirvikalpasya vastunal).1

nanasarpjfiavikalpanam avakasaprabhavanatll (85)]

zhes bya ba ni nam mkha' ni mam par mi rtog pa dang ldan pa yin du zin kyang sngon po dang

yangs pa dangl dag pa dang rna dag pa la sogs par mam par rtog pa' i 'du shes sna tshogs kyi go

skabs rab tu 'byed par byed doll gal te chos mams kyi de nyid kyang de dang 'dra bar gyur na

ni de yang dag pa dang rna dag pa la sogs par mam par rtog pa' i 'du shes sna tshogs kyi spyod

yul yin pa' i phyir mam par mi rtog pa nyid nyams par ' gyur roll

gzhan yang khyed cag yongs su grub pa' i ngo bo nyid brjod du med pa nyid yin par 'dod ces

grags pa de la yangl

skyes pa brjod med nyid mi rigsll

dgag pa gong du bstan phyir roll

brjod du med nyid yin gyur na ' angll

kun rdzob la ni de nyid norll (86)

Uate nanabhilapyatvarp pratik�epat puroditatl

saty apy anabhilapyatve sarpvrtau tattvavibhramal).11 (86)]

I P : khyed P: kyi

- 1 39 -

[Co 222a4, D. 222a4, P. 247b3] zhes bya ba ni yongs su grub pa' i ngo bo nyid skyes pa la ni

brjod du med pa nyid mi rigs tel de' i dgag pa nil brjod bya spyi ldan dngos po stell der snang

blo yi rgyu yin phyirll de ni de' i bdag nyid yod pasll brjod med nyid du mi rigs soli zhes bya ba

la sogs pa gong du bstan pa' i phyir roll ci ste yang mam pa 'ga' zhig gis brjod du med pa nyid

yin par gyur na yang de Ita na yang de kun rdzob pa yin pas kun rdzob pa de la de nyid yin par

nor bar mi bya' oil

gzhan yang/

de la de nyid gzhan med phyirll

gal te de nyid mthong 'dod nal /

bum la ' ang bum pa gzhan med pasll

ci phyir de nyid mthong mi 'dodll (87)

[tattve 'nyatattvasadbhavad yadI�tarp tattvadarsanaml

ghate 'pi dvighatabhavat kirp ne�tarp tattvadarsanaml/ (87)]

ces bya ba ni gal te don dam pa de la don dam pa' i de nyid gnyis pa gzhan med pa'i phyir gal

te don dam pa stong pa nyid des de nyid mthong bar 'dod na de Ita na bum pa la 'ang bum pa

gnyis pa gzhan med pas de mthong bas kyang ci ' i phyir don dam pa' i de nyid mthong bar brtag

par mi 'dod del/

ci ste yang 'di snyam du mam par mi rtog pa ni brjod du med pa nyid yin yang chos kyi dby­

ings ni2 chu' i khams dang/ gser dang nam mkha' dag pa bzhin du dag par 'dod pas de dag pas

sems la yang dag pa yod pa kho nar sems na de la kho bos dgag pa bshad par bya ste/

khyod kyi3 tshul skyon sba phyir gyi4 II

de ni nyon mongs byang mi 'gyurll

gser la sogs pa rkyen mams kyill

rjes su 'gyur ba yin phyir roll (88)

[na nIticchidraguptyartharp tatsarpklesavisuddhite/

syatarp te kanakadlnarp pratyayanuvidhanatal).11 (88)]

[Co 222b2, D. 222b2, P. 248a2] zhes bya ba ni chu' i khams dang/ gser dang/ nam mkha' dag las

rdul dang gya' dang sprin la sogs pa rkyen dag yod na dri rna dang bcas pa dag tu snang lal

rkyen de dag med na dag pa dag tu snang zhing yang dri rna can du 'gyur ba dang/ de nas yang

I 'de' omitted in C, D. C, D: na

3 P: kyis 4 P : te

- 1 40 -

dag pa dag tu ' gyur ba bzhin du gal te chos kyi dbyings kyang de kho na bzhin na Ian ' ga' mam

par dag pa dangl Ian 'ga' dri rna dang bcas par 'gyur bas de ni khyod kyi l tshul gyi skyon de sba

ba tsam de kho na' i phyir smras par zad kyil chos kyi dbyings de ni kun nas nyon mongs pa

dangl mam par byang bar mi ' gyur lal gser la sogs pa ni rkyen mams kyi rjes su ' gyur ba yin

pa' i phyirl gser la sogs pa' i dpe de dag gis chos kyi dbyings mtshon pa' i don mi ' grub boll , di ltar na ni rigs pa dang ldan pa nyid du ' gyur tel

nam mkha' rtag tu mam dag stell

mig ni dag dang rna dag pasl I

dri bcas dri med mkha' 'dod dangll

chos mams chos nyid de bzhin noll (89)

[yathak�asuddhyasuddhibhyarp. khyati kharp. samalamalaml

visuddharp. ca sadakasarp. dharmal).arp. dharmata tatha/I (89)]

[C. 222b5 , D. 222b5, P. 248a6] zhes bya ba ni j i ltar rab rib can dbang po nyams pas nam

mkha' kun du skra shad2 dangl sbrang rna dangl sbrang bu yang dag pa rna yin pa' i dra ba dag

gis dkrigs3 pa mthong zhingl de nyid kyis kyang rab rib sel ba' i mig sman bsten pas mig dag

pas4 na nam mkha' skra shad5 dangl sbrang rna dangl sbrang bu dang bral bar kun du mthong

yang dbang po nyams pa dang rna nyams pas nam mkha' de rna dag pa dang dag par mthong

ba' i tshe nam mkha' la ni 'gyur ba med pa de bzhin du chos nyid rang bzhin gyis mam par dag

pa la yang byis pa blo gros kyi mig yongs su rna dag pa mams kyis6 dri rna dang bcas par

mthong zhingl 'phags pa stong pa nyid la Ita ba' i mig sman bsten pa blo gros kyi7 mig mam par

dag pa mams kyis ni dri rna med pa nyid du rtogs kyang blo dri rna dang bcas pa dangl dri rna

med pas chos nyid rna dag pa dang dag par mthong ba' i tshe nal chos nyid la ni ' gyur ba ' ga'

yang med do zhe nal de' i phyir bshad pal

rna dag la sogs blo 'khrul tell

byed pa' i chos yin las kyi minll (90ab)

[tatkli�!atvadidhIbhranti� kartur dharmo na karmal).a� (90ab)]

[C. 223a2, D. 223a2, P. 248b3] zhes bya ba ni dper na nam mkha' rna dag pa dang dag par

snang bas blo 'khrul pa de ni byed pa po Ius dang dbang po mam par shes pa dang bcas pa' i

I P : kyis P: bshad

3 P: dgrigs 4 P: pa 5 P: bshad h P: kyi 7 P: kyis

- 1 4 1 -

blo' i tshogs kyi chos yin gyil narn rnkha' la sogs pa marn par shes par bya ba' i las kyi chos rna

yin pa de bzhin du chos kyi dbyings rna dag pa dang dag pa zhes bya ba ni yang byed pa po log

pa' i shes pa dangl yang dag pa' i shes pa dang ldan pa' i chos yin gyil chos kyi dbyings marn par

shes par bya ba' i chos rna yin pas khyed kyisl de ni dri bcas dri rna medii ces srnras pa de ni rni

rigs soil

gzhan yangl

de la drnigs pa dag rna yinl I

de nyid drnigs byar rni 'dod doll (90cd)

[na tadalarnbana suddhis tattvarp nalarnbyarn i�yatell (90cd)]

zhes bya ba de ni chos kyi dbyings de la drnigs pa' i ye shes ni dag pa yin par rni rigs l tel de la

drnigs na ye shes de marn par rni rtog pa nyid du rni 'grub pa' i phyir roll chos kyi dbyings de

nyid kyang drnigs par bya ba yin par rni 'dod del don darn par chos kyi dbyings zhes bya ba de

nyid drnigs su rned pa' i phyir roll

gzhan yangl

de nyid rdzas su yod yin nail

skyon ni snga rna bzhin du ' gyurll

'jig rten 'das pa marn2 rni rtogll

de blor rni 'dod 'j ig phyir roll (9 1 )

[dravyasattve c a tattvasya purvavad do�asarpplava�1

lokottaravikalpa ca tadbuddhir na rnata vyayat/ I (9 1 )]

[C. 223a5, D. 223a5, P. 248b8] zhes bya ba ni chos kyi dbyings de nyid rdzas su yod pa nyid du

rtog na de la skyonl kun nas nyon rnongs marn byang lasll gal te serns ni rdzas 'dod nail tshor

sogs de bzhin skye ba' i phyirll de grub pas na gnod pa medii ces bya ba dag 'dir yang snga rna

bzhin du 'byung bar ' gyur roll

'jig rten las 'das pa' i ye shes kyi tshe na yang gang chos nyid la drnigs pa marn par rni rtog pa

de skye'o zhe nal de Ita bu ' i blo skye ba yod par rni 'dod del de skyes rna thag tu 'jig pa' i phyir

roll des na 'jig rten las 'das pa'i blo de ji Itar 'j ig par rni 'gyur zhes bya bar shes par bya' oll

gzhan yangl

ji srid shes bya'i rjes 'jug pall

I P: dag par mi rigs C, D: rnams

- 1 42 -

de srid blo ni rab rib canll (92ab)

[tavat satirnira buddhir yavaj jfieyanukaril)II (92ab)]

gal te des skyon cir 'gyur zhe nal

ji srid shes pa drnigs yod pal II

de srid shes bya' i rjes 'jug nyidll (92cd)

[yavad utpadyate jfianarp tavaj jfieyanukarita/I (92cd)]

ces bya bar ' gyur tel des na yongs su grub pa' i no bo nyid la drnigs pa 'jig rten las 'das pa' i blo

yang rab rib can nyid du yin par ' gyur tel shes bya ' i marn par shes pa' i rjes su 'jug pa' i phyir ro

II ' 0 na ji Itar rigs par 'gyur zhe nal blo rab rib dang bcas pa de nyid shes bya'i marn pa' i rjes su

'jug pas ni 'khor ba 'byung bar 'gyur lal des gang gi tshe shes bya' i ngo bo nyid yongs su rna

grub par shes pas drnigs pa rned pa de' i tshe na nil 'khor bar rni ' gyur bas de ni chos marns kyi

de nyid yin par bsarns soil

khyed rang byung gi ye shes skad cig gcig dang ldan pa nyid du 'dod pa gang yin pa de yang

'di ltar rni ' thad del

tharns cad rnkhyen nyid cig car rninll

shes pa rang la 'jug pa nill

rned phyir ral gri so bzhin dangl I

rang rig 'gog par byed phyir roll (93)

[svatrnanlvasidharaya jfianavrtter asarnbhavatl

svasarpvittini�edhac ca na syat sarvajfiata sakrt/I (93)]

[C. 223b4, D. 223b4, P. 249a8] zhes bya ba ni 'di ltar shes bya marn pa tha dad pa du mas tha

dad pa yin yang chos nyid ngo bo nyid gcig pa' i phyir tharns cad rnkhyen pa des skad cig gcig

gis dbyer rned pa'i sgo nas rnkhyen par rung gil gang la ye shes skad cig rna yin pa de la ni

tharns cad rnkhyen pa nyid des shes bya marn pa tha dad pa dag cig car yongs su rnkhyen par

rni rung stel shes pa rang la 'jug pa 'gal ba' i skyon du ' gyur bas de Ita bu rned pa' i phyir tel

dper na ral gri rang gi so gang yin pa de nyid kyis de nyid la gcod par rni byed pa la sogs pa

bzhin noll de'i phyir gal te de ye shes skad cig rna don dam par yod pa nyid yin na shes pa' i

skad cig rna snga rna yongs su shes par bya ba' i phyir shes pa' i skad cig rna gnyis pa la Itos

dgos soil

gzhan yang chos nyid ni ci yang rna yin pa' i phyirl dngos po ' i rang gi ngo bo nges par rni 'dzin

I D: na - 1 43 -

pas rang rig pa yang 'gog par byed pa' i phyir thams cad mkhyen pa nyid skad cig gcig dang

ldan pa nyid du mi 'grub bolll kho bo cag 'dod pa ltar na de yang ' grub stel ji Ita zhe nal

mam par mi rtog 'phags blo ' i gzungll

mam pa kun du brjod med nyidl I

sngar bzhin skye ba bkag pa' i phyirll

skye med rdzas su yod min phyirll (94)

[pragvaj jatipratik�epad ajatadravyasattvatal]1

nirvikalparyadhlgrahyo ' nabhilapyasca sarvatha/I (94)]

[Co 224a l , D. 224a l , P. 249b5] ces bya ba ni mam par mi rtog pa 'phags pa' i blo ' i gzung ba ni

'dzin pa med pa' i tshul gyis gzung ba yin tel sngar de nyid shes2 pa tshol ba' i rab tu byed par

bstan pa bzhin skye ba bkag pa' i phyir skye ba med pa' i phyir dangl kun rdzob tu rgyu dang

rkyen rigs mthun pa las 'byung ba' i phyir bdag nyid rdzas su yod pa rna yin pa' i phyir roll de ni

mam pa kun du brjod du med pa nyid kyang yin tel ngo bo nyid stong pa'i phyir roll de lta bu' i3

ngo bo nyid ni don dam pa yin par sbyar roll

gzhan yang khyed 'dod pa ltarl

yod dang med pa' i dngos nyid kyill

ngo bo don dam nyid yin nail

sgro 'dogs pa dang skur mtha' lasll

grol ba khyod la ji ltar yodll (95)

[bhavabhavasya bhavo 'pi svabhaval] paramarthikal]!

samaropapavadantamuktis te vidyate katham/I (95)]

ces bya ba ni 'di ltar sgro 'dogs pa dangl skur pa 'debs pa' i mtha' gnyis las grol bar 'dod pas ni

yod pa dang med pa' i mtha' gnyis yongs su spang bar bya ba yin na khyod ni yod pa dang med

pa' i dngos po nyid kyi ngo bo ni yongs su grub pa' i ngo bo nyid kyi don dam pa nyid yin par

'dod pas de la yod pa nyid yin na sgro 'dogs pa' i mtha' las mi ' grol la med pa nyid yin na skur

pa 'debs pa'i mtha' las mi ' grol pas mtha' gnyis spangs pa' i phyir grol ba khyod la ji ltar yodl

kho bo 'dod pa ltarl

yod min de nyid skye med phyirll

med min de yod rna yin phyirll

I P adds 'zhe na' . C: zhes

J C: bus

- 144 -

yod dang med pa gnyis spangs pasl I

der 'dod de phyir gnyis su medii (96)

