an african path to a global future

Cultural Heritage and Contemporary Change

Series II, African Philosophical Studies, Volume 19

An African Path to a

Global Future

Edited by

Rianna Oelofsen and Kọlá Abimbọlá

The Council for Research in Values and Philosophy

Copyright © 2018 by

The Council for Research in Values and Philosophy

Gibbons Hall B-20

620 Michigan Avenue, NE

Washington, D.C. 20064

All rights reserved

Printed in the United States of America

Library of Congress Cataloging-in-Publication

Names: Oelofsen, Rianna, editor.

Title: An African path to a global future / Rianna Oelofsen and Kola

Abimbola (eds.).

Description: first [edition].. | Washington DC : Council for Research in

Values and Philosophy, 2018. | Series: Cultural heritage and contemporary

change. Series II, African philosophical studies ; Volume 22 | Includes

bibliographical references and index.

Identifiers: LCCN 2018022945 | ISBN 9781565183230 (pbk. : alk. paper)

Subjects: LCSH: Africa--Economic policy--21st century. | Africa--Social

policy--21st century. | Philosophy--Africa.

Classification: LCC HC800 .A5684 2018 | DDC 338.96--dc23

LC record available at https://lccn.loc.gov/2018022945

Table of Contents

Introduction 1

Rianna Oelofsen

Part I. Western Philosophical Ideas Applied to African Problems

1. Oil and Environment in the Niger Delta Region of Nigeria: 9

Nexus between the Conflict and Prospects of

a Sustainable Solution

J.P. Afam Ifedi

2. Improving Political Participation in Nigeria Using 43

John Locke’s Social Contract Theory

Grace Umezurike

Part II. African Philosophical Ideas to Solve African Problems

3. Deconstruction and Reconstruction: Theory, Praxis and 69

Decoloniality in Steve Biko’s Conception of Religion

M. Zakaria Asmal

4. The ‘Libertarian Paradigm’ of Severino Elias Ngoenha 87

Anke Graness

5. Rediscovering Individual-based Values in 107

Ubuntu Virtue Ethics: Transforming Corporate Entities in

Post-colonial Africa

Grivas Muchineripi Kayange

Part III. African Philosophical Ideas to Solve Global Problems

6. Wangari Maathai as a Postcolonial Critique of 131

African Development

T.D. Harper-Shipman

7. Afro-communitarianism, Humanization and 159

the Nature of Reconciliation

Rianna Oelofsen

8. Everyday Justice: African Populism and Caring 179

Transitional Justice in Rwanda

Laura Roost

9. Evolution in Ethics: Interrogating the Notion of 203

Vengeance in Criminal Justice through the Lens of

Ancient Egyptian Legal Codes

Charles Verharen

List of Contributors 215

Index 219

Introduction

RIANNA OELOFSEN

In this book, we have put together a collection of papers which

applies African philosophical solutions to problems in areas of ethics,

health, education, economics and criminal justice, both in Africa as

well as the rest of the world.

Part One consists of papers which apply Western philosophical

ideas and frameworks to African issues such as health and political

participation. This is in line with the usual ways in which the world

has approached African problems for some time. The papers in this

section are examples of how philosophical ideas from the West can

continue to be useful when applied to local African contexts and issues

in order to solve African problems.

While this methodology of applying Western philosophical ideas

and frameworks to Africa can be argued to have some merit, there has

recently been a call to decolonize the ways we think about Africa, in

applying ideas with their roots in Africa to African problems, instead

of utilizing Western ideas in order to do so. Therefore, the second and

third parts of the book consist of papers which focus on African

philosophical ideas, and how they can be applied to both African and

global problems.

Africa has long been seen as a problem in our global discourse.

Parts Two and Three seek to invert the usual way of looking at Africa

as a problem, or as having problems that need to be solved with West-

ern intervention and ideas. Instead, they ask how we might apply

some of the wisdom, ideas and philosophies of Africa in order to solve

Africa’s own, as well as global problems. Different conceptual frame-

works rooted in the African context are therefore applied in order to

try and find solutions for African, as well as global problems.

Part I. Western Philosophical Ideas Applied to African Prob-

lems. As mentioned above, Part One of this book contains papers

which apply philosophical ideas and frameworks to the African con-

text in a bid to solve particular problems.

“Oil and Environment in the Niger Delta Region of Nigeria:

Nexus between the Conflict and Prospects of a Sustainable Solution”

2 Rianna Oelofsen

by J.P. Afam Ifedi focuses on the environmental as well as human

health and development challenges which have stemmed from oil

production in the Niger Delta region of Nigeria. Ifedi argues that the

Nigerian government has provided support and protection to oil com-

panies, and that the government’s attempts to minimize harmful

effects on local populations and the environment have not provided

lasting solutions to the problem faced by the area. This, Ifedi claims,

has had the result that there has been continuous violence perpetrated

against the government and the oil industries in the area. This has con-

sequently led to numerous social, economic and developmental chal-

lenges. Ifedi posits a solution to the problem based on environmental

justice, which in turn ought to provide social, economic and political

justice.

Grace Umezurike applies John Locke’s social contract theory to

the Nigerian context in order to show how the application of this

theory might improve popular political participation. Umezurike

argues that political participation in Nigeria is limited to the few, and

that there needs to be an attempt to improve popular political parti-

cipation. She claims that improved political participation would have

positive effects on the polity. Locke’s social contract theory, she

claims, has a framework of openness to popular political participation

and the common good. This theoretical framework, when applied to

the Nigerian context, is therefore postulated to be a way to change the

nature of political participation in Nigeria.

Part II. African Philosophical Ideas to Solve African problems.

In Part Two, we have a collection of papers which use ideas and frame-

works with their roots in the African context, and then these ideas are

applied to particular current issues pertinent to the African continent.

M. Zakaria Asmal in his paper, “Deconstruction and Recon-struc-

tion: Theory, Praxis and Decoloniality in Steve Biko’s Conception of

Religion,” analyzes Steve Biko’s understanding of religion and its

potential to play a role in the liberation of black South Africans. The

paper seeks to address two central questions. First it seeks to address

whether Christianity, despite not being indigenous to Africa, repre-

sents an authentic part of South African black people under coloni-

alism and apartheid. The author argues that Biko saw Christianity as

Introduction 3

significant and authentic for many black South Africans, despite the

religion not being indigenous. Second, as it is argued that Christianity

can have an authentic place within the lived reality of blackness,

Asmal addresses how it is possible to employ Christianity in the

liberation of black South Africans. In answering this question, this pa-

per highlights the links between Biko’s practical and contextual theory

and the work of two Africana philosophers, Du Bois and Fanon, there-

by transporting his idea of religion into the broader African global

diaspora, anti-colonial discourse and Africana existential philosophy.

“The ‘Libertarian Paradigm’ of Severino Elias Ngoenha” by Anke

Graness explores the concept of the ‘libertarian paradigm’ in the philo-

sophy of this Portuguese-speaking Mozambican philosopher. It is the

intention of this paper to take a first step towards greater inclusion of

philosophers and philosophy from Portuguese-speaking Africa in

African philosophical debate. The paper gives a short introduction to

this African philosopher’s work, and starts to explore the potential

and limits of his concept of the ‘libertarian paradigm’, especially

focusing on the understanding of responsibility within this paradigm.

Graness argues that Ngoenha’s concept of the ‘libertarian paradigm’

differs fundamentally from the Euro-American understanding of

libertarianism present in the literature. Ngoenha’s libertarian para-

digm is characterized by a continued lack of freedom of the African

experience of slavery, colonialism and neo-colonialism. He argues

that, as freedom is absent from the African experience, African

thought is characterized by an anxious quest for freedom. The core of

his libertarian paradigm is a particular conception of responsibility.

“Rediscovering individual-based values in ubuntu virtue ethics:

transforming corporate entities in postcolonial Africa” by Grivas Mu-

chineripi Kayange argues for the need to rediscover individual based

virtues in the postcolonial African context. As opposed to philos-

ophical literature on what can be called ubuntu virtue ethics which em-

phasizes communitarian virtues, Kayange argues that ubuntu virtue

ethics also includes some individual-based virtues. He claims that the

neglect of individual values, which has been the result of over-empha-

sizing communitarian virtues, while effective in the battle against col-

onialism has resulted in grave problems in the post-colonial African

context. In arguing that we ought to restore the importance of individ-

4 Rianna Oelofsen

ual-based virtues alongside communitarian virtues in the African con-

text, he claims that various types of African organizations can be

transformed.

Part III. African Philosophical Ideas to Solve Global Problems.

In the final part of the book concepts, ideas and theoretical frame-

works with their roots in Africa are applied to problems from around

the globe.

In this section, T.D. Harper-Shipman applies the philosophy of

Wangari Maathai to the World Bank’s Contemporary Development

Model (CDF). Harper-Shipman argues that the World Bank’s Compre-

hensive Development Framework is too limited, despite the inclusion

of some poverty-reduction goals. She argues that the problem lies

with the fact that the CDF is still rooted in neoliberal epistemologies,

and that this has the result of limiting its ability to identify and address

historical and systematic barriers to development. In contrast to the

CDF’s neoliberal framework, Harper-Shipman argues that Maathai’s

ideas are able to contextualize development in important ways which

results in the sustainable economic, environmental and political pro-

gress.

“Afro-communitarianism, Humanization and the Nature of Re-

conciliation” by Rianna Oelofsen argues that an Afro-communitarian

understanding of personhood has important implications for how we

understand reconciliation and its cognate concepts. If we understand

personhood in a communitarian way, this affects the way in which we

conceptualize responsibility, justice, forgiveness and humanization.

Once the effects of understanding reconciliation from an Afro-com-

munitarian perspective have been explained, Oelofsen offers some

tentative reasons why such a conception of reconciliation and its cog-

nate concepts is desirable.

Laura Roost in her paper reconceptualizes the ways in which we

ought to understand transitional justice, with reference to philoso-

phical insights gleaned from the care ethics of Joan Tronto, and the

African populism of Claude Ake, Mueni wa Muiu, and Godfrey Mwa-

kikagile. These theoretical approaches require the prioritization of

local voices with regards to transitional justice. Roost also includes

data collected from interviews in Rwanda and at the International

Introduction 5

Criminal Tribunal for Rwanda (ICTR) in Arusha, Tanzania, and

argues that these highlight the importance of responsiveness to the

local context and people. This stresses the importance of theoretical

frameworks which emphasizes local participation and ownership of

transitional justice mechanisms.

In the final paper of the book entitled “Evolution in Ethics: Inter-

rogating the Notion of Vengeance in Criminal Justice through the Lens

of Ancient Egyptian Legal Codes,” Charles Verharen provides an out-

line of a research program which is aimed at reforming the criminal

justice system in the United States. The research program is based on

Ancient Egyptian ethics, which prohibits vengeance. This prohibition

of vengeance stands in stark contrast to the Ancient Mesopotamian

understanding of justice, which is encapsulated in the principle of ‘an

eye for an eye’. Such retribution is prohibited according to the Egyp-

tian principle of ‘maat’ (translated as harmony, order, and justice),

which advocates the re-establishment of harmony after individual

wrongdoings have disturbed their communities. Crime is understood

as a disease which requires healing, as opposed to an action which re-

quires punishment. Verharen then refers to recent research in the

neurosciences which he argues may confirm the ancient Egyptian

understanding of crime as a disease, as opposed to an act of free will.

From this, Verharen therefore argues for the reformation of the crimi-

nal justice system in the United States, based on ideas and frameworks

based in African ethics.

Part I

Western Philosophical Ideas Applied to

African Problems

1.

Oil and Environment in

the Niger Delta Region of Nigeria:

Nexus between the Conflict and Prospects

of a Sustainable Solution

J.P. AFAM IFEDI

Introduction

The attendant net negative environmental, health and ecological

impacts of the oil industry are a global phenomenon. Numerous stu-

dies of the environmental and ecological impact of oil sourcing on our

planet and important, but unprotected, ecological areas have indi-

cated significantly damaging and irreversible trends. In some regions

the quality of water and air has become significantly degraded. There

has been a negative impact onrenewable natural resources, water pu-

rification, soil formation, biodiversity, and ecosystem services (such

as climate regulation) in many places around the world where oil is

found and extracted, as well as an increase in flooding and erosion.

This is the case in the Niger Delta region of Nigeria which is in the

throes of increasing agitation and militancy and a lasting solution to

the problem has so far eluded the Nigerian state.

This study argues that oil and the associated industries account

not only for the ecological problems, but also the heightened level of

angst, and the desperate level of poverty experienced by the people of

the Niger Delta. Frustration over the limited commitment of resources

intended for their social, economic, environmental and physical de-

velopment, as well as the neglect that has historically been their plight,

has led to sustained violence in the region. Thus far, the Nigerian state

has proved unable to meet and/or assuage the demands of the people

of the area by adequately addressing the issues that undergird the

agitation and militancy in the region; instead, some of the proposed

attempts to bring about peace have actually exacerbated the problem;

10 J.P. Afam Ifedi

essentially because the Nigerian state has not crafted a sustainable

solution for the degraded environmental condition of the Niger Delta.

This article proffers, as its primary purpose, environmental jus-

tice as a concept for understanding and explaining the agitation and

militancy in the Niger Delta. It outlines the fundamental tenets of the

approach and discusses the environmental and ecological damage

caused by the oil industry, as well as indicating how the tenets of en-

vironmental justice would help to resolve the Niger Delta predica-

ment. It reviews the causes of the agitation and ensuing violence that

are the outcome of the environmental, ecological and health issues

stemming from the oil enterprise. The study then argues that environ-

mental justice provides a conceptual point of departure for the crea-

tion of a new paradigm to formulate policies that can lead to the reso-

lution of the environmental, ecological and health problems, and con-

flicts in the Niger Delta.

Niger Delta: The Geographical Area and Its People

The Niger Delta region is one of the world’s largest wetlands and

the most biodiverse region of Nigeria. It is also the area where the

largest proportion of Nigeria’s oil is found, generating over 80% of the

country’s revenue. “The Niger Delta region has a population of ap-

proximately 21 million people (1991) and covers an area of about 70,

000 square kilometers. The people live in a few large cities and over

3,000 small and often remote villages/communities in the mangrove

swamps and lowland rainforests.” 1 The indigenous peoples of the

Delta depend mainly on fishing and farming as self-sustaining econo-

mic activities, but indigenes who reside in the urban centers depend

mainly on commerce and oil industry-related enterprises. The Delta

terrain is extremely difficult and a large swath of the area falls under

the “world’s fragile ecosystem.” Many of the communities are located

along the creeks and are accessible only by boats.

1Omene Oghenovo and James Obaebor, Towards Peace and Security in the

Niger Delta: The Urhobo National Association of North America’s Position: 2,

http://www.waado.org/organizations/UNANA/Statements/peace-niger_delt

a.html.

Oil and Environment in the Niger Delta Region of Nigeria 11

The Niger Delta consists of a number of ecological zones: “Sandy,

coastal ridge barrier, brackish or saline mangroves, fresh water, per-

manent and seasonal swamps, forest and lowland rain forest. The

whole area is traversed and crisscrossed by a large number of rivers,

streams, rivulets, creeks and twenty estuaries: Forcados, Escravos,

Benin and Ramos on the western flank, and Dodo, Pennington, Digo-

toru, Middleton, Koluama, Fishtown, Sangama, Nun, Brass, St. Nicho-

las, San Barbara, San Bartholomew, New Kalabari, Andoni and Opobo

on the east.” 2 These zones are particularly vulnerable to climatic

changes, vagaries of the weather, floods, sea encroachments and oil

pollution. Furthermore, it is necessary to make clear not only the geo-

graphic boundaries but also indicate the ethnographic, political and

linguistic areas of the Niger Delta; the long quotation below indicates

the outline of the areas:

Essentially, the Niger Delta covers the area supplied with

water from the River Niger and the River Benue as they flow

together after Lokoja to empty into the sea. These rivers (now

joined) break up at Abutor into the Rivers Nun and Forcados.

The Niger Delta proper is that landmass and body of water

traversed by the Rivers Nun and Forcados and their tribu-

taries. Cartographically speaking, the Niger Delta covers the

area located to the north around Aboh, West from the Benin

River estuary, East from the Imo River estuary, South to Palm

Point, below Akassa and the Nun River estuary. However,

prior to the discovery of oil in economically significant and

profitable quantities, the Niger Delta was essentially contig-

uous with the old Ahoada, Degema, Opobo, Ogoni (in today’s

River State), Brass and Yenagoa (in today’s Bayelsa state) and

Warri divisions (in present-day Delta State).3

Furthermore, defined in terms of its ethnography, the Niger Delta

is comprised principally of the Ijaw people—who are spread to Akwa

Ibom, Edo Ondo, and even Lagos states—together with various small-

2Niger Delta Watch (3 January, 2008:29), http://nigerdeltawatching.blogspot.

com. 3Ibid.

12 J.P. Afam Ifedi

er ethnic groups—the Itsekiri, the Urhobo, and the Isoko. Identified

linguistically by ethnography and culture, the Niger Delta is com-

prised of a bewildering mix of ethnic and cultural groups. Among

these are the Ijaw in the Eastern, Western and Central Niger Delta and

the Ogoni, Itsekiri, Urhobo, Isoko, Ikwere in the Eastern areas. More-

over, politically, the people of the Niger Delta broadly defined include

the following: Ijaw of Western Division, Ijaw of Brass Division, Ijaw

of Degema Division, Ogoni and Eleme of Ogoni Division, Ikwere and

other ethnic groups of Port Harcourt Division; then the Etche, Ekpeye,

Ogba, Egbema, Egenne, and Abua of Ahoada division; and Obolo and

Opobian of Opobo division. This would also include parts of Kwale

but Akwa Ibom state could also be infdcluded for development pur-

poses because of the similarity of its terrain: limited development and

developmental needs, stemming from a long history of neglect by the

Nigerian state. Akwa Ibom state is made up mostly of the people of

Ikot Abasi, Oron, Mbo, Ugua-Ibeno, Eket, Ibibio, Anang, Efik, Ijaw.4

Theoretical Consideration

The field of environmental and ecological devastation as a cause

of conflict is a relatively new field; thus, it essentially has no strong

empirical and theoretical basis upon which to gather, anchor, struc-

ture and/or integrate knowledge. However, further discussion of this

dearth of environmental and ecological theories is beyond the scope

of this paper. Rather, the paper concentrates on the nexus between oil,

environment, health, ecology and conflict from the perspective of

environmental justice. Arguments founded on environmental justice

would appeal to the long-term interests of all stake-holders, duty bear-

ers and rights holders. Hence, this study associates the problems of

environmental, health and ecological damage driving the conflict in

the Niger Delta, with the inability of the Nigerian state and oil majors

to ameliorate the problems of environmental degradation and health

damage; consequently, local peoples resort to agitation. According to

Adeniyi Gbadegesin and Kolawole Owolabi, “it is presently evident

4Niger Delta Watch (3 January 2008:30), http://nigerdeltawatching.blogspot.

com.


that the corporate security, economy and indeed the continued sur-

vival of Nigeria as a nation-state are being threatened and under-

mined today by the Niger Delta crisis.”5 The issue of security is a pro-

minent reason for the interest in the ecological crisis of the country.6

A crucial line of argument in this paper, therefore is that the conflict

in Nigeria’s oil-bearing Niger Delta region is the result, in substantial

measure, of the despoliation of the ecological balance and biodiversity

of the region, as well as severe environmental damage and health

issues; “environmental conflicts are traditional conflicts induced by

ecological degradation…[and] they manifest themselves as political,

social, economic, ethnic…conflict over resources.”7 Whenever human

rights and environmental justice are ignored, some degree of conflict

could ensue. An example of this scenario is the problem of the degra-

dation of the ecology of the Niger Delta area, with the attendant health

and agricultural deterioration that engenders disaffection. This paper

now turns to a brief explication and conceptualization of the notion of

environmental justice.

Environmental Justice

Environmental justice is a conceptual framework that undergirds

the environmental movement in general and, of specific relevance to

this paper, provides a way to understand the environmentally based

agitation and conflict in the Niger Delta in particular. The concept of

environmental justice has become well developed and, despite its

detractors, largely accepted as an explanatory basis for conflict that

can emanate from industrial despoliation of the environment around

the world.

The nascent quality of the concept of environmental justice is

such that theory formation based on the concept is not yet in place,

5Adeniyi Gbadegesin and Kolawole Owolabi, “Oil, Resource Management

and Social Justice in Nigeria,” Journal of Development Alternatives and Area

Studies, Vol. 23. No.1 and 2 (March-June 2004), p. 96. 6Hjort af Ornas Anders and Sverre Lodgaard (eds.), The Environment and

International Security (Uppsala: Uppsala University, 1992), p. 5. 7George Bacehler, “Why Environmental Transformation Causes Violence,”

Environmental Change and Scarcity Report, Issue 4 (1998), p. 24.

14 J.P. Afam Ifedi

but its full conceptualization could foster the development of theory

in due course. Strains of general positions which weld together the

environmental movement entail, inter alia, emphasis on a link between

poverty and environmental degradation, and the view that affirma-

tive social action must be taken by government and industry to ensure

that people their source of livelihood is not denied or diminished by

government inaction or industrial irresponsibility or both. A review

of the concept of environmental justice reveals a broad range of philo-

sophical and ideological positions concerning environmental protec-

tion for the sake of a healthy population and on the role of government

in keeping the environment healthy for its population by balancing

natural ecological systems and necessary human developmental

needs. The people of the Niger Delta are not environmentalist per se,

but their demands to Nigeria’s government and oil companies reflect,

essentially, what the environmental movement considers to be the

proper duty of every government to holders of rights, so as to meet

the requirements of environmental justice. This is supported by the

following observation by Nickel that “the right to a good environment

requires states [and businesses] to refrain from activities harmful to

the environment, and to adopt and enforce policies promoting conser-

vation and improvement of the quality of the environment.”8

Generally, researchers, commentators, activists, and students of

environmental justice view the concept as a logical extension of basic

human rights to have clean water, good health care, education, etc. In

other words, having a safe and sustainable environment is paramount

and all other rights are related to it. Environmental justice proposes

that people have an inalienable right to an environment that is not

compromised by environmental degradation. It is important that

human industry and/or activities of any kind not create environmental

conditions that could lead to the debasement of farmland, water, air

and other elements upon which sustainable healthy life depends. Fur-

thermore, it posits that responsible stewardship of natural resources

and fragile ecosystems by industry is guided by law and supported

by the public. It entails the fair treatment and meaningful involvement

8 Jacob Kiekemann Boesen and Thomas Martin, Applying a Rights-Based

Approach: An Inspirational Guide for Civil Society (Copenhagen, Denmark: The

Danish Institute of Human Rights, 2007), p. 6.


of all peoples in the enforcement of environmental laws, which would

be achieved when everyone enjoys the same degree of protection from

environmental and health hazards as well as equal access to the deci-

sion-making processes meant to develop policy for a healthy environ-

ment in which to live and work.

The concept of environmental justice is rooted, more specifically,

in the human struggle for an ecologically balanced approach to ma-

naging the environment upon which lives and stable health depend.

Furthermore, any consideration of environmental justice evokes cer-

tain salient basic tenets such as “rights to ethical, balanced and respon-

sible uses of land and renewable resources in the interest of a sustain-

able planet for humans and other living things…fundamental right to

political, economic, cultural and environmental self-determination of

all peoples…calls for universal protection from disposal of toxic/

hazardous waste and poisons…[and] a fundamental, right to clean air,

land, water, and food.”9 It expects protection of the rights of victims

of environmental injustice to receive full compensation for damages

perpetrated on their environment, and opposes the destructive opera-

tions of transnational oil companies.

Since the 1990s, the scope of studies based on the concept of

environmental justice has broadened considerably; it is now viewed

as a method of protecting and securing popular rights and justice. In

this regard, environmental justice is associated with addressing the

political, economic, and distributive concerns of the people of the

Niger Delta. It focuses on protection of the “human ecosystem from

the destructive effects of economic development, for the benefit of

both the present and future generations.”10 According to Griffiths and

O’Callaghan, the crucial significance of environmental justice lies in

the fact that it poignantly points to the harmful effects of environ-

mental degradation and offers ways to leverage political action in

order to correct them.11This facility rejects the common practice by

9Ibid. 10 Owolabi Olayiwola and Iwebunor Okwechime, “Oil and Security in

Nigeria: The Niger Delta Crisis,” African Development, Vol. xxxii. No. 1 (2007),

p. 1. 11Michael Griffiths and Thomas O’Callaghan, International Relations: The Key

Concepts (London: Routledge, 2002), p. 23.

16 J.P. Afam Ifedi

transnational companies of exploiting natural resources in developing

countries without due attention to the environmental interests of the

native peoples. Also, environmental justice takes the position that

states are obligated to promote and defend the economic wellbeing of

their citizens.

Furthermore, the concept was given shape and form by the

United Nations through its 1992 Conference on Environment and

Development (UNCED), also known as the Rio Earth Summit; that

conference highlighted the value of promoting, popularizing and

operationalizing the concept of sustainable development, thereby

changing the way the international system looked at the relationship

between the environment and development. The linkage between the

concept of environmental justice and economic development was

articulated by Griffiths and O’Callaghan, who write that “the idea of

human life invites us to focus on the individual’s need to be safe from

…events that are likely to undermine the normal pattern of everyday

existence.”12

With regard to the issue of human fairness, environmental justice

principles offer significant insights into the ways that the activities of

a state, which is non-conforming to its rights-bearer responsibilities,

can pose direct threats to people.13 This threat shows, as Scott Pegg

puts it, that the emanation and continuation of environmentally harm-

ful activities on the part of oil companies results from the close rela-

tionship between repressive state institutions and transnational com-

panies. Nigeria’s brutal actions in the Niger Delta represent the con-

duct of a state that acts at the behest of transnational oil companies.14

The concept of environmental justice includes other variants of the

framework that may be applied to the analysis of conflict, which

suggests that it is a suitable approach for understanding the causes of

conflict and resolving them. Essentially, these variants attempt to link

12Ibid. 13Pamela S. Chasek, “The U.N. Commission on Sustainable Development:

The First Year,” The Global Environment in the Twenty-First Century: Prospects

for International Cooperation (Tokyo: United Nations University Press, 2000), p.

378. 14S. Pegg, “The Cost of Doing Business: Transnational Corporations and

Violence in Nigeria,” Security Dialogue, Vol. 30. No. 4 (1999), p. 4.


development and conflict, on the assumption that development can

lead to the resolution of conflict. Attempting to understand and analy-

ze the conflict in the Niger Delta is the point of departure of this paper.

The flagrant ecological damage affecting the livelihood and subsist-

ence of the inhabitants of the Niger Delta and their posterity is respon-

sible for the prevailing crisis and the consequent insurgency radicaliz-

ing the Niger Delta region in particular; and the whole country of

Nigeria in general. “In the Nigerian case, the source of the conflict lies

in state power over profitable natural resources—oil—which ignores

the ecological and social security of local people.”15

In essence, the dialectical interplay of power, culture, economy,

etc., explains the prevalence of conflict in human societies. This analy-

sis consequently focuses on the role of political and economic forces

in the unfolding violence in the Niger Delta and explores how tradi-

tional modes of subsistence are at stake. The concept of environmental

justice serves as the framework for realizing the objective of this study.

The Nature of the Problem in the Niger Delta

The root causes of the Niger Delta problem are a profound lack

of development and the denial of human rights, in a sense this em-

bodies the concept of rights-based environmental justice. The region

is saddled with developmental and environmental challenges which

include high levels of poverty, the decline of agricultural production,

low levels of industrial activity, severe ecological degradation, and

social conflict. Efforts made so far to improve the poor conditions in

the Niger Delta have been difficult, expensive and unsustainable—

especially because implementers of the developmental efforts appear

to have no long-term interest in developing the region. Essentially,

discontent and restiveness began and continue in the Niger Delta be-

cause the region suffers from underdevelopment and environmental

and ecological degradation, despite the fact that the region is the

source of crude oil (first discovered in the Niger Delta village of

Oloibiri in 1956 and later in many other areas in the region).

15Michael Griffiths and Thomas O’Callaghan, International Relations: The Key

Concepts (London: Routledge, 2002), p. 291.

18 J.P. Afam Ifedi

As Osunde and Adeleye observe, “Nigerians have been witnesses

to gross ecological catastrophes in the Niger Delta, begetting the

destruction of means of survival through fishing and agriculture….

[This is a] crisis of environmental degradation and impoverishment…

in the region, which pose a grave danger to economic stability.”16

Environmental and Ecological Degradation

Environmental health and ecological degradation are critical

challenges in the Niger Delta. Several studies of the environmental

and ecological impact of the oil industry across the world, and specifi-

cally in the Niger Delta, have indicated significant deleterious, unsus-

tainable and sometimes irreversible trends.17 In some areas the quality

of the environment and ecology—flora, fauna, water, land, and air—

has become significantly degraded. Moreover, biodiversity, renew-

able natural resources and ecosystem services such as climate regula-

tion, flood control, soil formation, or water purification have also been

deleteriously affected. 18 Ecological and environmental degradation

also has serious security implications, which is obvious in the Niger

Delta region of Nigeria where a majority of the population rely heavily

on subsistence farming, fishing, groundwater, precipitation, and

hand-processing of natural resources. The people of the Delta region

are part of the overall ecology and they are dependent on products

from their natural environment for basic subsistence. Hence, the en-

vironmental and ecological degradation occasioned by the oil indus-

try has created conditions for conflict, because ecological damage

arising in the process of oil extraction negatively affects the quality

16Omotimi Osunde and Ayeni Adeleye, “Niger Delta: Collapse of Nigeria’s

Oil Hub,” Sunday Tribune (17 October, 2008), p. 2, http://www.tribune.coming

sun/05102008/sun_mag.html. 17See World Wildlife Fund International, et al., Living Planet Report 2008

(Switzerland: World Wildlife Fund International, 2008); Millennium Ecological

Systems Assessment, Ecosystems and Human Well-Being: Synthesis (Washington,

D.C.: Island Press, 2005). 18John T. Ackerman, Letter No. 2 to Africom: “Environmental Degradation

and Conflict in Africa,” Air and Space Power Journal (ASPJ), Vol. 1, No. 2 (2010),

p. 15.


and yield of their farming and fishing as well as their ability to sustain

simple agricultural subsistence for their families, in many cases. This

tends to extend the scope of the conflict over one economic commod-

ity, such as oil, to the associated difficulties around the production of

life-sustaining commodities, such as available land and productive

waterways. For instance, oil-driven conflict in the Niger Delta region

of Nigeria has had a negative impact on the production of yams, cassa-

va, pumpkin, cocoa and various fruits. Fisheries, inland and shellfish

beds, spawning grounds and other living waterways have equally

been destroyed or damaged beyond productive use.19 Moreover, it is

evident that environmental degradation that promotes injustice is

enabled by a rentier state that benefits from supporting the odious cor-

porate activities of transnational oil companies and their ecology-

damaging practices.20

The views of some of the militant organizations challenging the

Nigerian government make it evident that they are bent on continuing

their attacks on oil company installations in defiance of the military

presence in the Niger Delta that is meant to protect oil companies’

installations as well as the Nigerian government’s oil assets. The mili-

tant groups have embarked on violent actions against entities that

they feel are allied in their quest to produce oil to the detriment of their

group rights and the safety of their region’s environment. According

to Sahara Reporters:

The Niger Delta Greenland Justice Mandate blew up the

Afiesere-Ekiugbo delivery line in Ughelli, said to be operated

by the NPDC/Shoreline…,while threatening to also target

pipelines operated by First Hydrocarbon, NPDC, Seplat, Total

E&P, Shell, Agip, Saipem, Mobil and others. In a mocking

tone, the group told the Chief of Army Staff, General Tukur

Yusuf Buratai, to continue to ‘allow his crocodile to smile’,

19 Amnesty International, Nigeria, Petroleum, Pollution and Poverty in the

Niger Delta (London: Amnesty International Publications, 2009), http://www-

secure.amnesty.org/en/library/info/AFR44/017/2009/en. 20 Matthew Todd Bradley, “Civil Society and Democratic Progression in

Postcolonial Nigeria: The Role of Non-Governmental Organizations,” Journal

of Civil Society, No. 1 (May 2005), p. 62.

20 J.P. Afam Ifedi

warning that his ‘time for reckoning’ is at hand. To the oil and

gas companies: We have observed that you have placed your

trust in the guns and fighter jets of the Nigerian armed forces.

Our words for you are few: keep at it and wait for your

rewards, which have almost come upon you. It is a reflection

of your minds towards our people. You obviously do not

believe that the people of these parts are undeserving of good

lives. You hide behind the guns of the oppressors to pillage

our lands and our people, leaving us despoiled and our lands

raped. You do all manners of things you will dare not imagine

in other parts of the world where you operate. Here you have

failed all basic corporate social responsibilities, leaving the

people to languish in lack and ruins. Continue with your

insolence against our people, but we vow to you today that

we shall uproot every asset and facility you think you have

secured with soldiers and their guns.21

Furthermore, another statement in Sahara Reporters makes the

point that in opting to use force to attempt to crush the militants of the

Niger Delta rather than negotiate with them and/ or grant them their

environmental rights, the Nigerian government has sought a military

approach against the people of the region and seeks instead to protect

the oil companies; hence stoking the growing violence in the region.

Sahara Reporters notes and it is worth citing the report at length, that:

In response to the Nigerian military’s recent activities in the

region, a Niger Delta militant group blew up the Ogor-Oteri

delivery line….The Niger Delta Greenland Justice Mandate

(NDGJM), an Urhobo organization operating in the area,

claimed responsibility for the attack in a press release….In its

statement, the group claimed that it was fighting for justice for

the Niger Delta people….In the statement signed by Aldo

Agbalaja, the NDGJM threatened that it would not ‘sit quietly’

while the Nigerian military continues to bombard the region

21“Militants Blow Afiesere-Ekiugbo Delivery Line, Mock Buratai,” Sahara

Reporters (September 19, 2016).


and harm innocent civilians. The group is referring to its

defense of the region as ‘Operation Crocodile Tears’, a re-

sponse to the Nigerian military’s Niger Delta mission, ‘Opera-

tion Crocodile Smile’. It shall from now on be an eye for an

eye; for every military atrocity carried out in the creeks and

hinterland of the Niger Delta, the Nigerian armed forces will

have the Niger Delta Greenland Justice Mandate to contend

with, the statement reads. The group warned all those work-

ing in the region to evacuate, emphasizing that it does not

want to harm indigenes.22

Essentially, the Nigerian state is more concerned about the secu-

rity of oil production and installations than the security and susten-

ance of the people of the Niger Delta. Hence, the idea of harnessing

the powers of the state as duty bearer to provide security to the rights

holder lacks meaning in the context of the Niger Delta.

Unfortunately, the linkages between environmental degradation

and conflict in the Niger Delta are complex, but it is known that ecolo-

gical degradation can exacerbate conflict, which causes further ecolo-

gical degradation, giving rise to a vicious cycle of ecological decline,

tense competition for diminishing resources, increased hostility, inter-

communal fighting, and ultimately social and political breakdown.23

The Niger Delta region is situated at the apex of the Gulf of

Guinea on the west coast of Africa24 and on Nigeria’s South-South

geopolitical zone. The Niger Delta, which is home to some 31 million

people,25 occupies a total area of about 75,000 km2 and makes up 7.5%

of Nigeria's land mass. The Niger Delta region consists of 9 oil-pro-

ducing states (Abia, Akwa Ibom, Bayelsa, Cross River, Delta, Edo,

22“Militants Blow Up Pipeline in Niger Delta,” Sahara Reporters (August 30,

2016). 23 United Nations Environmental Program (UNEP), Africa: Atlas of Our

Changing Environment (Nairobi, Kenya: Division of Early Warning and As-

sessment, United Nations Environmental Program, 2008), p. 57, http://www.

unep.org/dewa/Africa/AfricaAtlas/PDF/en/Africa_Atlas_Full_en.pdf. 24H. Doust, “Petroleum geology of the Niger Delta,” Geological Society, Lon-

don, Special Publications, 50:1 (1990), pp. 365-365. 25E.M.M. Young, Food and Development (Abingdon, Oxon: Routledge, 2012).

22 J.P. Afam Ifedi

Ondo, Imo and Rivers) and 185 local government areas. This region

cuts across over 800 oil-producing communities with an extensive net-

work of over 900 producing oil wells and several petroleum produc-

tion-related facilities.26 The ecological zones in the Niger Delta region

can be broadly grouped into tropical rainforest in the northern part of

the Delta and mangrove forest in the warm coastlines of Nigeria. Man-

grove forests and swamps, which are characterized by regular salt-

water inundation, lie at the centre of a complex and sensitive ecosys-

tem which is vital to the local economy and accommodates important

flora and fauna.27 The Niger Delta, which is the largest mangrove

forest in Africa and the third largest in the world, is the richest part of

Nigeria in terms of petroleum resources and diverse natural ecosys-

tems supportive of numerous species of terrestrial and aquatic fauna.

With regards to the Warri trunk line spill,

the aggrieved communities stated that since the spill occurred

on August 17, 2016, crude oil has been gushing out from the

ruptured point, especially when crude oil is pumped through

the trunk line. They stated that the crude oil has spilled into

all their communities with their people suffocating from the

gas content contained in the crude oil and that if urgent steps

are not taken to arrest the situation, their communities may be

engulfed by a massive fire outbreak, which could lead to the

death of innocent people in their communities. They accused

the NNPC/ PPMC owners of the trunk line of deliberately

refusing to cooperate with the National Oil Spill Response and

Detection Agency (NOSDRA) to carry out a Joint Investigation

Visit (JIV) to ascertain the point of rupture and take steps to

stop further spillage and damage to their communities. The

communities call on Dr. Kachikwu to prevail upon the

26L.C. Osuji and C.M. Onojake, “Trace Heavy Metals Associated with Crude

Oil: A Case Study of Ebocha-8 Oil-Spill-Polluted Site in Niger Delta, Nigeria,”

Chemistry and Biodiversity, Vol.1:11 (2004), pp. 1708-1715. 27C.N.C. Ugochukwu and J. Ertel, “Negative Impacts of Oil Exploration on

Biodiversity Management in the Niger Delta area of Nigeria,” Impact Assess-

ment and Project Appraisal, Vol. 26:2 (2008), pp.139-147.


NNPC/PPMC management to take urgent steps to save their

communities and people.28

Moreover, many environmental and health problems brought

about by gas flaring are aptly explained in the following complaint by

Niger Delta communities; their indignation over the Nigerian govern-

ment’s neglect of the environmental damage caused by the oil com-

panies is well worth quoting at length. According to The Guardian

newspaper in Nigeria:

No fewer than 13 lives have been lost in the last two months

to gas flaring in six communities of Warri South West and

Ndokwa West councils of Delta State. The communities in-

clude Koko, Diagbene, Kwale, Abbe, Utagbe-Uno and Ebede.

Warri South West chairman, Mr. Sheriff Mulade, who spoke

with newsmen yesterday in Asaba, urged the Federal Govern-

ment to be tough with multinational oil companies over their

refusal to end flaring, insisting that they must be compelled to

adhere to best environmental practices. The failure of multi-

national oil companies to adhere strictly to best environmental

practices in the Niger Delta region coupled with the unholy

activities of pipeline vandals and those stealing our oil are

affecting the environment. They are destroying the ecosystem.

Today, as a result of air pollution, our roofs are being destroy-

ed by gas flaring. Life expectancy in the region is now very

short all because of unabated release of emissions to the air.

‘For too long, we have allowed these multinationals to destroy

our environment through unending gas flaring’, he lamented.

Mulade, who is also the national coordinator Centre for Peace

and Environmental Justice (CEPE), added: ‘It is amazing that

justice is far from environmental offenders in Nigeria. Presi-

dent Muhammadu Buhari should take responsibility by ad-

dressing this ugly menace in Nigeria’. In Kwale community

and its environs, investigation showed that the area had been

under siege of the harmful practice with wanton destruction

28Sahara Reporters (New York, September 21, 2016), p. 1.

24 J.P. Afam Ifedi

of crops and aquatic life…the situation is becoming too bad

for us. The flaring is killing our people. Our farmlands and

crops are being destroyed. Now, we have nothing again.29

Pollutants from pipeline leaks and oil spills, waste dumping and

blow outs are exacerbated by insurgent activities, as well as neglect of

proper maintenance and management of oil extraction and distribu-

tion implements.

Oil Spills and Ecology

As mentioned earlier, the human component of the Delta eco-

logy—namely subsistence farming, fishing, and palm oil processing—

has experienced drastic deleterious changes, negatively affecting the

lives of the people of the Delta region, as a result of deforestation, air

and water pollution, desertification and loss of arable land, which

have in turn contributed to the high rates of social disease as well as

physical and mental ill-health. There have been over 300 oil spills of a

magnitude of the 2010 BP Gulf Coast spill in the Niger Delta since the

inception of the activities of the oil industry, with attendant damage

to the ecology of the Delta region.There are no consistent figures on

the quantity of crude oil spilled in the Niger Delta, but it is widely

believed that an estimated 13 million barrels (1.5 million tons) of crude

oil have been spilled since 1958 from over 7,000 oil spill incidents—a

average of about 240,000 barrels a year,30 though it is believed that the

oil industry and government under report the problem of oil spills.

For instance, in June 2001 cleanup of an oil spill in the town of

Ogbodo was delayed for at least three months resulting in 15 km of

soil along the Calabar River being severely affected. High levels of oil

and grease, laden with hydrocarbons, damaged soil, aquatic resources

and the biodiversity of the area.31 All across the Delta region the water

29The Guardian (September 22, 2016), p. 1. 30United Nations Development Program, Niger Delta Human Development

Report (Abuja, Nigeria: UNDP, 2006). 31ERA/FOEN (Environmental Rights Action/Friends of the Earth), The Shell

Report: Continuing Abuses in Nigeria 10 years after Ken Saro-Wiwa (Benin City:

ERA/FOEN, 2005).


and soil have been poisoned with hydrocarbons, heavy metals and

other substances.32 Evidently, oil spillage has a major impact on the

ecosystem into which it is released. Immense tracts of mangrove

forests, which are especially susceptible to oil spills mainly because it

is stored in the soil and released annually during inundations, have

been destroyed about 5 to 10% of the Delta’s mangrove forest ecosys-

tems. The rain forest covering some 7,400 km2 of land has disappeared

as well.33 Furthermore, oil spills often reach populated areas where

there are agricultural activities, ruining crops and aquaculture, and

contaminating groundwater and soil. Bacteria feeding on oil then de-

plete the land of oxygen, leading to ecological imbalance, rendering

the area increasingly uninhabitable. Effectively, oil production has

caused a radical imbalance in the ecology of the Niger Delta region,

an outcome that is common in oil-producing regions.34 The careless

activities of the oil companies have led to ecological pollution occa-

sioned by oil spills, which have caused severe disturbances in the

Delta marine ecosystems and biodiversity, affecting all forms of flora

and fauna.

Oil Spills and Human Health

Some 45.8 billion Kilowatts of heat are discharged into the atmo-

sphere of the Niger Delta from combustion of 1.8 billion cubic feet of

gas daily.35 Soot usually laded with harmful chemicals drifts to the

ground, adversely affecting soil fertility and compromising human

respiratory health; it also causes such illnesses as cancer, asthma,

blurred vision and bronchitis. Associated with gas flaring are ecologi-

cally deleterious chemicals: nitrogen dioxide, sulfur dioxide, volatile

32Ibid. 33Ibid. 34 “The Niger Delta Environment,” Niger Delta Watch (3 January, 2008),

http://nigerdeltawatching.blogspot.com. 35T. Agbajeand and T. Olurin, “Language and Landcover Change in the

Niger Delta,” American Journal of Environmental Protection, Vol. 1:4 (2003), p.

78. Excerpt from the research report presented to the Center for Development

and Democracy (2003) in Aniefiok, et all, “Petroleum Production and Ex-

ploration: Past and Present Environmental Issues in the Niger Delta.”

26 J.P. Afam Ifedi

compounds: benzene, toluene, xylene and hydrogen sulfide, as well

as carcinogens: benzapyrene and dioxin. Exposure of persons and the

environment to these harmful chemicals is damaging.

Many studies have noted the deleterious effects of oil spills in the

Niger Delta on its human inhabitants as well as the fauna and flora.

To selectively illustrate the extent of the damaging effects of oil spills

and the activities of oil companies, a list of studies cataloguing the

effects of dangerous chemicals that damage the ecosystem, and the en-

vironment, and create a medical hazard for people, is necessary. The

oil spills often result in contamination of surface water with hydro-

carbons and trace metals, as measured using atomic spectrometry.36 A

study carried out in the mangrove wetland of the region recorded a

mean Total Hydrocarbon (THC) concentration of 23.6 + 4.3 mg/l in the

water, a mean concentration of 449.30 ± 55.42 μg/g in Tympanotonus

fuscatus (Periwinkle) and 278.57 ± 34.57 μg/g in Perioph-thalmus papillio

(Mudskipper).37 Another study recorded concentrations of benxo (a)

pyrene that ranged from 0 to 2.32 ug/l.38 The crude oil of the region

contains some naturally occurring radioactive materials (NORM); the

decay series of naturally occurring radio-nuclides is headed by (238)

U [uranium] and (232). This has mean activity concentrations of 0.80 ±

0.37 Bq kg (−1) and 0.17 ± 0.09 Bq kg (−1), respectively, in the crude oil

blends, while the mean concentration of the non-decay series

radionuclide, (40) K is 10.52 ± 0.03 Bq kg (−1).39 The radiation level

within oil spill sites is often up to 0.016 mRh-1, about 45% higher than

the normal background level of 0.011 mRh-1 in the Niger delta com-

36United Nations Development Program, Niger Delta Human Development

Report (Abuja, Nigeria: UNDP, 2006). 37H.I. Clinton, G.U. Ujagwung and M. Horsfall, “Evaluation of Total Hydro-

carbon Levels in Some Aquatic Media in an Oil-polluted Mangrove Wetland

in the Niger Delta,” Applied Ecology Environmental Research, Vol. 7 (2009). 38C. Anyakora, A. Ogbeche, A. Coker, G. Ukpo and C. Ogah, “A Screen for

Benxo(a)pyrene, a Carcinogen, on the Water Samples from the Niger Delta,

Using GcM,” Nigeria Quarterly Journal of Hospital Medicine, Vol. 14 (2004). 39T.R. Ajayi, N. Torto, P. Tchokossa and A. Akinlua, “Natural radioactivity

and Trace Metals in Crude Oils: Implication for Health,” Environmental and

Geochemical Health Journal, Vol. 31 (2009).


munities,40and the concentrations of the NORM in surface water are

often higher than the WHO recommended maximum permissible

limit for drinking water. A study of the Imirigin oil field in Bayelsa

State recorded an alpha activity of up to 16.95 Bg/l and a beta activity

of up to 135.88 Bg/l.41 The crude oil spills also reduced soil fertility, as

well as smothering economically viable trees and food crops, killing

them outright or reducing their yield,42 causing a 60% reduction in

household food security.43 The oil spills also reduced the quality of

food crops; the ascorbic acid content of waterleaf was reduced by 36%,

while the crude protein content of cassava was reduced by 40%.44 The

food insecurity and deterioration of the quality of staple food led to a

24% increase in the prevalence of childhood malnutrition in the

affected communities. The crude oil spills also resulted in the bio-

accumulation of heavy metals in the surviving food crops like cassava

and pumpkin.45 The concentration of lead and cadmium increased in

the leaves of pumpkin by 90% and 94.29%, respectively.

40O.E. Agbalagba and R.K. Meindinyo, “Radiological Impact of Oil Spilled

Environment: A Case Study of the Eriemu Well 13 and 19 Oil Spillage in Ug-

helli Region of Delta State, Nigeria,” Indian Journal of Science and Technology,

Vol. 3 (2010). 41R.K. Meindinyo and E.O. Agbalagba, “Radioactivity Concentration and

Heavy Metal Assessment of Soil and Water, in and around Imirigin Oil Field,

Bayelsa state, Nigeria,” Journal of Environmental Chemistry and Ecotoxicology,

Vol. 4 (2012). 42N.E. Edema, B.O. Obadoni, H. Erheni and U.E. Osakwuni, “Ecophyto-

chemical Studies of Plants in a Crude Oil Polluted Terrestrial Habitat Located

at Iwhrekan, Ughelli North Local Government Area of Delta State,” Natural

Science Journal, Vol. 7 (2009). 43B. Ordinioha and W. Sawyer, “Food Insecurity, Malnutrition and Crude

Oil Spillage in a Rural Community in Bayelsa State, South-South Nigeria,”

Nigeria Journal of Medicine, Vol. 17 (2008). 44R.N. Nwaoguikpe, “The Effect of Crude Oil Spill on the Ascorbic Acid

Content of Some Selected Vegetable Species: Spinach Oleraceae, Solanum Me-

longena and Talinum Triangulare in Oil-polluted Soil,” Pakistan Journal of

Nutrition, Vol. 10 (2011). 45M.U. Osam, M.O. Wegwu and A.A. Uwakwe, “The Omoku Old Pipeline

Oil spill: Total Hydrocarbon Content of Affected Soils and the Impact on the

28 J.P. Afam Ifedi

The average concentrations of heavy metals (mg/kg) in the leaves

of food crops46 show that exposures to the spilled crude oil were asso-

ciated with significant increases in the period prevalence for diarrhea,

sore eyes, itchy skin and occupational injuries.47 Shock, acute renal fai-

lure, extensive epidermolysis, conjunctivitis, mucositis, esophagitis,

and chemical pneumonitis were reported in a 2-year-old treated for

febrile convulsion after ingesting…crude oil. 48 Furthermore, Ade-

sina, Shittu and Omonigbehin and other researchers found in animal

studies conducted by feeding rats and other experimental animals

with foods contaminated with crude oil that exposure to Nigerian

crude oil could result in infertility,49 hemotoxicity,50 hepatotoxicity,51

and carcinogenesis (through its effects on chromatin DNA).52

Nutritive Value of Food Crops,” Archives of Applied Science Research, Vol. 3

(2011). 46E.E. Nkwoocha and P.O. Duru, “Micro-analytic Study on the Effect of Oil

Pollution on Local Plant Species and Food Crops,” Advance Bioresearch Journal,

Vol.1 (2010). 47B. Ordinioha and W. Sawyer, “Acute Health Effects of a Crude Oil Spill in

a Rural Community in Bayelsa State, Nigeria,” Nigeria Journal of Medicine, Vol.

