GÖTEBORGS UNIVERSITET

School of Global Studies Centre for Africa Studies

_____________________________________________________________________

Research Programme: Regional networks in the Lake Victoria Region – Forces for

poverty reduction and sustainable development supported by Sida/SAREC.

Case Study: Networks for conflict resolution/management

Forced Migration and Sustainable Development in

Tanzania An Analysis of the Representation of the Kibondo Refugees and

the Effects on Development

Master Students: Camilla Sahlin and Mike Kerali

Supervisor: Fredrik Söderbaum/Michael Schulz

Abstract The purpose of this Master thesis is to examine the representation of Burundian

refugees living in the Kibondo UNHCR refugee camps and the consequences and

impacts on sustainable development in Tanzania. The thesis is a combined case study

and discourse analysis that includes development theories of modernisation, as well as

the theories of representation by Stuart Hall. In order to answer our thesis we have

used a set of research questions and a couple of sub-questions. In regards to the issues

of representation we have had our departure point in four prevailing discourses; the

general refugee-, the Tanzanian government-, the Tanzanian media- as well as the

UNHCR- and the donor community’s discourse. We have also included a background

analysis of the political context of the LVR in order to give a better understanding of

the situation.

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Abbreviations

AI Amnesty International

CNDD Centre for the Defence of Democracy

DRC Democratic Republic of Congo

EC European Commission

FAR Armed forces of Rwanda (Force armees rwandaises)

FDD Forces for the Defence of Democracy

HRW Human Rights Watch

IDP Internally Displaced Person

INGO International Non-Governmental Organisation

IP Implementing Partner

IRC International Rescue Committee

LVR Lake Victoria Region

NGO Non-Governmental Organisation

RC Regional Commissioner

RPF Rwandan Patriotic Front

TCRS Tanganyika Christian Refugee Services

UNDP United Nations Development Programme

UNHCR United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees

UNICEF United Nations Children’s Foundation

WFP World Food Programme

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Table of Content Abstract List of Abbreviations Map of the Refugee Camps in the LVR

1. Introduction _ 6

1.1 Purpose of Study and Research Questions _ 7

1.1.1 Sub-Questions _ 7

1.2 Outline _ 8

2. Methodology and Material _ 8

2.1 The Case Study Approach _ 8

2.2 Discourse Analysis _ 9

2.3 Informal semi-structured Interviews _10

2.4 Material and Source Criticism _11

2.5 Delimitations _12

3. Theoretical Framework _12

3.1 Modernization Theory and the Issues of Movement _12

3.2 Defining a Person as a Refugee _14

3.3 Stereotyping, Racism and the Securitisation of Refugees _14

3.4 The Prevailing Discourses 17

3.4.1 The General Refugee Discourse 17

3.4.2 The Tanzanian Government Discourse 17

3.4.3 The Tanzanian Media Discourse 18

3.4.4 The Donor Community and UNHCR Discourse 18

4. Background and Statistics 19

4.1 The Kibondo Area ______________ 19

4.2 Burundian refugee influx in the 1990s – A Political Context 21

4.2.1 Political Antagonism in the Great Lakes Region 23

4.2.2 Tanzania’s Response 24

4.2.3 The Forced Repatriations of the 1990’s 25

4.3 The Kibondo Refugee Camps 26

4.3.1 Measurements of Poverty and development___________________27

4.4 Sustainable Development Within and Outside the Kibondo Camps 28

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5. Tanzanian Government Policies and the Power of the Media 29

5.1 Migration – A Dynamic Discourse 29

5.2 The 1998 Refugee Act 30

5.2.1 The Representation by the Tanzanian Government 31

5.3 The Power of the Media 33

6. The True or Perceived Representations of the Refugees______ 34

6.1 The Refugees as Criminals 35

6.2 Representation and the Issues of Development 37

7. Discussion 41

8. Concluding Remarks and Results 44

9. References 45

Appendix

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1. Introduction The Lake Victoria Region (LVR) has been involved in, and affected by violent

conflicts for decades. Today, direct violence has ceased in many of the concerned

states, but the past violence has generated close to millions of refugees forcing

Tanzania, among other countries, to play host to refugees, not only from the LVR but

from as far as away as South Africa, Mozambique, Zimbabwe, Angola, Namibia, and

South Africa, Uganda, Sudan, Ethiopia and Somalia; for almost all of its nearly 50

years of independence.

Even though the constant flows of refugees are often blamed for creating

insecurity and hindering development in a host country, the hosting of refugees is

neither new nor has it always been considered negative. Migration could be

considered as vital for stabilising a region and as a step towards sustainable

development. However, the policies towards refugees in Tanzania changed drastically

from its 1960-80’s open door- to that of temporary protection policy from mid 1990s.

The new policies were motivated by the fact that the Tanzanian government lacked

badly needed international financial and technical support to care for the

disproportionately huge influx of refugee, given the time and space, on a more

humane and sustainable basis. The real and perceived facts, regarding long-term

negative verses positive impacts on local and national socio-economic infrastructure

and the environment, added to the hardened general attitude towards refugees.

The new approach that offered only temporary protection to refugees also

promoted the need for refugee camps. These refugee camps were often situated in

remote rural areas of the country and were often referred to as prison-like and

inhumane. Across the LVR, there were on-going discussions whether such refugee

camps were of any beneficial effect to the restoration of stability and sustainable

development in the region; or were, as implied, simply hot-beds for future conflicts

and wars.

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1.1 Purpose of Study and Research Questions

The aim of this thesis is to examine the circumstances surrounding Burundian

refugees who lived in the Kibindo UNHCR-supported refugee camps especially in the

1990s when the influx was at its climax; and the impact on sustainable development

within the local community; and in Tanzania as a whole. We argue that the

vulnerability and the stereotyping of the refugees was one of the contributing factors

to the notion that refugees were an obstacle to development in Tanzania. Further, we

also argue that there are various obstacles to development, into which we shall not. In

the case of Tanzania, hosting such a large mixed-population of civilian and ex-

combatants and keeping them at peace with themselves and their former countries is

like walking a political tight-rope. Under normal circumstances the receiving and

taking care of refugees is a joint operation involving the host country, UNHCR, donor

community, local and international NGOs; and other concerned parties such religious

organizations and private individuals. In this study we carried out extensive

examination of literature which included the Tanzanian policy documents related to

migration and refugees. The role of the press was also looked at to find out how

refugees were depicted in the local media at that time. The facts gathered during the

research provided the basis for our conclusions on how the representation of refugee,

among other causes, in Tanzania impacted on development. Therefore, our main

research questions were as follows:

1. Were there any benefits to the people of Kibondo area for hosting such

huge numbers of refugees; and were there any attempts made to integrate

the refugees with the local population?

2. What were the political backgrounds to the representation of the refugees?

1.1.1 Sub-Questions

1. What influence did the donor community have in regard to the refugee

presence and activities in Tanzania?

2. What were the real and perceived threats in regard to the refugee presence

in Tanzania; and how did that affect development in the country?

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1.2 Outline

This thesis starts off with a short introduction to the research and is followed by the

aim and research questions. The methodologies and material is discussed in chapter

two. Thereafter, we introduce our theoretical framework in chapter three. In chapter

four we provide a geographical and socio-political review of the Kibondo area during

the turbulent days at the peak of Burundian and Rwandan refugee exoduses in order to

understand the plight of the refugees; and in chapter five, the evoked responses by the

media, public, government authorities and the international community. While in

chapter six we examine whether the representation of the refugees were real or

perceived in connection to the issues of peace, security and development. In chapter

seven and eight we present our discussion as well as results and concluding remarks.

Chapter nine and ten contain our references and appendixes.

2. Methodologies and Material

In this chapter we discuss the methods we have applied to build our thesis. We have

used the case study and the discourse analysis approach; both methods are discussed

as well as the interview techniques that we have used in gathering information. Since

we relied mainly on qualitative and secondary materials we have chosen to include a

short representation of our most valuable material and the critique towards the latter.

Toward the end of this chapter we present our delimitations to the thesis and the

reasons that necessitated such an action.

2.1 The Case Study Method

When the aim is to analyse a specific phenomena instead of just describing or

explaining a certain situation; in such undertaking the case study method is widely

preferred in social sciences (Yin 1993:31). We have chosen to utilise this method in

order to analyse if the refugee camps of Kibondo could contribute to sustainable

development in Tanzania. The case study method can be used for both qualitative as

well as quantitative research even though the qualitative approach dominates as in our

case (Gummesson 2003:117). The reason is that the case study approach does not

measure exact equations but analyses uncertainties and complex variables (ibid,

p.117). When analysing the representations of the Kibondo refugees we made use of

the quantitative technique derived from available statistics. To complement our study

method we have also taken help of qualitative approach such as the interview. The

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case study method is our preferred choice due to the fact that we are basing our thesis

on theoretical propositions; “… the original objectives and design of the case study

presumably … [are] based on [theoretical] propositions, which in turn reflect[s] the

set of research questions, reviews of the literature and new insights” (Yin 1994:103).

Despite the fact that we have chosen the case study method for our thesis we

are aware of its short-comings, for example, the inability to generalise the results

obtained from a single case study to a larger sample; even though we can draw some

conclusions in regard to the aim of this thesis, it is impossible to claim this as the truth

in any other instances and circumstances. As such, our study could be valuable for

further research within this field. The case study method is also very subjective to a

researcher in that the research is always analysing and interpreting empirical material

(Gummesson 2003:132). We are aware that it is more difficult to reach a high

reliability when conducting a case study, all the same, we argue, as does Gummesson,

that a higher reliability is not possible and not desirable when analysing complex

phenomena (Ibid, p.134). Aware of the foregoing problems, we have done our utmost

to utilize reliable material and sources.

2.2 Discourse Analysis

The material used in our thesis is mostly of secondary sources, which include articles

from journals, web-based information and newspaper articles. Understandably,

analysing secondary material relating to refugees raises the question of objectivity.

The material and our results are merely one version of the truth, i.e. a discourse.

Hence a discourse is the “…production of knowledge rather than just meaning” (Hall

1997:43), whereas a discourse analysis is to analyse “… how human beings

understand themselves in our culture” and how our knowledge about “the social, the

embodied individual and shared meanings come to be produced in different periods”

(Ibid, p. 43). It is impossible to make a discourse analysis without taking the issues of

language and power into consideration. The researcher must be aware of the fact that

the language helps to form the discourse due to what the words represent. Thus,

different words can represent different meanings depending on the discourse (Ibid, pp.

42-43). The different meanings of the language are shaped by different power

structures within the society in such a way that some groups have more influence than

others in getting their message out in e.g. the media (Andersson 2007:1). Since we are

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aware of these factors, when analysing our material, we are not trying to present a

truth of how the refugees influence sustainable development, but rather how and why

people have certain perceptions regarding the issue.

2.3 Informal Semi-structured Interviews

Before deciding on how to conduct our interviews we looked into the different

methods in order to make a well-substantiated decision. Owing to the fact that we had

already decided on the case study approach with influences of a discourse analysis,

we knew that we were more interested in qualitative data rather than quantitative, and

therefore we decided that informal interviews would be the best option (Gronmo

2006:161). The informal interviews are conducted by the researchers together with the

respondents and are structured as flexible conversations (Ibid, p.161). Even though

the interviews are very flexible there were some factors that we had to take into

consideration, for example, the type of information needed.

We based our need for information on the aim of our thesis and the research

questions. Although our aim and questions served as the starting point of our

interviews we also allowed elaborations as long as the respondents kept to the specific

themes of our thesis. Furthermore, the selection of our respondents was based on a

different departure point than the one we present; the intention originally was not the

examination of the representations of the refugees by our respondents. We do,

however, claim that the meanings conveyed by our respondents were their own

representations of the refugees, and there was minimal influence from us the

researchers. Since our thesis shifted focus we could only use limited material from

some of the interviews.

In preparation for the interviews we took into consideration the many

obstacles that could present themselves when conducting this type of interviews. One

of the most important factors was good communication between us, the researchers;

and our respondents (Ibid, pp.161). We clarified to our respondents, from the onset,

what types of information we were interested in so that we could avoid leading

questions during the interviews. When we noticed that the respondents deviated to

talk freely on the representations of the refugees and stereotyping, we continued to

ask questions in relation to that topic and explore the respondents’ knowledge relating

to that particular matter of interest. That in turn influenced the development of the

aim and theme of our thesis.

