JOINT PUB 3-02.1

JOINT DOCTRINE FORLANDING FORCE OPERATIONS

1 NOVEMBER 1989

Reply Zip Code: JCS TEST PUB 3-02.120318-7000 1 November 1989

MEMORANDUM FOR: Distribution List

Subject: JCS Test Pub 3-02.1, Joint Doctrine for Landing ForceOperations

1. This test publication contains proposed joint doctrine toguide the activities and employment of the Armed Forces of theUnited States when two or more Services, or Service elements,acting as part of or in support of a joint force, conductlanding force operations.

2. JCS test publications are developed and issued inaccordance with JCS Pub 1-01. This test publication has beenstaffed with the Services and unified and specified commands.It is now ready to undergo evaluation in the field. After athorough evaluation is accomplished, and feedback from thefield and the evaluation process is considered, the publicationwill be implemented under the provisions of JCS MOP 197.

MALCOLM B. ARMSTRONGMajor General, USAFDirector for Operational

Plans andInteroperability

Attachment

JCS TEST PUBLICATION 3-02.1

Distribution:

By Director, Operational Plans and Interoperability (J-7),Joint Staff, Washington, D.C. 20318-7000

Joint Staff DIA US Coast Guard

Five Copies each to: Offices of CSA, CNO, CSAF, CMC

Four copies each to:

USCINCLANT USCINCEUR CINCSAC CINCFORUSCINCCENT USCINCSOC USCINCTRANSUSCINCPAC USCINCSO USCINCSPACE

Additional copies may be obtained from the Joint Doctrine andEducation Division (JDED), Operational Plans andInteroperability Directorate (J-7), Joint Staff, Washington,D.C. 20318-7000.

ii

RECORD OF CHANGES FOR JCS TEST PUB 3-02.1(JOINT DOCTRINE FOR LANDING FORCE OPERATIONS)

RECORD OF CHANGES

CHANGE COPY DATE OF DATE POSTNUMBER NUMBER CHANGE ENTERED BY REMARKS

While this publication is in the "test pub" stage, changerecommendations should be submitted through the chain ofcommand to the Joint Doctrine and Education Division,Operational Plans and Interoperability Directorate (J-7), JointStaff, Washington, D.C. 20318-7000, in accordance withguidance provided in JCS Pub 1-01.

iii

JOINT DOCTRINE FOR LANDING FORCE OPERATIONS

PREFACE

1. Purpose

a. This publication sets forth doctrine applicable tolanding forces in amphibious operations. It is a companionto JCS Pub 3-02, "Joint Doctrine for Amphibious Operations"(formerly FMFM 31-11/NWP 22(B)/AFM 2-53/LFM 01), andprovides information of primary interest to landing forcesthat complements and supplements the material therein.

b. In its entirety, this publication provides thefundamental doctrine, techniques, and procedures for anylanding force, notwithstanding the organizational,tactical, and procedural differences that exist betweenthose Services capable of providing landing forces.

2. Basis. The publication has been developed by the MarineCorps in coordination with the Army, Navy, and Air Force, inaccordance with the statutory responsibilities for amphibiouswarfare assigned to those Services by the National Security Actof 1947 (amended), DOD Directive 5100.1, and JCS Pub 0-2,"Unified Action Armed Forces (UNAAF)." This publication,interpreted within the framework of the above act, providesamplification concerning the responsibilities of all Servicesfor amphibious warfare.

3. Scope

a. This publication closely parallels the content andformat of JCS Pub 3-02, "Joint Doctrine for AmphibiousOperations." Efforts have been made to avoid redundancywith the information in that publication. Certain materialis, however, repeated in order to facilitate readerunderstanding and provide greater clarity and continuity ofdiscussion.

b. This publication provides an overview of the complexityof planning and executing landing force operations. It iswritten from the perspective of a senior staff officer orcommander whose organization may take part in, or providesupport to, landing force operations, yet who may havelittle experience in such operations. A considerable bodyof information on specific areas is omitted by design, bothbecause it is not considered relevant to the intendedreadership and because it is not unique to landing forceoperations. The publication does, however, providereference to where more detailed information may be found.

iv

c. This publication emphasizes information unique tolanding force operations and deemphasizes informationcommon to land warfare. The discussion of embarkationplanning, ship-to-shore movement, and supporting arms isextensive. Tactical operations ashore, after the initialstages of the assault, do not differ sufficiently from landoperations in general to warrant extensive discussion.

d. This publication does not include doctrine for basedevelopment, base defense, or the initiation of subsequentoperations, although these may require consideration duringthe planning process. Further, a number of areas thatrequire emphasis and detail in planning are not treated indepth. These areas include air operations, electronicwarfare, operational security, deception, mine andcountermine warfare, and offensive and defensive operationsashore. The need for thorough planning and properexecution in these, and many other functional areas, isacknowledged. However, the complexity of these general andspecific areas does not lend itself to detailed discussionin this publication. Further, differences that may existin the specific environment of a particular operation willnot materially alter the doctrine for this form of warfare.

4. Content

a. The organization of the separate chapters in thispublication provides an introduction to the material,including necessary definitions. The purpose and scopeprovides an overview of the subject matter and itsrelationship to other areas. The responsibilitiesparagraph sets forth the responsibilities of the majorcommanders, emphasizing the functions and tasks of thecommander landing force (CLF). Additional paragraphsprovide information as required to fully clarify thesubject matter of each chapter.

b. This publication provides discussion of each of thechapters in JCS Pub 3-02 from the landing forceperspective. Detailed information on development of thelanding plan is contained in the Appendix.

5. Terminology. Terms used throughout this publication aredefined in JCS Pub 1-02, "Department of Defense Dictionary ofMilitary and Associated Terms"; in JCS Pub 3-02; in theglossary; or when appropriate, within the text of thispublication. For ease of reference, a glossary of acronyms anddefinitions of key terms is included. Whenever the termscommander, amphibious task force (CATF) or amphibious taskforce commander, and commander, landing force (CLF) or landingforce commander are used, they apply equally to Navy or MarineCorps, joint, combined, or other amphibious operations.

v

TABLE OF CONTENTS

CHAPTER PAGE

Preface...............................................iv

Glossary

Part I Abbreviations and Acronyms...............xviiPart II Definitions..............................xxii

I THE CONCEPT OF AMPHIBIOUS OPERATIONS

Introduction......................................I-1Purpose and Scope.................................I-1General...........................................I-1Responsibilities of Key Individuals in

Amphibious Warfare..............................I-5Planning Considerations...........................I-5Types of Amphibious Operations....................I-6Operations in Support of an Amphibious

Operation.......................................I-7Sequence of Amphibious Operations.................I-8Planning..........................................I-8Embarkation.......................................I-9Rehearsal.........................................I-9Movement..........................................I-9Assault...........................................I-9Termination of an Amphibious Operation............I-9

II ORGANIZATION AND COMMAND

Introduction.....................................II-1Purpose and Scope................................II-1General..........................................II-1Responsibilities.................................II-2Planning Considerations..........................II-2Organizational and Command Considerations........II-2Basic Planning Considerations....................II-4Landing Force Organization.......................II-4Command Relationships............................II-5The Initiating Directive.........................II-12The Amphibious Objective Area....................II-13Airspace Control.................................II-14Airspace Control Systems.........................II-15Transfer of Control of Functions.................II-15Joint Force Air Component Commander..............II-16

vi

III THE APPROACH TO PLANNING

Introduction....................................III-1Purpose and Scope...............................III-1General.........................................III-1Responsibilities................................III-2Planning Considerations.........................III-3Special Considerations..........................III-3Basic Considerations............................III-4Planning Procedures.............................III-7The Planning Process............................III-10The Initiating Directive........................III-11Early Designation of Commanders and

Assembly of Staffs............................III-12Initial Planning Conference.....................III-12Planning Aids...................................III-14Planning Guidance...............................III-15Outline Plan....................................III-17Alternate Plans.................................III-17

IV BASIC DECISIONS

Introduction.....................................IV-1Purpose and Scope................................IV-1General..........................................IV-2Responsibilities.................................IV-4Planning Considerations..........................IV-4Special Considerations...........................IV-4Basic Considerations.............................IV-4Selection of Amphibious Task Force

General Course of Action.......................IV-4Selection of Amphibious Task Force

Objectives.....................................IV-5Determination of Landing Force Mission...........IV-5Designation of Landing Sites.....................IV-5Determination of Landing Force Objectives........IV-8Selection of Beachhead (Force Beachhead).........IV-10Selection of Landing Area........................IV-13Formulation of Landing Force Concept of

Operations Ashore..............................IV-15Selection of Landing Beaches.....................IV-17Selection of Helicopter Landing Zones............IV-18Selection of Fixed-Wing Aircraft Landing

Zones and Drop Zones...........................IV-20Determination of Date and Hour of the

Landing........................................IV-20Commencement of Detailed Planning................IV-22

vii

V LANDING FORCE TACTICAL OPERATIONS ASHORE

Introduction......................................V-1Purpose and Scope.................................V-3General...........................................V-3Responsibilities..................................V-4Planning Considerations...........................V-4Special Considerations............................V-4Basic Considerations..............................V-5Organizational Forms of the Landing Force.........V-7Scheme of Maneuver................................V-11Reserves..........................................V-13Security..........................................V-15Defense of the Landing Force......................V-15Defense Against Enemy Action of a

Specific Nature.................................V-17

VI SHIP-TO-SHORE MOVEMENT

Introduction.....................................VI-1Purpose and Scope................................VI-1General..........................................VI-1Responsibilities.................................VI-2Planning Considerations..........................VI-3Supply and Movement Categories...................VI-5Landing Serials..................................VI-6Scheduled Waves..................................VI-8On-Call Waves....................................VI-8Nonscheduled Units...............................VI-9Pre-positioned Emergency Supplies................VI-10Remaining Landing Force Supplies.................VI-12Free Boats.......................................VI-12Command and Control Helicopters..................VI-12Organization for Landing.........................VI-12Organization of Sea Areas........................VI-15Navy Control Group...............................VI-16Tactical-Logistical Group (TACLOG)...............VI-24Types of Movement and Control....................VI-32Ship-to-Shore Planning Sequence..................VI-36Ship-to-Shore Movement Plans.....................VI-37The Landing Plan.................................VI-37Mutual Responsibility for Debarkation and

Enplaning Schedules............................VI-39Ground Combat Element Landing Plan...............VI-40Subordinate Ground Combat Element

Landing Plan...................................VI-42Aviation Combat Element Landing Plan.............VI-43Conduct of the Ship-to-Shore Movement............VI-46

viii

VII INTELLIGENCE

Introduction....................................VII-1Purpose and Scope...............................VII-1General.........................................VII-2Responsibilities................................VII-5Preliminary Studies and Estimates...............VII-7Detailed Intelligence Estimates.................VII-8Intelligence Annex..............................VII-8Collection of Information.......................VII-9Amphibious Reconnaissance.......................VII-10Planning Considerations.........................VII-10Special Considerations..........................VII-11Basic Considerations............................VII-11Collection Plan.................................VII-12Intelligence Tasking and Control................VII-13Dissemination...................................VII-13Counterintelligence and Security................VII-14Target Intelligence.............................VII-15

VIII SUPPORTING ARMS

Introduction...................................VIII-1General........................................VIII-2Responsibilities of Commanders.................VIII-7Target List Responsibilities and Target

Information Center...........................VIII-10Planning Considerations........................VIII-11Special Considerations.........................VIII-11Basic Considerations...........................VIII-12Unique Supporting Arms Organizations...........VIII-13Supporting Arms Planning.......................VIII-13Fire Support Coordination Agencies.............VIII-16Fire Support Coordination Measures.............VIII-18Fire Support Coordination During

the Assault..................................VIII-18Air Support Planning...........................VIII-18Air Control Responsibilities...................VIII-20US Marine Corps Air Control Agencies.Ashore....VIII-22US Air Force Air Control Agencies

Ashore.......................................VIII-24Air Support Planning...........................VIII-26Air Support Planning Sequence..................VIII-27Principal Air Support Planning

Considerations...............................VIII-29Detailed Air Support Planning Within

the Landing Force............................VIII-30The Air Plan...................................VIII-31

ix

Air Support During the Assault.................VIII-33Artillery Fire Support Planning................VIII-37Artillery Fire Support Planning

Responsibilities.............................VIII-38Estimate of Artillery Fire Support

Requirements.................................VIII-39Artillery Fire Support Plan....................VIII-41Embarkation of Artillery.......................VIII-44Ship-to-Shore Movement of Artillery............VIII-45Air Defense Artillery..........................VIII-48Naval Gunfire Planning.........................VIII-48Control of Naval Gunfire.......................VIII-49Naval Gunfire Support Organization.............VIII-50Naval Gunfire Basic Planning Requirements......VIII-53Naval Gunfire Planning Sequence................VIII-54Types of Naval Gunfire Plans...................VIII-54Types of Fire..................................VIII-56Coordination of Naval Gunfire..................VIII-58Naval Gunfire Support During the Assault.......VIII-58Post D-Day Naval Gunfire Support...............VIII-59Nuclear and Chemical Weapons Support

Planning.....................................VIII-60Nuclear Weapons Employment Planning............VIII-61Chemical Weapons Employment Planning...........VIII-61Responsibilities for Planning Nuclear

and Chemical Fire Support....................VIII-62Planning Considerations........................VIII-63Planning Sequence..............................VIII-63Content of Nuclear and Chemical Fire

Plans........................................VIII-64Defense Against Nuclear, Biological,

and Chemical Weapons.........................VIII-64

IX COMMUNICATIONS FOR COMMAND AND CONTROL

Introduction.....................................IX-1Purpose and Scope................................IX-1General..........................................IX-1Responsibilities.................................IX-2Landing Force Shipboard Communications...........IX-3Communication Plan...............................IX-4Communications Means.............................IX-5Planning Considerations..........................IX-6Special Considerations...........................IX-6Basic Considerations.............................IX-8Communication Requirements.......................IX-10Control of Ship-to-Shore Movement................IX-13Control of Supporting Arms.......................IX-13

x

Control of Air Operations........................IX-14Control of Combat Service Support................IX-15Control of Signals Intelligence/

Electronic Warfare Operations..................IX-17Echelonment of Command Posts.....................IX-17Communications Channels..........................IX-19

X LOGISTICS AND COMBAT SERVICE SUPPORT

Introduction......................................X-1Purpose and Scope.................................X-1General...........................................X-2Responsibilities..................................X-2Planning Sequence.................................X-5Planning Considerations...........................X-6Landing Force Supply..............................X-11Engineer..........................................X-18Maintenance.......................................X-20Transportation....................................X-23Medical Support...................................X-26Miscellaneous Services............................X-32Organization of Landing Force Support Party.......X-39

XI EMBARKATION AND DEPLOYMENT PLANNING

Introduction.....................................XI-1Purpose and Scope................................XI-1General..........................................XI-2Sealift Planning Considerations..................XI-9Embarkation for Sealift..........................XI-18Principles of Embarkation Planning...............XI-18Content of Embarkation Plans and Loading Plans...XI-19Embarkation Planning.............................XI-20Execution of Embarkation.........................XI-27Embarkation for Airlift..........................XI-32Execution of Airlift Operations..................XI-36

XII REHEARSAL

Introduction....................................XII-1Purpose and Scope...............................XII-1General.........................................XII-2Special Planning Considerations.................XII-2Basic Considerations............................XII-4Types of Rehearsals.............................XII-5

xi

XIII MOVEMENT TO THE OBJECTIVE AREA

Introduction...................................XIII-1Purpose and Scope..............................XIII-1General........................................XIII-1Responsibilities...............................XIII-2En Route Considerations........................XIII-3

XIV SUPPORTING AND PREASSAULT OPERATIONS

Introduction....................................XIV-1Purpose and Scope...............................XIV-1General.........................................XIV-1Responsibilities................................XIV-2Planning Considerations.........................XIV-3Appropriate Preassault Missions and Tasks.......XIV-5Reconnaissance..................................XIV-5Preparation of the Landing Area.................XIV-5Landings........................................XIV-6Deception.......................................XIV-6Supporting Arms.................................XIV-9Coordination with Other Forces..................XIV-10

XV SUBSIDIARY LANDINGS

Introduction.....................................XV-1Purpose and Scope................................XV-1General..........................................XV-1Responsibilities.................................XV-2Planning Considerations..........................XV-2

XVI ASSAULT

Introduction....................................XVI-1Purpose and Scope...............................XVI-2General.........................................XVI-2Authority.......................................XVI-3Organization for the Assault....................XVI-3Control.........................................XVI-3Prelanding Operations...........................XVI-4Final Preparation of the Landing Area...........XVI-5Final Preparation for Ship-to-Shore Movement....XVI-5Initiation of the Assault.......................XVI-6Capture of the Beachhead........................XVI-6Combat Support Units............................XVI-6

xii

Combat Service Support Units....................XVI-7Landing of the Reserves.........................XVI-7Continuation of the Attack......................XVI-8Initiation of Other Tasks During the

Assault Phase.................................XVI-8Termination of the Assault Phase................XVI-8

XVII RAIDS, DEMONSTRATIONS, AND WITHDRAWALS

Introduction...................................XVII-1Purpose and Scope..............................XVII-1General........................................XVII-1Responsibilities...............................XVII-1Amphibious Raids...............................XVII-1Characteristics and Purposes...................XVII-2Planning Considerations........................XVII-2Rehearsals.....................................XVII-5Execution of the Raid..........................XVII-6Command and Control............................XVII-6Amphibious Demonstrations......................XVII-6Characteristics and Purposes...................XVII-7Planning Considerations........................XVII-7Amphibious Withdrawals.........................XVII-8Characteristics................................XVII-8Command Relationships..........................XVII-10Planning Considerations........................XVII-11

XVIII LANDINGS IN LIMITED VISIBILITY

Introduction..................................XVIII-1Purpose and Scope.............................XVIII-1General.......................................XVIII-1Responsibilites...............................XVIII-2Planning Considerations.......................XVIII-2Supporting Arms Considerations................XVIII-4

XIX COLD WEATHER OPERATIONS

Introduction....................................XIX-1Purpose and Scope...............................XIX-1General.........................................XIX-1Responsibilities................................XIX-2Planning Considerations.........................XIX-2Rehearsals for Amphibious Operations in Cold

Weather.......................................XIX-8

xiii

XX RELATED OPERATIONS

Introduction.....................................XX-1Purpose and Scope................................XX-1General..........................................XX-1Responsibilities.................................XX-2Planning Considerations..........................XX-3Noncombatant Evacuation Operations...............XX-3Operations to Protect Noncombatants and

Installations..................................XX-5Disaster Relief..................................XX-5Seabasing........................................XX-7Operations in Times of Tension...................XX-8Maritime Pre-positioning Ships Program...........XX-9Administrative Operations........................XX-10

APPENDIX

THE LANDING PLAN

Composition of the Plan for Landing...............A-1References........................................A-1Responsibility and Application....................A-1

FIGURE

II-1 Command Relationships in an AmphibiousTask Force During the Planning Phase......II-7

II-2 Command Relationships in an AmphibiousTask Force During Operations..............II-7

II-3 Command Relationships During OperationsWhen Command Authority Has BeenDelegated to Attack Group Commandersto Conduct Simultaneous...................II-9

II-4 Command Relationships During OperationsWhen Command Authority Has BeenDelegated to a Subordinate NavyCommander (Advance Force Commander)to Conduct Separate Operations OverWidely Separated Beaches..................II-10

II-5 Command Relationships During OperationsWhen Command Authority Has Not BeenDelegated to Attack Group Commanders......II-11

xiv

IV-1 Basic Decision Responsibilities.............IV-3

IV-2 Organization of the Landing Area............IV-7

IV-3 Examples of Various Types of Shoreline......IV-12

IV-4 Helicopter Lane Zones, Landing Sites,and Landing Points........................IV-18

VI-1 Helicopter Control During theShip-to-Shore Movement....................VI-20

VI-2 TACLOG Structure and Relationshipof Commanders.............................VI-27

VI-3 Concentrated Landings on ContigiousBeaches...................................VI-33

VI-4 Separated Landings Beyond EffectiveCentral Control Distance..................VI-34

VI-5 Separated Landings Within EffectiveCentral Control Distance..................VI-35

VI-6 Navy and Landing Force Responsibilityfor Preparation of Documents in Supportof the Ship-to-Shore Movement.............VI-38

VIII-1 Fire Support Control and CoordinationArea....................................VIII-17

VIII-2 Control of Close Air Support onD-Day or Shortly Thereafter.............VIII-34

VIII-3 Control of Close Air Support WhenTADC is Ashore and the TACC is AfloatBefore Control is Passed Ashore.........VIII-35

VIII-4 Control of Close Air Support WhenLanding Force Air Control Agenciesare Ashore and the TADC is Afloat,After Control is Passed Ashore..........VIII-36

VIII-5 Amphibious Task Force or LandingForce Naval Gunfire Organization........VIII-51

V-1 Organization of the Landing ForceSupport Party..............................X-40

xv

X-2 Shore Party Team.............................X-42

X-3 Helicopter Support Team......................X-44

XI-1 Organization of USTRANSCOM..................XI-5

XI-2 Parallel Navy and Landing ForceOrganization for Embarkation..............XI-14

XI-3 Schematic of the Mounting Area,Marshalling Area, Embarkation Area,and Embarkation Points....................XI-28

XI-4 Departure Airfield Operations...............XI-38

XI-5 Arrival Airfield Operations.................XI-39

(See pages A-2 and A-3 for an index of the figures andtables associated with the Appendix, "The Landing Plan.")

xvi

GLOSSARY

PART IIDEFINITIONS

adjust fire. In artillery and naval gunfire support:1. An order or request to initiate an adjustment of fire.2. A method of control transmitted in the call for fire by

the observer or spotter to indicate that he will control theadjustment. (JCS Pub 1-02)

administrative control. Direction or exercise of authorityover subordinate or other organizations in respect toadministrative matters such as personnel management, supply,services, and other matters not included in the operationalmissions of the subordinate or other organizations. (JCS Pub 1-02)

administrative landing. An unopposed landing involvingdebarkation from vehicles which have been administrativelyloaded. (JCS Pub 1- 02)

administrative loading. A loading system which gives primaryconsideration to achieving maximum utilization of troop andcargo space without regard to tactical considerations.Equipment and supplies must be unloaded and sorted before theycan be used. (JCS Pub 1-02)

administrative shipping. Support shipping that is capable oftransporting troops and cargo from origin to destination, butwhich cannot be loaded or unloaded without non-organicpersonnel and/or equipment; e.g., stevedores, piers, barges,boats. (JCS Pub 1-02)

advanced base. A base located in or near a theater ofoperations whose primary mission is to support militaryoperations. (JCS Pub 1-02)

advanced echelon (ADVON). A team of MAC ALCE members deployedin advance of the main ALCE to coordinate MAC requirements atthe arrival airfield. The ADVON may deploy equipment toestablish communications with MAC command and control agenciesand to establish the airlift operations center (AOC) prior tothe main ALCE arrival. (TACMEMO PZ 0022-1-87/FMFM 1-5)

advanced fleet anchorage. A secure anchorage for a largenumber of naval ships, mobile support units and auxiliarieslocated in or near a theater of operations. (JCS Pub 1-02)

advanced landing field. An airfield, usually having minimumfacilities, in or near an objective area. (JCS Pub 1-02)

xvii

advance force (amphibious). A temporary organization within theamphibious task force that precedes the main body to theobjective area. Its function is to participate in preparing theobjective for the main assault by conducting such operations asreconnaissance, seizure of supporting positions, minesweeping,preliminary bombardment, underwater demolitions, and air support.(JCS Pub 1-02)

advance party. A task organization formed by the MEB commanderwhich consists of personnel designated to form the nucleus ofthe arrival and assembly organizations. The primary tasks ofthe advance party are to arrange for the reception of the mainbody and flight ferry. (TACMEMO PZ 0022-1-87/FMFM 1-5)

aerial port. An airfield that has been designated for thesustained air movement of personnel and materiel, and to serveas an authorized port for entrance into or departure from thecountry in which located. (JCS Pub 1-02)

aeromedical evacuation. The movement of patients under medicalsupervision to and between medical treatment facilities by airtransportation. (JCS Pub 1-02)

afloat support. A form of logistic support outside the confinesof a harbor in which fuel, ammunition and supplies are providedfor operating forces either underway or at anchor. (JCS Pub 1-02)

air landed. Moved by air and disembarked, or unloaded, afterthe aircraft has landed or while a helicopter is hovering.(JCS Pub 1- 02)

airlift control element (ALCE). A composite organization of theUSAF Military Airlift Command (MAC) tailored to support airliftoperations. The ALCE proves command and control for MACresources, off-load and aircraft services, and serves as thefocal point for all airlift activities at an operatinglocation. (TACMEMO PZ 0022- 1-87/FMFM 1-5)

air movement table. A table prepared by a ground forcecommander in coordination with an air force commander. Thisform, issued as an annex to the operation order: a. Indicatesthe allocation of aircraft space to elements of the ground unitsto be airlifted; b. Designates the number and type of aircraftin each serial; c. Specifies the departure area, time of loadingand take-off. (JCS Pub 1-02)

amphibious assault. The principle type of amphibious operationwhich involves establishing a force on a hostile shore.(JCS Pub 1-02)

xviii

amphibious assault ship (general purpose). A naval shipdesigned to embark, deploy, and land elements of a landing forcein an assault by helicopters, landing craft, amphibiousvehicles, and by combinations of these methods. Designated LHA.(JCS Pub 1-02)

amphibious command ship. A naval ship from which a commanderexercises control in amphibious operations. DOD designated asLCC. (JCS Pub 1-02)

amphibious construction battalion (PHIBCB). A commissionednaval unit, subordinate to the commander, naval beach group,designed to provide an administrative unit from which personneland equipment are formed in tactical elements and made availableto appropriate commanders to operate pontoon causeways, transferbarges, and warping tugs; and to meet salvage requirements ofthe naval beach party. (JCS Pub 3-02)

amphibious control group. Personnel, ships, and craftdesignated to control the waterborne ship-to-shore movement inan amphibious operation. (JCS Pub 1-02)

amphibious demonstration. A type of amphibious operationconducted for the purpose of deceiving the enemy by a show offorce with the expectation of deluding the enemy into a courseof action unfavorable to him. (JCS Pub 1-02)

amphibious force1. A naval force and landing force, together with

supporting forces that are trained, organized and equipped foramphibious operations.