19 (2010). 48B.E. Otaigbe and A.F. Adesina, “Crude Oil Poisoning in a 2-year-old Nige-

rian: A Case Report,” Anil Aggrawal’s Internet. Journal of Forensic Medical Toxi-

cology, http://www.anilaggrawal.com/ij/vol_006_no_002/papers/paper004.ht

ml (accessed 19 September, 2012). 49A.O. Adesanya, L.A. Shittu, E.A. Omonigbehin and A.O. Tayo, “Sperm-

atotoxic Impact of Bonny Light Crude Oil (BLCO) Ingestion on Adult Male

Swiss Albino Mice,” International Journal of Physical Science, Vol. 4 (2009). 50E.U. Eyong, I.B. Umoh, P.E. Ebong, M.U. Eteng, A.B. Antai and A.O. Akpa,

“Haematoxic Effects Following ingestion of Nigerian Crude Oil and Crude

Oil Polluted Shellfish by Rats,” Nigeria Journal of Physiological Science, Vol. 19

(2004). 51T.O. Sunmonu and O.B. Oloyede, “Biochemical Assessment of the Effects

of Crude Oil Contaminated Catfish (Clarias Gariepinus) on the Hepatocytes

and Performance of Rats,” African Journal of BiochemicalResearch, Vol. 1 (2007). 52I.F. Oruambo and C.A. Peter-Omoghia, “Alterations in Chromatin DNA

and Protein Absorbance Ratio in the Liver of Albino Rats (Rattus Norvegicus)

Treated with Bonny Light Crude Oil,” Journal of Applied Bioscience, Vol. 54

(2012).


Agitation and Violence

Recently, dissent with this situation, which was formally organi-

zed along village, clan, or ethnic group lines, has coalesced into a loose

network of aggrieved groups. The once peaceful protests against the

Nigerian government for redress of the problems of the area have

turned into armed conflict.

A sketch of the history of the problem and conflict follows. No-

tably, the first prominent attempt at confronting the government was

centered on secession of the Niger Delta region from Nigeria; it was

led by Major Isaac Jasper Adaka Boro, an Ijaw from Kaiama, in 1966.

For almost thirty years after Boro’s rebellion, other protest movements

occurred and persisted but while most post-Boro agitation was not

secessionist in orientation, there were demands for autonomy, a

government action plan on environmental protection, government

enforcement of oil company’s corporate responsibility toward the

surrounding communities, and recognition of the need for resource

control. This is reminiscent of the Ogoni uprising and peaceful

demands, and the violent action by militias such as the Egbesu Boys,

the Niger Delta Avengers, the Niger Delta Greenland Justice Mandate,

the Chicoco movement, the Ijaw youth-centered Niger Delta Volun-

teer Force; many of these disparate groups coalesced into an umbrella

group, a Movement for the Emancipation of the Niger Delta (MEND),

to better coordinate and advance their demands from the Nigerian

government.

Another prominent confrontation against the Federal govern-

ment came from the Ogoni people of the Niger Delta, who, like the

Ijaw, are protective of their identity and environment. It occurred in

1990 under the leadership of Ken Saro-Wiwa. Many rich oil fields

operate in the approximately 400 square miles of Ogoniland and they

have collectively yielded several billion dollars—most estimates put

the figure at about $40 billion—to the national treasury.53 Despite this

contribution, Ogoniland remains seriously undeveloped with largely

no electricity, clean pipe-borne water, job prospects, or economic

53K. Ogundamisi, “Isaac Adaka Boro Seven Day Revolution,” http://kayod

eogundamisi.blogspot.co.za/2008/02/issac-adaka-boro-seven-dat-revolution.

(accessed November 1, 2008).

30 J.P. Afam Ifedi

projects. Against this backdrop, in 1990 the Ogoni people made up of

Babbe, Gokana, Ken Khana, Nyokhana, Ueme and Tai, numbering

about 500 thousand in population, formed the Movement for the Sur-

vival of the Ogoni People (MOSOP) under the leadership of Ken Saro-

Wiwa, a writer, orator, and businessman.54

The organization adopted the motto “Freedom, Peace and Jus-

tice.”55 It was founded and governed under the principles of non-

violence and equality. Ken Saro-Wiwa and MOSOP attracted interna-

tional attention to the Ogoni cause, which demanded political and

economic empowerment based on resource control, ethnic rights and

environmental justice. They proclaimed the Ogoni Bill of Rights, while

reaffirming their wish to remain a part of the Nigerian polity; the

Ogoni demanded some basic guarantees from Nigeria’s ruling mili-

tary regime at the time under General Sani Abacha. Salient features of

the MOSOP demands included “political autonomy to participate in

the affairs of Nigeria as a distinct and separate unit, and right to the

control and use of a fair proportion of economic resources for Ogoni

development.

Furthermore, they argued that the search for oil caused severe

land and food shortages in Ogoni. Government-licensed oil-prospec-

ting companies often neglect environmental pollution laws, leading

“to the complete degradation of the Ogoni environment,…[I]t is

intolerable that one of the richest areas of Nigeria should wallow in

abject poverty and destitution, that successive Federal administrators

have trampled on every minority right enshrined in the Nigerian con-

stitution.”56 In January 1993, MOSOP held a rally which was attended

by almost half of the entire Ogoni population. MOSOP became in-

creasingly hostile to the violation of their rights—human and environ-

mental—by Shell, a federal government-licensed oil exploration, ex-

54K. Ogundamisi, “Isaac Adaka Boro Seven Day Revolution,” http://kayod

eogundamisi.blogspot.co.za/2008/02/issac-adaka-boro-seven-dat-revolution.

html (accessed November 1, 2008). 55Ibid. 56 Urhobo Historical Society, “Towards Peace and Security in the Niger

Delta: The Urhobo National Association of North America’s Position,”

http://www.waado.org/organizations/UNANA/statements/peace_niger_delt

a.html,


traction and processing company that worked in its territory. Shell

extracts about 3 percent of its oil from Ogoni territory. Officially

known as Shell Petroleum Development Corporation (SPDC), the

company is a joint venture:57 40 percent of the company is owned by

Shell, 10 percent is owned by ELF and 5 percent is owned by AGIP.

Shell is the operating partner of SPDC, which is the largest component

of SCiN (Shell Companies in Nigeria).Although MOSOP’s primary

target was the Nigerian government, the group has consistently

accused Shell of colluding with officials of the Nigerian government

to deprive the Ogonis of oil revenue and demanded compensation for

environmental damages caused by oil spills and gas flaring. The state

oil company, Nigerian National Petroleum Corporation (NNPC), 30

percent of which is owned by Shell, pulled out of Ogoni territory,

citing intimidation and hostility towards its staff and operations.

Nigeria’s military government, under General Sani Abacha,

responded to the outcome of MOSOP’s activities with a crackdown; it

created the Rivers State internal security task force unit to deal with

the Ogoni crisis. Ken Saro-Wiwa and several other Ogoni activists

were arrested in May 1994, following the mob killings of four Ogoni

leaders from a MOSOP faction that had opposed Saro-Wiwa’s tactics

and been accused by some of being government collaborators. Sixteen

members were tried for the murders and nine, including Saro-Wiwa,

were convicted and sentenced to death by a special military tribunal.

They were executed on 10 November 1995.58 In the years since then

many Ogoni activists have been detained and the movement was

practically suppressed; MOSOP has experienced internal fragmenta-

tion and lost its former cohesion and strength. Nonetheless, MOSOP

has continued to press for political and economic reforms.

In the interim, disputes between Niger Delta communities and

security troops continue across the Niger Delta. Disputes, especially

those involving oil companies, frequently lead to violent confron-

tations between residents and troops, who frequently use coercion

57International Crisis Group, “Interviews by Crisis Group Researcher in a

Former Capacity with MOSOP Officials, 2001-2005,” The Swamps of Insur-

gency: Nigeria’s Delta Unrest, Crisis Group Africa, Report No. 11 (5 August,

2006), p. 5. 58Ibid.

32 J.P. Afam Ifedi

and extrajudicial killings to suppress dissent. It would be beyond the

scope of this article to give a complete account of all such occurrences.

However, three such events—in Umuechem, Odi and Odioma—are

salient examples of what the now fully developed military outfits cite

as provocations contributing to an escalation of tension and radica-

lization of the Niger Delta struggle.

In October 1990, a peaceful protest by residents of the town of

Umuechem, River State, demanding electricity, water, roads, and

other necessities turned deadly, leading to a case of severely over-

zealous military repression. “A contingent of Nigeria’s mobile police

attacked the protesters and began shooting indiscriminately. About 80

people were killed and 495 houses were burned down. The soldiers’

action was in response to complaint from Shell that Umuechem oil

flow station was ‘invaded by an armed group with guns and machetes

and drove our staff away and demanded a number of things including

the equivalent in naira of [$160,000]’.”59

A judicial inquiry convened after the incident found no evidence

of any threat or wrongdoing by the members of the community; the

commission also concluded that the police had displayed a “reckless

disregard for lives and property.” After a return to civilian rule some

ten years later, another large-scale massacre by security troops

occurred.

“In 1999, several young men described as ‘hoodlums’ by com-

munity leaders in the Bayelsa state town of Odi kidnapped and killed

several Yoruba police officers in alleged retaliation for the earlier

deaths of Ijaws in the hands of Yoruba militants in Lagos. Then they

took refuge in the town of Odi.”60 The Nigerian government gave the

community a deadline to hand over the killers. After the deadline

lapsed, the security forces responded with extreme brutality and

committed atrocities. They made no effort to seek out and apprehend

the killers. Instead, they entered the town with tanks and armored

vehicles and, as if engaging in scorched earth warfare, razed to the

ground nearly all structures, killing many people—estimates range

from 23 dead, as reported by the government, to about 2,400 as stated

59 International Crisis Group, p. 6. 60 Ibid.


by local activist groups.61 Another act of mass brutality occurred in the

town of Odioma, Bayelsa state. The military claimed that it had come

under fire from militants in the village. In response, the soldiers shot

randomly, doused houses with gasoline, before setting them alight,

and raped women. At least 17 people were killed. Officials claimed

that the raid occurred after a warlord from Odioma was accused of

killing a dozen members of a government delegation sent to mediate

a dispute between Odioma and the nearby village of Obioku, over

ownership of an area that had recently been visited by a survey boat

contracted to Shell.62

Against the backdrop of these developments, the Ijaw youths

convened a conference in the town of Kaiama in 1998. The Ijaw people,

the largest ethnic group in the Niger Delta, announced ten resolutions

known as the Kaiama Declaration, and resolved to confront the Ni-

gerian government and the oil companies. The Kaiama Declaration

demands and conditions are well known. The salient ones include that

“all land and resources within the Ijaw territory belong to Ijaw com-

munities.” They advised that “all oil companies” staff and contractors

withdraw from Ijaw territory by December 30, 1998 “pending the

resolution of the issue of resource ownership and control in the Ijaw

area of the Niger Delta.” They also asked for a sovereign national con-

ference to restructure the Nigerian federation, and set up the Ijaw

Youth Council (IYC) to coordinate the struggle of Ijaw people for self-

determination and justice. These demands were not met or even con-

sidered seriously, and consequently the situation snowballed into a

full armed militant resistance against the government. The second

president of the IYC, Mujahid Dokubo Asari, led the establishment of

the Niger Delta Peoples Volunteer Force, one of the many militant

Ijaw groups engaged in armed confrontation against the government.

Asari’s arrest in August 2005 in violation of a ceasefire agreement led

to the amalgamation of some previously disparate and independent

militant groups to form a larger group previously mentioned known

as MEND, as well as the formation of other militant groups. Apart

from frequent armed confrontations with the federal troops, involving

61 Ibid. 62 Ibid., p. 7.

34 J.P. Afam Ifedi

loss of lives on both sides, the militant groups adopted hostage taking,

especially of foreigners, as an attention-getting and revenue-raising

strategy. Today, the Niger Delta is on the boil, as militant groups

engage federal troops in sporadic gun fights, take hostages, kidnap

innocent people for ransom, destroy oil facilities and infrastructure,

and engage in oil bunkering, taking oil from pipelines illegally for sale

on the black market.

Recent Government Policy Changes and Peace Overtures

All efforts to find peace in the Niger Delta have so far been futile.

The attempt by the federal government under President Shehu Musa

Yar’Adua to convene a stakeholders meeting with leaders of the Niger

Delta fell apart because of the Niger Delta leaders’ disagreement over

the choice of the proposed chairman for the conference, Professor

Ibrahim Gambari, a UN under-secretary from Nigeria; he was rejected

on the grounds of his support for General Abacha’s execution of Ken

Saro-Wiwa and other MOSOP leaders in 1990.President Yar’Adua has

since established a Ministry for the Niger Delta to coordinate develop-

ment efforts and ensure that they are carried out, but the Ministry has

met with criticism from militant groups and some leaders of the Niger

Delta, claiming that it is a merely symbolic gesture and potentially

ineffectual in resolving the core issues that undergird and stoke the

fires of conflict in the Niger Delta region. Recently, starting in 2016,

new disaffected groups have emerged expressing disappointment at

the newly elected Buhari government’s resolve to renege on the pro-

mises and programs put in place by the governments of Yar A’dua

and subsequently Goodluck Jonathan to rehabilitate former insur-

gents under the federal government’s amnesty program and award

pipeline security contracts to some of their leader. Prominent among

these groups is the Niger Delta Avengers (NDA), Ultimate Warriors

of the Niger Delta (UWND), the Red Egbesu Water Lions (REWA) and

the Joint Niger Delta Liberation Force (JNDLF). These groups make

demands ranging from outright secession, to autonomy within Ni-

geria, to securing the lion’s share of the oil block to pipeline protec-

tion contracts. In their activism, these groups have successfully tar-

geted oil installations and crude oil extraction pipelines. Their activi-


ties have reduced Nigeria’s oil production and exports from about 2.3

million barrels per day to about 1.2 million barrels per day, thereby

significantly diminishing Nigeria’s revenue flow, exacerbating the

country’s already fragile economy because of falling global oil prices.

In the interim, the violence in the Niger Delta region is continuing un-

abated. While some of the militant groups—MEND, the NDA—are

open to negotiations with the government, others—Niger Delta

Greenland Justice Mandate—are determined on outright secession

from Nigeria and are prepared to destroy the oil industry in order to

deny Nigeria the revenue that accrues from that resource, thereby

bringing down the country’s economy.

Reframing a Solution to the Problem on the basis of

Environmental Justice

It has become obvious that the prevailing policy approaches to

the Niger Delta problem have not worked to assuage the passions of

the indigenes. The policies have in common a framework of pater-

nalism and altruism. In the interim, it is evident that the core elements

of the demands of the Niger Delta communities are human and en-

vironmental rights. Therefore, in order to moderate their agitation, it

is important that the federal government begin to reframe and locate

policies and projects meant to address the demands of the Niger Delta

in terms of rights and justice. Adopting policies that are founded on

environmental justice would go a long way towards bringing about

lasting peace and development in the region. In response to the posi-

tion of the people of the Delta, a cardinal principle must be recognition

of the need to take into account their rights in a development context

and the integration of these rights into development policies and pro-

grams, “especially, the right to meaningful participation in decisions

that directly impact their lives would help to reverse the sense of mar-

ginalization.”63

Understandably, adopting a rights-based environmental justice

approach as framework for addressing the situation in the Niger Delta

63Helen Quane, “The Rights of Indigenous People and the Development

Process,”Human Rights Quarterly I, Vol. 27: 2 (2005), p. 652.

36 J.P. Afam Ifedi

may be the single most important policy challenge facing Nigeria. The

problems of the Niger Delta are essentially a national problem, not

that of the people of the area alone, and so it should be resolved by

adoption of a framework of environmental rights, as they should

accrue to all groups and communities. Reviewing the agitation and

causes of the problems as identified by most observers, especially the

Niger Delta indigenes, it becomes clear that though state responses

may have somewhat moderated the ongoing crisis, they remain in-

adequate and ineffective. The inadequacy of these responses is not

unconnected with structural issues that render them merely cosmetic.

Inadequacy is linked to issues of existential wellbeing, environmental

justice, self-determination, devolution of power and local control of

resources.

This paper has outlined the many environmental and ecological

problems caused by oil spills, as well as the attendant health hazards

they cause for the human population. The sum total of the deleterious

effects of the oil industry is extreme poverty—the land is polluted,

people made unhealthy, flora and fauna are destroyed; hence, the

popular resort to agitation and violence—especially as the govern-

ment and oil companies fail to solve the problem. The local Niger

Delta communities have no faith that the government is interested in

protecting their environment, or is serious about solving their health

and economic problems. Hence, resource control and self-deter-

mination are central aspects of their agitation. The suppression of the

Ogoni people and the various violent attacks by the Nigerian govern-

ment against the people of Odi, Ogoni, Obioku, Odioma, etc., despite

the just nature of their agitation, is reason for distrust of the govern-

ment, which acts only to protect and advance the interests of the oil

companies that bring the government financial earnings. Regardless

of the rectitude, imperative nature and clarity of the demands for

environmental justice by the Delta communities, the Nigerian govern-

ment insists on protecting the interests of the oil companies over the

interests and environmental rights of the host communities, fueling

agitation and conflict in the Niger Delta. Hence, the fundamental

cause of the Niger Delta conflict is the refusal of the government to

adopt policies that are based on environmental justice. Such policies

must rest on the recognition of the basic tenets of environmental


justice—people have a right to a safe environment in which to live;

they have a right to clean air, water, and land that is not ruined by

industry of any sort; they have a right to decent health expectations

and to oil industry practices that respect the need for a renewable,

stable and healthy ecology, and to policies that are able to readily

address any deleterious health effects of the oil production industry.

This paper argues that until the government adopts and formulates

policies that are based on the tenets of environmental justice, the

violence and agitation in the Niger Delta region of Nigeria are in all

likelihood bound to persist.

Conclusion(s)

The various issues associated with deteriorating health and

ecological degradation in the Niger Delta, brought about by the oil

industry and the difficult living conditions that it has engendered,

have led to agitation and violence, threatening the continued corpo-

rate existence of Nigeria. Any attempt at finding a solution to the

problems in the region must, therefore, be based on policy develop-

ment on the basis of a new paradigm founded on the principles of

environmental justice. The present Nigerian President, Muhammadu

Buhari, alluded to this in a recent interview on the Niger Delta prob-

lem; he said that “non-cleanup of oil spillages in the Niger Delta,

especially Ogoniland, was responsible for the militancy in the region

witnessed in the past.…[T]he devastation caused by oil spillage has

destroyed many lives and livelihoods and is clearly one of the reasons

many people in the region lost faith in government and resorted to the

many criminal activities we are seeing in the region today.”64 Presi-

dent Buhari’s view echoes the central thesis of this paper.

64“Niger Delta Militancy Fuelled by Non-cleanup of Ogonoland-Buhari,”

Vanguard (January 29, 2016).

38 J.P. Afam Ifedi

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2.

Improving Political Participation in Nigeria

Using John Locke’s Social Contract Theory

GRACE UMEZURIKE

Introduction

This work is premised on the idea that political participation is

fundamental to the development and sustenance of democratic cul-

ture. This very point has been consistently made by political theorists

from Plato to John Rawls. Irrespective of their various points of

divergence they ultimately tend to agree that the human person is by

nature a social being; and as such can only discover, develop and

actualize his/her potentials and lead a happy and healthy life in a

society. The implication of this is that the human person is by nature

a being with others; hence is naturally inclined to desire fellowship

with others. It is thus, and certainly trite knowledge, that human

existence and well-being to a large extent depends on the activities of

others.

In line with this position, John Locke in his Two Treatises on

Government anchored the emergence, governance and sustenance of

an ideal civil society on political participation. For Locke, a civil

society that can protect the fundamental rights of every human being

to life, liberty and estates and ensure their common wellbeing must be

one that emerged through and is governed by the voluntary decisions

of all individuals involved. This is because Locke sees the right of

individuals to self-determination as inalienable. Buttressing this point,

Locke (1952, 95) in his Second Treatise on Government asserts:

The only way whereby anyone divests himself of his natural

liberty and puts on the bonds of civil society is by agreeing

with other men to join and unite into a community for their

comfortable, safe and peaceable living one amongst another,

in a secure enjoyment of their properties and a greater security

against any that are not of it.

44 Grace Umezurike

The pivotal point here is that an ideal civil society is produced

and governed by the consent of the citizenry. Political participation is

therefore the foundation and a necessary propeller of a virile civil

society towards its ultimate goal which is the protection of human life

and property.

Regrettably in Nigeria, although it claims to be an example of a

civil society and as such its goals as enshrined in the constitution

(1999, Sect 15-17) claim to ensure `the maximal protection and promo-

tion of the common good of all Nigerians’, the historical, existential

and factual experience of its emergence and governance right from the

1914 amalgamation show that Nigeria cannot realistically lay claim to

being a civil society where political participation has been protected,

promoted and preserved.

Democracy, Political Participation:

A Conceptual Clarification: Democracy

The etymology of the word 'democracy' is from the Greek words

'demos'—the mob, a people, etc. and 'kratein’ to rule; thus a ruling by

the people (Demokratic). Democracy in the fifth century BC was used

by Herodotus as a rule by the people, which was characterized by

equality before the law. This equality emphasized here demonstrates

the very character of democracy, which brings it down to the common

person. No wonder then why people conceive of democracy as the

best system of government since it appears to orchestrate freedom and

independence. This was made clearer by St. Augustine, who insisted,

according to Mill (1947, 205). "That by Law of nature, man has no right

over man seeing that his power stops short at things and animals, men

have of themselves logically only the right to command themselves

and no human being can of himself impose any authority on others"

(Mill, 205). No doubt human beings’ dire need for freedom necessi-

tates the desire for democracy; a system where everyone is free to

express himself or herself (as long as it does not interfere with the free-

dom of others) without fear of punishment.

Accordingly, democracy is said to be practiced where political

authority is used for the good of the masses in a polity. It was based

on this principle that Pericles of Athens explained the Athenian

Political Participation in Nigeria and Locke’s Social Contract Theory 45

constitution saying that it is called democracy because power is in the

hands not of the minority, but of the whole people…(Hutchins, 216

quoted in Okoye, C.A. 99).

Democracy is characterized by individual empowerment

whether economic, political, social or religious; in a sense, the intrinsic

freedom governing democracy makes it possible for individuals to

participate freely and actively in the developmental process, be it

religious, economic, etc. Democracy is expected to lead the people to

prosperity and socio-political excellence. Democracy in sum could be

said to be best described by Abraham Lincoln as "the government of

the people, by the people, and for the people" (www.abrahamlincoln

online.org/lincoln/speeches/gettysburg.htm).

Political Participation

Political participation refers to the direct or indirect involvement

of citizens in the governance of their country. Political participation

can be broadly divided into two groups, namely, conventional and

unconventional political participation. Conventional political partici-

pation is concerned with one's involvement in political campaigning,

public hearings, recalls, referendums, running for public office, vo-

ting in elections, etc.; while unconventional political participation has

to do with one's involvement in activities such as public protests, civil

disobedience, political debates, community development and strike

action.

Accordingly, O.P. Gauba (2000, 445) gave a lucid clarification of

the concept of political participation in An Introduction to Political

Theory when he explains:

In short, political participation denotes the active involvement

of individuals and groups in the governmental processes

affecting their lives. In other words, when citizens themselves

play an active role in the process of formulation and decisions,

their activity is called political participation. Conventional

modes of political participation includes voting, standing for

office, campaigning for a political party or contributing to the

management of a public park,…interestingly an act of opposi-

46 Grace Umezurike

tion or public protest also involves political participation. For

example, signing a petition, attending a peaceful demonstra-

tion, joining a protest march…, etc. come within the preview

of participation….[T]hey are the manifestation of a strong

awareness of public interest.

Subject to the foregoing analysis and citation, one discovers that

political participation is an important paradox and a delicate political

theory. The theory obliges individuals to form and support a given

government, or the implementation of a given policy, based on certain

grounds.

Historical Analysis of Political Participation in Nigeria

Since Nigeria returned to democracy in 1999, Nigerians have not

been given the opportunity to participate actively in the governance

of their country by their various leaders. From its inception in May 29,

1999, the Obasanjo led federal government made political participa-

tion the exclusive reserve of the wealthy. Joe Achuzia observed this

when he said: "…power goes to those that can produce the financial

wherewithal. It does not matter how they come about the money…"

(www.nairaland.com/.../handed0biafra-ov...). The dominance of the

sphere of political participation by the wealthy and the attendant

forclosure of the vast majority of Nigerian citizens who are not

wealthy explains the ills of the Obasanjo-led administration.

The April 2007 general election conducted by the Obasanjo

administration was marred by widespread fraud, violence and open

ballot rigging. However, Umaru Yar' Adua won a landslide victory on

a PDF ticket and was sworn in as the first president to assume power

from a previously elected leader through the ballot box. Reacting to

the 2007 election Nasir El-Rufia noted:

Yar' Adua came into the presidency through an election which

observers within and outside Nigeria have condemned as the

worst in our history. For some of us in President Obasanjo's

government the elections were disappointing, but the best


candidate won. We elected our first president to have gradu-

ated from university… (www.nasire chronicles.com, 2008).

There was no popular political participation in Yar' Adua's

administration; rather, what the nation experienced was the recycling

of some of the very old hands as key government officials by the Yar'

Adua-led administration. In the downstream oil sector, for instance,

Alhaji Rilwanu Lukeman, (a 73-year-old) who had been minister of

petroleum already three times in this country's history, was

reappointed to the same office, and Kingibe; (then 62 years of age), an

old-breed politician and Obasanjo's appointee for secretary to the

government of the federation and national security adviser, were both

retained by Yar' Adua. Nasir noted that since "[a]ll three appointees

were older than Yar' Adua…, [and] the promise of generational shift

began to lose credence" (5). All these are cases of doing something in

a particular and similar way and yet expecting a different result,

which is not practically possible.

Due to the lack of popular political participation, the Yar' Adua

led administration lacked the political and administrative will to

implement his Seven Points Agenda with the zeal it deserves to make

the country the largest economy by the year 2020, and consequently,

the Yar’ Adua's vision 2020 ended up as other catch phrases like

“Vision 2010,” and “education for all by the year 2000,” and a host of

others which did not solve the problems necessitated those policy

pronouncements. Comparing Obasanjo's administration to Yar'

Adua's, Nasir concluded "From Obasanjo to Yar' Adua, Nigeria has

changed so much, mostly for the worse, that one wonders whether

Obasanjo's successor was handpicked, of the same party and of the

highest level of education than any leader has ever had" (www.nasire

chronicles.com, 2008).

Yar’ Adua's ill health, however, prevented him from fully exe-

cuting his powers and shortly before his death the national assembly

passed a resolution to enable vice president Goodluck Jonathan to act

as president. In addition parliamentarians used a common law rule,

the "doctrine of necessity" to underline the move which had no

precedent and was not explicitly backed by the constitution.

48 Grace Umezurike

Almost immediately after Yar’ Adua's death Jonathan was sworn

in as executive president of Nigeria. Against all odds, Jonathan finally

became the presidential candidate of the ruling PDP, which since has

experienced deepening divisions. Jonathan won the April 2011

presidential election and was sworn in as elected president in May.

Goodluck Jonathan came on board with his Transformation

Agenda, which was based and draws its inspiration from vision 20:

2020 and the first National Implementation Plan (NIP). The agenda is

based on a set of priority policies and programs which will transform

the Nigerian economy to meet the future needs of our people. The

cardinal elements of the Transformation Agenda of the Goodluck

administration include constitutional and electoral reforms and

transformation of the budgeting process. Others will include over-

coming the current security challenges through ensuring peaceful co-

existence, tolerance, employment generation, poverty alleviation and

job creation for Nigerian youths.

In terms of political participation, Jonathan's administration may

not have met the standard of popular political participation, but it has

done far better than all other general elections, because there was a

certain level of political participation. For instance, the ruling PDP

primary election was campaigned for and contested competitively.

Nobody was compelled to step down for another, in fact the elections

in both primaries and general elections were relatively free and fair.

Unlike the general election in 2007, which was marred by widespread

fraud, intimidation and violence, the 2011 election which brought

Jonathan into power was relatively peaceful and well organized. At

least people’s votes counted to some extent. However, it must be said

that there was post-election violence, which in my own view was more

religious than political.

Civilian administrations have not improved participation in the

electoral process because there has been outright disregard for the

rules and regulations that are supposed to guide the process. The

electoral process has not been able to create and promote conditions

conducive to the holding of free and fair elections by: (1) facilitating

an orderly voter registration exercise culminating in the publication of

a final voters’ register prior to elections; (2) carrying out a program of

voter education; (3) providing adequate voting materials, ballot boxes


and screened voting compartments; (4) ensuring an open collation

process, and (5) preventing voter intimidation and bribery. All these

shortcomings of the electoral process deny the electorates the right to

the value of their vote in democracy because the entire process is being

hijacked by a few people in the political class, especially the ruling

party. It is for these reasons that there is a great need for an enduring

and transparent electoral process which will be open, competitive, free

and fair. This cannot be achieved if INEC still remains under the

presidency that controls its budget and appointments. All in all,

elections must be credible, free and fair because that is what will

guarantee popular participation and the ejection of those that fail the

electorates.

Generally, in almost all cases up to the present administration,

elections have not been properly conducted, and, given these severe

constraints in the quality of elections, the government cannot be

considered fully democratically elected.

Basic Implications of Locke's Theory of Political Participation

Locke's theory of political participation can be argued to have

many implications that are relevant to the setting-up and develop-

ment of a viable, egalitarian political society. In relation to this point,

some of the most glaring and significant implications of Locke's theory

that have, are and would continue to accelerate peaceful co-existence

and sustainable development in different societies include: the need

to recognize and respect the sacredness, dignity and inalienable rights

of every human being; the rule of law; the sovereignty of the people;

majority rule/representation and the right to private possession. These

principles are acknowledged principles of liberal democracy. Little

wonder Locke is usually hailed as the progenitor, if not the father, of

liberal democracy. Let us examine the link between Locke's theory and

these principles in more detail.

Indeed, there is a strong link between Locke's theory and the

principle of the sacredness of human life, the inalienability of funda-

mental human rights and the sovereignty of the people. Locke's theory

is firmly anchored on the view that all human beings are essentially

free, equal and have certain fundamental rights that are inalienable.

50 Grace Umezurike

Thus, the human person is an end in itself and should be treated as

such; and not as a means to other ends.

This therefore implies the idea of sacredness, dignity and inalien-

ability of every human life. Moreover, Locke's political philosophy

maintains that human beings decided to form a political society in

other to protect their dignity and enhance their common good. The

importance of this is that the people are sovereign in Locke's political

philosophy. This is supported by the fact that for Locke the aim of the

political society is the protection of human rights, dignity and the

pursuit of the common good; and any government that digresses from

this noble aim can be dissolved by the people. In a very succinct

manner, J. I. Omoregbe (1991, 120) in “Politics and Morality,” attests:

The main function of government in Locke's philosophy is to

enforce morality and protect the fundamental human right of

individual citizens. The government is the servant of the

people. The people are sovereign and they reserve the right to

remove any government that fails to perform its duty pro-

perly.

Furthermore, Locke is a strong advocate of the rule of law, which

no doubt forms the cornerstone of democracy. Locke’s political philo-

sophy reorganizes the supremacy of law over everybody including

the legislature itself. For him, as Obioha (2008, 45-54) plausibly

observed "the law is no respecter of persons and therefore enjoys total

obedience and respect by all including the very operators of the law."

Of course, this is evident in the fact that Locke frowns on absolute and

arbitrary power. Thus in order to promote transparency, responsibi-

lity and adequate accountability Locke bestows the power of legisla-

tion, execution and supervision on different persons or groups of

persons. Commenting on this point, W.F. Lawhead states:

With brilliant insight, Locke suggested that the government

should be divided into separate branches, each serving as a

limit on the power of the other units. He called these execu-

tive, legislative and federative branches; the latter would su-

pervise the relations between the government and other


foreign nations. He also mentions the judiciary, but it was

Montesquieu (1689-1755) writing under the influence of

Locke, who made the judiciary the third branch of govern-

ment (291).

The focus here is that Locke's theory embodies the principles of

the rule of law, separation of powers, as well as checks and balances

between the various organs of political power. Obioha (2008, 45-54)

makes this point more explicit: "Locke's political liberalism is

characterized by the legislative, executive and judicial functions of

government being kept separate." The importance of this is that the

rule of law, separation of powers, and checks and balances are

essential ingredients for peaceful co-existence, good governance and

the sustainable development of any given political society.

In addition to this, other viable implications of Locke's theory are

the need to recognize and respect the right of every individual to

personal possessions and the idea of majority rule. Locke's conception

of private property as an inalienable right encourages industry,

enterprise and diligence. This is because for Locke one only has the

right to own the product of his/her labor, yet one is to not permitted

to own personal possessions beyond his/her needs and in so doing

deprive other people of the opportunity to also work, acquire their

own property and meet their personal needs. In this regard, the issue

of extravagance, exploitation and laziness are eschewed.

Locke argued for majority rule against the practical impossibility

of getting all people at all times to participate in decision making. For

him, if the consent of the majority is not taken as the act of the whole

then that of every individual would be needed. But Locke (1952, 98)

acknowledged the impossibility of all always being available as public

assembly: "the infirmities of health, and avocations of business will

necessarily keep many away from the public assembly." Thus, he

argued that the majority could constitute government. This signifies

that while civil society is formed by the consent of all, the government

which acts as a trustee of the people's right to secure their property is

constituted not necessarily by the direct consent of each individual.

Rather the consent of the majority suffices.

52 Grace Umezurike

With the foregoing elucidations, one can now see that there is an

inseparable affinity between Locke's theory of political participation

and the acknowledged principles of modern democracy: sovereignty

of the people, fundamental human rights, majority rule, separation of

power, the rule of law, accountability, and the protection of human

life and property. Locke's theory necessarily implies these principles

and plausibly maintains that any political society that observes, and

applies these principles will be fundamentally characterized with

social stability, peaceful co-existence, good governance and sustain-

able development.

Political Participation as a Linch Pin of Democracy

J.S. Mill (1947, 122) insists on the active participation of the

common person in major decision making of the state. Public offices

must also be made open for the masses to join, to say the least: the

people have the authority over their representatives who are servants

to them. Many scholars, like Mill, emphasize popular participation for

a system to qualify as democratic. The electorate reserves the

supremacy of power. This culminates in the respect of rule of law and

human rights, which represent a typical tenet of democracy. If we

speak of democracy, then we must be ready to accept the fact that the

power and even the sovereignty reside in the people. If this is the case

the people reserve the right to alter or abolish any government that

becomes destructive or that goes against the will of the people, so as

to ensure their safety and happiness. This removal can take any form.

To be precise, John Locke in his Treatise of Government advocated for

revolution in a situation where any government begins to act outside

the favor of the people. Often, revolutions appear to be the very last

resort to the problems created by a particular democratic system.

Some Problems of Political Participation

i. Culture and Religion: Culture and religion are intertwined, hence

the need to discuss the two together as one of the problems affecting

political participation (e.g. Muslims exhibit a Muslim related culture

in everything including politics, likewise in other religions). Some


religions/cultures forbid a certain category of people from political

participation and even partaking in other social activities. This prohi-

bition is sometimes based on factors such as sex, age etc. for instance,

the Muslim doctrine of the puda system (i.e., the seclusion of women)

forbids women from participating in social and political activities.

ii. Violence and Insecurity: Violence is an act against an individual

or group with the intent to cause injury or death. The majority of

violence that affects political participation is electoral violence, which

is very common in Africa.

Electoral violence refers to the use of force by political parties or

their supporters to intimidate opponents, which can result in seizures

of political power by the use of undemocratic means, such as force.

Electoral violence takes us many steps backwards and even beyond

the original state of man (i.e., the state of nature) to a state of war

because, according to John Locke (1952, 2nd treatise, 19), "force or a

declared design of force upon the person of another…is the state of

war…." Sometimes, violence is used to intimidate opponents, prevent-

ing them from expressing their choice of candidates for political

position in a free, open and transparent atmosphere. The effects of

electoral violence range from constituting a major threat to national

security to instilling fear and causing low participation in elections by

eligible voters. The latter casts doubt on the credibility of the pur-

ported elected leaders in the eyes of the local and international com-

munity. Similarly, it could affect the respect from the governed and

this could further affect the general acceptability of the popularity of

the government. This amounts to stealing of genuine mandate from

the voters, diminishes good governance, dashes the people's hopes

and expectations, and, finally, hinders or does away with public

accountability by the so-called elected officers.

Delivering a paper on "Nigeria: Electoral Violence and National

Security," the onetime Inspector General of Police, Tafa A. Balogun

(2003, 15) notes:

Electoral violence could in conjunction with other prevailing

factors lead to anarchy and ultimately to political instability.

The result has been that political opponents are either inti-

54 Grace Umezurike

midated or out rightly killed or injured (http://www.ace pro

tect.org/accessibility-info. (10/03/2015).

The situation, as indicated above by Balogun, scares people to the

extent that they do not even leave their houses during elections, let

alone vote or talk of contesting any election, given the risk involved

due to violence and insecurity.

iii. Gender Inequality: Attention is always on women whenever

gender inequality is considered as a problem in political participation.

This is because many factors hinder women from active political

participation especially in Africa. These factors include: tradition,

marriage, reproductive roles, lack of confidence, financial depend-

ence, and a lack of education. Considering marriage as an example,

many husbands restrict their wives from active political participation

for fear of losing their wives to other politicians, due to the misconcep-

tion that most women politicians are wayward. Also other family

responsibilities like child birth, child upbringing and other domestic

activities hinder women from active political participation.

iv. Political socialization: An endless process; it involves the

transmission of a people's, group’s or society's political culture from

generation to generation. It is a developmental process through which

people acquire political orientations and patterns of behavior. Political

socialization starts from childhood. Having identified political sociali-

zation as the transmission of political culture from one generation to

another, if one must investigate the interplay of politics and socializa-

tion in political participation, the best place to commence is from the

area of political culture which according to Almond and Verba, (1963:

150) "is a people's predominant beliefs, attitudes, values, ideals, senti-

ments and evaluations about the political system."

One's participation in the political system is conditioned or

influenced by the inherent political culture in the system. Some

countries, no doubt, have more participatory culture than others, in

which case they are more enthusiastic and proud of their institutions,

and are more effective in the roles they play.

Political culture per se does not account for political participation,

but when this culture is transmitted through the process of sociali-

zation it can then affect political participation. For instance, a child


who is socialized in the culture of political thuggery, acrimonious

rivalry, political assassinations, and political contest fraught with

election rigging and vituperation tends to develop negative attitudes

towards politics, or be entirely discouraged from political participa-

tion.

Generally, unhealthy political culture discourages political parti-

cipation. In Nigeria, for instance, the annulment of the June 12, 1993

general election has produced much apathy to political activities in

the country. Many people still find it hard to believe in the sincerity of

any transition program in Nigeria. This has succeeded in reducing

active political participation, including voting in elections.

v. Wealth and Godfatherism: Godfatherism is a form of patron-

client relationship in the political setting. It is a social problem. It has

resulted in political insecurity and violence that are threatening

participatory democracy, peace, political stability and the consolida-

tion of democracy. Former governor Chimaroke Nnamani of Enugu

State of Nigeria (2003, 45) defines a political godfather from his own

personal experience as “an impervious guardian figure who provided

the life line and direction to the godson, perceived [to] a life of total

submission, subservience and protection of the oracular personality

located in the large, material frame of opulence, affluence and decisi-

veness, that is if not ruthless…strictly, the godfather is simply a self-

'seeking individual out there to use the government for his own

purpose.”

Political godfathers build an array of loyalists around them and

use their influence, which is often tied to monetary considerations, to

manipulate the rest of society. They use their influence to block the

participation of others in politics. The godfathers are political gatekee-

pers who dictate who participates in politics and under what con-

ditions. The existence of such people is highly injurious to the ad-

vancement of popular, participatory democracy.

Improving Political Participation in Nigeria using Locke's Views

on Sovereignty

As Locke held, unlimited sovereignty remains with the people

who have the normative power to void the authority of their govern-

56 Grace Umezurike

ment if it exceeds its constitutional limitations. In order to overhaul

the radical contradictions which have surreptitiously crept into the

Nigerian polity due to lack of popular political participation; there is

a need to re-articulate our concept and practice of sovereignty within

Nigerian society.

Locke in his political philosophy located sovereignty in the

people. Government, according to Locke, is held in trust only in

service of the people. But in Nigeria the reverse is the case. Although

the constitution recognizes that sovereignty lies in the hands of the

people, in practice this is subject to manipulation. Even though the

constitution recognizes the people as the source of sovereignty; the

government is the actual source and influence behind the political

scenario in Nigeria. This means that sovereignty in Nigeria is not

located in the people. As such, the masses that are not able to partici-

pate in government have little or no hand in governance.

There is a need for change from this situation. The degree of po-

verty and underdevelopment in Nigeria, the level of marginalization

of the various regions of the country and the spate of corruption

among the rulers necessitate the need for such a change.

Hence, contextualizing Locke to imply a re-location of sover-

eignty in the Nigerian people entails the convening of all interested

groups of citizens to participate in the formulation of an autoch-

thonous constitution; which would empower the people to judge,

monitor and/or replace an erring representative as well as dissolve the

entire government if found wanting. This empowerment of the masses

to judge or dissolve government makes representation in Locke sig-

nificantly different from the representation by afew; unquestionable,

self-seeking Nigerian politicians.

The Rule of Law

The rule of law is essential in any society where human rights are

to be protected. It acts as a safeguard for human rights first by guaran-

teeing them legally, and second by providing a means for redress

when violations occur. The rule of law comprising the principles of

equality and due process exists in different forms in each country; it

may be contained in the power of judicial review, the separation of


powers, the doctrine of ultra vires (which prevents state organs from

proceeding beyond their scope), the principles of equality and in

statutory interpretations (Allan, 2001).

Locke according to Surianarayanan (1983, 3) laid down several

principles of the rule of law: Firstly, the same law must exist for the

favorite in court, and the countryman at the plough. Secondly, Laws

should be designed for the good of the people. Thirdly, the state can-

not raise property taxes without the consent of the people. Fourthly,

the legislative may not transfer law-giving power to any other body.

Theoretically, in Nigeria under civilian rule the function of the

rule of law is performed by a supreme constitution which ensures fair

hearing of trials in all cases and guarantees the preservation of rights

through the subjection of all classes and persons, including govern-

ment and its agencies, to its provision. But the rule of law in Nigeria

seems not to be practically enforced, as government officials are often

regarded as sacred cows; and therefore commit crimes and go free

without being tried in acourt of Law. Moreover, even when tried,

these government officials are hardly punished.

However, Nigerian laws are deliberately punctuated with loop-

holes so as to serve the interest of the successive ruling elite. Social

cognitive theory explains the path-ways through which leaders in

government perpetrate their guided dictatorship in the name of

democracy, as well as why the leadership elite may never surrender

to popular democracy as anticipated by Locke's theory of political

participation.

The rule of law implies equal subjection of all before the law, in-

cluding those people who are being detained without court warrants

and timely trials for fair hearing. Nigeria is yet to become a democratic

egalitarian society where every citizen is equally provided for and

protected by the law. Explaining the reason behind this Obi Nwosu

(2007, 48) avers “this is because, from the formulation stages, the laws

were skewed to favor successive leadership cabals and protect their

local and international interests and institutions. These laws were

deliberately punctuated with loopholes to enhance easy manipulation

and multiple interpretations, so that the same law can acquit a friend

and convict a foe.” All these problems notwithstanding, the rule of

law could still be reappraised in Nigeria, in light of Locke's theory,

58 Grace Umezurike

against the haphazard observation of the principle in Nigeria. Pre-

sently the judiciary in Nigeria might not be validly said to be totally

free from executive manipulation.

When the people are truly made to wield political power their

fears would be allayed, and the judiciary would become really inde-

pendent to adjudicate, even between the executive arm of the govern-

ment and individuals. Appropriate adherence to the rule of law would

really make the judiciary, not just the defender of citizens, but the

weapon in the hands of the people to checkmate arbitrary powers of

the trustee, government. It would further strengthen the people's will

as the law of the state; thereby ensuring the trustee (government)

respects the law which is the will of its principal, the people. It was in

this sense that Oputa (2003, 12), in the case of Governor of Lagos State

Vs Ojukwu stated "the law is no respecter of persons, personalities,

governments or power and the courts stand between the citizens and

the government, alert to see that the state government is bound by law

and respects the law." Such enthronement of equality before the law

would ensure equal trial and sanction of all members of the society, in

both torts and felony, without any immunity for any class. Most

corrupt government officials in Nigeria hide under the umbrella of

official immunity, committing certain crimes and going free. This, for

us, is cheating the people who are the actual possessors of sovereignty.

If any immunity were to be given to shield any class of people from

the law, it should be to the people and their stewards. Our view is that

the enthronement of the rule of law would guarantee a sense of

purpose among the elected public office holders and a commitment to

the good of all in the state.

Separation of Powers

In the 17th century, the doctrine of separation of powers was

developed by John Locke who saw in it a way of freeing mankind from

the injustice and oppression which resulted from an absolute system

of government. He argued that it would be unwise to give any arm of

government the power to do the duties of others, since they might use

their powers to exempt themselves from the law they had made for

their fellow citizens. Baron de Montesquieu (1989, Chapter ix) con-


tributed immensely to the development of this doctrine; and he did a

lot to refine it so as to ensure justice and fairness in the running of the

government. In his treatise titled The Spirit of Law he said:

Political liberty is to be found only when there is abuse of

powers, but constant experience shows us that every man

invested with powers, is liable to abuse it and to carry his

authority as far as it will go….To prevent this abuse, it is

necessary from the nature of things that one power should be

a check on another… when the legislative and executive po-

wers are united in the same person or body-there can be no

liberty. Again, there is no liberty if the judicial power is not

separated from the legislature and executive. There would be

an end to everything if the same person or body, whether of

the nobles or of the people, were to exercise all these powers

(1989, Chapter ix).

The doctrine then explains that it will be foolhardy to give law-

makers the power of executing the law, because in the process they

might exempt themselves from obedience and suit the law (both in

making and executing it) to their individual interest.

Locke saw the need to share government functions among

different arms of government, which Omoregbe (1991, 65) interpreted

to mean that it would not be proper for the same people to be vested

with the legislative and executive powers. For if the same group of

people both make and execute laws, self-interest would dictate both

the making and the execution of laws.

In order to preventthe executive manipulation of the other arms

of government, the influence of political power, if allowed to flow

from the people as Locke recommended, would create a conducive

atmosphere for the three arms to operate objectively.

Under the 1979, 1989 and 1999 presidential constitutions there

were greater separations of powers, in a manner similar to that of the

United States of America. Under all these constitutions, section 4

vested legislative powers in the National Assembly, section 5 vested

executive powers on the president and governors (and the powers

subject to other constitutional provisions or laws made by the Na-

60 Grace Umezurike

tional Assembly be exercised by them directly or through the vice

president, ministers or officers of the public service), and by virtue of

section 6 judicial powers were vested in the courts established by the

constitution (Mowoe, 24).

Now, the big question is: all these provisions of the constitution,

are they being adhered to in practice? The answer is no. Separation of

powers in Nigeria could be said to be a misnomer. This is so because

there is no actual freedom of the legislature and the judiciary from the

executive arm of government. Instances abound where the executive

attempted to manipulate the legislature or judiciary. An example was

the Obasanjo led government’s attempt to manipulate the legislature

to approve a third term against the provision of the constitution.

Locke saw the need to share government functions among different

arms of government, which Omoregbe interpreted to mean:

it would not be proper for the same people to be vested with

the legislative and executive powers. For if the same group of

people both make and execute laws, self interest would dictate

both the making and the execution of laws.

It is my opinion that the separation of powers between the tiers

and arms of government in Nigeria should be clearly defined and

protected in line with Locke's political theory. These various arms and

tiers of government should be made to be accountable to the people

instead of the executive arm. This would remove the undue fear and

desire for executive gratification which often influences the judiciary

either directly or indirectly. When the three arms are made to be

accountable only to the people, then the fear of being blacklisted for

financial neglect and the desire for better appointments and favours

by the executive would be removed. This would enable the legislature

to make laws in line with the people's will and desire, as contained in

the constitution, for the day-to-day administration of the country. It

would also empower the legislature to ratify the executive bill and

general functions in line with the people's will without any executive

manipulation.


Censorship Right and Impeachment

Government is a contract between the leaders and citizens. Citi-

zens will surrender some liberty to create a government that allows

them to overcome the inconveniences of the state of nature. This

implies that citizens have the right to abolish governments that do not

protect the common good of the citizens. Locke emphasized the

citizens' right to judge the performance of government, since the very

existence of the state and civil government depends on the consent of

the people. Also, "…the natural rights of life liberty and property to

the individual limit the power of the community" (Appadorai, 1968,

25). This is because the people merely gave up their right to enforce

the law of reason alone, for the preservation of their property.

Since the government power is being held as a trust, the people

desire to see government perform what they were entrusted to do. To

ensure the effectiveness of government, Locke (1952, 240) maintained

that the people shall play the role of censoring their performance.

Using his words, "…the people be judge."

Locke by this gave the people a wider scope of political participa-

tion even to the extent of censoring the activities of their representa-

tives/government. Locke declared that under natural law all people

have the right to life, liberty and estate; government is a social con-

tract, the people could instigate a revolution against the government

when it acted against the interest of the citizens and replace it with

one that served the interest of citizens. Therefore in some cases, Locke

deemed revolution an obligation. The right of revolution, thus, essen-

tially acted as a safeguard against tyranny. For Locke, the people have

a right to remove erring representatives or even dissolve a bad go-

vernment. This is because for Locke, as Omoregbe (1991, 65) rightly

observes. The government derives its power from the people, a

mandate to carry out the wishes of the people. If the rulers are not

fulfilling the wishes of the people then the people reserve the right to

remove them from power by rebellion and to elect new rulers who

would carry out their wishes.

Locke supposed that the most likely cause of a revolution would

be the abuse of power by the government itself. Locke's view is of

special relevance to the Nigerian state, because the people's right to

62 Grace Umezurike

revolt would overcome government's resistance to change. Govern-

ments in Nigeria, like other African nations, are most likely to resist

the people's attempt to dissolve it. The representatives in government

positions are likely to use the security and military outfits against the

people's attempt to dissolve any government. But Locke offers a way

out through the relocation of sovereignty in the people. If the people

are allowed to articulate their constitution, the control of the military

would be better exercised by the people through the legislature. In

that case, the president would no more remain the Commander-in-

Chief of the Armed Forces. Hence, the chances of the executive using

the military against the people would be reduced.

Locke's view on revolution would therefore legalize such actions,

as the constitution would empower the people to revolt against bad

government; dissolve and reconstitute a desirable government with-

out being guilty of treason. Revolutionary movements have resulted

in a change of government to leadership the people desire, in countries

like Romania, Afghanistan, Cote d'lvoire, Lybia, and Egypt. Hence,

the phenomenon of justifiable revolution in rebellion would equally

be of help in Nigeria: legalization of rebellion, resistance, by the bad

government would be difficult and unsuccessful. Thus Locke's option

for and promotion of the people's right to revolution would greatly

enhance the people's place and relevance in the re-organization of

Nigerian society; as it would enable Nigerians to put the rule into the

hands of those who may secure the ends for which government was

first elected.

Revolution or rebellion, in Locke's view, is the final instrument in

the hands of the people to safeguard their right to preserve their pro-

perty. The exercise of rebellion requires some fundamental enlighten-

ment. This calls for a thorough political education of Nigerians on the

basics of civil life and rights.