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Despite the effectiveness of this interview technique there are some strengths

and weaknesses that need to be taken into consideration. Firstly, the qualities of semi-

structured interviews very much depends on the researchers’ own skills as

interviewers. At any rate, it is also difficult to repeat semi-structured interviews with

different respondents since conversations are never exactly the same. Our pre-

selection of respondents was divided into two: the first representing the Tanzanian

standpoint while the others the viewpoint of the UNHCR and the donor community.

This division also turned out to be good for our ‘new thesis’ direction.

2.4 Material and Source Criticism

The material we have used in our thesis is mainly secondary material concerning

refugees in general and refugees in the Kibondo area in particular. Further, we have

used several electronic sources in order to find material for our thesis. Due to the

variety of sources on the Internet we decided to use mainly the homepages of the UN

organs, Human Rights Watch (HRW), Amnesty International (AI), and the

International Rescue Committee (IRC), since these organisations are recognised by

the international community as reliable sources. By using these homepages we could

also examine the representations of the donor community since they are clearly stated

here.

The 1998 Refugee Act is one of the few primary sources in our thesis, which

has given us an insight in the representation of the refugees by the Tanzanian

government due to its quality as a primary source.

Further, one of the most important sources we have used in our thesis is The

Impact of the Presence of Refugees in North-western Tanzania a research made by the

Centre of Forced Migration at the University of Dar es Salaam. This research was

lead by Dr. Bonaventure Rutinwa a highly respected researcher within this field. We

have also crosschecked many of the references in this research and compared it to

other sources in order to secure the reliability of the research. In regards to our

theories, our major influences came from Abiri, and her PhD. thesis The

Securitisation of Migration – Towards an Understanding of Migration Policy

Changes in the 1990’s The Case of Sweden. Even though Abiri’s PhD. thesis is

focused on the migration issues in Sweden it has been valuable for our research due to

her conceptualisation of the migration discourse.

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As mentioned previously our interviews have also been valuable sources in our thesis.

However, we are aware of their strengths and weaknesses as discussed in the previous

sub-chapter.

2.5 Delimitations

Due to time and space factors we have limited the scope of our study to the Burundian

refugees who lived in the Kibondo area in the 1990s to early 2000s. Therefore, we

will also limit our research to the local population of this area as well. In regards to

the development perspective this has also been restricted to the Kibondo area but we

have here chosen to extend our conclusions to the development of the whole of

Tanzania since it is difficult to limit such significant events to a small area. We have

also chosen to exclude the different gender aspects that would have been relevant for

our thesis since we consider it to be a topic that deserves its own thesis. We are aware

that the most vulnerable victims of war, social and political instability are the

children, women and the disabled, the sick and aged.

3. Theoretical Framework Since there are many different aspects to our thesis such as the migration,

development as well as stereotyping and policy aspects we decided to use a theory

that encompass most of these issues. In analysing a case such as the impact that the

refugees on development, like the one in the Kibondo area, it is also important to look

at the origin of the refugee camps and the factors that have helped shape them. In this

chapter we have also defined certain words and concepts that are often used in

different ways within social sciences.

3.1 Modernization Theory and the Issues of Movement

The modern development theories originated from the period after World War II. On

the African continent this period was a gradual process of independence, and even

though independence was in general positive for the continent the new countries were

facing many challenges since the new world was divided into the developed and

underdeveloped or the first and the third world stuck in the vicious circle of poverty.

In order to come to terms with the poverty and ‘help’ the underdeveloped world

become developed, there was a common goal during the period from 1945-1960’s that

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economic growth, which in that era was synonymous with development, would come

if the states industrialized and modernized (Odén 2006:49). One of the essential

factors in this theory was that of modernization. African societies were still

considered backwards, even though the terminology had changed to underdeveloped.

However, the general thought was that the African continent had to go through a

revolutionary process and change completely in order to reach development (Harrell-

Bond 2000:2). Another essential factor in the modernization theory was that it was

more difficult to modernize and develop a society where people had resided for

decades and centuries. People who had moved were forced to create new ways of

thinking and found it easier to adjust to the issues conducive to modernization. Thus,

people who had been uprooted from their former ways of living were much more

inclined to undergo social change (Ibid, p. 2). What is important to note is that these

theories were not only theories for scholarly discussions but were actually principles

that were implemented by the International Bank for Reconstruction and

Development in agricultural programmes on the African continent.

Ultimately, the theories of modernization and movement of people are closely

linked to the circumstances of refugees especially the refugee camps. The United

Nations High Commissioner for Refugees (UNHCR) was established after World War

II in order to care for the European refugees. It was not until the 1960’s that the

UNHCR began their operation on the African continent at a time when modernization

theory was the dominant development theory. This resulted in the fact that the

UNHCR thought of the refugee camps as places where a new population could be

established and then in the future either be assimilated into the host community or be

repatriated to their countries of origin (ibid, pp. 3-4). These refugee camps or

‘settlements’ as they are often referred to by the UNHCR, were to be placed in

remote, uninhabited areas so that the refugee population themselves could create

“…new self-supporting rural communities that ultimately will form part of the

economic and social system of the area” as supported by the modernization theory

(Daley 1989:127, Harrel-Bond 2000:3-4).

Even though development theories have changed overtime since 1945 it is

very clear that the refugee camps of the Kibondo area are founded on the pillars of

modernization theory. Therefore, when examining the impact that refugee camps have

had on development and the involvement of the UNHCR we do so through a

‘modernity looking-glass’.

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3.2 Defining a Person as a Refugee

In this thesis we are solely examining the situation for the Burundian refugees in the

Kibondo refugee camps. Therefore, we will only discuss the people that have been

labelled a refugee by the UNHCR and therefore stand under protection of

International law. A refugee is defined as follows;

“any person who is outside his/her country of origin and who is unwilling or unable to return there or to avail him/herself of its protection because of;

1. a well-founded fear of being persecuted for reasons of race, religion, nationality, membership of a particular social group or political opinion or

2. a threat to life or security as a result of armed conflict and other forms of widespread violence which seriously disturb the public order” (UNHCR 2000:8).

3.3 Stereotyping, Racism and the Securitisation of Refugees

In order to understand the impact that the representations of the Burundian refugees in

the Kibondo camps had on development in the region and in Tanzania at large, it is

important to take into consideration the impact of the real and perceived threats that

these refugees pose on a community. There is also discourse analysis in our thesis

since we are examining the perceptions of the refugees as a social construction

through different perspectives. By stating that the perceptions of refugees are social

constructions we are opening up the possibility that these perceptions are dynamic

(Abiri 2000:36).

Furthermore, it would be impossible to have influences of discourse analysis

in our thesis without discussing the concept of power. Both intentional power and

structural power are of essence in this thesis. By intentional power we are referring to

the power of a specific subject such as a person or a state, and that the power in

question is the aim and goals of the subject or the ‘will’ of the subject (Franzén

2000:84). In this thesis the intentional power is the power of the Tanzanian state in

relation to the refugees and foremost the aims and goals the state has related to the

issues. However, we will also examine the intentional power of the UNHCR and the

donor community in relation to the issues of refugees and development. Structural

power, on the other hand, this refers to the relation between the superior and the

subordinate or the structure of a society is built on set conditions between different

positions, which in turn determine other societal relationships (Ibid, p.84). The power

concept enables the researcher to consider the subjects will and actions, as well as the

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power structures that the subject operates within (Franzén 2000:86-87). Obviously,

there are power relations within all relationships except that a state is not power in

itself but only receives power in different relationships and societal structures (Ibid,

pp. 86-87). It is, however, important to take into consideration the fact that power

does not necessarily confer strength but can both strengthen and weaken power

relations (Ibid, pp.86-87). Therefore, the concept of power can be considered both

positively and negatively since it both hinder and limit development but can also be

productive and create new discourses and knowledge (Hall 1997:261).

In order to examine the impact of refugees in North-western Tanzania it is of

importance to understand ‘representation’ since it gives ‘meaning’ to language and

discourses (Ibid, p.15). Further, we argue, as does Hall that “representation means

using language to say something meaningful about, or to represent, the world

meaningfully to other people” (Ibid, p.15). The approach that we have taken to

representation in our thesis is the constructionist approach, i.e. we construct our own

meanings of words and pictures using representational systems. Material things and

words do not have meaning in themselves, but it is the way we use the language and

convey meaning through representations that we construct meaning and power into

language and pictures (Ibid, p.25). Hence, the Tanzanian government, the donor

community and the local population of the Kibondo area and Tanzania at large may

construct different meanings in regards to the refugees and what they represent. The

meanings will are examined separately and together in order to come up with

conclusions to our thesis. Further, since we are influenced by discourse analysis in our

thesis we are mostly interested in the effects and consequences representations have

within the discourse. It is not the fact that refugees are presented in different ways for

different stakeholders that we find interesting for our thesis, but the fact that these

representations have effects on both the development of the area and Tanzania at

large.

We are also interested in the representational practice, which is known as

stereotyping. In our thesis stereotyping means the ‘representation of the different,’ the

‘other’, in our case the refugee. There are several theoretical standpoints behind the

concept of stereotyping but in our thesis we have focused on two theoretical

standpoints in order to explain why this is occurring. First off we have the linguistic

approach. Since our thesis is influenced by discourse analysis, linguistics is of the

utmost importance. The linguistic approach states that; “…difference’ matters because

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it is essential to meaning; without it, meaning could not exist” (Hall 1997:234), i.e.

meaning derives from the difference of something. In our thesis we mainly examine

the role of the Tanzanian government, the donor community, the media and the local

population of the people of Kibondo and how they mainly present the refugees as the

‘other’ as something different. Furthermore, the second approach is more

anthropological in its nature. This approach considers that; “… the marking of

difference is thus the basis of that symbolic order which we call culture” (Ibid, p.236).

Hence, different groups within the society give meaning to their discourse by

classifying material things and words based on difference.

Further, when discussing perceived threats we are referring to the threats

refugees pose in a stereotypical way; one is “making predictions about people’s

character, abilities or behaviour on the basis of socially constructed markers of

difference (Castles, Miller 2003:35). Further, stereotyping has turned the discussion

into an ‘us’ versus ‘them’ discussion. Thus, the concept of migration “…entered the

political realm as an issue that the state or states need to develop policies for” (Abiri

2000:10). Further, as mentioned above Tanzania used to attribute themselves with an

open door policy but in the 1990’s there was another dimension attached to the

migration concept; the concept of securitisation. As a result, the discussion of

migration no longer focused on ‘us’ versus ‘them’ but rather that ‘they’ threaten ‘us’

and ‘we’ need to protect ourselves (Ibid, p.11). Since the new dimension of

securitisation was added to migration discourse there has been a change globally

regarding the way refugees were and are perceived. The securitisation of migrants and

refugees is visible in the migration discourse in the media and also the public debates

(Ibid, p.11). The media is what we consider in our thesis to be an institution of power

that presents a will that can either empower or weaken the existing societal power

structures (Ibid, p.11). Even though it is important for the discourse that the issues of

securitisation of refugees are evident in the media and in the public debate, it can be

considered even more important that it has gained representation within governments

and bureaucracies (Ibid, p.11). Hence, when the state and its institutions are

emphasising that refugees are a security threat the state claims control over the issue

“…confines security to be a term for states, and to refer only to the phenomena which

the state choose to see as threatening” (Abiri 2000:42). With the foregoing concepts in

mind we examine the policy documents governing refugees in Tanzania. We will also

include the role of the media in presenting refugees and their impact on development.

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3.4 The Prevailing Discourses

In order to understand whether the refugee presence in the Kibondo area of Tanzania

is an obstacle or contributor to development in the region, and Tanzania at large, we

review the way the refugees are presented within the different discourses. We study

different policy papers, newspaper articles, interviews as well as talking to and

interacting with Tanzanian people during our field trip to Dar es Salaam and Lindi

region.