[na bhavas tattvato 'jater nabhavas tadabhavata�1

bhavabhavadvayapetam i�!arp tattvam ato 'dvayarn/I (96)]

[Co 224a6, D. 224a6, P. 250a4) ces bya ba ni yod pa rna yin tel don dam pa' i de nyid du dngos

po thams cad skye ba med pa' i phyir roll med pa rna yin tel yod pa de yod pa rna yin pa' i phyir

tel yod pa yod na de las bzlog pas med par 'gyur ba yin na yod pa de yod pa rna yin pa' i phyir

med par yang mi 'gyur ba' i phyir roll de ltar yod pa dang med pa gnyis spangs pasl gnyis su

med pa ni de nyid yin par 'dod pas de' i phyir gnyis su med pa de ni rigs pa dang mi 'gal ba yin

noll

khyod 'dod pa Itar na skyon chen po gzhan 'dir yang 'gyur tel

ston pa dmigs med mi 'gyur tell

de bzhin nyid la dmigs pa'i phyirll

byang chub mnyam nyid mi 'gyur tell

de nyid rang snang tha dad phyirl I (97)

[niralambo na sasta syat tathatalambanatvata�1

na capi samata bodhes tattvasvabhasabhedata�// (97)]

zhes bya ba ni yongs su grub pa' i ngo bo nyid kyi de bzhin nyid ces bya ba la dmigs pa yod na

ston pa sangs rgyas bcom ldan 'das dmigs pa med pa nyid du mi ' gyur tel de bzhin nyid la

dmigs pa' i phyir roll des na lung lasl sangs rgyas nam mkha' i mtshan nyid dell nam mkha' la

yang mtshan nyid medii mtshan gzhi mtshan nyid nges grol ball dmigs med khyod la phyag

'tshal loll zhes gsungs pa la sogs pa dang ' gal loll ston pa de' i byang chub kyang mnyam pa

nyid du mi ' gyur tel gang gi phyir zhe nal yongs su grub pa' i ngo bo nyid ces bya ba' i de nyid

gcig dang rab2 snang ba' i ye shes gnyis tha dad pa' i phyir tel de ltar gnyis yod na ngo bo nyid

gnyis mngon par rtogs pa de ji ltae mnyam pa nyid du 'gyurl

gzhan yangl

de bzhin nyid la dmigs pa' i bloll

nus pa rna bzhag ga las byungll

nam mkha' i me tog snang ba' i bloll

nus pa rna bzhag mi rigs bzhinll (98)

I P. adds ' gnyis pas' after ' pas' . C, D: rab tu

J C, D: srid

- 1 45 -

[tathatalambana ya dhIJ:1 kuto ' nahitasaktikaJ

na khapu�pabhadhlr yukta yathanahitasaktikaJ/ (98)]

[C. 224b4, D. 224b4, P. 250b3] zhes bya ba ni khyed cag kun gzhi rnam par shes pa ni thog rna

med pa'i dus dang ldan pa yin pa' i mig la sogs pa 'jug pa' i rnam par shes pa thams cad skye ba

dang ' gag pa na kun gzhi rnam par shes pa la yang nas yang du rang rang gi nus pa 'jog par

byed cing/ nus pa de dag yul dang dbang po dang rnam par shes pa sna tshogs pas yongs su

smin par gyur pa ni 'khor ba ji srid pa' i bar du kun gzhi rnam par shes pa las mngon par grub

par' 'dod ces grags pas des na so so' i skye bo de nyid ma2 mthong ba la de bzhin nyid la dmigs

pa' i blo nam yang rna skyes pa la de yang skye ba med pa' i phyir/ rna skyes pa la 'gag pa yang

med na mi ' gag pa gang gis kun gzhi rnam par shes pa la nus pa gang bzhag pa yongs su smin

par gyur pas de bzhin nyid mthong ba' i blor ' gyur ba' i nus pa gzhog pa yang med doll de ltar

nus pa rna bzhag par de bzhin nyid la dmigs pa' i blo rgyu med pa de dag ga las ' byung bar

' gyur tel dper na nam mkha' i me tog tu3 snang ba' i blo la nus pa skyes pa med pa' i phyir sngon

nam yang kun gzhi rnam par shes pa la nus pa rna bzhag pa des phyis kyang nam mkha' i me

tog mthong ba' i blo skye bar mi rigs pa bzhin noll

gzhan yang/

rang tshul sbed pas khyod .kyis nill

de nyid gcig nyid gzhan mi ' grol// (99ab)

[naikatvanyatvamuktarp vas tattvarp svanayaguptital)/ (99ab)]

[C. 225a l , D. 225a l , P. 25 1 a l ] zhes bya ba ni khyod yongs su grub pa' i ngo bo nyid dang/

gzhan gyi dbang gi ngo bo nyid yod par 'dod cing/ de gnyis gcig pa nyid kyang rna yin lal tha

dad pa nyid kyang rna yin par brjod pa yang rang gi tshul sbed pa tsam du zad pas des kyang

yongs su grub pa' i ngo bo nyid kyi de nyid ces bya ba de gcig pa nyid dang gzhan nyid las mi

' grol loll dbu rna shes pa' i tshul gyis4 rjes su 'brang ba la nil

rdzas med dmigs su med pa'i phyirl/

nged la ji skad smras de rigsll (99cd)

[adravyanupalabhyatvad yuktarp nas tad yathoditam// (99cd)]

zhes bya ba ni rdzas su med pa kho nas ngo bo nyid las dmigs su med pa' i phyir nged la ni

sngar ji skad srnras pa' i gcig pa nyid kyang rna yin lal tha dad pa nyid kyang rna yin par des rigs

I C, D: pa ' rna' omitted in P.

, P: bzhin du 4 P: gyi 5 'de' omitted in C, D.

- 146 -

pa kho na' oll

kho bo cag 'dod pa ltar nam mkha' la sogs pa'i dpe yang 'thad del j i Ita zhe nal

nam mkha' 'dra ba 'ang skye med pasll

khyad par med phyir rna gos phyirll

shin tu brjod du med nyid kyangll

bIos ni mam kun gzung med phyirll ( 1 00)

[ajater nirvise�atvat khatulyatp capy alipyatal).1

atyantanabhiHipyatp ca sarvathapy agrahad dhiya/I ( 1 00)]

[C. 225a4, D. 225a4, P. 25 1 a5] zhes bya ba' i don dam pa' i de nyid ni narn mkha' dang 'dra stel

de ' ang 'di Itar dngos po skyes pa la ni mam pa' i khyad par las sna tshogs nyid du dmigs par

'gyur gyil dngos po rna skyes pa la ni skye ba med pas khyad par med pa' i phyir dangl spros

pa'i rtog pa thams cad kyis gos pa med pas rna gos pa' i phyir nam mkha' dang 'dra'oll de ni

shin tu brj09 du med pa nyid kyang yin tel 'di Itar bIos gzung ba'i dngos po la ni mngon par

brjod pa 'jug par 'gyur gyi l I de ni bIos mam pa kun du gzung du med pa' i phyir shin tu brjod

du med pa nyid du rigs soil

gal te de shin tu gcig tu rna skyes pa nyid yin na de j i ltar 'jig rten las 'das pa2 zhes bya ba la

sogs pa'i tha snyad du 'gyur zhe nal de' i phyir bshad pal

skye ba rab rib bral ba' i bloll

'j ig rten 'das pa yin par 'dod/I

'jig rten las sgroI don phyir dangll

'jig rten shin tu 'da' phyir roll ( 1 0 1 )

[vigatotpadatimira matir lokottara mata/

lokad uttaraI)arthena lokatikramato 'pi va/I ( 1 0 1 )]

[C. 225a7, D. 225b l , P. 25 1 b l ] zhes bya ba ni skye ba nyid rab rib stel de dang bral ba'i3 blo

gang la yod pa de ni skye ba rab rib dang bral ba'i blo 'jig rten las 'das pa yin par 'dod del ci ' i

phyir zhe nal 'jig rten las sgroI ba' i don gyi phyir dang 'jig rten las shin tu 'da' ba' i phyir te4 I j i

skad du de n i 'jig rten lass gyo ba dang bskyod pa dang 'da' ba' i phyir 'j ig rten las 'das pa zhes

bya'o zhes gsungs pa Ita bu' oll gzhan yangl

de ni mi rtog dmigs rned dangl

1 P: gyis C, D: pa' i

3 'ba'i ' omitted in P. 4 P: dang 5 P: la

- 147 -

mtshan rna med cing de yis nil

rang gzhan chos nyid cig car dul

rtogs I med tshul gyis2 mnyam nyid rtogsl ( 1 02)

[nirvikalpa niralamba nimimitta ca sa taya/

abodhasamatabodhat svanyadharmataya salq1l1 ( 1 02)]

zhes bya ba la blo de ni mam par mi rtog pa yin tel rna skyes pa kho nas mam par rtog pa

thams cad dang bra I ba' i phyir roll dmigs pa med pa yang yin tel dngos po thams cad mi dmigs

pa' i phyir roll mtshan rna med pa yang yin tel yul la mtshan mar mi 'dzin pa' i phyir roll blo des'

shes pa rang gi chos nyid dang shes bya gzhan gyi chos nyid cig car du rtogs4 pa med pa' i tshul

gyis mnyam pa nyid du rtogs pa yang yin tel kho bo cag ni skad cig gcig gis mngon par rdzogs

par byang chub par mam par 'jog pa' i phyir roll

:jig rten las 'das pa' i ye shes kyi shes bya brtag pa' i phyirl

chos mams skye ba med pa nill

chos bdag med pa nyid ces byal I

de la rtog dri ' i mtshan rna dagl I

'byung ba med pa snga rna bzhinll ( 1 03)

[anutpado h i dharmal)arp dharmanairatmyam ucyatel

na kalpanakalankankasarpbhavas tatra piirvavatl I ( 1 03)]

[Co 225b5 , D. 225b5 , P. 25 1 b7] zhes bya ba smras tel chos mams skye ba med pa nyid gang yin

pa de nyid chos bdag med pa nyid ces bya stel de la rtog pa'i dri ma' i mtshan rna dag 'byung ba

med pa ni de nyid shes pa tshol ba'i le'ur bstan pa snga rna bzhin tel rtog pa nyid dri rna yin te

snang ba' oll de nyid mtshan rna ste5 mngon rtags6 soil de la de dag mam pa thams cad du

'byung ba med doll

'dir smras pal mdo sde lasl don dam pa ni rtag tu med pa dangl rtog ge ' i spyod yul rna yin no

zhes gsungs pas mngon sum gyi yul yin par gsungs pa yin na khyed kyis ni don dam par rtogs

par bya ba rna yin par bstan pas rtog ge' i spyod yul yin tel mtho ris la sogs pa bzhin no zhes

smras pas lung dang 'gal 10 zhe nal pha rol po dag gi bsam pa de bzlog pa' i phyir bshad pal

gal te de nyid rtog ge yil I

spyod yul min phyir rjes dpag pasll

I C, D: rtog 2 P: gyi , P: de'i 4 C, D: rtog , C, D: de 6 C, D: rtogs

- 148 -

de mi rtogs l pa de yi phyirll

ehos mams ehos nyid brtag min nail ( 1 04)

[tattvasyatarkagamyatvat tadbodho nanumanata!)1

natas tarkel}a dharmal}arp gamyate dharmateti eet! I ( 1 04)]

zhes bya ba ni gal te pha rol po dag de ltar sems na' oll

'di la rjes dpag skyon med pa2 II

lung gi rjes su sgrub byed pasll

brtags3 pa' i mam rtog ehu bo dagll

sna tshogs rna Ius bsal mdzad nasll ( 1 05)

[ihanumanan nirdo�ad agamanuvidhayina!)1

kalpitase�avividhavikalpaughaniralqte!)11 ( 105)]

zhes bya ba ni 'di la beom ldan 'das kyis dang por rjes su dpag pa' i shes pa skyon med pa lung

gi rjes su sgrub par byed pas rang dang gzhan gyi gzhun lugs kyis yongs su brtags pa' i mam par

rtog pa' i ehu bo sna tshogs rna Ius pa dag bsal bar mdzad nas de' i ' og tul

sangs rgyas mam rtog mi mnga' ball

dgongs pa mkha' mnyam ye shes kyisl I

shes bya mtha' dag j i bzhin dull

[ehos mams gzhag pa nyid rtogs shingll

ming la sog pa thob pa nyidll] ( 1 06t

[sakalajfieyayathatmyam akasasamaeetasal)l

jfianena nirvikalpena buddha!) pasyanty adarsanat!1 ( 1 06)]

[C. 226a3 , D. 226a4, P. 252a7] 'das pa dangl rna 'ongs pa dangl da Itar byung ba dangl brjod

par bya ba rna yin pa dangl 'dus rna by as zhes bya ba shes bya mam pa lnga po mi dmigs pa ni

nam mkha' mnyam pa' i sems soil mam par mi rtog pa' i mngon sum gyi ye shes kyi skad eig

ma'oll nye bar brtags nas gzigs pa zhes bya stel gzigs pa med pa' i tshul gyis soil

I P; rtog P: pa'o

3 P: brtag 4 The Tibetan translation has five verse feet, but the last two feet do not correspond with the extant Sanskrit manuscript. When reconstructed from the Sanskrit, the fourth foot in Tibetan should read something like "gzigs med tshul gyis gzigs so " .