Conclusion

So far, there has been a thorough examination of the extent and

exercise of political participation in Nigeria; the conclusion being that

participation is mostly determined by a few individuals thereby fore-

closing the chance of popular participation. We have also exposed the


adverse consequences of such mode of political participation on the

nation and its people. Locke's view on political participation theory

has equally been seen to be open to popular participation and the com-

mon good; owing to this, it becomes necessary to suggest a change in

the mode of political participation and administration in Nigeria

using Locke's theory as a theoretical framework. Supporting the im-

perative of a change in the nature of political participation in Nigeria,

Okon Uya wrote:

The Nigerian democratic project must ultimately involve no

less than a revolutionary overhaul of our institutions, attitudes

and ideas as well as fundamental restructuring of the Nigerian

society economically, politically and socially. Democratizing

Nigeria will be a complex, slow, time-consuming, expensive

and contentious process encouraged only by the certain

knowledge that democracy is undoubtedly the best suited and

most efficient system in satisfying the expectations of the large

majority of our people (2000, 4).

He went on to explain that such change would create room for

the consolidation of democracy in Nigeria, which in turn would en-

gender the good of the citizens in general, which is the objective of any

democracy. Democracy entails "how to forge a developmental plan

process which is simultaneously participatory for individuals citizens,

sensitive to and protective of individuals rights, freedom and liberty"

(Oyovbaire qtd in Uya 5). By this, Oyovbaire holds that participation

in politics should be accommodative of multiple and competing loyal-

ties, generate economic growth and distributive justice. This entails

the absence of dictatorship whether of a tyrant ruler or a godfather

who uses his influence to determine the political pace of the state at

will. It entails a polity of free and equal access to political participa-

tion. Locke's theory of political participation offers a chance for such a

society by situating the political power of the state in the people: "the

natural right of life, liberty and properties reserved to the individuals

limits the just power of the communities" (Locke, 1952, 129).

In Locke's theory, the people wield the actual political power. If

we should implement that in Nigeria, our political history will change

64 Grace Umezurike

and our national objectives will be realized. It is obvious that the

proper application of certain principles inherent in Locke's theory can

help to improve political participation in Nigeria. These principles in-

clude: the sovereignty of the people, rule of law, separation of powers,

censorship right of the people and right to dissolve a bad government.

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Part II

African Philosophical Ideas to Solve

African Problems

3.

Deconstruction and Reconstruction:

Theory, Praxis and Decoloniality in Steve

Biko’s Conception of Religion

M. ZAKARIA ASMAL

No nation can win a battle without faith, and if our faith in our

God is spoilt by our having to see Him through the eyes of the

same people we are fighting against, then there obviously

begins to be something wrong in that relationship (Biko, 2004,

65).

This paper analyzes the role of religion in the writings of South

African Black Consciousness (BC) leader Bantu Stephen Biko. More

specifically, it will show how the academically neglected strand of

religion in Biko’s works is a central thematic concern in his exposition

of the Black Consciousness cultural revival project. This paper poses

two basic questions. First, considering that Christianity arrived with

colonialism but is nonetheless adopted by the majority of black indi-

genous South Africans, does Christianity as a religion represent a

veritable part of the lived reality of blacks in the apartheid and/or

colonial condition? Second, if Christianity does have a genuine place

within the lived reality of blackness, how can it be made relevant to

this reality, and be utilized in the quest for liberation? Answering

these questions may shed some light on the practicalities and libera-

tory potential of religion in the colonial, apartheid and postcolonial

situation, despite aspects of South African religio-culture being hy-

bridized with foreign precepts. This paper is premised on the fact that

Biko remains one of the great liberation thinkers of the twentieth cen-

tury whose ideas transcend one’s life and context, while remaining

relevant in South Africa and other postcolonial/racialized settings still

dealing with the structural and socio-psychological repercussions of

apartheid/colonialism, and with sittings where racial oppression

persists.

70 M. Zakaria Asmal

In answering these questions, this paper promotes a reading of

Biko that enables moving from abstract theory to a more compre-

hensive ‘practical theory’ sensitive to the apartheid context. This

paper argues that Biko’s construction of religion merges theory and

praxis by promoting Black Theology. This can be explained on the

broad level of Africana philosophy. First, Biko’s construction of reli-

gion is an attempt at resolving the negative socio-psychological

aspects associated with W.E.B. Du Bois’ “double consciousness” and

reconciling the conflicting identities of being both African and

Christian, despite colonial Christianity’s disdain for African religio-

culture. Second, this call for a merging into a positive single religio-

cultural consciousness is sensitive to Frantz Fanon’s imploration for a

decolonized methodology, where epistemologically colonized intel-

lectuals such as Biko’s black clergy are urged to rediscover indigenous

perspectives in articulating decolonial practical theory. Third, such a

method is constitutive of Africana existentialist philosophy’s empha-

sis on the lived experience of blackness in an anti-black world which

is premised on its thematic concern with ‘ontology’ (which poses the

question, ‘What is our religion?’) and ‘teleology’ (which poses the

questions How is religion to be liberated? and/or How are we to use religion

for liberation?).

Historical Overview

Does religion have a liberatory role in colonial and postcolonial

Africa? The genealogy of the term ‘religion’ in much of Sub-Saharan

Africa is indeed a complex one. As Chidester (1996) has shown, the

understanding of the term ‘religion’ by laymen and its conception by

scholars have been shaped by European colonists, missionaries,

settlers and travelers who applied a Eurocentric and often Protestant

framework to categorize African beliefs and culture. This process

most often distorted African cultural rituals, norms and mores in

order to fit into the a priori facets typically understood by Europeans

as ‘religion’ or ‘religious’. In Southern Africa, large-scale conversion

to Christianity followed the subjugation of the various indigenous

tribes, from the Khoisan to the Zulus and the Xhosas. Despite this,

most indigenous Africans negotiated between the new religion and

Theory, Praxis and Decoloniality in Biko’s Conception of Religion 71

their pre-Christian religio-cultural norms. What resulted from these

fusions were syncretic African Independent Churches that amalga-

mated Christian and African indigenous religio-cultural norms.

Biko was perhaps the foremost ideologue in South Africa’s

national liberation struggle against apartheid. Unlike the multiracial

political organizations with which Nelson Mandela and other African

National Congress (ANC) leaders became synonymous, Biko oper-

ated in a time of the banning of liberation political organizations. He

rose to prominence as a student leader and black grassroots develop-

ment coordinator. It is for his promotion of Black Consciousness and

the reassertion of black selfhood in the South African context that he

is most famous. Biko quickly rose to prominence as the undoubted

leader of the Black Consciousness Movement (BCM) and de facto

leader of the liberation struggle in the absence of the senior guard of

the ANC, who were either incarcerated or exiled.

Many in the international audience have viewed Biko as the

South African liberation equivalent of Frantz Fanon. While Fanon also

passed away at a young age, he nonetheless has a body of work that

can be accessed. Biko’s banning by the apartheid regime, in 1973, at

the age of 26 and his premature death in detention, in 1977, at the age

of 30 have resulted in our having finite access to his direct thoughts

and utterances (Wilson, 2011, 11). The sole surviving primary

documentary resource we have of Biko (apart perhaps from court

proceedings and a few rare interviews) comes from the short period

between 1969 and 1972; it is a collection of his writings and speeches

first published in 1978 under the title I Write what I Like (Biko, 2004).

Following his banning by the apartheid regime in March 1973, Biko

could no longer speak or write in public, in addition to being restricted

to his hometown of King William’s Town (Woods, 1987, x).

Because of the activist audiences being addressed and the some-

times informal nature of much of Biko’s speeches and writings, his

arguments are articulated coherently, although at times he does not

elaborate on these systematically or at length. Most academic focus on

Biko has been on the political and cultural aspects of his writings on

Black Consciousness. Yet religion plays a central role for Biko in its

role as the normative basis of values, its symbiotic link to culture and

its potential for asserting Black Consciousness. While scholarly works

72 M. Zakaria Asmal

have focused on culture, few have identified the role of religion as

largely collapsed within culture and as the normative core of the

culture Biko refers to. Throughout this article I use the term ‘religio-

cultural’ whenever Biko refers to the nexus between religion, culture,

norms and values; although Biko does not use this term himself but

alludes to it. For Biko religion is:

[N]othing else but what it is, i.e. a social institution attempting

to explain what cannot be scientifically known about the

origin and destiny of man….In most cases, religion is intri-

cately intertwined with the rest of [the] cultural traits of

society (2004, 59).

In the Africana philosophy tradition, Biko’s views on religion

provide not only a theoretical framework, but also a blueprint for

active resistance in the context of the economic and cultural oppress-

sion that colonialism and apartheid imposed. Thus, we may term

Biko’s discourse on religion ‘practical theory’ in the quest for a telos of

‘liberation’ in the broadest sense. Barney Pityana, a renowned Black

Theologian, a close friend and colleague of Biko, and part of the Black

Consciousness leadership, summarizes this point about reflective

practical action succinctly:

[B]lack consciousness drew much from the method and peda-

gogy of the Latin American grassroots development move-

ment….Social analysis leading to reflection and action were

critical tools of engagement (Pityana, 2008, 4, my emphasis).

How was this pedagogical approach founded on practice applied

to religion? It was in the form of Black Theology that Biko attempted

to translate theory to praxis in the pursuit of realizing the religio-

cultural goals of Black Consciousness. While Biko did not articulate

the content of Black Theology, he enunciated the context which made

it exigent and the guiding principles that it should be based on. While

the Black Consciousness Movement itself was crippled by the death

of Biko and the imprisonment of its leadership core, Black Theology

flourished and continued, as it still does today.


Du Boisian Problematic of Double Consciousness

Du Boisdefines double consciousness as follows:

After the Egyptian and Indian, the Greek and Roman, the

Teuton and Mongolian, the Negro is a sort of seventh son,

born with a veil, and gifted with second-sight in this American

world—a world which yields him no true self-consciousness,

but only lets him see himself through the revelation of the

other world.

It is a particular sensation, this double consciousness, this

sense of always looking at one’s self through the eyes of

others, of measuring one’s soul by the tape of a world that

looks on in amused contempt and pity. One ever feels his

twoness—an American, a Negro; two souls, two thoughts, two

unreconciled strivings; two warring ideals in one dark body,

whose dogged strength alone keeps it from being torn asunder

(1965, 215).

In Du Bois’ idea, African Americans are compelled to view

themselves not only from their own unique perspective, but more

significantly from the negative external perspectives of white society.

The internalization of this anti-black sentiment begins to shape black

experience, resulting in a multifaceted conception of self. This forces

two antagonistic identities that blacks have to suffer from and nego-

tiate between; who one is and the misrepresentations ascribed on

them from the outside (white) world. This twoness of possessing one’s

own sense of self and the imposed external contempt for an ascribed

self is what is double consciousness (Black, 2007, 394). For Du Bois,

this condition prevents true self-consciousness. However, double

consciousness can be ameliorated by merging and reconciling these

two positive identities and cultures (black and American), freeing

both from the harmful ascription and contempt imposed by the out-

side white world:

The history of the American Negro is the history of this

strife—this longing to attain self-conscious manhood, to

74 M. Zakaria Asmal

merge his double self into a better and truer self. In this

merging he wishes neither of the older selves to be lost. He

would not Africanize America….He would not bleach his

Negro soul…He simply wishes to make it possible for a man

to be both a Negro and an American, without being cursed

and spit upon by his fellow, without having the doors of

opportunity closed roughly in his face. This, then, is the end

of his striving; to be a co-worker in the kingdom of culture (Du

Bois, 1965, 215).

There are ontological, methodological and epistemological sig-

nificances in the formulation of double consciousness. Ontologically,

Du Bois’ framing the question of black people subjectively poses the

ontologically reflective question that asks, How is it to be viewed as a

problem in society and thus to be black? This important step acknowl-

edges black selfhood as a quintessentially human mode of being,

amidst the residue of colonial dehumanization. Methodologically, Du

Bois shows how the study of blacks is not akin to studying other

groups, because society presumes blacks to live extraneously to the

framework of accepted “peoplehood.” Thus, any study of blacks must

pierce the imposed veil against their very humanity, where they are

viewed as a problem group. Epistemologically, double consciousness

shows us that conventional ways to study blacks in most of the Hu-

manities function in a way where white normativity is presumed to

be the standard of the real. This implies that studying white society is

analogous to studying humanity at large and thus the ‘universal’,

while non-whites are treated as the ‘particular’. The fact that non-

whites are also human means that they perennially encounter the false

universal of their particularization (Gordon, 2008, 75-79).

Fanonian Demand for a Decolonized Methodology

Marc Black (2007) has attempted to link Du Bois’ idea of double

consciousness with the works of Fanon; although Fanon does not use

the term himself, he conceives of something similar. In order to realize

a decolonized methodology, the duality of circumstance and con-

sciousness that gives rise to the negative self must be transcended in


order to realize the truer self, and ultimately liberation. In Fanon’s

(2008, 2) words:

The black is a black man; that is, as the result of a series of

aberrations of affect, he is rooted at the core of a universe from

which he must be extricated. The problem is important. I

propose nothing short of the liberation of the man of color

from himself.

For Fanon, two antagonistic viewpoints result from the supplant-

ing of indigenous culture by that of the colonizing culture. This results

in an epistemologically colonized methodology where colonized intel-

lectuals educated in, or in the method of, the metropole adopt colonial

perspectives unwittingly:

The colonized intellectual, at the very moment when he

undertakes a work of art, fails to realize he is using techniques

and a language borrowed from the occupier. The colonized

intellectual who returns to his people through works of art

behaves in fact like a foreigner. (Fanon, 2004: 160)

The colonized intellectual must realize that this double con-

sciousness and alienation that have led him to adopt the culture of the

colonizer can only be remedied by employing a decolonized methodo-

logy where s/he rediscovers the space where the values and ways of

the people s/he has left behind can be found:

[T]he first duty of the colonized poet is to clearly define the

people….We cannot go resolutely forward unless we first

realize our alienation. We have taken everything from the

other side. Yet the other side has given us nothing except to

sway us in its direction through a thousand twists, except lure

us, seduce us, and imprison us….It is not enough to reunite

with the people in a past where they no longer exist. We must

rather reunite with them in their recent counter move which

will suddenly call everything into question; we must focus on

76 M. Zakaria Asmal

that zone of hidden fluctuation where the people can be found

(Fanon, 2004, 163).

For Fanon, colonized intellectuals or activists cannot hope to

liberate their people when they define liberation in the terms, episte-

mology and methodology of colonial white normativity, all the while

thinking and behaving similarly. It is only when they return to the

general population of the colony, and once again engage with their

forgotten culture and the struggles faced by it that they regain the

indigenous perspective. This indigenous decolonized perspective

should serve as the foundation to critique the colonized normative

perspective. Liberation must therefore obligatorily include appraising

the epistemology of one’s own colonized perspective through the

viewpoint of an indigenous evaluation.

In this it is not necessary that white, European or colonial per-

spectives must be completely expunged. Rather the focus should be

on constraining the epistemological ramifications of colonial cultural

dominance and its power to subvert one’s consciousness with its nega-

tive external perspective. This is similar to Du Bois’ merging of striv-

ings, with the colonized intellectual now employing a decolonized

methodology where s/he rediscovers a single consciousness that is at

ease with both one’s sense of self defined by indigenous perspectives,

as well as with the Western education received; which although still

external, does not now entail white normative assumptions nor im-

pose negativity into one’s reading of self and the practical action

required for decoloniality.

This epistemological colonization at the methodological level

thus demands radical self-reflection, because white normativity has

the argumentative power to shift the focus from the actual topic of dis-

cussion to influencing the very method the argument itself is based

on. If the methods themselves are racialized or colonized, the result of

any deliberative exercise would necessarily be simple affirmations of

racialism/colonialism. Thus, as Lewis Gordon has argued, Fanon de-

mands the “suspension of methodological claims, of making method

itself an object of inquiry whose ontological status must be sus-

pended” (2008, 85).


Africana Philosophy

Both Du Bois and Fanon form part of what has recently been

termed “Africana philosophy,” of which they must rank as the

greatest thinkers, “the international impact of their thought…of near

equal weight” (Gordon, 2008, 81). This broad umbrella term coined by

Lucius Outlaw (1997, 267) is defined as “a ‘gathering’ notion under

which to situate the articulations [and] traditions [of] Africans and

peoples of African descent collectively.” The more specific “Africana

existentialist philosophy” is a constituent part of Africana philosophy

and is defined as:

[T]he philosophy that is enunciated from the lived experience

of being black in the anti-black world and to chart a way for

liberation,…a tradition [of] philosophical mediations that are

concerned with the lived experience of black subjects in the

colonial condition, and the manner in which they should

militate against such an existential condition (Sithole, 2016,

178).

Due to colonization, slavery and racial oppression, Africana

existentialist philosophy deals with black selfhood and suffering in an

anti-black world. It “therefore, consists in reflections, rooted in black

experience…and the utilization of such reflections to challenges con-

fronting African and African-descended people” (More, 2004, 82).

There are two main compacted themes within Africana existentialist

philosophy: ‘ontology’ epitomized by identity, and ‘teleology’ epito-

mized by liberation. The first is reflective and asks “What/who am I?”

and goes to being and essence to answer “the ontological question about

black identify in an anti-black world” (More, 2004, 83). The second is

more practically contemplative and asks, “What ought we to become?”

in the quest for teleological liberation. These two questions reinforce

each other: to know what we ought to do we should know who we are,

while to know who we are often requires knowing what we ought to be

doing. This reinforcement converges into a third question, “Who is to

be liberated?” where ontology and teleology intersect (More, 2004, 83).

78 M. Zakaria Asmal

Biko and Religion

For Biko, religion possesses the potential to inform values and

ignite Black Consciousness. Since most blacks had accepted various

different forms of Christianity in varying degrees, for Black Con-

sciousness to be asserted Christianity requires an epistemological and

methodological re-examination. “Christianity,” says Biko, has proven

to be very adaptable and it “does not seek to supplement existing

orders but—like any universal truth—to find application within a

particular situation” (Biko, 2004, 103). That is why Black Theology is

needed. Biko (2004, 104) says further that he does not want to discuss

Black Theology at length, nor articulate it. Rather he attempts to state

its aims. It should be to relate God and Christ to the black man and his

daily problems and to portray Christ as a fighting God, not a passive

one allowing lies to go unchallenged. It should grapple with

existential issues without claiming to be a theology of absolutes. It

should seek “to bring back God to the black man and truth and reality

of his situation” (Biko, 2004, 104). This for Biko is a highly significant

part of Black Consciousness. Thus, it is the duty of all black priests to

adopt the Black Theology approach, “thereby once more uniting the

black man with his God” (Biko, 2004, 104).

For Biko, there are two levels at play when analyzing how

Christianity has culturally disenfranchised blacks in southern Africa:

that of its introduction and that of its interpretation. On the first level,

we must understand how Christianity was introduced and spread. It

is at this level that the double consciousness seeds of negative ascrip-

tion of black religio-culture were sown. For Biko, because religion and

culture are so intertwined, religion is part of the behavioral pattern of

society. Its adherents are therefore bound by religion’s limits through

their strong identification with the group. If religion is divorced from

the cultural make-up of that society, discontent and open rebellion

ensue. One can thus claim that most religions are specific, and where

there is a lack of specificity, a particular religion “must be sufficiently

adaptable to convey [its] relevant messages” (Biko, 2004, 59-60).

Despite Christianity’s going through myriad cultural adaptations

when it spread to other parts of the world, when the missionaries

came to southern Africa they painted religion as rigid:


Christianity was made the central point of a culture which

brought with it new styles of clothing, new customs, new

forms of etiquette….The people amongst whom Christianity

was spread had to cast away their indigenous clothing, their

customs, their beliefs which were all described as being pagan

and barbaric (Biko, 2004, 60).

The missionaries were aware that the way they propagated

Christianity was not essential to its central message. However, their

methodological aims were interwoven with the colonial project and

their “arrogance and their monopoly on truth, beauty and moral

judgment led them to despise native customs and traditions and to

seek to infuse their own values into these societies” (Biko, 2004, 103-

104). Soon a cleavage developed between the converted and the

pagans on the small matter of clothing. Such trivial religio-cultural

differences were blown out of proportion and internecine warfare

followed. This process of cultural dichotomization, for Biko (2004: 60),

stripped Africans from “the core of their being” and they “became

estranged from each other [and] a playground for colonists.” Conver-

sion to this ‘colonial-tainted’ Christianity was the watershed moment

in the struggle of Africans.

This nadir of conversion shows the link between accepting

Western religio-culture and destruction of African religio-culture.

Biko here alludes to colonialism and the missionary monopoly of

truth/beauty as foundational to the epistemology of the harmful

ascription of double consciousness. The missionary-imposed external

perspective which led to conversion concomitantly resulted in nega-

tion of self, derision of indigenous customs, open enmity and cultural

dichotomization, because Western values imputed negativity to Afri-

can religio-culture. This internalization of anti-black sentiment began

to shape black experience and created the antagonistic identities

which are the base of double consciousness. The converts who ac-

quiesced to the misrepresentations ascribed to indigenous culture

imbibed false values from white society and ridiculed the African self.

Biko uses the example of mission schools, where children were

taught vague concepts such as good manners under the pretext of hy-

giene, as though it had some religious significance, and consequently

80 M. Zakaria Asmal

to despise their mode of upbringing and question African values and

customs. Using their new social viewpoint children lost respect for

their elders after being taught to disregard family teachings and, sub-

sequently, they dismissed their own cultural background as bar-

barism. The logic of missionaries being placed at the forefront of the

colonization project was that blacks accepted Anglo-Boer concepts

and their negative imputations, becoming perpetual students looking

to whites for guidance and eternal supervision when subscribing to

the standards demarcated by these foreign concepts (Biko, 2004, 104).

Black Consciousness, for Biko (2004, 105), must eradicate this form of

double consciousness, because colonialism is never satisfied with

having people within its grip; it must also distort their culture and

history.

Exhorting black ministers and clergy to take up the mantle of

Black Theology, Biko decries the way that Christianity was introduced

into South Africa and the perpetuating epistemological and methodo-

logical legacies of this in the form of the second level of cultural disen-

franchisement: that of interpreting Scripture. “In a country teeming

with injustice and fanatically committed to the practice of oppression,

intolerance and blatant cruelty because of racial bigotry” and when

blacks are unable “to relate the present to the future because of a

completely engulfing sense of destitution,” Biko (2004, 60-61) finds it

unbelievable that the church “adds to their insecurity by its inward-

directed definition of the concept of sin and its encouragement of the

mea culpa attitude.” While ministers concern themselves with theft,

murder and adultery, none attempt “to relate all these vices to po-

verty, unemployment, overcrowding, lack of schooling and migratory

labour” (Biko, 2004, 61).

In a prime illustration of double consciousness, white missiona-

ries quickly established a description of blacks as lazy and as thieves,

while associating worth and value with whiteness. On the epistemolo-

gical and methodological levels, black churches and ministers con-

sequently likewise do not see vices such as theft as manifestations of

injustice, but rather as the externally ascribed proof of black savagery

(Biko, 2004, 61). In effect the black clergy, much like the early converts,

in Du Bois’ words, saw black culture and themselves “through the

revelation of the other world…always looking at one’s self through


the eyes of others, of measuring one’s soul by the tape of a world that

looks on in amused contempt and pity.” Biko summarizes his points

about Christianity and its introduction and interpretation in the

following words:

Thus if Christianity in its introduction was corrupted by the

inclusion of aspects which made it the ideal religion for the

colonisation of people, nowadays in its interpretation it is the

ideal religion for the maintenance of the subjugation of the

same people (2004, 61, original emphasis).

Biko (2004, 63) argues that the white clergy, both tacitly and

overtly, prevent “the Church from assuming its natural character in

the South African context, and therefore [prevents] it from being

relevant to the black man’s situation.” He promotes Black Theology as

a form of Fanon’s decolonized methodological antidote to this inter-

pretational dilemma that makes the church increasingly less relevant

to black people. For Biko, there is indeed truth to the claim that we can

interpret things differently from different angles, and he argues that

Christianity cannot hope to remain isolated from its context. Black

Theology as a methodology is a ‘situational interpretation’ that relates

blacks to God in the context of their present suffering and their

attempt to break free from this. It shifts the focus from moral oblige-

tions to eschew petty sins such as theft, to being committed to eradi-

cating major sins such as systemic poverty, racism and oppression

(Biko, 2004, 64).

Thus, the introduction of Christianity in its colonial form was the

negative external ascription of self that led to double consciousness. It

led converted Africans to despise their customs and values, and

associate worth with whiteness. This double consciousness which was

catalyzed by Christianity’s introduction was further exacerbated in its

epistemological interpretation by the black clergy, who employed a

colonized methodology that ignored major systemic issues in their

propagation of Christianity and disregarded the anti-black context

that blacks found themselves in. The clergy could be likened to the

colonized intellectual and artist in Fanon’s description, who continue

using the perspective and terms of the colonized (for example,

82 M. Zakaria Asmal

sermons relating to minor sins). By returning to and rediscovering

their religio-cultural values such as human-centric communalism,

Africans can salvage their indigenous perspectives and reconcile their

two identities and ‘two warring strivings’. Biko invites the black

clergy to be Fanon’s colonized intellectual who rediscovers this indi-

genous perspective, this ‘zone of hidden fluctuation where the people

can be found’, and to apply a decolonized methodology of African

religio-cultural principles to contextual factors such as racial and cul-

tural oppression in articulating a new theology. The black clergy, like

Fanon’s colonized intellectual, should critique religion in its colonial

form, as liberation cannot be defined in the terms of colonist mission-

aries and their white clergy surrogates. This is because, in Biko’s

words, “our faith in our God is spoilt by our having to see Him

through the eyes of the same people we are fighting against” (2004,

65).

In doing this, it is not a requisite that Christianity itself should be

completely purged because of its colonial propagation. The problem

was not the message of Christianity, but how it was propagated with

its accompanying values. At its base, its message like other universal

truths has potential for promoting good values. The missionaries

promoted a colonized idea of religion where its epistemological,

methodological and conceptual values separated it and isolated it

from its social significance. Thus, the goal should instead be to con-

strict the cultural superiority and topical neutrality upon which

mainstream Christianity rests, and halt the negative ascriptions it

effects on African religio-culture. Thus the negative ascriptions of the

external missionary on the black self can be ameliorated with a decolo-

nized theological interpretation that recovers one’s own sense of self

located in African values. This allows the black person to end his/her

striving by merging and reconciling the two positive identities/

cultures of African and Christian, and consequently to apply religion

as part of Black Consciousness assertion. In Du Bois’ words, this

would be to “to merge his double self into a better and truer self….

This, then, is the end of his striving: to be a co-worker in the kingdom

of culture” (1965, 215).

Thus, Du Bois’ themes of double consciousness come to the fore

in Biko’s conception of religion. Ontologically, Biko acknowledges


that subscribing to Christianity yet still maintaining African religio-

cultural precepts is viewed as problematic by the missionaries and

black clergy. However, Biko dismisses such colonized perspectives

and affirms that retaining African religio-culture is not only positive,

but does not contradict the foundational principles of Christianity in

any substantial way. Methodologically, Biko shows how indigenous

customs are viewed as outside the accepted standards of colonial

Christianity. To remedy this, he proposes a theological interpretation

that must pierce the imposed veil that suggests African religio-cul-

tural precepts and customs are problematic in a Christian sense.

Epistemologically, Biko shows us the erroneous nature of missionary

propagation, which functions in a way that presumes white normati-

vity to be the standard of a ‘real’ and ‘universal’ Christianity.

Similarly, Fanon’s insight into epistemological colonization at the

methodological level is especially salient here. Like Fanon, Biko de-

mands radical self-reflection as white normativity has the argumen-

tative power and platform in churches, religious and other cultural

settings to shift the focus from the actual basis of Christian precepts of

justice to colonialized conceptions of Christianity which simply affirm

racialism, colonialism and apartheid. Thus, like Fanon, Biko demands

the suspension of the methodological claims of mainstream colonial

Christianity and makes their theological and cultural methods them-

selves the objects of inquiry whose ontological status must be sus-

pended.

The method that Biko uses in conceiving of religion is characteris-

tic of Africana existentialist philosophy. First, it contextually situates

itself within the experience of being black in the anti-black colonial

and apartheid condition; and second, it proposes practical theory to

liberate oneself from this existential condition. Contextually, in search

of ontology and identity, Biko’s conception reflectively asks ‘What is

our (current state of) religion?’ He shows how the missionary pro-

pagation of ‘religion’ was driven by colonial processes of capital/

cultural subjugation. This has led to Du Boisian double consciousness

where external religious perspectives impute negativity to African

selfhood and where blacks internalize this anti-black sentiment,

thereby negatively shaping their religio-cultural experience. This is

exacerbated by a colonized methodology where continued biblical

84 M. Zakaria Asmal

interpretation divorces social issues from church mandate. Despite

this, Christianity remains a very real and veritable part of black experi-

ence.

Thereafter, in search of teleology and liberation, Biko’s concept-

tion poses the practically contemplative question, ‘What ought religion

to become?’ At the outset, Biko makes a compelling finding: the foun-

dational substance of Christianity is indeed compatible with African

religio-culture. Thus, Biko proposes a decolonized methodology

where a syncretic Afro-Christian religion must rediscover indigenous

perspectives and values in articulating decolonial practical theory.

‘What religion ought to be’ includes values such as the “man-centred

[basis of African religio-culture] whose sacred tradition is that of

sharing” (Biko, 2004, 106), or imperatives such as relating God/Christ

to the black lived experience and the portrayal of Christ as a fighting

God in order to make religion relevant to this lived experience (Biko,

2004, 104). The reinforcing of these two steps leads to an intersection

of ontology and teleology, and the posing of a further two derivative

questions: ‘How is religion to be liberated?’ and/or ‘How are we to use

religion for liberation?’ It is here that Biko attempts to translate theory

into praxis by promoting Black Theology as a ‘situational interpreta-

tion’ that contextualizes black suffering and shifts the focus from

religious moral obligations to the liberatory telos of eradicating major

sins such as systemic poverty and racism in the quest for Black Con-

sciousness (Biko, 2004, 64).

This paper has analyzed Steve Biko’s analysis of religion and its

liberatory potential for black South Africans. It did this by asking two

questions. First, despite Christianity being a foreign import, does it

represent a veritable part of the lived reality of blacks in the apartheid

and/or colonial condition? In answering this, Biko affirms that

Christianity does indeed represent a very real and significant part of

the black experience.

Second, if Christianity does have a genuine place within the lived

reality of blackness, how can it be made relevant to this reality and be

utilized in the quest for liberation? In answering this question, this

paper highlights the links between Biko’s practical and contextual

theory and the work of the two foremost Africana philosophers, Du

Bois and Fanon, thereby transporting his idea of religion into the


broader African global diaspora, anti-colonial discourse and Africana

existential philosophy.

This paper argues that Biko attempted to merge theory and praxis

in the articulation of Black Consciousness by advocating Black

Theology to resolve the Du Boisian notion of double consciousness

emanating from being both African and Christian. It argues that Biko

encouraged black theologians to rediscover indigenous perspectives

in articulating decolonial practical theory in much the same way as

Fanon implored colonized intellectuals to employ a decolonized me-

thodology. Finally, this paper suggests that Biko’s conceptual process

in conceiving of religion is characteristic of Africana existentialist

philosophy’s emphasis on the lived experience of blackness in an anti-

black world and of the thematic focus of ontology and teleology in how

religion can be used for Black Consciousness liberation.

Bibliography

Biko, S. 2004. I Write What I Like, edited with a personal memoir by A.

Stubbs. Johannesburg: Picador Africa.

Black, M. 2007. “Fanon and Du Boisian Double Consciousness.”

Human Architecture: Journal of the Sociology of Self-Knowledge. Vol. 5,

No. 3.

Chidester, D. 1996. Savage Systems. Cape Town: University of Cape

Town Press.

Du Bois, W. 1965. “The Souls of Black Folk.” Three Negro Classics: Up

from Slavery, The Souls of Black Folk. New York: Avon Books.

Fanon, F. 2008. Black Skin, White Masks, translated by C.L. Markmann.

London: Pluto Press.

Fanon, F. 2004. The Wretched of the Earth, translated by R. Philcox. New

York: Grove Press.

Gordon, L.R. 2008. An Introduction to Africana Philosophy. New York:

Cambridge University Press.

More, M.P. 2004. “Biko: Africana Existentialist Philosopher.”

Alternation. Vol. 11, No.1.

Outlaw, L. 1997. “Africana Philosophy.” The Journal of Ethics. Vol. 1,

No. 3.

86 M. Zakaria Asmal

Pityana, N.B. 2008. “Reflections on 30 Years Since the Death of Steve

Biko: a Legacy Revisited.” The Legacy of Stephen Bantu Biko:

Theological Challenges. Du Toit, C.W. (ed.). Pretoria: UNISA.

Sithole, T. 2016. “Frantz Fanon: Africana Existentialist Philosopher.”

African Identities. Vol. 14, No. 2.

Wilson, L. 2011. Steve Biko: a Jacana Pocket Biography. Johannesburg:

Jacana.

Woods, D. 1987. Biko. London: Penguin Books.

4.

The ‘Libertarian Paradigm’ of

Severino Elias Ngoenha1

ANKE GRANESS

Introduction

Except for the work of Amílcar Cabral, the philosophy of Por-

tuguese-speaking Africa is seldom studied. Whether this is a result of

a language problem or not; Portuguese-speaking Africa is never actu-

ally taken into account in either the reconstruction of a pre-colonial

heritage or in contemporary philosophical work. However, prelim-

nary research in contemporary philosophical debates in Portuguese-

speaking areas of Africa reveals some interesting trends and topics.

Philosophy in Portuguese-speaking Africa is grounded in its specific

historical, politico-economic, linguistic, and cultural contexts and is

thus first and foremost political philosophy dedicated to questions

about freedom and responsibility in a postcolonial, post-Marxist, post-

civil war situation. Lusophone African philosophy includes discus-

sions of the theoretical and moral legacy of liberation movements; the

concept of liberty (Ngoenha 1993, 2004); the concept of modernity

(Macamo, 2005); the task, function, and identity of philosophy today

(Ngoenha and Castiano, 2011; Castiano, 2010); and the relationship of

philosophy and education (Ngoenha et al., 2005; Castiano, 1997).

Severino Elias Ngoenha is currently one of the best-known and

most influential philosophers in Portuguese-speaking Africa. He has

played an important role in establishing African philosophy institu-

tionally and in the public discourse in Mozambique and is widely

recognized today as the initiator of Mozambican philosophy. His

major works include a critical analysis of the discourse on philosophy

in Africa (Ngoenha, 2004); a critique of contemporary society in

Mozambique (Bussotti and Ngoenha, 1994); consideration of ques-

1 This research was made possible by support from the Austrian Science

Fund (FWF) V348 Richter Programme.

88 Anke Graness

tions of educational policy (Ngoenha et al., 2005), ecology, and justice;

and contributions to the debate on the South African concept of ubuntu

(Ngoenha, 2006a, 2008). Born in 1962 in Maputo, Mozambique,

Ngoenha graduated with a degree in theology from the Gregorian

University in Rome, where he also obtained his doctorate in philoso-

phy. In the 1990s, he was a UNESCO consultant regarding governance

in southern Africa. Later, he became Associate Professor of Intercul-

tural Education and the Philosophy of Education in the Department

of Anthropology and Sociology of the Faculty of Social and Political

Sciences at the University of Lausanne (Switzerland) and used to be

regularly invited as Visiting Professor at the Master in Interculturality

program of the Department of Philosophy of the University Roma Tre.

Since 2010, he has been a member of the Department of Philosophy of

the Pedagogical University in Maputo, where he teaches Intercul-

turality, African Philosophy and Anthropology. In addition, he is now

Rector of the Technical University of Mozambique (Universidade

Técnica de Moçambique) in Maputo. Moreover, he is the author of

studies on the foundations of political philosophy and the prospects

for democracy in Portuguese-speaking countries (Angola, Cabo

Verde, Guinea-Bissau, Mozambique, and São Tomé and Príncipe)

(Massoni, 2015, 55).

Mozambique, its history, its social and political situation, its

values and norms, and its problems and shortcomings are the starting

point and center of his philosophical reflections. Mozambique has had

a very peculiar history in comparison with other African countries or,

as Ngoenha expresses it in a 2006 article in French, “une particularité

plus particuliére que d’autre” (Ngoenha, 2006b, 195). Mozambique—

like all former Portuguese colonies—achieved independence late in

1975 after a long war of independence that began in 1964. Shortly after

independence, the country descended into a severe civil war that

lasted from 1977 to 1992. Peace returned to the country in 1992 with

the Rome General Peace Accords. By 1993 more than 1.5 million Mo-

zambican refugees who had sought asylum in neighboring countries

as a result of war and drought had returned; and in 1994 Mozambique

held its first free and democratic elections. Mozambique is a country

which has managed to overcome several armed conflicts and to en-

gage in an exemplary progression towards peace and democracy, and

The ‘Libertarian Paradigm’ of Severino Elias Ngoenha 89

it is a country which experienced two extremely different social

systems: Marxism/socialism and neo-liberalism, in a very short period

of time.

According to Ngoenha, another peculiarity of Mozambique is the

presence of permanent and quasi-legal violence (Ngoenha, 2006a,

195). Even though violence is a feature not only of the colonial but also

of the postcolonial period in Africa,2 the violence in Mozambique

seems to be—according to Ngoenha—peculiar in its intensity, dura-

tion, and form. Decades of the institutionalized violence of Portuguese

colonialism and its system of forced labor gave way to the violence of

a ten-year armed struggle for independence. This struggle was

followed by a sixteen-year civil war between the FRELIMO (Mozam-

bique Liberation Front) government and the RENAMO (Resistência

Nacional Moçambicana, Mozambican National Resistance) move-

ment, a conflict which victimized countless people and caused the

economic ruin of the country.

Already in his book, Filosofia africana: das independências às liber-

dades (African Philosophy: From Independence to Liberties, 1993), Ngoenha

focuses on a philosophical reading of the contemporary situation in

Mozambique after the experience of colonialism, liberation struggle,

civil war, and two radically different social systems: socialism (1975-

1989) and capitalism in the form of a liberal market economy (since

1990). Over a very short period Mozambican society underwent ra-

dical social, political, and economic change from a planned economy

to a neo-liberal economy. Whereas Ngoenha clearly criticizes the

shortcomings of the socialist orientation (e.g. corruption, lack of

democracy and absence of individual freedoms), he also criticizes the

shortcomings of the current neo-liberal orientation and its lack of

equal access to healthcare and educational systems. He criticizes the

fact that the social situation in Mozambique did not reflect its liberal

economy, because people lacked the education and information neces-

sary to understand the rules of liberalism. Therefore, they ended up

with a kind of social ‘dollarisation’, a ‘dollarocratie’ (see e.g. Ngoenha,

2006b, 198) or ‘dollarocracy replacing democracy’: a wild, uncon-

trolled accumulation of wealth unregulated by any ethical or juridical

2 See the considerations on violence in Mbembe's On the Postcolony (2001).

90 Anke Graness

standards (Ngoenha and Castiano, 2011, 17ff.). The present generation

faces the difficult task of building a better future in a country do-

minated by absolute poverty, corruption, and the misuse of public

property for the personal enrichment of the powerful. All this has

consequences for the production of philosophy, or as Ngoenha states

in an interview:

If philosophy ‘is its own time raised to the level of thought’, as

Hegel defines it, and an expression of our historical tem-

porality and circumstances (Ortega y Gasset), then this period

of time formed the adventure of Lusophone African philoso-

phy with a very specific character, which I define as Libertar-

ian. It was about the liberation from colonialism, about com-

batting the racist abuse of our neighbours in Rhodesia and

South Africa. It was about the struggle against the neo-

colonial and imperialist regimes of the Left and the Right in

the North, but in particular, we thought about our local

politicians, who were unable to transform independence into

concrete freedoms for people and nations in terms of demo-

cracy and just social redistribution (Graness, 2015, 28).

The Libertarian Paradigm

One of Ngoenha’s most famous concepts is the libertarian para-

digm. According to José Castiano (2015, 43), Ngoenha started to use

the term ‘Paradigma Libertário’ for the first time in his book Os tempos

da Filosofia (2004, 74-75) in order to refer to a specific African idea of

liberty born out of the African experience of slavery, colonialism, and

neo-colonialism. According to Ngoenha, the African experience is

characterized primarily by a lack of liberty. Hence, African thought is

marked by a desperate pursuit of liberty, a value conspicuous mainly

for its absence in the African experience of life. He expresses this in an

interview:

My concept of liberty is not an a priori formula, but a result of

my reflection on the historical preconditions of African phi-

losophy. This liberty first unfolded as a statement against


slavery. After the second half of the twentieth century, its aim

was political independence. Since then, its goal has been what

Amílcar Cabral has called ‘strong thought’ (pensamento forte),

liberty that unfolds within economic development, though it

should not be confused with economic growth or Western

imitation. It is a liberty which determines political develop-

ment and assumes political consensus between different act-

ors, a liberty of cultural harmony which implies a continuous

dialogue and a synthesis of the different cultural and legal

concepts that exist in the historical and social tissue of our

country. Finally, it is a social liberty that presupposes a

democratic, committed citizen who cares about improving the

welfare and the living conditions of the community and the

individual (Graness, 2015, 30).

For Ngoenha, the libertarian paradigm is a methodological and

practical guide for thinking about Africa. It is an approach to defining

an African ideal of liberty that goes beyond the left- or right-wing

definitions of Euro-American discourse, an ideal based on a critically

analyzed and reconstructed African history.

In fact, Ngoenha’s libertarian paradigm differs from the Euro-

American understanding of libertarianism. In Euro-American politi-

cal philosophy, libertarianism is a philosophical tradition with a

normative approach intended to maximize individual freedom and

rights. Euro-American libertarianism upholds autonomy and freedom

of choice; political freedom and the primacy of individual judgment

are its principal objectives. Peter Vallentyne and Bas van der Vossen

define the concept in their article on “Libertarianism” in the Stanford

Encyclopedia of Philosophy as a “moral view that agents initially fully

own themselves and have certain moral powers to acquire property

rights in external things” (Vallentyne and van der Vossen, 2014).

However, present-day libertarianism is rather an umbrella term for a

wide range of sometimes discordant, even contentious, political

concepts. It comprises so-called right-libertarianism, mainly devel-

oped in the United States, that advocates laissezfaire capitalism and

strong property rights (Robert Nozick, 1974), as well as ‘left-libertar-

ianism’, which seeks to abolish capitalism and private ownership of

92 Anke Graness

the means of production and encompasses those libertarian beliefs

that claim the earth’s natural resources belong to everyone in some

egalitarian manner, either unowned or owned collectively, as evident

in the works of Hillel Steiner and Philippe van Parijs (see Vallentyne

and van der Vossen, 2014).

However, Ngoenha’s concept of liberty focuses on neither indivi-

dual freedom and property rights, nor liberalism as individual free-

dom in an atomized manner. In contrast to the notion of libertarianism

in Euro-American political philosophy, the core principles of his

concept are responsibility and solidarity.

The Principle of Responsibility

For Ngoenha, to be free means to know that we are unique indivi-

duals who nonetheless belong to a whole. He assumes an inseparable

entanglement of the individual with the community and vice versa;

and concludes that true liberty requires one to remember at every

moment that the liberty of the individual depends on the commitment

and dedication of all others. At the same time, all the liberty of all

others depends on our commitment, our dedication, and our self-

denial. Thus, first and foremost, liberty means to be conscious of being

responsible for each other and to be ceaselessly compelled to accept

the responsibility for our lives and the lives of others (see Massoni,

2015, 60) Thus, Ngoenha’s ideal of liberty encompasses both respon-

sibility for oneself and for others in the community. Moreover, his

primary characteristic of freedom is responsibility in the sense of

working for reconciliation and peace (see Ngoenha, 2006b, 202).

Hence, it is not surprising that Ngoenha shows great sympathy

for the South African concept of ubuntu, which he regards as one of

the first important philosophical contributions of the African con-

tinent with global relevance.3 Especially the integrative dimension of

ubuntu which strongly advocates respect for the dignity and the needs

3 Even though Ngoenha appreciates the concept of ubuntu for its relational

character and emphasis on social responsibility, he critically points to the

theory and practice of ubuntu in South Africa and the risk of a new split along

lines of economic and social differences—and thus of an economic apartheid.

Ngoenha (2006a), p. 2008.


of each person and the group of persons, corresponds to Ngoenha’s

understanding of responsibility and solidarity. Ubuntu is currently

one of the most popular African indigenous concepts. A fuller under-

standing of the concept has benefited from increasing discussion and

awareness, even outside the African continent, since the 1990s. As is

widely known by now the term ubuntu belongs to the Nguni language

family in South Africa, but has equivalents in many other African

languages, like utu in Swahili (for the etymology of ubuntu see e.g.

Ramose, 1999). However, there is no consensus on precisely what

ubuntu means. The translations range from “humanity” and “charity”

to “common sense” and “generosity.” Regarding definitions of the

concept of ubuntu, we find at least three different approaches: ubuntu

as a human quality, as an ethics or world view, and as a postcolonial

ideology. 4 However, all different attempts to reconstruct and con-

ceptualize ubuntu agree that it is basically a relational concept. Inter-

dependence and interconnectedness are considered to be the main

features of this conception of the world. Ubuntu emphasizes that every

human being is part of a whole, integrated into a comprehensive

network of mutual dependencies and that the human self exists only

in relationship to its surroundings: these relationships are what con-

stitutes the human self (see Shutte, 2001, 23). On a moral level, ubuntu

is seen as a basic attitude of mutual respect and recognition of others.

Moreover, ubuntu stresses the existence of a universal bond that con-

nects all people to each other—as well as to all other types of existence

in the universe. In consequence, the ubuntu approach advances both

the idea of social or ‘collective’ responsibility for human dignity, the

pursuit of a harmonious and peaceful coexistence in the community,

and for ecological restoration and sustainability practices.

It is interesting to note that the concept of responsibility, which is

not only a central philosophical category but a core value of ubuntu,

has been rarely addressed in the broad debate on ubuntu. 5 And

4 Leonhard Praeg introduces the useful differentiation between ubuntu (a

traditional worldview and way of life) and Ubuntu (a postcolonial concept),

Praeg (2014), p. 11. 5 Astonishingly a short literature research on ubuntu and the concept of

responsibility indicated only few articles on ubuntu and corporate social

responsibility (CSR) as a tool that can be used to build brand loyalty. Thus, a

94 Anke Graness

Ngoenha also does not discuss the concept of responsibility in depth.

But, as philosophers, do we not have to explore the meaning of res-

ponsibility in a deeper way? In general, responsibility is a state of

moral, legal, or mental accountability for certain actions of a human

being (including omissions), or decisions and their consequences. Fur-

thermore, responsibility can mean the state of having a duty towards

someone: parenthood, for example, includes the duty to care for one’s

children. The precondition for responsibility is a human being’s free

thought, behavior, and action: for it is precisely the free will of human

beings that makes them accountable for their words or actions and all

the consequences. Responsibility is founded therefore in human free-

dom. Only a person who has the opportunity to determine his or her

thinking, behavior and actions can be held accountable.

In philosophical discussion we elaborate the meaning of respon-

sibility by distinguishing its different dimensions. Thus, one may

differentiate legal and moral responsibility; individual, collective, or

national responsibility; or retrospective and prospective responsibi-

lity. In the past few years the debate on principles of global justice and

the problem of world poverty has intensified discussion on the

meaning of responsibility as well as the scope of individual, collective,

or national responsibility for structural problems such as world hun-

ger. The cosmopolitan approach to global justice assumes that justice

concerns all human beings, regardless, of their membership in certain

groups. This approach is characterized by three criteria: individual-

ism, that each single human being is of moral importance; univer-

salism, that all living people have equal moral importance; and the

universal validity of duties, that everyone has duties towards all

human beings regardless of one’s own membership in a community.

Proponents of this approach include Thomas Pogge, Charles Beitz,

Martha Nussbaum, and Iris Marion Young. On the other hand, advo-

cates of communitarianism or liberal nationalism consider principles

of social justice and positive duties to emanate from a special relation-

ship between citizens of a single state or any other form of community.

In this view, while it is generally admitted that we have the humani-

deeper philosophical analysis of the concept of responsibility within the

framework of Ubuntu is pending.


tarian responsibility to give emergency aid to those hit by disasters,

our moral responsibilities towards the members of our own commu-

nities are considered more important. Proponents of this argument

include David Miller or Thomas Nagel. David Miller argues that we

have greater ethical duties to our co-nationals than to nationals of

other states. For Miller “nations are ethical communities….The duties

we owe to our fellow-nationals are different from, and more extensive

than, the duties we owe to humans as such” (Miller, 2000, 27). The role

of replicating the social solidarity found in local communities is

performed by the nation state at the level of states, in which popula-

tions are largely anonymous. Miller argues that global inequality, to

some extent, reflects different collective choices by different nations,

not holding members of a nation responsible for their nation’s bad

choices would be unjust: it would mean bringing about equality by

making members of other nations bear these burdens. Miller sees only

three ways in which citizens of rich nations can have remedial

responsibilities to the global poor. The first, involves remedying the

past injustices of one’s own nation; the second, involves addressing

failures to establish fair terms of cooperation between nations; and the

third, may arise “from the bare fact of poverty itself, independently of

any prior interaction between rich and poor countries” (Miller, 2007,

249).

Thus, liberal nationalism maintains that the nation state plays a

crucial role in the definition of responsibility and the scope of respon-

sibilities: in contrast, we find Severino Ngoenha’s arguments rather

heading in the cosmopolitan direction. He argues not only that it was

the logic of the nation state which impaired African independence, but

questions liberalism’s ability to embody fundamental aspects of plan-

etary justice as such (Ngoenha, 2006a, 2008). The logic of the nation

state condemns international relations to a closed political and cul-

tural approach based on nation states, which overlooks the fact that

solidarity among human beings precedes the existence of nation

states. Thus, the crucial concept for Ngoenha is not the nation but the

We. Massoni states on behalf of Ngoenha, “three practical horizons are

key to an African philosophical reflection on African history and

African historicity: the We-Together (the foundation of our selfhood),

Our Freedom (the affirmation of our selfhood)…, and finally, Our

96 Anke Graness

Future (the affirmation and the consolidation of our selfhood-free-

dom)” (Massoni, 2015, 61). Unfortunately, Ngoenha’s We is not a

specified We. According to his writings We seems to refer to a group

of individuals which is based on and interconnected by the solidarity

among these individuals, and where on a moral level each individual

has a responsibility for the wellbeing of the others and the community.

At this point we have to ask if this encompasses all humankind

on a planetary level. Ngoenha does not explore the concept of respon-

sibility nor of solidarity in its different dimensions in a deeper way.