3.4.1 The General Refugee Discourse

In both images and words the general view of refugees is that of the victims. Media

all over the world present refugees as persons who have gone through hardships and

wars but survived, and the general public often relate to these images as the truth. At

the same time refugees can also be represented as heroes, but more as victims who

need assistance. Governments, media and the general public tend to present refugees

differently once the refugees are situated within their own borders. They are no longer

innocent victims but may be portrayed as criminals, destroyers of the environment

and instigators of conflicts and wars. The refugees may also gradually be depicted as

“security threats” to the state and its development objectives; as well as the personal

security of the local inhabitants. In the Western countries refugees are often seen as

economic migrants who only take advantage of the social systems since most do not

fall under the UNHCR’s definition of refugees.

3.4.2 The Tanzanian Government Discourse

The 1998 Refugee Act and the 1999 Socio-Economic Report of the Planning

Commissioner in Dar es Salaam, as well as extracts from speeches and quotes in the

media provide the basis for our review of the Tanzanian government position on

refugees. The refugees, at some points, stand in the way of development. They may be

reduced to survival strategies that are a threat to human- and bio-ecologies. Some of

their activities border on criminal to out-right criminal behaviours that often evoke

public out-cry; and precipitate social strife and considerable conflicts within local

communities and beyond. The refugees are also reported may attract criminals from

far and wide. Cross-border skirmishes are not uncommon where refugees are located

close to international borders especially their countries of origin leading to semi-

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military to full-blown military mobilizations; see also section 5.2 and sub-section

5.2.1.

3.4.3 The Tanzanian Media Discourse

The control and ownership of the Tanzanian media will be discussed further below.

However, it is quite clear through the examination of newspaper articles and research

of the topic that the Tanzanian media was heavily influenced by the rerepresentations

of the Tanzanian government. In many newspapers refugees were represented as

criminals and instigators of cross-border conflicts. The newspapers, through the letters

to the editors, also reflected the general public opinion on the subject which mirrored

the government’s and media’s views; see also 5.3.

3.4.4 The Donor Community and UNHCR Discourse

We have chosen to examine the depiction of refugees by the donor community and

the UNHCR together, since the most of the countries supported refugees in Tanzania

multilaterally through the UNHCR. Thus, in the 1990s the UNHCR received

approximately $28, 130,264, annually from mainly the European Commission (EC),

the U.S., the Netherlands and Japan, but also from other donors (UNHCR 3). The

UNHCR is the UN agency whose sole purpose is to relieve the suffering of refugees.

Therefore, their rerepresentation of refugees is often that of victims in need of aid;

and sometimes as heroes and survivors who could be an asset to the host country. At

our interview with the UNHCR representative in Dar es Salaam, Mia Bülow, we were

given the image of refugees as very strong and resourceful people capable of

contributing to the development of Tanzania if the rules and regulations allowed them

(Bülow 30/03/07). Those views were also reflected in other UNHCR publications.

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4. Background and Statistics In this chapter we discuss quantitative and qualitative features of Kibondo area and

the available ways of attaining sustainable development today. We give a brief

statistical overview concerning health related matters for the local population of

Kibondo. We also present an outline of education, employment and water supply in

order to give some degree of measurement of poverty and development; as commonly

used by the UNHCR in refugee populations. Statistic comparisons with the local

population give an idea of what provisions are offered to the refugee in comparison to

the inhabitants. Further on, we present the causes of the Burundian refugee influx to

Tanzania and neighbouring countries. This will help us highlight why the refugees are

depicted the way they are foremost by the Tanzanian government, the public, the

donor community and the media.

4.1 The Kibondo Area

Kibondo is the largest district situated in the Kigoma administrative region which is

situated on the Tanzanian border with Burundi. The population of the area is 438,125

excluding the refugee population (District 2007). The largest ethnic group in Kibondo

is the Waha but there are also many other mixed groups belonging mainly to the

Sukuma and Fipa ethnic groups. A large number of Burundians are known to live

outside the camps but they are not included in our study due to the time and space

limitations; the Tanzanian authorities and refugee organizations too could not fully

account for these clandestine refugee populations (HRW 1). Furthermore, the Kigoma

region and especially the Kibondo area has always been one of the poorest areas in

the country. This area has also had a steady influx of refugees for decades (HRW 1).

In order to examine development in the Kibondo area, we look at the different

indicators of poverty and development based on the UNHCR methods. One of the

indicators of poverty, in regard to refugee-affected population, is the number of

people living below the poverty line, which in the case of Kibondo is estimated to be

39% (District 2007). The other measurement is the infant mortality rate; which stands

at 85 per 1000 live births, while the under five-child mortality rate was estimated at

136 per 1000 live births (Muhef 2002). Although in Kibondo there were 3 functional

health centres and 62 working health dispensaries these were not sufficient to meet

the demands of the local population. There was an estimated shortage of 706 doctors

19

and nurses for the public health sector in the larger district of Kigoma (Muhef 1

2002).

Another aspect that needs to be examined in regards to poverty and

development is the employment aspect.

The employment sector

Kibondo Area Office Agricultural Industry Un-employed Total

Male 2,053 29,043 572 17,311 48,979

Female 614 42,963 122 19,752 63,451 Source: TPC 1999:31

Considering these figures it is evident that the agricultural sector employs the largest

number of people. There is, however, a noticeable large part of the Kibondo

population not accounted for in the statistics such as unemployable persons due to old

age, retirement and health issues and un-accounted for self-employment residents.

What these numbers indicated was that the majority of the workforce was employed

in the agricultural sector; and that un-employment was a large obstacle for

development of the region (TPC 1999:31).

Education sector is another important indicator of poverty and development

but statistics in this regard was very limited and not up to date and since the situation

has not changed much in the last couple of years we can only draw some general

conclusions. The target enrolment for the primary schools in the Kibondo area was an

estimated 5, 895 children but the actual enrolment was 5,199; an estimated 88% of

primary school age children in the district (TPC 1999:70). Though 88% of the

targeted pupils were actually enrolled this did not imply that the pupils completed

their primary education. The dropout rate for the primary schools in the Kibondo

region was 3, 4 %, mainly due to truancy and pregnancy (TPC 1999:68). As far as

secondary education of the Kibondo area is concerned, there is a great shortage of

schools offering this type of education since there were only two public boarding

schools and one private day-school (TPC 1999:70).

Water supply and sanitation is yet another aspect of poverty and development.

Many of the traditional water sources such as lakes and rivers have become heavily

polluted and the ground water supply have become limited (TPC 1999:103). A larger

part of the population, therefore, have become reliant on the more modern ways of

20

obtaining water such as drills, wells, piped and bottled water supplies leading to an

increased need the financial resources and skilled people to maintain the equipments

(TPC 1999:102)

4.2 Burundian refugee influx in the 1990’s – A Political Context

The dramatically large stream of Burundi refugees, nearly all Hutu1, into the

neighbouring countries especially Tanzania, began in 1972 with the massacre of

Hutus; there was approximately 300, 000 refugees that fled the massacre. The

outflows were preceded by several smaller outward streams of refugees notably in

1965, 1969 adding onto the earlier total numbers (USA Committee for Refugees and

Immigrants 2004:1-3) and (ICG 1999:2-24). Following the 1972 unrest, the

Burundian refugees fled predominantly to Tanzania, Rwanda and the then Zaire, now

Democratic Republic of Congo (DRC). In Tanzania, the majority of the earlier

refugees settled among the local population or refugee camps which became

permanent settlements in the Tabora region, as was planned by the UNHCR according

to the theories of modernity. The refugees were given each five hectares of land

allowing them to become self-reliant cultivators, and productive members within the

local communities.

Politically, the older Burundian refugee population in Tanzania formed the

foundation of the first organized Hutu armed groups named Palipehutu and Frolina2,

which launched cross-border invasions against Burundi from the beginning of the

1980s. The Palipehutu is reported to have attracted a small number of followers in

Rwanda and Burundi as well; and Frolina drew its support from both refugee and

local populations originating principally from southern Burundi. According to the

ICG, “both groups recruited from the refugee camps and settlements, and carried out

active training and small-scale cross border attacks from the bush not far from their

Tanzanian encampments” (ICG 1999:2). Hence, these actions are still vivid in the

memories of the Tanzanian population and government, and serves as the foundation

for the representation of the refugees as instigators of war and conflicts. 1 In Burundi the majority Hutu and minority Tutsi are known to have lived side by side for many centuries but occasionally communal and political violence have erupted. Before the 1993 democratic elections, the Tutsi controlled all branches of government and armed forces since the 1962 political independence from Belgium. 2 Palipehutu: Party of the Liberation of the Hutu People; Frolina: Front for National Liberation.

21

Furthermore, in 1993 there were upcoming elections in Burundi and the

transition to democratic rule was expected as a smooth transition by the UNHCR and

the contracted relief organisations. Thus, the UNHCR and the other agencies

sponsored a large voluntary repatriation of Burundi refugees before the elections.

However, this was a difficult transition for the repatriates since many of them had lost

their land slots in Burundi and therefore their livelihoods (ICG 1999:2-3). Moreover,

a section of the Palipehutu and Frolina resisted repatriation and spread propaganda in

regards to the neutrality of the UNCHR, and foremost the trustworthiness of the

Burundian government. Nonetheless, the repatriation took place and the repatriates

took part in the presidential campaign as FRODEBU3 militants. (ICG 1999:2-3). In

spite of the propaganda the country’s first democratic elections installed a Hutu,

Melchoir Ndadaye, as president and the FRODEBU, which was dominated by the

Hutu, won most of the seats in the National Assembly in 1993 (USCRI 1998:1-3).

The stability in Burundi, notwithstanding, proved to be short-lived and on

October, 21, 1993 the first democratically elected president, Ndadaye, was

assassinated together with other high-ranking Hutu government officials. The

assassinations were a part of a failed coup d’état, led by elements within the Tutsi-

dominated military. After the assassination there were on-going uncontrolled violence

throughout the country, and approximately 30, 000 to 50, 000 people of both ethnic

groups lost their lives in the massacres. These massacres also led to the fleeing of

hundreds of thousands Burundians to the countries of Rwanda, DRC and Tanzania as

well as becoming internally displaced. The violence eventually cooled off and another

Hutu, Cyprien Ntaryamira, was elected as president in place of his predecessor.

Ntaryamira, however, died in an April 1994 plane crash in Rwanda, which also killed

the Rwandan president Habyarimana. Again, another Hutu FRODEBU party member,

Sylvestre Ntibantunganya, was named president after a bitter political stand off

between the rival parties. Burundi once more was wrapped in violence that cost the

lives of nearly 5, 000 people, that year. As the low intensity civil war flared, almost

10, 000 lives were lost the following year of 1995. The rapidly declining political

situation made it easy for large numbers of Hutus to join rebel fractions. Internally

3 FRODEBU –Front for Democracy in Burundi, was officially registered as a party in 1992 when multiparty democracy was introduced in Burundi but the Palipehutu remained clandestine in its activities.

22

displaced peoples (IDP’s) camps were targeted by both sides of the opposing forces.

The Burundi government forces supported by the Tutsi militias violently depopulated

the Hutus from many areas in and around the capital city of Bujumbura, leading to the

fleeing of thousands of Burundi Hutus to the DRC and Tanzania (ICG 1999:2-3 and

USCRI 1998:1-2).

4.2.1 Political Antagonism in the Great Lakes Region

A number of Burundian refugees who fled to Rwanda at the aftermath of the October

1993 crisis were known to have participated in the 1994 Rwandan genocide in areas

where they had taken refuge. These Burundian refugees were once again forced to

flee during the exodus of the Rwandan Hutus into eastern DRC in the wake of the

genocide but many of these refugees also returned to Burundi. In the DRC the

refugees were organized into 11 camps, spread along 80 km land stretch South of

Kivu in the Burundi border, while others lived in and around Bukavu and Uvira

towns. Some Burundi refugees also lived in mixed camps together with Rwandan

refugees. The Hutu refugees in the mixed camps took advantage of the situation to

forge military alliances, which later was to become a serious source of instability for

both Rwanda and Burundi; with spill-over effects into Tanzania (ICG 1999). The

consequence of which were the real and perceived fears the Tanzanian government

and population had in regard to the impact the refugees had on stability and

development in the region.