- 1 49 -

des na rjes su dpag pa' i yuIll

de nyid yin par sgrub mi nusll

de nyid shes pa' i mi mthun phyogsl/

gang yin de ni des zlog byedl I ( 1 07)

[ato ' numanavi�ayarp na tattvarp pratipadyatel

tattvajnanavipak�o yas tasya tena nirakriya! I ( 1 07)]

mam par mi l rtog pa' i de kho na nyid kyi shes pa' i mi mthun pa'i phyogs brtags2 pa zhes bya ba

de ni rjes su dpag pa' i shes pa 'dis zlog par byed pa yin gyil rjes su dpag pa' i spyod yul du de

kho na nyid sgrub par byed pa ni rna yin no zhes sbyar bar bya' oll

yang gal te rjes su dpag pas mi mthun pa' i phyogs j i ltar bzlog par bya zhe nal srnras pal

lung gi khyad par tha dad pasll

tha dad gyur pa' i blo la cill

lung gi dbye ba med pa lal I

rtogs par gyur pas gzhan c i yodll ( 1 08)

[agamantarabhedena bhedayatasu buddhi�ul

abhede 'py agamasyanya� ka� parlk�ak�amo vidhi�1 ( 1 08)]

[C. 226a7, D. 226a7 , P. 252b4] lung las gzhan pa' i lung ni lung gi khyad par tel de ni rgol ba

sum brgya drug cu rtsa gsum gyi dbye bas shes pa' i bye brag skye bar ' gyur ba' oll gang dag tha

mi dad par 'dod pa de dag la ni thabs gzhan gyis brtag par rigs pa rna yin gyil gzhan du phyogs

dang gtan tshigs dang dpe dang ldan pa' i rjes su dpag pas yin noll ci' i phyir zhe nal gang gi

phyirl

mi mthun phyogs ni spang bya ball

dam bcas tsam gyis j i Itar 'dodll

mam par rtog pa rna spangs pari I

mam par mi rtog blo ji ltarll ( 1 09)

[pratijnamatraka ne�!a pratipak�anirakriya!

ani�iddhe vipak�e ca nirvikalpa mati� kuta�// ( 109)]

mam par rtog pa thams cad 'gegs par byed pa na dam bca' ba 'ba' zhig gis byed par nus pa rna

I , mi' omitted in P. P: btags

- 1 50 -

yin tel mi mthun pa' i phyogs brtags pa zhes bya ba rna spangs kyi bar du mam par mi rtog pa' i

blo 'byung bar ' gyur ba rna yin pas dam bca' ba smras nas gtan tshigs brjod par bya' oll dpe

yang brjod par bya'oll mngon par 'dod pa' i don sgrub pa ni sgrub par byed pa'i rjes su dpag pa

tshang ba yin pas soil

thub pa bden pa gzigs pa yisl I

'di ltar bden pa gnyis su gsungsl I

tha snyad la ni brten nas sull

de nyid don ni rtogs 'gyur phyirll ( 1 1 0)

[satyadvayam atas coktal1l munina tattvadarsina!

vyavaharal1l samasritya tattvarthadhigamo yata!:tll ( 1 10)]

[Co 226b4, D. 226b4, P. 253a2] rjes su dpag pa gang gis mam par brtags pa 'gog par byed pa de

ni yang dag pa' i kun rdzob tu tha snyad kyi bden pa zhes bya ba la brten nas byed pa yin noll

tha snyad kyi bden pal de la brten nas de ni rim gyis mam par mi rtog pa brjod du med pa' i don

dam pa rtogs par 'gyur tel ji ltar kun rdzob kyi chos la rna brten par don dam pa rtogs par mi

nus so zhes gsungs pa Ita bu' 011

dbu rna pa' i lugs la rab tu grags pa' i de kho na nyid mam par bzhag cing mal 'byor spyod pa

pa' i de kho na nyid la skyon dang bcas pa nyid du srnras pal

de bzhin nyid la dmigs pa' i bloll

dmigs dang bcas phyir brdzun yin tell

rmi lam sogs yin de shes byall

des na de nyid yin mi rigsll ( 1 1 1 )

[salambanatvad vitatha tathatalambanapi dhI!:t1

svapnadidhlvat tadgrahyal1l natas tattval1l ca yujyatell ( 1 1 1 )]

de kho na nyid la dmigs pa' i blo zhes bya ba ni chos can noll de ni brdzun pa yin te zhes bya

ba ni de' i chos te2 bsgrub par bya ba'oll chos dang chos can bsdoms pa ni phyogs soil dmigs pa

dang bcas pa' i phyir zhes bya ba ni gtan tshigs tel gang dang gang dmigs pa dang bcas pa yin

pa de dang de ni brdzun pa yin tel dper na rrni lam gyi shes pa bzhin zhes bya ba ni dpe'oll

gang gi phyir de brdzun yin pa de' i phyir des gzung3 ba de ni de kho na nyid do zhes bya bar

rigs pa rna yin tel de yang brdzun nyid du thaI bar ' gyur ba' i phyir roll

gzhan yangl

I The underlined text is missing in P. C: de

3 P: bzung

- 1 5 1 -

gzung du med pa brjod med pall

shes pa' i spyod pa mam spangs pall

thub pa' i dbang pos gsungs pa' i chosll

de yis 'di Itar 'di la gnodll ( 1 1 2)

[agrahyo 'nabhilapyas ca dhlpracaravivarjitaJY

dharma ukto munlndreI]a sa caivarp. sati badhyatell ( 1 1 2)]

[Co 227a 1 , D. 227a2, P. 253a8] blo 'i yul nyid yin pa' i phyir gzung du med pa nyid dangl brjod

du med pa nyid yin par mi rigs tel 'di ltar chos nyidl de ni gzung du med pa dang brjod du med

pa'o zhes bya ba dangl de bzhin du don dam pa' i bden pa ni gang la shes pa 'jug pa med pa'o

zhes bya ba la sogs pa gsungs pa dang 'gal ba' i phyir roll

rab tu byed pa yongs su rdzogs nas shin tu spangs pa'i don dang reg par bya ba' i phyirl

de Itar lung rigs ldan pa yil I

de nyid gang zhig sngar bstan pall

rigs pas yongs su brtags na yangll

de las nyams pa med par gnasll ( 1 13 )

[ato yuktyagamopetarp. tattvarp. yat prag udahrtam/

parlk�yamaI]arp. yuktyaivarp. tadevavyahatarp. sthitam/I ( 1 1 3)]

gang mal 'byor spyod pa pas yongs su brtags pa' i de kho na nyid ni mam par brtags pa na

dpyad bzod pa rna yin noll

kha cig phung po ' i ljon shing chags2 II

kha cig mam shes rgya la thogsl I

yang dag mtha' yi gyang sar yangll

rna lhung rgyal ba'i thugs sras rolll ( 1 14)

de Itar na de kho na nyid gang de nyid shes pa tshol ba' i rab tu byed par lung dang' rigs pa

dang ldan par bdag gis 'di skad dul shes bya mam kun rna grub phyirll gang la mam par mi rtog

pa' ill blo yang skye bar mi ' gyur lall de nyid mnyam med de mkhyen gsungsll zhes bya ba la

sogs pa' i gzhung gis bdag dang gzhan gyi rtog ge pa mams kyi rjes su dpag pas kyang bskyod

1 ' nyid' omitted in P. C, D: chag

3 C : rab tu dbye par lung dang; 'dang' omitted in P.

- 1 52 -

par nus pa rna ym par yang dag par rab tu gnas pa ym noll dbu rna' l snymg PO' l ' grel pa rtog ge

' bar ba lasl mal ' byor spyod pa pa' l de kho na nYld gtan la dbab pa la 'Jug pa ste le'u lnga pa'ol

I [C 227a7, D 227a7, P 253b7]

- 1 53 -

Notes on the Sanskrit text of MHK V.85- H4

The fol l owmg I � d l I "t o f the vanant readl l1g� of MHK V 85- 1 1 4 that are found m the Sankrtya­

yana-Gokhale handcopy (SG). EJ lma\ unpubl I�hed ed it ion (E). and Lmdtner\ editIOn (L) Ap­

parently correct or preferable readmgs are mdlcated m bold An (x) ha" been added after l eadmg"

that .11 e m my J udgment mcorrect

85d SG ava . E avakJ�aprdbhedanat , L avakasaprabhavanat

86a SG Jata':;Yd n (a)bhI lapyatva, E Jata�ya na hi alapyatvaJ11 , L jate nanabhilapyatva�

86c SG. L "aty apy anabh I lapltve, E saty apy anabhiHipyatve

87a SG, E tdttve ' nyatattva"adbhavad , L tattve ' nyatattvasadbhavad ex)

87c SG gha!e ' pi h i gha!abhavat, E gha!e ' py anyagha!abhavat, L ghate 'pi dvigha�abhavat

90b SG, L karq dharmo, E kartur dharmo

93a SG, E watmanTvasldharaya, L �vatmanTva�ldhal aya�

94b SG, L aJ atadravya"attvata� , E aJatyadravya"attvata�

94d SG. L ' nabhI l.1pya�ca, E ' nabh I lapya�ca

95a SG, E bhavabhavasvabhavo 'PI , L bhavabhavasya bhavo 'pi

97cd G bodhe" tatva�vabha"abhedata� , E bodhes tattvaprabha5abhedata� ,

L bodhl:-' tattvasvabhasabhedatah

98c SG na khapu)pa ca dhTr, E na khapu)pabhadhTr, L na khapu�pabha dhir

1 00..1 SG, E atyantJnabh I lapyam , L atY.1ntanabh I l lpya111 (x)

I 05b E agamanuvldhyaymah, SG, L agamamnidhayinaJ;t

- 1 54 -

2. Translation

You say that the true nature of thmgs (tattvam) IS not an object of differentIatmg

thought (mrvlkalpa) because of ItS simllanty WIth space That IS agam not correct Why?

It IS not correct that the non-differentlable realIty IS sImIlar to space, because [space]

gIves way to all kmds of differentlatmg concepts I (85)

Although space IS not dIfferentIable, It gIves way to all kmds of differentIatmg concepts such as

'blue' , 'wIde' , 'pure ' , ' Impure ' , and so forth If the true nature of thmgs IS SImIlar to space, I t

also wIll be the object of all kmds of dIfferentIatmg concepts such as 'pure' , ' Impure ' , and so

forth, so that ItS non-dIfferentIable nature WIll be dented

Furthermore, you say that the perfectly establIshed nature [of thmgs]

(partm�pannasvabhiiva) cannot be expressed by words (anabhlliipya) Regardmg that tenet also,

we say

Somethmg that has ansen Viita) cannot be beyond the scope of words, because that has

already been refuted Even If It were beyond the scope of words, a conventIOnal eXIstence

( 'laf!1vr{l) WIll be mIstaken for the true nature of thmgs (86)

It IS not correct that the perfectly establIshed nature, bemg somethmg that has ansen, IS beyond

the scope of words 2 We have already refuted that, as follows "The referent of a word IS any real

entity WhICh possesses the general property [expressed by that word] , because any such [entIty] IS

the cause of the conSCIOusness m whIch ItS own Image appears And because that [general prop-

I Bhavavlveka's refutatIOn of the Yogacara understandIng of the true nature of thIng� (tattvam, dharmatii, pannl l ­pannasvahhiiva, paramiirtha, tathatii) and of the correspondIng non-dIfferentIatIng and non-objectIfYIng know­ledge (mrvlkalpajiiiina) start� here and contInues up to verse 1 1 2 The Yogacara texts often compare the true nature of thIngs With "pace to Il lu')trate Its absolute IdentIty or UniformIty (ekarasa ) For the Yogacura, the perfectly establI')hed nature of thIng� IS an uncondItIOned (a �amskrta ) real Ity Bhavavlveka argues here that, If the perfectly establIshed nature IS the Inherent nature (svahhiiva ) of dependently amIng thIng'), I t wIll anse together With the thIngs In whIch It Inheres Hence, 11 WIll be a condltloned thIng WIth an Intnnslc IdentIty that can be Identified and dlfferentlated from other thIngs (verse 85) and that can be expre��ed by word� (ver�e 86)

In verse� 85- 1 1 2 Bhavavlveka u.,e� a number of key terms, whIch In hI') vIew I mply each other aq follows To anse from condItIOns Viita, utpanna ) - to be a real entlty (dravyawt, vastu ) accordIng to conventIonal thought - to have an Intnnslc nature ( �vahhiiva ) consistIng of IndiVidual and general propertIes ( �va- , �iimiinyalahar:a ) - to be a potential object (vl wya, jiieya, griihya, iilamhva ) of both nonconceptual (pratyaksa ) and conceptual (kalpana) dual knowledge (vlkalpa ) - to be a potentIal object of �peech (ahhzliipya ) All of the')e ImplIcatIOns are negated when the true nature of thIngs IS at ')take (tattvatah, paramiirthata�), as follows What anse') from condltlOn� does not really an')e - IS not a real entity - lacks an Inherent nature - cannot be the object of e1lher nonconceptual or conceptual dual knowledge - cannot be expres')ed by words

1 QuotatIOn of MHK Y 6 1 AccordIng to the Yogacara, pannlspannasvahhava 15 the universal of universal s, the mo�t general property Inherent In all thIngs ( �iimiinvalabana , see SNS , T vol 1 6 , 690c 1 9 , MYK, Y 1 9) Whereas all other general propertIes are only names or deSignatIOns (prajiiaptlwt, namamiitra ), pannl�pan­na�vahhiiva 15 the ultImately real nature of all thIngs and IS therefore the only real general property If parznl l­panna l vahhiiva I� understood In that way, then Bhavavlveka's reasonIng In MHK Y 6 1 ImplIe5 that It cannot be Inexpre')slble by words

- 1 55 -

erty J 1 <., [part of] the IdentIty of <.,uch [ entIt Ie� ] , It I'> not correct thdt [ redl entItI e<., ] dre mexpre,><.,-

Ible ' " Even If r �omethmg that ha<., al l "en j wel e m <.,ome way or another beyond the <.,cope of

word<." It w I l l "t I l l be a conventIOnal eXI '>tence and you "hould not mI<.,takenly IdentIfy s>uch a

conventIonal eXI "tence wIth the true nature 01 thmg"

Furthermore,

I l' you argue that [to <.,ee the perfectl y e"tab i i <.,hed natlll el l '> to "ee the true ndtul c of

thmg" becdu<.,e there eXI <.,t<., no other true nature m that [true ndtlll e j , why not '><ly that [ to

�ee a pot l I� to �ee the true nature of rh1l1g" becau'>e III ,1 pot al<.,o there eXI<.,!<., no "ec()Jld

pot') (87)

I t you <.,ay "In that u l t Imate real I ty (paranulrtlw ) there eXI�t" no other, <.,econd t l ue nature of the

u ltI mate real I ty S1I1ce the u l tImate redi Ity 1 <., thm empty [ of another u lt lI11 dte rea l I ty j [ to <.,ee the

In VCI �e 87db the YOgdCdl d I cp l I c� thdt PUI l I l l IP(/IIII(/ 1 1O hhc/ \ a I� thc u ltImdte redl I ty (po/ {//71c/I t/I({ ) dnd not I Lht d convcntIondl eXI �tencc ( IClI7I1,i l l ), becdu'>e It I '> the only non-dl l'>cn t I ue IMtLll e 01 thl l1g'>