2. In naval usage, the administrative title of theamphibious type command of a fleet. (JCS Pub 1-02)

amphibious group. A command within the amphibious force,consisting of the commander and his staff, designed to exerciseoperational command of assigned units in executing all phases ofa division- size amphibious operation. (JCS Pub 1-02)

amphibious lift. The total capacity of assault shippingutilized in an amphibious operation, expressed in terms ofpersonnel, vehicles, and measurement or weight tons of supplies.(JCS Pub 1- 02)

amphibious logistics system (ALS). ALS assets are the U.S. Navyequipment installed and operated by amphibious constructionbattalions to offload the AFOE of a Navy/Marine Corps amphibiousforce. When directed, these assets may remain in place tooffload strategic sealift ships that resupply the amphibiousforce and deliver reinforcing units. (NWP 80FMFM 1-16)

xix

amphibious objective area. A geographical area, delineated inthe initiating directive, for purposes of command and controlwithin which is located the objective(s) to be secured by theamphibious task force. This area must be of sufficient size toensure accomplishment of the amphibious task force’s mission andmust provide sufficient area for conducting necessary sea, airand land operations. (JCS Pub 1-02)

amphibious operation. An attack launched from the sea by navaland landing forces, embarked in ships or craft involving alanding on a hostile shore. As an entity, the amphibiousoperation includes the following phases:

a. planning. The period extending from issuance of theinitiating directive to embarkation.

b. embarkation. The period during which the forces, withtheir equipment and supplies, are embarked in the assignedshipping.

c. rehearsal. The period during which the prospectiveoperation is rehearsed for the purpose of:

(1) testing adequacy of plans, the timing of detailedoperations, and the combat readiness of participating forces;

(2) insuring that all echelons are familiar with plans;and

(3) testing communications.d. movement. The period during which various components of

the amphibious task force move from points of embarkation to theobjective area.

e. assault. The period between the arrival of the majorassault forces of the amphibious task force in the objectivearea and the accomplishment of the amphibious task force mission.(JCS Pub 1-02)

amphibious planning. The process of planning for an amphibiousoperation, distinguished by the necessity for concurrent,parallel and detailed planning by all participating forces; andwherein the planning pattern is cyclical in nature, comprising aseries of analyses and judgments of operational situations, eachstemming from those that have preceded. (JCS Pub 3-02)

amphibious raid. A type of amphibious operation involving swiftincursion into or a temporary occupation of an objectivefollowed by a planned withdrawal. (JCS Pub 1-02)

amphibious reconnaissance. An amphibious landing conducted byminor elements, normally involving stealth rather than force ofarms, for the purpose of securing information, and usuallyfollowed by a planned withdrawal. (JCS Pub 1-02)

xx

amphibious shipping. Organic Navy ships specifically designedto transport, land, and support landing forces in amphibiousassault operations and capable of being loaded or unloaded bynaval personnel without external assistance in the amphibiousobjective area. (JCS Pub 1-02)

amphibious squadron. A tactical and administrative organizationcomposed of amphibious assault shipping to transport troops andtheir equipment for an amphibious assault operation.(JCS Pub 1- 02)

amphibious task force. The task organization formed for thepurpose of conducting an amphibious operation. The amphibioustask force always includes Navy forces and a landing force withtheir organic aviation and may include MSC-provided ships andAir Force forces when appropriate. (NWP 22-8/FMFM 1-15)

amphibious task force commander. The Navy officer designated inthe initiating directive as commander of an amphibious taskforce. (JCS Pub 3-02)

amphibious transport group. A subdivision of an amphibious taskforce, composed primarily of transport ships. (JCS Pub 1-02)

amphibious vehicle. A wheeled or tracked vehicle capable ofoperating on both land and water. (JCS Pub 1-02)

amphibious withdrawal. A type of amphibious operation involvingthe extraction of forces by sea in naval ships of craft from ahostile or potentially hostile shore. (JCS Pub 1-02)

antiair warfare. A US Navy/US Marine Corps term used toindicate that action required to destroy or reduce to anacceptable level the enemy air and missile threat. It includessuch measures as the use of interceptors, bombers, antiaircraftguns, surface-to- air and air-to-air missiles, electroniccountermeasures, and destruction of the air or missile threatboth before and after it is launched. Other measures which aretaken to minimize the effects of hostile air action are cover,concealment, dispersion, deception (including electronic), andmobility. (JCS Pub 1-02)

apportionment. The determination and assignment of the totalexpected effort by percentage and/or by priority that should bedevoted to the various air operations and/or geographic areasfor a given period of time. (JCS Pub 1-02)

approach lane. An extension of a boat lane from the line ofdeparture toward a transport area. It may be terminated bymarker ships, boats or buoys. (JCS Pub 1-02)

xxi

approach schedule. The schedule which indicates, for eachscheduled wave, the time of departure from the rendezvous area,from the line of departure, and from other control points andthe time of arrival at the beach. (JCS Pub 1-02)

area command. A command which is composed of those organizedelements of one or more of the armed services, designated tooperate in a specific geographical area, which are placed undera single commander. (JCS Pub 1-02)

area of responsibility1. A defined area of land in which responsibility is

specifically assigned to the commander of the area for thedevelopment and maintenance of installations, control ofmovement and the conduct of tactical operations involving troopsunder his control along with parallel authority to exercisethese functions.

2. In naval usage, a predefined area of enemy terrain forwhich supporting ships are responsible for covering by fire onknown targets or targets of opportunity and by observation.(JCS Pub 1-02)

arrival and assembly area (AAA). An area designated by CMPF incoordination with the unified commander and host nation forarrival, off-load, and assembly of forces and MPE/S andpreparations for subsequent operations. The AAA isadministrative in nature and does not denote command of ageographic area. Such an area may be inside an AOA. Within theAAA, coordination authority for the following is implied for theCMPF:

(a) prioritization and use of airfield(s), port, beachfacilities, and road networks.

(b) air traffic control.(c) logistic support activities.

(TACMEMO PZ 0022-1-87/FMFM 1-5)

arrival and assembly operations element (AAOE). An agency ineach MEB element which coordinates the logistic functions of theoff- load of MPE/S and the arrival and assembly of forces.(TACMEMO PZ 0022-1-87/FMFM 1-5)

arrival and assembly operations group (AAOG). A staff agency ofthe MEB, composed of personnel from the MEB and NSE, to controlthe arrival and assembly operations.(TACMEMO PZ 0022-1-87/FMFM 1- 5)

arrival and assembly support party (AASP). A task organizationcomposed of MEB elements responsible to the AAOG for throughputof off-load MPE/S from the beach, port, and arrival airfield(s).(TACMEMO PZ 0022-1-87/FMFM 1-5)

xxii

assault area. That area which includes the beach area, the boatlanes, the lines of departure, the landing ship areas, thetransport areas, and the fire support areas in the immediatevicinity of the boat lanes. (JCS Pub 3-02)

assault area diagram. A graphic means of showing, foramphibious operations, the beach designations, boat lanes,organization of the line of departure, scheduled waves, landingship area, transport areas, and the fire support areas in theimmediate vicinity of the boat lanes. (JCS Pub 1-02)

assault craft unit. A permanently commissioned navalorganization, subordinate to the commander, naval beach group,which contains landing craft and crews necessary to provideadditional lighterage required in an amphibious operation.(JCS Pub 3-02)

assault echelon. The element of a force that is scheduled forinitial assault on the objective area. (JCS Pub 1-02)

assault follow-on echelon. In amphibious operations, thatechelon of the assault troops, vehicles, aircraft equipment, andsupplies which, though not needed to initiate the assault, isrequired to support and sustain the assault. In order toaccomplish its purpose, it is normally required in the objectivearea no later than five days after commencement of the assaultlanding. (NWP 22-8/FMFM 1-15)

assault phase1. In an amphibious operation, the period of time between

the arrival of the major assault forces of the amphibious taskforce in the objective area and the accomplishment of theirmission.

2. In an airborne operation, a phase beginning withdelivery by air of the assault echelon of the force into theobjective area and extending through attack of assaultobjectives and consolidation of the initial airhead.(JCS Pub 1-02)

assault shipping. Shipping assigned to the amphibious taskforce and utilized for transporting assault troops, vehicles,equipment, and supplies to the objective area. (JCS Pub 1-02)

attack group. A subordinate task organization of the navyforces of an amphibious task force. It is composed of assaultshipping and supporting naval units designated to transport,protect, land and initially support a landing group.(JCS Pub 1-02)

attack position. The last position occupied by the assaultechelon before crossing the line of departure. (JCS Pub 1-02)

xxiii

augmentation forces. Forces to be transferred to theoperational command of a supported commander during theexecution of an operation. (JCS Pub 1-02)

bareboat charter. Under this type of contractual agreement, theship owner relinquishes control and management of his ship tothe charterer for a number of years - often for the ship’sentire service life. The charterer crews and operates the ship,and is responsible for all costs of operation, including fuel,port charges, and canal tolls. The charterer agrees to returnthe ship to the owner in good condition (normal wear and tearexpected) when the charterer pays "hire" which is usuallyexpressed in terms of a certain amount of dollars per day, or acertain dollar amount per dead weight ton (DWT) per month.(NWP 22-8/FMFM 1-15)

basic allowance. A quantity of ammunition required to support agiven number of weapons for a specified period of time. Whenused in relation to cargo offered for shipment (i.e., vehicleswith basic allowance), it means that the vehicles are loadedwith the ammunition necessary to support the unit involved.(NWP 22-8/FMFM 1-15)

basic intelligence. Fundamental intelligence concerning thegeneral situation, resources, capabilities, and vulnerabilitiesof foreign countries or areas which may be used as referencematerial in the planning of operations at any level and inevaluating subsequent information relating to the same subject.(JCS Pub 1-02)

basic tactical organization. The conventional organization oflanding force units for combat, involving combinations ofinfantry, supporting ground arms, and aviation foraccomplishment of missions ashore. This organizational form isemployed as soon as possible following the landing of thevarious assault components of the landing force. (JCS Pub 1-02)

battalion landing team. In an amphibious operation, an infantrybattalion normally reinforced by necessary combat and serviceelements; the basic unit for planning an assault landing. Alsoknown as BLT. (JCS Pub 1-02)

beach1. The area extending from the shoreline inland to a marked

change in physiographic form or material, or to the line ofpermanent vegetation (coastline).

2. In amphibious operations, that portion of the shorelinedesignated for landing of a tactical organization. (JCS Pub 1-02)

xxiv

beach capacity. An estimate, expressed in terms of measurementtons, or weight tons, of cargo that may be unloaded over adesignated strip of shore per day. (JCS Pub 1-02)

beachhead. A designated area on a hostile shore which, whenseized and held, insures the continuous landing of troops andmateriel, and provides maneuver space requisite for subsequentprojected operations ashore. It is the physical objective of anamphibious operation. (JCS Pub 1-02)

beachmaster. The naval officer in command of the beachmasterunit of the naval beach group. (JCS Pub 1-02)

beachmaster unit. A commissioned naval unit of the naval beachgroup designed to provide to the shore party a naval componentknown as a beach party which is capable of supporting theamphibious landing of one division (reinforced). (JCS Pub 1-02)

beach organization. In an amphibious operation, the plannedarrangement of personnel and facilities to effect movement,supply, and evacuation across beaches and in the beach area forsupport of a landing force. (JCS Pub 1-02)

beach party. The naval component of the shore party.(JCS Pub 1- 02)

beach support area. In amphibious operations, the area to therear of a landing force or elements thereof, established andoperated by shore party units, which contains the facilities forthe unloading of troops and materiel and the support of theforces ashore; it includes facilities for the evacuation ofwounded, prisoners of war, and captured materiel. (JCS Pub 1-02)

beach survey. The collection of data describing the physicalcharacteristics of a beach; that is, an area whose boundariesare a shoreline, a coastline, and two natural or arbitraryassigned flanks. (JCS Pub 1-02)

boat assembly areas. Areas designated for assembling emptylanding craft prior to their being called alongside a ship forloading. (JCS Pub 3-02)

boat diagram. In the assault phase of an amphibious operation,a diagram showing the positions of individuals and equipment ineach boat. (JCS Pub 1-02)

boat group. The basic organization of landing craft. One boatgroup is organized for each battalion landing team (orequivalent) to be landed in the first trip of landing craft oramphibious vehicles. (JCS Pub 1-02)

xxv

boat lane. A lane for amphibious assault landing craft, whichextends seawards from the landing beaches to the line ofdeparture. The width of a boat lane is determined by the lengthof the corresponding beach. (JCS Pub 1-02)

boat team. The troops assigned to one landing craft oramphibious vehicle for the ship-to-shore movement in anamphibious operation. (JCS Pub 3-02)

cargo classification (combat loading). The division of militarycargo into categories for combat loading aboard ships.(JCS Pub 1- 02)

cargo offload and delivery systems (COLDS). Active cargooffload and delivery assets include Navy ALS elements, Navylogistics over the shore (LOTS) assets, The Navy beach group(NBG), NAVCHAPGRU, and the U.S Army LOTS components.(NWP 80/FMFM 1-16)

casualty receiving and treatment ship (CRTS). In amphibiousoperations, a ship designated to receive, provide treatment andtransfer casualties. (JCS Pub 3-02)

causeway launching area. Areas located near the line ofdeparture but clear of the approach lanes, where ships canlaunch pontoon causeways. (JCS Pub 3-02)

C-day. The unnamed day on which a deployment operationcommences or is to commence. The deployment may be movement oftroops, cargo, weapon systems, or a combination of theseelements utilizing any and all types of transport. The letter"C" will be the only one used to denote the above. The highestcommand or headquarters responsible for coordinating theplanning will specify the exact meaning of C-day within theaforementioned definition. The command or headquarters directlyresponsible for the execution of the operation, if other thanthe one coordinating the planning, will do so in light of themeaning specified by the highest command or headquarterscoordinating the planning. (JCS Pub 1-02)

central control officer. The officer designated by theamphibious task force commander for the over-all coordination ofthe waterborne ship-to-shore movement. He is embarked in thecentral control ship. (JCS Pub 3-02)

change of operational control--(DOD). The date and time(Greenwich Mean Time/Greenwich Civil Time) at which theresponsibility for operational control of a force or unit passesfrom one operational control authority to another. (JCS Pub 1-02)

xxvi

charter party. A contractual agreement between a ship owner anda ship charterer. (NWP 22-8/FMFM 1-15)

chop. See change of operational control. (JCS Pub 1-02)

civil reserve air fleet. A group of commercial aircraft withcrews which is allocated in time of an emergency for exclusivemilitary use in both international and domestic service.(JCS Pub 1-02)

close air support. Air action against hostile targets which arein close proximity to friendly forces and which require detailedintegration of each air mission with the fire and movement ofthose forces. (JCS Pub 1-02)

close covering group. A task organization which providesprotection against attack by aircraft and surface ships. It isordinarily composed of battleships, cruisers, destroyers, andaircraft carriers, as needed. (JCS Pub 3-02)

close support areas. Those parts of the ocean operating areasnearest to, but not necessarily in, the objective area. Theyare assigned to naval support carrier groups, hunter-killergroups and certain logistic support components. (JCS Pub 3-02)

colored beach. That portion of usable coastline sufficient forthe assault landing of a regimental landing team or similarsized unit. In the event that the landing force consists of asingle battalion landing team, a colored beach will be utilizedand no further subdivision of the beach is required. Seenumbered beach. (JCS Pub 3-02)

combatant command. On of the unified or specified commandsestablished by the President. (JCS Pub 1-02)

Combatant Command (command authority). Non-transferable commandauthority established by title 10, United States Code, section164, exercised only by commanders of unified or specifiedcombatant commands. COCOM is the authority of a CombatantCommander to perform those functions of command over assignedforces involving organizing and employing commands and forces,assigning tasks, designating objectives, and givingauthoritative direction over all aspects of military operations,joint training, and logistics necessary to accomplish themissions assigned to the command. COCOM should be exercisedthrough the commanders of subordinate organizations; normallythis authority is exercised through the Service componentcommander. COCOM provides full authority to organize and employcommands and forces as the CINC considers necessary toaccomplish assigned missions. Also called COCOM. (JCS Pub 1-02)

xxvii

combat loading. The arrangement of personnel and the stowage ofequipment and supplies in a manner designed to conform to theanticipated tactical operation of the organization embarked.Each individual item is stowed so that it can be unloaded at therequired time. (JCS Pub 1-02)

combat organizational loading. A method of loading by which aunit with its equipment and initial supplies is loaded into asingle ship, together with other units, in such a manner as tobe available for unloading in a predetermined order.(JCS Pub 3-02)

combat search and rescue. A specific task performed by rescueforces to effect the recovery of distressed personnel duringwartime or contingency operations. (JCS Pub 1-02)

combat service support. The essential logistic functions,activities, and tasks necessary to sustain all elements of anoperating force in an area of operations. Combat servicesupport includes but is not limited to administrative services,chaplain services, civil affairs, finance, legal service, healthservices, military police, supply, maintenance, transportation,construction, troop construction, acquisition and disposal ofreal property, geodetic engineering functions, food service,graves registration, laundry, dry cleaning, bath, propertydisposal, and other logistic services. (JCS Pub 1-02)

combat service support areas. Those areas ashore which areorganized to contain the necessary supplies, equipment,installations, and elements to provide the landing force withcombat service support throughout the operation. (JCS Pub 3-02)

combat service support troops. Landing force units which rendersupport to combat units in supply, maintenance, transportation,evacuation, hospitalization, and related service matters.(JCS Pub 3-02)

combat spread loading. A method of combat loading by which someof the troops, equipment and initial supplies of a unit areloaded in one ship and the remainder are loaded in one or moreothers. This method is commonly used for troop units with heavyequipment. (JCS Pub 3-02)

combat unit loading. A method of loading by which all or a partof a combat unit, such as an assault battalion landing team, iscompletely loaded in a single ship, with essential combatequipment and supplies, in such a manner as to be immediatelyavailable to support the tactical plan upon debarkation, and toprovide a maximum of flexibility to meet possible changes in thetactical plan. (JCS Pub 3-02)

xxviii

Combatant Command (command authority). Non-transferable commandauthority established by title 10, United States Code, section164, exercised only by commanders of unified and specifiedcombatant commands. Combatant Command (command authority) isthe authority of a combatant commander to perform thosefunctions of command over assigned forces involving theorganizing and employing commands and forces, assigning tasks,designating objectives, and giving authoritative direction overall aspects of military operations, joint training and logisticsnecessary to accomplish the missions assigned to the command.Combatant Command (command authority) should be exercisedthrough the commanders of subordinate organizations; normallythis authority is exercised through the Service componentcommander. Combatant Command (command authority) provides fullauthority to organize and employ commands and forces as the CINCconsiders necessary to accomplish assigned missions. Alsocalled COCOM. (JCS Pub 1-02)

command1. The authority that the commander in the military Service

lawfully exercises over subordinates by virtue of rank orassignment. Command includes the authority and responsibilityfor effectively using available resources and for planning theemployment of, organizing, directing, coordinating, andcontrolling military forces for the accomplishment of assignedmissions. It also includes responsibility for health, welfare,morale, and discipline of assigned personnel.

2. An order given by a commander; that is, the will of thecommander expressed for the purpose of bringing about aparticular action.

3. A unit or units, an organization, or an area under thecommand of one individual.

4. To dominate by a field weapon fire or by observationfrom a superior position. (JCS Pub 1-02)

command and control. The exercise of authority and direction bya properly designated commander over assigned forces in theaccomplishment of the mission. Command and control functionsare performed through an arrangement of personnel, equipment,communications, facilities, and procedures employed by acommander in planning, directing, coordinating, and controllingforces and operations in the accomplishment of the mission.(JCS Pub 1-02)

command and control system. The facilities, equipment,communications, procedures, and personnel essential to acommander for planning, directing, and controlling operations ofassigned forces pursuant to the missions assigned.

commander, amphibious task force. The Navy officer designatedin the initiating directive as commander of an amphibious taskforce. (JCS Pub 3-02)

xxix

commander, landing force. The officer designated in theinitiating directive to command the landing force. (JCS Pub 3-02)

commander’s estimate of the situation. A logical process ofreasoning by which a commander considers all the circumstancesaffecting the military situation and arrives at a decision as toa course of action to be taken to accomplish the mission. Acommander’s estimate which considers a military situation so farin the future as to require major assumptions, is called acommander’s long-range estimate of the situation. (JCS Pub 1-02)

common-user ocean terminals. A military installation, part of amilitary installation, or a commercial facility operated undercontract or arrangement by the Military Traffic ManagementCommand which regularly provides for two or more Services,terminal functions of receipt, transit storage or staging,processing, and loading and unloading of passengers or cargoaboard ships. (JCS Pub 1-02)

concept of operations. A verbal or graphic statement, in broadoutline, of a commander’s assumptions or intent in regard to anoperation or series of operations. The concept of operationsfrequently is embodied in campaign plans and operation plans; inthe latter case, particularly when the plans cover a series ofconnected operations to be carried out simultaneously or insuccession. The concept is designed to give an overall pictureof the operation. It is included primarily for additionalclarity of purpose. Frequently, it is referred to ascommander’s concept. (JCS Pub 1-02)

consecutive voyage charter (CVC). A contract by which acommercial ship is chartered by MSC for a series of specifiedvoyages. (NWP 22-8/FMFM 1-15)

control. Authority which may be less than full commandexercised by a commander over part of the activities ofsubordinate or other organizations. (JCS Pub 1-02)

control group. Personnel, ships, and craft designated tocontrol the ship-to-shore movement. (JCS Pub 3-02)

controlled shipping. Shipping that is controlled by MSC.Included in this category are MSC (USNS) ships,government-owned ships operated under a General AgencyAgreement, and commercial ships under charter to MSC.(NWP 22-8/FMFM 1-15)

xxx

convoy1. A number of merchant ships of naval auxiliaries, or

both, usually escorted by warships and/or aircraft, or a singlemerchant ship or naval auxiliary under surface escort, assembledand organized for the purpose of passage together.

2. A group of vehicles organized for the purpose of controland orderly movement with or without escort protection.(JCS Pub 1-02)

convoy loading. The loading of troop units with their equipmentand supplies in vessels of the same movement group, but notnecessarily in the same vessel. (JCS Pub 1-02)

coordinating authority. A commander or individual assignedresponsibility for coordinating specific functions or activitiesinvolving forces of two or more Services or two or more forcesof the same Service. The commander or individual has theauthority to require consultation between the agencies involved,but does not have the authority to compel agreement. In theevent that essential agreement cannot be obtained, the mattershall be referred to the appointing authority. (JCS Pub 1-02)

covering air operations. Air operations conducted outside theobjective area but which directly affect the amphibiousoperation by providing protection for the amphibious task forceen route to and in the objective area. (JCS Pub 3-02)

cross-loading (personnel). A system of loading troops so thatthey may be disembarked or dropped at two or more landing ordrop zones, thereby achieving unit integrity upon delivery.(JCS Pub 1-02)

current intelligence. Intelligence of all types and forms ofimmediate interest which is usually disseminated without thedelays necessary to complete evaluation of interpretation.(JCS Pub 1-02)

D-day1. The unnamed day on which a particular operation

commences or is to commence. An operation may be thecommencement of hostilities.

a. The date of a major military effort.b. The execution date of an operation (as

distinguished from the date the order to execute is issued); thedate the operations phase is implemented, by land assault, airstrike, naval bombardment, parachute assault, or amphibiousassault. The highest command or headquarters responsible forcoordinating the planning will specify the exact meaning ofD-day within the aforementioned definition. If more than onesuch event is mentioned in a single plan, the secondary events

xxxi

will be keyed to the primary event by adding or subtracting daysas necessary. The letter "D" will be the only one used todenote the above. The command or headquarters directlyresponsible for the execution of the operation, if other thanthe one coordinating the planning, will do so in light of themeanings specified by the highest planning headquarters.

2. Time in plans will be indicated by a letter that showsthe unit of time employed and figures, with a minus or plussign, to indicate the amount of time before or after thereferenced event; e.g., "D" is for a particular day, "H" for anhour. Similarly , D + 7 means 7 days after D-day , H + 2 means 2hours after H-hour. If the figure becomes unduly large, forexample, D-day plus 90, the designation o f D + 3 months may beemployed; i.e., if the figure following a letter plus a timeunit (D-day, H-hour, etc.) is intended to refer to units of timeother than that which follows the letter, then the unit of timeemployed with the figure must be spelled out. (JCS Pub 1-02)

debarkation. The unloading of troops, equipment, or suppliesfrom a ship or aircraft. (JCS Pub 1-02)

debarkation schedule. A schedule which provides for the timelyand orderly debarkation of troops and equipment and emergencysupplies for the waterborne ship-to-shore movement.(JCS Pub 1-02)

decision. In an estimate of the situation, a clear and concisestatement of the line of action intended to be followed by thecommander as the one most favorable to the successfulaccomplishment of his mission. (JCS Pub 1-02)

defensive sea area. A sea area, usually including theapproaches to and the waters of important ports, harbors, bays,or sounds, for the control and protection of shipping; for thesafeguarding of defense installations bordering on waters of theareas; and for provision of other security measures requiredwithin the specified areas. It does not extend seaward beyondthe territorial waters. (JCS Pub 1-02)

demonstration. An attack or show of force on a front where adecision is not sought, made with the aim of deceiving theenemy. (JCS Pub 1-02)

departure airfield. An airfield on which troops and/or materielare enplaned for flight. (JCS Pub 1-02)

xxxii

departure point. A navigational check point used by aircraft asa marker for setting course. In amphibious operations, an aircontrol point at the seaward end of the helicopter approach lanesystem from which helicopter waves are dispatched along theselected approach lane to the initial point. (JCS Pub 1-02)

deployment1. Act of extending battalions and smaller units in width,

in depth, or in both width and depth to increase readiness forcontemplated action.

2. In naval usage, the change from a cruising approach orcontact disposition to a disposition for battle.

3. In a strategic sense, the relocation of forces todesired areas of operation.

4. Designated location of troops and troop units asindicated in a troop schedule.

5. The series of functions that transpire from the time apacked parachute is placed in operation until it is fully openedand is supporting its load. (JCS Pub 1-02)

direct air support center. A subordinate operational componentof a tactical air control system designed for control anddirection of close air support and other tactical air supportoperations, and normally collocated with fire-supportcoordination elements. (JCS Pub 1-02)

directive1. A military communication in which policy is established

or a specific action is ordered.2. A plan issued with a view to putting it into effect when

so directed, or in the event that a stated contingency arises.3. Broadly speaking, any communication which initiates or

governs action, conduct, or procedure. (JCS Pub 1-02)

direct support. A mission requiring a force to support anotherspecific force and authorizing it to answer directly thesupported force’s request for assistance. (JCS Pub 1-02)

diversionary landing. An operation in which troops are actuallylanded for the purpose of diverting enemy reaction away from themain landing. (JCS Pub 1-02)

dock landing ship. A naval ship designed to transport andlaunch loaded amphibious craft and vehicles with their crews andembarked personnel in amphibious assault, and to render limiteddocking and repair service to small ships and craft; and onethat is capable of acting as a control ship in an amphibiousassault. Designated LSD. (JCS Pub 1-02)

xxxiii

doctrine. Fundamental principles by which the military forcesor elements thereof guide their actions in support of nationalobjectives. It is authoritative but requires judgment inapplication. (JCS Pub 1-02)

embarkation. The loading of troops with their supplies andequipment into ships and/or aircraft. (JCS Pub 1-02)

embarkation area. An area ashore, including a group ofembarkation points, in which final preparations for embarkationare completed and through which assigned personnel and loads forcraft and ships are called forward to embark. (JCS Pub 1-02)

embarkation element (unit) (group). A temporary administrativeformation of personnel with supplies and equipment embarking orto be embarked (combat loaded) aboard the ships of one transportelement (unit) (group). It is dissolved upon completion of theembarkation. An embarkation element normally consists of two ormore embarkation teams: a unit, of two or more elements; and agroup, of two or more units. (JCS Pub 1-02)

embarkation order. An order specifying dates, times, routes,loading diagrams and methods of movement to shipside or aircraftfor troops and their equipment. (JCS Pub 1-02)

embarkation organization. A temporary administrative formationof personnel with supplies and equipment embarking or to beembarked (combat loaded) aboard amphibious shipping.(JCS Pub 1-02)

embarkation phase. The period during which the forces, withtheir equipment and supplies, are embarked in the assignedshipping. (NWP 22-8/FMFM 1-15)

embarkation plans. The plans prepared by the landing force andappropriate subordinate commanders containing instructions andinformation concerning the organization for embarkation,assignment to shipping, supplies and equipment to embarked,location and assignment of embarkation areas, control andcommunication arrangements, movement schedules and embarkationsequence, and additional pertinent instructions relating to theembarkation of the landing force. (JCS Pub 3-02)

embarkation team. A temporary administrative formation of allpersonnel with supplies and equipment embarking or to beembarked (combat load) aboard one ship. (JCS Pub 1-02)

establishment. An installation, together with its personnel andequipment, organized as an operating entity. (JCS Pub 1-02)

xxxiv

execution planning. The phase of the crisis action systemplanning in which an approved operation plan or other NationalCommand Authority-designated course of action is adjusted,refined, and translated into an operation order. Executionplanning can proceed on the basis of prior deliberate planning,or it can take place under a no plan situation. (JCS Pub 1-02)

fire support area. An appropriate maneuver area assigned tofire support ships from which to deliver gunfire support of anamphibious operation. (JCS Pub 1-02)

fire support coordination. The planning and executing of fireso that targets are adequately covered by a suitable weapon orgroup of weapons. (JCS Pub 1-02)

fire support coordination center. A single location in whichare centralized communications facilities and personnel incidentto the coordination of all forms of fire support. (JCS Pub 1-02)

fire support group. A temporary grouping of ships under asingle commander charged with supporting troop operations ashoreby naval gunfire. A fire support group may be furthersubdivided into fire support units and fire support elements.(JCS Pub 1-02)

fleet. An organization of ships, aircraft, marine forces, andshore-based fleet activities all under the command of acommander or commander in chief who may exercise operational aswell as administrative control. (JCS Pub 1-02)

Fleet Marine Force. A balanced force of combined armscomprising land, air, and service elements of the US MarineCorps. A Fleet Marine Force is an integral part of a US Fleetand has the status of a type command. (JCS Pub 1-02)

floating dump. Emergency supplies pre-loaded in landing craft,amphibian vehicles, or in landing ships. Floating dumps arelocated in the vicinity of the appropriate control officer whodirects their landing as requested by the troop commanderconcerned. (JCS Pub 3-02)

follow-up. In amphibious operations, the landing ofreinforcements and stores after the assault and follow-onechelons have been landed. (JCS Pub 1-02)

follow-up shipping. Ships not originally a part of theamphibious task force but which deliver troops and supplies tothe objective area after the assault phase has begun.(JCS Pub 3-02)

xxxv

force beachhead. The geographic area which contains theamphibious task force and landing force objectives and which thesecuring of will enable the landing force to accomplish itsbasic mission. When seized and held, the continuous landing ofpersonnel and equipment is ensured and provides a base forsubsequent operations ashore. (FMFRP 0-14, Marine Corpsdictionary)

force list. A total list of forces required by an operationplan, including assigned forces, augmentation forces, and otherforces to be employed in support of the plan. (JCS Pub 1-02)

force movement control center (FMCC). An FMF agency normallyestablished in the headquarters of the deploying MAGTF whichmonitors, coordinates, controls, and adjusts as required,strategic movement of Marine forces and associated Navy forceswithin the Joint Deployment System.(TACMEMO PZ 0022-1-87/FMFM 1-5)

General Agency Agreement (GAA). A contract between the MaritimeAdministration and a steamship company which, as general agent,exercises administrative control over a government-owned shipfor employment by MSC. (NWP 22-8/FMFM 1-15)

general unloading period. In amphibious operations, that partof the ship-to-shore movement in which unloading is primarilylogistic in character, and emphasizes speed and volume ofunloading operations. It encompasses the unloading of units andcargo from the ships as rapidly as facilities on the beachpermit. It proceeds without regard to class, type, or priorityof cargo, as permitted by cargo handling facilities ashore.(JCS Pub 1-02)

government-owned, contract-operated ships. Those ships to whichthe U.S. Government holds title and which MSC operates under acontract (i.e., nongovernment manned). These ships aredesignated U.S.Navy ships and use the prefix "USNS" with theship name and the letter "T" as a prefix to the shipclassification (e.g., T- AKR). (NWP 22-8/FMFM 1-15)

government-owned, MSC-operated ships. Those ships to which theU.S. Government holds title and which MSC operates with U.S.Government (civil service) employees. These ships aredesignated U.S. Navy ships and use the prefix "USNS" with theship name and the letter "T" as a prefix to the shipclassification (e.g., T-AKR). (NWP 22- 8/FMFM 1-15)

hard beach. A portion of a beach especially prepared with ahard surface extending into the water, employed for the purposeof loading or unloading directly into or from landing ships orlanding craft. (JCS Pub 1-02)

xxxvi

helicopter coordinator (airborne). An experienced navalaviator operating from an aircraft to direct airbornecoordination and control of helicopterborne assaults. Thehelicopter coordinator (airborne) (HC[A]) is responsible forthe airborne control of all helicopters in his assigned areaand coordinates with the tactical air coordinators (airborne)for support of close air support aircraft dedicated to thehelicopterborne assault. The HC(A) functions as an airborneextension of the helicopter direction center or direct airsupport center and as such is responsible for the execution ofspecific functions delegated to him by those agencies. Thehelicopter transport commander acts as HC(A) when an HC(A) hasnot been specifically designated. (FMFRP 0-14, Marine CorpsDictionary)

helicopter direction center1. In amphibious operations, the primary direct control

agency for the helicopter group/unit commander operating underthe overall control of the tactical air control center.(JCS Pub 1-02).