What is the scope of solidarity among human beings? And what is the

scope of the responsibilities of both the individual and the commu-

nity? Also, the relation between those different levels of responsibi-

lities (of the individual or the community) is rarely addressed. It is not

clear if his concept of responsibility refers to small communities or

transcends the narrow borders of smaller groups and nations to

include foreign and distant cultures or nations; that is, does it refer to

the world community and all its members as such? And if so, is that

not a moral challenge to be responsible for every human being in this

world? In addition, the time frame—that is, responsibility towards the

past, the present and the future—is not explicitly discussed. The

whole dynamic of levels of responsibilities—briefly noted, for ex-

ample, in connection with David Miller above—remains uncon-

sidered.6

Federalism and Shared Responsibilities

With respect to the specific situation in Africa, particularly in

Mozambique, Ngoenha calls for a renewal of the ‘social contract’ to

make all political actors participants in a common social discourse in

which they may be opponents, but never mortal enemies, and in

which they may communicate about upcoming issues in the form of

extended discussions or dialogue. Elsewhere Ngoenha speaks of a

“triple contract” (Ngoenha and Castiano, 2011, 37ff.). The cultural

6 For deeper reflections on the dimensions of the concept of responsibility

see, among others, Hans Jonas (1984). Even though his Imperative of Respon-

sibility centers on social and ethical problems created by technology, Jonas’

analysis is helpful in differentiating levels and dimensions of responsibilities.


aspect of this contract encompasses a critical reading of values and

institutions, and adapting them to the collective ‘imaginaire’ and lan-

guage of the people. It includes a critical reading of history under-

taken in order to restore the historical consciousness of the African

people. The social aspect of the triple contract concerns justice not only

in its political dimension, but also in the dimensions of ethics, religion,

history and metaphysics. The political aspect of the triple contract en-

compasses ways to achieve effective political self-government, which

should be founded on a process of dialogue and reconciliation, of

‘palabre’ that would include all of a country’s political and civil move-

ments. Here one has to be aware that individual freedom can be

realized only in democratic institutions which at the same time foster

the freedom and wellbeing of the community (Ngoenha, 1993, 154ff.).

The goal of this kind of multidimensional contractualism is to estab-

lish a culture of peace at a continental level. (For further discussion see

Mucale [2015].)

On the political level Ngoenha considers the concept of federa-

lism as a 'philosophical way' (in the sense of a reflective, rational way)

to define and perform independence. Federalism is, according to

Ngoenha, the best way to ensure cooperation and meet shared respon-

sibilities. Moreover, freedom(s) would be exercised from the lowest to

the highest levels of social organization. His reference to federalism is

interesting for two reasons: (1) the fact that federalism is a core concept

of libertarian socialists, and (2) that federal structures and a kind of

grassroots democracy were core concepts in the work of Amílcar

Cabral. Libertarian socialism (sometimes called social anarchism)

rejects the view of socialism as state ownership or command of the

means of production. Instead it emphasizes decentralized structures

of political government and asserts that a society based on freedom

and equality can be achieved through abolishing authoritarian institu-

tions. It favors decentralized means of direct democracy or federal and

confederal associations. The ideal is a society based on a structure that

has sufficient flexibility to permit the greatest possible autonomy for

social life and enough cohesiveness to prevent all disorder.

The proximity to European libertarian socialism is interesting,

but it is more likely that this point of Ngoenha’s theory is influenced

by Amílcar Cabral’s and Samora Machel's theories as well as the

98 Anke Graness

politics of FRELIMO during the first years of Mozambican independ-

ence.7 During the period directly after the country achieved inde-

pendence, Cabral favored a form of direct democracy (or ‘cooperative

democracy’8) through decentralized regional meetings. He believed

village councils should form the basis of society. Primary targets were:

the satisfaction of the basic needs of the population; autonomy and

independence; and decision-making based on a decentralized demo-

cracy of the people. FRELIMO’s political ideas went in the same

direction. Thus, Samora Machel, the leader of FRELIMO and first pre-

sident of Mozambique, emphasized:

Our decisions must always be democratic in both content and

form. Democratic in content means that they reflect the real

interests of the broad masses, democratic in form means that

the broad masses must take part in reaching a decision, feeling

that it is theirs and not something imposed from above

(quoted in Martin, 2012, 82).

It is important to note that the particular historical circumstances

of the liberation struggle had a major influence on both Cabral’s and

Machel’s political ideas. In both cases the liberated zones were not

governed from the top down. Peasants were encouraged to organize

themselves, to elect their own leaders, and to run their own affairs in

a kind of direct democracy. After Mozambican independence, the

elections of 1977 exemplified grassroots democracy. These elections

were not conducted in terms of a secret ballot; instead, nominees for

the various levels of administration, from the local to the national,

were interviewed in public meetings and then approved or rejected

by a show of hands (see Martin, 2012, 82). Unfortunately, this form of

political organization was soon dropped. Instead, FRELIMO re-

sponded to the country’s lack of resources, the civil war with RENA-

MO, and the circumstances of Cold War politics; by moving into

alignment with the Soviet Union and its allies. FRELIMO established

7 Moreover, Ngoenha's 'libertarian paradigm' and his preference for federa-

lism are influenced by the ideas of Rousseau, Du Bois, and Nkrumah. 8 See Cabral in Rudebeck (1974), pp. 146-147 and Rudebeck (2010), pp. 87-

96.


a one-party socialist state and quickly received substantial

international aid from Cuba and the Eastern bloc nations.

In various places Ngoenha has criticized the fact that the initial

participatory orientation of the young Mozambican state quickly

ended up in a system based on one-party ideology (see e.g. Ngoenha

and Castiano, 2011). Nonetheless, the ideals of participatory

democracy and solidarity are still core concepts of Ngoenha’s social

and political ‘imaginaire’ for a new Mozambique. He clearly favors a

political system where many responsibilities are shared by the levels

of government, i.e., where policies and service delivery are, as far as

is practical, the responsibility of the level of government closest to the

people receiving those services. Moreover, as many citizens as

possible should be included in decision-making and the respective

responsibilities to counter an indolence that has befallen many

Africans today, in face of the seeming inescapability of their living

conditions.

According to Ngoenha, the great challenge of philosophy in the

liberal and ultra-liberal world we live in today is to reconcile or

balance solitude and solidarity through the enrichment of moral

character. In this context, it is the task of the African philosopher to

turn African philosophy into a pedagogy of freedom.

The Responsibility of the Philosopher: Conceptualizing the Future

Philosophy cannot be satisfied with the status quo; it must criti-

cally challenge prevailing norms, values, and institutions. For Ngoen-

ha and his colleague José P. Castiano, philosophy is first of all a form

of committed thinking—as is reflected in the title of their 2011 collec-

tion of essays, Pensamento Engajado (Ngoenha and Castiano, 2011). As

such, African philosophy’s task is to contribute to the challenges of

justice today.

For this reason, the future is another of Ngoenha’s key concerns.

For Ngoenha, the development of ideas for the future is a task for

philosophy first and foremost: to imagine the future enables us to

question the validity of the present—one of the primary tasks of phi-

losophy. In this respect, it is important to reflect on and analyze

history, and in doing so to open up a new future that is not simply an

100 Anke Graness

extension of the old but works to create a world which satisfies the

needs and capabilities of human beings. In this context, Ngoenha

takes a critical look at the debate in African philosophy between

ethnophilosophy and its critics. He considers ethnophilosophy as

being caught in the past, since the ethnological discourse is focused on

the past. However, philosophical thinking should be directed towards

the future—particularly in Africa. The future has been the center of

debate before, but certainly, according to Ngoenha, this is the first

time 'we' (and here Ngoenha refers to the first multiparty election in

Mozambique in 1994) are called to choose the kind of future we want

for ourselves and our children—without ideological constraints.

In his book Filosofia Africana. Das Independências às Liberdades

Ngoenha introduces three different perspectives on or ways to

conceptualize the future: the prophetical way, future as utopia, and

the way of futurology. The first form of conceptualizing the future, the

prophetic way, is only possible within the framework of religions of

revelation, which hold that God makes his will known through a

chosen human individual. Marcus Garvey is one example of the

prophetical way of conceptualizing the future: “Africa must be

restored to the Negro as the haven of refuge when we need maternal

shelter” (Garvey, 1919). James Cone also uses the prophetic approach

in his A Black Theology of Liberation (1970). Cone reinterprets the

Christian faith and the entire biblical revelation in the light of African

Americans’ struggles against oppression and their quest for justice.

However, whereas prophets should be guides to the future—and

Ngoenha regrets the absence of prophets in the sense of guides who

are able to point out the best ways to realize the aims we set out for

achieving independence—African theology of hope or of liberation

(which Ngoenha criticizes as a kind of ethno-theology) and move-

ments like Négritude were always (paradoxically) concerned about

and fixed on a past which no longer existed. Thus, African theology

cannot have an impact on essential debates about the future of Africa.

However, Ngoenha acknowledges the enormous influence of African

churches and the important role they played in processes of peace and

reconciliation throughout Africa.

The philosopher is not a prophet. Even though no African philo-

sopher can ignore the prophetic approach in conceptualizing the


future, it is not a philosophical way of conceptualizing the future. A

second way, the proper philosophical way to conceptualize the future

is, according to Ngoenha, by considering utopian visions of a perfect

society. For him the idea of utopia is a fertile force of history. This is

because utopian thought considers ways to transform a factual-

historical order into an ideal order, and it is therefore not a flower of

illusion or an ungrounded way of thinking. On the contrary, utopian

thinking requires the ability to anticipate the concrete realities of a

more or less distant future. Utopian thought embodies a rational faith

in a reality which is not yet in existence, but potentially possible.

While Ngoenha clearly favors utopian thinking as a means to

renew African societies, he is also well aware of its dangers. The “evil

of utopia,” as he calls it (Ngoenha, 1993, 150ff.), lies in making history

a story without individuals, where all individuals are absorbed into a

Leviathan; that is a totalitarian state, or an absolute spirit. For example,

Plato’s republic is hostile to democratic values; or as Popper con-

cludes, it is opposed to the idea of an open society or it is an “enemy

of open society.”9 A further danger of a utopian society lies in its

potential for transforming into a kind of ‘utopian orthodoxy’, which

is in fact what happens when revolutions become oppressive and

liberators oppressors.10

A third way of conceptualizing the future is through futurology,

namely studies that postulate possible, probable, or preferable futures

and the worldviews and myths that underlie them. The term ‘futuro-

logy’ was coined in 1943 by Ossip K. Flechtheim, who proposed it as

a new branch of knowledge that would include a new science of

9 See Karl R. Popper, The Open Society And Its Enemies. Volume I. "The Spell

of Plato" (Routledge, 1945). 10 Ngoenha does not give examples here, but he might have in mind the

French revolution which turned into a Reign of Terror (5 September, 1793-28,

July, 1794), or the Russian revolution, which turned into Stalinism, or African

examples like Zimbabwean president Robert Mugabe, who turned from

being the leader of the Zimbabwean anti-colonial liberation movement and

famous for his politics of reconciliation between the former belligerents,

including white Zimbabweans and rival political parties, into a dictator.

Unfortunately, there are many more examples in Africa; see, for example, José

Eduardo dos Santos in Angola.

102 Anke Graness

probability. While Ngoenha clearly appreciates the merits of future-

logy, he criticizes the fact that the central interest of futurology is

almost exclusively technical and scientific progress; not the develop-

ment of values, norms, and social or political institutions. The future

is mainly a normative concept or project. Futurology does not cover

the normative dimension (Ngoenha, 1993, 175). Philosophy and ethics

focus on normative concepts, and thus the African philosopher has to

understand the primacy of the future for his or her work.

Ngoenha asserts that a future of participatory utopian thinking is

the solution to the problem of freedom that Africa faces today. The

freedom which is needed is not a freedom that feeds futuristic dreams.

It is a freedom that translates into development, in the sense of Amar-

tya Sen’s capability approach. Thus, creating the future is for Ngoenha

an open, participatory project—something that must be discovered

and conquered by us. The future, which is always under construction,

may become an objective for us, a contribution to others, and an op-

portunity to create a more solid and valid existence. A precondition

for this creation is a critical discourse about our experiences —past

experiences and experiences to come (Ngoenha, 1993, 135). For we

cannot change the past, but we can choose the kind of future we

want.11

Conclusion

A recent example “of an African negotiation of modernity”

(Macamo, 2015, 18), the ‘libertarian paradigm’ of the Mozambican

philosopher Severino Elias Ngoenha—and the principle of respon-

sibility as its core—is a concept of “social liberty that presupposes a

democratic, committed citizen who cares about improving the welfare

and the living conditions of the community and the individual”

(Graness, 2015, 30), as Ngoenha states. The libertarian paradigm is

meant to inspire people to think politically and thus avoid the mental

subordination that is the consequence of colonialism and Marxism. It

is above all a fundamental condition for the realization and exercise of

11 For further discussion of Ngoenha's concept of the future see Ucuassapi

(2013).


any freedom. Ngoenha maintains that people have to realize that

democracy is more than just simply participating in elections. Demo-

cracy demands participation in all dimensions of life: the economic,

the social, the political, and the educational. It is about creating

institutions that are able to support democracy and to encourage

everyone to participate (Graness, 2015, 30).

Similar to former South African President Thabo Mbeki’s call for

an African Renaissance Ngoenha argues that Africa must face up to its

responsibility and take its fate into its own hands. Slavery and

colonialism can no longer be an excuse; corruption, war, and economic

hardship are not problems that can be solved from outside, but ones

that need to be overcome by the efforts of Africans themselves. This is

about emancipation, anti-racism, humanism, and social justice. Or as

Ngoenha emphasizes at the end of his book Filosofia Africana—and

here we come back to his concept of responsibility: “As each of us is

responsible, nobody can blame policy or others for what happens:

each of us is protagonist of his/her own life and own history”

(Ngoenha, 1993, 179).

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5.

Rediscovering Individual-based Values in

Ubuntu Virtue Ethics: Transforming

Corporate Entities in Postcolonial Africa

GRIVAS MUCHINERIPI KAYANGE

Introduction

This paper grapples primarily with the problem of the foundation

of ubuntu ethics with the intention of transforming corporate entities.

It shows that what is obvious in most African philosophical writings

is that ubuntu ethics is founded on the community and its welfare

(Metz, 2012; Mangena, 2010; Masolo, 2010, Gyekye, 2010).1 It is on the

basis of this perception that, in principle, the common understanding

of ubuntu ethics leads to the view that an action is regarded as right if,

and only if, it leads towards the welfare of the community. At the basis

of this view is the communitarian ideology which has dominated Afri-

can philosophy in the postcolonial era (Nyerere, 1966, 2000; Kaunda,

1968; Senghor, 1964) and has led to a difficulty in any constructive

reflection on individuality or individualism, which is often seen as an

anomaly. Metz (2012, 99) indicated that the origins of this form of

ethics may be traced back over the past 50 years. Since the inde-

pendence of some sub-Saharan African countries in 1960s (such as

Malawi and Zambia in 1964), one might expect African leaders in vari-

ous corporate entities to live the communitarian values which they

promulgated. Surprisingly, this ethic has failed to yield the intended

results, as increasing numbers of immoral acts—such as corruption,

bribery and nepotism—have crippled African development in differ-

ent corporate entities (including businesses, government and non-

governmental organizations). It can be safely said that most sub-

Saharan African countries are undergoing a situation of moral decay

in the context of corporate governance in different areas and that

1 See also Coetzee (1998), Khoza (1994), Nussbaum (2003), Ramose (1999).

108 Grivas Muchineripi Kayange

ubuntu ethics in its current intellectual version is inadequate and in-

effective.2

In an endeavor to deal with moral decay in African corporate en-

tities, a number of scholars have developed a version of ubuntu

corporate ethics that inculcates and advances community virtues in a

range of systems. The thinking is that community-based values can

help in correcting unwanted corporate practices detrimental to the

welfare of African society; for instance these values may, among other

things, rectify environmental pollution, lack of social responsibility,

exploitation of workers, and lack of respect for life. This use of ubuntu

values/virtues in corporate governance implies an acceptance of the

validity of this theory as a normative authority in African ethics.

Although this has been the current trend, ubuntu virtue ethics pro-

moted in intellectual circles is incomplete and is mostly based on a

series of biases towards the Western world. Some African philoso-

phers, pushed by anti-Western philosophical developments, have

often blamed the Western world for introducing individualism claim-

ing that it consequently led to irresponsibility, dishonesty, and lack of

accountability (see Oruka, 1975). Ubuntu ethics is therefore seen as a

better alternative as it is based on African traditional/ communal

values. This paper argues that this whole comparison with Western

individualism reflects an anomaly in African philosophy which re-

quires immediate rectification.

Building on an investigation of ordinary African languages, this

paper takes the challenge of exploring the anomaly of ubuntu ethics

constituted in a lack of focus on individual-based ubuntu values/

virtues. The use of ordinary language as a milieu for this study is in-

fluenced by the belief that philosophy is a rational activity constituted

in reflection on ordinary language (see also Carnap, 1932, 1959;

Austin, 1962; Wittgenstein, 1953; Kayange, 2014). In exploring indivi-

dual-based values the argument develops on the assumption that a

comprehensive understanding of these values may become a break-

through in an applied context such as environmental ethics, profes-

sional ethics, business ethics, and corporate governance, where such

ethics are often utilized. After rediscovering the individual foundation

2 See the intellectual version in section 2 below.

Ubuntu and Transforming Corporate Entities in Africa 109

of ethics and values, the paper develops an integrated system of

ubuntu values (comprised of both individual and community values)

that may be utilized in the transformation of corporate entities. The

paper is structured as follows: in section 2 it discusses ubuntu virtue

ethics as understood in intellectual circles; in section 3 it discusses the

anomalies in current ubuntu ethics; in section 4 the paper interrogates

the intellectual brand of ubuntu ethics by investigating individual

elements and values in the African context; and in section 5 it develops

an integrated system of ubuntu ethics freed from community and

individual biases altogether. It further suggests a new form of an

African traditional system of values/virtues.

Ubuntu Virtue Ethics: A Brand for Intellectuals

Some African intellectuals such as Metz and Gaia have argued

that ubuntu is a form of virtue ethics; hence the name ubuntu virtue

ethics (see a discussion by Metz, 2012). Traditionally, virtue ethics in

general have been considered in philosophy as one of the main

normative ethical theories along with utilitarian and deontological

theories. 3 One of the first commonly known virtue theories was

forwarded by Plato (see Plato, 1966), who regarded virtues as forms

that may be instantiated in an individual, a community. Some of the

virtues that are listed at the highest level include ‘goodness’ and

‘justice’. Reason plays a fundamental role in the knowledge and

practice of virtue. A human being who lives a virtue such as goodness

is then regarded as a good person. This suggests that virtues are

abstract ethical entities, but they can become real in the world of

appearance by being instantiated in human beings. For example, in

‘Jean is a good person’, goodness is manifested in Jean. Any counter-

virtue is seen as a vice; hence ethically bad for the human soul.

Similarly Aristotle is well known for his virtue ethics described in a

number of writings such as in his famous works the Nicomachean

Ethics and the Eudemian Ethics. The greatest good for Aristotle is

happiness, which is the self-realization of an individual through the

3 Utilitarian ethics judge an action as good or bad based on the conse-

quences. Deontological ethics judge an action by the obligation attached to

the action itself.


use of reason. There are several virtues that are encouraged by

Aristotle: some of them are individualist in nature (such as temper-

ance and continence), while some are communitarian (such as bra-

very). In both Plato’s and Aristotle’s versions of virtue ethics the focus

is on discouraging vices and promoting virtues, which are important

for the attainment of a good life (happiness).

Ubuntu virtue ethics could have been expected to follow the same

trend of virtue ethics advocated by philosophers such as Plato and

Aristotle, but on the contrary, the intellectual brand of this ethics is

presented as parallel to Western virtue ethics. Thaddeus Metz (2012)

in an article “Ethics in Africa and Aristotle: Some Points of Contrast”

compares ubuntu virtue ethics with Aristotelian virtue ethics and

argues that the former is communitarian in nature and the latter is

both individualistic and communitarian. Commenting on this aspect

he writes:

In this article I compare and, especially, contrast Aristotle’s

conception of virtue with one typical of sub-Saharan philos-

ophers. I point out that the latter is strictly other-regarding,

and specifically communitarian, and contend that the former,

while including such elements, also includes some self-

regarding or individualist virtues, such as temperance and

knowledge. I also argue that Aristotle’s conception of human

excellence is more attractive than the sub-Saharan view as a

complete account of how to live, but that the African

conception is a strong contender for a limited group of the

most important virtues related to morality qua rightness

(Metz, 2012, 99).

The dictum that is commonly shared as the basis of ubuntu virtue

ethics is ‘I am because we are’ (see Mbiti, 1969, 108-109). This expres-

sion was introduced to indicate the ontological basis of ubuntu virtue

ethics as the ‘we’, which is equivalent to the society/community.4 It is

obvious that this view is meant to underline the difference between

the Western focus which is thought to be individualistic; and the

4 See also Nze (1989) on communalism.


African which is communitarian, as is evident in the above citation. In

Western ethics the ontological basis is Descartes’ ‘I think, therefore I

am’, whereby the ‘I think’ is representative of reasoning activity by an

individual (it reflects Aristotle’s consideration of man as a rational

animal) and the ‘I am’ is representative of individual existence in the

world (this is what Heidegger called ‘Dasein’). While Mbiti’s expres-

sion was designed to represent what is African, Descartes’ dictum was

expected to represent the Western ontological foundation. It is impor-

tant to do justice to Descartes’ cogito by indicating that his whole pro-

ject was not intended to express a Western cultural essence, instead he

wanted to develop a neutral epistemological foundation that could

not be doubted. I think that if African thinkers focused more on

Aristotle’s ethics rather than on Descartes’ ontology as a point of com-

parison: they would have acknowledged individualistic elements in

ubuntu virtue ethics.

Similar to the emphasis put on community by Mbiti, the famous

South African advocate of ubuntu Desmond Tutu (1999) promoted

communitarian virtues in African ethics. In Malawi there are also a

number of works that support and advance a communitarian perspec-

tive of ubuntu/umunthu ethics such as Tambulasi and Kayuni (2005,

2012)5 and Mfutso-Bengo (2006, 2016).6

In ubuntu virtue ethics in general, the greatest good (summum

bonum) that drives individuals is explicated as communal or social

harmony. This automatically means that there is enhancement of all

virtues that lead towards the achievement of this communal har-

mony.7 Commenting on the Malawian situation, Schoffeleers (1997)

and Braugel (2001) seem to hold a comprehensive understanding of

communal harmony that is not limited to human relations/com-

5 Kayuni and Tambulasi discussed ubuntu in a Malawian setting in their

works, Can African Feet Divorce Western Shoes? The Case of ‘Ubuntu’ and Demo-

cratic Good Governance in Malawi (2005) and Ubuntu and corporate social respon-

sibility: the case of selected Malawian organization (2012), but tried in vain to re-

commend African values in governance. 6 Mfutso-Bengo works more in the context of biomedical ethics. 7 The idea of harmony as a foundation of the African way of life is common,

as is claimed by a number of intellectuals. See Schoffeleers (1997) and Braugel

(2001).


munity, but also affects all other living and non-living creatures,

including God and the spirits (wider community). This is evident in

their discussion of the creation myth, where African traditional society

started its existence in total primordial harmony. All beings were

living together peacefully and when trouble came, the spirit of

solidarity helped them to continue living in harmony (see Braugel,

2001). Harmony is therefore a necessary condition for living well in

the universe. Metz and Gaia (2010, 275-277) also focus on this aspect

of harmony, but they limit their discussion to human relations/com-

munity. In these relations, they firstly emphasize harmony under-

stood as solidarity. Secondly, they focus on the element of identity or

sense of belonging to the community. Nevertheless, some of the

virtues that are indispensable in discussing social harmony include

solidarity, cooperation, friendliness and reciprocal respect. One of the

commonly cited expressions on social harmony as summum bonum is

Desmond Tutu’s:

We say, ‘a person is a person through other people’. It is not ‘I

think therefore I am’. It says rather: ‘I am human because I

belong’. I participate, I share….Harmony, friendliness, com-

munity are great goods. Social harmony is for us the summum

bonum—the greatest good. Anything that subverts or under-

mines this sought-after good is to be avoided like the plague

(1999: 35).

The mention of social harmony as the greatest good suggests that

an individual desires communal happiness in his actions and such

happiness consists in communal harmony. A person with umunthu or

an ethical person is the one who strives to live according to communal

virtues. Such a person must learn to sacrifice personal interests and

values for the sake of the other. He/she must practice a complete sense

of belonging to the entire community.

Although Desmond Tutu (1999), and Metz and Gaia (2010) fo-

cused more on communal harmony with respect to human society, I

think that a broader view that reflects both the physical (human

society) and spiritual worlds, which are inseparable, captures well the


practice in most African traditional cultures in the sub-Saharan

territory (Schoffeleers, 1997; Braugel, 2001).

Anomalies of the Current Theories of Ubuntu Virtue Ethics

There are some anomalies within ubuntu virtue ethics that require

special attention. The first set of anomalies in this form of virtue ethics

includes: (a) the elimination of ‘reason’ and its role in knowing and

directing the soul in practicing virtue; (b) ignoring the individual

focus of all virtues and a set of individually focused virtues; (c) tying

the objective of practicing virtue to the community; and (d) the elimi-

nation of an understanding of virtues as abstract forms with a

potential for being instantiated in both the community and the indivi-

dual. These anomalies may be explained as a consequence of political

propaganda in the colonial and early postcolonial period in Africa.

Reason and individualism were attributed to the colonials (Oruka,

1992), therefore they could hardly be introduced in an African version

of virtue ethics. Apparently an African does not use reason, but

passively receives customs and virtues from the traditional society

and is expected to live according to such dictates.Communitarianism

was an attribute of African society and this gave it a privileged

position in the explanation of virtues. In other words, the community

reasons for the individual. In the colonial period this was intended to

unite Africans in the fight against the same enemy (the colonial

powers). In the postcolonial period it is meant to strengthen African

political parties and their ideologies.

In the sub-Saharan region, Julius Nyerere (1966) and Kenneth

Kaunda were among the first promoters of ubuntu/umunthu values. In

the case of Julius Nyerere, the virtues promoted in his theory are

unfolded within a political theory (ideology) drawing inspiration

from African traditional society commonly known as ujaama (see also

Kayange, 2012, 16 ff.). This is based on the idea of family and com-

munal sharing. Similarly, Kenneth Kaunda focused on African hu-

manism and underlined the element of community with its values

such as unity, collaboration, solidarity, etc. Desmond Tutu is one of

the thinkers whose version of ubuntu ethics aims at promoting


political interests, in this case the promotion of peace and unity. For

instance, Tutuwrote:

Ubuntu means that in a real sense even the supporters of apart-

heid were victims of the vicious system which they imple-

mented and which they supported so enthusiastically. Our

humanity was intertwined. The humanity of the perpetrator

of apartheid’s atrocities was caught up and bound up in that

of his victim whether he liked it or not. In the process of de-

humanizing another, in inflicting untold harm and suffering,

the perpetrator was inexorably being dehumanized as well.

(1990, 32)

This understanding of ubuntu was utilized to stop people in-

flicting harm on each other during the apartheid years in South Africa.

Ubuntu ethics developed in this vein is more impartial than a gener-

alized elaboration, since it identifies certain traits in the community

and reinforces them for the achievement of particular interests.

The second anomaly in ubuntu virtue ethics is the deliberate

misconception of Western philosophy as exclusively individualistic.

In this regard, even the comparison by Metz (2012) indicated above

apparently builds on a similar misconception. What is surprising is

that one can assume that the promoters of ubuntu ethics, such as Man-

gena (2010) and Mfutso-Bengo (2016), were well aware of Aristotle’s

famous expression that a man is a social/political animal by nature

(Aristotle, 1946, Politics 1253a9; Aristotle, 1995, Nicomachean Ethics

1169b18). If remembering this was quite difficult, the communitarian,

before distorting Western philosophy, could have remembered the

Catholic Church’s social teaching which rebuked different forms of

individualism and promoted a form of communitarianism based on

Christian values. If all this was impossible, it was important at least to

remember the development of Western history that witnessed both

orientations (individualist and communalist). In my view Mbiti (1969)

is a very good example of this misrepresentation of Western thought.

By committing the fallacy of generalization, he convinced many

Africans that Western thought was exclusively individualistic. This

understanding is partly true when one considers modern Western


thought as founded on Descartes ([1641] 1984). 8 Nevertheless, in

various parts of Europe, for example in Southern Italy, most citizens

were/are still community oriented. This was/is also true in some parts

of Spain, France and other nations.

Correcting Ubuntu Virtue Ethics

The first correction necessary is the extension of the communitar-

ian focus through the inclusion of an individual focus. The idea is that

virtues or vices may be considered as abstract entities, universals, that

are instantiated in both the individual and in individuals/community.

In order to make the indicated correction, I will work with the as-

sumption that the investigation of ordinary language is fundamental,

because it can objectively point at virtues and vices used in a particular

context. Ordinary language is important because it is not conditioned

by communitarian biases that are promoted by different scholars (see

Tambulasi and Kayuni, 2005; Metz, 2012, 2007). I am well aware that

the chains of communitarian thinking put in place by different African

scholars are very difficult to unlock, and may be here to stay forever.

Nevertheless, I argue that the inclusion of the individual focus of

ubuntu virtues and vices may be argued for by identifying traits of

individualism and individual values in the African traditional context

(see also Kisekka, 2002; Kochalumchuvatti, 2010). This identification

was partly echoed in Kaphagawani (1998, 173), who indicated in one

of his criticisms of Mbiti’s communitarianism that:

[t]o assert African communalism is not in any way to imply

the denial of recognition of individual human beings qua

individuals. African communalism in fact takes cognizance of

ontological pluralism; and to assert, as Mbiti does, that we are,

presumes prior recognition of the individuality of those mak-

ing up the we….And to claim, ‘whatever happens to the indi-

vidual happens to the whole group’, and vice versa, is no

doubt to forget the difference between individuals on the one

hand and sets of individuals on the other. For Africans, cer-

8 This work of Descartes was first published in Latin in 1641.


tainly the Chewa, are aware of this important difference as

exemplified by the following expressions: Chaona mnzako cha-

pita mawa chili paiwe (What your neighbor has experienced is

gone, tomorrow it will be your turn); mvula ikakuona litsiro

siikata (When the rain has seen that you are dirty, it does not

stop pouring); and Wanthu ndi mchenga saundika (Human

beings are like sand out of which one cannot make a moun-

tain). All these proverbs and expressions reflect the Chewa’s

cognizance of the individuality of human beings.

Kaphagawani mentions the presence of individuality in the

African context by referring to proverbs; hence, his main focus is the

knowledge and affirmation of the ontological uniqueness of an indivi-

dual. This is an important observation, as it clearly shows that, while

Kaphagawani considers the epistemological and ontological connote-

tion of individuality, this paper exclusively focuses on virtues/ethical

perspective. Nevertheless, the fact that Kaphagawani mentions a

number of proverbs that support individuality is suggestive of the

type of data that can be utilized in tracing individualism or the notion

of the individual in the Bantu context.9 I therefore embarked on a

study of a sample comprising a total of 2,009 proverbs and metaphors

used by the Chewa people of Malawi (see Chakanza, 2000). My con-

tention goes beyond Kaphagawani’s work (1998), which discussed the

elements of individuality in general, by focusing on a number of

specific themes that emphasize the individual. The themes to be dis-

cussed below include self-knowledge, self-reliance, self-control and

individual ownership.

The first crucial discovery justifying the inclusion of an indivi-

dual focus among the Chewa proverbs is the presence of the idea of

‘self-knowledge’. One such proverb is Kadziwa mwini mkhuto wa fulu,

translated as ‘only a tortoise by itself knows whether it has had

9 This is a method that has been utilized by various scholars such as Austin

(1962), Wittgenstein (1953), Grice (1957), Sperber and Wilson (2008) and

Kayange (2014), who underline the importance of ordinary language in a

particular context as a source of philosophical investigation.


enough food or not’ (see Nthara, 1958; Chakanza, 2000, 96).10 Inter-

preting this expression focusing on ‘speaker’, ‘hearer’ and context in

terms of pragmatic theory (Grice, 1957; Sperber and Wilson, 2008;

Kayange, 2014), the first possible interpretation is that self-knowledge

is important because it leads to the value of self-responsibility. The

individual is capable of knowing that it has had enough and then takes

a decision to stop. The second possible meaning is that you know

yourself by carrying out self-examination. Other proverbs similar to

the above include: kadziwa mwini mpeni wamchiuno, translated as ‘only

the person in question knows that there is a knife hidden in his/her

waist’; Kadziwa mwini msampha wa m’chipeta, translated as ‘only the

trap-setter himself knows where the trap lies in the chipeta grass’. The

proverb Waika phale watama mano, translated as ‘he/she who has put

the potsherd ready, trusts his/her teeth’ suggests that self-knowledge

leads to self-trust or self-confidence.

The second discovery that calls for the inclusion of an individual

focus in African traditional philosophy is the existence of proverbs

regarding ‘self-reliance’. One of such expressions is Khasu liposa mako

ndi tate (Chakanza, 2000, 114), translated as ‘a hoe is more than your

mother and father’. The meaning of this expression is that self-reliance

is important rather than depending on parents or on the entire

community.11 Interestingly, the expression puts the self and his/her

economic activities at the center. Investigating further the element of

individuality, one encounters the Chewa expression Kufa saferana

(Chewa) or Kuwa kwangawelana (Yao), translated as ‘you cannot die for

the other’. This encourages self-reliance by discouraging dependence

on others. There are some things that other people cannot do for the

10 The literal expression ‘ndimazidziwa ndekha’, translated as ‘I know myself’,

is sometimes used to achieve the same purpose of self-knowledge. This ex-

pression is commonly used in ordinary communication when a subject does

not want to get involved in some actions that will lead him/her to destroy the

self or others. 11 Parents are important everywhere, including those places where the

individual is emphasized. It is nothing special to say that parents are valued

in this community. I still remember that in the early days, when I was in-

structed using this expression, I felt like I was being betrayed, given that

family and community were for me beyond everything.


individual. It further teaches self-responsibility in life by encouraging

individuals to perform their duties.12 Another important proverb is

kudya kwamzako sungamwere madzi, literarily translated as ‘when you

eat at a friend’s/neighbor’s home, you cannot accompany the food

with water’. This indicates that it is not good to rely on others.13 It

shows that dependence makes individuals feel uncomfortable in life.

The third discovery is the presence of the idea of ‘self-control’

(kudziletsa). One of these expressions is Chimkonda cha nsikidzi chidanka

ndi maliro kumanda (Chakanza, 2000, 58), literally translated as ‘the

bed-bugs’ object of affection made them accompany a corpse to the

graveyard. This refers to the habit of sucking the blood of human

beings; the expression warns individuals to practice self-control over

things they do as subjects, such as drinking beer, having sexual rela-

tions, and eating excessively. The individual is warned to be respon-

sible by avoiding addictions. Other proverbs include: Fisi akatola fupa

sadyera pomwepo, translated as ‘when a hyena gets a bone, it does not

eat it on the spot’.14 Although a hyena is known in Malawi for glut-

tony, it controls itself and eats where it is alone. Galu wofewerera adapita

ndi goli is translated as ‘a dog with an easy character went with its

protective stick’ (Chakanza, 2000, 84). Do not be deceived by the

senses, by following the good feelings they bring, but practice self-

12 In contemporary Chewa language, this figurative expression is often

replaced by the literal expression, uwona kuti uchita bwanji, wakula wantha,

translated as ‘you will see/know what to do, you are grown up and it’s over’. 13 For further study on self-reliance see the proverb Nyumba yamwini

saotchera mbewa, translated as ‘you don’t roast mice in someone’s house’.

Kumakanga (1975), p. 21. The story supporting this reads: ‘A person went to

catch mice. When he came back, he started preparing the mice. He saw in

somebody’s house a pot that was on the fire, and started thinking, ‘Let me

roast these mice so that, when the Nsima (food from maize floor) is ready, I

may use them’. After roasting his mice, he stayed and waited in vain for a

long time for Nsima to come, but there was nothing. He therefore decided to

eat his mice without Nsima. The proverb teaches that, ‘Each and every person

must try to stand on their own feet, without trusting/counting on what others

have, but they must provide for their own needs’. 14 The instruction is that when one gets something, it is important to practice

self-control by being prudent. The behavior of a hyena is in this context taken

as an example of patience.


control. Msipu wobiliwira udapha mbuzi is translated as ‘fresh lush grass

killed a goat’. In this proverb the lack of self-control led a goat to keep

on eating up to the point of bursting.15 This set of proverbs may be

summarized as suggesting that the self is the measure of the self. An

individual must know when it is enough, even if the activity is still

attractive and satisfying.

The fourth idea is that of ‘individual ownership’. For example, the

proverb chamwini ndi chamwini is translated as ‘that which is owned

by an individual, is that which is owned by an individual’. This clearly

shows that what an individual owns is not for the community. Other

proverbs showing individual ownership include: Chinthu chikatayika

chimalira mwini, translated as ‘when a thing is lost, it cries for the own-

er’; Kanthu ndi kako, kamwini nkamwini is translated as ‘a thing is what

you have, “that” which is with others is just a “that”’. This alludes to

the understanding that an individual must not count on what belongs

to others or the community; what one can count on is what one owns.

Kanthu n’kako, waona adakhuta thope is translated as ‘what you have is

yours, and whoever saw it got satisfied with mud’; Fodya wako ndiye

ali pamphuno is translated as ‘Your snuff is what you have on your

nose’.16

It is clear from the above that an exclusive focus on the commu-

nity in studying African philosophy or ethics is surely erroneous. A

focus on both the community and the individual provides an

15 Other instructive and interesting expressions include, Bongololo sadzolera

mafuta pa gulu, translated as ‘a millipede does not apply oil to his/her body in

the community’; Wamva ng’oma ndi yake, translated as ‘the one who heard the

drum is his/hers’. 16 Note that the focus on self-knowledge/awareness, self-reliance, self-

control and individual ownership connects the African traditional focus to

the Western individual focus. For example, the ancient idea that ‘an unex-

amined life is not worth living’ (attributed to Socrates in Plato’s Apology 35a-

38b), the Cartesian idea that ‘I think therefore I am’ (Descartes [1641] 1984)

and the Hegelian notion of self-consciousness/awareness (Hegel, 1977),

allude to this aspect of knowing and describing ‘the self’. This has not only

been a Western experience, but it is present in contemporary philosophical

reflections in the African context, for example, Gyekye’s work, The Unexa-

mined Life: Philosophy and the African Experience (1996). Similarly, self-control

and self-reliance are highly promoted in Western virtue ethics (Aristotle).


important foundation for any development of ubuntu ethics. What

promoters of communitarian thought in Africa forget is that there are

various proverbs that highlight the individual against the community;

for example, the proverb Chuluke chuluke ndi wa njuchi umanena iyo

yakuluma, translated as ‘being many is for bees, you identify the one

that stung you’. In some versions this figurative expression is written

as Piringupiringu ndi wa njuchi, yoluma ndi immodzi, translated as ‘Wan-

dering in large numbers is for bees, it is only one that stings’ (see Cha-

kanza, 2000, 70). Apparently this contradicts the famous commu-

nitarian proverb cited by Kayuni and Tambulasi (2005) which states

that Kalikokha ndi kanyama, ali awiri ndi anthu, translated as ‘[t]he one

who is alone is an animal, those that are two are humans’. Another

proverb that questions the community emphasis is Anagwirizana malo

okumana, koma anagona m’mitengo yosiyanasiyana, translated as ‘they

agreed on where to meet, but they slept in different trees’.17

Lastly, another powerful proverb questioning communitarianism

is Andiyitana pakalowa njoka, pakalowa mbewa akumba okha, translated as,

‘they call me when a snake has entered a hole, but when it is a mouse

they dig it out themselves’. It warns the individual against manipula-

tion by the community which wants him/her when there are pro-

blems, as in the case of fighting against colonialism. One wonders why

most African intellectuals have ignored this beautiful balance between

individualism and communalism that is present in African culture.

Ubuntu ethics can restore this missing balance through reformulation

of its virtues and vices to reflect individual and communitarian

elements.

Reformulation of Ubuntu Virtues and Vices

This section provides the reformulation of a system of ubuntu

virtues or vices taking as point of departure how they are reflected

17 The communal responsibility is reflected in the aspect of agreeing where

to meet, but then there is this element of difference that was demonstrated in

the behavior of the individual community members. An individual under-

stands from this context that what is said with respect to communal unity is

different from the actions of individuals, who are often individualistic in their

actions. This suggests that the community is sometimes irresponsible.


and used in ordinary language in some Bantu communities in Malawi.

I argue that corporate entities can be transformed if they start

concentrating on the general values sampled below, rather than

continue being con-ditioned by communitarian values only. The

virtues and vices below are sampled from the collection of 2,009

proverbs indicated earlier (Chakanza, 2000). The focus was on what

ordinary people mostly reinforce and what they discourage in

Malawi. From a general study of these proverbs, it was discovered

that out of 2,009 proverbs, there were 1,093 meanings that indicate

virtues and vices. The lists of mean-ings were suggested by Chakanza

(2000, 449-463). Below are the find-ings of 40 meanings that had the

highest number of proverbs attached to them.

Serial number Meaning of proverb Total number of

proverbs

1 Patience 55

2 Humility 46

3 Responsibility 39

4 Perseverance 38

5 Foresight 37

6 Respect 37

7 Discretion 34

8 Dishonesty 31

9 Prudence 31

10 Co-operation 30

11 Luck 29

12 Pride 29

13 Self-Control 29

15 Care 27

16 Determination 27

17 Effort 26

18 Friendship 26

19 Reciprocity 26

20 Acceptance 25

21 Hypocrisy 25

22 Cunning 24

23 Selfishness 24

24 Contentment 23

25 Haste 23

24 Honesty 22


Considering that some meanings above refer to the same values

—for example, the vice ‘dishonesty’ on number 8 and the virtue ‘hon-

esty’ on 24 are both meant to promote honesty—a new hierarchy of

values/virtues is suggested as follows (I have presented only 10

positions with virtues having the highest number of proverbs):18

18 Note that the purpose is to demonstrate what sorts of values are more

famous compared to others.

Humility

Patience

Honesty

Responsibility

PerseveranceRespect

ForesightDiscretion

Prudence

Co-operation

Self-control

25 Courage 22

26 Evil 22

27 Laziness 22

28 Appreciation 21

29 Evidence 21

30 Generosity 21

31 Stubbornness 21

32 Advice 20

33 Satisfaction 20

34 Self-reliance 20

35 Unity 19

36 Delay 19

37 Love 19

38 Preparedness 19

39 Misfortune 18

40 Injustice 17


The values that were changed include humility (virtue) and pride

(vice), which scored 46 + 29 = 75 (see the above values). The vice of dis-

honesty is on 31 plus its virtue ‘honesty’ on 22 = 53.

For the purpose of this paper, I will not discuss all these values in

detail. Just to mention a few ideas, the hierarchy above shows that

humility is potentially the most widely esteemed virtue in Malawi.

This can help individuals in corporate entities to become aware of

their weaknesses, accept correction, etc. The only possible drawback

is that in some circumstances humility can impede creativity and com-

petition in the context of business. Humility may be seen as primarily

oriented towards the community and is hence a partly communitarian

value. However, humility may also have an individual focus when

one uses it as a strategy to avoid embarrassment more especially in

situations of failure. In second place in the hierarchy is patience, which

qualifies both as an individual-focused virtue and a community-focus

virtue. Patience can be seen to have an individual focus in those situa-

tions where it enables an individual to avoid unnecessary anger and

an exaggerated response when his or her needs are not immediately

met. It benefits the community more as it encourages a good attitude

in an individual towards others, especially when the community’s

actions waste his or her precious time. It is a very important virtue be-

cause it promotes harmony in the community; as it enhances mutual

understanding and tolerance. Patience is important in most corporate

entities, because it helps to reduce the time wasted on complaints,

some of which are quite unnecessary. The fact that this sentiment is

commonly found in proverbs suggests that most Malawians value

patience. In the third place is honesty, which is one of the most

important values that needs to be reinforced in corporate entities in

Malawi and other sub-Saharan countries. This is because of the grow-

ing corruption in these countries, which is a sign of the absence of

honesty. Practicing honesty at work not only helps prevent corrup-

tion, it also ensures that employers and customers receive proper ser-

vice, and it leads to employees respecting working hours (doing work

based on the agreed time). Although other aspects such as corporate

cultures of competition, impulsive risk taking, and disrespect for

established norms may, possibly, boost the economy, the values of

responsibility, perseverance, respect, foresight, discretion, prudence


and cooperation are appropriate for a genuine and lasting economic

transformation of Malawi and the Sub-Saharan countries.19

Conclusion: Transformation of Corporate Entities

The old understanding of ubuntu virtue ethics and the centrality

of the community meant developing a corporate ethics founded on

cooperation, solidarity, collaboration, mutual respect, etc.20 The use of

ubuntu virtue ethics, as claimed by communitarian scholars, seems to

be a breakthrough in the context of corporate governance and busi-

ness ethics because of its link with the theme of corporate social

responsibility (supported in the stakeholder approach to business).

This is a development in African philosophy where communitari-

anism is viewed as an instrument to defend the stakeholder concep-

tion of social responsibility. It is unfortunate that Bantu ethics has not

yet achieved their desired end in corporate entities. Many corporate

entities in Malawi are not yet transformed and they are highly affected

by unethical behavior such as corruption (see Munthali, 2004).

This paper has laid a foundation for the transformation of cor-

porate entities in Malawi and other sub-Saharan countries. After de-

monstrating the weaknesses of the current community focus, it has

19 The late president of Malawi, Kamuzu Banda (president from 1966-1994),

encouraged four values: respect, unity, loyalty and obedience as the most

important values in Malawi. The current president Peter Mutharika (presi-

dent from 2014) encourages integrity, patriotism and loyalty. It was only

Bingu wa Mutharika (president from 2004-2012) who tried to promote all the

African values by insisting more on doing research on African traditional

culture in order to come up with a system of local values. He also criticized

the West in most of his writings. Mutharika (1995; 2011). 20 For example Tambulasi and Kayuni (2012) in their article, “Ubuntu and

corporate social responsibility: the Case of selected Malawian Organiza-

tions,” studied the Malawian context and focused more on communitarian

development. Similarly, Khomba and Vermaak (2012) in “Business Ethics and

Corporate Governance: An African Socio-cultural Framework,” built on a

communitarian orientation in a number of countries, such as Malawi, South

Africa and Botswana. See also Douglas, F.P. Taylor (2014) in a work entitled

“Defining Ubuntu Ethics for Business Ethics: a Deontological Approach,”

South African Journal of Philosophy, Volume 33, No. 3.


made a claim that individual-oriented virtues are an essential feature

of ubuntu virtue ethics. The following suggestions are fundamental in

the continuing process of transformation:

- Firstly corporate entities must develop a corporate ethics

founded on both community and individual virtues, as argued

above.

- Ubuntu ethics must reflect both a communitarian and an indivi-

dual focus.

I conclude by emphasizing that, although ubuntu virtue ethics

remains a challenging field, it is advisable that intellectuals should

constantly engage with it. This will help them to constructively iden-

tify and promote both community and individual virtues that can help

Malawi and other African countries to achieve and maintain sustain-

able economic development pioneered by its corporate entities.

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Part III

African Philosophical Ideas to

Solve Global Problems

6.

Wangari Maathai as a Postcolonial Critique

of African Development

T.D. HARPER-SHIPMAN

In 1999, the World Bank and International Monetary Fund (IMF)

collaborated on what is now the contemporary development para-

digm for foreign aid. These international financial institutions (IFIs)

fashioned the Comprehensive Development Framework (CDF) as a

response to claims about the failure of their previous peremptory neo-

liberal policies. The CDF was thought to mark a break with previous

World Bank and IMF development theories of the 1980s and 1990s

predicated on a monolithic approach to political and economic pro-

gress (Pender, 2000). Subsequently, questions regarding the function

and legitimacy of both the World Bank and the IMF began to pervade

the international discourse. Claimants maintained that neo-liberal

policies yielded ineffective and pernicious consequences for develop-

ing countries. The World Bank and IMF contended that, by incur-

porating a focus on poverty reduction and country context, this new

paradigm holistically and comprehensively identifies and mitigates

the various socioeconomic and political developmental problematics

(Fischer and Wolfensohn, 2000; Wolfensohn, 2005). The underlying

assumption; however is that these developmental problematics are all

endogenously produced, that they are the consequences of state

failure and economic atrophy.

The solution, then, remains entrenched in addressing neoliberal

policies. When applied to Africa—the most aid-saturated region in the

world—this approach manifests inherent limitations in both its ability

to diagnose and treat Africa’s socioeconomic and political difficulties.

These shortcomings prove all the more salient when juxtaposed with

a postcolonial analysis of Africa’s truncated economic and political

ontogenesis. Using the writings and development theory of Wangari

Maathai, I attempt to ascertain the extent to which the World Bank’s

model is informed by the concerns and aspirations of the context it

claims to serve.

132 T.D. Harper-Shipman

Given the general topic addressed in this paper—political and

economic development—I use the World Bank as a case study repre-

sentative of neoliberal development practices without addressing

issues related to the International Monetary Fund (IMF). Although the

IMF has consolidated poverty reduction principles and the CDF as

core institutions, the Bank remains the primary dictator of develop-

ment policy in the global South. That the international community

attributes the creation of the CDF and its principles to former World

Bank president James Wolfensohn is indicative of the perceived lead

the Bank takes on development issues. It goes without saying that in

positioning the Bank as a proponent of neoliberal development, I am

referring to the Bank’s realpolitik. Ideologically, the institution is not

so monolithic. Scholars have long conducted institutional ethnogra-

phies of the Bank in order to demonstrate the internal ideological

struggles that prevail within the institution (Mosley et al., 1991; Miller-

Adams, 2002; Woods, 2006). The practical nature of the Bank’s inter-

ventions; however, is in line with the tenets of neoliberalism (Gold-

man, 2005; Smith, 2006). The writings and development theories of

Wangari Maathai offer a provocative case for juxtaposition. While her

development approach lends itself to neocolonial and postcolonial

renderings of development, she also acknowledges similar neoliberal

impediments to progress such as the World Bank. Therefore, if these

neoliberal institutions were to address development using the contex-

tual understandings and aspirations that inform their frame of

reference; who better to inform this approach than Maathai? Because

of Maathai’s status as a Nobel Peace Prize recipient and frequent

champion of human, civil, and environmental rights, it would be im-

plausible to argue that her development philosophy does not tran-

scend national borders; hence it is very likely that the World Bank is

aware of her perspectives on aid and development.

The argument presented in this paper is two-tiered. The first tier

of the argument maintains that the Bank falls short of the overt claims

in its new development framework of novelty, country specificity, and

comprehensiveness. Instead the Bank continues to offer the same neo-

liberal approach that guided its failed Structural Adjustment Pro-

grams (SAPs) in the 1980s and 1990s. Their CDF is hackneyed and

driven by a monolithic approach to development in Africa. In under-

Wangari Maathai as a Postcolonial Critique of African Develoment 133

standing how and why the framework is in fact myopic, one need only

juxtapose it with the development philosophy of Wangari Maathai

and other postcolonial development scholars. Maathai and these

scholars lay the foundation for the second tier of the argument. As

long as the Bank and other development agencies continue to neglect

the historical legacies of colonialism in Africa, require African states

to emulate the ersatz development trajectory of the West, and employ

neoliberal understandings of the problem and solutions, the continent

will continue to look “underdeveloped” through this lens. I demon-

strate that although Maathai and the Bank profess congruent develop-

ment goals, Maathai’s approach (which is rooted in a post-colonial

approach to the problem) proves to be more inclusive and grounded

in a sincere understanding of Africa than the Bank’s Comprehensive

Development Framework, while simultaneously challenging the neo-

liberal presupposition that Africa’s development problems are auto-

chthonous and exacerbated endogenously.