In d pdId l le l pd'>'>dgC 111 the K(// u((//{/ /a/l1o �c7 �/m (KR) Bhdvdv lvekd I I1troduce'> the tol lowl I1g YogdCdI d ObJCl­tIon dg,lIn'>t h i � dl gumcnt tOl the nonexl '>tence ot uncondit Ioned (0 1(//7 1 lkr/O ) th l l1g'> (d Y dll ldguchl P 1 98 553 ) 'The YOgdcdl ,I" dl gue d\ tol low" Thcl c CX I'>h no othel [ "t I l l mOl c u l t lmdte l ult l l11dte l edl I ty (P(I / (/ll Icll t/W )

I II the u l tl l11dte l edht) The l I ue ndtu I e (!athu/(l ) l ot th l llg'> I I " the ult l l1Mte I Cdl Ity (pwumC/I /!za ) 01 th l l1g'> 11 you I B hdvdv lvekd l ,u guc that ult l l11dtely (parall1({! I/w[ClIz ) the l I ue lMtuI e 01 th l l1g� ( [(l[/7oli7 ) 1 \ cmpty [ 01 dnothcl tl UC ndtu l e I you I PI OP0'>ltlon I '> 111 conjoI l11lty with I ed�on But 11 y ou d��eI t that thc tl UC ndtUI e [ ot th l l1g\ I

doc'> not l e,tl ly eX I�t YOlll pI Opo�Itlon I'> not 111 contoll11lty W ith l ed"on How I I1dccd lould It be 1 11 conl clI Il1 Ity With rCd<;on to a'>\C l t th,lt the "upral11 unddne nondu,tI knowledge (l1 l f l Ika/palllclI lU ) dnd the \ub"equently dtt,lIncd PlllC munddne knowlcdge (fU/PI 1 //1O /o/xl/w luddha/ullkdoji'icll1a ) hdve noth1 l1gnc",> .1'> thclI oblec['I Th,lt 1\ dcfi­I1 1tely not 1 11 con lo l ll1 lty W ith l ed�on ' (T vol 30 274b2S-c3 )

Bhdv.1vlvekd l ep l Ic\ "Juq ,1'> I t I " not COl l ect to \dy thdt mund,lI1e knowledgc h,I'> noth 1 l1gne\, ,I', I t '> ohlect

lu'>t '>0 It h not COl l CCt to '>dy [ d'> you do l th,lt thl\ [ '>Upl dl11unddne I knowledge hd\ ,I I Cdl entity d\ Ih oblCLl To c l I ng to the view thdt the tl ue ndture 0 1 th l l1g\ I '> d redl entIty I " not COllect bCldU'>C Ih ndtu le 01 be 1 l1g ,I l edl cntlty I� very dI fticu l t to plove ( 274d -5) ( ) " Reg,u d 1 l1g YOlll qdtement There eXhh no uthcI ult lmdtc l edl­Ity 111 thc U l t l l11dtC rCdl lty', It '>tatel11ent'> I I kc the,e mean thdt ,ol11eth 1 l1g I '> empty heCdU'ie thl\ doe'> not eX I "t 1 11 thdt, then ,>hephel d,> dnd the l i ke w I l l a l l hdve to be cdl lcd '>eer\ 01 thc tl llth becdu<,e they dll know thdt the le CXI "t" no othcr '> I 1 k c loth 111 a " I lk cloth Fll l thermoi c el11ptI ne,,, ' " tdught 111 OI del to el I l11 l 11 dte I11I'>tdken v iew" But .I I11 I'>tdk.en view ,>uch d\ 'Thele eX I'>h another u lt l l11dte l edl Ity 1 11 the ult I l11dte l edlIty ' hd'> nevel been pI O­pounded by 'lI1ybody Elllpt \ l1e,>� I'> theI e lO ie not tdught \ 11 ordcl to le tutc a v iew l i ke that (274c I 4- 1 9)

The textudi �ou l ce 01 thc YOgdCdl d �tdtelllent 'ThcI C eXI'>h no othcl u ltl mdte I e,llIty 111 the u lt l llldte redhty 1\ !1l0�t pI Obdbly the jol lowl l1g pa��agc j rom the SOl7ld/1 l 1 l 1 1 1l10WI10I L/[/ (/ ' I I thc tI ue ndtu l c oj th l l1g� ( iO[/W/([ )

the u l t Il1ldte l edl ity (pOI Wllcll t/W ) OJ the db<,encc ot I I1helent CXI\tence 111 th \l1g� (dh(II Il1UIlOl } ({["l WIl1 ) h,ld ch l -1c l ent chal dcten'>tIC'> I t would hdve CdU�C� .mel would dl l '>C 1 1 0m Cdll�C� I t I t dll'>C\ hom ldu'>e'> It w I l l be ,[ condit ioned l th l I1g l ( 1(/}11 IkJ /a ) 1 1 It I'> londltIoned It W I l l not be thc ultl l1ldte l ed l l ty It It I'> not the Ult l l11dtC I C­,I l ity, one wI l l hdve to �earch tOl '>Ollle othcl ultlmatc I Cdl ny (dOli dall1 po gzholl z/lig HlIIg I I II bflo/ dg(l \ P(I I g \ 1 I 1 / 0 ) SlIbhul1 , becau�e the true natu l e the ult l l1Mte ledhty 01 the db�encc 01 I I1hel cnt cXI'>tence I II a l l th l l1g\

hd'> no CdU�C�, doe,> not dl l '>e h om CdU'>C� ,lI1d l� not conditIoned It cel tdl l1 ly I� thc l only l ul tll1Mtc ledl Ity Oncc one hd� I Cdl Ized thl'> ult l l1ldte redhty thel e 1\ 110 nced to �e,lI ch tor dnothel ultl m,lte truth (dOli dum po de I dOli dum pu gZ/7(/}l \ 0 11[;1 IU h/ I([/ 17m hw 1111 dgO l ) Whcthel a Tdthdgdtd dppedl '> 111 the woI ld 01 not thc 1I ue I1d­tlll e 01 d l l th l I1g'> I � c�tab l I �hcd pel l11anently dnd eteI ll al ly dnd thc l edlm 01 l edhty (d/7(// madl1({tLl ) pCI �I'>h ' (Tl dn,> ldlion bd\ed on thc Ch1 l1e'>e text, T vol 1 6 692<1 1 1 - 1 9 , SNS Tlb Llmotte cd I V 1 0, pp 5 1 -52 YBh T vol ')0, 7 1 7d2 1 -29, Y B h, 0 Scm" T\,[m 9 ZhI 52b l -'S )

The Pd"�dgC I n S N S '>dy� thdt thc true ndtUl e 0 1 th l l1g<, hd'> ,[ � l Ilgle td\le (eku / (/ I C/ ) Cdnnot bc the ohlcct 01 dd le lent ldt l l1g thought dnd I'> tl LI Iy ultl Illdte beCdU\C I t 1 \ thc only unconditIOned I Cdhty Accol c1 l 11gly, thc PUI ­pOl t ot thc YOgJCdl d thc�I'> 1 I1 l! oduced 111 MH K V 87 db and 111 the pdl dl lel Pd�\dge 111 KR �CCI11'> to bc that the u lt imate ndtu l e 01 th l l1g<, I� empty 01 dnothel �t I l I mOl e ultI mate I1dtLI I C , but I '> not cmpty oj It�c lf bccau'>e It I � thc only uncondltI oncd ledhty beyond which thcl c 1 \ n o othcl I t tl1cll ult I mdte Ildtul e wel e empty 0 1 I t'>c l t I t would not CX I\t ,lI1d would be equdl to nothl l1gnc,>,>

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perfectly establIshed nature] IS to see the true nature of thmgs," then why not say that to see a

pot IS abo to see ultimate realIty because m a pot also there eXIsts no other, second pot,)4

You mIght also argue as follows "Although the non-dIfferentiable [realIty] IS beyond the

scope of words, stIll the realm of realIty (dharmadhatu) IS thought to be pure (suddha ), J ust as

water, gold and space are pure And because the [realm of realIty] IS pure, the mmd ['>eemg It] IS

also pure "S We refute that as follows

It cannot be that the defilement and punty of that [realm of realIty] eXIst Just for the sake

of conceahng the errors m your own theory As a matter of fact, [the defilement and pu­

nty] of gold, and so forth, occur m conformIty wIth condItIons (88)6

Pure water, gold and space appear to be contammated (samala ) when [pollutmg] condItIOns such

as dust, rust, and clouds are present, and they appear to be pure (Suddha ) when these condItIOns

are absent Thus, they sometImes get contammated and afterwards they get pure agam If the

realm of realIty were exactly lIke that, It would sometImes get pure and sometimes get defiled

[Smce that IS ImpOSSIble] , your statement merely attempts to conceal the errors m your own the­

ory As a matter of fact, the realm of realIty does not become defiled and does not become pure

[m the same manner] , because gold, and so forth, change m conformIty wIth the conditIOns The

examples of gold, and so forth, do therefore not establIsh the meanmg [of defilement and punty]

you attnbute to the realm of realIty

[The Yogacara obJects ] [Our theory] proves to be correct when It IS understood as follows

Space IS always pure, but IS seen as eIther contammated or uncontammated dependmg on

whether the eyes are Impure or pure The true nature of thmgs IS Just hke that (89)

You mIght object as follows A person who suffers from partIal blIndness (talmmka ) and whose

VIsual sense faculty IS ImpaIred sees space as obscured by a net of unreal haIrs, msects and flIes

When hIS eyes have become pure after the applIcatIOn of an eye medlcme that cures partIal

bhndness, he sees space as entIrely free from haIrs, msects and flIes However, when hIS Im­

paIred Visual sense faculty [first] '>ees space as Impure and hIS cured VIsual sense faculty [later]

sees It as pure, no change at all occurs m space Itself The same IS true of the mtnnslcally pure

(Prakrtya vlsuddha ) true nature of thmgs Commoners (bala ) , whose mental eye IS Impure, see It

as contammated (samala ) Supenors (arya), whose mental eye has become pure by applymg the

) The Yogacara replies that seeIng a pot IS not seeIng ultImate truth, because a pot IS not the object ot pure knowledge Only the true nature of thIngs IS the object of a pure mInd (vl�uddhyalambana ) that '>ees redlity a'> It IS

" Ver�es 88-90ab Introduce and refute the Yogacara theory of 'the u ltImdte nature of the mInd a<; Intnmlcally pure, but adventItIOusly defiled and punfied' The companson of the Intnn<;lcally pure nature of the mInd WIth the Intnmlc punty ot wdter, gold, dnd space I� used In e g MVK 1 1 6 , MSA XI 1 3 , XIII 1 6, 1 8 , YBh, T vol 30, 70 I b28-c3, 748b 1 3- l 8 The parallel passage In PP quote<; MVK 1 1 6cd and MVK 1 2 1 -22 (see Eckel, pp 57-59)

- 1 57 -

eye medlCl l1e of ' the v I<; lon ot emptl l1e<;<; ' ( � jjl7 \ CltadQJ \af1o), "ee I t d" u ncontaml l1ated (amo/a )

However, when the contdml l1ated mll1d [ fir"tJ ')ee" the tI Ue l1dture of thll1g" a� Impure and the un­

contamll1ated m l l1d "ee" I t a" pure [ later] , no change at a l l occur" 1 11 the true natUl e of thll1g" It­

"elf 7

To refu te thl" , we "dY

The delu,)lon of the ml l1d, which "ee� l�p<Ke] a" defi led [fl r"t and a� undefi led latel j , I " a

pi operty ot the [knowl l1gJ agent dnd not of the known object (90db)

The de lu" lOn of the mll1d to which "pdce appedr" d" deti led [ fir')tJ and a" u ndefI led [ Idter ] , I" a

property of the agen t That I� to "dY, It I') d property of the mentdl contl l1 uum (dhik({ya) dctmg m

Ul1 l ')on with the body dnd the '.eme COmCIOU'.ne�<;e'. (mdrzWlvI/ii({I1C7 ) I t I " not a pl Operty ot the

known object'., "uch d" "pace, and ,,0 forth S l lmlarly, [the appearance on the realm ot l eal ity a"

Impure or pure I " abo a property of the dgent who ha" enhel en-oneous knowledge 01 correct

knowledge It I'. not a property ot the realm of reahty, WhICh I" the known object m thl" ca:'.e

Thel efOl e , your theory that the l ealm of real I ty It')elt I" contammated 01 uncontamlI1ated h not

con ect

Furthermore,

The perceptIon of thdt [ redlm ot real Ity] I'. not pure, dnd It I" not accepted thdt the true

natU l e of thmg" I " d perceivable object «((/amb\ (!) (90cd)

The knowledge that perceive') the realm of redl Ity cannot be pure, becdu"e If that knowledge per­

ceive" the real m ot l eal Ity, I t cannot be [a tru ly J non-objectlfY l l1g (I1lrvlkalpa) [knowledge]

MOl eover, the realm of l ed l I ty It"elf cannot be d pel celvable object, becdu')e u l t i mate ly (po / ([ -

marthatah) the tI ue nature of thmg'), cal led ' the realm of I eahty ' , I " not d perceivable object

Furthel more,

If the true nature of thl l1g,', I" a � ub"tdntldl ent ity (drav)asat ), the �ame errol a� betore

w i l l OCCUI [agam] And the [tru ly 1 "upramundane non-objectlty mg knowledge cannot be

the knowledge of "uch [ a "ub"tantral entity J becau"e huch a knowledge I pen�he" (9 1 )

it you conceive the realm of real Ity or the true nature of thll1g" d" d 5ub'-tantJal entity, the 101 l0w­

mg error, dh eady pOlI1 ted out before, w i l l OCCUI agdll1 " If, became of [the need to explcu n ] de­

fi lement and punficdtlon, you a')')eI t that the ml l1d I " a �ub"tdntlal ent i ty then I YOll l pO"ltion I

doe" not refute our po"Itlon [OUI pO"lt lOnl I " l I1deed e"tabh"hed becdll5e feel 1 l1g, and "0 forth ,

7 The YOgdCdl d I I1t lOdu(c� hel e the d l� t l l1(UOn between the pel n1dnent, I nt l ln� l( (P/{/� I I \ (7 ) punty oj the re,l Im oj l ed i i ty ,mel 11\ extl l l1� IC 01 delventlUou� (iigal1lu�a ) defilement ,1I1d pun ticdt lon 1 11 ordel to �how thdt the COIl1-Pdl l �on� WIth "pdce dnd �() lorth do dPp ly to the l edl ll1 of l ed i i ty The 1l1d1l1 YOgdCdl d text" on the I I1tl ln" l( pu­I Ity ,md eAtn n�IC delilement/pUl dicdUon of the I11 l 11d ,li e the j ol lowmg MVK I 16 I 2 1 -22 I I 1 5 V 20-22