2. The installation from which control and direction ofhelicopter operations are exercised. (JCS Pub 3- 02)

helicopter flight. An individual helicopter, or two or morehelicopters grouped under a flight leader and launched from asingle helicopter transport or base at approximately the sametime. (JCS Pub 3-02)

helicopter landing site. A designated subdivision of ahelicopter landing zone in which a single flight or wave ofassault helicopters land to embark or disembark troops and/orcargo. (JCS Pub 1-02)

helicopter landing zone. A specified ground area for landingassault helicopters to embark or disembark troops and/orcargo. A landing zone may include one or more landing sites.(JCS Pub 1-02)

helicopter support team1. A task organization formed and equipped for employment

in a landing zone to facilitate the landing and movement ofhelicopterborne troops, equipment and supplies, and to evacuateselected casualties and prisoners of war (JCS Pub 1-02).

2. It may be built around a nucleus of shore party andhelicopter landing zone control personnel. The Armycounterpart is the airmobile support party. (JCS Pub 3-02)

helicopter transport area. Areas to the seaward and on theflanks of the outer transport and landing ship areas, butpreferably inside the area screen, to which helicoptertransports proceed for launching or recovering helicopters.(JCS Pub 1-02)

xxxvii

H-hour. The specific hour on D-day at which a particularoperation commences. The operation may be the commencement ofhostilities; the hour at which an operation plan is executed orto be executed (as distinguished from the hour the order toexecute is issued); the hour that the operations phase isimplemented, either by land assault, parachute assault,amphibious assault, air or naval bombardment. The highestcommand or headquarters coordinating the planning will specifythe exact meaning of H-hour within the aforementioneddefinition. Normally, the letter "H" will be the only one usedto denote the above. However, when several operations or phasesof an operation are being conducted in the same area on D-day,and confusion may arise through the use of the same hourdesignation for two or more of them, any letter of the alphabetmay be used except A, C, D, E, J, M, or others that may bereserved for exclusive use. (JCS Pub 1-02)

horizontal stowage. The lateral distribution of unit equipmentor categories of supplies so that they can be unloadedsimultaneously from two or more holds. (NWP 22-8/FMFM 1-15)

imagery. Collectively, the representations of objectsreproduced electronically or by optical means on film,electronic display devices, or other media. (JCS Pub 1-02)

initial unloading period. In amphibious operations, that partof the ship-to-shore movement in which unloading is primarilytactical in character and must be instantly responsive tolanding force requirements. All elements intended to landduring this period are serialized. (JCS Pub 1-02)

initiating directive. The directive initiating an amphibiousoperation, issued by a commander of a command established by theJoint Chiefs of Staff or by other commanders so authorized bythe Joint Chiefs of Staff or by other higher authority.(JCS Pub 3-02)

inner transport area. In amphibious operations, an area asclose to the landing beach as depth of water, navigationalhazards, boat traffic, and enemy action permit, to whichtransports may move to expedite unloading. (JCS Pub 1-02)

intelligence. The product resulting from the collection,processing, integration, analysis, evaluation, andinterpretation of available information concerning foreigncountries or areas. (JCS Pub 1-02)

intelligence annex. A supporting document of an operation planor order that provides detailed information on the enemysituation, assignment of intelligence tasks, and intelligenceadministrative procedures. (JCS Pub 1-02)

xxxviii

joint. Connotes activities, operations, organizations, etc., inwhich elements of more than one service of the same nationparticipate. (When all services are not involved, theparticipating services shall be identified, e.g., JointArmy-Navy.) (JCS Pub 1- 02)

joint amphibious operation. An amphibious operation conductedby significant elements of two or more Services.

joint amphibious task force. A temporary grouping of units oftwo or more Services under a single commander, organized for thepurpose of engaging in an amphibious landing for assault onhostile shores. (JCS Pub 1-02)

joint deployment community. Those headquarters, commands, andagencies involved in the training, preparation, movement,reception, employment, support, and sustainment of militaryforces assigned or committed to a theater of operations orobjective area. The joint deployment community usually consistsof the Joint Staff, Services, certain Service major commands,(including the Service wholesale logistic commands), unified andspecified commands (and their Service component commands),transportation operating agencies, Joint Deployment Agency,joint task forces (as applicable), Defense Logistics Agency, andother Defense agencies (e.g., Defense Intelligence Agency) asmay be appropriate to a given scenario. Also called JDC.(JCS Pub 1-02)

joint deployment system. A system that consists of personnel,procedures, directives, communications systems, and electronicdata processing systems to directly support time-sensitiveplanning and execution, and to complement peacetime deliberateplanning. Also called JDS. (JCS Pub 1-02)

joint doctrine. Fundamental principles that guide theemployment of forces of two or more Services in coordinatedaction toward a common objective. It will be promulgated by theJoint Chiefs of Staff. (JCS Pub 1-02)

joint force. A general term applied to a force which iscomposed of significant elements of the Army, the Navy or theMarine Corps, and the Air Force, or two or more of theseServices, operating under a single commander authorized toexercise unified command or operational control over jointforces. (JCS Pub 1-02)

joint force air component commander. The joint force aircomponent commander derives his authority from the joint forcecommander who has the authority to exercise operational control,assign missions, direct coordination among his subordinatecommanders, redirect and organize his forces to ensure unity of

xxxix

effort in the accomplishment of his overall mission. The jointforce commander will normally designate a joint force aircomponent commander. The joint force air component commander’sresponsibilities will be assigned by the joint force commander(normally these will include, but are not limited to, planning,coordination, allocation and tasking based on the joint forcecommander’s apportionment decision). Using the joint forcecommander’s guidance and authority, and in coordination withother Service component commanders and other assigned orsupporting commanders, the joint force air component commanderwill recommend to the joint force commander apportionment of airsorties to various missions or geographic areas. (JCS Pub 1-02)

joint operations area. That portion of an area of conflict inwhich a joint force commander conducts military operationspursuant to an assigned mission and the administration incidentto such military operations. Also called JOA. (JCS Pub 1-02)

joint task force. A force composed of assigned or attachedelements of the Army, the Navy or the Marine Corps, and the AirForce, or two or more of these Services, which is constitutedand so designated by the Secretary of Defense or by thecommander of a unified command, a specified command, or anexisting joint task force. (JCS Pub 1-02)

land-based tactical air groups. Task organizations of tacticalair units, assigned to the amphibious task force, which are tobe shore-based within (or sufficiently close to) the objectivearea to provide tactical air support to the amphibious taskforce. (JCS Pub 3-02)

landing area1. That part of the objective area within which are

conducted the landing operations of an amphibious force. Itincludes the beach, the approaches to the beach, the transportareas, the fire support areas, the air occupied by closesupporting aircraft, and the land included in the advance inlandto the initial objective.

2. (Airborne) The general area used for landing troops andmateriel either by airdrop or air landing. This area includesone or more drop zones or landing strips.

3. Any specially prepared or selected surface of land,water, or deck designated or used for take-off and landing ofaircraft. (JCS Pub 1-02)

landing beach. That portion of a shoreline usually required forthe landing of a battalion landing team. However, it may alsobe that portion of a shoreline constituting a tactical locality(such as the shore of a bay) over which a force larger orsmaller than a battalion landing team may be landed.(JCS Pub 1-02)

xl

landing craft. A craft employed in amphibious operations,specifically designed for carrying troops and equipment and forbeaching, unloading, and retracting. Also used for logisticcargo resupply operations. (JCS Pub 1-02)

landing craft and amphibious vehicle assignment table. A tableshowing the assignment of personnel and materiel to each landingcraft and amphibious vehicle and the assignment of the landingcraft and amphibious vehicles to waves for the ship-to-shoremovement. (JCS Pub 1-02)

landing craft availability table. A tabulation of the type andnumber of landing craft that will be available from each ship ofthe transport group. The table is the basis for the assignmentof landing craft to the boat groups for the ship-to-shoremovement. (JCS Pub 1-02)

landing diagram. A graphic means of illustrating the plan forthe ship-to-shore movement. (JCS Pub 1-02)

landing force. A task organization of troop units, aviation andground, assigned to an amphibious assault. It is the highesttroop echelon in the amphibious operation. (JCS Pub 1-02) Itincludes units and supplies transported in either the assaultechelon (AE) or the assault follow-on echelon (AFOE).

landing force commander. The officer designated in theinitiating directive to command the landing force. (JCS Pub 3-02)

landing force supplies. Those supplies remaining in assaultshipping after initial combat supplies and floating dumps havebeen unloaded. They are landed selectively in accordance withthe requirements of the landing force until the situation ashorepermits the inception of general unloading. (JCS Pub 3-02)

landing force support party (LFSP). The forward echelon of thecombat service support element formed to facilitate theship-to-shore movement. It may contain a surface assaultsupport element (shore party) and a helicopter assault supportelement (helicopter support). The LFSP is brought intoexistence by a formal activation order issued by the MAGTFcommander. (JCS Pub 3- 02)

landing group. A subordinate task organization of the landingforce. It is composed of especially organized, trained, andequipped troops, including aviation units when assigned, capableof conducting landing operations. (JCS Pub 3-02)

xli

landing schedule. In an amphibious operation, a schedule whichshows the beach, hour, and priorities of landing of assaultunits, and which coordinates the movements of landing craft fromthe transports to the beach in order to execute the scheme ofmaneuver ashore. (JCS Pub 1-02)

landing sequence table. A document which incorporates thedetailed plans for ship-to-shore movement of nonscheduled units.(JCS Pub 3-02)

landing ship. An assault ship which is designed for long seavoyages and for rapid unloading over and on to a beach.(JCS Pub 1-02)

landing ship dock. A ship designed to transport and launchloaded amphibious craft and/or amphibian vehicles with theircrews and embarked personnel and/or equipment and to renderlimited docking and repair services to small ships and craft.(JCS Pub 1-02)

landing site. In amphibious operations, a continuous segment ofcoastline over which troops, equipment and supplies can belanded by surface means. (JCS Pub 1-02)

landing zone control party. Personnel specially trained andequipped to establish and operate communications devices fromthe ground for traffic control of aircraft/helicopters for aspecific landing zone. (JCS Pub 1-02)

L-hour. In amphibious operations, the time at which the firsthelicopter of the helicopterborne assault wave touches down inthe landing zone. (FMFRP 0-14, Marine Corps Dictionary)

lighterage. Consists of causeway ferries and landing craft.Boat crews report to the off-load control officer for ship andbeaching assignments. Once unloaded, until required to beplaced back aboard ship, the lighterage becomes responsibilityof the lighterage control officer who will keep the off-loadcontrol officer informed as to the location/status of theequipment. (TACMEMO PZ 0022-1- 87/FMFM 1-5)

lighterage control officer (LCO). The Navy officer or chiefpetty officer responsible to the debarkation officer forcontrolling the lighterage assigned to that ship for off-load.(TACMEMO PZ 0022- 1-87/FMFM 1-5)

line of departure. In amphibious warfare, a suitably markedoffshore coordinating line to assist assault craft to land ondesignated beaches at scheduled times. (JCS Pub 1-02)

xlii

lines of communication. All the routes, land, water, and air,which connect an operating military force with a base ofoperations and along which supplies and military forces move.(JCS Pub 1-02)

loading plan. All of the individually prepared documents which,taken together, present in detail all instructions for thearrangement of personnel, and the loading of equipment for oneor more units or other special grouping of personnel or materialmoving by highway, water, rail, or air transportation.(JCS Pub 1- 02)

logistic movement coordination center (LMCC). LMCCs areorganized from service support elements (or the supportingestablishment) in the geographic proximity of the marshallingunits. They are tasked by the FMCC to provide organic/commercial transportation, transportation scheduling, materialhandling equipment and all other logistic support required byparent commands during marshalling and embarkation. (TACMEMO PZ0022-1-87/FMFM 1-5)

logistics. The science of planning and carrying out themovement and maintenance of forces. In its most comprehensivesense, those aspects of military operations which deal with: a.design and development, acquisition, storage, movement,distribution, maintenance, evacuation, and disposition ofmateriel; b. movement, evacuation, and hospitalization ofpersonnel; c. acquisition of construction, maintenance,operation, and disposition of facilities; and d. acquisition orfurnishing of services. (JCS Pub 1-02)logistics over the shore operations. The loading and unloadingof ships without the benefit of fixed port facilities, infriendly or nondefended territory, and in time of war, duringphases of theater development in which there is no opposition bythe enemy. (JCS Pub 1-02)

major water terminal. A water terminal with facilities forberthing numerous ships simultaneously at wharves and/or workinganchorages, located within sheltered coastal waters adjacent torail, highway, air and/or inland water transportation nets. Itcovers a relatively large area, and its scope of operation issuch that it is designated as a probable nuclear target.(JCS Pub 1-02)

Marine Air-Ground Task Force. A task organization of Marineforces (division, aircraft wing and service support groups)under a single command and structured to accomplish a specificmission. The Marine Air-Ground Task Force components willnormally include command, aviation combat, ground combat, andcombat service support elements (including Navy SupportElements). Three types of Marine Air-Ground Task Forces whichcan be task organized are the Marine Expeditionary Unit, Marine

xliii

Expeditionary Brigade, and Marine Expeditionary Force. The fourelements of a Marine Air-Ground Task Force are:

a. command element. The MAGTF headquarters. The commandelement is a permanent organization composed of thecommander, general or executive and special staff sections,headquarters section, and requisite communications andservice support facilities. The command element providescommand, control, and coordination essential for effectiveplanning and execution of operations by the other threeelements of the MAGTF. There is only one command element ina MAGTF.b. aviation combat element (ACE). The MAGTF element thatis task organized to provide all or a portion of thefunctions of Marine Corps aviation in varying degrees basedon the tactical situation and the MAGTF mission and size.These functions are air reconnaissance, antiair warfare,assault support, offensive air support, electronic warfare,and control of aircraft and missiles. The ACE is organizedaround an aviation headquarters and varies in size from areinforced helicopter squadron to one or more Marineaircraft wing(s). It includes those aviation command(including air control agencies), combat, combat support,and combat service support units required by the situation.Normally, there is only one aviation combat element in aMAGTF.c. ground combat element (GCE). The MAGTF element that istask organized to conduct ground operations. The GCE isconstructed around an infantry unit and varies in size froma reinforced infantry battalion to one or more reinforcedMarine division(s). The ground combat element also includesappropriate combat support and combat service support units.Normally, there is only one ground combat element in a MAGTF.d. combat service support element (CSSE). The MAGTFelement that is task organized to provide the full range ofcombat service support necessary to accomplish the MAGTFmission. CSSE can provide supply, maintenance,transportation, deliberate engineer, health, postal,disbursing, prisoner of war, automated information systems,exchange, utilities, legal, and graves registrationservices. The CSSE varies in size from a Marineexpeditionary unit (MEU) service support group (MSSG) to aforce service support group (FSSG). Normally, there is onlyone combat service support element in a MAGTF. (JCS Pub 1-02)

Marine Expeditionary Brigade (MEB). A Marine ExpeditionaryBrigade is a task organization which is normally built around aregimental landing team, a provisional Marine aircraft group,and a logistical support group. It is capable of conductingamphibious assault operations in a limited scope. Duringpotential crisis situations, a Marine Expeditionary Brigade maybe forward deployed afloat for an extended period in order toprovide an immediate combat response. Also called MEB.(JCS Pub 1-02)

xliv

Marine Expeditionary Force (MEF). The Marine ExpeditionaryForce, the largest of the Marine air-ground task forces, isnormally built around a division/wing team, but can includeseveral divisions and aircraft wings, together with anappropriate combat service support organization. The MarineExpeditionary Force is capable of conducting a wide range ofamphibious assault operations and sustained operations ashore.It can be tailored to a wide variety of combat missions in anygeographic environment. Also called MEF. (JCS Pub 1-02)

Marine Expeditionary Unit (MEU). The Marine Expeditionary Unitis a task organization which is normally built around abattalion landing team, a reinforced helicopter squadron, andlogistics support unit. It fulfills routine forward afloatdeployment requirements, provides an immediate reactioncapability for crisis situations, and is capable of relativelylimited combat operations. Also called MEU. (JCS Pub 1-02)

maritime prepositioned equipment and supplies (MPE/S). Unitequipment and sustaining supplies associated with a MEB and anNSE, which are deployed on maritime prepositioning ships.(TACMEMO PZ 0022-1-87/FFMFM 1-5)

maritime prepositioning force (MPF). A task organization ofunits under one commander formed for the purpose of introducinga Marine Expeditionary Brigade and its associated equipment andsupplies into a secure area. The MPF is composed of a commandelement, a MPS squadron, a Marine Expeditionary Brigade, and aNavy Support Element. (TACMEMO PZ 0022-1-87/FMFM 1-5)

maritime prepositioning force operation. A maritimeprepositioning force operation is a rapid deployment andassembly of a Marine expeditionary brigade in a secure areausing a combination of strategic airlift and forward-deployedmaritime prepositioning ships. (TACMEMO PZ 0022-1-87/OH 7-6)

marshalling1. The process by which units participating in an

amphibious or airborne operation, group together or assemblewhen feasible or move to temporary camps in the vicinity ofembarkation points, complete preparations for combat or preparefor loading.

2. The process of assembling, holding, and organizingsupplies and/or equipment, especially vehicles oftransportation, for onward movement. (JCS Pub 1-02)

master. The commanding officer of a United States Naval Ship(USNS), a commercial ship, or a government-owned General AgencyAgreement (GAA) ship operated for MSC by a civilian company totransport DOD cargo. (JCS Pub 3-02)

xlv

M-day. The term used to designated the day on whichmobilization is to begin. (JCS Pub 1-02)

medical regulating. A system to coordinate the orderly movementof a casualty from the site of wounding or injury or the onsetof disease to and between medical treatment facilities.(FMFRP 0-14, Marine Corps Dictionary)

medical regulating officer. A medical administrative officerwho controls and coordinates the evacuation of casualties fromand within the amphibious objective area. He is normallyembarked in the amphibious task force flag ship. (JCS Pub 3-02)

Military Sealift Command (MSC). The single manager operatingagency for designated sealift service (JCS Pub 1-02). Aworldwide sealift organization, the commander of which isdirectly responsible to the Chief of Naval Operations. MSC isone of the operating forces of the Navy. The first and foremostdictum of the MSC mission is to provide an immediate sealiftcapability in support of approved contingency, general warplans, or other emergencies. (JCS Pub 3- 02)

mine warfare group. A task organization of mine warfare unitsfor the conduct of minelaying and/or mine countermeasures inmaritime operations (JCS Pub 1-02). These operations areconducted in support of the amphibious task force. (JCS Pub 3-02)

movement group. Those ships and embarked units which load outand proceed to rendezvous in the objective area.

movement phase. Definition is included under the term,amphibious operation. (JCS Pub 1-02)

movement plan. The naval plan providing for the movement of theamphibious task force to the objective area. It includesinformation and instructions concerning departure of ships fromloading points, the passage at sea, and the approach to andarrival in assigned positions in the objective area.(JCS Pub 3-02)movement report system. A system established to collect andmake available to certain commands vital information on thestatus, location, and movement of flag commands, commissionedfleet units, and ships under operational control of the Navy.(JCS Pub 1-02)

MSC-provided ships. Those ships assigned by MSC for a specificoperation. They may be MSC nucleus fleet ships (USNS), U.S.ships manned by active duty naval personnel (under certaincircumstances) contract-operated MSC ships (USNS), MSC-controlledtime or voyage chartered commercial ships, or MSC-controlledGeneral Agency Agreement (GAA) ships allocated by the MaritimeAdministration to MSC to carry out DoD objectives. (JCS Pub 3-02)

xlvi

National Command Authorities. The President and the Secretaryof Defense or their duly deputized alternates or successors.Commonly referred to as NCA. (JCS Pub 1-02)

National Defense Reserve Fleet (NDRF) including Ready Reserve Force (RRF). The NDRF (including the RRF) is composed of shipsacquired and maintained by the Maritime Administration for usein mobilization or emergency. (NWP 80/FMFM 1-16)

National Defense Reserve Fleet (NDRF) less Ready Reserve Force (RRF). The NDRF (less the RRF) is comprised of the older drycargo ships, tankers, troop transports and other assets in theMaritime Administration’s custody that are maintained at arelatively low level of readiness. They are acquired by MARADfrom commercial ship operators under the provisions of theMerchant Marine Act of 1936; they are available only onmobilization or Congressional declaration of an emergency.Because these ships are maintained in a state of minimumpreservation, activation requires 30 to 90 days and extensiveshipyard work for many. (NWP 80/FMFM 1-16)

naval advanced logistics support base--(DOD). A naval overseaslogistics base used as the primary transshipment point in thetheater of operations for fleet support. ALSBs possess fullcapabilities for storage, consolidation and transfer ofsupplies, and support of forward-based personnel (includingreplacements) during major contingency and wartime periods.ALSBs are located within the theater of operations but not inclose proximity to anticipated direct combat, and must possessthe throughput capacity required to accommodate incominginter-theater and outgoing intra-theater air and sealift. Whenfully activated the ALSB should consist of facilities andservices provided by a host nation, augmentation of existingU.S. bases located in the theater of operations, or acombination thereof. Also called ALSB. (JCS Pub 1-02)

naval beach group. A permanently organized naval command,within an amphibious force, comprised of a commander, hisstaff, a beachmaster unit, an amphibious constructionbattalion, and an assault craft unit, designed to provide anadministrative group from which required naval tacticalcomponents may be made available to the attack force commanderand to the amphibious landing force commander to support thelanding of one division (reinforced). (JCS Pub 1-02)

naval control of shipping organization (NCSORG). Theorganization within the Navy which carries out the specificresponsibilities of the Chief of Naval Operations to providefor the control and protection of movements of merchant shipsin time of war. (JCS Pub 1-02)

xlvii

naval coordinating activity. The activity responsible for theoverall coordination of amphibious lifts and for the loading ofships assigned amphibious lifts. (NWP 22-8/FMFM 1-15)

Naval Forward Logistics Site. An overseas port or airfieldwhich provides logistics support to naval forces within thetheater of operations during major contingency and wartimeperiods. FLSs may be located in close proximity to areas ofdirect combat to permit forward staging of services, throughputof high priority cargo, advanced maintenance and battle damagerepair. FLSs are linked to in-theater Naval Advanced LogisticsSupport Bases (ALSBs) by intra-theater air and sealift, but mayalso serve as transshipment points for inter-theater lift ofhigh priority cargo into areas of direct combat. In providingfleet logistics support, FLS capabilities may range from veryaustere to near that of an ALSB. (JCS Pub 1-02)

naval support area. A sea area assigned to naval ships detailedto support an amphibious operation. (JCS Pub 1-02)

Navy Cargo Handling Battalion. A mobile logistics support unitcapable of worldwide deployment in its entirety or inspecialized detachments. It is organized, trained and equippedto load and offload Navy and Marine Corps cargo carried inmaritime prepositioning ships, merchant breakbulk and/orcontainer ships in all environments; and to operate anassociated temporary ocean cargo terminal; load and offload Navyand Marine Corps cargo carried in military-controlled aircraft;and to operate an associated expeditionary air cargo terminal.Three sources of Navy cargo handling battalions are:

a. Navy cargo handling and port group (NAVCHAPGRU). Theactive duty, cargo handling battalion-sized unit composedsolely of active duty personnel.b. Naval Reserve cargo handling training battalion(NRCHTB). The active duty, cargo handling trainingbattalion composed of both active duty and reserve personnel.c. Naval Reserve cargo handling battalion (NRCHB). Areserve cargo handling battalion composed solely of selectedreserve personnel. (JCS Pub 1-02)

Navy Cargo Handling Force. The combined cargo handling units ofthe Navy, including primarily the Navy cargo handling and portgroup, the Naval Reserve cargo handling training battalion andthe Naval Reserve cargo handling battalions. These units arepart of the operating forces and represent the Navy’s capabilityfor open ocean cargo handling. (JCS Pub 1-02)

xlviii

Navy support element (NSE). The MPF element that is composed ofNaval beach group (NBG) staff and subordinate unit personnel, adetachment of Navy cargo handling force personnel, and otherNavy components, as required. It is tasked with conducting theoff-load and ship-to-shore movement of MPE/S.(TACMEMO PZ 0022-1-87/FMFM 1-5)

non-unit-related personnel. All personnel requiringtransportation to or from an area of operations, other thanthose assigned to a specific unit (e.g. filler personnel,replacements, temporary duty/temporary additional duty,(TDY/TAD) personnel, civilians, medical evacuees, and retrogradepersonnel). (JCS Pub 1-02)

numbered beach. A subdivision of a colored beach, designatedfor the assault landing of a battalion landing team or similarsized unit, when landed as part of a larger force. (JCS Pub 3-02)

objective area1. A defined geographical area within which is located an

objective to be captured or reached by the military forces.This area is defined by competent authority for purposes ofcommand and control (JCS Pub 1-02).