The methodological process involved in making this claim entails

comparative and interpretive analyses of Maathai and the World Bank

and postcolonial development theories. I begin by using Maathai’s

autobiography and relevant speeches to produce a cogent and coher-

ent rendering of her development theory. I focus extensively on her

speech given at the 4th UN World Women’s Conference, “Bottlenecks

to Development in Africa” (Maathai, 1995), while using other

speeches and texts for elaboration and support. In order to best under-

stand Maathai’s concerns and approaches to development, I engage

her positions on development by extracting some of the more substan-

tial themes that are omnipresent in her argument. The bottlenecks that

Maathai outlines speak to one or more of the following tropes: con-

textualization, responsibility, perceptions of Africa, and solutions—all

of which echo central themes in postcolonial development literature.

I then examine the World Bank’s development approach as es-

poused in its Comprehensive Development Framework (CDF). Using

this framework, World Development Reports, speeches from previous

Bank presidents and chief economists, and other Bank documents, I

contend that they continue to operationalize neoliberal renderings of

progress. Because Maathai is not traditionally recognized as a post-

colonial scholar, I explicate the ways in which her approach reconciles


explicitly with postcolonial literature. This analysis suggests that

Wangari Maathai’s approach to development invokes two opposing

development philosophies: neoliberalism and postcolonialism. While

she is able to indicate various development objectives and goals,

which coalesce with those proffered by the World Bank in its Com-

prehensive Development Frameworks, she also situates Africa’s de-

velopmental problematics within their colonial and postcolonial

origins, which allows for a development approach not predicated on

foreign aid.

Development as Polysemic Concept

In looking at the World Bank’s and Maathai’s respective ren-

derings of pathways towards change in Africa, one must situate them

within larger debates on defining development. Defining develop-

ment proves to be a contentious exercise for many scholars (Neder-

veen-Pieterse, 2001). For some, development is a benevolent activity,

wholly lacking in the global South (Sachs, 2005; Kohli, 2004; Collier,

2008). The process, then, becomes one predicated on economic

growth, political and social modernization, all realized primarily

through a “big push” in the form of aid (Easterly, 2006; Nederveen-

Pieterse, 2001). This conceptualization and its associated practices

have not gone unchallenged. Critical approaches attempt to grapple

not only with the discourses that accompany modern development

thinking, but also its ultimate translation into praxis (Escobar, 2011;

Gunder Frank, 1979). Scholars contributing to a postcolonial under-

standing of development begin by acknowledging the development

enterprise as a postcolonial phenomenon. The process of purposively

intervening in the domestic sociopolitical and economic arrangements

of the global South, however, can be said to be an extension of the

West’s civilizing mission (Fanon, 1961; Said, 1978; Hountondji, 2013).

Thus, the discourse on development is the cloaking of the old

civilizing rhetoric in talk of markets and governance. Wynter (1996)

challenges the putative ontologies of development using insights from

V.Y. Mudimbe, Hamidou Kane and Issiaka Laleye. She contends that

development, “rather than functioning only as a purely denotative,

and therefore transculturally ‘true’ and objective term, should be


recognized as a culturally-specific one” (Wynter, 1996, 299). In ques-

tioning the fundamental nature of the term, Wynter is destabilizing its

associated epistemologies. In other words, the suggested empirical

evidence of development—economic growth and material procure-

ment—should be critically evaluated and interpreted as products of

the “local culture” in Europe.

The current epistemological order necessitates a bifurcation of

development ontologies relative to their ability to achieve a “supra-

ordinate goal of development” for the developed and the under-

developed (Wynter, 1996, 310). The World Bank and IMF embody and

promulgate the goal of “development” by requiring the under-devel-

oped states to follow “prescriptive behavioral pathways” that further

reify existing ontologies of development. These two IFIs proffer a

development telos derived from Western culture. An extension of this

logic requires these institutions to act as “hegemonic overseers,” en-

suring “that the ‘underdeveloped’ areas of the world continue to

develop only along the prescribed lines that are needed to enable them

to continue as noncompetitive reserve areas of the overall global

system” (Wynter, 1996, 307). Thus, Africa’s development strategy

should be to rupture and escape this epistemic development trap.

Although a number of African leaders and thinkers have pro-

posed alternative development strategies that would ameliorate the

gestalt of Africa (Nkrumah, 1965; Nyerere, 1968; Wa Thiong’o, 1994;

Nnaemeka, 2009; Eyong and Foy, 2006; Adejumobi and Olukoshi,

2008), Maathai’s philosophy moves the continent a step closer to truly

rupturing the epistemic development trap. Prior to the promulgation

of the New Economic Partnership for Africa’s Development (NEPAD)

in 2001, African leaders directly challenged the World Bank’s neo-

liberal prescriptions for Africa. In response to the Bank’s and IMF’s

structural adjustments, African leaders proposed the Lagos Plan of

Action for Economic Development in Africa in 1980. The Lagos Plan

of Action entailed a series of policy initiatives that would increase the

continent’s self-sufficiency and identified exogenous factors such as

economic shocks and structural factors such as the international

trading system as responsible for Africa’s stifled development (Lagos

Plan of Action 1980). Most notable about the report was the limited

responsibility that African leaders assumed for Africa’s failure to


progress along the given economic and political telos—this in

response to the Bank’s 1981 Berg report, which placed the blame solely

on African leaders (Owusu, 2006).

Accordingly the Lagos Plan of Action outlined a restructuring of

the international trade system: industrialization, less reliance on raw

material exports, and augmenting the amount of foreign aid being

channeled to Africa as means through which the continent would

develop (Lagos Plan of Action 1980). In 1989, a group of economists

elaborated the African Alternative Framework to Structural Adjust-

ment Programs for Socio-Economic Recovery and Transformation

(AAF-SAP). Much like the Lagos Plan of Action, AAF-SAP articulated

a strategy for increased self-sufficiency across Africa. This framework

challenged the applicable scope of neoliberal SAPs and their ability to

address structures of the African economy such as environmental

degradation, reliance on external trade, uneven development across

urban and rural communities, or the shortages in trained personnel

and capital that led to a narrow production base in many African

countries (AAF-SAP, 1989). With their fixation on financial balances

and price structures; orthodox structural adjustments were not capa-

cious enough to move Africa out of poverty and into renaissance.

Where the AAF-SAP offers a substitute for the World Bank’s adjust-

ment programs, it is not more holistic than Wangari Maathai’s

appraisal and solution for Africa. The AAF-SAP model comes close

with its call for an African transformation ethic. Transforming Africa’s

social and economic structures requires relegation of the modernizing

language often used to measure and analyze economic and social

development in Africa. The AAF-SAP argues that the language of

modernization does not coalesce with African realities and values.

Consequently, the African transformation ethic must incorporate the

lived experiences and tenets of Africans. One of the means through

which the transformation can occur is through a fundamental change

in African consumption: “the present consumption patterns, espe-

cially those of the urban areas, are distorted as they are often a

derivative of the value systems of developed countries. The outward

orientation of consumption has inevitably resulted in a dependence

on the products of developed countries, while undermining the

development of internally-produceable goods” (AAF-SAP, 1989, 12).


This transformation in the African ethic resembles Maathai’s call for

an ethical revolution. Both Maathai and the AAF-SAP also give pri-

macy to self-sufficiency in Africa. However, the AAF-SAP succumbs

to many of the same limitations as the World Bank.

Postcolonial scholars are also concerned with the ways in which

Western powers have mobilized ethnicity for the purposes of exploita-

tion. Alemazung proposes that “[C]olonial masters emphasized the

distinctions between the different ethnic groups, thereby strength-

ening tribal differences and rivalries between these groups and pre-

venting them from forming a united opposition against the coloni-

zers” (Alemazung, 2010, 65). Legacies of ethnic violence become

institutionalized as oppressive mechanisms inherited by authoritarian

regimes. Consequently, colonial institutions that necessitated this

form of ethnic division and oligarchic system of rule gave way to con-

temporary forms of neo-patrimonialism that plague the continent.

“Neo-patrimonial leadership as practiced in many African countries,”

he states, “is an extension of the kind of autocratic and alien tyrant

rule that the colonial masters had initiated” (Alemazung, 2010, 67).

Scholars such as Mahmood Mamdani have also demonstrated the

ways in which “traditional” African institutions were created under

this extortive system that instilled a corrupt sense of authority among

the appointed village chiefs. Under a system of decentralized despot-

ism, these local leaders were accountable only to the colonial adminis-

tration, not to the populations that they represented. Mamdani draws

a correlation between these institutions and those that exist on the

continent today (1996). Maathai advances these arguments and re-

lationships in her own renderings of Africa’s development problems.

Understanding the underlying definitions of, and commitments

to, development prove necessary since, as Nederveen-Pieterse notes,

“different meanings of development relate to changing relations of

power and hegemony” (Nederveen-Pieterse, 2001). Although Maathai

does not propound an epistemological shift in development, she does

acknowledge and problematize the assumption that Africa’s develop-

ment trajectory should be analogous to that of the West. Her approach

finds troubling the presence of the World Bank and IMF in Africa.

Furthermore, she is able to situate the various Western contentions

about Africa—ethnic divisions, neo-patrimonialism, clientelism, neo-


colonialism, and authoritarianism—within their respective historical

contexts. Postcolonial critics consider these to be living legacies of

colonialism, which continue to haunt the present by making it impos-

sible to move constructively toward the future. Thus, any attempt to

mitigate these tensions must contend with the ways in which they

emerged in the colonial past.

The World Bank’s Development Model: Past and Present

With the Bank and its supporting economic system in question,

the institution moved to propagate an alternative framework con-

comitant with the international community’s new project to reduce

world poverty by half, by 2015. Yet, this framework continues to

operate under the assumption that the world economic system has

been, and remains, the most legitimate and optimal for IFIs and

development (Wolfensohn, 2005). The Comprehensive Development

Strategy is the cornerstone of this new paradigm. Wolfensohn states

that the CDF “brings together many current trends in development

thinking and is centered on a long-term vision—prepared by the

country through a participatory national consultation process—that

balances good macroeconomic and financial management with sound

social, structural and human policies” (Fischer and Wolfensohn, 2000,

n.p.). The goal, then, is to holistically address problems of under-

development using both domestic and international actors. The Bank

calls on other IFIs, national governments, civil society and the private

sector to work collectively to ameliorate living conditions for the

world’s poor. The comprehensive aspect also pertains to the move

from atomistic approaches to poverty. No longer will projects focus

solely on the macroeconomic impediments to development. With the

CDF: macroeconomic stability, improved sewerage systems, and

governance are equally weighted goals. At its earliest conception, the

Bank proposed a three-point strategy: promoting opportunity, facili-

tating empowerment, and enhancing security for poverty reduction

(World Development Report, 1999/2000).

Among the many tropes found in the Bank’s CDF, such as

governance, investment in human capital, market liberalization and

partnerships, the call for sustainable development encapsulates the


gamut of CDF objectives. While the Bank does not offer a coherent

definition of the term, it does suggest that sustainable development

comes with implicit objectives (World Development Report, 1999/

2000). These objectives include raising the standard of living through-

out poor populations while increasing per capita income; providing

opportunities for accessing health and education; maintaining clean

environments; and promoting intergenerational equity (World Devel-

opment Report, 1999/2000, 13). Furthermore, in striving for sustain-

able development, the Bank contends that process is tantamount to

policies. Thus, sustainable development necessitates institutions for

good governance with transparency and participatory mechanisms

(World Development Report, 1999/2000, 13). The participatory mecha-

nisms should facilitate input and partnerships among civil society,

government, the private sector, and donors. In fact, the Bank indicates

that improving governance is one of four necessary tasks for Africa, if

the continent is to “claim the 21st century” (Gelb, 2000). The Bank’s

demand for sustainable development is part of a larger attempt to

incorporate many of the liberal norms emanating from the West:

governance, active civil society etc. The assumption is that as African

states domesticate these various norms, poverty will decline and

development will increase.

The World Bank maintains that “opportunity, empowerment,

and security” are key combatants of poverty (World Development Re-

port, 1999/2000). Promoting opportunity for the poor means creating

access to “jobs, credit, roads, electricity, markets for their produce, and

the schools, water, sanitation,” etc. (World Development Report, 1999/

2000, 6). Opportunity refers specifically to material opportunities. The

second part of the Bank’s strategy requires an empowerment of the

poor. Empowering the poor requires institutions (both state and

social) and active collaboration (World Development Report, 1999/

2000). The Bank contends that state and social institutions, which

influence “access to markets” and “public sector service,” should be

“responsive and accountable to poor people” (World Development

Report, 1999/2000, 7). Having access to markets is key when facili-

tating empowerment. One can best access markets, according to the

Bank, through active collaboration between different socioeconomic

classes. Empowerment, however, comes from “making state and


social institutions more responsive” to the poor (World Development

Report, 1999/2000, 3). The final component of this three-pronged stra-

tegy for poverty reduction calls for increased security. The process of

enhancing security involves a decrease in “economic shocks, natural

disasters, ill health, disability, and personal violence” (World De-

velopment Report, 2000/2001, 7). In order to decrease the chances of

these pernicious phenomena, the poor must have more assets, engage

in an array of household activities, and have access to a “range of

insurance mechanisms” (World Development Report, 2000/2001, 7).

The way that the Bank intends to provide opportunity, empowerment,

and security is demonstrative of its continued reliance on markets.

Understanding the Bank’s prescriptions for combating poverty ex-

poses its underlying commitment to neoliberal approaches.

Since instituting the CDF and the associated poverty-reduction

strategy papers (PRSPs), many African countries have remained stag-

nant and mired in the same problems, giving the continent its title as

“hopeless” (Taylor, 2016). With African countries unable to industri-

alize and transcend their dependence on natural resource exports, for-

eign aid remains an indispensable dependency in Africa (Taylor, 2016;

Morvaridi, 2016). For example, the United States pledged 35 million

USD in humanitarian assistance and the European Union 20 million

euros in drought relief to Ethiopia and Namibia, respectively. The

World Bank and IMF also required the Zimbabwean government to

restructure its economy under the Lima Plan to clear 1.8 billion USD

in arrears and further access concessional loans (Mtomba, 2016). The

latest findings from the World Bank’s Country Policy and Institutional

Assessment (CPIA) for Sub-Saharan Africa characterizes the region as

demonstrating poor performance with respect to policy environment

and poverty reduction (World Bank, 2016). Sixteen years after the CDF

and more than 60 years after the independence movement, the con-

tinent remains unable to meet the international standards for develop-

ment.


Africa’s Bottlenecks According to Maathai and Postcolonial

Scholars

According to Maathai, many of Africa’s present issues stem from

both colonization and the Cold War. She states, “[the Cold War]

precipitated some of the most devastating internal wars as African

friends and foes of the superpowers fought it out for economic

political control” (Maathai, 1995, n.p.). She identifies the warring

factions of the Cold War as responsible for installing authoritarian

African leaders, who in turn fostered the conditions for insecurity in

the war-torn nations that dot the African continent today. “State

oppression by dictatorial rulers, especially during the Cold War,

precipitated a prevalent culture of fear and silence which gave a

semblance of peace in many countries” (Maathai, 1995, n.p.). Proxy

wars fought over the ideologies of capitalism vs. communism, and

resources in the Global South necessitated the installation of political

leaders with despotic proclivities. Despite the Cold War having ended

with the fall of the Berlin wall in 1989, many of these regimes remained

in power (backed by Western allies) despite their blatant disregard for

human, economic, and civil rights. When discussing the “destructive

style of political and economic leadership” as an impediment to

development, Maathai draws a clear link between authoritarian rule,

ethnic division, and colonialism. She contends that African leaders

have either created or maintained hindrances to progress. In fact, she

contends that these elites are culpable, to some degree, for the plethora

of development woes plaguing the continent. Their destructive style

of political leadership consistently prevents democratization from

taking hold in many countries by aggravating ethnic tensions for the

purpose of consolidating political and economic power. “[African

leaders] have invented divisive and manipulative tactics reminiscent

of the colonial tactics of divide and rule” (Maathai, 1995, n.p.). Maathai

is referring specifically to Daniel Arap Moi’s authoritarian govern-

ment in Kenya and its employment of colonial-style means of ob-

structing unified contestations of power. The notion that “ethnic

cleansing in Kenya is a creation of political leadership rather than an

age-old animosity over ethnicity and land” coalesces with arguments


advanced by a number of scholars (Posner, 2004; Laitin, 1986; Mam-

dani, 1995; Robinson, 2014).

Many African nations’ contemporary problems with sustained

hunger, malnutrition, and poor health are also the result of decisions

made during the colonial period. In her autobiography, Maathai re-

counts the extent to which the British began the process of deforesta-

tion, ultimately leading to poor soil quality and food shortage. With

the implementation of cash crops (such as tea and coffee), people were

forced to eat processed food imported from the global North. These

conditions led to increased malnutrition. Maathai states,

In traditional African societies food security was at the family

level even though there was also a collective responsibility in

the community for food security for all…[but] at the onset of

the colonial era in Africa and the introduction of cash crops…

all that changed. The traditional farming culture was de-

meaned, discredited and destroyed along with much of other

heritages of Africa. Crop land was commercialized for cash

crops, granaries disappeared from the homesteads, and peo-

ple became dependent on processed food from shops (Maa-

thai, 1995, n.p.).

Scholars such as Walter Rodney have also acknowledged the

pernicious consequences that the colonial system has had on food

security in Africa (Rodney, 1974). Furthermore, deforestation, which

leads to shortage in firewood, translates into a dearth of locally

produced food options. The colonial administration “cleared the

indigenous forests and replaced them with plantations of exotic trees

for the timber industry” (Maathai, 2008, 123). With international re-

quirements that Africa increase its agricultural exports after inde-

pendence in an effort to enter international trade systems, countries

such as Kenya eliminated more forests to produce coffee and tea for

exportation to industrialized nations. Currently, many rural popula-

tions that depend on firewood are forced to find other means to

sustain themselves. “Consequently, women were feeding their fa-

milies processed foods like white bread, maize flour, and white rice

(Maathai, 2008, 123). These foods, imported from outside of Africa,


“are high in carbohydrates but relatively low in vitamins, proteins,

and minerals” (Maathai, 2008, 123). The problem of malnutrition is,

then, a deceitful one. It is a manifestation of larger flaws in the struc-

ture of international trade. It also demonstrates how any attempt to

mitigate these tensions must contend with African countries’ colonial

past and interdependency.

Perceptions of Africa

Attempts to renegotiate perceptions of Africa are omnipresent in

Maathai’s approach. The ways in which the rest of the international

community conceives of Africa have material consequences for levels

of security, trade negotiations, and international assistance. Malinda

Smith intricately explores the inherent problematics of “performing

the African tragedy,” which corresponds directly with the way Maa-

thai problematizes the perceptions of Africa. Smith persuasively

argues, “[t]he idea of an ‘African tragedy’ is something that is made

within and through discourses on both tragedy and development in

an era of neoliberal globalisation” (Smith, 2006, 1). These mispercep-

tions and tragedies—detrimental to the continent’s progress—are

necessary for the continued exploitation of African resources: for

example the Cold War was fueled by a consistent and necessary pro-

liferation of misinformation and misrepresentation of Africa. She

argues that this tacticly sustains instability on the continent. Maathai

clearly indicates how these misperceptions translate into material

consequences: “[w]hen Africa is projected as negatively as possible, it

makes others elsewhere feel better and overlook the economic and

political policies in their own countries,” while “those who are respon-

sible for tragedies in Africa escape blame, which is laid at the feet of

the victims” (Maathai, 1995, n.p.).

Misperceptions that promote this derogatory view of the con-

tinent also serve to influence trade relations, while evading the issue

of trade as a source of underdevelopment. Again, Smith states, “[t]he

idea of an ‘African tragedy’ functions to reinforce endogenous ex-

planations for the crisis of development, and to suggest this crisis has

more to do with some inherent character flaw or inferiority of African

cultures and traditions, rather than, say, the logic of the global eco-


nomy” (Smith, 2006, n.p.). With regard to trade, Maathai problema-

tizes the existing trade structure, which is consistently overlooked as

the source of asymmetrical development. Instead, she argues, the

international community targets lack of population control and en-

vironmental degradation as producers of poverty. Trade, however,

has exacerbated Africa’s truncated ontogenesis while propelling

forward that of the industrialized world. “In 1991, for example, devel-

oped countries are said to have received about 1,361 billion US dollars

from developing countries in trade transactions and transferred only

about 60 billion US dollars in the form of aid and grants” (Maathai

1995, n.p.).

The impact that this tragedy has on empowerment and cultural

legitimacy is not lost on Maathai. The tragedy of Africa’s uneducated

and disempowered are intersubjective legacies of colonialism. The

neoliberal agenda to increase primary and secondary education en-

rollment rates on the continent overlooks the cultural implications of

such a goal. Maathai grounds this particular development problem-

atic in the postcolonial origins of African inferiority reified by

Africans’ ability to read, write, and speak the language of the colonial

master. “Literacy,” she states, “is an over-valued asset, and education

and the ability to read and write has been over-emphasized and

equated with extraordinary abilities. Illiterate people over-trust those

who can read and write and under-value and underestimate them-

selves” (Maathai, 1995, n.p.). Maathai grounds this criticism in the

scholarship of Ali Mazuri, who argues that “The huge imperial pre-

stige enjoyed by the English language distorted educational priorities,

diverted resources from indigenous cultures towards giving English

preeminence and diluted the esteem in which indigenous languages

were held” (cited in Maathai, 1995, n.p.). What these legacies have left

behind is a disempowered population who, she contends, find it

“easier or even more acceptable to leave one’s life in the hands of third

parties (governments, aid agencies, and even God) than to try to alle-

viate one’s circumstances through one’s own effort” (Maathai, 2011,

n.p.). The consequences of these psychological constraints manifest

themselves in the alleged partnership between Africa and the West.

“Is it this feeling of inadequacy that led Africa to copy the develop-

ment paradigm of the West in the mistaken belief that Africa can also


develop and catch up with the West even though Africa has no masses

and colonies to exploit and no people to enslave” (Maathai, 1995,

n.p.)? This suggests that Africa’s continued primordial orientation to-

wards inferiority becomes reinforced through political and economic

relations with the West.

Responsible Actors

In the process of outlining and denouncing each developmental

obstacle, Maathai identifies the key actors responsible for both creat-

ing and exacerbating these obstacles. Maathai contends that political

leaders, Western nations, international financial institutions and the

international community are culpable for creating many of the im-

pediments that stifle progress on the continent. Again, this observa-

tion is not Maathai’s alone. Throughout, postcolonial literature is the

tacit recognition (and often salient naming) of those who have

contributed to the continent’s degenerative state.

Africa’s problems do not lie solely on the consciences of its politi-

cal leaders. Western nations have also perpetrated egregious political

and economic crimes on the continent. “Africa has been maligned and

ridiculed by the same people who have exploited it and under-de-

veloped it,” she states (Maathai, 1995, n.p.). In acknowledging the

responsibility of external actors for Africa’s underdevelopment, Maa-

thai is challenging the IFIs’ response to aid ineffectiveness. Aware of

the implicit blame that comes with failed development initiatives, she

suggests that these institutions must acknowledge the role they play

in contributing to high levels of inherited debt on the continent.

“Further indebtedness of African states is making it difficult for the

state to protect its citizens from being overwhelmed by international

organisations on whose behalf IMF, World Bank and other donors de-

mand liberalisation and free markets” (Maathai, 1995, n.p.). This in-

fluence from the West has manifested itself in the policies and philo-

sophy of the World Bank and IMF. Furthermore, Maathai suggests

that African leaders “were persuaded to accept the development

model of the West, borrow capital from the West and be guided by

experts from the same West” (Maathai, 1995, n.p.).


Solutions

Maathai proposes holistic and generative solutions to address the

continent’s progressive stagnation. Her solution is more comprehen-

sive than the World Bank’s CDF in that it attempts to address the

relevant metaphysical impediments as well as the material depriva-

tions.

Underlying many of Maathai’s observed bottlenecks to develop-

ment is the prevalence of corruption. It is responsible for the disem-

powerment of people, stifled processes of democratization, en-

trenched aid dependency, a fragile state of security and much more.

What she views as corruption is not confined to African elites and

money laundering; it is also a systematic and pervasive corrupt

relationship between African elites and members of the international

community geared towards excessive and unregulated extraction of

resources from the continent. “The misery [corruption] brings to

ordinary Africans and the opportunity it provides to non-Africans to

exploit Africa is reminiscent of the exploits of the Slave Trade”

(Maathai, 1995, n.p.). Thus, the onus for addressing the prevailing

corruption in Africa falls on the international community as well as on

African elites. This suggests that the Bank’s solution to this problem,

i.e., liberal institutions, appears to be ineffective and incompetent,

given that these institutions function only to limit the corruption ema-

nating from African states. For the international financial institutions,

Maathai proposes that their constituents in the industrialized coun-

tries hold them accountable. “Hardly any of the friends of Africa are

willing to tackle the political and economic decisions being made in

their own countries and which are partly responsible for the same

horrible images brought to their living rooms by television” (Maathai,

1995, n.p.). Scholars such as David Booth endorse the need to address

development woes in Africa by educating politicians and commu-

nities in donor countries (Booth, 2011). Addressing the other side of

this nefarious relationship (with African leaders) requires an “ethical

revolution” (Maathai, 2011, n.p.).

Maathai’s ethical revolution serves to mitigate corruption and

disempowerment, and promote accountability inter alia. Because

African “communities often end up dealing with governments or


companies interested mainly in taking advantage of the vacuum

created by the culture of corruption to extract as many resources as

possible at as low a price as they can,” Africans must engage in an

ethical revolution that is both top-down and bottom-up (Maathai,

2011, n.p.). She suggests that presidents and prime ministers can begin

by openly, and honestly, acknowledging the pathological nature of

corruption. In admitting the insidious consequences that this system

has had on society, leaders are actively engaging the public in a dialo-

gue, while accepting their part in exacerbating the problem. The

ethical revolution does not end with leaders. This sentiment must

percolate through all echelons of society: “Even the poorest and least

empowered of Africa’s citizens need to work to end a culture that

tolerates systemic corruption and inefficiency” (Maathai, 2011, n.p.).

Maathai maintains that this step is most critical for the poorest section

of the population in that it “ensures that [they] are engaged in their

own development, and, by extension, in expanding the democratic

space that many African societies desperately need” (Maathai, 2011,

n.p.). She provides a list of questions that members of this community

must honestly answer during this process, resulting in a renewed and

“participatory system of governance” (Maathai, 2011, n.p.). An open

admission of the problem by all members of society will allow for an

organic and sincere reconciliation. Such an ethical revolution culti-

vates a renewed relationship between political leaders and their con-

stituents.

Although Maathai’s solution may seem quixotic, it is an honest

attempt to contend with the most ubiquitous and deleterious pro-

blems in Africa. It also demonstrates how empowerment and a dele-

gitimized culture cannot be remedied with foreign aid.Instead, reme-

diation of sociopolitical and economic degradation requires moments

of solidarity in the present and reconciliation with the past.

Maathai’s Objectives

In examining Maathai’s development philosophy, one finds very

similar objectives for Africa. Much like the CDF, Maathai envisions

civil society as pertinent for “pursuing participatory development,

promoting accountable and responsible governance, protecting hu-


man rights and encouraging respect for the rule of law” (Maathai,

1995, n.p.) When discussing the “frustrated democratisation process,”

which impedes development in Africa, she contends that “Africans,

like all other human beings, want justice, equity, transparency, re-

sponsibility, and accountability” (Maathai, 1995, n.p.). Even demands

for “mechanisms of governance” are prevalent in her democratic

vision for the continent. Maathai outlined her profound conviction

about the attainability of these goals during a speech in Gwangju,

South Korea. Entitled “Sustained Development, Democracy, and

Peace in Africa,” this address served to promote peace, sustained

development and democracy as highly achievable and paramount

targets (Maathai, 2006). At an abstracted level, both Maathai and the

Bank endorse ostensibly similar poverty-reduction strategies.

Although Maathai’s approach does not give primacy to economic

growth or markets, she does offer a vision of development that tran-

slates into a concrete material reality. Her Greenbelt movement

sought to mitigate everyday dilemmas by increasing access to ma-

terials, food, water, and finances, indicating her acknowledgement of

the need for greater opportunities. Maathai also recognizes a need for

empowerment across the continent. In fact, she states, “disempower-

ment…is perhaps the most unrecognized problem in Africa today”

(Maathai, 2006, n.p.). While empowerment is a critical point of con-

gruency for Maathai and the Bank, the causes of, and means for pro-

moting such empowerment advanced by the two are fundamentally

different. In her 1995 and 2006 speeches on African development,

Maathai explicitly identifies security and its fragile state in Africa as

factors inimical to development (Maathai, 1995, 2006). Beyond iden-

tifying similar development objectives, the Bank and Maathai suggest

divergent methods for moving Africa beyond the chrysalis of under-

development.

Same Objectives, Different Solutions

Despite indicating congruent goals for socioeconomic and poli-

tical development, the ways in which Maathai and the World Bank

seek to reach these objectives are markedly different. One can effort-

lessly differentiate between Maathai’s and the World Bank’s ap-


proaches based on their perceptions of foreign aid. For the Bank, aid

is an interminable necessity for the development process: hence the

move towards long-term partnerships between donors and recipients

(World Development Report, 1999/2000, 2000/2001). Maathai, on the

other hand, believed that Africa’s dependence on aid perpetuates a

vicious cycle of debt. Reliance on aid and the economic and political

policies concomitant with aid exacerbate Africa’s marginalized stand-

ing in the international market. She states, “Further indebtedness of

African states make it difficult for the state to protect its citizens from

being overwhelmed by international organisations on whose behalf

the IMF, World Bank and other donors demand liberalisation and free

markets” (Maathai, 1995, n.p.). These externally produced and im-

posed policies, she contends, cannot generate wealth for Africans or

benefit local businesses until African leaders are able to protect their

citizens from globalization—a feat they cannot achieve while con-

suming aid. By identifying external factors such as the international

trade architecture and IFI policies, along with internal elements such

as African politicians as responsible for the continent’s arrested

development, Maathai’s assessment becomes more holistic than both

the Bank’s and the African-derived plans such as the Lagos Plan of

Action and NEPAD.

Still, the means by which the Bank proposes to secure these

development objectives remain rooted in a neoliberal understanding

of the problem. One scholar notes: “Despite the shift to neoliberalism

with a human face, the heart of neoliberalism—its macroeconomic

policies and prescriptions—have not changed” (Smith, 2006, 13). With

the Bank suggesting that there is no one policy capable of inducing

development; and it remains firmly wedded to the primacy of liberali-

zation and privatization as prerequisites for economic progress, which

the Bank contends is necessary for development. The Bank propagates

that states must “encourage effective private investment” by creating

an appealing business environment (World Development Report,

2000/2001, 8). Governments must also “expand into international

markets” with fast-paced “pro-poor” liberalization (World Develop-

ment Report, 2000/2001, 8). And finally, developing nations must

“build the assets of poor people” through increased public spending

on the poor, using institutions, guided by good governance, markets


and agents, while allowing the poor to hold government accountable

for services (World Development Report, 2000/2001, 8). With regard

to Africa specifically, the Bank lauds Africa’s progress towards econo-

mic reforms such as market and trade liberalization and a growing

private sector (Gelb, 2000). Still, the continent struggles with poverty.

The solution, they propose, is to produce an African-owned business

plan that is coordinated with and supported by donors. This strategy

for poverty reduction has been translated into mandatory institutional

reform in underdeveloped countries. After examining over five thou-

sand World Bank projects premised on public sector institutional

reform, Matt Andrews found that forty-four percent of these projects

“aim to foster market-friendly governments through interventions

like privatization, deregulation, trade liberalization, and the establish-

ment of government entities needed to promote competitive markets”

(Andrews, 2013: 8). These measures were (and arguably still are) the

World Bank’s unyielding touchstones.

Problems with This Model

Regardless of the Bank’s professed paradigmatic shift, its policies

and approach remain heavily criticized by scholars both in, and out-

side of, the postcolonial camp. Despite demands for a reordering of

the international financial system and a fundamental questioning of

the ability of the Bretton Woods Institutions to assist any country

other than those in the Global North, Wolfensohn remained convinced

that “with some few changes, including expanded and more trans-

parent financial information, the basic international architecture has

served us well” (Wolfensohn, 2005, 132). This sentiment is indicative

of two problems. First, Wolfensohn made this statement to the Board

of Executive Directors and World Bank staff. Thus, one must ask to

whom he is referring when he declares that the system has served “us”

well. It is also worthy of analysis, since at the time that the speech was

given in 1999, Africa remained crippled by SAPs and global economic

crises.Statements such as these lend credence to the skepticism of

Maathai and postcolonial commentators about whom the Bank is

actually servicing. Second, if only “some few changes” are required to

fix the international architecture, to what extent can the “new”


development approach be fundamentally novel? This question is all

the more provocative when examining the proclaimed centering of

poverty as a novel agenda for the Bank, especially since Robert McNa-

mara—World Bank president from 1968 until 1981—was the first to

place poverty reduction on the Bank’s agenda.

Another salient point of contention is the dearth of contextual

specificity inherent in the Bank’s approach. Scholars have found that

the Bank’s economic and institutional reforms remain uniformly

required as conditions for financial disbursement (Rodrik, 2008; Pen-

der, 2000; Andrews, 2013). The Bank’s chief economist for the African

region, Shantayanan Devarajan, professed, “If you look at the pro-

grammes of the 2000s and compare them to the SAP, they are exactly

the same” (Mbom, 2013, n.p.). SAPs, however, were not predicated

upon country specificity. The development model was unapologeti-

cally top-down. What has changed, Devarajan suggests, is the geogra-

phical location that currently produces the neoliberal model. Instead

of creating the model on 14th street in Washington, it is ostensibly

produced in Bangui. As Pender notes, such an arrangement does not

allow for “developing countries to experiment with their own model”

(Pender, 2000, 399). Ultimately, these countries end up reproducing

the neoliberal model handed down from the Bank, which remains an

unproductive approach. Rodrik demonstrates how the most success-

ful countries are those that truly adopt an economic development

model that corresponds to their specific needs (Rodrik, 2008). The

most notable example of this approach is the Asian tigers: four Asian

countries that experienced high growth rates and poverty reduction

after omitting some of the key aspects of SAP requirements.

The unwillingness of the Bank to acknowledge the historical

nature of obstacles to African development is its final major limitation.

In a speech given in Ethiopia, Wolfensohn implores the audience of

African men and women to “not look back at what has happened in

the past” (Wolfensohn, 2005, 95). This point of criticism is fully ex-

plicated in Maathai’s postcolonial appraisals of the Bank’s neoliberal

development approach. Historically contextualizing Africa’s bottle-

necks that impeded socioeconomic and political advancement allows

Maathai not only to conceptualize an alternative approach, but also to


identify an array of critical impediments that the CDF does not target.

Thus, her approach is unarguably more capacious than the Bank’s.

Conclusion

The World Bank’s Comprehensive Development Framework is

myopic in scope, despite the inclusion of poverty-reduction goals.

Because it remains wedded to neoliberal epistemologies, CDF is

limited in its ability to identify and address the historically embedded

and systematic barriers impeding Africa’s progress. Despite many

disagreements over the approach from its critics, the World Bank

holds relentlessly to its nostrum of neoliberal development. Such an

approach results in a distorted and impercipient development model,

particularly when temporal and spatial contexts are willfully elided. I

contend that Maathai is able to identify impediments beyond the

scope of CDF and challenge the neoliberal assumption that Africa’s

problems are autochthonous and endogenous because of her willing-

ness to contextualize the problems and trace their origins to coloni-

alism. As a result, Maathai was able to identify the exogenous and

international factors that have contributed to Africa’s moral, cultural,

political and economic depreciation, the dependence concomitant

with aid, as well as the limitations of free market capitalism. Con-

sequently, she translated these findings into a generative movement

for environmental sustainability and Africa’s political and economic

advancement. The narrow focus on liberalization and building the

assets of the poor is indicative of the Bank’s inability to grasp that “to

overcome such a historical burden is an enormous task because the

battles of five centuries have left Africa weakened economically, not

only politically but especially culturally and spiritually” (Maathai,

1995, n.p.). Maathai presents a development challenge that can only

be addressed by coming to terms with Africa’s past. This challenge

attests to the need for more creative, honest, and sincerely context-

specific development approaches than the hegemonic neoliberal

model offers.


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7.

Afro-communitarianism, Humanization

and the Nature of Reconciliation

RIANNA OELOFSEN

Introduction

In this paper I will defend an account of reconciliation based on

an Afro-communitarian worldview. The paper firstly gives a brief

sketch of what an Afro-communitarian conception of reconciliation

entails, and goes on to argue that this conception of reconciliation is

able to deal with the issue of identity transformation, which is integral

for lasting peace and reconciliation.

Summarizing the effects on our understanding of the concept of

reconciliation when adopting Afro-communitarianism as the starting

point, the paper then moves on to suggest some tentative reasons why

we might want to accept this view of ethics and the person—and thus

this view of reconciliation—over a Western individualistic concep-

tion. These reasons include the claim that the Afro-communitarian

view captures some core empirical evidence about being human.

An Afro-Communitarian Understanding of the Person

First, let me explain that I intend to use the term ‘Afro-communi-

tarianism’ as an umbrella term to include core aspects of various

accounts of communitarian personhood put forward by numerous

African philosophers. Afro-communitarianism emphasizes the im-

portance of relationships between people, their interdependence, and

the duty to maintain flourishing relationships of a particular kind.1

1 For the kind of relationship that is the focus of Afro-communitarianism,

see Thaddeus Metz, “Toward an African Moral Theory.” Journal of Political

Philosophy, p. 333 (September 2007), Vol. 15, Issue 3, pp. 321-341. Metz claims

in this article that the relationship in question is one which is comprised of

both shared identity and goodwill. The kind of relationships involved re-

present the ethic which flows from an Afro-communitarian understanding of

personhood. Other examples of the Afro-communitarian understanding of

160 Rianna Oelofsen

Recognizing interdependence and the importance of interpersonal

relations for the self, this worldview sees the individual as necessarily

socially embedded and affected by his or her context in a very deep

way. However, it still acknowledges that there are individuals, and

that these individuals need to be well developed in order for there to

be the possibility of healthy relationships.

Afro-communitarianism does not imply that sub-Saharan Afri-

cans just are or live this way, as the project is not meant to be essen-

tialist. The Afro-communitarian project does not claim that there is an

‘ideal African past’ in which this understanding of the person and

ethics was always instantiated in all African communities, just as there

is no ‘ideal European past’ in which Kantian ethics were adhered to.

With that clarified, let us take a closer look at the Afro-communitarian

understanding of personhood.

Desmond Tutu claims that the self has necessary relations with

others. His exposition of the concept of ubuntu in his writing has been

the subject of much debate, and provides an entry point into the

worldview and assumptions that underpin his account of reconcilia-

tion. In explaining the concept of ubuntu, he writes that

A person is a person through other persons. None of us comes

into the world fully formed. We would not know how to think,

or walk, or speak, or behave as human beings unless we

learned it from other human beings. We need other human

beings in order to be human. I am because other people are

(Tutu, 2007, 3).

This view of the self recognizes the essentially communal nature

of human beings. A member of homo sapiens who bears no relation to

community, who is devoid of communal attachments of any kind, is

not what is understood as a ‘person’ according to the Afro-communi-

personhood and ethics, and the importance of relationships for this under-

standing of personhood, can be found in Ifeanyi Menkiti, “On the Normative

Conception of a Person.” A Companion to African Philosophy (2004) Kwasi

Wiredu (ed.), and Michael Onyebuchi Eze, “What is African Communitari-

anism? Against consensus as regulative ideal,” South African Journal of Phi-

losophy, Vol. 27, No. 4, p. 386.

Afro-communitarianism, Humanization and Reconciliation 161

tarian worldview. Tutu also expresses this thought when he says that

‘[m]y humanity is caught up, is inextricably bound up, in [yours]. We

belong in a bundle of life’ (2000, 34-35) This would seem to imply that,

as humans, we cannot disregard that we are not only individuals, but

that we are also part of a collective or communal self, and that we

cannot accurately describe what a person is without taking this into

account. Community comes in all shapes and sizes, however, and it is

difficult to conceive of a member of our species who does not belong

to a community of some kind.

Instead of continuing with the vocabulary of ubuntu that Tutu

draws on, I will instead use the terminology of Afro-communitari-

anism. The language of ubuntu has been used in so many contexts and

in so many ways that the concept has become too contested to be

useful for my current purposes. The concept of Afro-communitari-

anism is meant to capture a theoretically rigorous account of the

person inspired by ubuntu, but also similar views of the person

articulated by other African writers.2

From an appreciation of this metaphysical account of person-

hood, the concept of a person in Afro-communitarianism also ex-

presses a moral claim (Metz, 2009, 51; Wiredu, 1992; Menkiti, 2004).

To be human and to perceive someone else as being human encap-

sulates a moral response towards the other, a belief in their equal

claim to respectful treatment and protection from harm. This means

that this metaphysical conception of the self has inevitable implica-

tions for ethical theory. A good relationship between people, which

includes mutual respect for human dignity, is seen as a fundamental

moral goal.

Tutu’s metaphor of the rainbow nation, through an affirmation of

difference and celebration of diversity, is a way of understanding the

type of community at stake. It is diversity of opinions, cultures and

interests which allows development and growth in the community.

This celebration of difference requires equal power relations between

different parties in order for the diverse views to add to the society’s

2 For examples see Kwame Gyekye, “Person and Community in African

Thought,” p. 317, and Kwasi Wiredu, “The Moral Foundations of an African

Culture,” p. 307, in P.H. Coetzee, and A.P.J. Roux (eds.), Philosophy from Africa

(Johannesburg: International Thompson Publishing, 1998), 317-336.

162 Rianna Oelofsen

development of values. Without the recognition of the other as equal,

their views and contributions will not be valued as much as is neces-

sary for the ideal of the rainbow nation. If all parties are recognized as

equal in this exchange and dialogue, it is possible to have a continuous

conversation about how to reconcile the different opinions, cultural

beliefs, and worldviews present in a multi-cultural society in a practi-

cal way. This is not meant to lead to the creation of a homogenous

society, but rather a society in which the human rights of all are

respected and allowed to materialize within the context of different

cultures, perspectives and worldviews.

Within this possibility for ethical interplay between universality

and difference we see that ‘in advancing the good of the community,

the individual’s good is concomitantly advanced precisely because the

community’s and individual’s goods are not radically opposed, but

interwoven’ (Eze, 2008, 388). It remains important to note that it is

relationships that are deemed to be of moral importance, and that

relationships require different parties in the relationship to be distinct

in some sense, even though they are related, and even though their

relationship constitutes their identity in some way. Thus, moral value

can be seen as fundamentally residing in relationships between indivi-

duals, rather than in individuals themselves.

If a person sees the ‘self’ that they aim to realize as being diffused

in some ways throughout their community, constituted by others and

their relations with others (so that the self becomes a communal self

which needs to be realized), then this self-realization or communal self

could provide the justification for the need to promote harmony. This

communal self need not mean that everyone will be ‘the same’, as

might be suggested or implied by the notion of a common identity—

think of the different parts of the body and that it needs different

organs and limbs to function.3 In the same way, we can say that a com-

munal self needs to have diversity in order to function well. The focus

needs to be on the health of the different organs, as well as a harmo-

nious relationship between the different organs that they function

together well.

3 I am indebted to Michael Onyebuchi Eze for this example.


The good which has fundamental moral worth, then, in terms of

this communitarian understanding of the self, is the realization of

community, and an acknowledgement of the important emphasis on

developing moral personhood found throughout the literature on

ubuntu. It is then not personal fulfilment as an individual aim that is

required, but rather the recognition that personal fulfilment as a com-

munal self is the ultimate aim. As the individual and the community

are seen to be so intricately interrelated, self-realization and flourish-

ing include community realization and flourishing, or, in other words,

an individual cannot flourish in a non-flourishing society, and there-

fore the ultimate goal ought to be a flourishing (and ‘self-realized’)

society. The aim, however, is still self-realization and thus working

towards a flourishing self; consequently this ethical theory can still be

understood as being at its core a ‘virtue ethic’—the difference is that

this self is a communal self.

Thus, the Afro-communitarian ethical theory which I will employ

when talking about reconciliation will be communal self-realization

through the promotion of harmony the idea being that it is the collective

self (which is the proper object of virtue) which justifies and grounds

the importance of harmony. It is my contention that this view holds

substantial implications for the concepts of responsibility, justice,

forgiveness and humanization and their relation to reconciliation, if

this ethical theory forms one’s foundation.

An Afro-communitarian Conception of Reconciliation

Reconciliation in the Afro-communitarian view I will be defend-

ing is part of promoting and maintaining what is necessary for a

flourishing society, the aim of collective virtue, and thus constitutive of

personal and societal flourishing. Understanding ‘being human’ as a

collective, communal enterprise has implications for how responsibi-

lity, justice, forgiveness and humanization are conceptualized. These

implications will be summarized below with regard to these cognate

concepts and to reconciliation.

An Afro-communitarian conception of the self would lead to a

very different conception of responsibilities and to what would be

needed, in terms of responsibility, for the reconciliation process.

164 Rianna Oelofsen

Responsibility for structural and collective crimes would be expected

from individuals as well as from society, and would require recogni-

tion of collective or shared responsibility. According to the Afro-com-

munitarian approach to responsibility, agents and their moral respon-

sibilities are necessarily related to the community in which the indivi-

duals find themselves. As the community creates the person, the per-

son is dependent on the community. Agency is formed by the com-

munity in central ways. According to this understanding of the person

and of morality, moral responsibility can therefore not be merely

individualistic. In some ways there has to be responsibility for the col-

lective—and this then needs to be shared among the members of the

group. The collectively responsible agent is not ‘trans-individual’ but

rather ‘relational’.4 The agent is a collective agent, not in a strange

metaphysical sense, but rather in the sense that all the individuals in

the community are related and their relationships constitute this col-

lective agent. Thus, their relationships also constitute its collective

virtues or vices. As an Afro-communitarian conception of morality

situates moral value in relationships and the consequent communal

flourishing of these relationships, and not primarily in individuals, it

would necessarily follow that the collective (the community), as well

as the individuals who constitute the community, needs to take

responsibility for building harmonious relationships. As re-building

harmonious relationships after a crime has been committed that

affected the community—and thus also individuals within that com-

munity—requires accountability for these harms, it is necessary to

evaluate what such responsibility entails conceptually. As the person

is understood from an Afro-communitarian perspective, this view

expects more from the individual in terms of taking responsibility for,

and acknowledging complicity in, collectively (as well as indivi-

dually) perpetrated harms than would be expected under an indivi-

dualistic understanding of personhood. Once it is established that

taking collective responsibility is necessary for promoting reconcilia-

4 For another account of a relational understanding of the collective moral

agent, see Larry May’s Sharing Responsibility (Chicago: University of Chicago

Press, 1992).


tion in the South African context,5 and if the Afro-communitarian

worldview is one’s starting point, this leads one to ask what that

means in terms of justice.

Reconciliation “cannot be achieved without justice to the ag-

grieved party” (Cunneen, 2001, 97-98), and cannot occur if there is still

a general feeling of injustice and non-accountability for violations.

Discussions on justice and reconciliation often lead to an appeal to

‘restorative justice’, and it is generally accepted that the TRC process

instantiated this type of justice. Though this paper supports the notion

of restorative justice and affirms its links with African personhood as

set forth by Desmond Tutu (2000, 51-52), it must be noted that, contra

to what people have assumed about Tutu’s understanding of justice,

his account presupposes that restorative justice is never complete

without reparation. This implies that the TRC process did not, in fact,

instantiate restorative justice, as there were not proper reparations for

crimes. Without reparations proper, no restoration has really oc-

curred, as the society has not been ‘restored’ to a just society, either

economically or otherwise. Part of the failure of restoration has to do

centrally with the beneficiaries’ failure to admit responsibility. With-

out the beneficiaries taking responsibility, the people harmed have not

yet received the respect they deserve as equals. In other words, part

of the ‘restoring’ in restorative justice is the restoring of human

dignity, which needs to be addressed through reparations. Such

reparations should include not only economic aspects, but also other

social programmes which would allow for all citizens to regain their

human dignity and self-esteem (which would exclude the perpetua-

tion of both the inferiority and superiority complexes as set out by

Franz Fanon in Black Skin, White Masks).

Restorative justice requires responsibility to be taken by the per-

petrator and beneficiary groups for the harms which transpired, and

so we can see how considerations of justice support my earlier re-

marks regarding responsibility. Whereas both retributive and reha-

bilitative justice can transpire without responsibility being assumed

on the part of the perpetrators (and/or beneficiaries) of harm, restora-

5 See my article “Group Responsibility in the Aftermath of Apartheid,”

South African Journal of Philosophy (2008), 27(4) for an in-depth discussion on

race, group responsibility and apartheid.

166 Rianna Oelofsen

tive justice requires that responsibility be taken by people for their part

in, benefiting from, or inheriting gains from injustice and harms, and

that the groups involved act on this sense of responsibility.6

Collective responsibility is required for justice and reconciliation

according to the principles of Afro-communitarianism; this duty

explains why many black people feel anger and resentment towards

the white population in the present socio-economic context within

which such a collective sense of responsibility is largely absent. This

is especially the case as forgiveness was conditionally extended to

some perpetrators of apartheid crimes.

Afro-communitarianism requires forgiveness from victims, in

order to open up the possibility of a relationship with perpetrators and

beneficiaries of harm. This relates back to the necessity for acknowl-

edging responsibility, as a recognition of responsibility on the part of

perpetrators/beneficiaries is what completes the ‘circle of forgiveness’.

The concept of forgiveness, when understood within an Afro-commu-

nitarian framework, denotes a central mechanism of humanization

through opening the possibility to ‘become wholly human’ after harm

has undermined the humanity of both victim and perpetrator. Hu-

manization lies at the core of the Afro-communitarian worldview, and

is the common thread and justification behind the understandings of

justice, responsibility and forgiveness implied by this view. It requires

an act of imagination to attempt to understand the depth of emotions

involved in another person’s relationships. After all, what makes us

human, according to Afro-communitarianism, is our capacity for the

meaningful interpersonal relationships we are necessarily entangled

in. As such, seeing the other as human requires seeing them in terms

of their complex relationships with other humans and with their

world.7

6 For a more substantive discussion on the issues of reconciliation and

justice, see my article “Afro-Communitarian Implications for Justice and

Reconciliation,” in Theoria (March 2016). 7 For a more substantive discussion on the Afro-communitarian conception

of forgiveness, see my article “Afro-communitarian Forgiveness and the

Concept of Reconciliation,” South African Journal of Philosophy (2015), 34(3).


The humanization of self and other8 (in the context of the Afro-

communitarian understanding of personhood) is required for ad-

dressing, the ‘inferiority’ and concurrent ‘superiority’ complexes as

diagnosed by Franz Fanon and Steven Bantu Biko. These complexes

reach deeply into individual and collective psyches and identities;

hence, political solutions which do not address these deep-seated

issues will be inadequate.