MSA VI I , IX 22-23 37, 56, Xl 1 3 X I I I 1 6, U �- 1 9 DDVV 44 1 -45 8 YBh T vol 30 70 1 b25-c9, ASBh (N Tdt ld ed ) 1 4 9- 1 7

- I SS -

anse that way [as eIther defiled or pure] "x

You mIght say "Even when [the level of] supramundane knowledge (lokottaraJfiana) [has been

attamed], the nondual (nzrvlkalpa) perceptIOn of the true nature of thmgs (dharmata) does anse "

[We reply ] The ansmg of such a [percelv1Og] m10d IS not approved [at the level of supramun­

dane knowledge], because that m10d wIll pensh ImmedIately after ItS ansmg You should there­

fore ascertam how that supramundane mmd could pOSSIbly not pensh 9

Moreover,

As long as knowledge arIses, Just as long does It functIOn 10 conformIty with knowable

objects 10 (92cd)

If you ask what error follows from that, we answer

As long as the m10d functIOns 10 conformIty WIth knowable objects, JU'lt as long IS the

m10d obscured by partIal bl10dness I I (92ab)

That [error] wIll follow Accord1Ogly, the supramundane m10d that perceIves the perfectly estab­

lIshed nature [of thmgs] wIll also be obscured by partIal blmdness (satzmlra), because It func­

tIons as [any other] obJectlfymg knowledge of a knowable object The correct VIew [about nzrvl­

kalpaJfiana ] IS as follows Samsara anses because the obscured mmd functIOns m conformIty

with the form (akara) of knowable objects When that m10d realIzes that the 10herent nature

(5 vabhava) of [all] knowable objects IS not truly establIshed (apartnz�panna), It no longer per-

x Quotation of MHK V 47 ThiS ver<;e, as quoted In the present context, rejects the Yogacara view that It I:' nece:,­<;ary to conceive the true nature of the mInd (= the realm of realIty) as a substantial entity In order to account for the transformatIOn ot a defiled mInd Into a pure mInd AccordIng to Bhavavlvekd, defilement and punfica­tlOn can be explaIned perfectly well when the mInd 15 understood a:, a nomInal entity For the detaIl .;; , <;ee the commentary to MHK V 47

9 Paral lel pa-;sage In KR "The knowledge that gra<;ps the true nature of thIngs (tathata ) a<; an object I:' not the true, supramundane, non-objectifYIng knowledge, because It grasps an object and becau<;e It I'> conditIOned ( 5am�krta ), Ju�t like any other mundane, objectifYIng knowledge " (T vol 30, 274c5-7)

Bhavavlveka's POInt IS that ntrvlkaipa)fiana, dS the Yogacara understands It, perceives or objectifies the true nature of thIng,>, because the Yogacara mlsconcelve<; the true nature ot thIng:, a:, d perceivable reality If the true nature of thIngs IS a reality In It'>elf and has ItS own Identity ( �vabhava ), It wIll act d:, the objective condition of ntrvlkalpclJfiana The latter wIll then be a conditIOned ( 5amlkrta) knowledge and wIll pensh Immediately dtter ItS ansIng, JU'>t lIke any other ordInary, mundane knowledge of '>peclfic objects It can therefore not be the truly unconditIOned (a 5am�krta ) dnd non-objectifYIng supramundane knowledge of realIty as It IS

For Bhavavlvekd, true supramundane knowledge I'> an unconditIOned state of mInd, charactenzed by the ab­'>ence of all dIfferentiatIng and objectifyIng forms of mundane knowledge It 1<; not a new knowledge In It<, own nght that would anse by graspIng, :,eeIng or perceivIng a speCific object, VIZ the true nature of thIng:, a:, d real­Ity In It'ielt Adequdte supramundane knowledge IS necessanly non-obJectifYIng, �Imply because the true nature of thIng') I') not d perceivable realIty, dS the fol loWIng pd:,:,dge trom the Pra)iiapradrpa clearly under<;cores "The true nature of thIng<; (tattvam ) IS that they are In every re<;pect not establIshed la:-, haVIng then own Intnn­SIC Identltle<;] (aparml�panna ) SInce that [true nature IS a mere absence andJ IS never present In front [of the mInd] as a perceivable object (vl5aya ), It cannot be an actual object of perceptIOn (alambana ) " (PP, D Tsha 247b7-248a l , P T:,ha 3 1 I a2-3)

I II TranslatIOn ba<;ed on the Samknt text (yavat utpadyate jiianam ) The Tibetan text reads ")1 md Ihe \ pa dmlgl yod pa" (As long as knowledge eXists as a perceptIOn of somethIng )

I I I follow Yamaguchi (pp 564-565) who nghtly observes that verse 9 2 sound5 more natural when the order ot 92ab and 92cd IS reversed Note aho that the half-verse 92ab 1<; missIng In the Tibetan ver<;lon ot the ver'>e.,­only text ThiS Indlcdtes that somethIng must have gone wrong With the transml.,.,lon ot the text

- 1 59 -

celve� rmdlvldual l y e�tab l t �hed object,> ] Becau<;e at that t ime <;am<;ara no longer al l <;e", that rab­

�encc of mhel ent natureJ I " thought to be the true nature (tam all1 ) of thmg"

Moreover, your the� l<; that the [ omnI�c lentl knowledge of the Lord (Svavamhlni) occur" m

a "mgle m"tant I " a l'>o not e'>tab l t '>hed for the fol lowll1g rea<;on

OmnI"CIenCe cannot be m �tantaneou'l [ m your doctnneJ , becau"e knowledge doe" not act

on It"elf , and becau'.e [the eXI <;tence of] 'lelf-awarene,>,> (\ va \ClI71Vltfl) I� negated (93)

A l though the knowable thmg" are manIfold becau'>e of theIr many difterent 10rm�, theIr true na­

ture (dharmata) I '> an undIff erentIated nature The Oml1 l�ClenCe lof the LOi dl can therefore know

leveryth mg ] m a '>mgle m'ltant wIthout makmg any dI�tmctIOn'l 12 But I f 1 0ml1 l '>clent] knowledge

I" m'>tdntaneou�, Oml1l'>Clence cannot '> lmultaneou,> ly know the dlfterent form'> of rai l ] knowab le

thmg� I , Othel WI�e, the contradictIOn that know ledge act<; on Itself w I l l fol low [ Knowledge 1

:;,ure ly doe� not dct that WdY, j u'>t a" the edge of a "word doe,> not cut Ihel1 Theretore It <;uch an

ll1'ltantaneou� knowledge eAI�t� u l ti mately (paral71arthatah), one w i l l have to I el y on the next m-

stant of knowledge m order to ful l y know the prev Ious m�tant of knowledge Moreovel , '>mce the

true nature of thmg" (dharmata) I :;' not any thmg at aIL [m Oml1 l '>CIence a'. we under:;,tand It]

there 1<; no po<;ltIve gl a'>pmg of the Identity C\vabJu]va) of a real thmg, and l�mce thel e 1<; no

gra<;pmg of "omethmg, the eXIstence of] �elt-awaJ ene�,> [a,> the awarene,>,> by con'>clou<;ne"" ot I t'>

own act of gra�pll1gJ I '> therewIth a l"o negated Smgle-m,>tant Oml1 l "ClenCe I '. thel efore not e<;tab-

I t '>hed [m your �y�teml It I'> however e"tabl t '>hed m OUI "y"tem, a" fol l ow,>

What I � gra'.ped by the <;upenor non-obJectlfymg mmd can m no way be expl e,,<;ed by

WOl ds, becau�e the an'>mg lor mherent eXI"tence'.] I '> negated as we have expl amed be-

tore, dnd becau'>e thmg'> that do not an�e (a}ata) [a,> mhel ent eXI <;tenCe '. ] are not real (a -

dravvmat) ru l tImate ly ] (94)

What J " gl asped (gn'ihya) by the supenor non-objectIfymg mll1d (ntrvlkalparyadhi) I S gra�ped by

way of non-gra�pll1g (agraha)'ogena) Thl� I� becau�e there I" [ u lt l lnatelyJ no an"lI1g [of lI1herent

eXI "tence� that could be gra<;ped] The an�mg lof mherent eXI"tence<;] I '. mdeed negated a'> we

have already demon'>trated m Chapter [Th lee] Tattv(ljllan(l/ \C/J.1a Moreover, becau'>e thmg,> con-

I ' Thl� I � Bhavdv lvekd � dccount 01 omIl l'>llence 'WIthout ma"-mg dny dl�t l l1ct IOn�' medn� wIthout pel ce lv l l1g dny l l1d lv ldudl IdentI t le'> of t h l l1g�' See dl�o vel �e� 1 02 and 1 06

1 1 Bhdvdv lvekd reJect,> the YogdCdl ct view that the Buddhct\ omIl l �Clence Cdn knO\\ dl l the v drIelIe'> of thmg� 1 11 <I � l l1gle m�Unt Thl" view I '> tdught 111 tOl eXdmple MSA IX 3 1 <md IX 3) (ct Ydnldguch1 , p S6X) See dl�o Sth l l dnldtI '> commentctl Y on MSA/MSABh IX 33 When the knowledge of the B uddhd know� the knowdbl e th l l1g " It l � not the Cd�e that 1 t know,> '>ome thl l1g'> wh I le not knowl l1g othel " nOI l � It the ca�e thdt It know" '>ome thmg� fil �t dnd other th l l1g� Idtel I t "-now� <ti l the val letIe '> o f know<lble th l l1g� "uch d'> the dggl egctte" (,kol/dlw ) , the con'>tI tuent'> of cogIl l tlon (dhc7tu ), dnd '>0 t Oi th all dt once (dl/ I gC lg Ill ) " (0 MI 1 23ct l -2 )

Bhdvdvlvekd'� v Iew I '> tlMt omnl�Clence Cdn 1 n d � l l1gle l l1�tdnt "-now dl l th l l1g" <l� undlfferenlloted but d l tt el ­ent1dted th l l1g� Cdn only he known 111 m<my con�ecutIve m'>tdnt\ (�ee dl,>o vel �e,> 94 1 02 1 06 )

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ventIOnally speakmg (samvrtya) anse from appropnate causes and condItions, theIr nature (at­

man) IS not a real entIty (adravyasat) [ultImately] Now, that [absence of mherent nature] can m

no way be expressed by words, because It IS eqUIvalent to the absence of self-IdentIty ( �vabha­

vasunya) 1 4 It should be added that Just that kmd of own-nature (svabhava) [consIstmg m the ab­

sence of an mherent nature] IS the object of the hIghest knowledge (paramartha) I )

Moreover, m your doctnne,

The mherent nature (svabhava) that IS both eXIstence (bhava) and the presence of nonex­

Istence (abhavasya bhava) IS the ultImate [nature of thmgs] If so, how can your doctnne

be free from the extremes of affirmmg too much (samaropa) and negatmg too much

(apavada)'7 1 6 (95)

Whoever seeks lIberatIOn from the two extremes of affirmmg too much and negatmg too much,

1 4 Accordlllg to the TJ-commentary, verse 94 explalll� how the Madhyamaka can account for the po�slbll lty of slllgle-mstant omnISCIence A<; I understand It, Bhavavlveka reasons a� follows Only when the object of the hlghe<;t knowledge (paramartha ) I� understood as the absence of perceIvable and expre��lble mdlvldual entItIes (dravya mt), can omnI<;clence be a <;mgle-illstant knowledge, because It then just mlrror<; all thlllg� wIthout 'graspmg' any llldlVldual entltle� If omnISCIence I� a ' grasplllg' of mdlvldual entItIes, that ' gra<;plllg' wIll also need to know It� own act of ' graspmg' m order to be truly omnI�Clent (that IS, In order to be the knowledge of everythmg , mcludmg knowledge of Itself) Moreover, If that ' graspmg' IS a sIngle-mstant knowledge, Its act of , gra�pmg' wlll need to be known eIther by Itself or by a SImultaneous act of self-awarenes�, whIch are both ex­

cluded by Bhavavlveka (�ee verse 93) On the other hand, If the true nature of all thIng� IS that they have no IndlVldual IdentIty that could be grasped, then true omnISCIence doe� not grasp 'any thmg' and IS In that sen�e not a genUIne act of knowledge Or, a<; BhavavIveka says, ' It grasps by way of non-gra�pmg' If true omnI­sCIence I� thm not a ' gra<;pmg' of somethmg, the questIon as to how that ' graspmg' could al<;o know Itself be­comes Irrelevant

Bhavavlveka reject� the eXI<;tence of self-awareness not only In the case of supramundane knowledge but al�o m the case of all ordmary, mundane perceptIOn� (see MHKlTJ V 20-26) In hIS VIew, an object 1 <; adequately perceIved when an Image of the perceIved object appear<; m the mmd (vl\ayabhasa ) Consequently, there eXlsb no �eparate act of comCIOu�nes<; ( �vabham ) that could be known by a sImultaneous act of �elf-awarene�s The dIfference between the supramundane knowledge of the true nature of thIngs on the one hand and ordmary, mundane perceptIons on the other hand I� then as follows OrdInary perceptIOn I S only vl sayabhasa (no sva­bhala and hence no self-awarene�s) Supramundane knowledge IS not even vlsayabha:;a (because It doe� not gra�p any object) and IS IpSO facto not svclbha:;a (hence not accompanIed by self-awarene�s) In �hort, �upra­mundane knowledge I� In all respect� a formle�s knowledge (mrakara ) because It lacks both an objectIve and a subjective form

" Compare With MHKlTJ VIII 89 "The fact that thmg� [ultimately] do not anse (ajatata ) IS theIr [true] own na­ture ( I Vabhava ) becau<;e It I� not fabncated (akrtnma ) And because that [natureJ does not decay, It I� abo called 'the [truel �elt' (atman ) [of thmg�] " (See 0 Qvarnstrom, "The Vedantatattvavml�caya-chapter of Bhavya'� Madhyamakahrdayakanka," WZKSA 34 ( 1 990), p 1 95)

1 6 See al<;o MHK V 2-3, 1 0- 1 2 and my notes to these verses Accordmg to BhavavIveka, the Yogacdra� mIscon­ceIve the ultImate nature of thmgs as an mherently eXIstmg nature and, even worse, as a reified nothIngne�<;, be­cause they understand the negatIon of the Imagmed nature of thIngs as an affirmative negatIOn (paryuda \ a ) and not as an ab�olute negatIOn (pramJ Va ) BhavaVIveka put� It as follows "If the negatIon 'the two do not eXIst' IS understood as an absolute negatIOn (med par dgag pa ), It wlll exhaust It� power m the mere negatIOn of the ex­Istence of the two In that case, the error of [relfymg] nonexistence wlll not occur ThIS IS becau�e [ the nega­tIonJ wlll then pnmanly functIOn as a negatIOn lonly] and wlll not [affirml an ultimate nonexl�tence Thm, [ the extreme of] negatmg too much by saymg