2. In amphibious operations, the objective area isdelineated in the initiating directive in terms of sea, land,and air space. (JCS Pub 3-02)

officer in tactical command (OTA). In maritime usage, thesenior officer present eligible to assume command, or theofficer to whom he has delegated tactical command. (JCS Pub 1-02)

off-load control officer (OCO). The Navy officer responsible tothe NSE commander for the off-load of the MPS squadron, theship- to-shore movement, and the reception and control oflighterage on the beach. (TACMEMO PZ 0022-1-87//FMFM 1-5)

off-load preparation party (OPP). A task organization of Navyand Marine maintenance, embarkation, and cargo handlingpersonnel deployed to the MPS squadron before or during itstransit to the objective area to prepare the ship’s off-loadsystems and embarked equipment for off-load.(TACMEMO PZ 0022-1-87/FMFM 1-5)

offshore POL discharge system (OPDS). The OPDS provides a semi-permanent bulk transfer of POL directly from an offshore tankerto beach storage. Major components of the OPDS are: a singleanchor leg mooring fuel buoy; a mooring anchor to accommodatetankers of 25,000 to 70,000 DWT; hoses; and four miles ofpositive buoyancy 6-inch flexible steel piping. When charged,the pipe lies on the bottom. The ACB installs and operates theOPDS. OPDSs are embarked on RRF tankers. (NWP 80/FMFM 1-16)

xlix

one day’s supply (day of supply). A unit or quantity ofsupplies adopted as a standard of measurement, used inestimating the average daily expenditure under statedconditions. It may also be expressed in terms of a factor,e.g., rounds of ammunition per weapon per day. (JCS Pub 1-02)

operating forces. Those forces whose primary missions are toparticipate in combat and the integral supporting elementsthereof. (JCS Pub 1-02)

operation. A military action or the carrying out of astrategic, tactical, service, training, or administrativemilitary mission; the process of carrying on combat, includingmovement, supply, attack, defense and maneuvers needed to gainthe objectives of any battle or campaign. (JCS Pub 1-02)

operational control--(DOD). Transferable command authoritywhich may be exercised by commanders at any echelon at or belowthe level of combatant command. Operational control is inherentin Combatant Command (command authority) and is the authority toperform those functions of command over subordinate forcesinvolving organizing and employing commands and forces,assigning tasks, designating objectives, and givingauthoritative direction necessary to accomplish the mission.Operational control includes authoritative direction over allaspects of military operations and joint training necessary toaccomplish missions assigned to the command. Operationalcontrol should be exercised through the commanders ofsubordinate organizations; normally this authority is exercisedthrough the Service component commanders. Operational controlnormally provides full authority to organize commands and forcesand to employ those forces as the commander in operationalcontrol considers necessary to accomplish assigned missions.Operational control does not, in and of itself, includeauthoritative direction for logistics or matters ofadministration, discipline, internal organization, or unittraining. Also called OPCON. See also combatant command;Combatant Command (command authority); and combatant commander.(JCS Pub 1-02)

operational control authority (OCA). The naval commanderresponsible within a specified geographical area for theoperational control of all maritime forces assigned to him andfor the control of movement and protection of all merchantshipping under allied naval control. (JCS Pub 1-02)

operation order. A directive issued by a commander tosubordinate commanders for the purpose of effecting thecoordinated execution of an operation. (JCS Pub 1-02)

l

operation plan. A plan for a single or series of connectedoperations to be carried out simultaneously or in succession.It is usually based upon stated assumptions and is the form ofdirective employed by higher authority to permit subordinatecommanders to prepare supporting plans and orders. Thedesignation "plan" is usually used instead of "order" inpreparing for operations well in advance. An operation plan maybe put into effect at a prescribed time, or on signal, and thenbecomes the operation order. (JCS Pub 1-02)

organization for embarkation. The administrative grouping ofthe landing force for the overseas movement. It includes, inany vessel or embarkation group, the task organization which isestablished for landing as well as additional forces embarkedfor purposes of transport, labor or for distribution to achievea maximum of security. (JCS Pub 3-02)

outer landing ship areas. Areas to which landing ships proceedinitially after their arrival in the objective area. They areusually located on the flanks of the outer transport areas.(JCS Pub 3-02)

parallel chains of command. A parallel system of command,responding to the interrelationship of naval and landing forcetasks, wherein corresponding commanders are established at eachsubordinate level of both components to facilitate coordinatedplanning for, and execution of, the operation. (JCS Pub 3-02)

plan for landing. A collective term referring to all theindividually prepared naval and landing force documents which,taken together, present in detail all instructions for executionof the ship-to-shore movement. (JCS Pub 1-02)

planning directive. The plan issued by the task forcecommander, following receipt of the initiating directive, toensure that the planning process and interdependent plansdeveloped by the task force headquarters and assigned majorforces will be coordinated, the plan completed in the timeallowed, and important aspects not overlooked. (JCS Pub 3-02)

port. A place at which ships may discharge or receive theircargoes. It includes any port accessible to ships on theseacoast, navigable rivers or inland waterways. The term"ports" should not be used in conjunction with air facilitieswhich are designated as aerial ports, airports, etc.(JCS Pub 1-02)

li

port operations group. The unit responsible for preparation ofthe port prior to arrival of the Maritime PrepositionedSquadron and the throughput of supplies and equipment as theyare off-loaded from the ship. The port operations groupoperates under the overall direction on the arrival/assemblysupport party and in coordination which the ship’s debarkationofficer. (OH 7-6)

preassault operation. An operation conducted in the objectivearea prior to the assault. It includes reconnaissance,minesweeping, bombardment, bombing, underwater demolition, anddestruction of beach obstacles. (JCS Pub 1-02)

primary control officer. The officer embarked in a primarycontrol ship assigned to control the movement of landing craft,amphibious vehicles, and landing ships to and from a coloredbeach. (JCS Pub 3-02)

primary control ship. A ship of the task force designated toprovide support for the primary control officer and a CICcontrol team for a beach. PCS responsibilities include:

1. controlling all boats assigned2. radar tracking and plotting to assist PCO in maintaining

current location status of all boats assigned, including safetyand salvage boats.

3. directing all scheduled waves over the beach assigned4. maintaining an accurate plot of ships in the PCS area of

responsibility and directing landing craft to the appropriateship.

raid. An operation, usually small scale, involving a swiftpenetration of hostile territory to secure information, confusethe enemy, or to destroy his installations. It ends with aplanned withdrawal upon completion of the assigned mission.(JCS Pub 1-02)

readiness and movement coordination center (RMCC). Acoordination agency under technical control of the LMCCestablished by parent commands (major FMF or Navy organizations)of deploying forces at their home stations. This agencyprepares units for embarkation, staging, marshalling, movement(within organic means), or coordinates with the LMCC movement toAPOEs/SPOEs, and oversees embarkation of those forces.(TACMEMO PZ 0022-1-87/FMFM 1-5)

Ready Reserve Force (RRF). The RRF is composed of shipsacquired by MARAD with Navy funding and newer ships acquired byMARAD for the NDRF. Although part of the NDRF, RRF ships aremaintained in a higher state of readiness and can be madeavailable without mobilization or Congressionally declared stateof emergency. (NWP 80/FMFM 1-16)

lii

reduced operational status (ROS). Applies to Military SealiftCommand ships withdrawn from full operational status (FOS)because of decreased operational requirements. A ship in ROS iscrewed in accordance with shipboard maintenance and possiblefuture operational requirements with crew size predeterminedcontractually. The condition of readiness in terms of calendardays required to attain FOS is designated by the numeralfollowing ROS (i.e., ROS-5). (TACMEMO PZ 0022-1-87/FMFM 1-5)

regimental landing team. A task organization for landing,comprised of an infantry regiment reinforced by those elementswhich are required for initiation of its combat function ashore.(JCS Pub 1- 02)

remain behind equipment (RBE). Unit equipment left by deployingforces at their bases when they deploy.(TACMEMO PZ 0022-1-87/FMFM 1-5)

screening group. A task organization of ships which furnishesprotection to the task force en route to the objective area andduring operations in the objective area. (JCS Pub 3-02)

sea control. The control of designated sea areas and theassociated air space, and underwater volume. It is a selectivefunction exercised only when and where needed. Sea control isperformed in order that the U.S.Navy may have secure operatingareas for the projection of power ashore and secure sealanes ofcommunication that ensure buildup and resupply of U.S. andallied forces in the theater(s) of operations. It is aprerequisite to the conduct of sustained overseas operations byother U.S. general purpose forces. (NWP 80/FMFM 1-16)

sea echelon area. An area to seaward of a transport area fromwhich assault shipping is phased into the transport area, and towhich assault shipping withdraws from the transport area.(JCS Pub 3-02)

sea echelon plan. The plan for reduction of concentration ofshipping in the transport area, to minimize losses due to enemyattack by mass destruction weapons and to reduce the area to beswept of mines. (JCS Pub 3-02)

Sealift Readiness Program (SRP). The SRP is a formal agreementbetween U.S. flag ocean carriers and the Military SealiftCommand for the acquisition of ships and related equipment underconditions of less than full mobilization. (NWP 80/FMFM 1-16)

liii

selective unloading. The controlled unloading from assaultshipping, and movement ashore, of specific items of cargo at therequest of the landing force commander. Normally, selectiveunloading parallels the landing of nonscheduled units during theinitial unloading period of the ship-to-shore movement.(JCS Pub 1-02)

serial. An element or a group of elements within a series whichis given a numerical or alphabetical designation for conveniencein planning, scheduling, and control. (JCS Pub 1-02)

serial assignment table. A table that is used in amphibiousoperations and shows the serial number, the title of the unit,the approximate number of personnel; the material, vehicles, orequipment in the serial; the number and type of landing craftand/or amphibious vehicles required to boat the serial; and theship on which the serial is embarked. (JCS Pub 1-02)

service component command. A command consisting of the Servicecomponent commander and all those individuals, units,detachments, organizations, and installations under the commandthat have been assigned to the unified command. (JCS Pub 1-02)

ship-to-shore movement. That portion of the assault phase of anamphibious operation which includes the deployment of thelanding force from the assault shipping to designated landingareas. (JCS Pub 1-02)

shore party. A task organization of the landing force, formedfor the purpose of facilitating the landing and movement off thebeaches of troops, equipment, and supplies; for the evacuationfrom the beaches of casualties and prisoners of war; and forfacilitating the beaching, retraction, and salvaging of landingships and craft. It comprises elements of both the naval andlanding forces. Also called beach group. (JCS Pub 1-02)

special unloading berth. Berths established in the vicinity ofthe approach lanes into which transports may move to forunloading, thus reducing the running time for landing craft andassisting in the dispersion of transports. (JCS Pub 3-02)

stage. To process, in a specified area, troops which are intransit from one locality to another. (part 2 of 3 JCS Pub 1-02definition)

liv

staging area1. amphibious or airborn e - A general locality between the

mounting area and the objective of an amphibious or airborneexpedition, through which the expedition or parts thereof passafter mounting, for refueling, regrouping of ships, and/orexercise, inspection, and redistribution of troops.

2. Other movement s - A general locality established for theconcentration of troop units and transient personnel betweenmovements over the lines of communication (JCS Pub 1-02)

stowage. The method of placing cargo into a single hold orcompartment of a ship to prevent damage, shifting, etc.(JCS Pub 3-02)

strategic air transport. The movement of personnel and materielby air in accordance with a strategic plan. (JCS Pub 1-02)

strategic mobility. The capability to deploy and sustainmilitary forces worldwide in support of national strategy.(JCS Pub 1-02)

strategic sealift. The prepositioning and ocean movement ofcargo, POL, and personnel including ship-to-shore cargo handlingsystems and personnel. (NWP 80/FMFM 1-16)

strategic sealift C2. The exercise of authority and directionby a properly designated naval commander over assigned strategicsealift forces in the accomplishment of the strategic sealiftmission. C2 functions are performed through an arrangement ofpersonnel, equipment, communications, facilities, and procedureswhich are employed by the naval commander in planning,directing, coordinating, and controlling strategic sealiftforces and operations. (NWP 80/FMFM 1-16)

subordinate command. Commands consisting of the commander andall those individuals, units, detachments, organizations, orinstallations that have been placed under the command by theauthority establishing the subordinate command. (JCS Pub 1-02)

subsidiary landing. In an amphibious landing, a landing usuallymade outside the designated landing area, the purpose of whichis to support the main landing. (JCS Pub 1-02)

supporting arms. Air, sea, and land weapons of all typesemployed to support ground units. (JCS Pub 1-02)

supporting arms coordination center. A single location on boardan amphibious command ship in which all communicationsfacilities incident to the coordination of fire support toartillery, air, and naval gunfire are centralized. This is thenaval counterpart to the fire support coordination centerutilized by the landing force. (JCS Pub 1-02)

lv

supporting operations. In amphibious operations, thoseoperations conducted by forces other than those assigned to theamphibious task force. They are ordered by higher authority atthe request of the amphibious task force commander and normallyare conducted outside the area for which the amphibious taskforce commander is responsible at the time of their execution.(JCS Pub 1-02)

survey, liaison, and reconnaissance party (SLRP). A taskorganization formed from the MEB and NSE, which is introducedinto the objective area prior to the arrival of the main body ofthe FIE to conduct initial reconnaissance, establish liaisonwith in- theater authorities, and initiate preparations for thearrival of the main body of the FIE and the MPSRON.(TACMEMO PZ 0022-1-87/FMFM 1-5)

tac-log group. Representatives designated by troop commandersto assist Navy control officers aboard control ships in theship-to- shore movement of troops, equipment, and supplies.(JCS Pub 1-02)

tactical air control system. The organization and equipmentnecessary to plan, direct, and control tactical air operationsand to coordinate air operations with other Services. It iscomposed of control agencies and communications-electronicsfacilities which provide the means for centralized control anddecentralized execution of missions. (JCS Pub 1-02)

tactical command ship. A warship converted from a lightcruiser, and designed to serve as a command ship for afleet/force commander. It is equipped with extensivecommunication equipment. Designated as CC. (JCS Pub 1-02)

tactical control. The detailed and usually local direction andcontrol of movements or maneuvers necessary to accomplishmissions or tasks assigned. (JCS Pub 1-02)

target1. A geographical area, complex, or installation planned

for capture or destruction by military forces.2. In intelligence usage, a country, area, installation,

agency, or person against which intelligence operations aredirected.

3. An area designated and numbered for future firing,4. In gunfire support usage, an impact burst which hits the

target. (JCS Pub 1-02)

target intelligence. Intelligence which portrays and locatesthe components of a target or target complex and indicates itsvulnerability and relative importance. (JCS Pub 1-02)

lvi

target list. The listing of targets maintained and promulgatedby the senior echelon of command; it contains those targetswhich are to be engaged by supporting arms, as distinguishedfrom a "list of targets" which may be maintained by any echelonas confirmed, suspect, or possible targets for informational andplanning purposes. (JCS Pub 1-02)

task fleet. A mobile command consisting of ships and aircraftnecessary for the accomplishment of a specific major task ortasks which may be of a continuing nature. (JCS Pub 1-02)

task force1. A temporary grouping of units, under one commander,

formed for the purpose of carrying out a specific operation ormission.

2. Semi-permanent organization of units, under onecommander, formed for the purpose of carrying out a continuingspecific task.

3. A component of a fleet organized by the commander of atask fleet or higher authority for the accomplishment of aspecific task or tasks. (JCS Pub 1-02)

time-phased force and deployment data. The computer-supporteddata base portion of an operation plan; it contains time-phasedforce data, non-unit-related cargo and personnel data, andmovement data for the operation plan, including:

a. In-place units.b. Units to be deployed to support the operation plan witha priority indicating the desired sequence for their arrivalat the port of debarkation.c. Routing of forces to be deployed.d. Movement data associated with deploying forces.e. Estimates of non-unit-related cargo and personnelmovement to be conducted concurrently with the deployment offorces.f. Estimate of transportation requirements that must befulfilled by common-user lift resources as well as thoserequirements that can be fulfilled by assigned or attachedtransportation resources. Also called TPFDD. (JCS Pub 1-02)

time-phased force and deployment list. Appendix 1 to Annex A ofthe operation plan. It identifies types and/or actual unitsrequired to support the operation plan and indicates origin andports of debarkation or ocean area. It may also be generated asa computer listing from the time-phased force and deploymentdata. Also called TPFDL. (JCS Pub 1-02)

transport area. In amphibious operations, an area assigned to atransport organization for the purpose of debarking troops andequipment. (JCS Pub 1-02)

lvii

transportation operating agencies1. military. These agencies are the Military Traffic

Management Command, under the Department of the Army, theMilitary Sealift Command, under the Department of the Navy, andthe Military Airlift Command, under the Department of the AirForce.

2. civil. Those Federal agencies having responsibilitiesunder national emergency conditions for the operationaldirection of one or more forms of transportation; they are alsoreferred to as Federal Modal Agencies or Federal TransportAgencies. (JCS Pub 1-02)

transport group (amphibious). A subdivision of an amphibioustask force, composed primarily of transports. (JCS Pub 1-02)

type command. An administrative subdivision of a fleet or forceinto ships or units of the same type, as differentiated from atactical subdivision. Any type command may have a flagship,tender, and aircraft assigned to it. (JCS Pub 1-02)

unified command. A command with a broad continuing missionunder a single commander and composed of significant assignedcomponents of two or more Services, and which is established andso designated by the President, through the Secretary of Defensewith the advice and assistance of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, or,when so authorized by the Joint Chiefs of Staff, by a commanderof an existing unified command established by the President.(JCS Pub 1-02)

unified operation. A broad generic term that describes the widescope of actions taking place within unified commands under theoverall direction of the commanders of those commands.(JCS Pub 1-02)

United States Naval Ship (USNS). A public vessel of the UnitedStates in the custody of the Navy and (1) operated by the MSCand manned by a civil service crew or (2) operated by acommercial company under contract to the MSC and manned by amerchant marine crew. (JCS Pub 3-02)

vertical loading. A type of loading whereby items of likecharacter are vertically tiered throughout the holds of a ship,so that selected items are available at any stage of theunloading. (JCS Pub 1-02)

vertical stowage. A method of stowage in depth within a singlecompartment by which loaded items are continually accessible forunloading, and the unloading can be completed withoutcorresponding changes or prior unloading of other cargo.(NWP 22-8/FMFM 1-15)

lviii

vital area. A designated area or installation to be defended byair defense units. (JCS Pub 1-02)

warning order. A preliminary notice of an order or action whichis to follow. (JCS Pub 1-02)

war reserve materiel requirement. That portion of the warmateriel requirement required to be on hand on D-day. Thislevel consists of the war materiel requirement less the sum ofthe peacetime assets assumed to be available on D-day and thewar materiel procurement capability. (JCS Pub 1-02)

Worldwide Military Command and Control System. The system thatprovides the means for operational direction and technicaladministrative support involved in the command and controlfunction of the U. S. military forces. WWMCCS ensures effectiveconnectivity among NCA, the Joint Chiefs of Staff, and othercomponents of the National Military Command System down to theService component commanders. (JCS Pub 0-2)

lix

CHAPTER ITHE CONCEPT OF AMPHIBIOUS OPERATIONS

1. Introduction

a. Amphibious Operation. An amphibious operation is anattack launched from the sea by naval and landing forces,embarked in ships or craft involving a landing on a hostileshore (JCS Pub 1-02). It normally requires extensive airand naval gunfire support and is characterized by closelyintegrated efforts of forces trained, organized, andequipped for different combatant functions.

b. Waterborne Operations That Are Not Amphibious Operations.Combat operations that involve waterborne movement, such

as inland-water, ferrying, and shore-to-shore operations inwhich the landing forces are not embarked in naval ships,waterborne administrative landings on friendly territory,and water terminal and logistics over-the-shore operationspossess certain characteristics and employ some of thetechniques of an amphibious operation. However, THESE ARENOT AMPHIBIOUS OPERATIONS.

c. Landing Force. A landing force is a task organizationof troop units, aviation and ground, assigned to anamphibious assault. It is the highest troop echelon in theamphibious operation (JCS Pub 1-02).

2. Purpose and Scope. This chapter provides definitions andbasic information essential to an understanding of amphibiouswarfare. The information serves as a foundation for theremainder of the text, which focuses on landing forceoperations. This chapter parallels the information in JCS Pub3-02, "Joint Doctrine for Amphibious Operations," withsupplementary information of interest to the landing force.The material includes discussion of the nature, capabilities,limitations, characteristics, and types of amphibiousoperations; the phases within an operation; Service and commandresponsibilities; planning considerations; and termination ofoperations.

3. General

a. Naval Character. Amphibious warfare integratesvirtually all types of ships, aircraft, weapons, andlanding forces in a concerted military effort against ahostile shore. The inherent naval character of theamphibious operation is reflected in the principles thatgovern the organization of the forces involved and theconduct of the operation.

I-1

b. Marine Corps Responsibilities. The US Marine Corps isassigned the primary responsibility to develop, incoordination with other Services, the doctrine, tactics,and techniques for landing forces in amphibious warfare.This statutory requirement stems from the National SecurityAct of 1947, as amended, and is amplified in DOD Directive5100.1 and JCS Pub 0-2, "Unified Action Armed Forces(UNAAF)."

c. Capabilities and Limitations

(1) Major Advantages. The essential usefulness of theamphibious operation stems from its ability andflexibility, that is, the ability to concentratebalanced forces and to strike with great strength at aselected point in the hostile defense system. Theamphibious operation exploits the element of surpriseand capitalizes on enemy weaknesses through applicationof the required type and degree of force at the mostadvantageous locations at the most opportune time. Themere threat imposed by the existence of powerfulamphibious forces may induce the enemy to disperse hisforces, and this in turn may result in his makingexpensive and wasteful efforts in attempting to defendhis coastline.

(2) Dynamic and Evolutionary Form of Warfare.Doctrine, tactics, techniques, and procedures forconducting amphibious operations are not staticprinciples--they are dynamic and evolutionary, adaptingto new technology, the threat, and changingrequirements. For example, in 1945 only 17 percent ofthe world’s coastline was subject to the classicfrontal amphibious assault. Innovations such as thehelicopter and the landing craft air cushion (LCAC)have opened about 70 percent of the world’s littoralsto forcible entry by amphibious assault. Theseinnovations, along with other advances in technology,provide for more flexibility in the selection oflanding sites and compound the problems of the defenderin protecting his coastline. Conversely, the landingforce faces the threat from weapons with improvedrange, accuracy, and mobility; the potential foremployment of nuclear or chemical weapons is alwayspresent. Advances in electronic warfare, real-timeintelligence collection, analysis and targetingcapability, and other advances have increased thelethality and tempo of warfare.

I-2

(3) Innovative Tactics Required. The amphibious taskforce retains the significant advantage of choosing thetime and place for the assault, but firm establishmentof the landing force ashore may demand innovativetactics. Although the landing force concept ofoperations ashore is situation dependent, it must beless predictable than in the past; focused more on theenemy than on physical terrain; and designed to destroythe enemy’s cohesion and ability to disrupt theamphibious task force mission.

(4) Buildup of Combat Power From Zero. The salientrequirement of the amphibious assault is the necessityof building up combat power ashore from an initial zerocapability to full coordinated striking power as theattack drives toward the amphibious task force finalobjectives. The special measures introduced to meetthis requirement form the basis of the organizationaland technical differences existing between amphibiousand land warfare.

(5) Difficulties in Conducting Amphibious Operations.The amphibious assault must be conducted in the face ofcertain additional and distinguishing difficulties.Natural forces--unfavorable weather; seas, surf, andfeatures of hydrography--represent hazards not normallyencountered in land warfare. Technical problems oflogistics represented by loading thousands of troopsand large quantities of materiel into ships at widelyseparated embarkation points, moving them to theobjective, then landing them in exactly the propersequence, usually on open beaches or landing zones andunder fire initially, all require extraordinaryattention in the form of detailed planning. During themovement from ship to shore, troops are especiallyvulnerable.

d. Purpose and Traditional Employment of Amphibious Forces.History is replete with examples of amphibious

operations. The most renowned is probably the Normandyinvasion of World War II wherein the Allied Forcesestablished a foothold on the continent of Europe for thepurpose of opening a second front. A second well-knownexample is the seizure of the island (atoll) of Iwo Jimafor the purposes of denying it and its airfields to theenemy, and providing advanced airbases and emergencyairfields for aircraft on long-range bombing missionsagainst Japan. These examples illustrate the basic reasonsfor an amphibious operation:

I-3

(1) Prosecute further combat operations.

(2) Obtain a site for an advanced naval or air base,and/or

(3) Deny the use of an area or facilities to the enemy.

e. Non traditional Amphibious Operations. The traditionaltypes of amphibious operations (assault, demonstration,raid, and withdrawal) will be discussed later in thischapter. However, other frequent examples of the nontraditional employment of amphibious forces also illustratethe flexible and varied employment of these forces and arediscussed in the following paragraphs.

(1) Low-Intensity Conflicts. Various terms areapplied where military force is used in conditionsshort of war; e.g., counterinsurgency, presence,deterrent operations, terrorism counteraction, and thelike. Such operations are generally described aslow-intensity conflicts. The continuing possibility ofunstable conditions in many areas of the world requireshighly responsive forces to meet the contingencies thatmay occur. The mobility to move freely at sea, theflexibility to apply military force when and whereneeded, and the quick responsiveness of such forcesmake them well suited for these operations.

(2) Early Military Response. Because of the ambiguousand political nature of insurgent activity, numerouscomplications are involved in the direct commitment ofmilitary force; however, amphibious forces, either nearthe scene of potential trouble or strategically locatedin a state of readiness, are capable of deterringhostile activity without direct action, or of applyingmeasured force at a precise time and place. Whendirected by higher authority, early military responsewhile the government of the threatened country still isthe dominant authority will increase the probability ofearly success. Delayed response may be more difficultand more likely to produce unfavorable internationaldevelopments.

(3) Use of Airborne or Air-Landed Forces. Airborne orair-landed forces may also be employed in combinationwith amphibious forces in low-intensity conflicts. Byproviding additional flexibility and mobility, theseforces greatly enhance the overall US capability. Inparticular, air-landed forces provide a means of

I-4

increasing the buildup of forces and continuity ofaction, particularly in situations where the effort isinitiated with limited forces rapidly committed fromforward-deployed forces. Air-landed forces may bemoved directly to the threatened area or to proximateairfields from which they can be committed to thethreatened area.

(4) Related Operations. Many operations involvelanding forces that are naval in character and mayinvolve many of the characteristics of amphibiousoperations, but are not amphibious warfare per se.These related operations include disaster relief,noncombatant emergency evacuation, operations in timesof tension, and administrative landings, which arediscussed in Chapter 20.

4. Responsibilities of Key Individuals in Amphibious Warfare

a. Commander, Amphibious Task Force. The commander,amphibious task force (CATF), a Navy officer, is chargedwith overall responsibility for an amphibious operation.

b. Commander, Landing Force. The commander, landing force(CLF) is either an Army or Marine officer who is in overallcharge of the landing forces (which may include aviationunits) from the issuance of the initiating directive untilthe conditions established in that directive have been metand the amphibious operation is terminated. The CLF is asubordinate of the CATF within the amphibious task force(ATF). During the planning phase of the operation,however, the CLF and CATF enjoy coequal status for planningtheir respective portions of the operation. Planningmatters on which the CATF and the CLF and commanders ofother forces are unable to agree are referred to theircommon superior for decision.

c. Commander, Air Force Forces. Commander, Air Forceforces, is an Air Force officer, who is in charge of theAir Force component of the amphibious task force.

d. Additional Information on Commanders. Chapter IIcontains more detailed information on the aforementionedcommanders and their responsibilities.

5. Planning Considerations

a. Special Considerations. Special considerations areaddressed throughout this publication. However, if asingle factor is essential, it is the critical need for

I-5

cooperation and coordination. The closest cooperation andmost detailed coordination among all participating forcesin an amphibious operation are essential to success. Theremust be a clear understanding of mutual obligations and ofthe special capabilities and limitations of each componentof the ATF.

b. Basic Considerations

(1) Relative Strength Requirements. In order toachieve success, an amphibious force should be assuredof naval supremacy against enemy surface and submarineforces, air superiority, and a substantial superiorityover enemy forces ashore in the objective area. In theface of compelling necessity, however, an amphibiousoperation may be undertaken on the basis of areasonable total superiority of force. For example,surface and air superiority may justify a landing eventhough the ATF does not possess the desired numericalsuperiority in landing forces, provided US surface andair units can be used effectively against enemy landforces. In addition to a preponderance of force withinthe objective area, an amphibious task force shouldhave reasonable assurance of:

(a) Freedom from effective interference by enemysurface, subsurface, and air or ground forces fromoutside the objective area;

(b) The ability to provide continuous logisticalsupport for the forces ashore.

(2) Other Basic Considerations. Other basicconsiderations are contained throughout the publication.

6. Types of Amphibious Operations

a. Amphibious Assault. The principal type of amphibiousoperation which involves establishing a force on a hostileshore (JCS Pub 1-02).

b. Other Amphibious Operations. Other types of amphibiousoperations that are governed by the doctrine containedherein but do not involve establishing a force on a hostileshore are as follows:

(1) Amphibious Withdrawal. A type of amphibiousoperation involving the extraction of forces by sea innaval ships or craft from a hostile or potentiallyhostile shore (JCS Pub 1-02).

I-6

(2) Amphibious Demonstration. A type of amphibiousoperation conducted for the purpose of deceiving theenemy by a show of force with the expectation ofdeluding the enemy into a course of action unfavorableto him (JCS Pub 1-02).

(3) Amphibious Raid. A type amphibious operationinvolving swift incursion into or a temporary occupancyof an objective followed by a planned withdrawal (JCSPub 1-02).