The nature of reconciliation from an Afro-communitarian per-

spective, therefore, provides a model of reconciliation which centrally

requires humanization of all the groups involved, and a transforma-

tion of their particular identities into a new group identity, which

includes the former enemy group. Note that this does not imply the

loss of particular ethnic and cultural identities, as long as these ethnic

and cultural identities do not have a particular dehumanized under-

standing of others as a central or ineradicable feature. In fact, differ-

ences between individuals and groups need to be fostered and

celebrated, as long as they are compatible with the ‘becoming human’

of all others in society. The ‘collective self’ needs to expand to include

everyone in society, in order for reconciliation to be complete.

Collective Rehumanization and Healing Societal Pathologies

As humanization is centrally about collective and political iden-

tities, according to the Afro-communitarian understanding of person-

hood, this means that humanization is the perfect tool to deal with the

pathologies potentially inherent in some of these identities. To say that

there is nothing left of the pathologies created by colonialism and

apartheid, is to underestimate the psychological impact of both, and

there is ample evidence that the scars of colonialism and apartheid

have not yet healed in the collective psyches of the groups involved. I

explain here how it might be possible, through the humanization

process, to deal with, and perhaps even eventually heal, the ‘inferi-

ority’ and ‘superiority’ complexes as diagnosed by Franz Fanon.

8 For a more substantive discussion on humanization, see my article “De-

and Rehumanization in the Wake of Atrocities,” South African Journal of

Philosophy (2009), 28(2).

168 Rianna Oelofsen

In order to address these pathologies, I propose Afro-communi-

tarian humanization as a possible avenue for the societal therapy

essential to overcoming them and starting the healing process. What

makes us human, according to Afro-communitarianism, is our capa-

city for meaningful interpersonal relationships in which we are neces-

sarily entangled. The capacities of the imagination can, and should, be

utilised in order to attempt to understand the depth of emotions

involved in the other person’s relationships, which are a direct result

of the complexity and depth of their inner lives as human beings. The

imagination ought to be harnessed, and this should be done in con-

junction with a continual critical assessment of our relations and

specifically our relationships to each other as members of different

races in South Africa.

Only the process of humanization will start to deal with these

complexes, and until both inferiority and superiority complexes have

been faced and addressed, they will continue to haunt our public and

private psyches and relationships. Focusing on the depth of others’

ability and capacity for meaningful relationships might allow us to

remember that we are all members of the same community and that

my flourishing depends on yours; and vice versa. The superiority com-

plex can be related to the type of ‘arrogant perception’ that Isobel

Gunnings argues can be overcome by the process of world travelling

while the inferiority complex—which could be the result of a type of

‘self-effacing perception’—could also be overcome through world

travelling—but only in conjunction with starting to see the self and

one’s own ‘world’ as equal to that of others. Both of these complexes

dehumanize, as the person(s) and group(s) who suffer from them can-

not relate to one another on an equal basis. The fact that there is no

possibility for establishing equal relations until these pathologies have

been dealt with means that relationships will remain superficial, and

ubuntu relationships (which embody shared identity and goodwill)

would remain impossible. As healthy interpersonal relationships are

the core of a society with collective virtue, such a failure means that

society cannot flourish, which results in none of the individuals in

society being able to flourish. In essence, that means there has to be a

collective humanization project for racial reconciliation in South

Africa. This is, at its core, what Afro-communitarianism would pre-


scribe and hence an Afro-communitarian conception of humanization

would be very well suited to deal with these societal pathologies. As

Desmond Tutu wrote,

We belong in a bundle of life. We say, ‘a person is a person

through other people’. It is not ‘I think therefore I am’. It says

rather: ‘I am human because I belong’. I participate, I share. A

person with ubuntu is open and available to others, does not

feel threatened that others are able and good; for he or she has

a proper self-assurance that comes from knowing that he or

she belongs in a greater whole and is diminished when others

are humiliated or diminished, when others are tortured or

oppressed, or treated as if they were less than who they are

(2000, 35).

The fact that social structures in South Africa at the moment still

overwhelmingly benefit white people materially (and a few black

people) is not the same as saying that this is good for them. It is not

good for the people involved; this is what the humanization from an

Afro-communitarian perspective draws attention to. Whites need to

recognise that our ill-gained benefits have been bad for us, morally,

have made us ‘less of a mensch’, and affect society as a whole. What

makes us human is our capacity for love and the interpersonal

relationships we are engaged in.

Advantages of Pursuing an Afro-Communitarian Conception of

Personhood and Reconciliation

My aim in this paper has not been to argue that we ought to be

Afro-communitarians in our moral lives as opposed to, say, Kantians

or utilitarians. However, I would like to conclude the paper by high-

lighting some possible advantages of pursuing the Afro-communi-

tarian view of ‘human being’ in future research. First, a few reasons

why this understanding of reconciliation might be superior to those

with a different moral framework are suggested from some empirical

evidence in social psychology. Second, I reiterate how projects such as

this one might support and work towards the decolonization of the

170 Rianna Oelofsen

mind and intellectual landscape, as prescribed by Ngugi wa Thiong’o

(1986). Finally, I review the ways in which this project can allow for a

productive analysis of some contemporary misunderstandings and

complications that still afflict the reconciliation project in South Africa.

African Ethical Theory in Post-Conflict Situations

One of the reasons why an Afro-communitarian framework

might prove useful in our projects of trying to reconcile societies in the

aftermath of protracted conflict is that it can take into account some of

the empirical evidence about the importance of situation in identity

formation.9 This is particularly important in contexts of protracted

conflict and warrants further attention. It follows that the Afro-

communitarian understanding of reconciliation might be superior to

those with a different moral framework in taking into account some

empirical evidence in social psychology.

Taking into account empirical evidence which suggests a strong

connection between conflict and both individual and group identity, I

propose that an Afro-communitarian conception of personhood can-

not only take the implications of this into account, but also can offer a

coherent explanation for why identities are affected in this way by

protracted conflict. Research on identity formation in social psycho-

logy supports the claim that identity is formed in response to one’s

social context, not only in cases of protracted conflict, but in general.10

As this is accepted as a truism in much social psychology, I will not

spend much time defending the plausibility of this claim. One

example of how identity is formed in relation to context is the

acceptance of, and identification with, specific social roles within a

situation of conflict and how the identification with specific social

roles creates and sustains (or breaks down) individual and group

identities.

9 I do not claim that Afro-communitarianism is unique in this regard, merely

that it does have this feature in its favour. 10 See, for example, the Journal of Adolescence, Vol. 19, Issue 5, pp. 401-500

(October 1996), for theoretical as well as empirical research on the importance

of context for identity formation.


Conflicts affect individuals and their sense of self, their group as

well as their collective identities. In conjunction with the empirical

research which supports Daniel Bar-Tal’s conclusions,11 the landmark

Stanford Prison Experiment is a good example of how individuals

take on identities in accordance with assigned social roles.12 In this

experiment, university students who volunteered for the experiment

were randomly assigned the role of either ‘guard’ or ‘prisoner’. It

became clear after only a few days that the assigned roles became

integral to the student’s identities when they were in the mock prison

environment. All parties acted in accordance with their assigned roles,

so much so that the experiment had to be prematurely terminated, as

the guards were becoming extremely abusive towards prisoners. This

is relevant in terms of what seems to be the acceptance of, and total

adherence to, the particular ascribed social roles. Setting up social

roles in terms of conflict with others means that the agents adopting

those roles take the socially prescribed conflict and contrast between

self and other as central to their identity in that situation.

It is interesting to note from such research that people who have

an overly individualistic understanding of themselves and others

(‘idiocentrics’ as Harry Triandis, 2001) calls them) could be mistaken

when citing individualistic reasons for their actions and behaviour.

They could be mistaken in what is actually the motivation behind their

actions, as they fail to take into account how their social embedded-

ness affects their choices. In other words, it seems that individualistic

cultures and idiocentric people are mistaken about the types of crea-

tures humans actually are. Note that the experiment took place among

individuals already embedded in a community with morally prob-

lematic enactments of the roles of guards vis-à-vis prisoners, so the

students enacting this are simply enacting the communal roles ex-

pected of them. This means that the experiment can challenge the

narrative of the primacy of the individual in Western societies and

11 Daniel Bar-Tal has done empirical research which supports this claim.

See, for example, Bar-Tal et al., “Intergroup Biases in Conflict: Reexamination

with Arab Pre-Adolescents and Adolescents,” in International Journal of

Behavioural Development (2007), 31 (5), pp. 423-432. 12 See Phil Zimbardo, The Lucifer Effect: Understanding How Good People Turn

Evil (New York: Random House Inc., 2008).

172 Rianna Oelofsen

show, instead, that there are many more communal tendencies in our

societies than Westerners are willing to admit. As Triandis claims,

idiocentrics tend to use character traits and robust internal disposi-

tions in describing others and themselves, while allocentrics (people

who have a communitarian understanding of personhood) tend to

refer to ‘context, situation, and group disposition’ (2001, 914). Ac-

cording to social psychology research, the allocentric’s perception of

reality is closer to how things actually are; we are the types of crea-

tures that respond to context and, for most of us, our behavioural traits

are not robust across situations.

This research, which claims to have proven that we do not have

a robust character across situations but rather that the situation is

extremely relevant in determining our behaviour, seems an incredibly

important point to take into account when discussing reconciliation.

It seems that when people are given a certain role, they take on this

identity as it is ascribed to them and so in conflict their roles as ‘ene-

mies’ affect (or even determine) the behaviour of the groups towards

each other. Specifically, for my purposes, many individuals’ identities

become dependent on their roles in protracted conflict.13 The cause

fought for might have become so central in the person’s identity that

holding on to the conflict stands as a way of not facing the void with

which the agent might be left if peace and political reconciliation were

to be negotiated, unless their identity is reforged. In other words, for

many people in a protracted conflict, the conflict itself becomes so im-

portant that they define themselves through the conflict. One might

object that, from looking at the implications of The Stanford Prison

Experiment and other social psychology experiments, identity formed

in conflict can be easily shrugged off, as it seems the ‘guards’ in the

experiment did as soon as they left the mock prison environment and

were no longer interacting with the ‘prisoners’.

To relate this to the real world of conflict, however, it would be a

mistake to conclude that once a peace treaty has been negotiated be-

tween the two sides of a conflict, the identities of the groups and their

constituent members will become separated from the conflict and the

roles they see themselves and others as having played in this conflict.

13 This refers back to Daniel Bar-Tal’s research mentioned above.


Unlike the experimental environment of the Stanford prison, the

people involved in protracted conflict have formed most, if not all, of

their social roles and constituent identities in relation to the conflict,

and have a long and entrenched background of having done so. The

formation of identity and the important role that cultural and group

history and collective memories play in the formation of group

identity, and the fact that individuals become so absorbed within their

groups during protracted conflict, mean that the negotiating of a peace

treaty will not change the underlying situation significantly, as a peace

treaty leaves the situation mostly intact. This is so since the ‘situation’

in a protracted conflict includes the historical existence of the con-

flictive ethos and this can, as history, not change significantly apart

from seeing it as something else. In the case of the Stanford prison ex-

periment, it was easy to end the experiment, pack away the props and

change the situation completely.

In real-life situations of protracted conflict, it is not so easy to

‘pack away’ the things which have propped up conflict—things such

as stereotypes of the other group, and structural and economic dis-

advantages—as these are structurally embedded within the present

situation. People are enmeshed in bias-generating circumstances

which partially fuelled the conflict, and a situation would need to

change substantially in order for bias to disappear. The fact that there

is a certain context and structural features at play means that a certain

identity has been created and this identity cannot change until struc-

tural features change significantly.

The identities of the next generation of people within a protracted

conflict (or in its aftermath) do not escape these prejudice-producing

circumstances. They are either similarly entangled in the same (pre-

judice-producing) social situations, or in a ‘new’ (new in its instantia-

tions, still the same in its causes) set of prejudice-producing circums-

tances. Some of the structural features would include the response

others have towards people who are perceived to be of a certain

group, as well as ways in which the person views and understands

her situation in this context, which would include beliefs and col-

lective memories of victimhood.

In accordance with the understanding of how identity is created

through our situation, it seems that the very broad categories of con-

174 Rianna Oelofsen

text self- and other-evaluation according to preconceived stereotypes

and structural features of the social situation would all need to be

addressed when reconciliation is sought. This can be linked to the

view of an Afro-communitarian ethic, which perceives society as a

communal moral agent. According to this view, there needs to be a

change in society as a whole, as individuals can only be moral in a

basically moral society. Examples of the atrocities that individuals

commit under criminal and immoral social orders support this

insight.14 To claim that all that needs to be done in order to achieve

reconciliation after the collapse of an oppressive and conflictive social

order is its replacement with another and better one is to assume that

the mere discontinuing of moral atrocities equals a restoring of the

moral balance.

This, however, goes against all our common sense intuitions in

our day-to-day lives, which seem to require, at the very least, apolo-

gies, forgiveness and/or punishment in order for a moral balance to be

restored. It is naïve to think that, once the atrocities have ceased and

the immoral social order has collapsed, the situation has returned to,

or has turned into, a context in which people are reconciled, or that

their current identities would not be informed by the events which

have transpired. In other words, to expect that abstract changes to

situations (such as the recognition of equality under the law) are

enough to rectify all aspects of an unjust racial order or enough to

reconcile groups; while inequalities with regards to life expectancy,

education and so forth continue is not realistic.

The Afro-communitarian understanding of the person, which

postulates a collective personhood and virtue, is able to explain why

the context is so important to take into account for virtue, and there-

fore flourishing, to manifest. If the context is not changed sufficiently,

the lingering identities of victim and oppressor could simply keep

changing dominant roles, unless there is a true forging of a new

collective identity which supersedes the old group identities.

A second good reason for pursuing an Afro-communitarian

understanding of personhood is that such projects might support and

14 I have in mind such atrocities committed by individuals and groups under

the command of a criminal state such as in, for example, Nazi Germany and

apartheid South Africa.


work towards the decolonization of the mind and intellectual land-

scape (Ngugi wa Thiong’o, 1986). The Afro-communitarian account of

reconciliation is able to focus on and deal with the issue of identity

transformation integral to reconciliation, and instantiates philosophy

as therapy in the postcolonial African context.

Pedro Tabensky (2008) argues that African philosophy has a dis-

tinctive aim, namely the restoration of social and personal health. I

believe that this can be related to empowerment through articulating

philosophical positions which take the context and cultural particu-

larities of African places into account, and thereby reclaim the intellec-

tual space denied to Africa during the racist project of colonialism.

This can also be articulated as a decolonization of the mind.15 Interest-

ingly, this makes the project of African philosophy, as a whole, recon-

ciliatory.

According to Tabensky, what is usually referred to as ‘Western

philosophy’ has as its primary aim the search for truth. African philo-

sophy likewise also aims at truth, but puts the search for truth to work

in its main project of the restoration of social health. It could also be,

however, that instead of the thin notion of ‘truth’ at work in much

Western philosophy, truth is about the whole person, the whole

community, and the health of both. In other words, it could be argued

that the truth sought in African philosophy is a deeper truth about us

in our individual, communal, historical and psychological complexity

than Western philosophy can permit, and which shows up conven-

tional Western philosophy as overly simplistic.

This paper forms part of a project of African philosophy which

has as its aim the restoration of health lost through the colonial heri-

tage of violent oppression and exploitation by way of exploring the

truths articulated within the context of Africa with regard to recon-

ciliation. The paper intends to focus on the postcolonial context and to

be an instantiation of how philosophy can cast new light on the pro-

blems which arise as the effects of the continent having had a rupture

with its past when the colonial project so violently, yet indifferently,

15 This term was coined by Kenyan writer Ngugi Wa Thiong’o and forms a

central part of his argument in his book Decolonising the Mind: the Politics of

Language in African literature.

176 Rianna Oelofsen

carved the continent up into pieces of the pie meant for European

consumption.

An Afro-communitarian view of the person seems reasonable (as

seen from the empirical evidence of social psychology experiments in

this paper) and desirable, as it fosters community and harmony,

which are good for societal and individual mental and social welfare.

Political analysts and philosophers might object that this project

is too idealistic, and that such a maximal understanding of reconcilia-

tion as I have endorsed will only serve to make people more cynical

about the possibility of practical reconciliation. However, I believe

that this account emphasizes exactly how difficult it is for a society to

be reconciled after protracted conflict, and yet it offers an account of

how this might still be possible. Though many of us do not currently

adhere to the Afro-communitarian worldview that underpins this

account, it might be possible for us to critically and reflectively learn

to do so.

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8.

Everyday Justice: African Populism and

Caring Transitional Justice in Rwanda

LAURA ROOST

In response to genocide in Rwanda, the international community

emphasized criminal justice in the form of the International Criminal

Tribunal for Rwanda (ICTR) as a fundamental component of post-

genocide transitional justice. While the ICTR has created important

legal precedents, the question of its impact in Rwanda remains open

to debate. In addition to the ICTR, other transitional measures such as

national court cases, gacaca community court cases, training of conflict

mediators, and shared planned communities have been adopted

within Rwanda, though much of the research focus is on legalistic

mechanisms such as gacaca. While talking with victims/survivors in

Rwanda, something that was of particular note was the limited dis-

cussion of legalistic measures. Individuals who did discuss legal

measures tended to be lawyers themselves, or worked in the legal

field, and they discussed both the accomplishments of international

legal precedents from the ICTR, as well as the limitations of the law.

Others, who did not mention legalistic measures, highlighted con-

cerns of everyday life: Can my perpetrator and I interact with each

other peacefully? Am I limited in my job prospects because of the

nature of my injuries from genocide? Can I provide for those around

me who depend on me?

This suggests a gap between the international and local percep-

tions of the topics, areas, and subjects of transitional justice. Ad-

dressing this gap requires that the complex justice claims made by

local voices are heard and prioritized, that alternative theories are con-

sidered alongside the dominant international preference for Western-

ized legal justice as the primary response to injustice, and that more

holistic conceptualizations are utilized so that space for local respon-

ses is encouraged. In this paper I consider the ways that transitional

justice is transformed when taking seriously the contributions of alter-

native philosophical approaches, such as feminist care ethics (exem-

180 Laura Roost

plified by the work of Joan Tronto) and African populism (exemplified

by Claude Ake, Mueni wa Muiu, and Godfrey Mwakikagile). In addi-

tion to the conceptual discussion of the justice of transitional justice, I

also—following the prioritization of local voices demanded by both

care ethics and African feminism—include data collected from inter-

views in Rwanda and at the ICTR in Arusha, Tanzania. These inter-

views provide some insight into how participants evaluated national

and international transitional justice, and what they counted as

aspects of transitional justice in daily Rwandan life. Combining ethical

theory, populist thought, and practice in this way has highlighted the

importance of conceptualizing transitional justice holistically, rather

than primarily as legal criminal justice.

Transitional justice refers to mechanisms and processes intended

to address past human rights violations after conflict or regime change

(Elster, 2004; Hinton, 2010; Kritz, 1995; Teitel, 2003). The ICTR is an

example of such a measure, as is the Rwandan use of gacaca—a version

of community justice revised for genocide cases in which Rwandans

would come together as a community and hear testimony from ac-

cused perpetrators as well as the victims/survivors of genocide (Clark,

2010; Temple-Raston, 2008). It is based on traditional conflict-resolu-

tion mechanisms, but has been revised to apply to genocide cases by

including elected judges, who make a ruling following the community

discussion. Another potential mechanism of transitional justice is

truth commissions, such as the South African Truth and Reconcili-

ation Commission (van der Merwe and Chapman, 2008; Graybill and

Lanegran, 2004; Hayner, 2001).

Coverage of these approaches often includes a focus on legalistic

aspects, such as whether or not perpetrators who testify will be given

amnesty from legal prosecution, and is often framed in contrast to

legal trials. With the creation of the International Criminal Court

(ICC), the preferred method of the international community seems to

be legal prosecution as a primary component of transitional justice.

Legal trials at the ICC have created important legal precedents, just as

the trials at the ICTR have done. Still, the thought that these cases

make a vital impact on local experiences, or local perceptions, of

justice is debatable. These trials take place far from the sites of atrocity,

and it is difficult to have the time to access all the legal information at

African Populism and Caring Transitional Justice in Rwanda 181

the trials, let alone fully understand the legalistic rules that govern

acquittals or reductions in sentences for well-known perpetrators such

as Bagosora Théoneste (Bagosora v. Prosecutor, ICTR-98-41-A).

Something notable about the interviews in Rwanda 1 was the

overall satisfaction with recovery after genocide, despite the pain,

injuries, psychological trauma, and economic challenges still experi-

enced by victims/survivors. 2 Also remarkable was how rarely re-

search participants talked about the ICTR or gacaca when discussing

justice after genocide. The assumption of international criminal law

experts of a correlation between legal cases and local experiences of

justice is in need of further questioning. During interviews many more

participants described the everyday strategies of living together, and

the challenges associated with limited job prospects from economic

disadvantage that preceded the genocide, rather than any legal ap-

proach. The title of Jennie Burnet’s latest book, Genocide Lives in Us:

Women, Memory, and Silence in Rwanda (2012), highlights this idea. As

a woman she interviewed talked about the genocide as “living in us”

[victims/survivors] long after the genocide itself stopped. This phrase

came up as they discussed another survivor’s/victim’s experience

1 Preliminary fieldwork in Rwanda was conducted in June 2009 with the aid

of University of Nebraska-Lincoln Department of Political Science Senning

Summer Research Fellowship. Subsequent fieldwork was undertaken in

Rwanda from October 2011-July 2012 thanks to a Fulbright U.S. Student

Grant. Research in Rwanda focused on 119 individual participants associated

with 51 organizations, along with observations of NGO and government

projects pertinent to the research.

Research in Rwanda conducted under permission No. MINEDUC/S&T/

0060/2011. I would like to thank the Department of African Studies of The

Pennsylvania State University, allowing me to present an earlier version of

this paper, and for the many helpful comments offered on that draft. This

paper would not have been the same without such excellent feedback. I

would also like to thank the Department of Political Science of The Pennsyl-

vania State University for its support to present this research at the Inter-

national Society for African Philosophy and Studies 2015 Conference. 2 Throughout the paper I will use the phrase victims/survivors to signify the

different identities claimed by various victims/survivors. Where I use only

one term, it signifies the preferred identity or term used by an individual or

organization.

182 Laura Roost

with continued problems with blood pressure and exhaustion (Bur-

net, 2012, 10).

Based on these sorts of complex justice claims that include more

than legal justice alone, I argue that legal transitional justice measures

are not sufficient on their own, despite the important work done by

the tribunals and gacaca. Instead, reconceptualizing transitional justice

to address the complex justice claims made by victims/survivors is

more appropriate. Doing so can help us better understand what

victims/survivors consider successful transitional justice, what vic-

tims/survivors experience as the justice of transitional justice, and

what work still needs to be done as transitional justice, even when that

work is not legal justice. This is because at the heart of this issue is the

question of the justice of transitional justice. I argue for a reconcep-

tualization of transitional justice in Rwanda using caring transitional

justice philosophically informed by care ethics and African populism.

Basic Tenets of Care Ethics

To understand the theoretical reconceptualization of transitional

justice envisioned through this paper, it will be helpful to look at the

basic tenets of care ethics as well as the specifics of Tronto’s care ethics.

This will be followed by an examination of the basic tenets of African

populism. When applied to transitional justice, the transformative po-

tential of care ethics and African populism makes it possible to better

conceive of holistic responses to past and lingering experiences of

atrocity: so that there can be some feeling of justice, since it would be

difficult to demand complete justice after genocide, as well as helping

us to better understand research participants’ responses, which were

much more inclusive in their discussions of what counts as tran-

sitional justice. After these introductory comments, their impact on

reconceptualizing transitional justice will be considered in the case of

Rwanda.

Care ethics began as a discussion about a dichotomously paired

ethics of justice and ethics of care. Gilligan’s (1982) work in child psy-

chological moral development found that more girls spoke about

ethics in a different voice, a discovery made when including girls in

study samples as opposed to all boy samples traditionally used in


Kohlberg’s study of moral development. This has led to the field of

care ethics in feminist philosophy and political theory, albeit with a

range of varying clarifications. Gilligan noted that girls tended to see

a posed moral question from a perspective of relationships to others

based on questions of care, whereas boys tended to view the question

from the point of view of adherence to rights and rules based on

conceptions of legal justice. The rules-based response given by more

boys in the study was labeled an ethics of justice by Gilligan. The

concept of an ethics of care emerged from the girls’ responses, which

focused more on relationship and interdependence than did the boys

surveyed by Kohlberg. There were, of course, boys who utilized an

ethics of care, girls who utilized an ethics of justice, and mixtures of

the two ethical approaches utilized by the children to address the

problem posed. In later work, Gilligan suggested that this did not

mean that women were naturally associated with care ethics, but that

both genders can and do display care concerns. Through the develop-

ment of a care literature responding to internal and external critiques,

care came to be seen as an ethical approach to which anyone can

adhere, and as either opposed to or in relationship with justice.

Gilligan arrived at her argument about the ethics of care through

experiments which put the Heinz dilemma to a mixed sample of

children and compared the responses from the mixed gender sample

to the responses given by boy-only samples used by Kohlberg. This

formed the basis for his stages of moral development which include

autonomy and legalized thinking as the ultimate goal of a moral

development, said to be universally applicable but which was not re-

plicable in a mixed-gender sample of children. In the Heinz dilemma,

children were asked to consider what action to take when faced with

a choice between stealing medication needed by a husband to treat his

spouse’s cancer but which could not be afforded, or finding some

other solution. Sample respondents, Jake and Amy, reflected an ethics

of justice and an ethics of care, respectively. Jake took the legal rights

of individuals involved and balanced them against each other; while

Amy took into consideration the impact that various responses to the

Heinz dilemma would have on the relationships of those involved.

This consideration led Amy to seek discursive, communal responses

to the dilemma.

184 Laura Roost

I want to investigate the conceptualization of care in slightly more

detail than Gilligan, utilizing the Heinz dilemma and the children’s

responses as indicative of either an ethic of care or an ethic of justice.

When care is placed more centrally as an ethical value, the question of

the Heinz dilemma itself changes. The real Jake and Amy problem

seems not to be their choice within the dilemma, but the existence of a

world in which the Heinz dilemma is a dilemma. To get to such a point

means there is, already, a failure of care within society. Care ethics

when taken even more seriously, prioritize basic care needs. Care

needs: which are required to live should receive priority. The Heinz

dilemma, more simply, describes a failure of a community, in which

the care needed to live is not politically prioritized. It is instead indivi-

dualized as a choice between the spouses and the pharmacist, without

consideration of larger social and political ethical obligations to care.

This interpretation of the dilemma becomes particularly striking when

those sampled reside in a country which has the resources to provide

such care, and actively chooses not to do so. This is a direction in

which Tronto’s Caring Democracy (2013), along with Tronto’s other

work which has sought to ungender care and show it as an ethical

behavior of humans generally, takes the discussion of care ethics. A

just government would care for its citizens. Just citizens would care

for each other. This is the transformative potential of care when

applied to conceptions of government broadly.

Thinking about justice and care in this way, it is helpful to start

with some basic tenets of care ethics. When I talk about care ethics

broadly, I favor the broad definition utilized by Fisher and Tronto:

“Caring can be viewed as a species activity that includes everything

we do to maintain, continue, and repair our ‘world’ so that we can live

in it as well as possible” (1990, 40). Fisher and Tronto discern four

kinds of care activities, and Tronto adds a fifth in her latest work

(2013): caring about, caring for, care-giving, care-receiving, and caring

with. These are motivated by four kinds of ethical concepts: attentive-

ness, responsibility, competence, and responsiveness.

This definition of care ethics arose as care ethicists and others

outside of care ethics have sought to clarify what it means to concep-

tualize care as an ethical value. Perhaps the largest divide in the litera-

ture is whether or not care is associated with women. While some em-


phasize care as a maternal woman’s ethical perspective, or at least best

modeled through maternal persons, male or female, others view care

as an ethical approach available to all. Ruddick (1989), Noddings

(1982, 2002), and Held (2006) to varying degrees emphasize mothering

and women’s care as a model from which to emulate ethical action.

This follows an explanation given by Gilligan regarding why more

girls tended to use the ethical voice of care: women tend to be in

traditional care roles. Critics note that such an approach is problematic

when the relegation of women and disadvantaged persons to caring

work is indicative of their oppression (Dietz, 1985; Tronto, 1993).

Tronto (2013, 10) explains that:

As the historical records shows, if one wishes to exclude some

people from participating in democratic life, then the prob-

lems of care are easily solved. One assigns the responsibilities

for caring to noncitizens: women, slaves, ‘workingclass for-

eigners’, or others who are so marked.

It is precisely women’s and disadvantaged persons’ association

with caring that long excluded them from rights conversations, while

those associated with rational rights and rules-based ethics were

linked directly to political practice. Care ought not to be celebrated as

a women’s or feminist approach/voice simply because women or

subordinated groups do care. There are things to be learned from such

experiences in a rules-dominated ethical climate, but focusing on the

ethics of care as a gendered alternative to purportedly masculine

rules-dominated ethics unnecessarily and dangerously traps the

potential of care in essentialist claims surrounding gender. When care

is relegated as feminine in this way—as a woman’s approach to ethics

—it is care done unjustly, and cannot be considered an ethical activity

or model for preferred ethical activity. That care is often done by wo-

men is not indicative of women’s natural caring capacity, but instead

indicative of the devaluing of both women and care.

Ungendering care helps us question gender relations. Ungender-

ing care also helps us see care as the fundamental ethical guide that it

is. All of us need care, have needed care in the past, and will continue

to need care, albeit in ways that fluctuate throughout our lives. When

186 Laura Roost

we experience failures of care, we conceive of such failures as injustice:

abandonment, abuses against human dignity, and starvation in a

world with a population of 7 billion which produces enough food to

feed 10 billion people. Taking care seriously makes it a priority for all.

Fisher and Tronto’s definition is broad, but it is purposefully so.

Human care needs are broad and vary across cases, but the ethical

impetus of care remains a helpful way to understand our ethical

relationships to each other, based on our shared interdependence. A

just society would prioritize care as an ethical guide for social and

political behavior: in short, a just society is a caring society. The

problematic dichotomization of justice and care has inhibited the vital

connection between care and justice. While justice, as rules-adherence,

is prioritized over care, even the work of transitional justice becomes

dichotomized in ways that neglect the actual care needs (and care de-

mands) of those in whose name transitional justice efforts are

undertaken.

This means that the seemingly important work, according to the

international community prioritizing a dichotomized ethics of justice,

is legal work, while other care needs apart from legal care—for legal

work is, itself, a care need—are relegated as development. This relega-

tion compartmentalizes care as something less important than the

work of legal justice. When we take African populism into considera-

tion, we will see that Ake (1994, 2000), Muia (2008), and Mwakikagile

(2001) point out similar ways that compartmentalization takes place

between legal democratization and development work which echo

Western interests and are prioritized over approaches that reflect, re-

spond to, and include holistic, non-compartmentalized local interests.

Both care ethics and African populism emphasize the interdepend-

ence of humans with each other and their community; question

Western theoretical compartmentalization between values such as

justice and care; and between legal justice and economic/social justice,

albeit in different ways and from different conceptual starting points.

The second debate in the literature on care ethics focuses on the

relationship between care and justice. The relationship has been

argued to be of varying degrees from dichotomously opposed, with

care being a completely alternative ethical approach to an ethics of

justice, to being interrelated. The two dimensions are framed as con-


tending in Gilligan’s work. While Virginia Held has shown a divi-sion

of care ethical thinking and Kantian ethics, which look like rules-based

ethics/ethics of justice, Robinson (1999) seeks to demonstrate that care

and justice do not have to be dichotomous. Much of the debate focuses

on the perceived individualistic manner in which rules-based ethical

decisions are made. Care ethicists emphasize the relationships in-

volved, and stress that the demands of care are legitimate ethical

claims which create a responsibility to reasonably provide care. I look

at care and justice as deeply connected, and argue that the justice

claims of victims of atrocity are not limited to legal concerns about

rule-breaking, though legal claims are vital components. The sense of

justice expected to be fostered during transitional can only be achiev-

ed by taking into account the full range of care needs and care de-

mands of victims/survivors. This includes legal claims as well as non-

legal care claims.

I see justice and care as connected ethical principles which have

been separated and dichotomously opposed without good reason. In

transitional justice this plays out negatively as the focus on the inter-

national level tends to be on international criminal tribunals alone,

without enough consideration being given to participant care needs

and their ability to participate effectively, or to broader community

and grassroots care needs. If transitional justice is implemented with

care, it could address these concerns better and so get closer to nur-

turing a sense that reasonable justice has been done.

Key Tenets of African Populism

Three factors of care ethics reflect many of the concerns of African

populist thought: the call of care ethics to listen to holistic justice

claims which include broad care needs, rather than dichotomizing and

prioritizing the former as legal justice alone; the call to focus on power

in care; and the call to prioritize local care interests. Yet these two

theoretical approaches of care ethics and African populism are not

often brought together. Combining them proves conceptually helpful

in discussions of transitional justice as experienced locally, as well as

determining what can count as transitional justice. African populism,

in particular, brings a people-centered focus which requires the pri-

188 Laura Roost

oritization of African voices in addressing African political problems

and solutions challenges the prioritization of Western interests—

which frequently dichotomize legal concerns and economic concerns;

whereas local interests see connections between such concerns—and

it emphasizes the importance of local needs. The philosophical em-

phasis of populism is the populace as the source of legitimate political

knowledge and action. Much of the work of African populism has

broadly focused on issues of governance or development. This em-

phasis on African solutions and on African voices guiding such

solutions, applies even to transitional justice and refocuses the tran-

sitional justice literature on the victims/survivors in whose name such

justice is undertaken. It also encourages a conceptual change in the

legal language of justice being applied for a population towards a

people-centered, caring language of justice as led by, directed and

guided by locals making complex justice claims.

A key approach to African populism is outlined in the work of

Claude Ake. Ake particularly emphasizes the way that even develop-

ment, said to be undertaken to help Africans, is really Western-driven

and limited to Western definitions of democracy, which are in turn

vitally connected to a specific kind of market economy—particularly

one that is open to exploitation by the West. In The Democratization of

Disempowerment (1994), Ake provides a much more distressing

explanation of the experience of democratization, as being one in

which the African voter:

has to be ‘mobilized’, that is herded through voter registration,

possibly placed in protective custody so she is unavailable to

other ‘hunters’, and produced later to demonstrate the can-

didate’s popular standing and, finally, guided through the

voting process and then discarded (21).

This description echoes concerns about ICTR witness treatment

and regret about not being able to follow up with witnesses after

testimony was provided to the tribunal, unless a witness was needed


for another case.3 Victims/survivors need to feel that some form of

justice has been done (Zehr, 1990; Urban Walker, 2006), a hard task

when they are contacted only to testify without any follow-up or

future care for their needs arising from victimization.

Ake helps us see the divisions between local and Western in-

terests, as well as the way these divisions are exported in Western-led

development projects. Challenging this approach, Ake argues for a

people-centered development which contributes to self-realization,

and particularly highlights the dichotomy between democratization

and development which, I argue, echoes the similar dichotomy be-

tween legal justice and care. This is most clearly seen as Ake explores

what people-centered development changes about the people in-

volved:

[T]he dichotomy between democratization and economic

development arises only because the economic development

had been misconceived and perverted to an exercise in aliena-

tion rather than an emancipator experience, and, hence, a de-

mocratic project. Development is a process of self-realization,

and it is so only in so far as the people are the means and the

end of development. The self-development of ordinary people

is democratization at its most concrete and most profound

(2000, 173).

Similarly, combining this populism and care ethics helps us to see

that transitional justice is only able to contribute to local experiences

of justice—a feeling that justice has been reasonably done—in so far

as the people are the means and end of transitional justice.

Regarding the care critique of traditional Western conceptions of

justice as being limited, African populism joins the care critique and

highlights the dichotomization dominant in Western thought which

brackets select portions of people’s lives that cannot be reduced to

abstract legal principles or solely rules-based principles without con-

sideration of relational responsibilities and connections between

3 Interview, ICTR (May 2012). Note that interviews with personnel of the

ICTR were personal interviews, and do not reflect any official position of the

ICTR or the United Nations.

190 Laura Roost

people. If we read Ake’s points on the need for law to be relevant to

social experience with transitional justice measures in mind, we find

additional cause to seek to reconceptualize transitional justice as

broader than legal or legalistic justice alone:

Although advocates and scholars of democratization do not

seem to be concerned by the formidable problems posed by

the received practice of democracy and legal systems that

alienate instead of inculcating the reassuring feeling of being

secure in freedom and in the consciousness that the social

order is predictable and just, ordinary people are acutely

aware of this problem because it oppresses them (2000, 178).

This emphasis on law needing to be relevant to social experience

is, I think, telling about the problematic dichotomy between legal aims

and other goals. It is not the case that there is no desire for law or

tribunals. In fact, many victims/survivors do want trials. The question

is how trials are conducted, and what else is done to respond to other,

non-legal justice claims related to the atrocity to which transitional

justice is intended to respond.

The importance of a people-centered approach is highlighted in

Ake’s work, and the need for such an approach to apply in transitional

justice is clear. It is also echoed in Muiu’s (2008) research on liberal

democracy as problematically applied in South Africa. Muiu argued

for local contexts to be prioritized, rather than assuming a one-size-

fits-all model of liberal democracy. Specifics of how to apply people-

centered development and people-centered approaches are expanded

in the work of Muiu and Mwakikagile. Muiu and Martin’s Fundi wa

Afrika highlights ways for local direction to be prioritized, for local

needs and interests rather than Western interests to guide political

action. In particular, Muiu’s work points to local non-governmental

organizations as leaders and partners, to women’s involvement and

development, and to the incorporation of traditional cultural practices

that can give social meaning to contemporary political practices. She

is particularly interested in retaining elements of indigenous African

institutions that are still functioning. Through this, social meaning and

local ownership are encouraged.


In addition to Muiu’s emphasis on local interests and local insti-

tutions, Mwakikagile particularly warns against external interests and

non-people focused internal interests. In other words, he is concerned

both with Western interests that are not in accord with local interests,

and local leaders who are not focused on the people’s interests. His

work focuses on leaders listening to the people, the people having

spaces to engage with leaders, and increasing local financial control as

much as possible. Mwakikagile argues that “[n]ational development

is fueled from within, not without. Foreign investment should never

be considered to be the primary source for Africa’s economic growth”

(2001, 236). All of these perspectives point to the need for people to be

the basis for all interventions: international or national.

Together, these African populist writers seek to prioritize the

people of the various African states as the rightful focus of political,

economic, and social activities of those states, rather than external

Western interests, or leaders focused on their own interests rather than

the interests of their people. In short, to the questions of care ethics:

who gives care, to whom is care given, and who shares in giving care?

Their answer is: the people. Connecting this with transitional justice,

we are left with no other suitable response than insisting that caring

transitional justice is locally led, locally focused, and responds to

complex local justice demands—even when those demands are more

expansive and less dichotomized than external actors expect. These

African populists’ emphasis on African solutions to African problems,

and African voices guiding such solutions, applies even in transitional

justice. The importance of approaching transitional justice with a

reconceptualized understanding of the importance of care and po-

pulism is evident when considering the case of Rwanda through this

new lens.

African Populism and Caring Transitional Justice in Rwanda

During my first experiences in Rwanda in 2009, I noticed not only

how rarely people talked about the ICTR when discussing justice after

genocide, but also how often they talked about local experiences as

transitional justice, even when these did not include traditional me-

chanisms such as courts, gacaca, or direct conflict mediation initiatives.

192 Laura Roost

On the basis of a focus which prioritizes Westernized legal approaches

as the primary response to atrocity, this would seem surprising.

Taking the philosophical insights of care ethics and African populism

into account, it becomes quite clear why complex local needs beyond

exclusively legal needs would be conceptualized as aspects of tran-

sitional justice by research participants. Both approaches emphasize

the importance of needs. Care ethics does so by highlighting the inter-

dependence that is common to all of us, since many of our needs re-

quire others to be fully met—they may in turn require our care to meet

their needs or the needs of some other person to whom we can pay

our received care forward. African populism highlights needs by

demonstrating the importance of community, across various African

contexts and rooted in various local traditions, in the development of

individuals within the community who, in turn, contribute back to the

community that has provided for his or her needs. In care and African

populist contexts, responding to atrocity requires a holistic approach

that addresses the complex needs associated with the experience in

question.

These contexts also highlight the depth of the wrong experienced.

It is not in the breaking of the law that the horror of genocide is ex-

perienced; it is in the failure to care for the humanity of others, the

failure to honor other community members as community members,

and in the betrayal of the community—particularly in cases where

perpetrators and victims/survivors were closely related before the

genocide. Transitional justice in everyday life, then, needs to respond

to the laws broken as well as to the needs which arise from injury, and

repair the community destroyed during the genocide. Understanding

the philosophical contributions of care and African populism towards

conceptualizing transitional justice helps us to understand just how

complex are the needs of the victims/survivors and the community to

be repaired after atrocity. Such understanding also challenges the ten-

dency to dichotomize some of these claims (as development claims or

social justice claims that are separate from legal transitional justice

claims) when they are, in fact, fundamentally related to the full spec-

trum of needs at the heart of the justice of transitional justice.

Even when victims/survivors discussed gacaca, it was typically in

the context of social experiences: (1) healing, for lack of a more


appropriate word, as neither solely healing nor solely recovery really

indicates the impacts of atrocity that last even as people continue on

with their lives; and (2) job training, along with job opportunities that

made it possible for the person in question to feel ready to give

testimony in gacaca. For example, during that first visit to Rwanda I

was part of a group that was able to meet with Rwandan survivors of

genocide who worked in an organization aimed at helping women

with HIV/AIDS by providing access to medical services and employ-

ment opportunities. As I was interested in transitional justice, I was

curious what these women thought about various measures in place

to advance justice such as the ICTR, the Rwandan national courts

dealing with particular genocide cases, and gacaca. Their interaction

around such measures of transitional justice, particularly gacaca, was

profoundly telling. Rather than talking about the legal mechanisms,

their focus was on the care that made it possible for them to suffi-

ciently address what could qualify as care needs, so they could better

participate in gacaca, but even more importantly, the care that made it

possible for them to live their daily lives. This included the medical

aid of the organization; their financial earnings, stemming from their

job training, which made it possible to provide financially for their

family; and, regarding gacaca, the informal counseling received from

a member of the gacaca courts who accompanied some of the women

to select gacaca. In many cases, it was the care activities of NGOs,

family members, other women in the NGO, or the community that

made it possible for them to feel that they could participate.

The impact of activities that provided care and responded more

to these women’s complex justice claims rather than legal justice alone

was vitally important to these women’s stories. Similarly, experiences

that were people-focused—with the emphasis on their social well-

being, their economic ability to contribute to their family, and their

capacity to meet the needs of their daily lives—were prominent in

their stories of transitional justice. Their experiences were not always

the romanticized reconciliations that tend to be highlighted in tran-

sitional justice literature. Such experiences are possible, and incredibly

meaningful, but cannot be the absolute measure of local experiences

of transitional justice. Just as other ideas have been dichotomized,

there seems to be a dichotomized view of recovery: as tales of deep

194 Laura Roost

friendships between perpetrator and victim/survivor, and, failing to

find such friendships as a sign of failed transitional justice or a pur-

ported dichotomy that Meister (2012) criticizes: i.e., the morally un-

damaged victim and the blameworthy one. In some ways, these views

seem to reflect the Western impatience to move forward.

The push to close the ICTR was evident in the years soon after it

opened: How much longer will this Tribunal really continue? How

long before people move on? This focus on idealized expectations

ignores or bypasses alternatives. De-dichotomizing approaches can

help us see that sometimes the experience is not ideal, but people are

able to live together. This phrase is the theme that came up most often

throughout interviews in Rwanda: “we live together.” For example,

one victim/survivor described repeatedly asking perpetrators where

the bodies of loved ones are, and continuing to live together in a com-

munity, even though they are not told where the bodies are, since each

side knows the other cannot harm them now (Interview, April 2012).

Others mentioned walking in the same village with their perpetrators,

or other daily encounters. Surprisingly, many victims/survivors who

had ongoing economic concerns related to discrimination before the

genocide which left them with few advantages even before psycholo-

gical trauma, nonetheless noted the shared poverty of their perpetra-

tors—with the exception of the higher-level perpetrators. This idea of

living together is, in some ways, central to the African populist ap-

proach which requires a focus on the people in the community.

That living together, and the day-to-day justice of living together,

are central becomes less surprising when thinking about the ICTR

through the lens of transitional justice reconceptualized through care

ethics and African populism. The work of Claude Ake and Mweni wa

Muiu show why externally introduced, foreign-directed programs

will not successfully address the needs they are purportedly created

to meet. The limited role of victims/survivors is a concern (Gready,

2005). The Tribunal is held away from the sites in question and can

only practically arraign a limited number of the accused. It can also

hear from only a limited number of victims/survivors, and is bound

to legalistic practices that are not always accessible to the average

citizen. Rather than the victims/survivors taking a central role in the

activity of transitional justice, instead groups of international transi-


tional justice experts work across different conflicts and may dictate a

set of guidelines before victims/survivors voice their justice claims

based on expertise, but neglecting the potential and the legitimacy of

local voices.

When I visited the ICTR in 2012, the people watching the pro-

ceedings were primarily Western legal personnel and researchers like

myself. The Rwandans who were there were the family of the accused.

This is not surprising, given the financial burden of a visit to Arusha

and the dire economic realities many survivors/victims experience.

This is, of course, not to say that victims/survivors are opposed to

trials. Victims/survivors in many such cases often want legal trials,

and this was also the case in Rwanda. The problem is that victim/

survivor demands are not limited to only seeking legal justice. Their

demands are much more complex, and interconnected. Legal justice is

not dichotomized from economic justice, as both are various forms of

care needs. In taking into account care needs and people-centered

approaches, transitional justice must be able to hear and understand

such demands as aspects of transitional justice.

It was the demand for trials that eventually led to the gacaca

system, even though the process included actions that victims/survi-

vors originally opposed or did not feel like participants in, such as the

government’s releasing of select prisoners who were awaiting trial in

an attempt to address overcrowding in prisons. Despite this problem,

through gacaca there is an effort to respond to victim/survivor de-

mands for judgment and trial of local-level perpetrators, since only

high-level perpetrators would be tried at the ICTR. Gacaca is an

example of a procedure which follows Muiu’s emphasis on retaining

working African institutions. Gacaca is a traditional Rwandan ap-

proach to settling minor disputes among neighbors in a community

which included the members of the community in the process of con-

flict-resolution. Though gacaca traditionally dealt with minor disputes,

its community focus and ability to go through cases more quickly than

legal trials could lead the Rwandan government to review the process

so that it could apply to crimes of genocide.

Though there are challenges with the approach, the most mean-

ingful statements that came out of gacaca experiences seemed to be a

sense of community ownership and community participation. It is

196 Laura Roost

telling that an external researcher of gacaca used the title How Rwanda

Judged Its Genocide for his report summarizing the proceedings (Clark,

2012). This community involvement was connected to people’s ability

to live together, and participation in it was a part of victim/survivor

stories of living together, though not in the way expected. The story

expected of the ICTR legal justice model is that the completion of the

legal proceedings and handing down the appropriate legal judgment

would lead to a sense of justice on the ground. In the stories of those I

spoke with, it was being able to feel capable of participating in gacaca

or other community events that was an important marker. Perhaps

this is why Rwandans are more pleased with their progress since

genocide than might be expected in such a short time: the justice of

daily life and being able to go about daily life is in itself an experience

of imperfect, but livable, justice.

This question of living together is key when thinking about

Mwakikagile’s emphasis on voice and participation. Regarding Rwan-

da in particular, Mwakikagile (2013) is concerned about the ability of

all people to feel included in the government, or feel their voices are

being heard by the government. Clark (2012) highlights the impact of

gacaca as being an expectation that people can participate in govern-

ment and politics, since they were able to participate in the gacaca

process, even though decisions were ultimately made by inyamga-

mayo—essentially elected judges. As these questions continue to be

researched, what is notable are the many arenas in which there is

potential for local voices to discuss their daily experiences of living

together. These include umudugudu meetings after required monthly

community work, or umuganda, Women’s Councils which meet at

various levels from the umudugudu level, to the cell, to the sector, and

eventually all the way to the national level. These structures are

intended to be spaces for discussion between levels of government

and the people.

This question of being heard is another item that becomes more

important when thinking about a caring and populist transitional

justice. In Rwanda, I attended conferences about reconciliation and

justice, and one in particular sought to bring reconciliation practices

from other post-conflict states to be replicated in Rwanda, without

consideration of what Rwanda had done in the area or what Rwanda


still needed to do. This gave the impression of locals being treated as

incompetent and in need of outside actors to tell them their own

justice needs, rather than locals being treated as competent partners in

a participatory process of navigating, prioritizing, and logistically

providing for needs.

In response to these kinds of concerns, and to promote local

voices, the Rwandan government has emphasized another traditional

concept: agaciro. It translates roughly as ‘self-respect’ or ‘dignity’, and

emphasizes Rwandan successes and ability to solve their own pro-

blems, particularly in the area of sustainable socio-economic develop-

ment. The goal is to increase Rwanda’s financial autonomy, much in

line with African populist arguments about reducing dependency. In

2012, the Agaciro campaign was launched, complete with billboards,

TV commercials, and songs. Since then, it has continued developing

Rwandan-owned approaches as it emphasizes Rwandans as agents of

their own change, celebrates Rwandan history, and encourages Rwan-

dans to return.4 The Agaciro campaign builds on earlier programs

which cultivate local ownership of development such SACCO (Sa-

vings and Credit Cooperative), which helps to create local sources for

economic development, much in line with Mwakikagile’s local-led

economic development advice.

This leads to the most extensive topic, apart from living together,

that victims/survivors discussed: economic justice. Often in Rwanda,

interviewees would connect their current economic plight to discri-

mination prior to the 1994 genocide as well as to the genocide itself.

Limited school opportunities, inability to focus in school while still

traumatized, and the loss of their family support structure, which was

historically a fundamental economic support structure, all contribute

in victims’/survivors’ minds to create a scenario where they start at a

disadvantage and can never catch up. Hence, calls for reparations are

not only an example of seeking retribution and acknowledgment of

the past violation suffered, they are an acknowledgment that the suf-

fering continues. The after-effects continue for a lifetime. The question

is which policies and processes can best meet the needs of the victims/

4 For a good summary of the Agaciro campaign, view the short documentary

on Agaciro, https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=1oBN_qmlQMU.

198 Laura Roost

survivors and the needs of the community that is to be created after

the atrocity?

This speaks to other justice claims occurring at the same time as

legal transitional justice claims. Economic and social justice claims are

of vital importance and, if not met, can impede survivor and perpetra-

tor’s abilities to address past wrongs. In other words, some of the

language of transitional justice suggests that there is a need to address

legal concerns first so that people can continue forward with other

aspects of their lives;conversely, it is suggested, that economic and

social concerns of daily life be prioritized so that people are able to

address the wrongs of the past. An alternate view is that both need to

be simultaneously addressed, rather than compartmentalized into

separate processes of transitional justice and development.