, [The ultimate nature] IS the [permanent] pre�ence of the absence of

the two' (dvayabhava:;ya bhava ) w1l1 not occur If, on the other hand, the negatIOn I� understood as an affirm­lllg negatIOn (ma ym par dgag pa ), affirmatIOn will be ItS pnmary functIOn and It wlll affirm [the presence of] nonexl�tence That I� unacceptable, because It IS the extreme of negatmg too much (apavadanta ) The nonexl�t­ence of the horns of a rabbIt abo [IS a mere ab<;ence and] IS not a [reified] non-entity (abhava ) If the ultimate [ nature ot thmg�] were �lmllar to such a [relfiedl nonexistence, It Will result m a nIhll lStlC view (uahedadntl ) " (PP, D Tsha 247 a6-b2, P Tsha 3 1 Oa6-b2, Eckel, p 7 1 )

- 1 6 1 -

.;,hould complete l y e l immate the two extreme::, of [affirm1l1g 1 I1herent l eXi stence and [mherent]

nonexl '>tence You , however, hold that an 1 I1herent nature that I � both eXI .;,tence and the pre'>ence

of nonexl::,tence, IS the perfect ly e.;,tab l I shed, u lt I mate natll I e of thlOg'> If that [u l t Imate naturel I '>

eXI .;,tence, you are not free from the extreme ot affirm1 l1g too much If It I � nonexl 'Itence, you are

not free trom the extreme of negat1 l1g too much How then can l IberatIOn , WhICh 1::' attaIned by

the e l ImlOatlon ot the'le two extreme�, eXI �t lo YOllI doctl lne')

AccordlOg to our doctnne, It I � a� fol l ow.;,

[The true nature of thmgl,] I S not eXI�tence, becdul,e u l t Imate ly ( tattvata�) there I � no aJ 1 1,­

l I1g [of th1 l1gs1 I t I � [al::,ol not nonex Istence, became It I � not [a real] eXI .;;tence [ lo the

fmt place] Sl I1ce thl� ab"ence ot both eXI '>tence and non-eXl'�tence I'> thought to be the

true ndture of thlOgs, [ the true nature of thlOg'l] 1'1 [tru ly] non-dual (96)

[The true nature of thlOgs] I S not eXI.;;tence, becau.;,e ul t I mately cll l th1 l1g'> do not dl l"e I t I '> [a l'>o 1

not noneX I '>tence, becau::,e the eXI "tence [that could be negated] I ';; not [ real] eX i stence [ 111 the fi r.;; t

p lacel If the eXIstence [of thlOg'>] were [a real ] eXI "tence, th1 l1g.;; could become nonexI�tent

through the ce.;;satIOn of that [eXIstence I However 'I 1 l1ce the eXI'>tence [ of th 1 l1gs] I '> not [a real ]

eXIstence, th1 l1g" d o n o t [real ly ] become nonexistent 1 7 We a'>sert that the non-dudhty (advayam)

comlstl l1g m the absence of both [ 1 l1herent] eXI 'Itence and [ 1 l1herentl non-exl'ltence, I � the true na­

ture of th 1 l1g::, Therefore, that non-dual I ty does not contradict rea.;,on 1 \

Another .;,enou.;; error fol l ow� from your doctrine

[The m1l1d of] the Teacher w i l l not be a non-obJectlfYlOg [mlOd ! , becau'Ie It WI l l have the

true nature (t([ thata) [of thlOg.;;] a.;; Ib object The enl Ightened m1 l1d w i l l then not be char-

actel lzed by the �amene.;;1, (wmata) [of peI ceIver and perceIved] , becduse the true nature

1 7 Compcll e wi th M"I/amadl1 \ulI1akaklinka XV 5 and XlI I 7 ' I f thel e I � no I l l1herent l eX l qenee, thel e I � al\o no I l l1herent J nonexl..,tence People I l1deed �ay that thel e I.., noneXI \tence when dn eXI\tence hd.., changed mto ..,ome­th l l1g el ..,e ' (bhava \ WI ced apia �lddhll abhav() natva I ldh \ Utl hhc7vo n ({ h\ ({I1 V({Thahhal'all1 ahhawl1l hi llvatc Janclh) " I t any non-empty th l l1g eX l ..,ted, empt l l1e..,.., woulu .11<;0 be ..,ometh l l1g I edl ! namely lI1hel ent noneXl ..,t­ence 01 ,ub�tantJal noth l l1gne,� a.., the oppmlte of l I1hel ent eXl �tence J S l Ilce not ,my non-empty th l l1g eX I �t..,

how could empt l l1e.,.., eXI�t ') ' (\ O(Il a l ill1 wl11 bha'vet kllnClt n CI( (/1 1111 \ (//11 apl kll71C una na klll1Ud ({ I f\ ({ Iiill­\u111 (a kuTah I lll1vam bhavl \ wtl) See al..,o M H K I I I 263 "Emptl l1e�� 1<; empty o f the l I1 herent natlll e of empti­ne..,�, and <;0 fOi th A wise per<;on therefOi e doe<; not even <;ee emptl l1e�<;' 111 emptl lle..,.., '

1 \ I t the negation ' not eX I..,tence' were , m dffi l m l llg negdt lon (pun udc/ \(/ ), I t would Imply the dtti I IndtIon ' hence noneX I <;tence whI le the negdtIOn ' not nonexl.,tence' would I l11ply the df ti rnldtlon hence eX I\tenLe' In thelt ca..,e It w I l l he I l11po�"'Ible to ' Imul tdneou�ly a..,..,ert ' not eXI �tence dnd not nonexhtence' wIthout tal l l l1g Into contl d­d IctIOn., M ddhYdInaka rea�onl l1g under�tand.., both negdtiOll'> a.., ab..,olute negatIOn.., (pm WI \ a) beUIU\e It aI m.., at negatl llg both l I1herent eXl <;tence .tnd I I1hel ent nonex l� tence In other WOl d.." tor the Mddhyamaka m hel ent eX I..,­tence ,mu l I1herent nonexlqence are not contrddlctone.., I t they were u)!1trdd lctoI lC\ one of both would hdve to be truc They dI e contrane� They cannot both be nght but they I11dY both be wl Ong Ju..,t d.., "x I .., not blue" doe\ not Imply 'X I.., wh I te" ( I f X happen� to be yel low, both \ldtemenh wI l l bc wl Ong l ) ( ,ec PP 0 T..,ha 94d7-b l COl11mentdl Y on MMK V 8) Thc Madhyamakd cld lm, th,1I only the negdlIon ot both Inhcl ent eX I \lence ,lI1e1 I l1herent noncxl..,tence I.., true non-duality 01 the true Inlddle way A l though the Yogdcdl a aho a��c lb that the u l l Imdte nature ot thl l1g� I.., ' ne l thel eXI ..,tcnce nO! nonexl qence the YOgdCdl cl undel �tdnd l l1g ot th l� non­dU,lhty 1\ bd..,CU on ' PdrYlldd�el negdtlOn\ emd theretOi e contl ddlLh red..,on (�ee M H K/TJ V 1 0- 1 2 )

-- 1 62 -

and the conSCIOusness that perceIves It (sviibhiisa) wIll be [two] separate [thmgs] (97)

If [the mmd of] the Teacher Buddha-Bhagavat perceIves what you call the perfectly establIshed

and true nature of thmgs, It wIll not be non-obJectIfymg, because It wIll have that true nature as

ItS object That wIll contradIct scnptural statements such as "The Buddha has the charactenstics

of space Space also has no [vIsIble] marks (lak�alJa) Homage to You who, not bemg vIsible

(lak�ya) and havmg no vlSlble marks (lak�alJa), cannot be perceIved 1 , , 1 9 Moreover, the enlIght­

ened mmd of the Teacher wIll not be charactenzed by the sameness [of perceIver and perceIved]

Why? Because the true nature (tattvam) you call ' the perfectly establIshed nature of thmgs' , and

the knowledge m WhICh an Image [of that nature] appears (prabhiisajfiiina), will be [two] sepa­

rate thmgs If these two eXIst m that way, how can such a two-natured (ngo bo nYld gnYls) reali­

zatIOn (abhlsamaya) be [charactenzed by the] sameness [of perceIver and perceIved] ?20

Furthermore,

From what could the mmd that perceIves the true nature [of thmgs] anse If Its potency IS

not deposIted [m conscIOusness ]? [It cannot anse,] Just as a mmd that perceIves flowers m

the sky and whose potency IS not deposIted [m conscIOusness] cannot anse (98)

Accordmg to your doctnne, vIsual conSCIOusness and the other kmds of forthcommg conscIOUS­

ness (pravrttlVljfiiina) functIOn m UnIson WIth a begmnmgless store-conscIOusness (iilayavlJfiiina)

and deposIt their respective potencies (svasaktl) m the store-consCIOusness each time they anse

and pensh When these potencIes, m theIr vanous forms of perceIvable objects (vl�aya), sense

facultIes (mdnya) and perceIvmg conscIOusnesses (vljfiiina), have matured, [new conSCIOUS­

nesses] come forth (abhmlrVrt) from the store-conSCIOusness as long as samsara lasts

If that IS true, a mmd that perceIves the true nature of thmgs will not anse m commoners

(Prthagjana) who are not seers of realIty (atattvadarsm) and m whom a mmd that perceives the

true nature of thmgs (tathatii) has never ansen before As there can be no penshmg of somethmg

that has not ansen, the potency of the mmd that perceIves the true nature of thmgs cannot be de­

posIted, for what potency could a non-pen shed thmg deposit m the store-conSCIOusness so that It

could [subsequently] mature there? Smce ItS potency IS thus not deposited, the mmd that per­

ceives the true nature of thmgs Will be WIthout a cause, and from what could such a mmd ever

anse? ThIS IS SImilar to the potency of a mmd that perceIves flowers m the sky Smce that po­

tency IS never produced, It IS ImpOSSIble that, from a potency that has never once before been de-

1 9 Also quoted In PP AvalokItavrata Identifies It as a quotatIOn from the Ar'yasarvabuddhavlIayajFliinii!okalam­kiirasutra (see Eckel, p 73)

20 See also MHK V l3ab, 1 6 'Samenes� [of perceiver and perceived] ' In thiS context means ' non-duality' or ab­sence of a perceived object and of a perceivIng comclOusness that would conform to It by repre<;entmg ItS form (iikara, iibhiim)

- 1 63 -

pO"lted 1 11 the "tore-COl1',ClOmne".." a perception of flower" 111 the "ky would an"e l ettel c l

Furthermore,

The t l lle nature of th111g'l, a� you under..,tand It, I" not beyond Identity and dlttel cnce, be­

cau..,e [111 ..,aY111g ..,01 you [merelyJ conceal [the el ror" of ] your own doctnnc (99clb)

You 'lay that the perfect ly e..,tabl i ..,hed nature and the dependent natlll e [of th 1 11 g'l ] I eal ly eXI..,t ,

and that the..,e two are neither Identical nor dlffel ent 2 2 Howevel 111 "ay111g "'0, you merely conceal

[ the error'l of ] your own doctnne No mattel what you 'lay, the perfectl y e�tabl i "hed ndture you

cal l 'the true natlll e ' of th111g" I" not free from Identity and difference 2' When one fol low" the

doctnne of tho..,e who know the [ true 1 middle [ way 1 then

What wa.., ,,<l Id [ about neIther Identity nor d ifference] hold.., 111 our doctnne, beCdU'le [ tO i

u'> the true nature of th111g" ] I .., no t a real entity (ad/ {/vva) and I " [thel el Ol e [ no t pel cel-

vable (anupalabh va) (99cd)

jmt becau..,e [ fOi u" the tl lle nature of th111g"J I � not a real entity (adrav\ (/ \at) , It h not percel-

vdble a'l hdV111g an Identity of It'-> ow n ( svab/ulva ) Therefore what wa.., "'cud before, namely thclt

I t 1 1 1 1 \ lleu/jJo/i1(II7C1 I� el percelv l l1g con�clou�ne�� JUI.,( l ike the � IA k l l1u� oj 1 00 thcom l llg con�l1ou�ne�� the Yo­gJCJl d wdl h elv e to CX pldl ll how I t Celn ell 1 �e 1 10 m It� potency 01 �eeu� I II the qore-con�clou�ne,s Bh Jv<lvlveLI dl gue� thelt �uch potency cannot eX11.,( I II the �tOl e-COn�l1ou�ne�� unle�, It ha� been depo�lted the le by pl ev lou� l Il�telnce, 01 1 1 1 1 \ llea/pu/lliiIlO The YogJcJrel pO�lt lon thu� II1\'ol ve� the VICIOU, C I I C Ie th<lt I1 ln lleo/po/lWIlO �hould dl i e<ldy eX I �t 1 11 01 del to be elble to <lI l�e fOl the fi "t t ime

One p()�'lble l eply to BhJvdv lvek.el , objection would be thdt the potency 01 1 I 1 1 \ ' lleo/pa/llclllo " <In I I1n<lte ndtul dl ly g iven potency (d/Ul I l1wtclp/{{ll/ahd/w P} ({IeUI It/wgot/ {{ ) thdt Cdn be ueveloped th IOugh �pl l l tUdl prelc­t lce untd an elctudl l l1�tdnce ot 111 1 \ 'lleo/pajl1clIlO dl "e, h om It 1 01 the fi l �t t ime I ,ee B Bh 3-4, 3 1 S-1 1 9 MSA 1 I I 7 D S Ruegg 1 0 Theol l(, dl l Tathagatagw h/w el du GotJ (l Pell \ � 1 969 pp 73- 1 00 ] Howevel tIm theOl y leelve� the tol lowlllg pl Oblems un,olveu ( I ) A potency thdt w i l l eventudl ly deve lop I Ilto the u l l ec. t Cdu,e of dC­tUdl enl i ghtenment IllU<,t Ihel l be conul tl Oneu 01 Cdu<,eu ( 1{/I1 1 I1e 1 til ) becdu<,e eln unconult loned thl l1g Ldnnot dc.t d� d Cdu�e So, what I� the ong l ll 01 Celu�e ot that l l1nelte potenc y 7 ( 2 ) I I the potency 01 enl lghtenlllent I� I I1ndte I� It Inndte l l1 ,ti l hUllldn bel llg�') II not why,) If �o why do not ,til humeln belI1g� dc.tudl ly dttdlll enl ightenment ' (3 ) I � the potency thdt wi l l eventudl ly uevelop I Ilto the u l l ec.t Cduse of ,Upl dll1Unddne (/oIeOllu l O ) dnu pUl e (uml l l ({ l,a ) �tdte, 01 m l lld Ihelt ,uprdlllunudne <md pUl e 0\ I" It mund,me dnd ImpUl e ( lalllelleu, 1(/ 1 / (/ \ (/ » ) Cdn d munddne ,md I ll1pUl e potency be the remote C<lU �e of <,upl dmunddne pUl e qdte.., 01 ml l1cP