7. Operations in Support of an Amphibious Operation.Operations conducted in conjunction with an amphibiousoperation are in two broad categories: supporting operationsand preassault operations. The primary distinction between thetwo is whether the support is provided by CATF assets or not.In supporting operations, the support is provided by assetsexternal to the ATF, whereas preassault operations areconducted by forces assigned to the amphibious task force.Subsidiary landings can be conducted by assets internal orexternal to the force and can be conducted before or during theassault. Detailed definitions of these terms and related termsfollow.

a. Supporting Operations. In amphibious operations,operations conducted by forces other than those assigned tothe ATF. Although they may be requested by the CATF, theyare normally conducted outside the area for which the CATFis responsible at the time of their execution.Additionally, supporting operations conducted in theamphibious objective area before or during the amphibiousoperation will be at the request of, and/or coordinatedwith, the CATF. Specific examples are carrier-based airstrikes, long-range strategic bombing, and aerialreconnaissance. (Command relations will be in accordancewith Chapter II.) Examples of supporting operations ingeneral are:

(1) Feints or demonstrations intended for purposes ofdeception.

(2) Isolation of the objective area by interdictingthe movement thereto of enemy forces.

(3) Operations designed to assist in gaining ormaintaining air, ground, or naval supremacy.

(4) Air, surface, submarine, or special operationsdesigned to secure information.

I-7

(5) Psychological and unconventional warfareoperations.

b. Preassault Operations. Preassault operations can beconducted by the advance force, which is an element of theamphibious task force. Preassault operations can also beconducted by amphibious task force assets not organized asan advance force. An example would be a reconnaissanceteam inserted into the objective area. In either event,preassault operations are conducted by forces assigned tothe amphibious task force.

c. Advance Force (Amphibious). A temporary organizationwithin the amphibious task force that precedes the mainbody to the objective area. Its function is to participatein preparing the objective for the main assault byconducting such operations as reconnaissance, seizure ofsupporting positions, mine sweeping, preliminarybombardment, underwater demolitions and air support (JCSPub 1-02).

d. Subsidiary Landing. Subsidiary landings are conductedto capture specific positions to be used to support themain landing; to capture an area to deny its use to theenemy in opposing the main landing; and/or, throughdeception, to induce a hostile reaction that will favor themain landing.

8. Sequence of Amphibious Operations. The amphibious assaultfollows a well-defined pattern. It includes a sequence ofevents or activities that occur, although to a lesser degree,in other types of amphibious operations. The general sequenceconsists of planning, embarkation, rehearsal, movement to theobjective, and, finally, assault and capture of the objective.Planning occurs throughout the entire operation but is normallydominant in the period before embarkation. Successive phases,therefore, bear the title of the dominant activity taking placewithin the period covered.

9. Planning. The planning period extends from the issuance ofthe initiating directive to embarkation. Although planningdoes not cease with the termination of the planning phase, itis useful to distinguish between the planning phase andsubsequent phases. During the planning phase the CATF, CLF,and other commanders designated in the initiating directive areon equal levels of command. All basic decisions must bereached on a basis of common understanding of objectives andprocedures and on free exchange of information. Any differencethat commanders of the components of the amphibious task forcecannot resolve is referred to the common superior. Once the

I-8

ATF and landing force missions have been analyzed and planninghas progressed to the point where the basic decisions (seeChapter IV) have been made, and when the landing force isembarked on amphibious shipping, the commander of the ATFassumes full responsibility for the entire force and for theoperation. If a change in amphibious task force mission occursafter commencement of operations, or if an amphibious operationis initiated from an afloat posture, planning by the commandersconcerned will be conducted as previously described (coequalstatus) for the planning phase or as specified in theinitiating directive.

10. Amphibious Operation--Embarkation. The period duringwhich the forces, with their equipment and supplies, areembarked in the assigned shipping (JCS Pub 1-02, from thedefinition of amphibious operation).

11. Amphibious Operation--Rehearsal. The period during whichthe prospective operation is rehearsed for the purpose of: (1)testing adequacy of plans, the timing of detailed operations,and the combat readiness of participating forces; (2) insuringthat all echelons are familiar with plans; and (3) testingcommunications (JCS Pub 1-02, from the definition of amphibiousoperation).

12. Amphibious Operation--Movement. The period during whichvarious components of the amphibious task force move from thepoints of embarkation to the objective area (JCS Pub 1-02, fromthe definition of amphibious operation). This move may beinitiated from a forward-deployed position and/or viarehearsal, staging, and/or rendezvous areas. The movementphase is completed when the components of the amphibious taskforce arrive in their assigned positions in the objective area.

13. Amphibious Operation--Assault. The period between thearrival of the major assault forces of the amphibious taskforce in the objective area and the accomplishment of theamphibious task force mission (JCS Pub 1-02, from thedefinition of amphibious operation).

14. Termination of an Amphibious Operation

a. Conditions for Termination of an Amphibious Operation.The termination of the amphibious operation is predicatedon the accomplishment of the mission of the ATF inaccordance with the specific conditions or instructions setforth in the initiating directive. The firm establishmentof the landing force ashore is usually specified as one ofthese conditions.

I-9

b. Landing Force Established Ashore. The landing force isregarded as firmly established ashore when in the opinionof the landing force commander:

(1) The force beachhead has been secured (see ChapterIV, paragraph 13).

(2) Sufficient tactical and supporting forces havebeen established ashore to ensure the continuouslanding of troops and materiel requisite for subsequentoperations.

(3) Command, communications, and supporting armscoordination facilities have been established ashore.

(4) The CLF has stated that he is ready to assume fullresponsibility for subsequent operations.

c. Commander, Amphibious Task Force, and Commander, LandingForce, Jointly Decide. When the CATF and the CLF aresatisfied that the aforementioned conditions have been met,the CATF will report these facts to higher authoritydesignated in the initiating directive. This authoritywill then terminate the amphibious operation, dissolve theamphibious task force, and provide additional instructionsas required, including command arrangements and dispositionof forces.

I-10

CHAPTER II

ORGANIZATION AND COMMAND

1. Introduction. The task organization formed to conduct anamphibious operation is the amphibious task force (ATF). TheATF always includes Navy forces and a landing force, each ofwhich may have organic aviation. USTRANSCOM forces (MilitaryAirlift Command (MAC) and Military Sealift Command (MSC))provide aircraft and ships that may be included whenappropriate.

2. Purpose and Scope. This chapter describes organizationalarrangements unique to landing forces in amphibious operations,and the nature of command relationships necessary to ensureunity of command. Organizational forms and commandrelationships change markedly during the five phases of theamphibious operation. Accordingly, the various organizationsof the landing force and applicable relationships for eachphase are described. The reader should refer to Chapter 2, JCSPub 3-02, for information not included herein on theorganization of Navy forces. Chapters VI through X of thispublication provide information on command and control of thelanding force in the major functional areas of intelligence,supporting arms, communications, and combat service support.

3. General

a. Basis of Organization. The considerations that governorganization of forces for any combat operation apply toamphibious operations. However, organization for theexecution of the amphibious operation reflects theinterrelationship at every level between the tasks of thelanding force, the corresponding naval forces, andparticipating Air Force forces. The task organization ofthe ATF is based primarily on the requirement forestablishing the landing force ashore.

b. Organizational Requirements. No standard organizationis applicable to all situations that may be encountered inconducting an amphibious operation. The task organizationof the ATF as a whole must meet the requirements ofembarkation, movement to the objective area, protection,landing, and the support of the landing force. Flexibilityof task grouping is essential.

II-1

c. Parallel Commands. The interrelationship of Navy andlanding force tasks during the planning for and executionof the amphibious operation requires the establishment ofparallel chains of command and corresponding commanders atall levels of the ATF organization.

4. Responsibilities

a. Commander, Amphibious Task Force. Regardless of thecomposition of the amphibious task force, the CATF is aNavy officer designated in the initiating directive.

b. Commander, Landing Force. The commander of all troopcomponents within the landing force is the CLF, who is alsodesignated in the initiating directive.

c. Subordinate Commanders. Commanders of subordinate taskgroups within the ATF, if not named in the initiatingdirective, are designated by the CATF or CLF as appropriate.

d. US Air Force Forces. If Air Force forces are assigned,their commander, an Air Force officer, will be designatedin the initiating directive.

5. Planning Considerations. The initiating directive(discussed in paragraph 10 of this chapter) is the basis for anamphibious operation. Both the CATF and CLF may have beeninformed of the prospective operation in advance and may haveassisted in drafting the directive. Preliminary planning,including initial staff estimates, may commence before thedirective is officially received.

6. Organizational and Command Considerations. Theinterrelation of Navy and landing force tasks during theplanning for and execution of the amphibious operation requiresthe establishment of parallel chains of command andcorresponding commanders at all levels of the ATForganization. The following fundamental considerations governthe application of such a system of parallel command:

a. Commander, Amphibious Task Force. Except during theplanning phase, the CATF, a Navy officer, is responsiblefor the operation and exercises that degree of authorityover the entire force necessary to ensure success of theoperation.

b. Component Commanders. The amphibious task force andlanding force commanders are on a corresponding level ofcommand with regard to their respective components.

II-2

c. Corresponding Commanders. Corresponding commanders areestablished at each subordinate level of both Navy andlanding force task groups or elements.

d. Navy Forces Matters. Matters of command that affectonly Navy forces are dealt with by the CATF through theNavy chain of command.

e. Landing Forces Matters. Matters of command that affectonly the landing forces are dealt with by the CLF throughthe landing force chain of command. Administrative controlof landing force units remains with the parent Service(s)providing the forces.

f. Matters of Mutual Concern. Matters of command thataffect both the Navy force and the landing force are dealtwith through the corresponding Navy and landing forcechains of command. Commanders at all levels are requiredto maintain a close and continuous relationship to ensurethat, except in emergencies, no commander makes decisionsaffecting corresponding commanders without consultation.In such cases, the commander making an emergency decisionwill notify corresponding commanders of his action at theearliest practicable time.

g. Air Force Forces. When Air Force forces are assignedto the ATF, they will be organized as a separate force orcomponent under the command of an Air Force officer. TheAir Force commander, with respect to his own forces,exercises command similar to that exercised by the CLF andthe CATF, subject to the overall command authority of theCATF. When the criteria for establishment of a joint taskforce are met, a joint ATF will be formed, and the AirForce commander will provide appropriate Air Forcerepresentation to the joint ATF commander.

h. Organic Aviation. Organic Navy and landing forceaviation will be organized as subordinate task groups orelements of the Navy and landing forces respectively.

i. Special Command Arrangements. Detailed provisionscovering special command arrangements not otherwiseprovided for herein must be clearly specified for eachoperation. Such information is normally included in theinitiating directive for the operation.

II-3

7. Basic Planning Considerations

a. Supportability. Because immediate responsibility forthe conduct of landing force operations ashore is vested inthe CLF, the planning and execution of the landing andassault are primarily his concern. Participation of othercomponents in the assault consists generally of providingsupport for the landing force. This participation involvesthe analysis of landing force proposals to determine theirsupportability from the standpoint of the ATF as a whole.The capability of providing necessary support is a primaryfactor in evaluating and concurring in proposed landingforce plans and concepts.

b. Organizational Forms. An essential understanding isthat the basic tactical organization, or organization forcombat of the landing force is a task organizationpredicated on the tactical plan. The organization forlanding in turn is a temporary task organization employedduring the ship-to-shore movement portion of the assault.The organization for embarkation is an administrativegrouping of forces for movement, which must support theplan for landing and the plan for tactical operationsashore.

8. Landing Force Organization

a. Composition. The landing force comprises the troopunits, aviation and ground, assigned to conduct theamphibious assault. When used in this publication,"landing force" designates the highest landing forceechelon. The CLF is the senior landing force officer inthe amphibious task force.

b. Joint or Combined Landing Forces. In some cases, thelanding force may include forces from more than one Serviceand/or more than one nation. In such cases, the commanderwould be designated commander, joint landing force orcommander, combined landing force, as applicable.Relationships between commanders of the Service or nationalcomponents, if not specified in the initiating directive,are arranged during the planning phase.

c. Functions of Landing Force Organization. The landingforce is specially organized for the following functions:

(1) Embarkation of troops, equipment, and supplies.

II-4

(2) Debarkation and landing of troops by air and/orsurface units.

(3) Conduct of assault operations.

(4) Naval surface fire support.

(5) Provision and control of air support.

(6) Discharge of cargo from assault shipping, andlanding and movement of materiel across the beaches orinto helicopter landing zones.

(7) Operation and tactical employment of organicamphibious vehicles and/or aircraft.

d. Organization for Amphibious Assault. The amphibiousassault demands that the landing force, at various timesduring every operation, be organized in one of threefunctional forms, the latter two of which are peculiar toamphibious operations alone.

(1) The Basic Tactical Organization (Organization for Combat). The conventional organization of the landingforce units for combat, involving various combinationsof ground and aviation combat, combat support, andcombat service support units for accomplishment ofmissions ashore. This organizational form is employedas soon as possible during that battle for thebeachhead following the landing of the various assaultcomponents of the landing force.

(2) The Organization for Landing. The specifictactical grouping of forces for an assault, employedduring the ship-to-shore movement.

(3) The Organization for Embarkation. Theadministrative grouping of forces for embarkation andmovement to the objective area. It includes, in anyvessel or embarkation group, the task organization isestablished for landing as well as additional forcesembarked for purposes of transportation, labor, or fordistribution to achieve a maximum of security.

9. Command Relationships

a. Planning Phase. As directed by higher authority,component commanders of the ATF, at the beginning of theplanning phase, report for planning purposes to the CATF

II-5

who is responsible for the preparation of the overall planfor the amphibious operation. The CATF serves as thecoordinating authority for the conduct of planning. Duringplanning, matters on which the CATF and the CLF andcommanders of other forces are unable to agree are referredto their common superior for decision. (See Figure II-1.)

b. Embarkation, Rehearsal, and Movement Phases

(1) Components Reporting to the CATF. At the timespecified by the appropriate authority, the variouscomponent commanders of the ATF report to CATF foroperations. In the case of the landing force, thisreporting is usually at the time of embarkation unlessotherwise stated in the initiating directive.Commanders of other forces may report at various timesfor operations; for example, upon their arrival in theamphibious objective area.

(2) Commander, Amphibious Task Force, Responsibilityfor Operations. The CATF, upon embarkation of thelanding forces, assumes responsibility for the entireforce and for the operation, and is vested with thecommensurate command authority to ensure success of theoperation. (See Figure II-2.)

(3) Exercise of Command Authority. The CATF exercisescommand authority through the commanders of the taskorganization. The latter, in turn, exercise theirauthority through their own chains of command.

(4) Subordinate Navy Commanders. No Navy commanderother than the CATF exercises authority over, orassumes responsibility for, the operations of landingforce units, except where a Navy commander below theATF level has been designated as commander of asubordinate force composed of Navy and landing forceunits. (See subparagraph II-09d.)

(5) Forward-Deployed Landing Forces. An afloatforward-deployed landing force commander will normallyretain an equal status with the commander of theamphibious task force in whose ships he is embarkedwith regard to planning for amphibious operations.Operational control of the landing force is vested inthe CATF as specified by the initiating directive or bya common senior commander directing the conduct of aspecific operation or exercise. Such transitions incommand relationships should be stipulated in the

II-6

II-7

Figure II-1. Command Relationships in an Amphibious Task Force During the Planning Phase

Figure II-2. Command Relationships in an Amphibious Task Force During Operations

original letter of instruction or activation order forthe afloat forward-deployed landing force. (Foradditional information on forward-deployed landingforces, see Chapter XX.)

(6) Authority of a Ship’s Commanding Officer. Nothingin the foregoing is to be construed as affecting theparamount authority of a commander of a naval ship oraircraft over persons embarked therein in mattersaffecting the safety and good order of the ship oraircraft, or the authority of a senior officer presentto act in an emergency.

c. Assault Phase

(1) Commander, Amphibious Task Force, Authority in Amphibious Objective Area. Within the amphibious objectivearea, the CATF is given specific command authority, asprescribed by the joint force commander having overallauthority for the operation. CATF will exercisecontrol, as prescribed in the initiating directive,over forces not a part of the ATF when such forces areoperating within the amphibious objective area afterthe arrival of the advance force or the ATF. When suchforces are merely passing through the amphibiousobjective area, control will be exercised only to theextent of preventing or minimizing mutual interference.

(2) Commander Landing Force Authority Ashore. Subjectto the overall authority of the CATF, responsibilityfor the conduct of operations ashore, and for thesecurity of all personnel and installations locatedwithin the area of operations ashore, is vested in theCLF.

d. Alternative Relationships

(1) Organization of Subordinate Task Groups. Whenrequired, subordinate task groups are established asfollows:

(a) Attack Group. An attack group is asubordinate task organization of the Navy forcesof an amphibious task force. It is composed ofassault shipping and supporting naval unitsdesignated to transport, protect, land, andinitially support a landing group.

II-8

II-9

(b) Landing Group. A landing group is composed of especially organized, trained, and equipped troops, including aviation units when assigned, and is capable of conducting landing operations against a position or group of positions so located as to permit their capture by troops operating under a single tactical command.

(2) Delegation of Command Authority. While the CATF exercises command authority over the entire ATF, command authority may be delegated to a subordinate Navy attack group commander over a corresponding landing group commander. The conditions for such delegation of authority would exist when:

(a) Multiple Attack and Landing Groups. Simultaneous or nearly simultaneous assaults are conducted in areas so widely separated as to preclude effective control by a single tactical commander. This condition requires the formation of two or more attack groups and corresponding landing groups. (See Figure II-3.)

Figure II-3. Command Relationships During Operations When Command Authority Has Been Delegated to Attack Group Commanders to Conduct Simultaneous or Nearly Simultaneous Landings Over Widely Separated Beaches

II-10

(b) Advance Force. Separate operations are conducted by a detached portion of the ATF, such as the operations of an advance force with a corresponding landing force. (See Figure II-4.)

Figure II-4. Command Relationships During Operations When Command Authority Has Been Delegated to a Subordinate Navy Commander (Advance Force Commander) to Conduct Separate

Operations Over Widely Separated Beaches (c) Single Tactical Commander. When attack groups and landing groups are formed to conduct an amphibious assault over separated beaches that are sufficiently close together to permit control by a single tactical commander, it will not be necessary to delegate command authority. (See Figure II-5.)

II-11

Figure II-5. Command Relationships During Operations When Command Authority Has Not Been Delegated to Attack Group Commanders

e. Supporting Operations. Operations conducted in conjunction with the amphibious assault by forces other than those assigned to the ATF are classified as supporting operations. A directive for one force to support another does not effect a transfer of command or of operational control with respect to the forces concerned but does automatically require that:

(1) Supported Force. The commander of the supported force indicate in detail to the supporting commander the support missions he wishes to have fulfilled and provide the information necessary for complete coordination of the supporting action with the action of his own force.

(2) Supporting Force. The commander of the supporting force ascertain the requirements of the supported force and take such action to fulfill them as is within his capabilities, consistent with the priorities and requirements of other assigned tasks.

(3) Coordination. Both commanders plan theiroperations in closest coordination to take maximumadvantage of their respective capabilities andcontemplated actions.

10. The Initiating Directive

a. Directive. The initiating directive is an orderdirected to the CATF to conduct an amphibious operation.It is issued by the commander delegated overallresponsibility for the operation. Copies are furnished toall major subordinate commanders.

b. Form of Initiating Directive. The initiating directivemay take the form of a campaign plan, an operation plan, oran order to execute an already existing plan or order. Theinitiating directive:

(1) Provides for the establishment of an ATF, theassignment of a mission, and the necessary forces toaccomplish the mission.

(2) Designates the CATF, the CLF, and other commandersas appropriate.

(3) Provides special instructions on commandrelationships, if required.

(4) Positively defines the amphibious objective areawithin which is located the area or areas to be securedby the ATF. The amphibious objective area isdelineated by the initiating directive in terms of sea,land, and air space. The size of the amphibiousobjective area, dictated by the requirements of aspecific operation, must be sufficient to ensureaccomplishment of the ATF mission, and providesufficient area for the conduct of necessary air, land,and sea operations.

(5) Provides a code name and sets target dates forexecution of the operation.

(6) Contains special instructions as required,pertaining to the employment, allocation, and controlof nuclear and chemical weapons, and planning therefore.

II-12

(7) Includes:

(a) Positive instructions governing thetermination of the amphibious operation and, iffeasible, command arrangements and disposition offorces to be effective at that time.

(b) Information regarding operations to beconducted after termination of the amphibiousoperation.

(8) Provides information or assigns responsibility, asappropriate, for the conduct of combat, logistics,intelligence, or special operations related to or insupport of the amphibious operation, and coordinatinginstructions pertaining thereto.

(9) Provides appropriate instruction in operationalsecurity and signal security with respect to release ofclassified information via non secure means. In thisregard, such instruction will be provided beforecommencement of the initial planning phase.

11. The Amphibious Objective Area

a. Amphibious Objective Area (AOA). A geographical area,delineated in the initiating directive for purposes ofcommand and control, within which is located theobjective(s) to be secured by the amphibious task force.This area must be of sufficient size to ensureaccomplishment of the amphibious task force’s mission andmust provide sufficient area for conducting necessary sea,air and land operations(JCS Pub 1-02).

b. Air Operations in AOA. The size and shape of the AOAis of prime importance to the aviation elements of theamphibious task force. Principal tasks of air operationswill be to gain and maintain air superiority in theobjective area and provide support to the ground forces.The CATF must be able to employ his air resources withoutthe requirement to obtain permission from adjacentcommands. He must also have the authority to coordinatethe flights of other aircraft operating in or through theAOA.

c. Factors in Determining AOA. Factors that influence thesize and shape of the AOA include:

II-13

(1) Mission assigned the ATF.

(2) Enemy threat from land, sea, and air.

(3) Location of units constituting the enemy’sreinforcing capability.

(4) Proximity of friendly forces and intensity ofmilitary activity within the area.

(5) Availability of assistance from other forces.

(6) Capability to maintain surveillance and control.

(7) Air support requirements and capabilities.

(8) Antiair warfare space requirements andcapabilities.

(9) Location of convenient coordination boundaries.

(10) Political boundaries.

(11) Sea space for the dispersion and maneuver ofamphibious task force shipping.

d. Additional Information. See STANAG 1231, "Guidance forEstablishment of an Amphibious Objective Area (AOA)" (NATORestricted) for additional information.

e. Changes to AOA. The size and shape of the AOA shouldbe reviewed as changes to these influencing factors occur.Adjustments or modifications are requested through the CATFto the authority that issued the initiating directive.

12. Airspace Control. Airspace control, as set forth in thispublication, consists of the coordination, integration, andregulation of the use of an airspace of defined proportionsthat will include the AOA. In this context, coordination isconsidered as that degree of authority necessary to achieveeffective, efficient, and flexible use of airspace without, atthe same time, providing command authority. Integrationconsiders the necessity to consolidate requirements for the useof this airspace in the interest of achieving a commonobjective at the lowest possible level of effort. Regulationindicates the requirement to supervise activities in thisairspace to provide for flight safety and connotes the

II-14

authority required to ensure such safety. Airspace control,therefore, denotes a service provided in order to permitflexibility of actions and does not include measures toapprove, disapprove, deny, or delay air operations.

a. Assignment of Airspace. For the amphibious operation,the joint force commander who orders the operation willassign to the CATF an airspace control subarea of definedproportions that will coincide with the AOA.

b. Control of Air Operations in AOA. All air operationsin the AOA will be under the control of the CATF until theamphibious operation is terminated. (See paragraph II-14below.)

c. Coordination of Air Operations With Commanders Externalto AOA. To ensure unity of effort in overall airoperations, the CATF will coordinate air operations withinthe defined airspace as necessary with the commanderresponsible for airspace control in the surrounding area.At the termination of the amphibious operation, the ATFwill be dissolved, the assigned airspace will bedisestablished, and the airspace control will normally beexercised in accordance with doctrine for control ofairspace over the combat zone by the airspace controlauthority designated for that area.

13. Airspace Control Systems. When the preponderance oftactical aviation is provided by the Air Force for theamphibious operation, an Air Force officer will be designatedby the Air Force commander of the participating Air Forceforces to direct the total air effort in the AOA. He willexercise such direction under the joint ATF commander or, whencontrol of air operations is passed ashore, under the CLF or anappropriate commander ashore who has the capability to controlsuch operations. When the preponderance of tactical aviationcomes from the Navy or Marine Corps, the overall air effort inthe objective area will be directed by a naval aviator underthe CATF until control is passed ashore. In either case, theofficer so designated will use the control system, orcombination of Air Force, Navy, or Marine Corps tactical aircontrol system elements, best suited for the amphibiousoperation.

14. Transfer of Control of Functions. As conditions warrantand as coordination agencies are established ashore, the CATFpasses control of supporting arms and air defense missilesupport to the CLF. At the discretion of the CATF, control of

II-15

air operations in the amphibious objective area is passed tothe CLF or to an appropriate commander ashore who has thecapability to control such operations. For additionalinformation, see Chapter VIII, paragraph 15 of this manual andparagraphs 737 and 1651, JCS Pub 3-02 (formerly LFM 01), "JointDoctrine for Amphibious Operations."

15. Joint Force Air Component Commander. For operationsconducted outside the AOA and or subsequent to thedisestablishment of the AOA, the joint force commander willnormally designate a joint force air component commander(JFACC). The JFACC derives authority from the joint forcecommander who has the authority to exercise operationalcontrol, assign missions, direct coordination among hissubordinate commanders, redirect and organize his forces toensure unity of effort in the accomplishment of his overallmission. The joint force air component commander’sresponsibilities will be assigned by the joint force commander(normally these would include, but not be limited to, planning,coordination, allocation and tasking based on the joint forcecommander’s apportionment decision). Using the joint forcecommander’s guidance and authority, and in coordination withother service component commanders and other assigned orsupporting commanders, the joint force air component commanderwill recommend to the joint force commander apportionment ofair sorties to various missions or geographic areas. Based onthe joint force commander’s guidance, the JFACC will beassigned the responsibility to plan and conduct overall airoperations. Further discussion of the JFACC is in JCS Pub3-01.2, "Joint Doctrine for Theater Counterair Operations."

a. US Marine Corps forces participating in joint combatoperations will provide forces and conduct jointoperations, including supporting operations, as directed bythe joint force commander.

b. The Marine Air-Ground Task Force (MAGTF) commander willretain operational control of his organic air assets (1986Omnibus agreement). The primary mission of the MAGTF aircombat element is the support of the MAGTF ground element.During joint operations, MAGTF air assets will normally bein support of the MAGTF mission. The MAGTF commander willmake sorties available to the joint force commander, fortasking through his air component commander, for airdefense, long-range interdiction, and long-rangereconnaissance. Sorties in excess of MAGTF direct supportrequirements will be provided to the joint force commanderfor tasking through the air component commander for the

II-16

support of other components of the joint task force, or ofthe joint task force as a whole. Nothing herein willinfringe on the authority of the theater or joint forcecommander, in the exercise of operational control, toassign missions, redirect efforts (e.g., thereapportionment and/or reallocation of any MAGTF TACAIRsorties when it has been determined by the joint forcecommander that they are required for higher prioritymissions), and direct coordination among his subordinatecommanders to ensure unity of effort in accomplishment ofhis overall mission, or to maintain integrity of the force,as prescribed in JCS Pub 0-2, "Unified Action Armed Forces(UNAAF)."

II-17

CHAPTER III

THE APPROACH TO PLANNING

1. Introduction. The nature of amphibious warfare gives riseto planning procedures that are both intricate and unique.Planning intricacy stems from the complex detail needed tofully coordinate the assault landing of troops, equipment, andsupplies with all available supporting arms, while ensuringthat the plan remains flexible to respond to changingcircumstances. The uniqueness of amphibious planning stemsfrom the interrelationships of ground, sea, and air forces thatsupport and sustain the assault. Concurrent, parallel, anddetailed are not mere catchwords to describe amphibiousplanning--they are doctrinal principles that embody the entireprocess.

2. Purpose and Scope. This chapter provides information of ageneral nature designed to inform senior officers of thelanding force about the nature of amphibious planning, withemphasis on the commencement of the planning process. Thischapter complements information in Chapter 3, JCS Pub 3-02,"Joint Doctrine for Amphibious Operations." The emphasis ofthe discussion that follows is on the early stages of planning;however, information applicable to the entire process isincluded. The chapter discusses planning considerations ofspecial interest to the commander, landing force (CLF) anddescribes concurrent, parallel, and detailed planning. Theinitial planning conference and the use of various planningaids are described.

a. Basic Decisions. The basic decisions of amphibiousplanning are discussed in Chapter IV.

b. Detailed Planning Requirements. Subsequent chapterscover detailed planning requirements for the majorfunctional areas.