The Burundian military insurgency operations from the refugee camps in

eastern DRC gained headlines in the media and diplomatic circles, especially for their

co-operation with Rwandans responsible for the 1994 Rwandan genocide. Not

surprisingly, during the earlier period of their exile in the DRC the Burundian rebel

militias “were dependent on the former FAR4 and allied Interahamwe militias for

arms, training, logistical support and joint military operations.” (ICG 1999:3-5). Their

intention was to create a Hutu zone inside northern Burundi from where they could

4 FAR –Armed forces of Rwanda was the army of the ethnic Hutu-dominated Rwandan regime that carries out the genocide of 500 000 or more Tutsi and regime opponents in 1994; while Interahamwe was the armed civilian militia wing. Accessed 2007-05-28 at: http://www.fas.org/irp/world/para/interahamwe.htm

23

launch their respective guerrilla campaigns. Eventually, the Burundian rebel groups

gained strength with the formation of the Centre for the Defence of Democracy

(CNDD) and the armed wing the Forces for the Defence of Democracy (FDD) created

in September 1994; they moved out of eastern DRC and forged their own source of

arms and logistical supplies (ICG 1999:3-5).

By the time president Buyoya took power for the second time in Burundi in a

military coup in 1996, the Burundian and Rwandan Hutu rebels operations from the

eastern DRC was a force to reckon with. Occasional attacks in south by the Frolina;

and in the north by Palipehutu and regular ambushes and military strikes by the FDD,

destabilized 13 out of the 15 provinces in Burundi. A part from that, splinter groups of

the Frolina and Palipehutu carried out military raids into Burundi from small bases

within Tanzania in the Kigoma and Ngara districts further fuelling the notion that the

refugees are instigators of wars and conflicts.

4.2.2. Tanzania’s Response

The spill-over of the 1990’s refugee crises in the Great Lakes Region following

conflicts in Burundi, Rwanda and Zaire (later DRC) led to heightened tensions in

western Tanzania and the country as a whole. Domestic pressures called for effective

measures to halt the “instability, crime and environmental degradation” caused by the

huge flood of refugees in the region. Internationally, Tanzania came under pressure

for supposedly allowing perpetrators of the 1994 Rwandan genocide to use its

territory as a launching base for renewed attacks against Rwanda. Tanzania did not

take kindly to the criticisms; in addition to the notion that the Rwandese refugees,

“…embarrassed the government of Tanzania with their political agitation in the

camps” (ICG 1999:4-6) After prolonged appeal for assistance, Tanzania eventually

was granted funding and logistical support by the donor community to use the police

to monitor the security situation in the Rwandese refugee camps. Unfortunately, the

international opinion and “donor fatigue” concerning the refugees had already reached

breaking point.

Furthermore, in the mid to late 1990’s the Tanzanian government changed

policies toward refugees; and the securitisation of migration that had occurred

globally, was also taking place in Tanzania. That lead the government of Tanzania to

work with the Rwandese counterpart to “forcibly expel over 250, 000 Rwandese

24

refugees in December 1996, some of whom had lived in Tanzania since the 1960’s.

(Jones 1996:67-68, ICG 1999:4-6).

The mass expulsion of refugees was not the first type of drastic action taken

by the Tanzanian government in line with the new refugee policies and legislation.

One of the preceding actions was the closing of the borders to Burundi and Rwanda in

1995, which was in direct violation of the 1951 UN Refugee Convention. Tanzania

argued its case on grounds that insecurity on the western frontiers had reached

intolerable proportions, and that its resources and capacity to handle the refugee-

generated situation was stretched thin. Conclusively, refugees were no longer only

represented as instigators of conflicts but also as a threat to the external and internal

security of Tanzania. In May 1995, Tanzania followed the border closure by the

deployment of troops along the border with Burundi in order to check the hot cross-

border pursuits of refugees by Burundian troops. Both countries had by July 1995

deployed considerable number of troops along their common borders. Expectedly,

only a trickle of Burundian refugees managed to cross into Tanzania; those caught

were often forcibly sent back to Burundi. Owing to the tense situation, the UNHCR

and NGO’s assisting with relief were not allowed into certain border zones (USCRI

1995:1-4). The securitisation process of refugee in Tanzania had reached its

completion.

4.2.3 The Forced Repatriations of the 1990’s

After the expulsion of the Rwandese refugees in 1996, Tanzania again faced similar

accusations for allowing Burundian rebel groups to use its territory as recruitment and

launching platforms for cross-border raids into Burundi. Incidentally, following the

forced expulsion of Burundi refugees from eastern DRC and the launch of the ADFL

rebellion in 1996, huge numbers of Burundians fled into western Tanzania. Among

the refugees were Burundian rebel fighters “who later used Tanzania as a base to

regroup” and carry out further insurgencies into Burundi (ICG 1999:6). The stream of

international criticisms of Tanzania’s handling of the refugees, initiated by the

Burundi government at that time, eventually led to the large scale rounding up of

Burundian refugees who were living outside of the refugee camps in 1997. That

round-up included Burundians who had lived in Tanzania since the 1960’s as well as

those who had fled following the 1972 unrest. A good number of the Burundians had

settled in villages, married local Tanzanians and integrated effectively into the local

25

communities (ICG 1999:6 and HRW 1999: July issue). Furthermore, the local

communities had shared ethnic and/or family relations with the Burundian refugees,

and actually depended on the refugee labour, initiatives and skills as a complement to

their own socio-economic livelihoods. The Burundians were known to have enhanced

the growth of local economies by producing “marketable crops from previously

unproductive and disused land.” The rounding up forced many of the refugees from

their homes and several were separated from spouses and families, and often not even

given the opportunity to collect their belongings (ICG 1999:6). As mentioned

previously the representation of refugees changed drastically during the 1990’s due to

the prevailing political climate leading to forced repatriation of thousands of refugees

who had up to those days were depicted as contributors to development in Tanzania.

4.3 The Kibondo Refugee Camps

Due to the instability in the region Tanzania became one of the countries that hosted

the largest refugee population in the world. There were approximately 683,000

refugees residing in Tanzania but only 285,000 lived in twelve different camps

managed by the UNHCR (UNHCR 2 2007:1). The Kibondo area situated in the

Kigoma region hosted 52,014 refugees in five camps; 49,770 of whom were

Burundians (UNHCR 1 2007:2).

Refugee camps in Kibondo by nationality and population

CAMPS NATIONALITY POPULATION

Kibondo

52,014

Mtendeli Burundians 18,736

Kanembwa Burundians 12,428

Ndutu Burundians 18,606

Mkugwa Mixed 2,050

Mkugwa Rwandans 194

Source: UNHCR 1 2007:2

26

The Kibondo Camps, like all refugee camps in Tanzania, are managed by the

UNHCR who in their turn are contracted by the Tanzanian government. As a part of

the UNHCR’s mandate from the Tanzanian government the UNHCR are responsible

for appointing a field officer for each camp, who is responsible for general

management and administration, the placing of newly arrived refugees as well as the

distribution of food and other supplies (Bülow 30/03/07). The UNHCR is also

responsible for providing a Community Officer, who is responsible for the community

programmes in the camps such as education and vocational training; as well as a

Protection Officer. The Protection Officer is a member of the UNHCR staff who is

responsible for all the security and protection in the camps including assisting the

refugees with legal advice (HRW 1). Although it is the UNHCR responsible for the

overall security in the camps, they have in their turn contracted local Tanzanian police

force to help with the protection of both their own staff as well as the refugees (Bülow

30/03/07). The UNHCR also sub-contracts other UN organs to help assist in the

camps; examples include the UNDP and UNICEF who provide for children’s health

and education. The UNHCR also choose to sub-contract both International Non-

Governmental Organisations (INGO’s) as well as National Non-Governmental

Organisations (NGO’s) in order to get assistance within the areas of expertise that

these organisations encompass (Bülow 30/03/07). There are also representatives of

the Tanzanian government working in the camps and almost exclusively are there to

oversee the security situation in the camps (HRW 1). However, many external

agencies and NGO’s remain very critical of the camps both in regard to the living

conditions as well as security in the camps.

4.3.1 Measurements of Poverty and Development

In order to secure the rights of the refugees within the Kibondo camps the UNHCR

set up a series of standard indicators, which relates to issues such as health,

employment, education, water supply and food distribution. These standard indicators

are considered the minimum requirements for a decent life and we have examined

some of them in order to compare the situation for the refugees in the Kibondo camps

with the local population of the Kibondo area. There are also different indicators for

the individual refugee and what should be accounted for such as the structure of the

camps and public areas. At the individual level the standard indicators state that every

person should be given seven litres of clean water per day and that the nutrition

27

standard is set on 2100 kcal/day (UNHCR 2000:6). With regard to health, the

standard indicator is set at one health centre per 20,000 people; one hospital per

200,000 patients.

Health staff in Kibondo

Community Health Workers 10-20 Traditional Birth Attendants 6-10

Public House Nurse 1 Clinic Nurses Midwives 3-4

Doctor/Medical Assistants 1-3 Pharmacy Attendant 1

Laboratory Technician 1 Dressers/Assistants 10

Sanitarians 2-4 Sanitarian Assistants 20 Source: UNHCR 2000:14

There should also be one latrine provided per every ten persons and one water-tap per

community of about 80-100 people (UNHCR 2000:13). In regard to education there

should be one school per 5000 people (UNHCR 2000:13). Even though these are

standard indicators, they do give a genuine guideline as to how the situation was for

the refugees in the camps (Katunzi 2004:1, Bülow 30/03/30). As far as refugee

employment is concerned there are no statistics since they are forbidden to work

under Tanzanian law but within the camps they are allowed to engage in a number of

occupational activities such as agriculture, sawing and carpentry (Bülow 30/03/07).

4.4 Sustainable Development Within and Outside the Kibondo Camps

After examining the situation for the local population and the refugees in the Kibondo

refugee camps it is evident that both groups deal with great hardships and extreme

circumstances and conditions. Any two different groups living side by side there are

bound to be conflict and the UNHCR took this into account consideration and actions

were taken to ease the tensions. Thus the UNHCR targeted the local population in

order to

1. Mitigate the impact of the refugees (concerning environmental issues)

2. Foster good relations through trickle down effects to the local population;

achievable by, for example, harnessing and distributing of water supplies to

the camps and to the local population as well (Bülow 30/03/07).

According to Bülow, the UNHCR also allowed the local population access to the

resources and facilities of the camps which were often described as better than what

28

the local inhabitants had. In some of the facilities such as the paediatrics wards and

the education there were approximate utilization on 50-50% basis by the refugees and

the local population (Ibid 30/03/07).

Repatriation and resettlement of refugees is one of the main objectives of the

Tanzanian government in regard to the long-term solutions to the refugee crisis in the

region (Bülow 30/03/07). After the closure of the refugee camps, following large

scale voluntary or forced repatriations, the UNHCR handed over unused facilities and

equipments to the local authorities and encouraged the neighbouring population to use

and maintain the them (Bülow 30/03/07). By retaining the facilities in the same areas

previously occupied by refugees the local people are forced to relocate to the disused

settlements and take advantage the new infrastructures; this was a strategy very much

in keeping with the modernization theories of development (Harrell-Bond 2000:2).

5. Tanzanian Government Policies and the Power of the Media In this chapter we examine how refugees and migrants are represented by the

Tanzanian government through the 1998 Refugee Act. We also discuss the

implications that legislation had on development in the refugee-affected region and

Tanzania at large. We then proceed to look at how refugees are depicted in the local

newspapers in order to understand the influence of the media on the discourse at large

as well as the consequences for the refugees and the development of the country.

5.1 Migration – A Dynamic Discourse

As mentioned previously, the policies of the Tanzanian government changed

drastically from mid 1995. The open-door policy of the 1960s to 1980s gave refugees

significant socio-economic rights, including the right to work and settle in Tanzania.

By mid 1990s the Tanzanian government shifted focus from resettlement to offering

temporary protection. By adopting this new policy the Tanzanian government

simultaneously limited the refugees’ freedom of movement and imposed restrictions

on their ability to engagement in self-reliance activities; and the government resorted

to active pursuit of rapid repatriation of refugees (Rutinwa et al. 2003:1). The

Tanzanian government put forward several arguments in the defence of the sudden

shift in policy, which include;

29

1. Negative impact the refugees had on security, environment, infrastructure as

well as the economic deterioration of the hosting region and of Tanzania as a

whole.

2. The lack of sufficient International support in regard to the refugee flows

(Rutinwa 2003:2).

Evidently, the global trend in the securitization of refugees reached Tanzania as well.