The dmblgulty of A �dngd � notIon 01 I l11pl e..,,,on, of i 1 �ten l l1g to dnd undel qdndl l1g the MdhJyJnd tedch l l1g�' ( 1 l l l tm cllOl1cl ) uel lve� trom the Lil t that I t ,lttempt� to an�wel d l l of the,e que�tlon� A �dngd �dy� thdt the �tOl e­con�u()u�ne<,� of bodh l �dttVd� LOntdll1 � the 1 Il1p l e<'�lon� of i 1 �ten l l1g to dnu COl i euly undel �tdnd1 l1g the MdhJ­yJnd tedch 1 l1g� He define� the�e Impl e�W)\1� ,l� f o l low� ( I ) They die not I I1ndte but die out l low � ( 1 1 1 I vOlldo ) of the completely pLll e ({{(II I \ l/(/dh{{ ) , �uPJ amu nddne I edlm ot t l Uth (dlzaI lI1Cld/Ultll ) Altel ndtlvely the Buddhd � tedch l llg� di e out l low� 01 the �upl ,lmunclane I e<t im of tl llth ,mu the 1 1 /ltC/ \ {/ \(/l1cl di e dcgu l l ed ( hence not 1 I1flate) by bodh I �dttv,l� who ,Iltudl ly �tuuy dnd unueI �tand tho�e tedch l llg� (2 ) The l Inpl e��lon� elle not I l11pLl le ( Icl l­/ (I V({ ) dnd <II e thel dOl e exll ancou� to ,md not dn 1 I1 tegl al pdI t of the qOle-con�clou�ne�� ( 3 ) Although the 1 111-pI e�"on� dl e thel11�el ve.., mu nddne they c,m be developed 1 I1to the Cdu,e, of �Upl dl11und,me "tdte� of ml lld I See MS Lll11otte, TOl11e I I 1 44-49 pp 64-70, D 'i Ruegg, op Ci t pp 490-492 Schl11 lthdu�en pp 77-)50 IU WZK'iA 17 ( 1 97 1 ) P 1 42 note 22 ]

FOI th I � tenet, �ee my lI dn�ldtlon dnd note, to M H K/TJ V 5 III Sludlel ({} {{I EI I({\ I, Be/l(/ \ fI}/ {/! S( lell( C I (//1(/ F'hl/Olop/1 \ Fdculty 01 LWel �, KdndLdwd Un lvel �Ity 19 ( 1 999) P 1 5 2

I I th l l1g� hdve two Inherent ndtul e� one cond It IOned (pO} ({tOIl I I ({ ) ,mu the other unconc! l t lOned (pm llll lj){lIl1w ) the�e two ndtll l e� wi l l nece�"dl l l y be el lher Identlcdl 01 (! I tf erent no I1ldttel whdt the YOgJCJl d �dy' Thl� I� be­Cdu�e d nel thel Idenllc,ti nOl d l tle l ent' rel ,ltlon between two I Ilhel ent l1eltLl l e � I� I lllpo,,,ble d� NJgJI Ju n,1 �,ly�

When two th l llg� uo not eXlq elthel d� IdcnllCdl (do ) 01 d� d lt le lent (11({1 111 ) how could the�e two thlng� be eqdbi l �hed I d� I Ilhel ently eXI�t l llg thlng� ] 7' ( M M K I I 2 1 )

- 1 64 -

[the true nature of thIngs] IS beyond IdentIty (ekatvam) and dIfference (ntintitvam )/4 1& surely ac-

counted for In our doctnne

Moreover, In our doctnne, the similanty [of the true nature of thIngs] wIth space, and so

forth, IS also accounted for, as follows

[The true nature of thIngs, as we understand It,] also resembles space, because distInctIOns

do not eXIst where there IS no ansIng, and because [the true nature of thIngs] cannot be

defiled (altpya) It can also never be expressed In words, because the mInd cannot gra"p

It In any possIble way 2S ( 1 00)

The ultImate, true nature of thIngs IS SImIlar to space for the folloWIng reason If things anse,

they are perceIved as mamfold In accordance wIth theIr dIStInct forms (tiktira) But If thIngs do

not anse [ultImately] , there IS similanty with space, because distInctIOns do not obtaIn where

there IS no ansIng Since defilement by dIfferentiatIng thought and "peech (prapaiicavlkalpa)

does [therefore] not obtain at all, [the true nature of things] cannot be defiled, Just like space It

can also never be expressed by words for the follOWing reason Speech functIOns wIth respect to

things that are grasped by the mInd, but the true nature of things [as we understand It] cannot be

grasped by the mind In any way Therefore, the fact that [the true nature of thIngs] cannot be ex­

pressed by words IS [also] accounted for [In our doctnne] 26

You mIght object "If [the true nature of thIngs] IS that they do not anse at all , how do

you explaIn that It IS expressed by terms such as 'supramundane' (lokottara), and so forth')" We

reply

A mInd that IS free from the partIal blIndness (tzmzra) of ansIng (utptida), IS thought to

be supramundane (lokottara), because It delIvers from the world and because It surpasses

the world ( 1 0 1 )

AnsIng Itself I S a partIal blindness A mind that has ceased to anse I S thought to b e a supramun­

dane mind that IS freed from the partial blIndness of ansIng ThIS IS because such a mind delIvers

from the world and surpasses the world, as It IS Said In the scnptures "Thl& IS called 'supramun­

dane' because It IS free from the restlessness and agItatIOn of the world, ,

27

Furthermore,

2" See MHK III 1 1 (vlgatazkatvananatve tattve ) , MHK IV 67 (nanatvazkatvarahttam tattvam) " Verse 1 00 contrast� with ver"es 85-86 and 88 (the true nature, as understood by the Yogacara, 1<; not <amilar to

space and not Ineffable) 26 Verse 100 follows NJgarjuna's fundamental teachIng about the ultimate truth and the adequate knowledge of

the ultimate truth In MMK XVIII 7 The true nature of thIngs (dharmata) cannot be the object of a percelVlng mInd (IUvrtta � uttagoLarah ), becau�e It 1<; not somethIng that anses and penshe<; (anutpanna, amruddha ) And just because It cannot be the object of a perceivIng mInd, It cannot be an object of speech either (Illvrttam ahhl­dhatavyam)

" QuotatIOn not Identlf'ied Ver<;e 1 0 1 should be read together With ver<;e 92

- 1 65 -

1 hat [ m Ind [ 1<; non-pel celVlng (11 l 1 t' lka!pa ) non-obj ectIfYIng ( 1 l IrCi!wnha ) and free of

obJect- lm£1ge:;., ( I 1 lnw71 1 !!a ) It "> I lllu l taneou<;]y ( \(/"-rt ) and non-dual ly ( \(/ma!a ) real Ize">. by

way of non-realIzmg, the true natU l e of It:;.,elf and of othel "> ( 1 02)

That mmd I"> d non-percelvmg mmd. becau">e It I� free from all perceptlom '.mce It doe,,> not dn'.e

[ from obJect,,> thdt could act £1:;" Ih objectIve condItIon] It I � al">o a non-obJectIf Y1l1g mmd, be­

came It doe" not obj ectIfy any thmg (hhavCl ) It I" al"o f ree of obJect-Image,,>, becau">e It doe,,> not

gra,,>p the marh ( 11 ll71 l tta ) of dny perceIvab le object (\ 'nava ) That mmd £11 ">0 re£1 l Ize� s lmultane-

ou,,>ly and non-dual ly, [ whIch 1 ::- to ::-ay] by W£1Y of non-real I zmg, the true n£1ture (dharmatci ) of It­

"elf a" knowledge (jlliina ) and the true natUl e of [al l l othel [ thmg::- [ a"> the known (jlleya ) [ We

a'."ert thIs ] becau">e m our v Iew perfect enl ightenment (abhnw}lhodhl ) occurs m a <; l I1g le m �tant '\

To m£1ke c ledl what 1 <; known (}lle} Clm ) by supramundane knowledge, [the next verse ]

The non-an">mg of thmgs I S cal led ' absence of an II1herent nature m thmgs (dhcll ­

lI1anaz rcitm yam ) WIth re<;pect to that, the stmm of perceptIon ("-a!puncl ) do not anse as

wa� ">ald before ( 1 03)

The ver">e "ay'. th£1t the very non-an�mg of thmg,,> I � the absence of an I l1herent nature 1 11 thll1g�

The ">tell l1 '. of pel ceptlon do not an ">e there. a<; wa'. <;aId m Chapter [Th l ee I Tatt'vajllallaz�'i(// la

"PerceptIon Iheli I'. defilement, an appearance (abha \(/ ) [ of ult Imately unreal thmg<;] I t I :;" [ the

an"mg ofJ obJect- Images (T1 lnlltta ) and the IdentIfIcatIon of mdlvldudl mark/, (ahll l!a"- .\L/J.w )

The">e do not an ">e at a l l wIth respect to that [true nature of thmg�J ' 2Y

[The Yogadir a [ obJects " The "utI a teaches that ult Imate I eell I ty (pa rctmiirtiza ) I S an object

of d I rect real IzatIon (siik�atkaraJla ) , becau'.e It ,,>ay::- that u l tImate real I ty I"> a permanent non­

eXI "tence (rtag tu med pa ) £1nd I � not acce:;""> lble to logIcal l ea">ol1lng (ta rkiigocara ) liJ FOI you ,

however, [u It Im£1te real I ty J 1 " an object of logIcal rea<;ol1 lng, l u'.t l Ike [the eXI�tence of J heaven

( , varga ) and �o forth , ' 1 becau ">e you argue that [ul t Imate l eahtyJ 1<; u l t Imate ly (jJaramiirthat(l�I )

not :;.,omethll1g that can be real Ized (hodhav) (l ) Hence. you contradIct ,,>cnpture " To refute th l ">

ohJectlon of O U I opponent<;, we '.ay

If [you say] " S l I1ce the true nature of thl l1g� (tattv([ln ) h not acce">">lble to logIcal rea<;on­

l Ilg (t(/f k([ ) , It cannot be known through mferentwl l ea�onl l1g (Lll1 l1miina ) ThelefOl e. the

" See thc r emar k" dbout the po,>" rbt l r ty of <, l l1gle- ll1 ,>tdnt Ol1ll1 l <,Clencc I II the note" to ver '>e<, 93 ,\l1d 94

-') My t r an'>]dtron I'> bd'>ed on the Pek1 l1g edltron Cd Y,ll11dguchl p 594) Notc thelt thr " ver "e I" not f ound III EJ 1 l11d\ edi tion of Chdpter Three or M H K

'II The Yog:ic:ir,! r e ter '> 1l10',\ probably to one of the PIO/iWpiilOll1ll(/ \ /II I Ll \ Ol to clllothcl �utr a that I'> appr oved by both thc Yogdc:ira ,l lld the McldhYdll1elka See thc r e fel Cnce to M H KrI J IX 50-54 rn note I to my t I dn�latr ()n of lVI H K V �-9

- 1 66 -

true nature of thlOgs (dharmata) IS not understood by logIcal reason 109 ,,

12 ( 1 04)

If our opponents thlOk lIke that, we reply

Here, by means of flawless lOferentIal reasonlOg 10 conformity wIth sCrIpture, [Bhagavat]

has [first] turned back all the floods of mIstaken thought ( l 05)

Here, by means of flawless lOferential knowledge 10 conformIty wIth sCrIpture,'1 Bhagavat has

first turned back all the floods of mIstaken thought that are conceIved by the BuddhIst and non­

BuddhIst doctrInes After that,

The Buddhas, theIr mlOds sImIlar to space, by means of non-dual (mrvlkalpa) knowledge,

see by way of non-seelOg all the knowable thlOgs exactly as they are 14 ( 1 06)

'A mlOd sImIlar to space' IS a mlOd that does not perceIve any of the five knowable thlOgs,

whIch are the past, the future, the present, lOexpressIble thlOgs (anabhllapya), and uncondItIOned

thlOgs (asaf!1skrta) [That mlOd] IS a [slOgle] lOstant of non-dual (nzrvlkalpa), dIrect (:,ak�at­

karalJa) know ledge It IS called 'seelOg' for the purpose of desIgnatIOn (upacara) [only], because

[It sees] by way of non-seelOg 1\

The object known by lOferentIal reasomng IS therefore not the true nature of thlOgs [It­

self] [InferentIal reasonlOg] does however elImlOate everythlOg that opposes (vlpak�a) the

knowledge of the true nature of thlOgs ( 1 07)

Inferential knowledge elImlOates everythlOg that opposes the non-dual knowledge of the true na-

12 TramlatlOn ba,>ed on the Sansknt text 1 1 On the relatIOn between scnpture and reasomng according to Bhavavlveka, see note I to my tramlatlOn of

MHKlTJ V 8-9 14 TramlatlOn based on the Sansknt text 1\ 'Seeing by way of non-seeing' IS the usual Madhyamaka way of charactenzlng the knowledge ot reality a'> It