3. General

a. Amphibious Planning Characteristics. Amphibiousplanning is a continuous process, proceeding from receiptof the initiating directive to termination of theamphibious operation. Amphibious planning procedures arecharacterized by:

(1) The necessity for concurrent, parallel, anddetailed planning by all participating forces. Theseterms are discussed in paragraphs 9, 10, and 11 below.

III-1

(2) The degree of flexibility that must beincorporated into plans to meet the exigencies ofcombat while ensuring the most effective and economicalemployment of forces. The fact that opposing forcesare not initially in contact increases the possibilityof unforeseen contingencies. No preconceived plan,however carefully prepared, can provide for everyeventuality.

b. Internal Planning Procedures. Joint Doctrine forAmphibious Operations (JCS Pub 3-02) discusses the planningprocess, including the basic decisions and functionalconsiderations for the amphibious task force (ATF) as awhole. Planning by the landing force is interwoven in theplans of all components of the ATF and other forces thatprovide support. The internal landing force planningprocess, however, will depend on the composition of theforce. The landing force may be primarily uni-Service(Army or Marine), joint, or combined. Internal command andstaff planning procedures, or steps in the planningprocess, are generally unique to each service. The CLF andhis staff must therefore provide flexible procedures thatconsider the requirements of each major element of thelanding force, while plans are developed within the overallframework prescribed by JCS Pub 3-02.

c. Landing Force Concept of Operations. The developmentof the CLF concept of operations ashore has singularimportance in the planning process. The concept ofoperations must be such that it can be supported bysurface, air, and combat service support elements, and istherefore examined by all commanders concerned forfeasibility. The landing force concept of operations mustbe concurred in by the commander, amphibious task force(CATF) before the commencement of detailed planning. It isimperative, since other planning is based on it, that thelanding force concept of operations ashore be formulatedexpeditiously. However, all commanders who provide supportfor the assault must be prepared to alter and accommodatetheir supporting plans to changing requirements of thelanding force as induced by changes in the enemy situationand other potential factors, e.g., availability of shipsand supporting forces.

4. Responsibilities

a. Commander, Amphibious Task Force, Coordinating Authority.The CATF serves as the coordinating authority for the

conduct of planning. During planning, matters on

III-2

which the CATF, CLF, and commanders of other forcesassigned to the ATF are unable to agree are referred totheir common superior for decision.

b. Specific Responsibilities. Specific planningresponsibilities of the CATF and CLF are discussed inrelation to functional areas in subsequent chapters.

(1) CATF is responsible for development of the overallATF plan to achieve the mission set forth in theinitiating directive. As the coordinating authorityfor planning, the CATF prescribes schedules andprovides guidance as necessary to meet the deadlines ofthe operation.

(2) Because immediate responsibility for the conductof operations ashore is vested in the CLF, he isresponsible for development of the landing force plan.

5. Planning Considerations. Although every operation requirescareful and detailed preparation, the amphibious operation iscomplicated by the need to coordinate in detail the actions ofground, air, and sea forces; the complexity of logisticsupport; the need for precise timing of supporting armsactivities; and the nature of the command relationships thatprovide unity of command.

6. Special Considerations

a. Landing Force Concerns. Establishment of a lodgementby amphibious assault requires the projection ofsignificant forces against a hostile or potentially hostileshore. Factors such as the need for a favorable ratio ofcombat power, gaining air superiority and naval supremacy,and attaining strategic or tactical surprise will beforemost concerns in developing the plan for tacticaloperations. Additionally, however, the CLF must also beconcerned with the deployment of his entire force into thearea of operations and its logistic support. The CLF, inaddition to developing plans to employ forces tactically,has responsibility to consider such matters as thefollowing:

(1) Availability of forces assigned: troop list,readiness conditions, equipment shortages, activationschedules of subordinate headquarters, and replacements.

(2) Plans for absorbing or being absorbed by otherforces (compositing).

III-3

(3) Deployment: air, sealift, and other supportrequired for movement of forces to and through ports ofembarkation and debarkation; movement echelons requiredto phase forces into the AOA.

(4) Airfield support requirements external to theAOA: en route staging and support requirements forself-deploying aviation elements.

(5) Joint and combined operations: supportrequirements of other assigned or attached forces(logistics, intelligence, communications); command andcontrol arrangements.

(6) Political considerations: host-nation support,rules of engagement, treaties, status of forces,operational restraints (overflight restrictions, etc.).

b. Other Planning Concerns. Subsequent chapters provideinformation on planning for major functional areas,focusing on the differences between amphibious operationsand land combat. Other elements of planning that do notdiffer significantly from traditional land combat planningare not discussed in detail. However, the force multipliereffect, and the necessity to develop plans for all aspectsof the operation, must not be neglected. These importantareas, not discussed in detail, include:

(1) Psychological operations.

(2) Electronic warfare.

(3) Deception.

(4) Civil affairs.

(5) Operational security.

(6) Defensive operations, including rear areasecurity, nuclear, chemical, and biological defense,and antimechanized and antiair planning.

7. Basic Considerations

a. Complexity. Landing force planning is of a greatercomplexity than other operational planning where forces ofcomparable size are employed. Actions of each element ofthe landing force must be coordinated and actions of Navy

III-4

and other supporting forces must be fully integrated andcoordinated to achieve the decisive result. Logisticsupport must initially sustain the operation from aseabase; facilities ashore may have to be developed orrehabilitated shortly after the initial assault. Theship-to-shore movement of troops, equipment, and suppliesby helicopter, surface, and amphibious craft requirescomplex detail to ensure efficient use of assets, whilerapidly developing combat power ashore. The coordinatedemployment of all available supporting arms must becarefully orchestrated to achieve maximum effect.

b. Relation to Other Operations. Planning for a specificoperation is usually related to previous, current, andcontemplated operations. For this reason, particular caremust be taken to ensure that adequate instructions areissued to prevent mutual interference.

c. Continuous Nature. Planning does not end with theplanning phase, but continues throughout the operation inresponse to changing conditions and circumstances.

d. Flexibility. The complexity and detail inherent toamphibious planning does not imply that the operation planwill be executed in an inflexible manner. Rather, the planmust be flexible, capable of being altered in response tothe changing enemy situation or opportunities that arise inbattle. The development of alternate plans, provisions toshift the weight of supporting fires, and ability to employthe reserve at the critical time and place promoteflexibility.

e. Inverse Planning. Ideally, planning for the amphibiousoperation is "backwards" or "inverse" planning. That is,given the situation and mission, tactical operations ashoreare planned first, then steps necessary to achieve thedesired tactical posture are planned. For example, thetask organization of forces for combat is developed tosupport the landing force commander’s concept of operationsashore. Next, an organization for landing is developedthat, employs the available assets (helicopters, amphibiousvehicles, landing craft) to facilitate the formation of thedesired organization for combat once ashore. Finally, theorganization for embarkation is developed, which enhancesdispersed security (spread loading) yet enables theformation of the organization for landing. Inverseplanning results in the optimum force and economy of effortfor a specific operation.

III-5

f. Forward-Deployed Forces. In some situations, a landingforce is already afloat; i.e., forward deployed when theinitiating directive is received. For example, relativelysmall-size landing forces are continuously forward-deployed. Larger size landing forces may be forwarddeployed during exercises or in times of crisis. In suchcases, planners must consider and resolve any constraintsthat may be imposed by the afloat deployed posture.Examples include the need for additional assets not organicto the force, or the need to shift forces, equipment, orsupplies within the assigned shipping.

(1) Small-size landing forces that are continuouslydeployed afloat are configured for a variety ofoperations within their capabilities. The embarkedconfiguration of such forces will generally not be alimiting factor for small scale-operations.

(2) Small-size landing forces generally do not havethe requisite combat power to execute an amphibiousassault or, in the event of commitment, the ability tosustain combat operations ashore. These forces mayhave to merge with other forces before an assaultlanding, or absorb or be absorbed by other forcesshortly after the initial assault. A compositing offorces before the assault may require transfer betweenships of troops and equipment (cross-decking), orrearrangement of the embarked configuration in afriendly port.

(3) The embarked configuration of larger size forces,deployed for exercises or in times of crisis, mayrequire adjustment or augmentation before an assault.

g. Time Factor. The time necessary for planning anamphibious operation depends on many variable factors,including the number, diversity, and physical separation ofunits involved, the magnitude and complexity of theoperation, and the experience of the forces involved. Thetime required for amphibious planning can therefore initself be regarded as a planning factor. The time lapsebetween initiation of amphibious planning and execution maypreclude accurate assessment of logistic, operational, andintelligence situations on the day of assault. Thisproblem, inherent in amphibious operations, can beminimized by the creation of standing operating procedurescovering those aspects of the assault that can bestandardized. Problems can be further diminished bycontinuous planning and by flexibility of the plans.

III-6

h. Security. Operational security (OPSEC) is theresponsibility of all echelons of command. The assembly ofstaffs, embarkation, and rehearsals all tend to disclosethe nature of projected operations. Commencing withinitial planning, a vigorous OPSEC program must beinitiated.

i. Estimating Requirements. Estimation of overallrequirements is a process that begins during preliminaryplanning and is continually refined throughout the periodof the operation. Estimates of requirements influence thebasic decisions, the estimates of supportability of coursesof action, and the concept of operations. Additionally,they provide focus and a basis for detailed planning.Estimates are prepared by the staff in such areas as:

(1) Amphibious lift capacity and landing force liftrequirements. (See subparagraph 12c below.)

(2Allocation of landing force elements to the assaultechelon and assault follow-on echelon. (See Chapter V,subparagraph 7c, and Chapter XI, subparagraph 3b.)

(3) Naval gunfire and artillery support requirements.

(4) Aviation support requirements.

(5) Combat service support requirements.

j. Allocation of Resources. In the development of plansfor an amphibious operation, the means initially availablewill seldom satisfy stated requirements. For this reason,the reconciliation of these real and potential shortfallscontinues throughout the planning cycle. Thisreconciliation normally takes the form of procuringadditional means or reducing requirements in excess of themeans available, with consequent modification of the otherdecisions as necessary.

8. Planning Procedures. Amphibious planning procedures aredistinguished by the necessity for concurrent, parallel, anddetailed planning by all participating forces.

a. Concurrent Planning

(1) Concurrent Planning. Concurrent planning is thatplanning conducted simultaneously by two or moreechelons of the same command, or by correspondingechelons of different commands. For example,

III-7

concurrent planning is that conducted simultaneously bya regiment and its battalions; and by the groundcomponent and a supporting air and/or combat servicesupport component. Concurrent planning is necessary to:

(a) Reduce the overall time required to prepareplans by all forces and echelons involved.

(b) Ensure coordination of plan development atall levels. Interdependent problems must beresolved in order for planning to proceedsmoothly. For example, allocation of availableamphibious shipping, landing means, fire supportships, and aircraft cannot be finally determineduntil the plans of subordinate elements of thelanding force are sufficiently advanced to providea basis for evaluating total requirements.Further, decisions reached by the CLF are ofteninfluenced by recommendations submitted bysubordinate commanders throughout the planningphase.

(2) Commencement of Planning. Initially, planning maybe originated by subordinate commanders on the basis ofpreliminary information announced at planningconferences and briefings before the issuance ofwritten planning documents. Planning memorandums,warning orders, guidance, and outline plans provideadditional means for disseminating fragmentary planninginformation and are encouraged. (See paragraphs 13-16below.)

b. Parallel Planning

(1) Parallel Planning. Planning by parallel chains ofcommand refers to the close and continuous coordinationbetween corresponding Navy and landing force echelons.This coordination is essential because of theinterrelationships of tasks assigned to the forces andthe complexity of support requirements. Basicdecisions are reached on the basis of a commonunderstanding of objectives and procedures and arebased on a free exchange of information. This closecoordination in planning is essential at all commandlevels. Examples of parallel planning are thecorresponding staffs in the Navy and landing forcechains that must work in close harmony throughout theoperation. At lower levels, parallel planning occursbetween ships’ officers and officers of the landingforce responsible to embark a team or element aboardthe ship.

III-8

(a) Parallel planning at higher command levelsbegins when the CLF reports for planning to theCATF at the inception of the planning phase.

(b) At subordinate levels, planning usuallycannot begin until certain basic decisions havebeen announced by the CATF and CLF.

(2) Exchange of Information and Liaison Officers.Parallel and concurrent planning favors the assembly ofcommanders and staffs of corresponding echelons in thesame locality. If such an arrangement is notpracticable, the exchange of liaison officers qualifiedto perform essential planning is necessary.

c. Detailed Planning

(1) Detailed Planning. The term "detailed planning"relates to a phase of planning as well as to thecomplexity of the operation order. In developing theplan for an amphibious assault, detailed planningformally commences with the approval of the landingforce commander’s concept of operations; thus detailedplanning is definitive in nature as opposed toconceptual planning.

(a) The complexity of the operation order issituation dependent. What is adequately detailedfor one operation may not suffice in another.

(b) Care must be taken in the development ofplans not to overly constrain or restrict theflexibility of subordinate commanders. Therequirements of ship-to-shore movement planning tosupport the CLF concept of operations ashore will,however, constrain the latitude of subordinatecommanders during the initial assault.

(2) Flexibility. Detailed planning should promote,rather than inhibit, flexibility. Planners shouldforesee the likely possibilities and develop plans thatare responsive to changing conditions. Detailedplanning should enable commanders at all levels toadjust rapidly to the situation and take advantage ofopportunities on the battlefield. Detailed planningshould enable planned fires to be shifted, forces enroute to be landed on alternate beaches or landingzones, and on-call waves to be landed when and whereneeded.

III-9

(3) Worst-Case Planning. Amphibious planners cannottake the risk that a landing will be administrative,conducted in a permissive environment, or againstlightly armed forces. The availability ofsophisticated, lethal weaponry, and the ability ofmodern enemy forces to reinforce threatened areas withmechanized, airborne, amphibious forces, or airpower,can rapidly change the ratio of combat power. Thus,planners must consider and provide for these worst-casesituations.

9. The Planning Process. This section provides information onthe initial phases of the planning process and describes basicdocuments employed in amphibious planning.

a. Exchange of Information. In amphibious planning,decisions by a commander at one level may affect the plansof other commanders on the same or other levels. In orderto keep all commanders and staffs fully informed during theplanning phase, there must be early and continuousdissemination of planning data by each commander to hissenior, subordinate, and corresponding echelon commanders.The early exchange of liaison officers is desirable.

b. Initial Studies and Estimates

(1) Commanders who will provide forces for theamphibious task force are often alerted to theimpending operation before the issuance of theinitiating directive. Valuable preliminary planning isaccomplished at this time by an analysis of the area ofoperations and the possible effects of terrain,hydrography, weather, and cultural features on theproposed operation. The most favorable areas forexecuting the landing are tentatively determined andadditional intelligence requirements identified.Studies of beaches, ports, communication networks,existing air facilities, and terrain provide an initialbasis for determining the number and types of landingforce elements that can be accommodated and supportedwithin possible landing areas. On the basis of thesesame studies, engineer and service support requirementsare estimated. The intelligence necessary to supportpreliminary planning is contained in intelligencepublications and studies furnished by higherheadquarters.

III-10

(2) The initial estimates prepared by the landingforce staff or the major components of the landingforce should consider the following:

(a) Broad enemy situation and enemy capabilities.

(b) General topographical, hydrographic, orclimatic considerations.

(c) Location of key facilities in the objectivearea.

(d) Location of advanced air bases within rangeof the objective area.

(e) Significant capabilities and limitations ofthe landing forces, shipping, and relative combatpower.

c. Format. The operation plan or operation order for anamphibious operation is prepared in the Joint OperationPlanning System (JOPS) format. Specific instructions and asample plan are in Naval Warfare Publication (NWP)22-1/FMFM 1-14, The Amphibious Task Force Plan. Elementsof the plan are customarily referred to by functionaltitle; e.g., landing plan, embarkation plan, air plan.These elements are annexes and appendixes within theoverall landing force or amphibious task force plan oroperation order.

(1) To the extent possible, annexes and appendixesprepared by one component are incorporated withoutmodification by other components of the landing force,and in the overall ATF and landing force plans aswell. Incorporating these annexes and appendixesensures commonality, saves time, and eases theadministrative effort necessary to assemble theoperation order.

(2) Initially, the plans and orders of subordinateelements of the landing force will be less completethan those prepared at the landing force level.

(3) The landing plan is normally contained in Annex R.

10. The Initiating Directive. As described in Chapter II, theinitiating directive commences the planning process. Thedirective may take many forms, from a letter of instruction, toan order to execute an existing plan, to an operation plan orcampaign plan.

III-11

11. Early Designation of Commanders and Assembly of Staffs.To expedite the preparation of plans within the amphibious taskforce, all major commanders, particularly the CATF, the CLF,and, when appropriate, the Air Force commander, should bedesignated as soon as the decision has been reached to conductan amphibious operation. Commanders at the next echelon belowthe ATF or landing force level of command must receive at leastfragmentary planning instructions as early as practicable.Planning can be facilitated by the assembly of these next lowerechelon commanders, with their staffs, in the same locality forcoordinated planning.

12. Initial Planning Conference. Whenever practicable, theCATF will convene an initial planning conference shortly afterreceipt of the initiating directive. The CLF reports forplanning to the CATF (the coordinating authority) at thistime. The conference provides the opportunity for key officersto establish liaison, discuss preliminary issues, and ensurecommon understanding of the situation and amphibious task forcemission. Decisions made at the initial planning conferenceestablish the basis for concurrent and parallel planning. Theinitial planning conference may consider the following agendaitems:

a. Analysis of the Initiating Directive. The initiatingdirective is reviewed in such areas as the specified andimplied tasks contained in the mission, the forcesassigned, the size and shape of the AOA, target dates, etc.

b. Basic Decisions. The process of making basic decisionsis discussed in detail in Chapter IV. The initial planningconference may consider each of the decisions. It may bepossible to reach agreement on certain decisions at theinitial planning conference, including:

(1) General course of action.

(2) ATF objectives.

(3) Landing force mission.

(4) Landing sites.

c. Amphibious Lift Capacity and Landing Force Lift Requirements

(1) Lift Requirements. The total lift capacity ofassigned amphibious shipping must be compared at theoutset of planning with the total lift requirements of

III-12

the landing force. If the capacity is inadequate,additional shipping may be requested. However, theavailability of shipping is likely to be a majorconstraint in any amphibious operation. The CATFprovides information on lift capacity to the CLF. Thisenables the CLF to develop a general structure for theassault echelon, identify probable shortfalls, andconsider allocation of forces and materiel fortransportation by the assault follow-on echelon or bystrategic airlift. Computer-assisted models may beuseful in making these comparisons.

(2) Structure of the Landing Force. The generalstructure of the landing force must be determined earlyin the planning process so that the CLF will know thebroad composition of the combat power available for theassault. This early determination does not imply thatthe composition of the force will not change--itsstructure is dynamic and continually refined duringplanning. As planning proceeds, answers to morespecific questions will be necessary in order for theCLF to develop courses of action and develop theconcept of operations for the landing force. Forexample:

(a) Comparison of available helicopter deckspaces with helicopters in landing force aviation.

(b) Single lift capability of helicopters in theassault echelon.

(c) Single lift capability of amphibious assaultvehicles.

(d) Capability to preboat tanks, artillery, andother critical combat equipment.

(e) Landing craft availability by type and number.

d. Supporting Operations. The initial planning conferencemay also involve a preliminary consideration of preassaultoperations, subsidiary landings, deception, and supportingoperations. It is not possible to make firm decisions atthis time but it is not too early to open discussions. Theuse of the sea echelon concept (see Appendix) fororganizing the sea area and the extent of any rehearsalsare also areas of mutual concern. However, these decisionsmay have to be deferred until later in the planningsequence.

III-13

e. Information Requirements. Solutions to problemsencountered during the planning process will requireanswers to questions posed by planning staffs at allechelons. Many of these questions will be intelligencerelated, dependent on current information, and oftenexpressed as essential elements of information or otherintelligence requirements. The overall commander or theCATF will issue guidance that generally is concerned withintelligence in the objective area or the conduct of othercurrent military operations. Upon receipt of planningguidance or on his own initiative, the CLF, through theCATF, informs higher headquarters and supportingintelligence agencies of the specific intelligencerequirements that cannot be met by his organic intelligencemeans. As these requirements are fulfilled, the agencydeveloping the intelligence passes it on to the commandersconcerned. Development of new intelligence requirementsand dissemination of new and supplementary intelligence inthe objective area are continuous throughout the planningprocess.

f. Liaison Officers. The initial planning conferenceprovides the opportunity for key officers to establishliaison. In addition, the exchange of liaison officersbetween and among the major components of the ATF isencouraged to facilitate mutual understanding and aidcoordination efforts.

13. Planning Aids. Planning directives, schedules, andmemorandums are prepared to focus planning, ensure commonunderstanding, and meet time constraints.

a. Planning Directive. A planning directive is issued bythe CATF to ensure that interdependent plans arecoordinated and completed in the time allowed and thatimportant aspects are not overlooked. The planningdirective specifies the principal plans to be prepared andsets a deadline for the completion of each major step inthe planning process. The planning directive is preparedby the staff of the CATF in coordination with the staff ofthe CLF and other force commanders, as appropriate, inorder to realistically reflect the capabilities of allcommanders to complete their planning tasks.

b. Planning Program. Using the ATF planning directive asa guide, the CLF prepares his planning program, whichcontains the schedule of planning events for his force.Similarly, major elements of the landing force may issue

III-14

their own planning programs, if warranted. The planningprogram may also be used to provide planning guidance forsubordinate commanders.

c. Planning Schedule. A planning schedule may be includedin the planning directive or issued alone to indicate theplanning program. It graphically shows the specific periodof time allowed for the completion of each planning task.Each section of the staff can, in turn, prepare its ownplanning schedule based on the deadlines prescribed. Thetime period set in planning schedules should be sufficientto permit timely completion of assigned tasks as well ascoordination with other interested staff sections andheadquarters.

d. Planning Memorandums. When information becomesavailable and as additional guidance and instructions arereceived, commanders issue planning memorandums in advanceof the preparation of formal plans. These memorandums aredesigned to ensure that subordinate commanders possess alldetails that affect their own planning.

e. Distribution of Drafts. Drafts of operation plans andorders, or portions thereof (such as annexes andappendixes), should be distributed to other commanders, asappropriate, in order to keep them abreast of currentplanning for the operation.

14. Planning Guidance

a. Commander, Landing Force, Initial Guidance. The CLFlanding force will provide initial guidance to his staff assoon as possible, before or after receipt of the initiatingdirective, and preferably before the initial planningconference conducted by the CATF. This guidance will beincomplete, but is developed and expanded as moreinformation is obtained. Initial guidance should precedethe preparation of staff estimates and should be designedto minimize unnecessary staff effort, while emphasizingareas of concern.

b. Sources of Planning Guidance. Planning guidance isderived from a consideration of the information containedin the initiating directive and/or instructions that mayhave been received. This guidance is the commander’sassistance to his staff in preparing or revising theirestimates. In addition, concurrent planning at subordinatelevels of command, and by corresponding echelons of

III-15

different commands, is based on this preliminaryinformation. The CLF planning guidance for the amphibiousoperation may take a wide variety of forms, but shouldconsider all aspects of the operation. Guidance mayinclude:

(1) Restatement of the ATF-LF mission, including thespecified and implied tasks.

(2) Assumptions.

(3) Previous decisions and policies or restrictions.

(4) Analysis of relative combat power (air and ground)with any identified enemy strengths and weaknesses.

(5) Requirement to divide the operation into phases.

(6) Nuclear and chemical fire support guidance.

(7) Mine warfare guidance and policy.

(8) Ground maneuver guidance.

(a) Broad courses of action that the commanderdesires to be considered.

(b) Key terrain.

(c) Tactical determinations (night landing, etc.).

(9) Aviation guidance

(a) Use of advance bases.

(b) Participation of landing force aviation inpre-D-day operations.

(c) Deployment of aviation into the landing area.

(d) Air defense.

(10) Combat service support guidance.

(a) Requirements, priorities, and allocation ofresources.

III-16

(b) Facility construction or rehabilitationrequirements.

(c) Levels of supplies ashore.

(11) Security considerations.

(a) Deception.

(b) Electronic warfare.

(c) Communications security (COMSEC).

(d) OPSEC.

(12) Essential elements of information.

15. Outline Plan. Following preparation of detailed staffestimates based on courses of action proposed, the CLF makeshis estimate of the situation and decision. That decisionprovides the basis for development of the concept of operationsand the operation plan or order. Once the landing forceconcept of operations ashore has been approved, detailedplanning commences. An outline plan may be issued to provideadditional planning factors needed by planners at all echelons,as well as to issue the concept of operations and provide anynecessary amplification.

a. Contents. The outline plan should include the mission,concept of operations, phasing, general task organization,zones of action, fire support, basic undertakings, andscope of initial and subsequent operations.

b. Relation to Basic Decisions. The outline plan shouldalso provide information to assist in the resolution of anybasic decisions that have not been made; e.g., landingbeaches, landing zones, drop zones, date, and hour oflanding.

16. Alternate Plans

a. Plans. An operation plan is developed from a singlecourse of action that is selected by the CLF in theestimate process. Should subsequent events invalidate anassumption on which a plan is based, the decision toexecute the plan and, consequently, the plan itself must bemodified. Alternate plans provide for this modificationand give the commander the flexibility to shift rapidly andefficiently from one course of action to another. The twotypes of alternate plans are:

III-17

(1) Alternate Course of Action. An alternate plan maybe developed based on a course of action considered butnot selected in the commander’s decision process. Inother words, it will provide a different plan toconduct the assault in the same general area as theprimary plan. However, the scheme, timing, etc., mayvary from the primary plan.

(2) Alternate Area. An alternate plan may also bedeveloped to accomplish the same ATF mission in an areaother than that described in the primary operationplan. For example, it could be developed around thesecond choice of those options considered at theinitial planning conference when developing the generalcourse of action.

b. Contents of Alternate Plans. Alternate plans developonly those aspects of the primary plan that requirechange. If the changes are not extensive, alternate plansmay be published as annexes to the primary plan.

c. Task Organization for Alternate Plans. To the extentpossible, alternate plans should reflect the same generaltask organization for the landing force that was providedin the primary operation plan. This considerationfacilitates simplicity and flexible response.

(1) The embarked configuration of the landing force isdesigned to support the organization for landing and inturn the organization for combat. Major changes to theorganization for landing could, therefore, requireextensive cross-decking of units before the assault.Unless absolutely necessary, this undesirable situationshould be avoided.

(2) Documents that support the landing plan areinterrelated and prepared in complex detail to optimizethe use of surface and helicopter assets. Such planscan be adjusted for time sequence and location oflanding, but generally cannot be adjusted rapidly toaccommodate major changes in sequence of landing ororganization. The movement ashore of a unit byhelicopter rather than surface means, or the lateaddition of an artillery battery to a helicopterborneforce, for example, may require time-consuming changesto the landing plan or delay the buildup of combatpower ashore.

III-18

(3) Adjustment of the primary landing plan may alsorequire adjusting the disposition and sequence ofmovement of amphibious shipping along approach andretirement lanes. These adjustments may cause criticaltime delays in the discharge and subsequent landing oftroops and materiel ashore.

III-19

CHAPTER IV

BASIC DECISIONS

1. Introduction

a. Basic Decisions. As described in JCS Pub 3-02, basicdecisions are those decisions that must be made at thehighest level within the amphibious task force (ATF) beforedetailed planning for an amphibious operation can proceed.

b. Separate Basic Decisions. Joint Doctrine forAmphibious Operations groups several related decisionsunder headings such as "Determination of Objectives." Fromthe perspective of the landing force (LF), however, it isuseful to separate specific decisions in order to amplifydiscussion of the factors involved in the decision process.

c. Commander, Landing Force, Role in Basic Decisions. Anunderstanding and appreciation of the CLF participation inthe determination of basic decisions and of theinterrelationship among the decisions is fundamental to anoverall comprehension of LF planning.

2. Purpose and Scope. The purpose of this chapter is toprovide an understanding of the considerations that influencethe CLF in the basic decision process, and to illustrate theinterrelationships of the basic decisions. This chaptercomplements Chapter 4 of JCS Pub 3-02, emphasizing the CLF’srole in the decision process. Chapter III of this documentprovides a discussion of how the basic decisions relate toother steps in the planning sequence.

a. Preliminary Planning. Upon completion of the analysisof the initiating directive, the CATF and commanders ofcomponents of the ATF initiate preliminary planning toarrive at certain basic, interrelated decisions.Preliminary planning is characterized by the preparation ofstudies and estimates required for the preparation ofdetailed plans. At the LF level, preliminary planning isexemplified by concurrent and coordinated planning incidentto reaching decisions, preparing and issuing outline plans,and providing subordinate commanders with planning guidance.

b. Areas of Principal Interest to One Service or Element.Certain factors of the amphibious operation have principleinterest to one Service component or element of the ATF.These factors must be determined early in the planningprocess as they may affect other components or elements ofthe ATF. The part played by the CLF in the determinationof each decision and the influence of these decisions on LFplanning are emphasized herein.