As such, we follow the developments of the 1990s in order to understand the events

that lead to the new policy trends and the implications for development and stability

in the LVR. The roles of the various stakeholders, including that of the refugees

discussed in chapter 4; is discussed below.

5.2 The 1998 Refugee Act

The reception and care of refugees as well as the living conditions, movement and

security of refugees in Tanzania are regulated by the 1998 Refugees Act. In this

document the definition of refugee does not differ much from the definition given by

the UNHCR5 referred to in our thesis; a refugee is depicted as a victim.

As mentioned before, development has almost become synonymous with

economic growth (Odén 2006:49). To achieve economic growth people need to freely

look for and travel to work and be able to invest some of their income. The new

Refugee Act, however, restricts refugee movement to a five km radius from the

camps. Other mobility restrictions exist even within the camps. Failure to comply

could means committing an offence (Refugee Act 1998, Bülow 30/03/07).6 Due to the

unusually large numbers of refugees the vegetation cover of the area has suffered

severe damage creating shortages of firewood and other traditional sources of food

items and necessities. Many refugees, especially women, are compelled to leave the

camps and venture into the surrounding areas in search for firewood and/or work to

earn some money which they can use to purchase what they lack. Since most of the

refugee camps are situated in very remote areas the refugees are sometimes forced to

walk distances of 20-30 km in order to find what they are looking for. In doing so

they may spend several hours or even days outside the camps with the risk of

committing crime and being listed among refugees convicted of crime. Petty as it

would be, violating camp curfews or straying beyond designated perimeters, could 5 See the definition in our appendix 1 the 1998 Refugee Act 6 Due to the length of the quotes we have to refer to our appendix 1 the 1998 Refugee Act

30

lead to the notion and present that refugees are over represented in the crime statistics

of the area. The refugee population, by implication, could be seen as undesirables

reversing or slowing down development although the intended aim the Act may have

been to protect the refugees and the local population as well as the environment in

order to sustain development. The dilemma for the authorities is how best to maintain

peace, protect the environment, sustain development without depicting the refugees in

a negative image.

Furthermore, in regard to work and formal employment the refugees are once

again constrained by the 1998 Refugee Act, which prohibits employment (Refugee

Act 1998, Bülow 30/03/07, UNHCR 2). By prohibiting employment, the refugees are

completely in the hands of the UNHCR, the Tanzanian government and the donor

community for their survival. When there are reductions in the accessible aid to the

refugees this has very serious consequences, for example, through raised gender-

based violence, and inducing women to engage such risky behaviours as in ‘survival

sex’ (UNHCR 2). Those who go outside the camps to look for employment may

commit double offence, according to the 1998 Refugee Act, since they break both the

mobility laws as well as the existing employment laws. The refugees, at the same

time, may be represented as lazy if; and since, they do not work. Being lazy and

unemployed means that the refugees are a burden for the society and hindrances to

development and utterly reliable on the government, the UNHCR and the donor

community for their livelihood. In a way the new Act forces the refugees to become

more aid dependent with serious consequences for the development of the area and

country at large.

5.2.1 The Representation by the Tanzanian Government

Even though the 1998 Refugee Act gives a clear reference to the laws and regulations

concerning the refugees, as well as the consequences that this framework can evoke, it

does not give the whole picture of how the government perceives them. The

government, however, in order to influence the public opinion, gave some speeches in

regard to refugees. Our literature study and interview with the UNHCR, on the other

hand conveyed that the government over time represented refugees as instigators of

war and conflict with distinct fear of spill-over effects in Tanzania from the

neighbouring states. In a speech in 2003, the then Tanzanian President Mkapa stated

that; “… refugees were to blame for the increase in small arms in the country” (IRIN

31

2003:1). President Mkapa continued in the same speech by claiming that; “…refugees

were to blame for an increase in armed crime and trafficking of weapons in western

Tanzania” (IRIN 2003:1). In another presidential speech by Mkapa, the President

pointed out that “…Tanzania is a victim of the problems created by successive

political leaders in Burundi” (Mkapa 2001:1). Further, President Mkapa also

represented the refugees as “…a severe and social burden on the country which

threatened to reverse the gains so far made by the country” (Rutinwa 2003:4). The

former Regional Commissioner (RC) of the Kigoma Region, Mr Mgumia, once stated

that the “…refugees are a burden to the region” and that; “…refugees had a negative

impact on the development” (The Guardian 2000).

The government of Tanzania, at the peak of the refugee crisis, pointed out that

there was a ‘refugee fatigue’ in the world that lead to a decrease in aid and assistance

concerning this matter. President Mkapa further stated in a speech in 2001 that;

“against the phenomenon of reduced international material support to refugees, and of

increased criminal activities by truant refugees, there is developing a palpable erosion

of the national policy of support to, and hosting of, refugees” (Mkapa 2001:1). Hence,

Tanzania’s capacity to single-handedly care for the exceedingly large refugee

population materially and financially, in combination with clandestine refugees’

activities and foraging for food and survival methods, had strained open-door policy

calling for a once-and-for-all solution.

There are also instances where the government represented refugees as a threat

to national state security. According to Mahiga, at the UNHCR, the then Tanzanian

minister of Home Affairs, Mwambulukutu, stated that the; “hosting of refugees has

become a heavier and more painful burden than ever before and that protecting and

assisting refugees has brought new risks to national security, and exacerbated tension

between states” ( Mahiga 1997:1). The minister of Home Affairs continued by stating

that the tension that was rising between Tanzania and Burundi was due to refugee

issues and rather then sacrificing the stable security situation it would be better to

limit the Burundian refugees residing in Tanzania (Mahiga 1997:1). At that point

there is a clear representation of the refugees as a threat to the national security and a

source of conflict in the region. Further, we argue, as does Abiri that the refugees

were no longer the innocent victims due to instability in their country of origin, but

had become a political issue that needed to be controlled and regulated through

judicial and political frameworks (Abiri 2000:10).

32

5.3 The Power of the Media

The media has become a very powerful tool in every contemporary society since they

have the ability to reach many people as well as to represent people and events

according to their own agenda and or will. Therefore, it is important that we first

examine the ownership and influence of the Tanzanian media in order to find out

whose agenda and will that we are discussing.

The Tanzanian media is very much influenced and controlled by the

government even though the press is officially free since 1990 (Moses 2000:1).

Further, albeit the press in Tanzania is officially considered as free it is important to

take into consideration that it is the government that is the biggest advertiser and

sponsor of the media (Moses 2000:1). Furthermore, there have also been instances

according to Moses, where the Tanzanian government has withheld the revenues

otherwise gained from advertising, if the material published was not approved by the

government (Ibid, p.1). Under the Newspaper Registration Act of 1976 the

government can decide to close down any newspaper without giving an explanation.

This act also states that every newspaper has to be registered with the government in

order to be considered legal (Ibid, p.1). In March 2006 there were 537 registered

newspapers in Tanzania, although many out of these are privately owned only one

was reported to be regularly criticising the government (CRHRP 2006:1). When

taking these factors into consideration it is obvious that the media is very much

controlled by the government, and that they represent the refugees in the same manner

as the government directs.

In this chapter, lift out some of the letters to the editor in order to examine the

representations by the public through the media. Many of the letters to the editor

conveyed the same message as the government did, representing refugees as criminals

and a threat to the national security. Our findings, through examination of newspaper

clippings, also concur with the views of two of our interview respondents, both of

whom were adult teachers, in a Dar es Salaam college stated that “… the refugees

carried the blame for deteriorated security situation in the area of settlement and the

country; overstretched local administration, dilapidated infrastructure, environment

and other services” (Res 1, Res 2 09/04/07). Further, this response mirrors a letter to

the editor in the Mtanzania where the author stated that; “…refugees are a burden due

their social economic and political impact” (Mtanzania 1999:1). This is in its turn a

clear mirroring of the representation by the Tanzanian government. This particular

33

citizen continued by arguing that refugees were also responsible for breaking up

Tanzanian marriages since the refugees engaged in sexual activities with married

Tanzanians due to the demographic imbalance (Rutinwa et.al. 2003:8). According to

Rutinwa et.al. the same newspaper also published letters that claimed that “…the

refugees were a burden to Tanzania due to their objectionable behaviour” (Rutinwa et

al 2003:8). This behaviour included robbery and banditry according to the writer.

Another letter published in the Mzalendo newspaper stated that the refugees caused so

much banditry that the local population could no longer go to work (Rutinwa et.al.

2003:8). The same newspaper also published letters of the spill-over effects of

conflicts from the neighbouring states claiming that “any person with a long nose and

neck was in danger of being attacked by Hutu refugees as he or she was presumed to

be a tutsi” (Rutinwa 2003:8). It is obvious once again that the public opinion concurs

with the prevailing governmental opinions at that time, that a segment of the refugees

were not only a threat to the personal security of the local population but also a threat

to the national, state and international security. Whether these allegations and

representations are true or simply perceived will be discussed further in our thesis.

6. The True or Perceived Representations of the Refugees We have so far shown that the representations of the refugees by various stakeholders

have changed over the years since the 1960´s open-door integration approach to that

of closed-door temporary settlement strategy and a hardened attitude toward refugees

in general. Refugees from Burundi and Rwanda apparently received a much tougher

deal; and not without cause as we have shown in chapter 4, section 4.2. Certainly

many refugees not directly identified as agent provocateur, particularly women,

children, the aged, the disabled, the sick; and wounded non-armed ex-combatants may

have been caught up in the huge security sweeps to round up and eventually deport, or

quarantine them in camps, the socio-economically and politically unwanted foreigners

regardless of whether they fell under the UNHCR refugee mandate or not. In the next

chapter we critically examine the depiction of refugees against the background of

available research and documentations.

34

6.1 The Refugees as Criminals

In order to understand the stakes against the refugees in regard to crime committed in

the Kigoma region, which includes the Kibondo district, we review studies carried out

by the University of Dar es Salaam on this particular issue and other topics of interest.

Crime rate in the Kigoma Region

Kigoma Region

Report All Cases Refugee Cases % of Refugee Cases

Murder 89 20 22

Armed Robbery 232 59 25

Illegal possession

of firearms

38 - -

Source: Rutinwa et.al. 2003:15

According to the above table it was clear that the refugee population was over-

represented in the crime rate statistics of the region given their relatively small

number. As one of the regions hosting the most refugees in Tanzania, the refugees

constituted 22 % of the total population in the region. Thus, the proportion of crime

committed by the refugees was almost as high as the proportion of refugees in the

area (Rutinwa et.al. 2003:16) which was alarming at any rate in terms of public

relations; and bound to have far reaching political implications.

With regard to convicted and imprisoned criminals, the same study by

Rutinwa et. al. showed that 65 % of the refugees were there for administrative and

immigration offences (ibid, p. 16). The offences included, as mentioned section 5.2,

having left the camps in order to collect firewood as well as look for and taking on

employment. This illustrated how the refugees´ survival strategies forced them into

crime, more often than the local population, thereby making it difficult for the

authorities, the media and the general public to look kindly toward their plight leading

to the frequently negative depictions of the refugees. At the same time there were of

course issues of deteriorating security and human rights issues within the camps as

well but due to time and space limitations we shall not discuss this further (Nyanduga

08/04/07).

The findings of another study carried out by UNHCR 2005:29 showed that the

security situation in the refugee-populated areas in north-western Tanzania indeed

35

worsened especially after the waves of refugees from Rwanda and Burundi from mid

1990s. The worst periods were between 1994 – 2000 which were accompanied by

very high incidences of murder, armed robbery, rapes and unlawful possession of

illegal weapons. By early 2005 the entire refugee demarcated areas were under the

Security Phase One, in the UN security classifications, on account of the risk of

banditry. At that time Ngara was regarded as more dangerous than Kasulu, Kibondo

and Kigoma. Recorded incidents in Ngara in January to June included several armed

attacks; one of the worst attacks was by a group of about 40 bandits with guns and

grenades in the village of Murugwanza just 5 km from Ngara Town centre. A

UNHCR vehicle was hijacked along the highway 27 km from Ngara Town Centre. In

August 2004, six members of staff of the IP Concern were robbed by bandits not far

away from a refugee camp. In May 2004, one of the Kibondo TCRS staff was shot

dead while travelling to Karagwe when the truck they were travelling in was attacked

by bandits in the Kimisi forest. In late 2004, an attack on a bus, reportedly by Burundi

bandits, a short distance from the Mtabila Burundi camp in Kasulu, lead to the severe

restriction of the movement of refugees or contacts with the local population; a

restriction which was still in place in Burundi camps by the time of the UNHCR 2005

study was carried out.