Concerns about development, marginalization, structural violen-

ce, corruption and the like can impact on the ability of transitional

justice to function, if people cannot see a future different from the one

that contributed to the violence in the first place, particularly if econo-

mic disparities or threats were a factor (Collier, 2003; Mani, 2008).

Speaking with survivors in Rwanda, it became clear that there was

disillusionment, disappointment, or reluctant acknowledgment of the

limitations of legal transitional justice mechanisms when focusing on

the tribunals, national courts, or Rwanda’s gacaca. The responses

instead focused on living together and dealing with economic con-

cerns, with the two often forming a bridge across ethnic identities

through the shared experience of poverty.

Victim/survivor research participants in Rwanda connected their

current economic status to the discrimination against Tutsis before the

genocide and the destruction of the familial support system during

the genocide. This means that it was made a transitional justice claim,

much as Mani (2008) would expect. This was in reference to being able

to carry on with life, but the role of grassroots support as a mechanism

of transitional justice, when acting towards meeting transitional

justice needs and goals, is seen in other areas as well. Civil society

organizations and non-governmental organizations can have an im-

pact on the issues that legal mechanisms such as truth commissions

and trials emphasize. They have petitioned for changes in the way that

the mechanisms operate. They have offered support to witnesses.


When one considers the care required—both individually and socie-

tally—to address the grievances of the past, it may be that non-govern-

mental organizations can help bridge the gap between legal mecha-

nisms of transitional justice and the needs of the local population.

Despite the important work that current transitional justice mea-

sures have done to date, they are not sufficient on their own to best

attain the stated goals of transitional justice because of this justice gap

between legal justice and other forms of caring justice, particularly

economic needs. Making implicit goals explicit can help us face the

assumptions of transitional justice, by highlighting the inability of a

compartmentalized and ad hoc approach to transitional justice to attain

such goals. The process, scope, and goals of transitional justice will

need to be reconceptualized to better reach these goals. Most impor-

tantly, taking more seriously the sorts of claims made by survivors

and focusing more on the needs of the community that is to be created

will lead to a more holistic approach to transitional justice.

Care ethics suggest that care claims be taken seriously; African

populism suggests that the claims of the people also need to be taken

seriously. The care ethics for which I argue claim that justice demands

care, and that when transitional justice mechanisms work to include

care providers and care concerns, transitional justice can more effect-

tively fulfill its goals. It also prioritizes local agency, local decisions,

and local voices in accordance with the tenets of African populism

such as Ake’s social democracy, and Mwakikagile’s and Muiu’s focus

on fair economic distribution, the equitable status of women, African

self-definition of their own states (and needs to be met by the state),

and retaining indigenous African institutions that function effectively

and are self-directed.

Thinking about caring populist transitional justice helps us to

acknowledge, as a part of transitional justice, the everyday experi-

ences of living together, being heard, and economic justice claims in

Rwanda. Applying these theoretical lenses to the case of transitional

justice in Rwanda has helped show both what is lacking in a prioriti-

zation of legal justice alone, but also what is missing from conceptions

of transitional justice if they do not take into account what local voices

refer to when discussing their experiences.

200 Laura Roost

Conclusion

The arguments for care ethics and African populism, and the

questions they raise for justice in general, have important implications

for conceptions of transitional justice. Most importantly, care ethics

challenges us to interrogate the nature of justice and African populism

requires that attempts at implementing justice be people-centered.

Key gaps between the international legal conceptions of transitional

justice and local experiences of transitional justice echo gaps that

African populists and care ethicists repeatedly note between local

conceptions of interests and Western conceptions of interests. These

include the distance between internationally conceived principles of

legal justice and other demands for care—or more complex justice

claims—made by local people. Also notable is the gap between the

formal mechanisms of transitional justice and the needs of the local

community. Both are experienced and created through transitional

justice measures as they are perceived by local populations, including

the local population’s ability to participate in the processes of transi-

tional justice. The inability of certain formal mechanisms such as the

ICTR to connect with the grassroots level, the realistic inability of law

to do everything that is demanded of it after an atrocity, and various

justice claims of people on the ground suggest that the process, scope,

and goals of transitional justice need to be reconceptualized. Applying

an ethics of care and African populism shows that transitional justice

must be people-centered and caring if it is to address the complex

needs and demands of victims/survivors. Transitional justice must be

able to apply to the everyday lived justice of transitional justice, just

as it applies to legal transitional justice.

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nalists, Their Trial for War Crimes, and a Nation’s Quest for Redemption.

New York: Free Press.

Tronto, Joan. 1993. Moral Boundaries: a Political Argument for an Ethic of

Care. New York: Psychology Press.

Tronto, Joan C. 2013. Caring Democracy: Markets, Equality, and Justice.

New York: New York University Press.

Urban Walker, Margaret. 2006. Moral Repair: Reconstructing Moral

Relations after Wrongdoing. New York: Cambridge University Press.

West, Robin. 1997. Caring for Justice. New York: New York University

Press.

Zehr, Howard. 1990. Changing Lenses: a New Focus for Crime and Justice.

Harrisonburg, Virginia: Herald Press.

9.

Evolution in Ethics:

Interrogating the Notion of Vengeance in

Criminal Justice through the Lens of

Ancient Egyptian Legal Codes

CHARLES VERHAREN

Introduction

The paper’s purpose is to outline a research program targeting

the reformation of the United States criminal justice system. The

foundation of the program rests on the Ancient Egyptian ethical

proscription of vengeance. In his The Better Angels of our Nature: Why

Violence Has Declined (2011), Stephen Pinker claims that the abolition

of vengeance through the rule of law is key to establishing stable

societies grounded in non-violent principles. The first part of this

essay claims that Ancient Egypt was the first culture to interrogate the

status of vengeance in writing. Evolutionary theory suggests that

vengeance executed by individuals who have unjustly suffered harm

is a natural disposition necessary for the stability of early human

groups. However, complex societies tend to replace vengeance

executed by the offended individual or family with state-controlled

vengeance. The second part of the paper briefly examines recent

research in neuroscience that appears to undercut the grounds for

vengeance. This research supports the Ancient Egyptian principle that

collective harmony is a societal responsibility. The third part of the

paper considers the consequences of the abolition of vengeance for the

United States criminal justice system. Where criminals pose no further

threat to the social fabric, they are to be reintegrated into society to the

degree that the society’s power permits. With the abolition of

vengeance, retribution can no longer be a factor in criminal justice. The

fourth part of the paper sketches a model for a radiating prison system

based on the abolition of vengeance as an instrument of a criminal

justice system. The fifth part of the paper underscores the urgency of

204 Charles Verharen

the need for reform of the United States criminal justice system. The

United States has more prisoners per capita than virtually all other

countries. Mandatory sentencing together with privatization of the

prison system means that criminals who pose no threat to the social

fabric become wards of the state, in inhumane conditions at the

expense of taxpayers. The paper argues, in conclusion, that the reform

of the United States criminal justice system requires a foundation

comprised of research on the full spectrum of African ethics.

Part I

Pinker’s (2011) controversial claim is that intra-species violence

has declined markedly over the past 10,000 years. The Harvard

anthropologist Richard Wrangham (2004) supports Pinker’s research.

He finds that human intra-species kill rates matched those of wolves

and chimpanzees, the other two notorious intra-species killers, during

the human hunting-gathering and proto-agricultural periods. Even in

the face of two world wars and genocide in the 20th century, Wrang-

ham claims that human intra-species kill rates are far below those of

wolves and chimpanzees. It must be remembered that Wrangham is

addressing kill rates rather than numbers of individuals killed.

Estimates suggest that the human population some 70,000 years ago

numbered only approximately 5,000. Not many individuals would

have to be killed to achieve high kill rates.

Pinker’s (2011) analysis of declining kill rates is based on three

factors: the extraordinary increase in human group size from small

tribes to nations to empires; an increase in group control of the instru-

ments of survival and flourishing; and the abolition of vengeance as

an instrument of social control. For Pinker, societies grounded in

honor codes fail to make this transition. Levels of individual violence,

particularly gender-based violence, remain high. Nonetheless, state-

executed vengeance continues to be a justification for criminal penal-

ties even in contemporary complex societies. Against this ethics of

retribution, ancient Egyptian texts denounce vengeance as a legiti-

mate ground of ethical action: “The teaching to guard against retalia-

tion, lest a portion of it reach you” (Papyrus Insinger) (Lichtheim and

Fischer-Elfert, 2006, 211); “Don’t rush to attack your attacker—leave

Ancient Egyptian Legal Codes vesus Vengeance in Criminal Justice 205

him to the god” (Instructions to Any) (Lichtheim and Manning 2006,

142); “Do not kill, it does not serve you. Punish with beatings, with

detention, Thus will the land be well-ordered” (Instructions to Meri-

kare) (Lichtheim and Manning 2006, 100).

The Instructions to Any relegate vengeance to the precincts of the

gods. The other texts proscribing vengeance are unremarkably scarce

in the ancient Egyptian texts. The Ancient Egyptian empire was ex-

traordinary in its geographical extent from Nubia (now northern

Sudan) through the Levant to the precincts of Babylonia (now Iraq),

yet other empires such as the Persian and Hittite continuously

threatened its power. Xenophobia and vengeance for attacks are con-

sequently constant themes in Egyptian literary texts. In only two texts,

the Hymns to Aten, is xenophobia denounced (Hornung, 1999/1995).

The likely author of these texts, the Pharaoh Akhenaten, enjoyed a

reign free of warfare during the 14th century BCE.

The ancient Egyptian texts against vengeance contrast starkly

with the Codes of Hammurabi and Ur-Nammu and other ancient

codes grounded in vengeance: ‘an eye for an eye’. Like some ancient

Egyptian texts, the Old Testament affirms the conviction that ven-

geance is the Lord’s. However, this principle is honored in the breach

rather than the observance, as vengeance becomes a matter for state

rather than personal or family administration. The reason is the lack

of power (in the fullest sense) of the nations professing to embody

Judaism, Christianity, and Islam. The power conferred by the devel-

opment of modern social sciences finally makes possible an analysis

of resentment (the emotional vehicle of vengeance) as the expression

of a powerless society. Highly technological societies possess suffi-

cient power to eschew vengeance in favor of group solidarity, as

Pinker (2011) details in his research. E.O. Wilson’s Social Conquest of

Nature (2010) explores the evolutionary reasons for sacrificing per-

sonal gain (the satisfaction that comes from vengeance well executed)

to the good of the group. Both Pinker and Wilson illustrate the im-

possibility of cultures based on vengeance, ‘honor cultures’, achieving

stability. Martha Nussbaum (2015) proposes a scheme of “transitional

anger” to bridge the gap between the genetic inclination to seek ven-

geance for harm and the gradually developing epigenetic inclination

to restore the criminal to harmony with society.


Part II

This section briefly examines recent research in neuroscience that

appears to undercut the grounds for vengeance. This research

supports the Ancient Egyptian principle that collective harmony is a

societal responsibility. When group members act against the social

fabric, the society’s primary responsibility is to restore the errant

individual to the collective. This ethical principle follows from four

evolutionary propositions. First, other things being equal, groups that

expand their numbers have better chances of survival. Second, groups

whose members are tightly bonded together have better chances of

survival. Restoring group members who violate the social fabric to the

community supports this principle. Third, groups have better chances

of survival if their members live lives of excellence. Repressing the

lives of group members who are no longer a threat to the social fabric

negates this principle. Fourth, groups that have the power to encom-

pass genetic, linguistic and cultural diversity have better chances of

survival. Redirecting criminal behavior according to principles of

social harmony has the potential to increase group diversity. This

principle opens an avenue for incorporating civil disobedience into a

society’s capacity for self-reformation.

The philosophy that abolishes the role of vengeance in criminal

justice is based on the conviction that social unity, the society itself, is

responsible for crime. Individuals simply act out their roles within

that society. Michael Gazzaniga’s (2011) research in Who’s in Charge?

Free Will and the Science of the Brain, challenges the dominance of the

idea of ‘free will’ in contemporary society. Gazzaniga’s hypothesis is

based on abundant research showing that neural activation of muscles

takes place before the brain makes a conscious decision for activation.

His research is particularly controversial as it challenges the virtually

universal conviction that humans are fully responsible for their

actions, given the absence of countervailing conditions. But Gazzaniga

devotes his last chapter to the proposition that humans must continue

to believe in free will for the sake of maintaining the societal fabric.

For the sake of cohesion, society must assume that its members are

responsible for their actions, with exceptions duly noted in the case of

minors or the mentally ill.


Part III

This section considers the consequences of the abolition of the

principle of vengeance, for the ethics that ground the United States

criminal justice system. The current system is unethical in two major

aspects. First, numerous prisoners are subjected to solitary confine-

ment. This practice was introduced in 19th-century prisons, notori-

ously in Port Arthur in Tasmania and Eastern State Penitentiary in

Philadelphia, Pennsylvania. The idea of a penitentiary was rooted in

the notion of penitence itself. Prisoners were kept in total isolation. In

Port Arthur, attendance at Sunday religious services was mandatory

for all inmates, but physical devices prevented them from seeing or

interacting with one another. In Philadelphia, guards wore thick

woolen socks over their boots so that inmates would never know

whether the guards were present. As Charles Dickens pointed out

after visiting Eastern State Penitentiary, ‘that way madness lies’. The

philosophical conviction underpinning this barbaric treatment of

prisoners was that reflection on their crimes would lead to their

rehabilitation. Solitary confinement in contemporary prisons does not

rely on this primitive justification. Rather it is a method of behavior

control that has devastating effects on inmates’ mental health.

The second miscarriage of justice in the prison system is its tacit

acceptance of prisons as methods of exacting vengeance for the harm

criminals have done to society. Prisoners are subjected to physical and

mental abuse both by guards and other inmates. Prison rape rates and

HIV infection are notoriously high. Inmates are not given the means

to develop their human capacities to the fullest. The motive for this

barbaric treatment of prisoners continues to be the deep-seated

human proclivity toward vengeance.

Criminal justice reform demands that where criminals pose no

further threat to the social fabric, they are to be reintegrated into

society to the degree that the society’s power permits. With the aboli-

tion of the principle of vengeance, retribution can no longer be a factor

in administering criminal justice. If it can be proven that criminal

penalties act as a deterrent, then deterrence can be an ethical aspect of

criminal justice. However, research on deterrence is inconclusive.

Containing criminals who pose a future threat to societal fabric is a


second ethical aspect of criminal justice. Criminals who pose a threat

to the community’s fabric must be contained.Communities have no

other choice.

The third ethical aspect is compensation for harm done to the

social fabric. The need for compensation does not align with the

neuroscience research finding that free will is a problematic notion.

However, both custom and common sense dictate that criminals must

do all in their power to restore the social fabric after they have

disrupted it. However, I argue that the motive of restitution must be

collective for the entire society. The entire society must take respon-

sibility for the crimes committed by its members.This principle

follows from the conviction that crime is a mental health problem,

rather than the effect of “free will” choices. As advanced technical

societies offer universal health care and other instruments of social

security, so they must insure their members against the effects of

crime. Where possible, criminals must make every effort to effect the

restitution that is within their power. Here a regression to the ancient

codes of payments for crime can provide a contemporary model. The

Code of Hammurabi, for example, is famous for its principle of ‘an eye

for an eye’. Less well known are the monetary payments for lesser

crimes: “If a man of gentle birth has struck the strength of a man of

gentle birth who is like himself, he shall pay one mina of silver” (§203).

Part IV

This section sketches a model for a radiating prison system based

on the abolition of vengeance as an instrument of a criminal justice

system. What my discussion so far has ignored are the brute facts of

psychopathy and sociopathy. Researchers have estimated that some

small percentage of the human population, either for genetic reasons,

blunt force head trauma, or brutal socialization, are unable to live in

society without harming their fellows. Given the predisposing genetic

or social causes of pathology, those suffering from mental pathologies

cannot be held responsible for their actions. In severe cases, those

convicted of criminal actions are remanded to mental institutions.

However, in other cases, they are committed to prison systems. The

causes of the crime are identical, but the effects vary across a wide


spectrum. Mental institutions are not designed to be systems of

torture.

However, prisons by their very nature are torture systems. The

model recognizes that psychopaths and sociopaths are by and large

untreatable with current psychotherapies. The core of the prison for

these individuals must be maximum security in line with current

models. However, psychopathy and sociopathy are recognized in this

model as diseases caused either by genetic malformation, blunt force

head trauma, or destructive socialization; hence prisoners in maxi-

mum security institutions are to be given the best possible life

circumstances consonant with the society’s tools of containment.

As prisoners pose decreasing degrees of threat to society, their

containment must become less restrictive. Incarceration takes away

the earning power of criminals whose earnings can in part be used for

restitution. So-called “white-collar” criminals must dedicate a portion

of their lives to restitution proportionate to the damage they have

caused. Criminals like Bernard Madoff or Michael Robert Millikan, for

example, would have to dedicate all of their cunning to advancing

social good, unless they suffered from a pathology. In the case of

violent psychopaths and sociopaths, incarceration must be our last

resort, since we are incapable of restoring the criminal to society

because of the current limits of psychology and psychiatry.

To the degree possible, prisoners are to lead normal lives so long

as: they are capable of making a contribution to society and do not

pose a threat to the social fabric. At the outer core of the prison system,

prisoners will lead lives indistinguishable from those of their fellow

society members, except for being subject to such monitoring devices

that guarantee they pose no threat to the social fabric. In some cases

(pedophilia, for example), these devices will be mandatory for life;

inasmuch as some criminal tendencies are currently ineradicable.

Part V

The research project proposed in this paper underscores the

urgency of the need for reform of the United States criminal justice

system. The United States has more prisoners per capita than virtually

any other country. Mandatory sentencing together with privatization


of the prison system means that criminals who pose no threat to the

social fabric become wards of the state in inhumane conditions at the

expense of taxpayers (New York Times, July 13, 2015). A year in prison

may in some cases cost more than a year at Harvard. Cutting funds

for prisoners’ continuing education and other instruments of rehabili-

tation exacerbates recidivism and robs society of prisoners’ potential

contributions to society. Michelle Alexander (2012) and Angela Davis

(2012, 2005) have documented the inequity of the United States

criminal justice system for African Americans and other minorities. A

society that does not act in every manner possible consonant with the

four evolutionary principles to advance ethical behavior, is acting

against its own survival.

The history of humanity is at its root a history of liberation, fol-

lowing the four evolutionary principles for survival and flourishing:

expand the size of one’s group, increase the power of its bonding

principles, ensure the excellence of every member of the group, and

work toward the maximum genetic, linguistic and cultural diversity

of the group. Humanity’s capacity to follow these four principles has

always been a function of its technological prowess. It is only in recent

history that women’s capacities to achieve excellence in virtually all

fields of endeavor have been recognized. The abolition of slavery in

the past two centuries acknowledges the capacities of all humans to

achieve excellence. This paper argues for the recognition of criminals’

capacities to achieve excellence in their contributions to the social

fabric—within the technical constraints of their respective societies.

Conclusion

This project for the reform of the United States criminal justice

system requires a foundation comprised of research on the full spec-

trum of African ethics. African philosophers with PhDs from Euro-

American institutions, such as Kwame Gyekye, Kwasi Wiredu,

Kwame Appiah and Segun Gbadegesin, have done extensive research

on Akan and Yoruba ethical models. Researchers too numerous to

mention have published work on other middle and southern African

ethical concepts such as ubuntu (Gade, 2012, 2011; Eze 2010; Ramose

1999). The ancient African emphasis on harmony is compatible with


the more recent African emphasis on the networks of mutuality

expressed across Bantu ethics. An ethical system based on the “ancient

African emphasis on harmony” will also profit from African examples

of restorative justice in the cases of the truth and reconciliation

commissions in South Africa and Rwanda. In the best case, research

into African ethics will be complemented with that of Africana

scholars such as Frantz Fanon, Aimé Cesaire, W.E.B. Du Bois and

Alain Locke. Martin Luther King, Jr., presents perhaps the best inti-

mation of what an ethics for the African Union’s next fifty years

should embody: “all mankind is tied together; all life is interrelated,

and we are all caught in an inescapable network of mutuality, tied in

a single garment of destiny. Whatever affects one directly, affects all

indirectly” (King, 1965).

Finally, Ancient Egyptian ethics might inspire researchers to

examine ethical principles through scientific as well as philosophical

lenses (Verharen et al., 2013). Ancient Egyptian philosophies found

ethics to be inseparable from the structure of the universe. Contem-

porary psychologists and biologists imagine that our capacity to be

ethical is comparable to our capacities to learn languages and to be

rational (Verharen et al. 2013a, 2013b; Joyce, 2001, 2006; Haidt, 2007;

Hauser, 2006).

Virtually every human is born with the capacity to learn any of

the approximately 7,000 languages still spoken on the planet. Virtually

every human is born with the capacity to be rational. The capacity to

exercise ethical, linguistic and rational behaviour is innate, conveyed

from our ancestors through our genes. The particular expression of

these capacities is a function of the social environments into which we

are born. Failure to develop these capacities is not to be explained by

‘falls from grace’ or ‘ill will’ or ‘evil spirit possession’, but rather

through variant genetic developments or blunt force head trauma

(psychopathy), self-destructive socialization (sociopathy), or bio-geo-

graphical constraints.

Humans have been extraordinarily successful in our dramatic

rise from a bare handful some 200,000 years ago to over 7 billion

strong today. In The Social Conquest of the Earth, E.O. Wilson (2010)

attributes our advance in part to an altruism that is essential to our

biological nature. Humans are “eusocial,” like very few other species


on the planet (Wilson, 2012). This term indicates that in the very best

of circumstances we are capable of sacrificing our own self-interest for

the sake of our group. In The Better Angels of our Nature: Why Violence

Has Declined, Stephen Pinker claims that humans have exhibited

continual moral progress (2011; see also Wrangham, 2004). Violence

has declined dramatically, he argues, as our definitions of ‘our group’

have grown to include all humans, not simply those to whom we are

most closely connected through genes, language and culture.

Ancient African thinkers speculated that ‘doing the right thing’ is

something that comes naturally to humans. And what comes naturally

is in turn a gift of nature. Contemporary research efforts to merge

ethics with the sciences of nature may give us an extraordinary im-

petus to reexamine the experience of our African ancestors, in search-

ing for new ways to ensure that we pass the gift of life on to our

children’s children.

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List of Contributors

Dr. Anke Graness is Elise Richter Fellow at the chair of

Philosophy in a Global World/ Intercultural Philosophy at the Depart-

ment of Philosophy, University of Vienna, Austria. She is the author

of "Das menschliche Minimum. Globale Gerechtigkeit aus afrikanis-

cher Sicht: Henry Odera Oruka," (Frankfurt/New York: Campus,

2011). She has also co-edited (with K. Kresse) an anthology on the

Kenyan philosopher, Henry Odera Oruka: "Sagacious Reasoning. H.

Odera Oruka in Memoriam," (Frankfurt/M.: Peter Lang Verlag, 1997)

and a book on Intercultural Philosophy: "Perspektiven interkul-

turellen Philosophierens. Beiträge zur Geschichte und Methodik von

Polylogen" (Wien: Facultas/WUV, 2012) with F. Gmainer-Pranzl. Gra-

ness has published a number of articles in peer reviewed journals on

African philosophy, intercultural philosophy, and global justice. Her

research interests include history of philosophy, ethics, political philo-

sophy, and feminist theory. Anke Graness is currently project leader

of a FWF funded research project on the History of Philosophy in

Africa at the University of Vienna.

T.D. Harper-Shipman, M.A., is a Doctoral Candidate in Political

Science at the University of Connecticut. Her two fields of study are

Comparative Politics and International Relations. She is interested,

specifically, in the various political economies of development in

Africa. Her current research examines how the contemporary devel-

opment paradigm reproduces the underdeveloped subject in Burkina

Faso and Kenya.

Dr. J.P. Afam Ifedi lectures in various Political Science areas at

both Howard and Lincoln Universities. He has published extensively

in various scholarly peer reviewed journals in Political Science and

has co-edited two books on U.S. Foreign Policy. He has undertaken

many political consulting assignments on election monitoring and

democracy development in Eastern Europe, especially Kosovo and

Bosnia-i-Herzgovina, under the auspices of the Organization for

Security and Cooperation in Europe (OSCE) and the U.S. State

Department. Dr. Ifedi is also the Executive Director of the Council on

African World Affairs, an organization dedicated to educating the

public on African world issues.

216 List of Contributors

Dr. Grivas Muchineripi Kayange holds a Ph.D. in Philosophy

from the Gregorian Pontifical University, Rome, Italy. He is the

current Head of Philosophy Department at Chancellor College,

University of Malawi. His main research interest is the logical relation

between theories/policies and practice in African ethics, language,

politics, religion and natural science. Some of his publications include:

“Modern Nationalistic-Ideological Philosophy: Its Controversial

Development in Malawi” Journal of African Philosophy (2012); “AU-

ICC-Malawi Conflict: An Analysis of Malawi’s Position and its Impli-

cations” JH (2013); “Understanding the Semantics of Chewa Proverbs

in the Light of Contemporary Philosophy of Language” Journal of

African Cultural Studies (2014); “Marginalisation of Persons with Dis-

abilities in Metaphorical Conceptualisation” Disabilities in Africa,

Kenya (2016); and “Existence and Needs: A Case for the Equal Moral

Considerability of Nonhuman Animals” Bangladesh Journal of Bioethics

(2016).

Dr. Rianna Oelofsen is a senior lecturer at the University of Fort

Hare in the Eastern Cape, South Africa. She was the secretary for the

International Society for African Philosophy and Studies (ISAPS)

(2014-2016). She is also secretary for the South African Centre of

Phenomenology (SACP), launched in 2012. Oelofsen’s publications

include “Group Responsibility in the Aftermath of Apartheid” South

African Journal of Philosophy, Vol. 27: 4 (2008); “De- and Rehumani-

zation in the Wake of Atrocities” South African Journal of Philosophy,

Vol. 28: 2 (2009); “Afro-Communitarian Forgiveness and the Concept

of Reconciliation” South African Journal of Philosophy, Vol. 34: 3 (2015);

“Decolonization of the African Mind and Intellectual Landscape”

Phronimon, Vol. 16: 2 (2015), 130-146; and “Afro-communitarianism,

Justice and Reconciliation” Theoria, No 146, (March 2016).

Dr. Grace Umezurike, is a senior lecturer with the department of

Philosophy and Religion, Ebonyi state University Abakaliki, Ebonyi

State, Nigeria. Her research interest is socio-political philosophy.

Dr. Laura Roost is an Assistant Professor of Political Science amd

the Political Science Program Coordinator at Newberry College,

U.S.A. Her research interests include feminist political theory, gender

and transitional justice, and women's rights/ human rights.

List of Contributors 217

M. Zakaria Asmal is a Ph.D. candidate at the University of Cape

Town’s Department of Religious Studies. His research interests lie at

the intersection of political sociology and religious studies and how

these relate to Africana philosophy and the religious philosophy of

social transformation within the context of postcolonial societies and

the lived experiences of anti-black racism. His dissertation focuses on

conceptions of religion as theories of praxis in apartheid, colonized,

and racialized settings. His research on Steve Biko shows how Biko's

conception of religion links to broader currents in Africana philoso-

phy, especially W.E.B Du Bois’ notion of double consciousness and

Frantz Fanon’s imploring for a decolonized methodology in post-

colonial practical theory. This critically analyzes the scope of religion

as a possible catalyst for social change in the fight against anti-black

racism. Zakaria is currently a researcher at the Network for Religion

Education at the University of Cape Town on a project aimed at

informing policy formulation and educational goals in the teaching of

religion in state schools in the post-apartheid setting. Zakaria holds an

Honours in International Relations and a Masters in South African

and Comparative Politics from the University of Cape Town.

Professor Charles C. Verharen is currently serving his fiftieth

year in the Howard University Department of Philosophy.He has

written Rationality in Philosophy and Science (Lanman: University Press

of America, 1983) and co-edited African Philosophy in Ethiopia (Council

for Research on Values and Philosophy, 2012) with Professor Bekele

Gutema, Addis Ababa University department of philosophy. He has

published numerous refereed articles in such journals as: Philosophia

Africana, Philosophical Forum, Présence Africaine, African Journal of

Science, Technology, Innovation and Development, Ethiopian Journal of

Social Sciences and Humanities, Phronimon, Journal of Negro Education,

Journal of Black Studies, and the Western Journal of Black Studies, Social-

ism and Democracy. He has recently completed Beginning Philosophy:

From Ancient Africa to Our World, and is now comparing the philoso-

phies of education of Nietzsche and Du Bois.

Index

A

Abraham Lincoln, 45

African Alternative Framework

to Structural Adjustment

Programs for Socio-Economic

Recovery and Transformation

AAF-SAP, 136

African culture, 120, 161, 177

African global diaspora, 3, 85

African languages, 93, 108

African populism, 4, 180, 182,

186-189, 191, 194, 199

African populist thought, 187

African traditional society, 112,

113

Africana existentialist

philosophy, 70, 77, 83, 85

Africana philosophy, 70, 72, 77,

85, 217

Afro-Christian religion, 84

Afro-communitarian, 4, 159-163,

166-170, 174, 176, 177

Afro-communitarianism, 2, 4,

159-161, 166, 168, 170, 216

agricultural, 13, 17, 19, 25, 142,

204

Aimé Cesaire, 211

allocentrics, 172

Amílcar Cabral, 87, 91, 97

Ancient Egyptian, 3, 5, 203, 205,

206, 211, 213

Angola, 88, 101

anti-black, 70, 73, 77, 79, 81, 83,

85, 217

anti-colonial discourse, 3, 85

apartheid, 2, 69, 70-72, 83, 84, 92,

114, 165-167, 174, 217

Aristotle, 109-111, 114, 119, 125,

127

Arusha, 5, 180, 194

atrocity

atrocities, 21, 180, 182, 187, 190-

192, 197, 200, 201

B

biodiversity, 9, 10, 13, 18, 25

Black Consciousness

BC, 71

BC cultural revival project,

69

black selfhood, 71, 74, 77

Black Theology, 70, 72, 78, 80, 81,

84, 85, 100

business ethics, 124, 126

C

Cabo Verde, 88

capitalism, 89, 91, 152

Care ethics, 184, 191

Christianity, 2, 69, 70, 78, 79, 80,

81, 82, 83, 84, 205

civil society, 43, 44, 51, 138, 139,

147

civil war, 87, 88, 89, 98, 201

climate, 9, 18, 185

Cold War, 98, 141, 143

collective harmony, 203, 206

colonial perspectives, 75, 76

colonialism, 2, 3, 69, 72, 76, 79, 80,

83, 89, 90, 102, 103, 120, 133,

138, 141, 144, 152, 153, 167, 175

colonization

colonized, 70, 75, 76, 81-85, 217

communitarian ideology

communitarian, 107

220 Index

communitarian values, 107, 121

communities, 5, 10, 22, 23, 27, 29,

32, 33, 35, 36, 64, 94, 96, 121,

136, 146, 160, 179

community, 24, 27, 32, 33, 41, 43,

45, 61, 91-97, 102, 107-120, 123-

125, 132, 138, 142-147, 160-164,

168, 171, 175, 176, 179, 180, 184,

186, 187, 192-200, 206, 208

Comprehensive Development

Framework

CDF, 4, 131, 133, 152, 155, 156

Comprehensive Development

Strategy, 138

conflict, 12, 13, 17, 19, 21, 29, 35,

37, 89, 170-172, 176, 179, 180,

191, 195, 196, 201, 202

conflicts, 10, 13, 88, 194

constitution, 31, 44-47, 56, 57, 60-

62

corporate entities, 3, 107-109, 121-

125

corporate governance, 107, 108,

124

corruption, 56, 89, 103, 107, 123,

124, 146, 198

crisis, 13, 17, 18, 32, 36, 143, 156

cultural, 12, 15, 69, 70-72, 76, 78-

80, 82, 83, 87, 91, 95, 96, 111,

124, 126, 144, 152, 162, 167, 173,

175, 190, 206, 210

cultural dichotomization, 79

culture, 52, 64, 65, 127, 154

D

decolonization

decolonized, 70, 75, 76, 81, 82,

84, 85, 217

democracy, 44-46, 49, 50, 52, 55,

57, 63, 88-90, 97-99, 103, 148,

154, 188-190, 199-202, 215

democratization, 141, 146, 186,

188, 189

Descartes, 111, 115, 119, 126

Desmond Tutu, 111-113, 160, 165,

169

Tutu, 114, 128, 160, 161, 165,

177

development, 1, 4, 12, 14-17, 31,

34, 36, 37, 43, 45, 49, 52, 59, 71,

72, 91, 99, 102, 105, 107, 114,

120, 124, 131-135, 137-149, 151-

156, 161, 176, 182, 183, 186, 188,

189, 190, 192, 197, 198, 201, 205,

212, 213, 215

developmental, 2, 12, 14, 17, 45,

54, 63, 131, 134, 145

developmental challenges, 2

dichotomized, 186, 191, 193, 195

dictatorship, 57, 63

discrimination, 194, 197, 198

disease, 5, 24

disempowerment, 146, 148, 200

disenfranchised

disenfranchise, 78

diversity, 161, 162, 206, 210

dollarocracy, 89

double consciousness, 70, 73-75,

78-83, 85

Du Bois, 3, 73-77, 80, 82-85, 98,

217

E

ecological, 9-14, 17, 18, 21, 22, 25,

36, 37, 93

economic, 2, 4, 10, 15-19, 30, 32,

37, 45, 63, 72, 89, 91, 92, 103,

117, 124, 125, 131-135, 138, 140-

157, 165, 166, 173, 181, 186, 187,

189, 191, 193, 194, 197-199

ecosystem, 9, 10, 15, 18, 22-26

Index 221

education, 14, 47, 48, 54, 62, 76,

87, 89, 139, 144, 174, 202, 210,

213, 217

egalitarian, 49, 57, 92

elections, 45-49, 53, 54, 88, 98, 103

environment, 2, 12-19, 23, 26, 30,

31, 37, 140, 171, 172

environmental, 4, 9-18, 20, 21, 23,

26, 29, 30, 31, 35-37, 108, 136

environmental degradation, 12,

14, 15, 18, 144

environmental justice, 10-16, 36,

37

environmental sustainability, 152

equality, 30, 44, 57, 58, 95, 97, 174,

202

ethical principles, 187, 211

ethical thinking, 186

ethics, 3-5, 93, 97, 102, 107- 111,

113, 114, 119, 124-126, 159, 160,

179, 182-189, 191, 194, 199, 201,

202, 204, 207, 210-216

ethnic, 12, 13, 29, 30, 33, 137, 138,

141, 155, 167, 198

ethnography, 11

ethnophilosophy, 100

ethno-theology, 100

European libertarian socialism, 97

eusocial, 212

existential condition, 77, 83

F

farming, 10, 18, 24, 142

crops, 24, 25, 27, 28, 40, 142

federalism, 97, 98

feminist philosophy, 182

financial, 37, 46, 60, 131, 136, 138,

145, 146, 150, 151, 190, 193, 194,

197

fishing, 10, 18, 24

aquatic life, 24

food security, 27, 142, 155

foreign aid, 131, 134, 136, 140,

147, 149, 153

Foreign investment, 190

forgiveness, 4, 163, 166, 174, 177

Frantz Fanon, 70, 71, 86, 211, 217

Franz Fanon

Fanon, 3, 71, 74-77, 81-85, 134,

153, 154, 165, 167, 176

free will, 5, 94, 206, 208

freedom, 3, 44, 45, 60, 63, 87, 91,

92, 94, 95, 97, 99, 102, 103, 189

Frelimo, 89, 97, 98

futurology, 100, 101

G

gacaca, 179, 180, 181, 191, 192, 195,

196, 198, 200

Gaia, 109, 112

gender inequality, 54

genetic, 205, 206, 208, 209, 210,

211

genocide, 179, 180, 181, 182, 191,

192, 194, 195, 197, 198, 200, 201,

204

global, 9

government, 2, 14, 22, 25, 29-34,

36, 38, 44-53, 55- 62, 64, 89, 97,

99, 107, 139, 140, 141, 150, 181,

184, 195, 196

Greenland Justice Mandate, 19,

20, 29, 35

Guinea-Bissau, 88, 103

H

Hammurabi, 205

harmony, 5, 91, 111, 112, 123, 162,

163, 176, 205, 206, 211

health, 9-12, 14, 15, 18, 23-26, 36,

37, 47, 51, 139, 140, 142, 162,

175, 207, 208

222 Index

health damage, 12

healthcare, 89

Hegel, 90, 119, 126

Herodotus, 44

Hillel Steiner, 92

human dignity, 93, 161, 165, 185

human health, 1

human person, 43, 50

human rights, 13, 14, 17, 49, 50,

52, 56, 148, 162, 176, 180, 201,

216

humanization, 4, 163, 166, 167,

168, 169

I

ICC, 180, 216

ICTR, 5, 179, 180, 181, 188, 191,

193, 194, 195, 200

identity, 30, 77, 83, 87, 112, 159,

162, 167, 168, 170, 172-175, 181

identity transformation, 159, 175

ideological, 14, 100, 132

idiocentric, 171

indigenous culture, 75, 79

indigenous customs, 79, 83

indigenous perspective, 76, 82

individual, 3, 5, 16, 45, 50, 51, 53,

55, 59, 61, 89, 91, 92, 94, 96, 100,

102, 107-109, 111-120, 123, 125,

160, 162-164, 167, 170, 171, 175,

176, 181, 203, 204, 206

industry, 14, 18, 35, 37, 51, 142

inequality, 95

inferiority, 143, 144, 165, 167, 168

interdependence, 159, 183, 186,

191

International Criminal Tribunal

for Rwanda

ICTR, 5, 179

International Monetary Fund

IMF, 131, 132

Islam, 205

J

John Locke

Locke, 2, 43, 52, 53, 58, 65

José P. Castiano

Castiano, 99, 105

Judaism, 205

Julius Nyerere

Nyerere, 113

justice, 1, 4, 5, 10, 12-17, 21, 24, 30,

34, 36, 37, 59, 63, 83, 87, 94, 95,

97, 99, 100, 103, 106, 109, 111,

148, 163-166, 176, 179-182, 184,

186-203, 206-210, 215, 216

K

Kamuzu Banda, 124

Kenneth Kaunda

Kaunda, 113

Kenya, 21, 42, 141, 142, 215, 216

L

Lagos Plan of Action for

Economic Development in

Africa

Lagos Plan of Action, 135

legal, 89, 91, 94, 179-183, 186, 187,

189-191, 193-199

legislature, 50, 59, 60, 62

liberal democracy, 49

liberation, 2, 69, 70-72, 75-77, 82,

84-90, 98, 100, 101, 210

libertarian paradigm, 3, 90, 91, 98,

102

libertarianism, 3, 91, 92, 106

libertarian, 3, 90, 91, 97, 98, 102

linguistic, 11, 87, 206, 210, 211

Literacy, 144

Lucius Outlaw, 77

Index 223

Lusophone African philosophy,

87, 90

M

Malawi, 107, 111, 116, 118, 121,

123, 124, 125, 126, 127, 128, 216

Marxism, 88, 102

Mesopotamian, 5

Metz, 107, 110, 112, 114, 115, 127,

159, 161, 177

missionaries, 70, 78, 79, 80, 82, 83

moral responsibility, 94, 164

Mozambican philosophy, 87

Mozambique, 87, 88, 89, 96, 98,

99, 100, 104

multicultural society, 162

N

natural disasters, 140

natural resource, 140

natural resources, 14-18, 91

neocolonial, 132

neo-colonialism, 3, 90

neoliberal, 4, 131, 132, 133, 134,

135, 140, 143, 144, 149, 151, 152

neo-liberal, 89

neoliberalism, 132, 134, 149, 153,

154

neo-patrimonialism, 137, 138

neuroscience, 203, 206, 208

New Economic Partnership for

Africa’s Development

NEPAD, 135

Niger Delta, 9-26, 29-42

Nigeria, 9, 10, 13-19, 22-32, 34, 36-

44, 46-48, 53, 55-58, 60, 62-65,

200, 216

Nkrumah, 98, 135, 155

non-violent, 203

Nyerere, 107, 127, 135, 155

O

Obasanjo, 46, 47, 60

oil, 11-12, 14-16, 18-23, 26-28, 30-

33, 35-37, 39, 40, 41, 47, 119

oil companies, 14-16, 19, 20, 23,

25, 26, 32, 33, 36

oil spills, 24, 25, 26, 31

Ossip K. Flechtheim

Flechtheim, 101

P

pathology, 208, 209

peace, 9, 10, 31, 34, 36, 40, 42, 55,

88, 92, 97, 100, 114, 141, 148,

154, 159, 172, 202

Pericles of Athens, 45

personhood, 4, 159, 160, 161, 163,

164, 165, 167, 169, 170, 172, 174

Peter Mutharika, 124

petroleum, 22, 47

Philippe van Parijs, 92

physical development, 9

Plato, 43, 101, 105, 109, 110, 119,

128

policies, 10, 14, 35, 37, 48, 99, 131,

138, 139, 143, 145, 149, 150, 157,

197, 216

political godfather, 55

political justice, 2

Political liberty, 59

political participation, 43-49, 52-

57, 61, 63, 64

political philosophy, 50, 56, 87,

88, 91, 92, 215, 216

political power, 51, 53, 58, 59, 64,

154

political socialization, 54

political society, 49, 50, 51, 52

political theory, 46, 60, 113, 182,

216

politico-economic, 87

224 Index

pollution, 11, 23-25, 31, 40, 108

population, 10, 14, 18, 30, 31, 36,

76, 98, 144, 147, 166, 185, 188,

198, 200, 204, 208

postcolonial, 3, 69, 70, 87, 89, 93,

107, 113, 131, 132, 133, 134, 144,

145, 150, 151, 175, 217

Postcolonial, 19, 39, 137, 138, 141

poverty, 4, 9, 17, 31, 36, 48, 56, 80,

81, 84, 89, 94, 136, 138-140, 144,

148, 150-152, 155, 194, 198

poverty reduction, 138, 140, 150,

151

prison, 171-172, 203, 207-210

prison systems, 209

private sector, 138, 139, 150

privatization, 149, 204, 210

proverbs, 116, 117, 118, 119, 120,

121, 122, 123

proverb, 116-121

psychiatry, 209

psychological, 69, 70, 144, 167,

175, 181, 182, 194

psychology, 169, 170, 172, 176,

209, 212

R

races, 168

racial oppression, 69, 77

racialized, 69, 76, 217

racism, 81, 84, 103, 217

rebellion, 29, 62, 78

reconciliation, 4, 92, 97, 100, 101,

147, 159, 160, 163, 165-170, 172,

174-177, 196, 200, 201, 211

relationships, 93, 137, 159, 162,

164, 166, 168, 169, 182, 183, 186

religio-culture, 69, 70, 78, 79, 82-

84

religion, 2, 52, 69, 70-72, 78, 81-85,

97, 216, 217

Renamo, 89, 98

renewable natural resources, 9, 18

responsibility, 3, 4, 21, 24, 29, 50,

87, 92-96, 99, 102, 103, 108, 111,

120, 123, 124, 133, 136, 142, 145,

148, 163, 165, 166, 184, 187, 203,

206, 208

restorative justice, 165, 166, 211

revenue, 10, 31, 34, 35

revolution, 30, 40, 52, 61, 62, 101,

137, 146

rights, 12, 14-17, 19-21, 30, 31, 35,

37, 43, 49, 57, 61, 63, 91, 92, 141,

182, 183, 185, 216

rule of law, 51, 52, 56, 57, 64

Rwanda, 3, 4, 179, 180, 181, 182,

191, 192, 194, 195, 196, 197, 198,

199, 200, 202, 211

S

Samora Machel, 97

São Tomé and Príncipe, 88

school, 197

sea encroachments, 11

self-control, 116, 118

self-determination, 15, 34-37, 43

self-esteem, 165

self-reliance, 116-119

self-responsibility, 117, 118

Severino Elias Ngoenha

Ngoenha, 2, 3, 87, 102, 104, 106

slavery, 3, 77, 90, 210

social cognitive theory, 57

social, economic, 2, 9, 13

socialism, 88, 89, 97, 127, 153, 155

socialization, 54, 55, 208, 209, 211

societal fabric, 206, 208

socioeconomic, 131

Socrates, 119

Index 225

South Africa, 69, 71, 80, 90, 92, 93,

106, 114, 124, 168, 169, 170, 174,

190, 200, 201, 211, 212, 216

sovereignty of the people, 49, 52,

64

St. Augustine, 44

Structural Adjustment Programs

SAPs, 133

subsistence, 17, 18, 24

superiority, 82, 165, 167, 168

sustainability, 93

sustainable development, 49, 51,

139

T

Tanzania, 5, 180

teleology, 70, 77, 84, 85

Thabo Mbeki, 103

Thadeus Metz

Metz, 109

The Code of Hammurabi, 208

the rule of law, 49, 50-52, 57, 58,

148, 203

trade liberalization, 150

trade relations, 143

transitional justice, 4, 179-182,

186-191, 193, 194, 197-199

transparency, 50, 139, 148

Truth and Reconciliation

Commission

TRC, 165, 200

U

ubuntu, 3, 87, 92, 93, 107-115, 120,

124-126, 160-163, 168, 169, 211

Ubuntu ethics, 108, 120

umunthu, 111, 112, 113

unconventional political

participation, 45

underdevelopment, 56, 138, 143,

145, 148

United Nations, 16, 21, 25, 26, 38,

39, 42, 156, 188

universalism, 94

urban, 10, 136

Ur-Nammu, 205

utilitarian, 109

utopia, 100, 101, 105, 106

V

vengeance, 5, 203-208

victims/survivors, 179-181, 187,

188, 190, 192, 194, 195, 197, 200

villages, 10

violence, 9, 10, 17, 20, 30, 35-37,

46, 48, 53-55, 89, 137, 140, 198,

201, 204

virtue, 3, 60, 107-111, 113-115,

119, 122-125, 163, 168, 174

virtue ethics, 3, 107-110, 113, 124

virtues and vices, 115, 120, 121

W

W.E.B. Du Bois, 70, 211

Wa Thiong’o, 135, 156, 175

Wangari Maathai, 2, 4, 131, 132,

133, 134, 136

Maathai, 4, 132-137, 141-154

weather, 11

Western interests, 186, 187, 188,

190, 191

white normativity, 74, 76, 83

World Bank, 4, 131-135, 138-140,

145, 146, 148, 150, 152-157, 201

world economic system, 138

Z

Zambia, 107

Zimbabwe, 127

The Council for Research in

Values and Philosophy

Purpose

Today there is urgent need to attend to the nature and dignity of the

person, to the quality of human life, to the purpose and goal of the physical transformation of our environment, and to the relation of all this to the

development of social and political life. This, in turn, requires philosophic clarification of the base upon which freedom is exercised, that is, of the values which provide stability and guidance to one’s decisions.

Such studies must be able to reach deeply into one’s culture and that of other parts of the world as mutually reinforcing and enriching in order to uncover the roots of the dignity of persons and of their societies. They must

be able to identify the conceptual forms in terms of which modern industrial and technological developments are structured and how these impact upon

human self-understanding. Above all, they must be able to bring these elements together in the creative understanding essential for setting our goals and determining our modes of interaction. In the present complex global

circumstances this is a condition for growing together with trust and justice, honest dedication and mutual concern.

The Council for Research in Values and Philosophy (RVP) unites

scholars who share these concerns and are interested in the application thereto of existing capabilities in the field of philosophy and other disciplines. Its work is to identify areas in which study is needed, the intellectual resources

which can be brought to bear thereupon, and the means for publication and interchange of the work from the various regions of the world. In bringing

these together its goal is scientific discovery and publication which contri-butes to the present promotion of humankind.

In sum, our times present both the need and the opportunity for deeper

and ever more progressive understanding of the person and of the foundations of social life. The development of such understanding is the goal of the RVP.

Projects

A set of related research efforts is currently in process: 1. Cultural Heritage and Contemporary Change: Philosophical Founda-

tions for Social Life. Focused, mutually coordinated research teams in uni-

versity centers prepare volumes as part of an integrated philosophic search for self-understanding differentiated by culture and civilization. These evolve more adequate understandings of the person in society and look to the cultural

heritage of each for the resources to respond to the challenges of its own specific contemporary transformation.

Council for Research in Values and Philosophy 227

2. Seminars on Culture and Contemporary Issues. This series of 5 to 10

week cross-cultural and interdisciplinary seminars is coordinated by the RVP in Washington.

3. Joint-Colloquia with Institutes of Philosophy of the National Acade-mies of Science, university philosophy departments, and societies. Underway

since 1976 in Eastern Europe and, since 1987, in China, these concern the person in contemporary society.

4. Foundations of Moral Education and Character Development. A study

in values and education which unites philosophers, psychologists, social scientists and scholars in education in the elaboration of ways of enriching the moral content of education and character development. This work has

been underway since 1980. The personnel for these projects consists of established scholars willing

to contribute their time and research as part of their professional commitment to life in contemporary society. For resources to implement this work the Council, as 501 C3 a non-profit organization incorporated in the District of

Columbia, looks to various private foundations, public programs and enter-prises.

Publications on Cultural Heritage and Contemporary Change Series I. Culture and Values

Series II. African Philosophical Studies Series IIA. Islamic Philosophical Studies

Series III. Asian Philosophical Studies Series IV. Western European Philosophical Studies Series IVA. Central and Eastern European Philosophical Studies

Series V. Latin American Philosophical Studies Series VI. Foundations of Moral Education Series VII. Seminars: Culture and Values

Series VIII. Christian Philosophical Studies

**********************************************************

Cultural Heritage and Contemporary Change

Series I. Culture and Values I.1 Research on Culture and Values: Intersection of Universities, Churches

and Nations. George F. McLean, ed. ISBN 0819173533 (paper). I.2 The Knowledge of Values: A Methodological Introduction to the Study of

Values. A. Lopez Quintas, ed. ISBN 081917419x (paper).

228 Publications

I.3 Reading Philosophy for the XXIst Century. George F. McLean, ed. ISBN

0819174157 (paper). I.4 Relations between Cultures. John A. Kromkowski, ed. ISBN 1565180089

(paper). I.5 Urbanization and Values. John A. Kromkowski, ed. ISBN 1565180100

(paper). I.6 The Place of the Person in Social Life. Paul Peachey and John A. Krom-

kowski, eds. ISBN 1565180127 (paper).

I.7 Abrahamic Faiths, Ethnicity and Ethnic Conflicts. Paul Peachey, George F. McLean and John A. Kromkowski, eds. ISBN 1565181042 (paper).

I.8 Ancient Western Philosophy: The Hellenic Emergence. George F. McLean

and Patrick J. Aspell, eds. ISBN 156518100X (paper). I.9 Medieval Western Philosophy: The European Emergence. Patrick J.

Aspell, ed. ISBN 1565180941 (paper). I.10 The Ethical Implications of Unity and the Divine in Nicholas of Cusa.

David L. De Leonardis. ISBN 1565181123 (paper).

I.11 Ethics at the Crossroads: 1. Normative Ethics and Objective Reason. George F. McLean, ed. ISBN 1565180224 (paper).

I.12 Ethics at the Crossroads: 2. Personalist Ethics and Human Subjectivity.

George F. McLean, ed. ISBN 1565180240 (paper). I.13 The Emancipative Theory of Jürgen Habermas and Metaphysics. Robert

Badillo. ISBN 1565180429 (paper).