IV-1

c. Interrelated Decisions. Because the factors upon whichthese decisions must be based are interrelated, and becausethe decisions based thereon will have some effect on everyelement of the ATF, each factor must be considered from theviewpoint of all participants. This chapter deals withthese basic decisions, delineates the participation of theCLF in the making of these decisions, and discussesconsiderations affecting them.

3. General

a. The basic decisions are:

(1) Selection of ATF general course of action.

(2) Selection of ATF objectives.

(3) Determination of LF mission.

(4) Designation of landing sites.

(5) Determination of LF objectives.

(6) Selection of beachheads.

(7) Selection of landing areas.

(8) Formulation of LF concept of operations ashore.

(9) Selection of landing beaches.

(10) Selection of helicopter landing zones.

(11) Selection of fixed-wing aircraft landing zonesand drop zones.

(12) Selection of tentative D-day and H-hour.

b. Sequence of Basic Decisions. The basic decisions arenot made necessarily in the sequence shown. While thefollowing discussion implies a sequential relationship,certain decisions may be made concurrently or held inabeyance pending further information. Also, the initiatingdirective may preempt the CATF and CLF in some of the basicdecisions; e.g., ATF objectives.

c. Commander, Amphibious Task Force, Review. Figure IV-1lists the basic decisions and indicates who has primaryresponsibility for each decision. Since the decisions mustbe supportable by all forces involved, the CATF reviewsdecisions or selections made by each component commander.

IV-2

IV-3

Figure IV-1. Basic Decision Responsibilities

4. Responsibilities. In the planning phase, the variouscommanders (CATF, CLF, etc.) are on equal levels of command.All basic decisions must be reached on a basis of commonunderstanding of objectives and procedures and on a freeexchange of information. Any differences the commanders areunable to resolve will be referred to their common superior.

5. Planning Considerations. As discussed in Chapter III, theinitiating directive formally commences the planning processfor an amphibious operation. The CLF and other commanders,however, may initiate preliminary studies and estimateswhenever it is known that an operation is under consideration.

6. Special Considerations. The formulation of the LF conceptof operations ashore has singular importance in the basicdecision process. Since subsequent detailed planning is basedon the CLF concept, it must be determined expeditiously. Theconcept must be supportable by all elements of the ATF.

7. Basic Considerations. At the inception of the planningprocess, there are likely to be many unknowns. Two principles,discussed in Chapter III, are reemphasized here. The first isthe role of commander’s guidance in focusing the efforts of hisstaff. The second is the importance of establishing a viableprogram for operational security throughout the command.

8. Selection of Amphibious Task Force General Course of Action

a. Commander, Amphibious Task Force, and Commander, LandingForce, Jointly Select. The CATF the CLF jointly select ageneral course of action for the force as a whole designedto accomplish the ATF mission.

b. Latitude in Selection. Some initiating directives willprovide an option in areas to be seized--"Establish alodgement on the coast...." In such cases, the CATF andCLF must first agree on the general area for the landing;i.e., a general course of action that will accomplish theamphibious task force mission. If the initiating directiveis specific --"seize the port..."--the CATF and CLF may nothave a choice in selecting the general area to be assaultedor the primary objectives.

c. Purpose. In some cases, it may be necessary toevaluate potential landing areas within an assigned AOAbefore a decision can be reached on the general course ofaction. A general course of action does not include aconcept of operations, nor is it related to specificlanding sites. Analysis of alternative general courses of

IV-4

action is a comparison of the advantages and disadvantagesof landing at various widely separated locations.

9. Selection of Amphibious Task Force Objectives. Once thegeneral course of action for the force has been determined, theCATF and CLF together select those ATF objectives essential forthe accomplishment of the mission. These objectives will oftenbe key facilities that are directly related to the purpose ofthe operation; e.g., a port, airfield, or communicationscenter. Only the minimum number of essential objectives areselected, to avoid constraining later planning.

10. Determination of Landing Force Mission. The LF mission isnot stated in the initiating directive. The CLF proposes amission statement for the LF and requests CATF’s concurrence atthe initial conference. The LF mission is derived from:

a. The ATF mission.

b. General course of action.

c. ATF objectives.

d. Specified and implied tasks, and priority of tasks asdiscerned from mission analysis.

11. Designation of Landing Sites

a. Relationship of Landing Beaches, Sites, and Areas. Inorder to fully understand the sequence in the selection oflanding beaches, sites, and areas, the definition andinterrelationship must be clear.

(1) Landing Site. A landing site can vary in widthfrom that of a single landing beach to the entirelength of usable coastline within the objective area.(See Figure IV-2.). Although the amphibious operatingarea is prescribed in the initiating directive, thelanding sites are key to the accomplishment of thelanding force mission. Landing sites may contain anynumber of beaches.

(2) Landing Area. The landing area comprises the sea,air, and land areas required for executing andsupporting the landing and establishing the beachhead(paragraph IV-13) selected by the CLF. It includes thebeach, the approaches to the beach, the transportareas, the fire support areas, and a land areaincluding the beachhead as a minimum. In most cases,

IV-5

it will be larger than the beachhead to providenecessary airspace for close air support aircraft.Indication of the landing area, like the forcebeachhead, serves as a planning aid and graphicrepresentation. It is not intended as a control orcoordination feature. A landing area may contain anynumber of landing sites or groups of landing sites.

(3) Landing Beach. Landing beaches are often referredto as colored or numbered beaches. The term "coloredbeach" (Beach Green, Beach Red, etc.) is used when onebattalion landing team (BLT) or similar unit is used inthe assault wave over a single beach. The term"numbered beach" (Red One, Red Two, etc.) is used whenthe two BLTs assault abreast into one landing site.The beach selected within the landing site is the onethat will best support the landing force concept ofoperations ashore, both tactically and logistically.(See Figure IV-2.)

(4) Interrelationships. The normal planning anddecision-making process, movement from largest tosmallest, or vice versa, does not apply in theselection of sites, areas, and beaches as one wouldexpect. The determination of where, within the AOAassigned, can the LF land determines the landingsite(s) available for consideration. Next, after theLF objectives have been selected, the landing area isproposed. Only one landing area will exist in anamphibious operation. Finally, after the LF concept ofoperations ashore is formulated, the best beacheswithin the available landing sites in the selectedlanding area are chosen for the operation.

b. Selection of Landing Sites. As evident by thedefinition, the selection of landing sites will be criticalin the rapid projection of combat power inland anddevelopment of sustainability for the LF ashore. Theproper selection of landing sites, based on the LF mission,will enable the earliest possible seizure of the LFobjectives. The advent of helicopters and LCAC hasexpanded the capability to surmount previously unassailablecoastlines; however, the sustainability essential for LFoperations ashore and subsequent operations requireslanding sites suitable for conventional, displacementlanding craft and causeway ferries.

IV-6

IV-7

Figure IV-2. Organization of the Landing Area

c. Commander, Amphibious Task Force, Designates. The CATFdesignates potential landing sites and provides the CLFpertinent hydrographic data concerning all sites; e.g.,tidal information, beach gradient, and each site’sdesirability from a naval viewpoint. In addition,information is made available concerning beach exits andthe nature of terrain bordering the beach.

d. Intelligence Requirements. The determination orconfirmation of the characteristics of landing sitesare therefore an early intelligence requirement.

12. Determination of Landing Force Objectives

a. Commander, Landing Force, Selects. Landing forceobjectives are selected by the CLF and reviewed by theCATF. In selecting LF objectives, the CLF does not try totake into account the scheme of maneuver of the groundcombat element. The minimum number of objectives areselected that, in conjunction with the ATF objectives, willensure accomplishment of the ATF mission. Landing forceobjectives are usually key terrain that will providesufficient depth to the force beachhead to ensureaccomplishment of the ATF mission. In subsequent planning,the ground combat element commander may select additionalobjectives to aid him in the control and disposition of hisforces.

b. Considerations in Selecting Landing Force Objectives.

(1) Amphibious Task Force Mission and Objectives. TheATF objectives are an expression of the mission and aremajor factors in developing LF objectives. Thismission will dictate the selection of landing forceobjectives at such distances as would providereasonable protection of the ATF objectives from enemyindirect fire weapons. The LF usually will notredesignate ATF objectives as LF objectives. If an ATFobjective is large and the CLF wants to consider it astwo or more separate entities, the CLF can subdividethe objective and designate the components as separateLF objectives.

(2) Landing Force Mission. A review of the specifiedand implied missions derived during the missionanalysis will identify potential LF objectives.

(3) Terrain. Most amphibious assaults will require adefense of the force beachhead. Therefore, in additionto identification of key features such as bridges, high

IV-8

ground, communication centers, and choke points, etc.,terrain must be examined from a defensive perspective.The enemy avenues of approach must be identifiedbecause they will be important factors in selecting LFobjectives. Incorporation of existing obstacles in thedefense of the force beachhead will enhance thedefensive scheme with minimum commitment of effort.

(4) Enemy Situation. Information regarding the enemywill vary. If firm enemy positions are known, theselection of objectives may be easier. However, theabsence of information does not preclude planning. Itmerely increases the importance of flexibility andobjectives must be selected to enhance the security ofthe force. In addition to the location of enemy units,the composition and capability of the enemy must alsobe considered. An infantry-heavy enemy will dictatedifferent objectives than one that is armor-heavy.

(5) Resources. The resources available to the landingforce must be considered, especially in relation to theenemy. Landing force objectives must providesufficient depth to the force beachhead but yet notoverextend the landing force. Considerable depth isdesirable when defending against a mechanized orarmor-heavy enemy. However, LF mobility must beadequate to shift forces rapidly and to preventpiecemeal defeat. Restrictive terrain or insufficientmobility assets will constrict the force beachhead. Aminimum objective is to deny the enemy the ability toplace indirect fire on critical areas within thebeachhead.

c. Relationship of Amphibious Task Force to Landing ForceObjectives. The following examples illustrate therelationship between ATF objectives and LF objectives:

(1) Amphibious Task Force Objectives. Usuallyfacilities directly related to the ATF mission; e.g.,ports, airfields.

(2) Landing Force Objectives

(a) Additional facilities or locations essentialto the mission; e.g., major bridges andcommunications hubs.

(b) Key terrain necessary to protect the ATFobjectives, block avenues of approach, or engagethe enemy under favorable circumstances.

IV-9

(3) Other Objectives. As planning proceeds,additional objectives may be chosen. These may relateto terrain necessary to maneuver against or destroy theenemy, to protect critical areas, or to control themaneuver of friendly forces.

13. Selection of Beachhead (Force Beachhead)

a. Beachhead. A beachhead is the physical objective of anamphibious operation. Figure IV-2 illustrates the forcebeachhead, which is the land area contained within theforce beachhead line (FBHL) (discussed below).

b. Commander, Landing Force, Determines. The CLFdetermines possible beachheads for each designated landingsite and notifies the CATF of the selections in order thatthey may be incorporated in the designation of tentativelanding areas.

c. Beachhead Elements. A beachhead includes ATF and LFobjectives, as well as one or more landing sites. In somecases, several potential beachheads, with associatedlanding sites and objectives, may be developed forevaluation.

d. Trace of the Force Beachhead Line. The force beachheadline is generally drawn along the outer edge of the mostdistant LF objectives. Figure IV-2 depicts the FBHL. TheFBHL provides a graphic representation of the area thatmust be seized, occupied, or controlled by the LF to ensurethe accomplishment of the ATF’s mission. The FBHL is not adefensive line or a fire support coordination measure, andit does not restrict maneuver of air or ground forces towithin its confines. It is a planning aid and in no wayeffects the employment of fire support coordinationmeasures.

(1) As planning proceeds, designating objectivesbeyond the original FBHL may become necessary. In suchcases, the FBHL should be adjusted accordingly.

(2) During the assault, designating objectives outsidethe FBHL may be necessary. In this case, boundariesand fire control measures would be adjusted asnecessary, but the FBHL would not need to be changed.

(3) During the initial stage of an amphibious assault,the coordinated fire line and fire support coordinationline will be inside the FBHL, permitting air strikes

IV-10

and artillery or naval gunfire support to be conductedwithout clearance by the forward ground maneuverelement. On the other hand, ground reconnaissance maybe conducted beyond the FBHL throughout the operation.In addition, after the FBHL has been secured, forwardunits may establish outposts or covering forces beyondthe FBHL.

e. Factors in Delineating the Force Beachhead. Thebeachhead is directly related to available landing sites,the ATF objectives, and associated LF objectives. Inaddition to those factors that influenced the selection ofLF objectives, the CLF considers the following indelineating the force beachhead:

(1) Suitability of landing sites, including favorableconfiguration of the coastline from the LFperspective. Discussion on factors concerning thedesirability of a particularly configured coastline isin the next paragraph.

(2) Terrain inland from the beaches and routes ofegress.

(3) Suitability of potential landing zones forhelicopters, fixed-wing aircraft, and air cushionvehicles; suitability of drop zones for airborne forcesif planned or contemplated.

(4) Adequacy of maneuver space.

(5) Requirements for combat service support.

f. Configuration of Coastline. The configuration of thecoastline is an important factor to be considered in theselection of a beachhead. Shorelines have three primaryforms: convex, concave, and straight. Combinations of thethree types are possible. (See Figure IV-3.) Thesignificance of each of these in selection of the beachheadis as follows:

(1) The convex shoreline in the form of largepromontories or deltas causes dispersion of hostiledefensive forces and prevents effective enfilade fireon the landing beaches. Except for its generallyinferior hydrographic characteristics, convex is themost favorable coastal formation from the attacker’spoint of view.

IV-11

IV-12

Figure IV-3. Examples of Various Types of Shorelines.

(2) The concave shoreline, particularly in the form of a bay or reentrant, is unfavorable because it provides opportunity for the convergent massing of enemy fires at any point in the area and permits establishment of an organized system of crossfires that are extremely disadvantageous to the attacker. Conditions such as the existence of sheltered water and favorable landing conditions may dictate the selection of a concave shoreline as a place of landing despite its unfavorable characteristics. In such cases, particular consideration is given to the promontories that form the shoulders on either flank of the landing beach and provide naturally advantageous positions for defensive weapons

(3) The straight shoreline has no prominentindentations or promontories and is relatively lessfavorable because it lends itself to enemy enfiladefire. Straight shoreline represents a compromisebetween the advantages of the convex shoreline and thedisadvantages of the concave shoreline.

14. Selection of The Landing Area

a. Commander, Amphibious Task Force, Delineates. The CATFdelineates the sea area and airspace required for theestablishment of each beachhead tentatively selected by theCLF. This process results in tentative landing areas. TheCATF then reviews each tentative landing area and, ifrequired, the broad course of action for each to determinetheir supportability by the naval force.

b. Factors in Delineating the Landing Area. To arrive atthis decision, the CATF weighs the capabilities of thenaval force and the operational requirements for the air,land, and sea areas. The CATF forwards an evaluation ofeach landing area to the CLF along with his relative orderof preference from the naval perspective. Principalconsiderations are shown in Figure 4-1, JCS Pub 3-02. Ananalysis of LF considerations includes:

(1) Suitability of the Landing Area for Attainment ofthe Final Ground Objective. Assault landings should bemade near objectives to facilitate their early seizureand accomplishment of the landing force mission. Theeffectiveness of an amphibious assault is enhanced bytaking maximum advantage of the shock effect of theinitial landing and the advantages of surprise.

(2) Hostile Capabilities

(a) The advantages of landing near objectives maybe offset by dispositions of enemy forces.Landings in undefended or lightly defended areasremote from objectives may thus be preferred.

(b) In evaluating the effects of enemydispositions upon selection of the landing area,the following factors should be considered:

1. Adequate fire support is necessary inorder to destroy or neutralize the defensesof a heavily defended area before landing.

IV-13

2. Landing at a site remote from theobjectives requires adequate logistics andfire support means and sufficient force toensure sustained offensive action.

3. Landing in an area with unfavorablelanding conditions requires additionaltraining, provision of special equipment, andspecial measures for ensuring security andgaining tactical surprise.

4. The enemy capability to reinforce beachdefenses or materially redeploy major combatforces must be considered.

(3) Configuration of the Coastline. (See subparagraph13f above.)

(4) Terrain and Facilities Inland From the Beaches.Following an evaluation of the shoreline, considerationis given the terrain over which the operations ashoremust be conducted. Ground rising gently from the beachto form a well-defined coastal ridge at such distanceinland and of such relief as to mask the landing beachis desirable. Such a conformation increases theeffectiveness of fire support and provides the terrainfeatures suitable for objectives of assault elements.When captured, it provides cover, concealment, andprotection for landing successive elements of thelanding force. Objectives essential to securing thebeachhead should be located on defensible ground.

(5) Requirements for Logistic Support. In addition totheir suitability for assault operations, helicopterlanding zones, landing beaches, and lines ofcommunication within the beachhead should permitsustained logistic support of operations ashore. Thelogistic support of aviation elements ashore placesincreased importance on an adequate road net, portfacilities, existing airfields, and beaches suitablefor landing heavy aviation and engineer equipment.

(6) Relative Desirability of the Landing Areas.Relative desirability of the landing areas from thenaval viewpoint.

(7) Possibility of Early Seizure and Rehabilitation ofAir Facilities. The early seizure and rehabilitationof existing air facilities, airfields, and air defenseradar and missile sites contributes materially to theorderly transfer of air operations ashore.

IV-14

c. Commander, Landing Force, Selects. The CLF presentshis selections of primary and alternate landing areas tothe CATF for concurrence with respect to the Navy’s abilityto support operations in the selected area(s) with theforces assigned. The CLF maintains continuous liaison withinterested commands to ensure that there is completeunderstanding concerning any restrictive considerations.The CLF selects those landing areas that, consistent withthe ability of the surface and air elements to providesupport, will best facilitate the accomplishment of the LFmission.

d. Commander, Landing Force, Develops Initial Concept ofOperations. After concurrence by the CATF in the CLF’sselection of primary and alternate landing areas, the CLFis ready to develop the initial concept of operations forthe primary landing area and for the alternate landingarea(s).

e. Multiple Landing Areas. When the ATF mission can bestbe accomplished by landing at more than one landing site,which are widely separated, normally a separate attackgroup, with related landing group, is formed to assaulteach landing site. (See Chapter II, subparagraph II-9d(2

15. Formulation of the Landing Force Concept of OperationsAshore

a. Concept of Operations Ashore. The concept ofoperations ashore is usually a written and graphicrepresentation, in broad outline, of the CLF’s assumptionsor intent with respect to the operation. The concept givesan overall picture of the operation and is providedprimarily for clarity and understanding of the operationbeing planned. Although general in nature at this stage,it is refined continually in detailed planning andeventually becomes a part of the operation plan. It isoften referred to as the commander’s concept.

b. Concept of Operations Ashore Pivotal to Planning.Amphibious planning at the CATF and CLF levels, as well asthe planning requirements of supporting commanders, isheavily influenced by the landing force commander’s conceptof operations ashore. Therefore, this concept must beformulated as expeditiously as possible. The developmentof the landing force concept of operations is dependent oncertain basic decisions, while other basic decisions flowfrom the CLF concept of operations.

IV-15

c. Formulating the Landing Force Concept of OperationsAshore. Principal considerations in the formulation of thelanding force concept of operations ashore are:

(1) The mission of the landing force.

(2) The nature and extent of the designated landingarea, including the characteristics of the beaches andthe terrain therein.

(3) The enemy capabilities.

(4) The forces available.

(5) The nature, extent, and locations of airfields,airfield sites, and air control and warning sites.

(6) The nature and extent of practicable helicopterlanding zones.

(7) The nature and extent of the practicable airbornedrop and landing zones.

d. Must Be Supportable. The CLF concept of operationsashore must be supportable by naval and air elements.Accordingly, the CLF requests CATF concurrence in theconcept. Naval and air considerations affecting theformulation of the concept of operations ashore are thosepertaining to the capabilities for transporting,protecting, and landing the LF, and supporting andsustaining its operations during and after the landing.

e. Distribution of Concept of Operations. After the CATFhas concurred in the concept, it may be distributed to theLF and other components as part of an outline plan. Theinitial concept of operations ashore provides the basis forplanning by subordinate units.

f. Principal Medium for Coordination. The concept ofoperations ashore is the principal medium for coordinationbetween subordinate landing force elements and with othercomponent commanders to ensure that planned operationsashore can be supported.

g. Content. No prescribed format exists for the conceptof operations. The concept includes overall formation forlanding, scheme of maneuver for the LF, principal landingforce objectives, general task organization, ship-to-shoremovement means, fire support, and, when applicable, plansfor deception operations and subsidiary landings.

IV-16

h. Basis for Refining Studies. Based on the concept ofoperations ashore, the LF staff and subordinate elementstaffs prepare and refine studies and estimates.

i. Concept of Operations for Alternate Landing Areas. Aseparate concept of operations ashore is prepared for thealternate landing area(s).

16. Selection of Landing Beaches

a. Selection of Specific Landing Beaches. The CLF selectsspecific landing beaches within the selected landing sitesbased on the requirements of subordinate elements of the LFand in response to their detailed plans. The CATF reviewsthese selections in light of the naval considerations inparagraph 430, JCS Pub 3-02. When the ATF is composed oftwo or more attack groups with related landing groups, alanding site may be selected for each attack group. Inthis case, each landing group commander selects hisrespective landing beach from within the assigned area.

b. Planning Considerations. The principal factors in thefinal selection of landing beaches, in addition to thosepreviously described for the selection of landing areas,are:

(1) The LF concept of operations ashore.

(2) Capacity for landing supplies and equipment(throughput).

(3) Suitability of offshore approaches.

(4) Beach trafficability.

(5) Number, location, and suitability of beach supportareas and beach exits.

(6) Location, type, and density of beach obstacles,including underwater obstacles.

(7) Nature of the terrain immediately inland from thebeaches.

(8) Suitability of communication facilities, includingroads, railroads, waterways, and airfields or airfacilities.

(9) Suitability of the beach from the standpoint ofexpected prevailing weather, tidal, and surf conditions.

IV-17

IV-18

(10) Proximity of beaches to existing or planned airfields or planned helicopter operating bases. Use of beaches contiguous to air bases facilitates supply of the necessarily large quantities of aviation fuel and handling of heavy aviation and supporting engineer equipment.

(11) Enemy coastal defenses, including known hostile force dispositions, strengths, and capabilities.

(12) Suitability for beaching landing ships, landing craft, and amphibious vehicles.

17. Selection of Helicopter Landing Zones

a. Helicopter Landing Zone. A helicopter landing zone is a specified ground area for landing assault helicopters to embark or disembark troops and/or cargo. A landing zone may contain one or more landing sites (JCS Pub 1-02) (which may contain one or more landing points). (See Figure IV-4.)

Figure IV-4. Helicopter Landing Zones, Landing Sites, and Landing Points.

b. Selection of Helicopter Landing Zones by the CLF. TheCLF selects the helicopter landing zones and advises theCATF of his selections. In reviewing these selections, theCATF considers the ability of his other forces to supportthe proposed assault landings and required logisticsbuildup therein.

c. Concurrent Planning. Concurrent and parallel planningis needed at all command echelons involved in thehelicopterborne ship-to-shore movement. Coordination isnecessary between helicopterborne forces and helicopterunits, with the helicopter transport group, and at allintervening echelons up to the ATF or landing force level.The selection of landing zones and possible approach andretirement lanes is of interest to all these echelons.Therefore, their recommendations and requirements areconsidered in making these selections.

d. Principal Considerations. The principal considerationsin the selection of helicopter landing zones are:

(1) The LF concept of operations ashore.

(2) Enemy capabilities and dispositions, particularlylocation, type, and density of antiaircraftinstallations.

(3) Location and nature of the terrain over which thehelicopterborne forces contemplate operations afterlanding.

(4) Requirements for logistic support.

(5) Ease of identification from the air.

(6) Suitability and capability for the landing andtakeoff of helicopters.

(7) Restrictive effect of the location of landingzones and available approach and retirement lanes onsupporting fires for other forces.

(8) Requirements for air, naval, and ground firesupport.

e. Multiple Landing Groups. When the ATF is composed oftwo or more attack groups with related landing groups, thetask of conducting the helicopterborne assault operationsis usually assigned to the commander(s) of one or more ofthe attack groups.

IV-19

18. Selection of Fixed-Wing Aircraft Landing Zones and DropZones. When airborne or air-transported forces are employed inamphibious operations, the CLF, together with the airbornecommander and the air commanders involved, selects the dropzones and the landing zones. The CATF reviews them todetermine his ability to support the operations in the selectedzones with the forces at his disposal. Landing and drop zonecriteria are described in FM 57-1/AFM 2-51, "U.S. Army/U.S. AirForce Doctrine for Airborne Operations."

19. Determination of the Date and Hour of the Landing

a. D-day. D-day is the unnamed day on which an operationcommences or is due to commence. (See JCS Pub 1-02 for thecomplete definition of D-day). The approximate date forinitiation of an amphibious operation is in the initiatingdirective through the establishment of limiting dates. Theselection of a specific day (D-day) is made by the CATFafter consultation with the CLF and other commanders asappropriate.

(1) Principal Factors. The principal factors in theselection of a tentative D-day include:

(a) Availability of forces.

(b) Readiness of forces.

(c) Present and projected enemy situation.

(d) Seasonal conditions in the area underconsideration.

(e) Local conditions of weather, tide, current,and phase of moon (duration of darkness anddaylight).

(f) Designation of limiting dates by higherauthority.

(g) Coordination with preliminary operations.

(2) Tentative D-day. A tentative D-day is usuallyestablished by the CATF early in the planning phase.This day is usually the earliest date within the timelimits prescribed by the initiating directive when thepreliminary operations can be completed and allelements of the ATF can be in position for the attack.The final confirmed date for D-day may vary from thetentative date.

IV-20

(3) Delay of D-day. Unforeseen changes within theobjective area, such as adverse weather, unexpectedmoves of major enemy forces, etc., may force the CATFto delay D-day. He has this authority unless otherwisedirected by higher authority. Such postponements areusually for 24-hour periods. Longer periods orrepeated postponements may result in a period where theselected conditions for H-hour can no longer be met.It may then become necessary to return the force to thestaging areas or to a designated rendezvous.Preparation of alternate plans may reduce thepossibility of having to delay D-day.

b. H-hour. In amphibious operations, the term H-hour isused for the time the first assault wave lands on the beachin the surface ship-to-shore movement. Helicopterborneassaults, subsidiary operations, etc., may be expressed asanother letter designation such as L-hour for helicopters,or they may be expressed in terms of time differential fromH-hour, such as H-12 hours, H+30 minutes, etc.

(1) Principal Factors. The principal factors in theselection of a tentative H-hour include:

(a) Known enemy routine.

(b) Duration of daylight.

(c) Need for tactical surprise.

(d) Concept of operations ashore of the landingforce.

(e) Favorable conditions of wind, tide, and phaseof moon; requirements for conducting certainoperations during hours of darkness.

(f) Most effective employment of air and navalgunfire support.

(2) Selection of H-hour. The selection of a specifictime to commence the amphibious assault (H-hour) ismade by the CATF after consultation with the CLF andother commanders as appropriate, the same as in thecase of selecting D-day.

IV-21

(3) Change of H-hour. An important note duringplanning is that H-hour is the planned time of landingof the first assault wave, but during the executionphase, H-hour is the actual time of landing. Forexample, during planning, H-hour is scheduled for 0800;however, for various reasons on D-day or shortlybefore, H-hour is determined to be 0900. Accordingly,all events will now be based on H-hour at 0900. As inthe case of D-day, complications may arise that make itimpossible for the first assault wave to land at theplanned time. Many events in the amphibious operationare based on the exact time of landing and arescheduled in relation to H-hour. These events includesuch items as final beach neutralization fires, liftingbeach neutralization fires to the beach exits, andhelicopterborne assaults. In the case where theassault landing will be delayed from the plannedH-hour, some events scheduled in planning for theperiod just prior to H-hour may be repeated until theactual H-hour; others will be delayed and others willhave to be cancelled. The CATF confirms H-hour as soonas practical.