I� Thl<; knowledge IS 'non-seeing' because It IS the absence of al l the ordinary dual perceptIOn.., of thing,> Ne­verthele<;.." It 1<; the only true 'seeing' of reality as It IS The most extemlve dl<;cu�5.lon of thl<; <;eemlngly para­dOXical 'seeing without seeing' IS found In KR I Intend to translate and comment on this long pa<;<;age on an­other occasIOn The following are some other pas<;ages where Bhavavlveka attempt<; to put this apparent paradox Into words "The highest knowledge (piiramiirthlkT prcljiiii ) move,> toward<; the ultimate nature of thlng<; without really moving toward5. It (apraciirapraciira )" (MHK III I I ) , "[The true nature of things 1 <;hould be realized by a mind that sees It 1<; <;een by way of non-<;eelng (taddar�anam adarsaniit, mthong ba med pa � de mthong Yin ) " (MHK III 246cd) [Commentary on III 246cd In TJ, D Dsa 1 1 6b5 ' It IS <;een by way of non-seeing' mean" that the very ab<;ence of seeing [In the ordinary sense of a dual perceptIOn] 1<; conventIOnally called 'seeing' (mthong ba med pa � de mthong ba yin no zhe� mthong ba med pa n)zd mthong ba 'o zhe� nye bar gdag l te I , "The nondual knowledge of the wise anses b y way of non-anslng 0iiyate ajiitl }ogena mrvlkalpa maflh la­tiim ) " (MHK III 26 1 cd) [Commentary on III 26 1 cd In TJ, D D<;a 1 2 1 a l -2 "Because knowable thmg" 0Fieyam ), haVing elther eXlstence or noneXl<;tence as thelr nature, do not eXl'>t at all, the mind that does not perceive l exls­tence or nonexl�tence] al'>o doe,> not anse The non-anslng of this mind IS conventIOnally called (upacuryate ) 'ansmg' because this mind realizes the non-percelvable lrealityJ (dmlg� su med pa ) Its non-an'>mg la'> a dual perceptIOn] I'> Ib non-dualIty (mrvlkalpatvam ) " 1 , "The Wise, whose eye [of knowledge] ha" become free h om the darkne<;s (tarna l ) and partial blIndne'>.., (tuntra ) of the afflictive and cogmtlve obstruction,>, does not <;ee any thmg (na pa syatl klmut) " (MHK III 252), "Whoever realize'> that rtrue nature of thmg!> (tattvam) ] without dny knowledge an'>mg, I'> called ' awakened' (huddha, clang � rgya � ) m the true sense of the word, becau'>e he hd'> de'>troyed ( \ang � ) the sleep of dual perceptIOn (vlkalpa ) by realizing In the manner of non-reahzlng (ahodhabo­dhatah ) " (MHK III 267) , "Here words come to an end Thl<; IS not an object of [dualJ thought Dual thought come" to an end and the silence of knowledge ame� 0Fiiinamaunam W jiiyate ) " (MHK II I 283)

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ture ot thl l1g", but the object that I� under�tood by lI1 ferentlal rea�on ll1g I '> [ I t�elfl not the true na-

ture ot thl l1g'>

I t you a5k how lI1ferentlal rea'>onll1g can ehmll1ate that which oppo'>e<; [non-dual knowledge I we

dn'>wer

When thought<; d l tfer becau<;e of the dlver<;,lty of other <;cnptu re<; and al '>o when the �ame

[ Buddhl ,>tl �cnpture<; are fol lowed , what other meam rbut l I1fel entIdl reasonll1g1 can be

"u lted for examll1mg [ truth and fal "Ityp 'r, ( 1 08 )

Other <;cnpture<;' ( agwlUil1tara) are <.,cnptUl e<; that are dlfTel ent from the lBuddhI <;,t l <;'cJ lpture"

The'>e [ other �cnpture� 1 give me to dIfferent way'> of th l l1kl l1g that denve from the thl ee hundred

and s Ixty-thl ee POll1ts of dl<.,pute (vlvada) Even among those who adhere to the �ame [ Buddh l"t]

'>cnpture'>, there 1 <; no othel propel mean<., to examme rtruth and fdl <;Ity l except mferences that

con'>I'>t of a Pl Opo<;Itlon (pak�a) , a logical rea<;on and an example Thl� I'> "0 tor the fol lowll1g

How could one l efute opposite vlew� by merely '>tatl l1g one's own the'>l� (pratt/lia r) And

how cou ld non-dual knowledge dn<;e a� long a'> ml�taken thought'> al e not ehmll1ated 7 ,7

( 1 09)

Whoever want'> to refute all [ m l"taken 1 thought'> cannot do '>0 by merely '>tdtIng a the'>I'> , cll1d

nondual knowledge doe<; not an"e a� long a'> the mhtaken thought� that oppo�e It al e not e l im i­

nated TherefOl e , after one ha'> '>tated a the'>I'> , one <.,hould <;tate a rea'>on, and one <;,hould abo

give an example Thl'> I'> becau�e [ only I a demomtratIve lI1ference ( ,adhaI1CI17111nal1([) can ful ly

e<;tabl I,>h the t I lith of 50methll1g one hold� to be true

That I'> why the MUI1 l , the Seel of Truth, ha5 taught two tl uth<;, for It I� by rely l l1g on the

conventIonal l truth] that one come� to real ize the tI lle nature of th 1 l1g'> ( tattvclf fha) ( 1 1 0)

The l I1 ference<; that ehm1l1ate m l<;taken thought,> are based on what I� cal led ' the cotTed conven­

tIOnal truth' ( tath) a\am H'tlv\ avalu7rmatva) By relYl l1g on that conventIOnal truth , one gradually

come'> to real ize the hlghe"t [truthJ (paramar tha) , whIch I " not an object of thought ( 1 1 1 1 vlkalpa)

and <;peech (ol1abhzlap) 0 ) " Thh agl ee'> WIth the fo l low1 l1g teachll1g [from "cnptUl e] "WIthout

'I, TI ,m\Llt lon bd'>cd on thc S,m\k] It text " T] an\ldt]On bd\ed on the TI betdn tcxt " Scc M H K/TJ I I I 7- 1 2 The corrcct d l'>ccl nment (p/ O\ 1 \ eA.a ) 01 dl l the th l l1g\ that l edl ly eXI\t (h/ulliil t/w M H K

I I I 7 ) dCCOI d l l1g to convcntlOndl thought ( \O/11V/ ll \am�ero ) I I, .In l I1dl '>pen\dblc f i l '> t <'!cp behlI e onc pl Oceed\ to eXdIl1l11e the ul t l l1ldte-l eal tty chdfdcter of convcntIonal ly I Cdl th l l1g\ by Il1edn<, ot Mdclhyan1dkd l ed\Onl l1g (\ /­( {Ira ) Thl'> I'> beCdU\C thel c 1\ 110 nced to cumlne the u l t l l11dtc-rcal I ty ch,u dctel of th111g\ th,lt do not eX I<,! dC­cOl d l l1g to conventIondl thought \uch d'> Il1dny 01 the th1l1g\ that B uddhl "t dnd non-B uddh l \t phI lo\ophel \ con­celvc to be l e,d On the othel hand oil thc th1 l1g'> thdt do eXI"t accOl dl l1g to conventIonal thought \uch d\ ex­tel n,t! Ob)ech (wh ICh the Yogdcdra dl'>ml'><'c'> d<, u l1l e,t! wIthout ch \l1 nguI "hl l1g between the two l1 uth,» , ll1U\t be CXdIl1 lned 111 ol dcI to ,]\Cel tdl l1 the MddhYdll1dLl PO\ltlon thdt not dny 01 them 1 \ Ul t l l1ldtcly IC,t!

- 1 6� -

relymg on the conventlOnal truth, one cannot realIze the hIghest [truth] "

Vmdicatmg (vyavastha) [the meanmg of] ' ultImate realIty' (tattvam) that IS explamed well

(praslddha) m the Madhyamaka doctnne, [the condudmg verses] say that theYogacara [under­

standmg of] ultimate realIty IS replete wIth errors

The knowledge that perceIves a true nature (tathata) IS deluded, because It grasps an ob­

Ject, Just like [knowledge] 10 a dream Consequently, what IS known by that knowledge

cannot be the true nature of thmgs (tattvam) 19 ( 1 1 1 )

' The knowledge that perceIves the true nature of thmgs (tattvam)' I S the subject of the proPOSI­

tion (dharmm) 'That [knowledge] IS deluded ' IS the property of that subject (dharma) and 15 the

thmg to be proven (sadhyam) The subject and ItS property together form the propositlOn

(pak�a) 'Because It grasps an object' IS the reason (hetu) 'Any know ledge that grasps an object

IS deluded, as for mstance knowledge m a dream' IS the example (d!�ranta) Smce that know­

ledge IS deluded, the thmg that IS grasped by It (tadgrahyam) cannot be the true nature of thmgs

(tattvam) OtherwIse, the absurd consequence WIll be that the true nature of thmgs IS also unreal

Furthermore,

The truth (dharma) that was taught by the Great Sage IS not an object of graspmg, not an

object of words, and maccessible to [obJectIfymg] knowledge40 If It I S so, then that [truth]

IS vlOlated (badhyate) [m your doctnne] ( 1 1 2)

Because [the true nature of thmgs] IS an object (vl�aya) of knowledge [10 your doctnne] , It can­

not be beyond graspmg and beyond words Thus [your doctnne] contradIcts the teachmgs [of the

Buddha] , such as "The true nature of thmgs IS not an object of graspmg and not an object of

words," and "The ultimate truth IS that with respect to whIch [even] knowledge does not come

forth (apracara) ,,-li

In order to remmd42 [the reader] of the doctnne (artha) that was thoroughly negated by

completmg thIS chapter, [the final verse says ]

Thus, even If the true nature of thmgs, whIch has been explamed before 10 conformIty

1Y Parallel pa�sage<; abound "What they [= the Yogacara] conceIve as the true nature of thIng� (tathata) 1<; not the true ultImate realIty (paramartha ), because It I') an object of perceptIon (alambana ), jU�t lIke color and '>0 forth " (KR, T vol 30, 274c I 3 - 1 4) "What they [= the Yogacal a] conceIve a<; the formles') (anll1utta ), Inexpre'>'>­Ible (anabhtlapya ) true nature (tathata) or ultImate realIty (paramartha ) cannot be the [true I ultImate realIty, becau'>e It IS an object of perceptIOn (iilambana ), Just l Ike <lny other object of perceptIon [ I ,) not ultImately real I " (KR, T vol 30, 276c22-24) "The knowledge that perceIves the true nature of thIng'> (tathata ) cannot have ultImate realIty (paramiirtha ) as Its object, because It IS condItIoned ( Iamskrta ), lIke vl<;ual perceptIOn (whurvlJfiiina ) Llkewl,>e, the thu<; perceIved true nature of th Ings IS f<llse (moladharmaka ) and IS not tl lle re<l­I I ty (tattvam ), Ju'>t lIke color " (PP, D T<;ha 248a3-4, P Tsha 3 1 I a7-b l , Eckel, p 73)

4() The expreSSIOn ' dhlp rae iira Vl varjltam ' 1<; also used In MHK I 2 See V V Gokhale, "Madhyamahrdayakanka TarkaJvaIa Chapter I," In Chr LIndtner ed , Mmellanea BuddhlW (Indlske StudJer V), Copenhagen 1 985, p 8 1

4 1 Ftom the AkJa'yamatlmrdeSa �lttra Also quoted m PP (Eckel, p 72) 4' TentatIve translatIOn of 'reg par bya ba' l phYlr'

� 1 69 �

with l ea�on and 'icnpture, I.., careful l y examined by mean<., of I atlOnal argument,> (vuku ) , I t

5>tand'i ao;, I t I '> without being defeated [ by tho'>e argument..,l ( 1 1 3 )

When one carefu l l y exammeo;, the Yogdcara under5>tandmg of the true nature of thing" (tattvam).

l one tInd" that ] It doe" not w lth5>tand ratIOnal analY'> I" (vluim)

Some are attached to the foreo;,t of the aggi egate�

Other" are Impeded by the ocean of comclOu<;ne..,o;,

The Son of the VIctor, who doe.., not even fal l II1to the aby.;,s of the l im I t ot real i ty (blul­

takott), amu:-,e.., hlm.;,elf ( 1 1 4 t,

Thu" . the true natu re of thIng:-, (tattvam) - a" I have explamed It In conformity with <;cnptUl e and

l ea"on 111 the [ Third] chapter Tattv([jiictnCl l) ClI.1ct m tor example the fol lowmg way "Became [U l t I ­

matelyJ not dny knowable thl 11g eXI5>t:-" that with re5>pect to WhICh even the non-dual knowledge

l of the B uddha] uoe:-, not al l <;e. that 1" the unequdl led true nature of thl 11go;" k nown by H im who

know" the truth,, ,44 - that true nature of thI ngo;, :-,tand" fi rmly a" It I" without bel11g ..,haken even by

the l 11ference" of Buddhl:-,t and non-Buddhl<;t phI lo'>ophers (tarklA.a ) al i ke

[ Here end,, ] the fifth chapter of the 7(lrA.([jvalct -commentaI Y to the Madhv([/1/akahrdav([ , called

' Entry II1 to an do;,certal 11ed J udgment lon the truth or fal '> l ty ] of the Yogacara [doctnne of] Rea-

I I ty' ( YogctulmtattvaVlIl l \Wwlvattim)

Thl� vel �e I� lackmg I II the ext.lIlt Sdn�kl lt text It occur� d'> ver'>e I 1 3 1 11 the TIbetan vel �lOn 0/ the vel '>e'>-on ly text 0 1 MHK V where I t I '> loll owed by MHK I I I 266 ( nmtdkenly added a:" ve l '>e 1 1 4 ) Note that the TJ­lommentdl Y thdt fol low,> ,tltel ver'>e 1 1 4 I '> d colllmental Y on ver�e 1 1 3 , ,lIld not on ver'>e 1 1 4 My gue,>,> I'> theretore that ver'>e 1 1 4 Wd� not l I1c 1uded 111 the Ol lg l l1.t1 S,lI1�knt tex t 0/ M H K V I t I '> 1110"t PI Obdbly d ljUOtd­tlon 0/ ,111 ul1 Identl fied '>utrd thdt Wd'> added a'> the concludl l1g vel '>e ot Chapter FIve by ,] Idtel edltOl

Y EJ lllld on the othel hdnd, con'>lder'> ver'>e 1 1 4 ' tOl the t l lne bel l1g to be the lond udl l1g VCI �C ot Chaptcl FIve (note to ver'>e 1 1 4 III hI'> unpubiJ,>hcd edItIOn 01 the San<;knt ,lI1d Tlbetdn text'> ot M H K V) Not l llg that tho'>c who dre dttdched to the dggregdte'> dre the Valbhd'>lkd<; whtle rho'>e who di e Impeded by comclou<,ne,>,>

dI e the YOgdCdl d'>, he conclude,> "I n the p lev l Olh chdpter BhdV lvekd hd� retuted the v Iew of the Vdlbhd'>lk,h .lI1d I'> now c1o�l I1g the Cl l t lCdl lhdptel on Yogdldrd theory In th l'> �en,>e k 1 1 4 dgl ee'> With [ the l duthOl ' ,> own I Iltentlon ' QUotdl lon of M H K I I I 266 jiieH/I \(/ lonOilu/l /ddhel /1 / / vlko/papl wtl ([ dhThl llotp({c/\'({te tad otu/WI/1 t({ tt\ ([/ll

{([ttVOV{(/o \ Iduhll

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