I.14 The Deficient Cause of Moral Evil According to Thomas Aquinas. Edward Cook. ISBN 1565180704 (paper).

I.15 Human Love: Its Meaning and Scope, a Phenomenology of Gift and En-counter. Alfonso Lopez Quintas. ISBN 1565180747 (paper).

I.16 Civil Society and Social Reconstruction. George F. McLean, ed. ISBN

1565180860 (paper). I.17 Ways to God, Personal and Social at the Turn of Millennia: The Iqbal

Lecture, Lahore. George F. McLean. ISBN 1565181239 (paper).

I.18 The Role of the Sublime in Kant’s Moral Metaphysics. John R. Goodreau. ISBN 1565181247 (paper).

I.19 Philosophical Challenges and Opportunities of Globalization. Oliva Blanchette, Tomonobu Imamichi and George F. McLean, eds. ISBN 1565181298 (paper).

I.20 Faith, Reason and Philosophy: Lectures at The al-Azhar, Qom, Tehran, Lahore and Beijing; Appendix: The Encyclical Letter: Fides et Ratio. George F. McLean. ISBN 156518130 (paper).

I.21 Religion and the Relation between Civilizations: Lectures on Coopera-tion between Islamic and Christian Cultures in a Global Horizon. George F. McLean. ISBN 1565181522 (paper).

I.22 Freedom, Cultural Traditions and Progress: Philosophy in Civil Society and Nation Building, Tashkent Lectures, 1999. George F. McLean. ISBN

1565181514 (paper).


I.23 Ecology of Knowledge. Jerzy A. Wojciechowski. ISBN 1565181581

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I.25 Reason, Rationality and Reasonableness, Vietnamese Philosophical Stu-dies, I. Tran Van Doan. ISBN 1565181662 (paper).

I.26 The Culture of Citizenship: Inventing Postmodern Civic Culture. Thom-

as Bridges. ISBN 1565181689 (paper). I.27 The Historicity of Understanding and the Problem of Relativism in Ga-

damer’s Philosophical Hermeneutics. Osman Bilen. ISBN 1565181670

(paper). I.28 Speaking of God. Carlo Huber. ISBN 1565181697 (paper).

I.29 Persons, Peoples and Cultures in a Global Age: Metaphysical Bases for Peace between Civilizations. George F. McLean. ISBN 1565181875 (paper).

I.30 Hermeneutics, Tradition and Contemporary Change: Lectures in Chennai/Madras, India. George F. McLean. ISBN 1565181883 (paper).

I.31 Husserl and Stein. Richard Feist and William Sweet, eds. ISBN 156518

1948 (paper). I.32 Paul Hanly Furfey’s Quest for a Good Society. Bronislaw Misztal,

Francesco Villa, and Eric Sean Williams, eds. ISBN 1565182278 (paper).

I.33 Three Theories of Society. Paul Hanly Furfey. ISBN 9781565182288 (paper).

I.34 Building Peace in Civil Society: An Autobiographical Report from a Believers’ Church. Paul Peachey. ISBN 9781565182325 (paper).

I.35 Karol Wojtyla's Philosophical Legacy. Agnes B. Curry, Nancy Mardas

and George F. McLean, eds. ISBN 9781565182479 (paper). I.36 Kantian Imperatives and Phenomenology’s Original Forces. Randolph

C. Wheeler. ISBN 9781565182547 (paper).

I.37 Beyond Modernity: The Recovery of Person and Community in Global Times: Lectures in China and Vietnam. George F. McLean. ISBN 9781

565182578 (paper) I.38 Religion and Culture. George F. McLean. ISBN 9781565182561

(paper).

I.39 The Dialogue of Cultural Traditions: Global Perspective. William Sweet, George F. McLean, Tomonobu Imamichi, Safak Ural, O. Faruk Akyol, eds. ISBN 9781565182585 (paper).

I.40 Unity and Harmony, Love and Compassion in Global Times. George F. McLean. ISBN 9781565182592 (paper).

I.41 Intercultural Dialogue and Human Rights. Luigi Bonanate, Roberto

Papini and William Sweet, eds. ISBN 9781565182714 (paper). I.42 Philosophy Emerging from Culture. William Sweet, George F. McLean,

Oliva Blanchette, Wonbin Park, eds. ISBN 9781565182851 (paper).

230 Publications

I.43 Whence Intelligibility? Louis Perron, ed. ISBN 9781565182905 (paper). I.44 What Is Intercultural Philosophy? William Sweet, ed. ISBN 978156518

2912 (paper).

I.45 Romero’s Legacy 2: Faith in the City: Poverty, Politics, and Peace-building. Foreword by Robert T. McDermott. Pilar Hogan Closkey, Kevin

Moran and John P. Hogan, eds. ISBN 9781565182981 (paper). I.46 Cultural Clash and Religion. William Sweet, ed. ISBN 9781565183100

(paper).

Series II. African Philosophical Studies

II.1 Person and Community: Ghanaian Philosophical Studies: I. Kwasi Wire-du and Kwame Gyekye, eds. ISBN 1565180046 (paper).

II.2 The Foundations of Social Life: Ugandan Philosophical Studies: I. A.T. Dalfovo, ed. ISBN 1565180062 (paper).

II.3 Identity and Change in Nigeria: Nigerian Philosophical Studies, I. Theo-

philus Okere, ed. ISBN 1565180682 (paper). II.4 Social Reconstruction in Africa: Ugandan Philosophical Studies, II. E.

Wamala, A.R. Byaruhanga, A.T. Dalfovo, J.K. Kigongo, S.A. Mwanahe-

wa and G. Tusabe, eds. ISBN 1565181182 (paper). II.5 Ghana: Changing Values/Changing Technologies: Ghanaian Philo-

sophical Studies, II. Helen Lauer, ed. ISBN 1565181441 (paper).

II.6 Sameness and Difference: Problems and Potentials in South African Civil Society: South African Philosophical Studies, I. James R. Cochrane and

Bastienne Klein, eds. ISBN 1565181557 (paper). II.7 Protest and Engagement: Philosophy after Apartheid at an Historically

Black South African University: South African Philosophical Studies, II.

Patrick Giddy, ed. ISBN 1565181638 (paper). II.8 Ethics, Human Rights and Development in Africa: Ugandan Philosophi-

cal Studies, III. A.T. Dalfovo, J.K. Kigongo, J. Kisekka, G. Tusabe, E.

Wamala, R. Munyonyo, A.B. Rukooko, A.B.T. Byaruhangaakiiki, and M. Mawa, eds. ISBN 1565181727 (paper).

II.9 Beyond Cultures: Perceiving a Common Humanity: Ghanaian Philo-sophical Studies, III. Kwame Gyekye. ISBN 156518193X (paper).

II.10 Social and Religious Concerns of East Africa: A Wajibu Anthology:

Kenyan Philosophical Studies, I. Gerald J. Wanjohi and G. Wakuraya Wanjohi, eds. ISBN 1565182219 (paper).

II.11 The Idea of an African University: The Nigerian Experience: Nigerian

Philosophical Studies, II. Joseph Kenny, ed. ISBN 9781565182301 (paper).

II.12 The Struggles after the Struggle: Zimbabwean Philosophical Studies, I.

David Kaulemu, ed. ISBN 9781565182318 (paper). II.13 Indigenous and Modern Environmental Ethics: A Study of the Indigen-

ous Oromo Environmental Ethic and Modern Issues of Environment and


Development: Ethiopian Philosophical Studies, I. Workineh Kelbessa. ISBN 9781565182530 (paper).

II.14 African Philosophy and the Future of Africa: South African Philo-

sophical Studies, III. Gerard Walmsley, ed. ISMB 9781565182707 (paper).

II.15 Philosophy in Ethiopia: African Philosophy Today, I: Ethiopian Philo-sophical Studies, II. Bekele Gutema and Charles C. Verharen, eds. ISBN 9781565182790 (paper).

II.16 The Idea of a Nigerian University: A Revisit: Nigerian Philosophical Studies, III. Olatunji Oyeshile and Joseph Kenny, eds. ISBN 978156518 2776 (paper).

II.17 Philosophy in African Traditions and Cultures: Zimbabwe Philosophi-cal Studies, II. Fainos Mangena, Tarisayi Andrea Chimuka, Francis

Mabiri, eds. ISBN 9781565182998 (paper). II.18 Universalism, Relativism, and Intercultural Philosophy: Nigerian

Philosophical Studies IV. Joseph C. Achike Agbakoba and Anthony C.

Ajah, eds. ISBN 9781565183162 (paper). II.19 An African Path to a Global Future. Rianna Oelofsen and Kola Abim-

bola, eds. ISBN 9781565183230 (paper).

II.20 Odera Oruka in the Twenty-first Century: Kenyan Philosophical Studies, II. Reginald M.J. Oduor, Oriare Nyarwath and Francis E.A. Owakah, eds. ISBN 9781565183247 (paper).

II.21 Perspectives in Social Contract Theory. Edwin E. Etieyibo, ed. ISBN 9781565183315 (paper).

II.22 Philosophy, Race and Multiculturalism in Southern Africa: Zimba-bwean Philosophical Studies, III. Fainos Mangena & John Douglas Mc-Clymont, eds. ISBN 9781565183360 (paper).

Series IIA. Islamic Philosophical Studies

IIA.1 Islam and the Political Order. Muhammad Saïd al-Ashmawy. ISBN 156518047X (paper).

IIA.2 Al-Ghazali Deliverance from Error and Mystical Union with the Almighty: Al-munqidh Min al-Dadāl. Critical Arabic edition and English translation by Muhammad Abulaylah and Nurshif Abdul-Rahim Rifat;

Introduction and notes by George F. McLean. ISBN 1565181530 (Arabic-English edition, paper), ISBN 1565180828 (Arabic edition, paper), ISBN 156518081X (English edition, paper).

IIA.3 Philosophy in Pakistan. Naeem Ahmad, ed. ISBN 1565181085 (paper). IIA.4 The Authenticity of the Text in Hermeneutics. Seyed Musa Dibadj.

ISBN 1565181174 (paper).

IIA.5 Interpretation and the Problem of the Intention of the Author: H.-G. Gadamer vs E.D. Hirsch. Burhanettin Tatar. ISBN 156518121 (paper).

232 Publications

IIA.6 Ways to God, Personal and Social at the Turn of Millennia: The Iqbal

Lectures, Lahore. George F. McLean. ISBN 1565181239 (paper). IIA.7 Faith, Reason and Philosophy: Lectures at Al-Azhar University, Qom,

Tehran, Lahore and Beijing; Appendix: The Encyclical Letter: Fides et Ratio. George F. McLean. ISBN 1565181301 (paper).

IIA.8 Islamic and Christian Cultures: Conflict or Dialogue: Bulgarian Philo-sophical Studies, III. Plament Makariev, ed. ISBN 156518162X (paper).

IIA.9 Values of Islamic Culture and the Experience of History, Russian Philo-

sophical Studies, I. Nur Kirabaev, Yuriy Pochta, eds. ISBN 1565181336 (paper).

IIA.10 Christian-Islamic Preambles of Faith. Joseph Kenny. ISBN 156518

1387 (paper). IIA.11 The Historicity of Understanding and the Problem of Relativism in

Gadamer’s Philosophical Hermeneutics. Osman Bilen. ISBN 156518 1670 (paper).

IIA.12 Religion and the Relation between Civilizations: Lectures on Coo-

peration between Islamic and Christian Cultures in a Global Horizon. George F. McLean. ISBN 1565181522 (paper).

IIA.13 Modern Western Christian Theological Understandings of Muslims

since the Second Vatican Council. Mahmut Aydin. ISBN 1565181719 (paper).

IIA.14 Philosophy of the Muslim World; Authors and Principal Themes.

Joseph Kenny. ISBN 1565181794 (paper). IIA.15 Islam and Its Quest for Peace: Jihad, Justice and Education. Mustafa

Köylü. ISBN 1565181808 (paper). IIA.16 Islamic Thought on the Existence of God: Contributions and Contrasts

with Contemporary Western Philosophy of Religion. Cafer S. Yaran.

ISBN 1565181921 (paper). IIA.17 Hermeneutics, Faith, and Relations between Cultures: Lectures in

Qom, Iran. George F. McLean. ISBN 1565181913 (paper).

IIA.18 Change and Essence: Dialectical Relations between Change and Continuity in the Turkish Intellectual Tradition. Sinasi Gunduz and Cafer

S. Yaran, eds. ISBN 1565182227 (paper). IIA.19 Understanding Other Religions: Al-Biruni and Gadamer’s “Fusion of

Horizons.” Kemal Ataman. ISBN 9781565182523 (paper).

Series III. Asian Philosophical Studies

III.1 Man and Nature: Chinese Philosophical Studies, I. Tang Yijie and Li Zhen, eds. ISBN 0819174130 (paper).

III.2 Chinese Foundations for Moral Education and Character Development:

Chinese Philosophical Studies, II. Tran van Doan, ed. ISBN 1565180321 (paper).


III.3 Confucianism, Buddhism, Taoism, Christianity and Chinese Culture:

Chinese Philosophical Studies, III. 2nd edition. Tang Yijie. ISBN 9781 565183193 (paper).

III.4 Morality, Metaphysics and Chinese Culture: Metaphysics, Culture and Morality, I. Vincent Shen and Tran van Doan, eds. ISBN 1565180275

(paper). III.5 Tradition, Harmony and Transcendence. George F. McLean. ISBN

1565180313 (paper).

III.6 Psychology, Phenomenology and Chinese Philosophy: Chinese Philo-sophical Studies, VI. Vincent Shen, Richard Knowles and Tran Van Doan, eds. ISBN 1565180453 (paper).

III.7 Values in Philippine Culture and Education: Philippine Philosophical Studies, I. Manuel B. Dy, Jr., ed. ISBN 1565180412 (paper).

III.7A The Human Person and Society: Chinese Philosophical Studies, VIIA. Zhu Dasheng, Jin Xiping and George F. McLean, eds. ISBN 1565180887.

III.8 The Filipino Mind: Philippine Philosophical Studies II. Leonardo N.

Mercado. ISBN 156518064X (paper). III.9 Philosophy of Science and Education: Chinese Philosophical Studies IX.

Vincent Shen and Tran Van Doan, eds. ISBN 1565180763 (paper).

III.10 Chinese Cultural Traditions and Modernization: Chinese Philosophi-cal Studies, X. Wang Miaoyang, Yu Xuanmeng and George F. McLean, eds. ISBN 1565180682 (paper).

III.11 The Humanization of Technology and Chinese Culture: Chinese Philosophical Studies XI. Tomonobu Imamichi, Wang Miaoyang and Liu

Fangtong, eds. ISBN 1565181166 (paper). III.12 Beyond Modernization: Chinese Roots of Global Awareness: Chinese

Philosophical Studies, XII. Wang Miaoyang, Yu Xuanmeng and George

F. McLean, eds. ISBN 1565180909 (paper). III.13 Philosophy and Modernization in China: Chinese Philosophical Stu-

dies XIII. Liu Fangtong, Huang Songjie and George F. McLean, eds.

ISBN 1565180666 (paper). III.14 Economic Ethics and Chinese Culture: Chinese Philosophical Studies,

XIV. Yu Xuanmeng, Lu Xiaohe, Liu Fangtong, Zhang Rulun and Georges Enderle, eds. ISBN 1565180925 (paper).

III.15 Civil Society in a Chinese Context: Chinese Philosophical Studies XV.

Wang Miaoyang, Yu Xuanmeng and Manuel B. Dy, eds. ISBN 1565180 844 (paper).

III.16 The Bases of Values in a Time of Change: Chinese and Western:

Chinese Philosophical Studies, XVI. Kirti Bunchua, Liu Fangtong, Yu Xuanmeng, Yu Wujin, eds. ISBN l56518114X (paper).

III.17 Dialogue between Christian Philosophy and Chinese Culture: Philo-

sophical Perspectives for the Third Millennium: Chinese Philosophical Studies, XVII. Paschal Ting, Marian Kao and Bernard Li, eds. ISBN

1565181735 (paper).

234 Publications

III.18 The Poverty of Ideological Education: Chinese Philosophical Studies,

XVIII. Tran Van Doan. ISBN 1565181646 (paper). III.19 God and the Discovery of Man: Classical and Contemporary Ap-

proaches: Lectures in Wuhan, China. George F. McLean. ISBN 156518 1891 (paper).

III.20 Cultural Impact on International Relations: Chinese Philosophical Studies, XX. Yu Xintian, ed. ISBN 156518176X (paper).

III.21 Cultural Factors in International Relations: Chinese Philosophical

Studies, XXI. Yu Xintian, ed. ISBN 1565182049 (paper). III.22 Wisdom in China and the West: Chinese Philosophical Studies, XXII.

Vincent Shen and Willard Oxtoby. ISBN 1565182057 (paper)

III.23 China’s Contemporary Philosophical Journey: Western Philosophy and Marxism: Chinese Philosophical Studies, XXIII. Liu Fangtong. ISBN

1565182065 (paper). III.24 Shanghai: Its Urbanization and Culture: Chinese Philosophical Stu-

dies, XXIV. Yu Xuanmeng and He Xirong, eds. ISBN 1565182073

(paper). III.25 Dialogue of Philosophies, Religions and Civilizations in the Era of

Globalization: Chinese Philosophical Studies, XXV. Zhao Dunhua, ed.

ISBN 9781565182431 (paper). III.26 Rethinking Marx: Chinese Philosophical Studies, XXVI. Zou Shipeng

and Yang Xuegong, eds. ISBN 9781565182448 (paper).

III.27 Confucian Ethics in Retrospect and Prospect: Chinese Philosophical Studies XXVII. Vincent Shen and Kwong-loi Shun, eds. ISBN 9781

565182455 (paper). III.28 Cultural Tradition and Social Progress, Chinese Philosophical Stu-

dies, XXVIII. He Xirong, Yu Xuanmeng, Yu Xintian, Yu Wujing, Yang

Junyi, eds. ISBN 9781565182660 (paper). III.29 Spiritual Foundations and Chinese Culture: A Philosophical

Approach: Chinese Philosophical Studies, XXIX. Anthony J. Carroll and

Katia Lenehan, eds. ISBN 9781565182974 (paper). III.30 Diversity in Unity: Harmony in a Global Age: Chinese Philosophical

Studies, XXX. He Xirong and Yu Xuanmeng, eds. ISBN 978156518 3070 (paper).

III.31 Chinese Spirituality and Christian Communities: A Kenotic Per-

spective: Chinese Philosophical Studies, XXXI. Vincent Shen, ed. ISBN 978156518 3070 (paper).

III.32 Care of Self and Meaning of Life: Asian and Christian Reflections:

Chinese Philosophical Studies, XXXII. William Sweet and Cristal Huang, ed. ISBN 9781565183131 (paper).

III.33 Philosophy and the Life-World: Chinese Philosophical Studies,

XXXIII. He Xirong, Peter Jonkers and Shi Yongzhe, eds. ISBN 9781 565183216. (paper).


III.34 Reconstruction of Values and Morality in Global Times: Chinese

Philosophical Studies, XXXIV. Liu Yong and Zhang Zhixiang, eds. ISBN 9781565183278. (paper).

III.35 Traditional Values and Virtues in Contemporary Social Life: Chinese Philosophical Studies XXXV. Gong Qun, ed. ISBN 978156518. (paper).

IIIB.1 Authentic Human Destiny: The Paths of Shankara and Heidegger: Indian Philosophical Studies, I. Vensus A. George. ISBN 1565181190 (paper).

IIIB.2 The Experience of Being as Goal of Human Existence: The Hei-deggerian Approach: Indian Philosophical Studies, II. Vensus A. George. ISBN 156518145X (paper).

IIIB.3 Religious Dialogue as Hermeneutics: Bede Griffiths’s Advaitic Ap-proach: Indian Philosophical Studies, III. Kuruvilla Pandikattu. ISBN

1565181395 (paper). IIIB.4 Self-Realization [Brahmaanubhava]: The Advaitic Perspective of

Shankara: Indian Philosophical Studies, IV. Vensus A. George. ISBN

1565181549 (paper). IIIB.5 Gandhi: The Meaning of Mahatma for the Millennium: Indian Philo-

sophical Studies, V. Kuruvilla Pandikattu, ed. ISBN 1565181565 (paper).

IIIB.6 Civil Society in Indian Cultures: Indian Philosophical Studies, VI. Asha Mukherjee, Sabujkali Sen (Mitra) and K. Bagchi, eds. ISBN 156518 1573 (paper).

IIIB.7 Hermeneutics, Tradition and Contemporary Change: Lectures in Chennai/Madras, India. George F. McLean. ISBN 1565181883 (paper).

IIIB.8 Plenitude and Participation: The Life of God in Man: Lectures in Chennai/Madras, India. George F. McLean. ISBN 1565181999 (paper).

IIIB.9 Sufism and Bhakti, a Comparative Study: Indian Philosophical

Studies, VII. Md. Sirajul Islam. ISBN 1565181980 (paper). IIIB.10 Reasons for Hope: Its Nature, Role and Future: Indian Philosophical

Studies, VIII. Kuruvilla Pandikattu, ed. ISBN 156518 2162 (paper).

IIIB.11 Lifeworlds and Ethics: Studies in Several Keys: Indian Philosophical Studies, IX. Margaret Chatterjee. ISBN 9781565182332 (paper).

IIIB.12 Paths to the Divine: Ancient and Indian: Indian Philosophical Stu-dies, X. Vensus A. George. ISBN 9781565182486 (paper).

IIIB.13 Faith and Reason Today: Fides et Ratio in a Post-Modern Era: In-

dian Philosophical Studies, XIII. Varghese Manimala, ed. IBSN 9781 565182554 (paper).

IIIB.14 Identity, Creativity and Modernization: Perspectives on Indian Cul-

tural Tradition: Indian Philosophical Studies, XIV. Sebastian Velassery and Vensus A. George, eds. ISBN 9781565182783 (paper).

IIIB.15 Elusive Transcendence: An Exploration of the Human Condition

Based on Paul Ricoeur: Indian Philosophical Studies, XV. Kuruvilla Pan-dikattu. ISBN 9781565182950 (paper).

236 Publications

IIIB.16 Being Human in Multicultural Traditions: Indian Philosophical

Studies, XVI. K. Remi Rajani and Vensus A. George, eds. ISBN 9781 565183285 (paper).

IIIC.1 Spiritual Values and Social Progress: Uzbekistan Philosophical Studies, I. Said Shermukhamedov and Victoriya Levinskaya, eds. ISBN

1565181433 (paper). IIIC.2 Kazakhstan: Cultural Inheritance and Social Transformation: Kazakh

Philosophical Studies, I. Abdumalik Nysanbayev. ISBN 1565182022

(paper). IIIC.3 Social Memory and Contemporaneity: Kyrgyz Philosophical Studies,

I. Gulnara A. Bakieva. ISBN 9781565182349 (paper).

IIID.1 Reason, Rationality and Reasonableness: Vietnamese Philosophical Studies, I. Tran Van Doan. ISBN 1565181662 (paper).

IIID.2 Hermeneutics for a Global Age: Lectures in Shanghai and Hanoi. George F. McLean. ISBN 1565181905 (paper).

IIID.3 Cultural Traditions and Contemporary Challenges in Southeast Asia.

Warayuth Sriwarakuel, Manuel B. Dy, J. Haryatmoko, Nguyen Trong Chuan, and Chhay Yiheang, eds. ISBN 1565182138 (paper).

IIID.4 Filipino Cultural Traits: Claro R. Ceniza Lectures. Rolando M.

Gripaldo, ed. ISBN 1565182251 (paper). IIID.5 The History of Buddhism in Vietnam. Chief editor: Nguyen Tai Thu;

Authors: Dinh Minh Chi, Ly Kim Hoa, Ha thuc Minh, Ha Van Tan,

Nguyen Tai Thu. ISBN 1565180984 (paper). IIID.6 Relations between Religions and Cultures in Southeast Asia. Gadis

Arivia and Donny Gahral Adian, eds. ISBN 9781565182509 (paper). IIID.7 Rethinking the Role of Philosophy in the Global Age. William Sweet

and Pham Van Duc, eds. ISBN 9781565182646 (paper).

IIID.8 Practical Issues and Social Philosophy in Vietnam Today. Pham Van Duc. ISBN 9781565183346 (paper).

Series IV. Western European Philosophical Studies

IV.1 Italy in Transition: The Long Road from the First to the Second Repub-lic: The Edmund D. Pellegrino Lectures. Paolo Janni, ed. ISBN 156518 1204 (paper).

IV.2 Italy and the European Monetary Union: The Edmund D. Pellegrino Lectures. Paolo Janni, ed. ISBN 156518128X (paper).

IV.3 Italy at the Millennium: Economy, Politics, Literature and Journalism:

The Edmund D. Pellegrino Lectures. Paolo Janni, ed. ISBN 1565181581 (paper).

IV.4 Speaking of God. Carlo Huber. ISBN 1565181697 (paper).

IV.5 The Essence of Italian Culture and the Challenge of a Global Age. Paulo Janni and George F. McLean, eds. ISBB 1565181778 (paper).


IV.6 Italic Identity in Pluralistic Contexts: Toward the Development of Inter-

cultural Competencies. Piero Bassetti and Paolo Janni, eds. ISBN 156518 1441 (paper).

IV.7 Phenomenon of Affectivity: Phenomenological-Anthropological Per-spectives. Ghislaine Florival. ISBN 9781565182899 (paper).

IV.8 Towards a Kenotic Vision of Authority in the Catholic Church. Anthony J. Carroll, Marthe Kerkwijk, Michael Kirwan, James Sweeney, eds. ISNB 9781565182936 (paper).

IV.9 A Catholic Minority Church in a World of Seekers. Staf Hellemans and Peter Jonkers, eds. ISBN 9781565183018 (paper).

IV.10 French Catholics and Their Church: Pluralism and Deregulation.

Nicolas de Bremond d’Ars and Yann Raison du Cleuziou, eds. ISBN 9781565183087 (paper).

IV.11 Philosophy and Crisis: Responding to Challenges to Ways of Life in the Contemporary World (2 Volumes). Golfo Maggini, Vasiliki P. Solo-mou-Papanikolaou, Helen Karabatzaki and Konstantinos D. Koskeridis,

eds. ISBN 9781565183292 (paper). IV.12 Re-Learning to be Human in Global Times: Challenges and Opportu-

nities from the Perspectives of Contemporary Philosophy and Religion.

Brigitte Buchhammer, ed. ISBN 9781565183339 (paper).

Series IVA. Central and Eastern European Philosophical Studies

IVA.1 The Philosophy of Person: Solidarity and Cultural Creativity: Polish

Philosophical Studies, I. A. Tischner, J.M. Zycinski, eds. ISBN 156518 0496 (paper).

IVA.2 Private and Public Social Inventions in Modern Societies: Polish

Philosophical Studies, II. L. Dyczewski, P. Peachey, J.A. Kromkowski, eds. ISBN. 1565180518 (paper).

IVA.3 Traditions and Present Problems of Czech Political Culture: Czecho-

slovak Philosophical Studies, I. M. Bednár and M. Vejraka, eds. ISBN 1565180577 (paper).

IVA.4 Czech Philosophy in the XXth Century: Czech Philosophical Studies, II. Lubomír Nový and Jirí Gabriel, eds. ISBN 1565180291 (paper).

IVA.5 Language, Values and the Slovak Nation: Slovak Philosophical Stu-

dies, I. Tibor Pichler and Jana Gašparíková, eds. ISBN 1565180372 (paper).

IVA.6 Morality and Public Life in a Time of Change: Bulgarian Philo-

sophical Studies, I. V. Prodanov and A. Davidov, eds. ISBN 1565180550 (paper).

IVA.7 Knowledge and Morality: Georgian Philosophical Studies, I. N.V.

Chavchavadze, G. Nodia and P. Peachey, eds. ISBN 1565180534 (paper).

238 Publications

IVA.8 Personal Freedom and National Resurgence: Lithuanian Philosoph-

ical Studies, I. Bronius Kuzmickas and Aleksandr Dobrynin, eds. ISBN 1565180399 (paper).

IVA.9 National, Cultural and Ethnic Identities: Harmony beyond Conflict: Czech Philosophical Studies, III. Jaroslav Hroch, David Hollan, George

F. McLean, eds. ISBN 1565181131 (paper). IVA.10 Models of Identities in Postcommunist Societies: Yugoslav Philo-

sophical Studies, I. Zagorka Golubovic and George F. McLean, eds. ISBN

1565181211 (paper). IVA.11 Interests and Values: The Spirit of Venture in a Time of Change: Slo-

vak Philosophical Studies, II. Tibor Pichler and Jana Gasparikova, eds.

ISBN 1565181255 (paper). IVA.12 Creating Democratic Societies: Values and Norms: Bulgarian

Philosophical Studies, II. Plamen Makariev, Andrew M. Blasko and Asen Davidov, eds. ISBN 156518131X (paper).

IVA.13 Values of Islamic Culture and the Experience of History: Russian

Philosophical Studies, I. Nur Kirabaev and Yuriy Pochta, eds. ISBN 1565181336 (paper).

IVA.14 Values and Education in Romania Today: Romanian Philosophical

Studies, I. Marin Calin and Magdalena Dumitrana, eds. ISBN 156518 1344 (paper).

IVA.15 Between Words and Reality, Studies on the Politics of Recognition

and the Changes of Regime in Contemporary Romania: Romanian Philo-sophical Studies, II. Victor Neumann. ISBN 1565181611 (paper).

IVA.16 Culture and Freedom: Romanian Philosophical Studies, III. Marin Aiftinca, ed. ISBN 1565181360 (paper).

IVA.17 Lithuanian Philosophy: Persons and Ideas: Lithuanian Philosoph-

ical Studies, II. Jurate Baranova, ed. ISBN 1565181379 (paper). IVA.18 Human Dignity: Values and Justice: Czech Philosophical Studies,

IV. Miloslav Bednar, ed. ISBN 1565181409 (paper).

IVA.19 Values in the Polish Cultural Tradition: Polish Philosophical Stu-dies, III. Leon Dyczewski, ed. ISBN 1565181425 (paper).

IVA.20 Liberalization and Transformation of Morality in Post-communist Countries: Polish Philosophical Studies, IV. Tadeusz Buksinski. ISBN 1565181786 (paper).

IVA.21 Islamic and Christian Cultures: Conflict or Dialogue: Bulgarian Philosophical Studies, III. Plament Makariev, ed. ISBN 156518162X (paper).

IVA.22 Moral, Legal and Political Values in Romanian Culture: Romanian Philosophical Studies, IV. Mihaela Czobor-Lupp and J. Stefan Lupp, eds. ISBN 1565181700 (paper).

IVA.23 Social Philosophy: Paradigm of Contemporary Thinking: Lithuanian Philosophical Studies, III. Jurate Morkuniene. ISBN 1565182030 (paper).


IVA.24 Romania: Cultural Identity and Education for Civil Society: Roma-

nian Philosophical Studies, V. Magdalena Dumitrana, ed. ISBN 156518 209X (paper).

IVA.25 Polish Axiology: the 20th Century and Beyond: Polish Philosophical Studies, V. Stanislaw Jedynak, ed. ISBN 1565181417 (paper).

IVA.26 Contemporary Philosophical Discourse in Lithuania: Lithuanian Philosophical Studies, IV. Jurate Baranova, ed. ISBN 1565182154 (paper).

IVA.27 Eastern Europe and the Challenges of Globalization: Polish Philoso-phical Studies, VI. Tadeusz Buksinski and Dariusz Dobrzanski, eds. ISBN 1565182189 (paper).

IVA.28 Church, State, and Society in Eastern Europe: Hungarian Philosoph-ical Studies, I. Miklós Tomka. ISBN 156518226X (paper).

IVA.29 Politics, Ethics, and the Challenges to Democracy in ‘New Indepen-dent States’: Georgian Philosophical Studies, II. Tinatin Bochorishvili, William Sweet and Daniel Ahern, eds. ISBN 9781565182240 (paper).

IVA.30 Comparative Ethics in a Global Age: Russian Philosophical Studies II. Marietta T. Stepanyants, ed. ISBN 9781565182356 (paper).

IVA.31 Lithuanian Identity and Values: Lithuanian Philosophical Studies, V.

Aida Savicka, ed. ISBN 9781565182367 (paper). IVA.32 The Challenge of Our Hope: Christian Faith in Dialogue: Polish

Philosophical Studies, VII. Waclaw Hryniewicz. ISBN 9781565182370

(paper). IVA.33 Diversity and Dialogue: Culture and Values in the Age of Globali-

zation. Andrew Blasko and Plamen Makariev, eds. ISBN 9781565182387 (paper).

IVA.34 Civil Society, Pluralism and Universalism: Polish Philosophical

Studies, VIII. Eugeniusz Gorski. ISBN 9781565182417 (paper). IVA.35 Romanian Philosophical Culture, Globalization, and Education:

Romanian Philosophical Studies VI. Stefan Popenici and Alin Tat, eds.

ISBN 9781565182424 (paper). IVA.36 Political Transformation and Changing Identities in Central and

Eastern Europe: Lithuanian Philosophical Studies, VI. Andrew Blasko and Diana Janušauskienė, eds. ISBN 9781565182462 (paper).

IVA.37 Truth and Morality: The Role of Truth in Public Life: Romanian

Philosophical Studies, VII. Wilhelm Dancă, ed. ISBN 9781565182493 (paper).

IVA.38 Globalization and Culture: Outlines of Contemporary Social Cog-

nition: Lithuanian Philosophical Studies, VII. Jurate Morkuniene, ed. ISBN 9781565182516 (paper).

IVA.39 Knowledge and Belief in the Dialogue of Cultures, Russian Philo-

sophical Studies, III. Marietta Stepanyants, ed. ISBN 9781565182622 (paper).

240 Publications

IVA.40 God and Post-Modern Thought: Philosophical Issues in the Contem-

porary Critique of Modernity, Polish Philosophical Studies, IX. Józef Ży-ciński. ISBN 9781565182677 (paper).

IVA.41 Dialogue among Civilizations, Russian Philosophical Studies, IV. Nur Kirabaev and Yuriy Pochta, eds. ISBN 9781565182653 (paper).

IVA.42 The Idea of Solidarity: Philosophical and Social Contexts, Polish Philosophical Studies, X. Dariusz Dobrzanski, ed. ISBN 9781565182961 (paper).

IVA.43 God’s Spirit in the World: Ecumenical and Cultural Essays, Polish Philosophical Studies, XI. Waclaw Hryniewicz. ISBN 9781565182738 (paper).

IVA.44 Philosophical Theology and the Christian Tradition: Russian and Western Perspectives, Russian Philosophical Studies, V. David Brad-

shaw, ed. ISBN 9781565182752 (paper). IVA.45 Ethics and the Challenge of Secularism: Russian Philosophical Stu-

dies, VI. David Bradshaw, ed. ISBN 9781565182806 (paper).

IVA.46 Philosophy and Spirituality across Cultures and Civilizations: Rus-sian Philosophical Studies, VII. Nur Kirabaev, Yuriy Pochta and Ruzana Pskhu, eds. ISBN 9781565182820 (paper).

IVA.47 Values of the Human Person: Contemporary Challenges: Romanian Philosophical Studies, VIII. Mihaela Pop, ed. ISBN 9781565182844 (paper).

IVA.48 Faith and Secularization: A Romanian Narrative: Romanian Philo-sophical Studies, IX. Wilhelm Dancă, ed. ISBN 9781565182929 (paper).

IVA.49 The Spirit: The Cry of the World: Polish Philosophical Studies, XII. Waclaw Hryniewicz. ISBN 9781565182943 (paper).

IVA.50 Philosophy and Science in Cultures: East and West: Russian Philo-

sophical Studies, VIII. Marietta T. Stepanyants, ed. ISBN 978156518 2967 (paper).

IVA.51 A Czech Perspective on Faith in a Secular Age: Czech Philosophical

Studies V. Tomáš Halík and Pavel Hošek, eds. ISBN 9781565183001 (paper).

IVA.52 Dilemmas of the Catholic Church in Poland: Polish Philosophical Studies, XIII. Tadeusz Buksinski, ed. ISBN 9781565183025 (paper).

IVA.53 Secularization and Development of Religion in Modern Society:

Polish Philosophical Studies, XIV. Leon Dyczewski, ed. ISBN 978156518 3032 (paper).

IVA.54 Seekers or Dwellers: The Social Character of Religion in Hungary:

Hungarian Philosophical Studies, II. Zsuzsanna Bögre, ed. ISBN 9781 565183063 (paper).

IVA.55 Eurasian Frontier: Interrelation of Eurasian Cultures in a Global

Age: Russian Philosophical Studies, IX. Irina Boldonova and Vensus A. George, eds. ISBN 9781565183186 (paper).


IVA.56 Religion, the Sacred and Hospitality: Romanian Philosophical St-

udies, X. Wilhelm Dancă, ed. ISBN 9781565183254 (paper). IVA.57 Identity and Globalization: Ethical Implications: Lithuanian Philo-

sophical Studies, VIII. Dalia Stanciene, Irena Darginaviciene and Susan Robbins, eds. ISBN 9781565183261 (paper).

Series V. Latin American Philosophical Studies

V.1 The Social Context and Values: Perspectives of the Americas. O. Pe-goraro, ed. ISBN 081917355X (paper).

V.2 Culture, Human Rights and Peace in Central America. Raul Molina and

Timothy Ready, eds. ISBN 0819173576 (paper). V.3 Aymara Christianity: Inculturation or Culturization? Luis Jolicoeur.

ISBN 1565181042 (paper). V.4 Love as the Foundation of Moral Education and Character Development.

Luis Ugalde, Nicolas Barros and George F. McLean, eds. ISBN 156518

0801 (paper). V.5 Human Rights, Solidarity and Subsidiarity: Essays towards a Social

Ontology. Carlos E.A. Maldonado. ISBN 1565181107 (paper).

V.6 A New World: A Perspective from Ibero America. H. Daniel Dei, ed. ISBN 9781565182639 (paper).

Series VI. Foundations of Moral Education

VI.1 Philosophical Foundations for Moral Education and Character Devel-opment: Act and Agent. George F. McLean and F. Ellrod, eds. ISBN 1565180011 (paper).

VI.2 Psychological Foundations for Moral Education and Character Devel-opment: An Integrated Theory of Moral Development. Richard Knowles, ed. ISBN 156518002X (paper).

VI.3 Character Development in Schools and Beyond. Kevin Ryan and Thomas Lickona, eds. ISBN 1565180593 (paper).

VI.4 The Social Context and Values: Perspectives of the Americas. O. Pe-goraro, ed. ISBN 081917355X (paper).

VI.5 Chinese Foundations for Moral Education and Character Development.

Tran van Doan, ed. ISBN 1565180321 (paper). VI.6 Love as the Foundation of Moral Education and Character Develop-

ment. Luis Ugalde, Nicolas Barros and George F. McLean, eds. ISBN

1565180801 (paper).

Series VII. Seminars on Culture and Values

VII.1 The Social Context and Values: Perspectives of the Americas. O. Pe-

goraro, ed. ISBN 081917355X (paper).

242 Publications

VII.2 Culture, Human Rights and Peace in Central America. Raul Molina

and Timothy Ready, eds. ISBN 0819173576 (paper). VII.3 Relations between Cultures. John A. Kromkowski, ed. ISBN 156518

0089 (paper). VII.4 Moral Imagination and Character Development: The Imagination

(Volume I). George F. McLean and John A. Kromkowski, eds. ISBN 1565181743 (paper).

VII.5 Moral Imagination and Character Development: Moral Imagination in

Personal Formation and Character Development (Volume II). George F. McLean and Richard Knowles, eds. ISBN 1565181816 (paper).

VII.6 Moral Imagination and Character Development: Imagination in

Religion and Social Life (Volume III). George F. McLean and John K. White, eds. ISBN 1565181824 (paper).

VII.7 Hermeneutics and Inculturation. George F. McLean, Antonio Gallo and Robert Magliola, eds. ISBN 1565181840 (paper).

VII.8 Culture, Evangelization, and Dialogue. Antonio Gallo and Robert

Magliola, eds. ISBN 1565181832 (paper). VII.9 The Place of the Person in Social Life. Paul Peachey and John A. Krom-

kowski, eds. ISBN 1565180127 (paper); 1565180135 (cloth).

VII.10 Urbanization and Values. John A. Kromkowski, ed. ISBN 156518 0100 (paper); 1565180119 (cloth).

VII.11 Freedom and Choice in a Democracy, Volume I: Meanings of Free-

dom. Robert Magliola and John Farrelly, eds. ISBN 1565181867 (paper). VII.12 Freedom and Choice in a Democracy, Volume II: The Difficult

Passage to Freedom. Robert Magliola and Richard Khuri, eds. ISBN 1565181859 (paper).

VII.13 Cultural Identity, Pluralism and Globalization (2 volumes). John P.

Hogan, ed. ISBN 1565182170 (paper). VII.14 Democracy: In the Throes of Liberalism and Totalitarianism. George

F. McLean, Robert Magliola and William Fox, eds. ISBN 1565181956

(paper). VII.15 Democracy and Values in Global Times: With Nigeria as a Case Stu-

dy. George F. McLean, Robert Magliola and Joseph Abah, eds. ISBN 1565181956 (paper).

VII.16 Civil Society and Social Reconstruction. George F. McLean, ed. ISBN

1565180860 (paper). VII.17 Civil Society: Who Belongs? William A. Barbieri, Robert Magliola

and Rosemary Winslow, eds. ISBN 1565181972 (paper).

VII.18 The Humanization of Social Life: Theory and Challenges. Christopher Wheatley, Robert P. Badillo, Rose B. Calabretta and Robert Magliola, eds. ISBN 1565182006 (paper).

VII.19 The Humanization of Social Life: Cultural Resources and Historical Responses. Ronald S. Calinger, Robert P. Badillo, Rose B. Calabretta,

Robert Magliola, eds. ISBN 1565182006 (paper).


VII.20 Religion, Morality and Communication between Peoples: Religion in

Public Life, Volume I. George F. McLean, John A. Kromkowski and Ro-bert Magliola, eds. ISBN 1565182103 (paper).

VII.21 Religion and Political Structures from Fundamentalism to Public Ser-vice: Religion in Public Life, Volume II. John T. Ford, Robert A. Destro

and Charles R. Dechert, eds. ISBN 1565182111 (paper). VII.22 Civil Society as Democratic Practice. Antonio F. Perez, Semou Pathé

Gueye, Yang Fenggang, eds. ISBN 1565182146 (paper).

VII.23 Ecumenism and Nostra Aetate in the 21st Century. George F. McLean and John P. Hogan, eds. ISBN 1565182197 (paper).

VII.24 Multiple Paths to God: Nostra Aetate: 40 Years Later. John P. Hogan

and George F. McLean, eds. ISBN 1565182200 (paper). VII.25 Globalization and Identity. Andrew Blasko, Taras Dobko, Pham Van

Duc and George Pattery, eds. ISBN 1565182200 (paper). VII.26 Communication across Cultures: The Hermeneutics of Cultures and

Religions in a Global Age. Chibueze C. Udeani, Veerachart Nimanong,

Zou Shipeng and Mustafa Malik, eds. ISBN: 9781565182400 (paper). VII.27 Symbols, Cultures and Identities in a Time of Global Interaction. Paata

Chkheidze, Hoang Thi Tho and Yaroslav Pasko, eds. ISBN 978156518

2608 (paper). VII.28 Restorying the 'Polis': Civil Society as Narrative Reconstruction.

Yuriy Pochta, Gan Chunsong and David Kaulemu, eds. ISNB 9781

565183124 (paper). VII.29 History and Cultural Identity: Retrieving the Past, Shaping the

Future. John P. Hogan, ed. ISBN 9781565182684 (paper). VII.30 Human Nature: Stable and/or Changing? John P. Hogan, ed. ISBN

9781565182431 (paper).

VII.31 Reasoning in Faith: Cultural Foundations for Civil Society and Glob-alization. Octave Kamwiziku Wozol, Sebastian Velassery and Jurate Baranova, eds. ISBN 9781565182868 (paper).

VII.32 Building Community in a Mobile/Global Age: Migration and Hospi-tality. John P. Hogan, Vensus A. George and Corazon T. Toralba, eds.

ISBN 9781565182875 (paper). VII.33 The Role of Religions in the Public-Sphere: The Post-Secular Model

of Jürgen Habermas and Beyond. Plamen Makariev and Vensus A.

George, eds. ISBN 9781565183049 (paper). VII.34 Diversity and Unity. George F. McLean, Godé Iwele and Angelli F.

Tugado, eds. ISBN 9781565183117 (paper).

VII.35 The Secular and the Sacred: Complementary and/or Conflictual? John P. Hogan and Sayed Hassan Hussaini (Akhlaq), eds. ISBN 9781 565183209 (paper).

VII.36 Justice and Responsibility: Cultural and Philosophical Foundations. João J. Vila-Chã, and John P. Hogan, eds. ISBN 9781565183308 (paper).

244 Publications

Series VIII. Christian Philosophical Studies

VIII.1 Church and People: Disjunctions in a Secular Age, Christian Philo-

sophical Studies, I. Charles Taylor, José Casanova and George F. McLean, eds. ISBN9781565182745 (paper).

VIII.2 God’s Spirit in the World: Ecumenical and Cultural Essays, Christian Philosophical Studies, II. Waclaw Hryniewicz. ISBN 9781565182738 (paper).

VIII.3 Philosophical Theology and the Christian Tradition: Russian and Western Perspectives, Christian Philosophical Studies, III. David Brad-shaw, ed. ISBN 9781565182752 (paper).

VIII.4 Ethics and the Challenge of Secularism: Christian Philosophical Stu-dies, IV. David Bradshaw, ed. ISBN 9781565182806 (paper).

VIII.5 Freedom for Faith: Theological Hermeneutics of Discovery based on George F. McLean’s Philosophy of Culture: Christian Philosophical Stu-dies, V. John M. Staak. ISBN 9781565182837 (paper).

VIII.6 Humanity on the Threshold: Religious Perspective on Transhuman-ism: Christian Philosophical Studies, VI. John C. Haughey and Ilia Delio, eds. ISBN 9781565182882 (paper).

VIII.7 Faith and Secularization: A Romanian Narrative: Christian Philo-sophical Studies, VII. Wilhelm Dancă, ed. ISBN 9781565182929 (paper).

VIII.8 Towards a Kenotic Vision of Authority in the Catholic Church: Chri-

stian Philosophical Studies, VIII. Anthony J. Carroll, Marthe Kerkwijk, Michael Kirwan and James Sweeney, eds. ISBN 9781565182936 (paper).

VIII.9 The Spirit: The Cry of the World: Christian Philosophical Studies, IX. Waclaw Hryniewicz. ISBN 9781565182943 (paper).

VIII.10 A Czech Perspective on Faith in a Secular Age: Christian Philosophi-

cal Studies, X. Tomáš Halík and Pavel Hošek, eds. ISBN 9781565183001 (paper).

VIII.11 A Catholic Minority Church in a World of Seekers: Christian Philo-

sophical Studies, XI. Staf Hellemans and Peter Jonkers, eds. ISBN 9781 565183018 (paper).

VIII.12 Dilemmas of the Catholic Church in Poland: Christian Philosophical Studies, XII. Tadeusz Buksinski, ed. ISBN 9781565183025 (paper).

VIII.13 Secularization and Development of Religion in Modern Society:

Christian Philosophical Studies, XIII. Leon Dyczewski, ed. ISBN 9781 565183032 (paper).

VIII.14 Plural Spiritualities: North American Experience: Christian Philo-

sophical Studies, XIV. Robert J. Schreiter, ed. ISBN 9781565183056 (paper).

VIII.15 Seekers or Dwellers: The Social Character of Religion in Hungary:

Christian Philosophical Studies, XV. Zsuzsanna Bögre, ed. ISBN 9781 565183063 (paper).


VIII.16 French Catholics and Their Church: Pluralism and Deregulation:

Christian Philosophical Studies, XVI. Nicolas de Bremond d’Ars and Yann Raison du Cleuziou, eds. ISBN 9781565183087 (paper).

VIII.17 Chinese Spirituality and Christian Communities: A Kenotic Per-spective: Christian Philosophical Studies, XVII. Vincent Shen, ed. ISBN

9781565183070 (paper). VIII.18 Care of Self and Meaning of Life: Asian and Christian Reflections:

Christian Philosophical Studies, XVIII. William Sweet and Cristal Huang,

ed. ISBN 9781565183131 (paper). VIII.19 Religion and Culture in the Process of Global Change: Portuguese

Perspectives: Christian Philosophical Studies, XIX. José Tolentino Men-

donça, Alfredo Teixeira and Alexandre Palma, eds. ISBN 978156518 3148 (paper).

VIII.20 Seekers and Dwellers: Plurality and Wholeness in a Time of Secular-ity: Christian Philosophical Studies, XX. Philip J. Rossi, ed. ISBN 9781 565183155, (paper).

VIII.21 Renewing the Church in a Secular Age: Holistic Dialogue and Kenotic Vision: Christian Philosophical Studies, XXI. Charles Taylor, José Casanova, George F. McLean and João J. Vila-Chã, eds. ISBN 9781

565183179 (paper). VIII.22 Narrating Secularisms: Being Between Identities in a Secularized

World: Christian Philosophical Studies, XXII. William Desmond and

Dennis Vanden Auweele, eds. ISBN 9781565183223 (paper). VIII.23 Envisioning Futures for the Catholic Church: Christian Philosophi-

cal Studies, XXIII. Staf Hellemans and Peter Jonkers, eds. ISBN 9781 565183353 (paper).

The International Society for Metaphysics

ISM.1 Person and Nature. George F. McLean and Hugo Meynell, eds. ISBN

0819170267 (paper); 0819170259 (cloth). ISM.2 Person and Society. George F. McLean and Hugo Meynell, eds. ISBN

0819169250 (paper); 0819169242 (cloth). ISM.3 Person and God. George F. McLean and Hugo Meynell, eds. ISBN

0819169382 (paper); 0819169374 (cloth).

ISM.4 The Nature of Metaphysical Knowledge. George F. McLean and Hugo Meynell, eds. ISBN 0819169277 (paper); 0819169269 (cloth).

ISM.5 Philosophical Challenges and Opportunities of Globalization. Oliva

Blanchette, Tomonobu Imamichi and George F. McLean, eds. ISBN 1565181298 (paper).

ISM.6 The Dialogue of Cultural Traditions: Global Perspective. William

Sweet, George F. McLean, Tomonobu Imamichi, Safak Ural, O. Faruk Akyol, eds. ISBN 9781565182585 (paper).

246 Publications

ISM.7 Philosophy Emerging from Culture. William Sweet, George F.

McLean, Oliva Blanchette, Wonbin Park, eds. ISBN 9781565182851 (paper).

The series is published by: The Council for Research in Values and Philosophy, Gibbons Hall B20, 620 Michigan Avenue, NE, Washington, D.C. 20064; Telephone: 202/319-6089; Email: [email protected]; website:

www.crvp.org. All titles are available in paper except as noted. The series is distributed by: The Council for Research on Values and

Philosophy – OST, 285 Oblate Drive, San Antonio, T.X., 78216; Telephone: (210)341-1366 x205; Email: [email protected].

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