According to the UNHCR 2005 study carried out jointly with the Tanzanian

Government, a number of factors were found to contribute to the security situation as

illustrated above. Firstly, is the location of the refugee camps in a region bordering

war torn Great Lakes countries of DR Congo, Burundi and, at that time, Rwanda. That

situation, among other factors, enables criminals within Tanzania and across the

borders to obtain weapons from deserters and warring parties in those countries with

which to facilitate their crimes. It was not unusual that rebels from neighbouring

countries slipped into Tanzania to replenish their food and cash needs by stealing

from Tanzanians. However, the study found no evidence of this later practice

continuing in 2005 but was deemed to have been rampant between 1994 and 2000.

The other factor that contributed to crime in the refugee-populated area was

the perennial shortage of food and other basic needs which forced refugees to turn to

petty and serious crime conducts to fullfill their needs. Another aspect of the security

situation in the region was that refugee operations-and-services introduced into the

region a range of amenities such as four-wheel-drive vehicles, communications

equipments, spare parts, which were essential but rare commodities; and local and

36

international cash money. All of which proved to be lucrative items for illicit trade to

criminals from other parts of Tanzania and the Great Lakes region; and beyond.

Admittedly, maintenance of security, law and order in refugee-populated area

is the responsibility of the host country, according to the Geneva Convention on

Refugees. In the case of Tanzania, the unusually high level of refugee influx and

insecurity in the refugee settlements which was the spill-over effect of the Rwandan

genocide, called for special measures. The Tanzanian Government and the UNHCR

worked out an arrangement whereby the Tanzanian country security programme

included a “Security Package”. The package involved Tanzania providing an agreed

number of policemen and women who were then trained in refugee issues and

equipped and paid by the UNHCR to work in refugee-populated areas for a period of

time, usually six months. After which they were replaced by another contingent of

police officers and staff. The police force carried out a number of duties which

included security patrols in the camps, investigating and reporting of crimes in the

settlements and escorting vehicles travelling along the high-risk roads facing constant

threats from attacks by bandits. The UNHCR, by 2005, considered the security

programme a success in helping minimize the level of insecurity both inside and

around the refugee camps.

Despite the efforts, the security package did not succeed in restoring the

security needs of the local residents principally because of the relatively small number

of police force deployed in each group of about 300 personnel, who were supposed to

police an area of over 400 000 people, including the refugee affected area. As a result,

by 2005 bandits and other criminals could still enter villages and terrorise the

population as they chose.

6.2 Representation and the Issues of Development

A reflection on the forgoing chapters and sections gives the impression that the

refugee population, living in the north-western Tanzania, had collectively made

themselves unwanted in the host country. Noteworthy is that some elements within

the refugee community were actively engaged in actions that were counter productive

to peace and stability within and outside the camps; and not the least across

international borders. The local and international opinions seemed to differ on a

number of key factors. Delayed support by the donor community to supplement local

37

efforts and capacities may have lead to the drastic actions by the Tanzanian

authorities. We now turn our attention to other social indicators of progress

particularly health and education, within and outside the camp areas, in relation to

sustainable development the influence on the representation of the refugees.

With regard to the health we have already mentioned that the facilities within

the Kibondo camps including the staffing had a higher standard than the ones offered

to the local population by the Tanzanian government. It is worth to recall that

development within and outside the camps are not solely the work of the UNHCR but

of a collection of other UN organs, INGO’s and NGO’s as well, contracted to enhance

development. One of these is the United Nations World Food Programme (WFP) that

handled the food security in the hospitals and schools of the Kibondo area. The

contribution was aimed at giving food assistance to the local health facilities and

schools in order to reduce the financial and administrative pressures on these

institutions (WFP 1 2007:1). The programme also targeted women helping them

supplement and encourage breast feeding programmes in order to reduce malnutrition

in mothers and children. It also targeted malnutrition in the neighbourhood by

offering training facilities to health workers and staff in government and private

health facilities (WFP 1 2007:1). The WFP also went into joint projects together with

other donors countries such as Japan to help “…strengthen community capacities to

cope with the presence of refugees,” for example, by way of improved water supply

and sanitation (WFP 2007:7). According to our two respondents from the Adult

Education College in Dar es Salaam the local population were often aware of these

advantages but were often not reported on when refugee issues are discussed or

debated in the local media (Res 1, Res 2, 09/04/07).

In some case patients were referred or for other reasons; or voluntarily went to

health centres and hospitals that had treated them previous to being placed into camps,

for treatment and follow-ups. Naturally, the large influx of refugees within that time

and space strained the local health capacities that were already understaffed, poorly

equipped and supplied. To ease the strain on these facilities the local population were

allowed to access the facilities within the camps. The IRC, for instance, payed for the

treatment the refugees received at the local health facilities and the revenue that this

brought were estimated at between Tanzanian shillings (TSH) 1 – 3 billion per year

(IRC 2007:1, Rutinwa et.al. 2003:31). The IRC also set up a programme known as the

Refugee Host Areas Programme (RHA) for the purpose of negotiation and mitigation

38

between the local population and the refugee community. The programme supports

the two groups by opening up new health centres as well as providing medical

equipment and training for the medical staff (IRC 2007:1).

In as far as education is concerned; it is especially during the refugee arrival

period that the disruption in the educational system is most noticeable. This is due to

the fact that the school buildings are used as temporarily shelters for the refugees

upon arrival before they get their designated camps (Rutinwa et.al. 2003:32).

Approximately 43% of the schools used for this purpose were situated in the Kibondo

area (Ibid, p.32). The usage of school buildings as transit centres had direct impact on

the educational set-up in the affected areas since school-buildings were already in

short supply.

Nonetheless, there were also some positive factors that need to be taken into

consideration when examining how refugees affected the educational in the Kibondo

area. The educational system is one of the very popular institutions target by the

donor community. UNICEF as a UN organ, together with INGO’s and NGO’s are

contracted to support education within and outside the camps for both refugee- and

host population. The UNICEF is one of the largest contractors working in the

education area with the main task of training teachers in the camps and the remaining

Kibondo area on the new teaching methods to incorporate the new curriculum

requirements such as “peace education/conflict resolution, landmine awareness,

HIV/AIDS.” (Unicef 2007:84). The UNICEF is also actively working in the gender

theme aimed at improving the learning situation for women and girls in the area

(Unicef 2007:84).

Water supply and sanitation was another challenging area as far as the

relationship with the local community and representation of refugees is concerned. A

vital natural resource closely linked to the physical and bio-systems of the area, the

hottest constraints were identified as polluted natural water sources and limited

ground water supplies (TPC 1999:103). The increases population intensity due to the

huge concentration of refugee in such a small area, often caused the pollution and the

destruction of vegetation cover. It is estimated that 20% of the total population in the

Kibondo area were affected by the pollution and environmental degradation due to

soil erosion (Ibid, p.37). Just as the educational sector is popular amongst the donor

community, so is the water and sanitation sector. The UNHCR was the largest

contributor to this sector within and outside the camps but there were also a great deal

39

of bilateral aid that was channelled to this purpose, from example, Denmark and

Japan (UNHCR 3). The methods that were used in order to support the water supply

and sanitation plants were quite modern requiring training so that the local population

could be able to and care maintain the facilities on their own (Unicef 2007:85).

From our research, we can draw the conclusion that the impact the refugee

presence in Kibondo had on development have been both positive and negative. In

reference to the health and education sectors; and to a good extent water supply and

sanitation facilities, the impacts on the whole were positive. As stated before, these

were the factors often used as indicators of social progress when studying and

quantifying poverty especially in a refugee population. Development, on the other

hand, was more associated with economic growth (Odén 2006:49). In economic

terms, we have shown that there was great increase in productivity due to the large

demand for food and other basic needs either locally produced or transported to the

area. The contributions, financial and technical, by the UNHCR and the donor

community in their efforts to assist the refugees mitigate the impact the refugees had

on the Kibondo area (Rutinwa et.al. 2003:49) are still in place often run by employees

predominantly from the surrounding communities. The area also witnessed a steady

growth in local businesses and trade due to the large number of staff that the different

organizations brought to the area (Ibid, p.49). Many of the donor agencies had a ‘local

purchase’ policy which greatly enhanced profits for local traders. The WFP is one of

the larger agencies that promoted this policy and always bought locally produced

grains with the Tanzanian government approval to prevent buying from farmers

where there was prevailing food insecurity (WFP 3 2007:1).

40

7. Discussion In our thesis we have examined how the Tanzanian government, the media, the donor

community and the local population represent the Burundian refugees. We have also

examined the development in the Kibondo area and the cross-border clandestine

activities which gave way to the militarization of the area; and how the real and

perceived representations of the refugees have impacted on development. In this final

chapter of our thesis we conclude our research by discussing the relationship between

the representations of the refugees by the media, the donor community and the

Tanzanian government; and the effects on sustainable development.

As stated our thesis, the migration discourse has gone through major changes

in the last couple of decades. Tanzania, which used to exercise an open-door African

solidarity policy toward refugees as they were perceived as assets and contributors to

the society rather hostile unfriendly foreigners who could be a threat to the stability

and development. Nevertheless, a gradual shift did take place which brought about a

changed policy; and we argue, as does Abiri, that there occurred a ‘securitisation of

migration,’ not without cause though. Hence, refugees came to seen as security threats

to the personal and community security of the local population as well as threats to

the environment, the development and national state security. This change had, as

mentioned previously, gained a global impetus. In particular, Kenya and Tanzania, on

the same fateful day in 1998, suffered very high-scale international security

incidences which clearly revealed the concern many countries around the globe had in

relation to UNHCR conventions and migration regulations. The Tanzanian 1998

Migration Act could be viewed against this background as well as the LRV instability

of the 1990s calling for special legal frameworks to deal with the new trends in the

globalization process.

The Tanzanian government, at the time we carried out our research, had a

strained relationship with the Burundian refugee community in the Kibondo area and

a major contribution is believed to be the lukewarm political climate between

Tanzania and Burundi and the ‘refugee fatigue’ prevailing in Tanzanian. Being one of

the few stable states in the region it is understandable that Tanzanian was regarded as

a safe place for refuge which has lead to the country playing host and bearing the

burden of being a safe haven for who may have hidden agenda and ambitions in

regard to their countries of origin. A close look at the proportion of refugees

41

imprisoned for violating mobility and employment prohibitions of employment and

other petty crimes it becomes clear that there is pressure within Tanzania to find

solutions to deal with this chronic emergencies. The best available options are,

hopefully, positive political developments in the countries of origin, including

Burundi, which would allow for voluntary repatriations. This places pressure on

Burundi government officials as well the opposition and donor communities, in

conjunction with the UNHCR and the AU, to work out solutions that could bring

about lasting peace in Burundi and the region. As pointed out in our thesis, the

disproportionate numbers of Burundian refugees and rate of flow, including the earlier

arrivals since the 1970, were beyond the capacity of a country like Tanzania. Even

with the best intentions under the old open-door policy, the political agitation and

armed insurgencies by a section of the refugees within and outside the camps, with

goal of forcibly returning to Burundi, called for some strong actions on the part of the

Tanzanian government, which could cause international outcry to the plight of the

genuine asylum seekers and those in need of protection. The question of objectivity in

representing refugee issues were thus put to test in light of the Tanzanian

government’s position calling for acute help in face of depleted resources, strained

community relations, collapsing infrastructure, environmental degradation and cross-

border skirmishes. A long-term solution to the refugee crisis was the most sought-

after diplomatic commodity involving several key players and nations including

Nelson Mandela the ex-South African president who chaired the peace negotiations

between the warring factions. At government level, Tanzania pursued a return-home-

and-live-in-peace policy which was also reflected in the local press and media;

however, some important facts concerning developments in the affected areas were

often omitted giving a one-sided rather negative image of refugees.

The UNHCR and the donor community, in comparison, depicted the refugee

as strong survivors and resourceful people committed to development if their situation

was managed carefully. The image of refugees as being a burden to the society was

portrayed as a short-term emergency situation rather than a continuous burden. As

events have shown, effect the refugees have on the local community and the

environment, for the good or bad, can be long-lasting and difficult to reverse. It is in

the interest and convenience of the donor communities, sponsored by various Western

countries and USA, to have the refugees stay in the region owing to the huge

logistical implications if, according to the Geneva Convention, the refugees were to

42

be relocated, for their own sake to avoid being violated by agents and persons from

across the border to their country of origin. Indirectly, the UNHCR and the donor

communities are in agreement with the Tanzanian government’s new temporary

protection policy close to the point of entry making the distance travelled, when

repatriating the refugees, for practical purposes much shorter and less costly in terms

of accommodation and administration. During our interview with UNHCR

representative, Mia Bülow, the representation of the refugees as contributors to

development in the society was conveyed, at the same time she expressed an

understanding of the Tanzanian government position and style of representing the

refugees. She also mentioned ‘refugee fatigue’ in the country as a leading factor to the

negative projection of refugees.

Furthermore, considering whether development in a country like Tanzania

would proceed faster without interference by refugee presence is highly hypothetical

considering the situation in the region to this date. One must conduct a research with

today’s situation as a starting point and weigh this against the hypothetical action of

repatriating all refugees from Tanzania immediately. We do understand that this is

impractical and the question that needs to be answered should rather be “what would

the situation in the Kibondo area be like if the UNHCR and all the donor states

working with the refugees withdrew?” Once again a very hypothetical issue that most

people involved with international development aid is wrestling with.

Under the current situation today, the benefits of the presence of the relief

agencies outweigh the negative impacts of the refugees on development. We were

able to show that there are several UN bodies and INGO’s and NGO’s in

collaboration with the Tanzanian government and local authorities, are working on

numerous programmes aimed at helping the local population in refugee affected areas

to mitigate the impact that the refugees had on the area. In regards to economic

growth the areas that have had large influx of refugees have grown very quickly and

were projected to reach the target goals set by the National Poverty Eradication

Strategy of June 1998 (Rutinwa et.al. 2003:49).

43

8. Concluding Remarks In our thesis we have established that;

• The representations of the Burundian refugees by the Tanzanian government,

and media to some extent contributed to the securitisation of the refugee

discourse.

• The securitisation of the refugee discourse in Tanzania led to the creation of

legal frameworks that, at some length, hindered the refugees from partaking in

productive societal activities; forcing many into survival crimes for survival

reasons.

• The Tanzanian media is, to a good degree, a power tool for the Tanzanian

government used to convey government positions on key issues such as the

causes and effects of the of refugee presence in north-western Tanzania.

• The UNHCR and the donor community depicted the Burundian refugees as

victims of power-play in their home country; and assets to the Tanzanian

government, a representations only valid for the refugees in Tanzania.

Concurrently, in many of the donor states there was ongoing process of

securitisation of the migration discourse.

• There are both real and perceived threats in regard to the refugee presence in

Tanzania but it was evident that the perceived threats could as well be the

mere stereotyping of the ‘other’.

• The real threats posed to development programmes in the refugee affected

areas were to some extent balanced out by the benefits offered in forms of

socio-economic assistance, for example, by the UN organs and the donor

community.

As a final remark we would like to point out that most of the researches that we came

across were within our work on the representations of refugees. A part from author

Abiri´s work, there were few materials that carried out information on why and how

the representations of refugees were one-sided; an interesting field for further studies.

In regard to communal development there are a multitude of topics that could be of

interest such as the transformations in the Kibondo area in the 1960’s-1980’s when

Tanzania had the open-door policy in place.

44

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Moses, Judy. (2000) Tanzania Media Report. [Online]. Available on: http://journ.ru.ac.za/amd/tanzania.htm [2007, May 2]. Mtanzania 1999 (1999,September) in Rutinwa et. al. 2003. (2003, September). The Impact of the Presence of the Refugees in Northwestern Tanzania. [Online]. Available on: http://www.refugees.org/data/warehousing/tanzania/docs/Refugee_Impact_Study_Sep_2003.pdf [2007, April 22]. Muhef 2002 No Author (2000) Infant, Child and Under-five Mortality Rates by Nation, Regional and District, 2002 Census. [Online] Available on: http://www.muhef.or.tz/articles/ref%20581.pdf [2007, May 2]. Muhef 1 2002. No Author (2002). HRH Constraints in Tanzania. [Online]. Available on: http://www.muhef.or.tz/articles/ref%20143.pdf [2007, May 2]. Rutinwa et. al. 2003. (2003, September). The Impact of the Presence of the Refugees in Northwestern Tanzania. [Online]. Available on: http://www.refugees.org/data/warehousing/tanzania/docs/Refugee_Impact_Study_Sep_2003.pdf [2007, April 22]. The Guardian 2000 in Rutinwa et. al. 2003. (2003, September). The Impact of the Presence of the Refugees in Northwestern Tanzania. [Online]. Available on: http://www.refugees.org/data/warehousing/tanzania/docs/Refugee_Impact_Study_Sep_2003.pdf [2007, April 22]. TPC 1999. No Author (1999). Kigoma Region Socio-Economic Profile. [Online]. Available on: http://www.tzonline.org/pdf/kigoma.pdf [2007, May 2]. UNHCR 2000. No Author (2000) A Handy Guide – To UNHCR Emergency Standards and Indicators. [Online]. Available on: http://www.the-ecentre.net/resources/e_library/doc/handyGuide.pdf [2007, April 25].

UNHCR (2005) Identifying Gaps in Protection Capacity –Tanzania at: Accessed

http://www.unhcr.org/protect/PROTECTION/429b19982.pdf 2007-04-18.

WFP 2006. No author. (2006, November). Protoracted Relief and recovery Operation United Republic of Tanzania 10529.0. [Online]. Available on: http://www.wfp.org/operations/current_operations/projects_docs/105290.pdf [2007, May 3].

WFP 1 2006. No Author. (2006, November). Vountry Programme United Republic of Tanzania 10437.0. [Online]. Available on: http://www.wfp.org/operations/current_operations/projects_docs/10437.0.pdf [2007, May3]

47

Verbal Sources

Bülow, Mia. Junior Programme Officer UNHCR in Dar es Salaam. Interview 30/03/07 Res 1and Res 2. Two (anonymous) respondents who were representing the Adult Education College of Dar es Salaam Interviews; anonymous at Kibata 09/04/07. Nyanduga Tom Bahame, the Commissioner / Special Rapporteur on Refugees, Asylum Seekers, Migrants and Internally Displaced Persons in Africa. 08/04/07 Other Sources

UNHCR 1 Computed from a document supplied by UNHCR Dar es Salaam

UNHCR 2 Computed from a document supplied by UNHCR Dar es Salaam

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KasamaKasamaKasamaKasamaKasamaKasamaKasamaKasamaKasama

Nkhota KotaNkhota KotaNkhota KotaNkhota KotaNkhota KotaNkhota KotaNkhota KotaNkhota KotaNkhota Kota

ChipataChipataChipataChipataChipataChipataChipataChipataChipata

SongeaSongeaSongeaSongeaSongeaSongeaSongeaSongeaSongea

TunduruTunduruTunduruTunduruTunduruTunduruTunduruTunduruTunduru

Vila de Mocímboa da PraiaVila de Mocímboa da PraiaVila de Mocímboa da PraiaVila de Mocímboa da PraiaVila de Mocímboa da PraiaVila de Mocímboa da PraiaVila de Mocímboa da PraiaVila de Mocímboa da PraiaVila de Mocímboa da Praia

Porto AmeliaPorto AmeliaPorto AmeliaPorto AmeliaPorto AmeliaPorto AmeliaPorto AmeliaPorto AmeliaPorto Amelia

TaboraTaboraTaboraTaboraTaboraTaboraTaboraTaboraTabora

ChungyaChungyaChungyaChungyaChungyaChungyaChungyaChungyaChungya

MbalaMbalaMbalaMbalaMbalaMbalaMbalaMbalaMbala MbeyaMbeyaMbeyaMbeyaMbeyaMbeyaMbeyaMbeyaMbeya

TakuyuTakuyuTakuyuTakuyuTakuyuTakuyuTakuyuTakuyuTakuyu

TangaTangaTangaTangaTangaTangaTangaTangaTanga

ZanzibarZanzibarZanzibarZanzibarZanzibarZanzibarZanzibarZanzibarZanzibar

MorogoroMorogoroMorogoroMorogoroMorogoroMorogoroMorogoroMorogoroMorogoro

IringaIringaIringaIringaIringaIringaIringaIringaIringa

ButareButareButareButareButareButareButareButareButare

KisumuKisumuKisumuKisumuKisumuKisumuKisumuKisumuKisumu

KisiiKisiiKisiiKisiiKisiiKisiiKisiiKisiiKisii

ShinyangaShinyangaShinyangaShinyangaShinyangaShinyangaShinyangaShinyangaShinyanga

NakuruNakuruNakuruNakuruNakuruNakuruNakuruNakuruNakuruNyeriNyeriNyeriNyeriNyeriNyeriNyeriNyeriNyeri

EmbuEmbuEmbuEmbuEmbuEmbuEmbuEmbuEmbu

MachakosMachakosMachakosMachakosMachakosMachakosMachakosMachakosMachakos

MoshiMoshiMoshiMoshiMoshiMoshiMoshiMoshiMoshiArushaArushaArushaArushaArushaArushaArushaArushaArusha

MbaleMbaleMbaleMbaleMbaleMbaleMbaleMbaleMbale KitaleKitaleKitaleKitaleKitaleKitaleKitaleKitaleKitale

TororoTororoTororoTororoTororoTororoTororoTororoTororoFort PortalFort PortalFort PortalFort PortalFort PortalFort PortalFort PortalFort PortalFort Portal

JinjaJinjaJinjaJinjaJinjaJinjaJinjaJinjaJinja

EntebbeEntebbeEntebbeEntebbeEntebbeEntebbeEntebbeEntebbeEntebbe

EldoretEldoretEldoretEldoretEldoretEldoretEldoretEldoretEldoret

NanyukiNanyukiNanyukiNanyukiNanyukiNanyukiNanyukiNanyukiNanyuki

MtwaraMtwaraMtwaraMtwaraMtwaraMtwaraMtwaraMtwaraMtwara

DodomaDodomaDodomaDodomaDodomaDodomaDodomaDodomaDodoma

MombasaMombasaMombasaMombasaMombasaMombasaMombasaMombasaMombasa

KAMPALAKAMPALAKAMPALAKAMPALAKAMPALAKAMPALAKAMPALAKAMPALAKAMPALA

KIGALIKIGALIKIGALIKIGALIKIGALIKIGALIKIGALIKIGALIKIGALI

LILONGWELILONGWELILONGWELILONGWELILONGWELILONGWELILONGWELILONGWELILONGWE

NAIROBINAIROBINAIROBINAIROBINAIROBINAIROBINAIROBINAIROBINAIROBI

Primary road

International boundary

Administrative boundary

Secondary town or village

Secondary road

Track, trails or footpaths

Railway

UNHCR Office

Refugee community

Refugee camp

LEGEND

Capital

United Republic of Tanzania

Lake VictoriaLake VictoriaLake VictoriaLake VictoriaLake VictoriaLake VictoriaLake VictoriaLake VictoriaLake VictoriaLake VictoriaLake VictoriaLake VictoriaLake VictoriaLake VictoriaLake VictoriaLake VictoriaLake VictoriaLake VictoriaLake VictoriaLake VictoriaLake VictoriaLake VictoriaLake VictoriaLake VictoriaLake VictoriaLake VictoriaLake VictoriaLake VictoriaLake VictoriaLake VictoriaLake VictoriaLake VictoriaLake VictoriaLake VictoriaLake VictoriaLake VictoriaLake VictoriaLake VictoriaLake VictoriaLake VictoriaLake VictoriaLake VictoriaLake VictoriaLake VictoriaLake VictoriaLake VictoriaLake VictoriaLake VictoriaLake Victoria

"""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""

C:\M

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OR

The boundaries and names shown and the designations used on this map do not imply official endorsement or acceptance by the United Nations.

UNHCR Mapping Unit.

((((((((((((((((((((((((((((((((((((((((((((((((((

((((((((((((((((((((((((((((((((((((((((((((((((((

((((((((((((((((((((((((((((((((((((((((((((((((((

((((((((((((((((((((((((((((((((((((((((((((((((((

((((((((((((((((((((((((((((((((((((((((((((((((((

((((((((((((((((((((((((((((((((((((((((((((((((((((((((((((((((((((((((((((((((((((((((((((((((((((

((((((((((((((((((((((((((((((((((((((((((((((((((((((((((((((((((((((((((((((((((((((((((((((((((((

((((((((((((((((((((((((((((((((((((((((((((((((((((((((((((((((((((((((((((((((((((((((((((((((((((((((((((((((((((((((((((((((((((((((((((((((((((((

((((((((((((((((((((((((((((((((((((((((((((((((((

((((((((((((((((((((((((((((((((((((((((((((((((((

((((((((((((((((((((((((((((((((((((((((((((((((((

((((((((((((((((((((((((((((((((((((((((((((((((((

((((((((((((((((((((((((((((((((((((((((((((((((((

((((((((((((((((((((((((((((((((((((((((((((((((((

(((((((((((((((((((((((((((((((((((((((((((((((((((((((((((((((((((((((((((((((((((((((((((((((((((( ((((((((((((((((((((((((((((((((((((((((((((((((((

((((((((((((((((((((((((((((((((((((((((((((((((((

((((((((((((((((((((((((((((((((((((((((((((((((((

((((((((((((((((((((((((((((((((((((((((((((((((((

((((((((((((((((((((((((((((((((((((((((((((((((((

((((((((((((((((((((((((((((((((((((((((((((((((((((((((((((((((((((((((((((((((((((((((((((((((((((

0

BURUNDIBURUNDIBURUNDIBURUNDIBURUNDIBURUNDIBURUNDIBURUNDIBURUNDIBURUNDIBURUNDIBURUNDIBURUNDIBURUNDIBURUNDIBURUNDIBURUNDIBURUNDIBURUNDIBURUNDIBURUNDIBURUNDIBURUNDIBURUNDIBURUNDIBURUNDIBURUNDIBURUNDIBURUNDIBURUNDIBURUNDIBURUNDIBURUNDIBURUNDIBURUNDIBURUNDIBURUNDIBURUNDIBURUNDIBURUNDIBURUNDIBURUNDIBURUNDIBURUNDIBURUNDIBURUNDIBURUNDIBURUNDIBURUNDI

RWANDARWANDARWANDARWANDARWANDARWANDARWANDARWANDARWANDARWANDARWANDARWANDARWANDARWANDARWANDARWANDARWANDARWANDARWANDARWANDARWANDARWANDARWANDARWANDARWANDARWANDARWANDARWANDARWANDARWANDARWANDARWANDARWANDARWANDARWANDARWANDARWANDARWANDARWANDARWANDARWANDARWANDARWANDARWANDARWANDARWANDARWANDARWANDARWANDA

UNITEDUNITEDUNITEDUNITEDUNITEDUNITEDUNITEDUNITEDUNITEDUNITEDUNITEDUNITEDUNITEDUNITEDUNITEDUNITEDUNITEDUNITEDUNITEDUNITEDUNITEDUNITEDUNITEDUNITEDUNITEDUNITEDUNITEDUNITEDUNITEDUNITEDUNITEDUNITEDUNITEDUNITEDUNITEDUNITEDUNITEDUNITEDUNITEDUNITEDUNITEDUNITEDUNITEDUNITEDUNITEDUNITEDUNITEDUNITEDUNITEDREP.REP.REP.REP.REP.REP.REP.REP.REP.REP.REP.REP.REP.REP.REP.REP.REP.REP.REP.REP.REP.REP.REP.REP.REP.REP.REP.REP.REP.REP.REP.REP.REP.REP.REP.REP.REP.REP.REP.REP.REP.REP.REP.REP.REP.REP.REP.REP.REP.

OF TANZANIAOF TANZANIAOF TANZANIAOF TANZANIAOF TANZANIAOF TANZANIAOF TANZANIAOF TANZANIAOF TANZANIAOF TANZANIAOF TANZANIAOF TANZANIAOF TANZANIAOF TANZANIAOF TANZANIAOF TANZANIAOF TANZANIAOF TANZANIAOF TANZANIAOF TANZANIAOF TANZANIAOF TANZANIAOF TANZANIAOF TANZANIAOF TANZANIAOF TANZANIAOF TANZANIAOF TANZANIAOF TANZANIAOF TANZANIAOF TANZANIAOF TANZANIAOF TANZANIAOF TANZANIAOF TANZANIAOF TANZANIAOF TANZANIAOF TANZANIAOF TANZANIAOF TANZANIAOF TANZANIAOF TANZANIAOF TANZANIAOF TANZANIAOF TANZANIAOF TANZANIAOF TANZANIAOF TANZANIAOF TANZANIA

BUJUMBURABUJUMBURABUJUMBURABUJUMBURABUJUMBURABUJUMBURABUJUMBURABUJUMBURABUJUMBURA

MuyingaMuyingaMuyingaMuyingaMuyingaMuyingaMuyingaMuyingaMuyinga

GitegaGitegaGitegaGitegaGitegaGitegaGitegaGitegaGitega

KibuyeKibuyeKibuyeKibuyeKibuyeKibuyeKibuyeKibuyeKibuyeKibungoKibungoKibungoKibungoKibungoKibungoKibungoKibungoKibungo

KigomaKigomaKigomaKigomaKigomaKigomaKigomaKigomaKigomaKasuluKasuluKasuluKasuluKasuluKasuluKasuluKasuluKasulu

RuyigiRuyigiRuyigiRuyigiRuyigiRuyigiRuyigiRuyigiRuyigi

KibondoKibondoKibondoKibondoKibondoKibondoKibondoKibondoKibondo

NgaraNgaraNgaraNgaraNgaraNgaraNgaraNgaraNgaraGikongoroGikongoroGikongoroGikongoroGikongoroGikongoroGikongoroGikongoroGikongoro

KoberoKoberoKoberoKoberoKoberoKoberoKoberoKoberoKoberoSongoreSongoreSongoreSongoreSongoreSongoreSongoreSongoreSongore

KigemeKigemeKigemeKigemeKigemeKigemeKigemeKigemeKigeme

MuboneMuboneMuboneMuboneMuboneMuboneMuboneMuboneMubone

MbubaMbubaMbubaMbubaMbubaMbubaMbubaMbubaMbubaLukole A/BLukole A/BLukole A/BLukole A/BLukole A/BLukole A/BLukole A/BLukole A/BLukole A/B

KizibaKizibaKizibaKizibaKizibaKizibaKizibaKizibaKiziba

MtendeliMtendeliMtendeliMtendeliMtendeliMtendeliMtendeliMtendeliMtendeliKaragoKaragoKaragoKaragoKaragoKaragoKaragoKaragoKarago

MtabilaMtabilaMtabilaMtabilaMtabilaMtabilaMtabilaMtabilaMtabila

KanembwaKanembwaKanembwaKanembwaKanembwaKanembwaKanembwaKanembwaKanembwaNdutaNdutaNdutaNdutaNdutaNdutaNdutaNdutaNduta

MkugwaMkugwaMkugwaMkugwaMkugwaMkugwaMkugwaMkugwaMkugwa

LugufuLugufuLugufuLugufuLugufuLugufuLugufuLugufuLugufu

MuyovosiMuyovosiMuyovosiMuyovosiMuyovosiMuyovosiMuyovosiMuyovosiMuyovosi

NyarugusuNyarugusuNyarugusuNyarugusuNyarugusuNyarugusuNyarugusuNyarugusuNyarugusu

MalagarasiMalagarasiMalagarasiMalagarasiMalagarasiMalagarasiMalagarasiMalagarasiMalagarasi

NyanzaNyanzaNyanzaNyanzaNyanzaNyanzaNyanzaNyanzaNyanza

RutanaRutanaRutanaRutanaRutanaRutanaRutanaRutanaRutana

KezaKezaKezaKezaKezaKezaKezaKezaKeza

NyaruongaNyaruongaNyaruongaNyaruongaNyaruongaNyaruongaNyaruongaNyaruongaNyaruongaKarusiKarusiKarusiKarusiKarusiKarusiKarusiKarusiKarusi

KakonkoKakonkoKakonkoKakonkoKakonkoKakonkoKakonkoKakonkoKakonko

ButareButareButareButareButareButareButareButareButare

KIGALIKIGALIKIGALIKIGALIKIGALIKIGALIKIGALIKIGALIKIGALI

IND

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OC

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OC

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N O

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AN

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OC

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AN

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OC

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NIN

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AN

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OC

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NIN

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N O

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AN

IND

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OC

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NIN

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N O

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OC

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NIN

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AN

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OC

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NIN

DIA

N O

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AN

IND

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OC

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NIN

DIA

N O

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AN

IND

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OC

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N

Lake Tanganyika

Lake Tanganyika

Lake Tanganyika

Lake Tanganyika

Lake Tanganyika

Lake Tanganyika

Lake Tanganyika

Lake Tanganyika

Lake Tanganyika

Lake Tanganyika

Lake Tanganyika

Lake Tanganyika

Lake Tanganyika

Lake Tanganyika

Lake Tanganyika

Lake Tanganyika

Lake Tanganyika

Lake Tanganyika

Lake Tanganyika

Lake Tanganyika

Lake Tanganyika

Lake Tanganyika

Lake Tanganyika

Lake Tanganyika

Lake Tanganyika

Lake Tanganyika

Lake Tanganyika

Lake Tanganyika

Lake Tanganyika

Lake Tanganyika

Lake Tanganyika

Lake Tanganyika

Lake Tanganyika

Lake Tanganyika

Lake Tanganyika

Lake Tanganyika

Lake Tanganyika

Lake Tanganyika

Lake Tanganyika

Lake Tanganyika

Lake Tanganyika

Lake Tanganyika

Lake Tanganyika

Lake Tanganyika

Lake Tanganyika

Lake Tanganyika

Lake Tanganyika

Lake Tanganyika

Lake Tanganyika

Lake Rukwa

Lake Rukwa

Lake Rukwa

Lake Rukwa

Lake Rukwa

Lake Rukwa

Lake Rukwa

Lake Rukwa

Lake Rukwa

Lake Rukwa

Lake Rukwa

Lake Rukwa

Lake Rukwa

Lake Rukwa

Lake Rukwa

Lake Rukwa

Lake Rukwa

Lake Rukwa

Lake Rukwa

Lake Rukwa

Lake Rukwa

Lake Rukwa

Lake Rukwa

Lake Rukwa

Lake Rukwa

Lake Rukwa

Lake Rukwa

Lake Rukwa

Lake Rukwa

Lake Rukwa

Lake Rukwa

Lake Rukwa

Lake Rukwa

Lake Rukwa

Lake Rukwa

Lake Rukwa

Lake Rukwa

Lake Rukwa

Lake Rukwa

Lake Rukwa

Lake Rukwa

Lake Rukwa

Lake Rukwa

Lake Rukwa

Lake Rukwa

Lake Rukwa

Lake Rukwa

Lake Rukwa

Lake Rukwa

Lake Nyasa

Lake Nyasa

Lake Nyasa

Lake Nyasa

Lake Nyasa

Lake Nyasa

Lake Nyasa

Lake Nyasa

Lake Nyasa

Lake Nyasa

Lake Nyasa

Lake Nyasa

Lake Nyasa

Lake Nyasa

Lake Nyasa

Lake Nyasa

Lake Nyasa

Lake Nyasa

Lake Nyasa

Lake Nyasa

Lake Nyasa

Lake Nyasa

Lake Nyasa

Lake Nyasa

Lake Nyasa

Lake Nyasa

Lake Nyasa

Lake Nyasa

Lake Nyasa

Lake Nyasa

Lake Nyasa

Lake Nyasa

Lake Nyasa

Lake Nyasa

Lake Nyasa

Lake Nyasa

Lake Nyasa

Lake Nyasa

Lake Nyasa

Lake Nyasa

Lake Nyasa

Lake Nyasa

Lake Nyasa

Lake Nyasa

Lake Nyasa

Lake Nyasa

Lake Nyasa

Lake Nyasa

Lake Nyasa

Sources: UNHCR, Global Insight digital mapping - © 1998 Europa Technologies Ltd.

As of April 2000