20. Commencement of Detailed Planning

a. Need for Close Coordination and Reevaluation ofDecisions. Although the basic decisions have been made,the balance of the planning process involves numerousdetailed decisions, many of which must be coordinated withsubordinate, adjacent, supporting, or higher headquarters,including joint and combined commands. The operation plan,including the embarkation plan, the landing plan, andcombat service support plan, and various alternate plansmust be developed. In addition, decisions on advanceforce, deception, subsidiary, and supporting operationsmust be continuously reevaluated and updated. Decisions onthese operations may be made at any time during theplanning process.

b. Adequacy of Forces to Meet Requirements. Plans for thenaval forces and participating Air Force forces provide fortransporting, protecting, landing, and supporting the LF.During detailed planning, the adequacy of the forces madeavailable for the operation is constantly reexamined. Ifadditional forces are required, they are requested ofhigher authority through appropriate channels.

IV-22

CHAPTER VLANDING FORCE TACTICAL OPERATIONS ASHORE

1. Introduction

a. Key Elements of the Landing Force Plan. This chapteroutlines the considerations immediately related to thepreparation of the operation plan. Essential topreparation of the operation plan is the concept ofoperations ashore, the plan of attack, and the plans forthe employment of landing force (LF) aviation and thecombat service support element (CSSE). Theinterrelationships of these terms are defined for clarityas follows:

(1) Concept of Operations Ashore

(a) The development of the concept of LFoperations ashore is an evolutionary process. Theconcept developed during detailed planning is arefinement of the initial concept developed duringpreliminary planning (see Chapter IV, paragraph15). Ultimately, the detailed concept is includedin the operation plan. Such influences as theoperational and logistical requirements ofsubordinate elements and changes in the enemysituation will usually necessitate modificationsin the concept. Throughout its formulation, theconcept provides the basis for detailed andconcurrent planning. It is included in theoperation plan in order to provide additionalclarity as to the landing force commander’s intent.

(b) The detailed concept of operations ashoreamplifies the commander’s decisions and indicateshow he visualizes the operation will be executed.No established scope for the content of theconcept exists; however, the final concept willusually be a broad outline of the plan of attackand, as a minimum, it should include the purposeand scope of the operation, major or essentialtasks, and phasing or sequence of events.

(2) Plan of Attack. The plan of attack provides forthe employment of various elements of the LF. Itconsists of the scheme of maneuver, the landing plan,and the plan of supporting fires.

V-1

(a) Scheme of Maneuver. The scheme of maneuveris a plan for the execution of a tactical courseof action. It includes objectives, types ofoffensive maneuver to be employed, distribution offorces, and necessary control measures. Informulating the scheme of maneuver for anamphibious operation, the principles of groundcombat are valid; however, variations ofapplication may be necessitated by the amphibiouscharacter of the operation.

(b) Landing Plan. The landing plan isessentially the plan for the ship-to-shoremovement of the LF. It is predicated on thescheme of maneuver ashore and the means availableto move the LF ashore. For additional informationon the landing plan, see Chapter VI, paragraph 22.

(c) Plan of Supporting Fires. Fire support has amajor effect on the development of the plan ofattack. Until artillery is landed, gunfiresupport ships and aircraft furnish bothpreparatory fires and fires in close support ofthe attack. For additional information onsupporting arms, see Chapter VIII.

(3) Plan for the Employment of Landing Force Aviation.The plan for the employment of LF aviation to supportthe landing and operations ashore is integrated withand based on the overall air plan of the CATF. The airoperations performed by Navy and LF aviation elementsand other supporting air forces (i.e., operations fromland bases outside the objective area, from aircraftcarriers, and from bases within the landing area)complement one another and constitute a collectivecapability for support of the amphibious operation.For additional information on aviation support, seeChapter VIII.

(4) Plan for the Employment of the Landing ForceCombat Service Support Element. The plan for theemployment of the landing force CSSE is expressed inthe concept of CSS. This document establishes thelogistic support plan for the LF from the embarkationphase through the termination of LF operations ashore.

b. Tactical Operations Ashore Must Be Supportable. Thetactical operation ashore must be supportable by allelements of the task force. Therefore, the need forcoordination within the various elements of the task forcecannot be over emphasized.

V-2

2. Purpose and Scope. This chapter discusses the variousconsiderations related to the preparation of the operation planand associated annexes. The discussion centers on the processof refining the initial concept of operations, which isdeveloped during initial planning, and which is the basis fordetailed planning.

3. General

a. Overview. Much of the information that must beincluded in the operation plan is so detailed, specialized,and technical that it does not lend itself to inclusion inthe body of the document; therefore, the additional subjectmatter is included in annexes to the operation plan. Thedetailed tactical planning associated with the developmentof certain of these annexes is discussed in Chapters VIthrough X; however, the contents of this chapter must beregarded as relevant to all detailed planning because thischapter serves as a basis for all detailed planning.

b. Comparison with Normal Land Operations. Once ashore,tactical operations of the landing force do not varysignificantly from normal land operations. The majordifference is that the forces ashore are dependent onforces at sea for support (e.g., logistics, fire support,reinforcements). As the operation progresses and supportis established ashore, the degree of dependence isreduced. Further, command remains at sea with the CATFuntil termination of the amphibious operation.

c. Defense of Vital Areas. The CLF has a major concernwith protecting certain areas within the beachhead. Theseareas include CSS areas, command and control facilities,and beach and helicopter landing zones where supplies arebeing brought in to sustain the assault. The requirementfor protection of these areas will influence tacticaloperations ashore. In past years, the FBHL was generallyconsidered to be a line that would place these areas out ofthe range of indirect fire weapons. In this modern era ofmissiles and rapidly moving mechanized forces, the CLF maynot be able to develop a FBHL that will preclude theseareas from being within the range of missiles or strikingdistance of mechanized forces. The CLF may have to planhis tactical operations in such a manner as to be able toseek out and destroy the threats early or to be able toquickly respond to a threat as it develops. Additionally,as amphibious task force objectives are seized, such asairfields and/or ports, concern arises about protecting

V-3

these areas. Those areas that the CLF is most concernedabout protecting may be classified as vital areas (vital tothe accomplishment of the LF mission). If the CLF hassufficient air defense assets, he will in all probabilityassign air defense units to the defense of these areas.

d. Force Beachhead Line. The FBHL should not beconsidered a static line of defense, but rather a trace ofthe outer limits of LF objectives. (See Chapter IV,paragraph 13, and Figure IV-2.)

4. Responsibilities

a. Commander, Amphibious Task Force, and Commander, LandingForce. The CLF is responsible for development of the plansfor tactical operations ashore. The CATF reviews theseplans from a supportability viewpoint.

b. Plan Relationships. The interrelationship of planningamong various echelons of the landing forces is explainedin detail in Chapter 3, Section 3.5, page 3.5-18, FMFM 0-3,"Doctrinal Publication Guide."

5. Planning Considerations. During detailed tacticalplanning, the CLF considers the operational conditions,preliminary planning decisions, and the additional factorsdescribed in this chapter in the development of his plan.

6. Special Considerations

a. Support Capabilities of Other Elements of theAmphibious Task Force. In developing plans, the CLF mustconsider all elements of the LF, including the aviation andCSS elements as they relate to the needs of the groundcombat element, as well as the ATF and other forces thatsupport the tactical plan.

b. Other Plan Requirements. Neither this document nor JCSPub 3-02 discuss in detail all functional planningresponsibilities included in the operations plan. Thoseareas that do not significantly differ from land combat,including psychological operations, civil affairs,electronic warfare, operations security, base development,and offensive and defensive operations in general, are notdiscussed in detail.

V-4

7. Basic Considerations

a. Mission. The mission of the LF is developed duringpreliminary planning (see Chapter IV, paragraph 10). Themission may be general in nature and requires carefulanalysis during detailed planning to identify additionalspecified or implied tasks that must be accomplished. Themission is translated into specific landing forceobjectives ashore by the CLF. The objectives serve as theprimary basis for determining the LF scheme of maneuver,fire support, organization for combat, formation forlanding, and phasing of the attack. The mission developedby the commander, and as amplified by the concept ofoperations ashore, is the principal means by which thecommander ensures that his intent is understood andaccomplished in detailed planning and execution of theoperation.

b. Development of Combat Power Ashore. In the amphibiousattack, combat power is rapidly developed ashoreprogressively during the assault. The LF is able to exertonly a small fraction of its total potential power in theinitial assault. The attack is initiated by small unitssupported by naval gunfire and tactical aircraft. Agradual buildup occurs until the entire LF is ashore andfunctioning as a cohesive organization exerting its maximumcombat power. The echelonment reflected in theorganization for landing provides for the orderlyprogression and development of combat power.

c. Echelonment for Landing

(1) Critical Factors. The rate of landing anddevelopment of combat power ashore depends on manyfactors, the most important of which are:

(a) The availability of amphibious assaultshipping and landing craft, amphibious vehicles,and helicopters for the ship-to-shore movement.

(b) Capacity of landing beaches and landing zones.

(c) The degree of enemy interference with thelanding.

(d) The extent of fire support provided to the LF.

(e) Terrain, weather, and sea conditions in thelanding area.

V-5

(f) The necessity for balance among combat,combat support, and CSS units.

(g) The relationship between available land areaand the requirements for maneuver and separation.

(2) Judicious Use of Assault Shipping. These factorsinfluence the rate of landing and, thus, thecomposition of the echelons of the LF. In particular,the number and types of amphibious assault ships andship-to-shore movement means available may limit themateriel that can be landed in the initial assault.Economy and effectiveness in the use of assaultshipping in the assault dictate that only essentialpersonnel, equipment, and supplies be included in theinitial assault. On the other hand, organization ofthe force for landing involves a reinforcement ofassault units to provide the required sustainability.These considerations, and others, may require thatportions of units and their supplies and equipment notneeded initially be phased for later arrival. (AlsoSee Chapter XI, subparagraph 3b.)

(a) The LF assault echelon (AE) consists of thoseassault troops, vehicles, aircraft, equipment, andsupplies required to initiate the assaultlanding. The landing force AE includes thoseelements that arrive in the AOA on or, in somecases, before D-day aboard amphibious assaultshipping; air transported units such as airborneforces that are scheduled for the initial assault;and self-deploying aircraft and air transportedsupport units required for the initial assault.

(b) The LF assault follow-on echelon (AFOE) isnormally required in the objective area no laterthan 5 days after commencement of the assaultlanding. Shipping assigned to the CATF is calledassault shipping. When sufficient amphibiousassault shipping is not available, a portion orall of the AFOE may be transported in MSC orcommercial shipping designated as assault shippingof the ATF. AFOE shipping may arrive on a timeschedule, with some elements required as early asD-day, or remain in a specified operating areauntil called forward by the CATF as requested bythe CLF.

V-6

(c) After the assault and follow-on echelons havebeen landed, follow-up personnel, equipment, andsupplies may be transported by sealift, airlift,or a combination thereof to provide the logisticpipeline to sustain the LF and provide forces forbase development and tactical forces forsubsequent operations ashore.

d. Phasing the Amphibious Assault

(1) Factors. In phasing the amphibious attack,consideration must be given to the rate of landing forcombat, combat support, and CSS forces plus the factorsconsidered in phasing a ground offensive.

(2) Basis of Phasing. Phasing is based on time (e.g.,in relation to H-hour or D-day), on distance (e.g.,intermediate objectives or phase lines), on terrain andhydrography (e.g., crossing of obstacles), or on theoccurrence of a particular event (e.g., linkup withhelicopterborne forces or seizure of an off shore firesupport position).

(3) Intermediate Objectives. The LF will seldom beable to secure control of the entire beachhead in asingle sustained attack. Therefore, the CLF may phasethe operation in his concept of operation.Intermediate objectives and phase lines may bedesignated to implement the commander’s concept.

(4) Reestablishment of Centralized Control. Theinitial stage of an amphibious assault is characterizedby decentralized execution of the plan by subordinateelements of the LF. In phasing the attack on thehostile shore, the CLF should not slow thesedecentralized attacks by attempting to reestablishcentralized control too early. On the other hand, heshould not subject his forces to defeat in detail bydelaying the reestablishment of centralized control.The reestablishment of centralized control progressesfrom lower to higher echelons successively.

8. Organizational Forms of the Landing Force. Landing forceelements are initially formed in the embarkation organizationand remain in this organization until the ship-to-shoremovement commences. LF elements are then reformed into landinggroups (i.e., organizations for landing). Once ashore, theyare reformed a third time into their basic tactical

V-7

organizations for combat. The process for the forming of theseorganizations requires inverse planning. The firstorganization to be considered during the planning phase is thetactical organization to accomplish the LF mission. The secondis the organization for landing wherein the tacticalorganization is restructured to fit aboard available landingcraft, helicopters, etc., in accordance with the landing plan.And third, the LF is formed into the organization forembarkation, which is a temporary administrative organizationalarrangement to fit the force aboard available amphibiousshipping. These three organizations will be discussed brieflyin the following paragraphs. Additional discussion iscontained in Chapter II, paragraph 9; Chapter VI, paragraphs8-12; Chapter VI, paragraph 19; and Chapter XI, subparagraph 7c.

a. Basic Tactical Organization

(1) Composition of Basic Tactical Organization. Thebasic tactical organization is the task organization ofLF units for combat, involving combinations ofinfantry, mechanized units, supporting arms, aviation,and CSS units for accomplishment of missions ashore.These task groups normally consist of maneuver forces,combat support forces, and CSS forces. Thisorganizational form must be considered during tacticalplanning because it is employed as soon as practicablefollowing the landing of various assault elements ofthe LF.

(2) Infantry Elements and Units. The reinforcedinfantry regiment or brigade is the largest singletactical element of the LF normally landed over asingle beach or landing zone. The reinforced infantrybattalion is the basic tactical unit for landing. Theorganization of the infantry division lends itself tothe formation of task groups of combined arms, referredto as battalion or regimental or brigade landing teams(BLT, RLT or BDELT), respectively.

(3) External Fire Support. External fire supportmeans provided to the infantry division may beorganized to support the specified task groups formed.Such forces normally include artillery units (notorganic to the division), naval gunfire support, andsupporting aircraft.

(4) Combat Service Support. CSS installations andunits are organized and located to support the maneuverand combat support forces. Centralized control of CSS

V-8

is efficient, but it is often necessary to decentralizecontrol to those elements that support BLTs, RLTs orBDELTs, which is particularly the case when these taskorganizations have been assigned independent missions.

(5) Additional References. For more detailedinformation see Chapter XI and appropriate Servicedoctrinal manuals.

b. Organization for Landing

(1) Composition of Organization for Landing. Theorganization for landing is the tactical grouping ofthe LF and its subordinate echelons for the amphibiousassault. Basically, it groups the forces that are toexecute the landing and to conduct initial operationsashore in accordance with the commander’s concept ofoperations. The concept of operations, with relatedconsiderations of terrain and enemy, dictates theallocation of troops and fire support to initialassault elements, support elements, on-call forces, andthe reserve. These components in turn dictate thesequence of landing.

(2) Self-Sufficiency. Initially in the assault, thereis an absence of normal control and support from thenext higher command echelon. Therefore, each commandechelon is reinforced to make it relativelyself-sufficient and capable of independent operationsuntil the next higher command echelon is ashore andable to assume responsibility for control and support.Attachments to a unit should be limited to those neededand for the time required for independent operations.

(3) Characteristics of the Organization for LandingProvides. In order to support the concept ofoperations, the organization for landing should providefor the following:

(a) Maximum shock effect at the point of landingand a cumulative shock effect in the direction ofthe objectives.

(b) Depth to the assault to ensure flexibilityand a sustained buildup of combat power as theattack develops.

V-9

(c) The required dispersion consistent with otherrequirements.

(d) Flexibility sufficient to exploit weaknessesfound in the enemy defenses.

(e) The timely establishment and employment ofboth tactical and administrative support systemsashore.

(f) The tactical integrity of subordinateorganizations commensurate with the precedingrequirements.

(4) Attachments for Landing. Reinforcement ofsubordinate echelons follows the normal procedure ofattaching units to subordinate organizations to achieveunity of command. Attachments are made for a specifiedor unspecified time or until a certain event has takenplace, just as they are in land operations. Some unitsmay be attached only for landing. A unit attached toan organization for landing is under control of thatorganization for the purpose of landing only.Subsequent to landing, the unit attached for landingreverts to control of its parent organization or otherdesignated command. The headquarters makingattachments for landing designates the approximate timeor sequence that the attached unit is to be landed.The organization to which a unit is attached schedulesthe unit ashore as directed by the higherheadquarters. Attachments for landing are made by thelanding force commander and subordinate echeloncommanders when it is necessary to land a unit early inorder that preparations may be made for subsequent LFoperations, but delegating greater command authorityover such unit to a subordinate commander isundesirable.

(5) Additional Information. For additionalinformation see Chapters II and VI.

c. Organization for Embarkation. This temporaryadministrative formation of personnel with supplies andequipment is logically the last of the three organizationalforms developed once the basic tactical organization andthe organization for landing have been developed. Itprovides the necessary organization for movement to theobjective area. Chapters II and XI contain a discussion ofthe LF organization for embarkation.

V-10

9. Scheme of Maneuver

a. Formulation of Scheme of Maneuver. The formulation ofthe scheme of maneuver for an amphibious assault is basedon the same fundamentals of combat that apply in groundcombat although certain conditions and considerationsrequire particular attention.

b. Goals of the Assault. The fundamental goal of theassault is to achieve a successful lodgement of the LF fromwhich it subsequently can achieve the ATF mission. In theinitial assault, the LF seeks the early seizure of keyobjectives and the destruction of opposing enemy forces sothat its intended scheme of maneuver may be fullyexecuted. Aggressive offensive action will disrupt enemydefenses, permit the rapid landing of supporting units, andcontribute to the early development of full combat powerashore, thus reducing the vulnerability of the force tocounterattack at a critical stage.

c. Frontal Assault and Vertical Envelopment. In theinitial stages, the amphibious assault retains an overallfrontal assault appearance with the rear oriented on thebeach support areas where principal reinforcing units andcombat and CSS are landed. Depth and flexibility in theattack may be achieved through the employment ofhelicopterborne forces in a vertical envelopment (includingturning movement). The vertical envelopment avoids theenemy’s main defensive strength by going around or over itto seize an objective in his rear. This subjects him todestruction in position or causes him to abandon hisposition. It also may cause him to divert major forces tomeet the threat and thus fight on ground selected by the LF.

d. Width of Assault. The assault is made on the widestfront with the greatest depth possible, consistent with thecapability of the LF to accomplish its mission ashore.Tactical separation of units ashore may be required to meetactive use, or the threat of use, of nuclear weapons.Separation of units is accomplished through the use ofmultiple, separated landing beaches and landing zoneswithin the landing area. BLTs are the basic unit ofseparation.

e. Attainment of Mass. Separated landings in theamphibious assault create problems in achievement of masswith attendant difficulties in control, higher echelonsupport, and mutual support between tactical units. Mass

V-11

is best achieved by the combined capabilities of firesupport means and rapid maneuver by highly mobile forces.A large proportion of the combat units of the force arelanded in the initial assault. The cumulative shock effectresulting from dispersed, coordinated assault landings onbeaches and movements of assault elements inland causesdisruption of enemy resistance over an extended area inboth width and depth. Thus, by the combined capabilitiesof firepower and the near simultaneous assault by maneuverunits, mass is achieved early in the assault.

f. Absence of Threat of Nuclear and Chemical Weapons. Inan operational environment devoid of active or threateneduse of nuclear and chemical weapons, landings against astrong enemy may require greater physical massing of forcesand conventional fires. When such weapons are notemployed, there may be:

(1) A decrease in the land area a given combat forcecan clear and control.

(2) A reduction in the width and depth of the landingarea and less dispersion between landing beaches.

(3) A reduction in the acceptable distance betweenlanding beaches and landing zones inland from beaches.

(4) A significant reduction in the speed of theoperation. However, the use of helicopters, amphibiousvehicles, armor, and motor transport as a means ofmobility ashore will provide increased speed.

g. Influences on Scheme of Maneuver. The types of combatunits in the LF task organization and their strengthinfluence the scheme of maneuver.

(1) Assault divisions may be reinforced infantrydivisions. The basic unit on which assault landingteams are formed is an infantry battalion.

(2) Armored elements may be landed early in theassault, by LCAC or conventional landing craft, tofacilitate rapid progress inland, early linkup withair-delivered forces, and expeditious clearance of thebeachhead.

(3) Artillery in the assault echelon may be eitherself-propelled or towed. Self-propelled artillery iswell suited for certain conditions and is landed in thesame manner as armor.

V-12

(4) Engineer units will normally be attached toinfantry and mechanized units during the assault toprovide immediately responsive decentralized support.Later, engineer forces may be reorganized to providenormal direct or general support.

(5) Antiair warfare units organic to the LF areestablished ashore early to provide for the landwardextension of the ATF antiair warfare system.

h. Characteristics of Scheme of Maneuver. The LF schemeof maneuver should:

(1) As a primary purpose, provide for the seizure ofobjectives requisite to the buildup and establishmentof the LF ashore.

(2) Utilize adequate avenues of approach proximate tothe selected landing beaches and landing zones.

(3) Be supportable by naval gunfire, missiles, andtactical air, especially until the landing of artillery.

(4) Provide that each unit be capable of initialsuccess without dependence on other assault units.

(5) Provide for the development of mutual supportbetween units as the attack progresses.

(6) Provide for early establishment of beach supportareas required for establishment of administrative andCSS ashore.

(7) Provide for the required degree of coordinationand control.

(8) Provide for a disposition of forces thatfacilitates the initiation of operations subsequent tothe termination of the amphibious operation.

10. Reserves

a. Purpose of Landing Force Reserves. To provide securityto the LF and flexibility to the amphibious assault, theCLF will usually plan to withhold a portion of the forceduring the initial assault. Such a force, capable of beinglanded when and where desired in order to best influencethe tactical situation as it develops ashore, is the LFreserve.

V-13

b. Source for Landing Force Reserves. Within assaultorganizations of the LF, available assets for reserves maybe limited during the initial assault when all landinggroups are committed to achieve maximum shock effect.Assault elements to be landed on an on-call basis provide ameans with which the ground commander can influence theaction ashore. While afloat, certain units may be treatedas a reserve for commitment as required by the situation.

c. Complexity of Committing Reserves. Commitment of thereserve in an amphibious assault is more complex than innormal land operations for the following reasons:

(1) While the reserve is afloat, its commitment may bedelayed pending availability of landing craft,amphibious vehicles, or helicopters, plus the timerequired for debarkation and movement ashore.

(2) Pre-employment joining of the reserve with landingcraft, amphibious vehicles, or helicopters, whileincreasing reserve responsiveness, may delay themovement of other assault elements.

(3) Landing of the reserve by surface means alsodepends on the availability of a suitable landing beachnear the area of intended employment.

d. Routine Landing of Reserve. When keeping the reserveafloat is no longer any advantage, it is landed andpositioned ashore to facilitate future employment. Thisaction should not be undertaken until sufficient area hasbeen seized ashore to permit adequate maneuver room.

e. Maximum Flexibility Required. Because of the generallyunpredictable nature of the initial operations ashore,commitment of the reserve to a specific area is unlikely tobe decided on before initiation of the assault. Maximumflexibility of the reserve should be maintained until aspecific opportunity for its commitment arises.

f. Plans for Landing the Reserve. The reserve should becapable of taking over the mission of forces in the initialassault. The reserve, therefore, should have plans foreach contingency and be provided with adequateattachments. Such provision may include appropriatelanding support units, which are discussed in Chapter X.Means for landing the reserve in an assault role should beprovided in the plan.

V-14

g. Staging of Reserve External to the Amphibious ObjectiveArea. A shortage of assault shipping or the need to reducecongestion in the objective area may favor retention ofhigher echelon reserves of the LF in a base area(s) fortransport to the AOA in aircraft.

h. Combat Support in Reserve. Employment of fires andobstacles held in reserve (including minefields, andnuclear and non-nuclear fires) is planned for variouscontingencies, for use in support of forces ashore, and tofacilitate exploitation.

11. Security

a. Purpose. Security in the amphibious assault ismaintained to preserve secrecy, to prevent unexpectedinterference by the enemy, to protect tactical integrity,and to gain and maintain freedom of action. Shock actionand speed of the attack offer the best security by keepingthe enemy so heavily involved that he has neither the timenor means to endanger success of the attack. The retentionof a reserve enhances the security of the command.

b. Bypassed Enemy and Rear Area Security Concerns. Widelydispersed landings tend to bypass enemy strong points andto expose friendly flanks. Bypassed enemy forces must becontrolled or at least kept under surveillance untildestroyed. Combat service support, aviation, and firesupport units and the rear area may require protection fromground or air attack. These considerations must not slowor divert the momentum of the attack. The flanks of unitsand gaps between units are covered by patrols, flankguards, positioning of reserves, surveillance, andobstacles, including minefields.

c. Early Warning. Early warning of impending enemycountermeasures and the collection of timely, accurateinformation are essential to security. Aviation and highlymobile reconnaissance forces are employed extensively inthis role. In addition, the reconnaissance and otherintelligence capabilities of committed units are exploitedfor this purpose.

12. Defense of the Landing Force

a. Similarities with Defense of Any Ground Force.Defensive measures for the LF are not significantlydifferent from those for any ground force. Service manualsprescribe the appropriate defensive measures and

V-15

procedures. The information presented in the followingparagraphs is designed to provide an overview and specialconsiderations in planning the defense of the LF.

b. Strong Offense, Best Defense. Defensive combat is, initself, the antithesis of the amphibious attack. Avirtually uninterrupted offensive, characterized bymaneuver, firepower, and shock effect, is maintained by theLF throughout the amphibious attack. The principle of theoffensive is the basic operational precept throughout theLF. An offensive state of mind and an aggressive spirit ismaintained at all times and at all levels of the LF.Constant pressure is exerted on the enemy to deny him theinitiative.

c. Reasons to Assume Defensive Posture. Although theamphibious assault is essentially offensive in character,during the course of operations ashore, occasions willarise when the entire LF, or certain of its subordinateelements, will be required to assume a defensive attitudeor employ certain specific defensive measures. In general,defensive action by or within the LF will assume thefollowing forms:

(1) Defense of a Temporary Nature. A defensiveposture may be assumed by elements of the LF on aday-by-day basis following the seizure of certainobjectives, the defense of which is incident topreparing for the early continuation of the attack.Other reasons for assuming this posture may be todevelop more favorable conditions for offensive action,to economize forces in one area in order to applydecisive force elsewhere, or to deceive or trap ahostile force.

(2) Defense in Relation to the Termination of theAmphibious Operation. As the LF seizes those specificphysical objectives incident to the conclusion of theLF mission, the LF or certain of its elements mayassume a defensive posture. The defense in thisconnection is conducted to ensure the control of thecaptured area pending the prosecution of further combatoperations ashore, to establish a base defenseorganization, and to deny the use of the area to theenemy. This type of defense is conducted in accordancewith the established procedures of land warfare.

V-16

(3) Defense Against Enemy Action of a Specific Nature.Throughout the operation, the LF as a whole and each ofits subordinate elements must be alert and prepared todefend against specific enemy reactions to thelanding. Enemy countermeasures may include air attack;mechanized counterattack; airborne or helicopterborneattack; guerrilla or infiltration operations; andnuclear, biological, or chemical attack. See ChapterV, paragraph 13 for additional discussion. For generaldiscussion of security as a tactical consideration, seeChapter V paragraph 11.

13. Defense Against Enemy Action of a Specific Nature

a. Be Prepared for Enemy Reaction to Amphibious Assault.Assumptions are that the enemy will attempt to employ allavailable means and methods to resist, repel, harass, ordestroy the LF. Throughout all phases of the operation,the enemy’s capabilities for counteraction are assessed ascarefully as possible in order that the LF may bethoroughly alerted to these prospects and, if necessary,provided with the specific means to overcome any reactionthat would impede the attack. During the execution of theoperation, aggressive reconnaissance and surveillance areemployed to provide early warning of indications of aprobable enemy course of action.

b. Offense Must Be Maintained. In the amphibious assault,it is important that the offensive character of theoperation be maintained throughout. Accordingly, wheneverpossible, the enemy reactions to the landing should beovercome without interruption to the momentum of the attack.

c. Antiair Warfare and Counterair Operations. Theattainment of air superiority is a requirement for thesuccessful conduct of amphibious operations. Airsuperiority is gained and maintained only through offensiveand defensive operations that exploit the capabilities ofall participating forces. Both types of operations areessential; neither alone can provide the degree of airsuperiority needed for the decisive joint application ofmilitary power. Although functionally distinct from thoseoperations directly concerned with the primary offensivemission of an ATF, antiair warfare is vital to thesuccessful accomplishment of that mission. Accordingly,antiair warfare is an integral part of the overallamphibious operation. Planning and execution of thiseffort must be closely coordinated with all otheroperations in the objective area to ensure freedom ofaction for friendly aircraft.

V-17

d. Defense Against Mechanized Counterattack. One of themost dangerous enemy reactions to an amphibious assault isa mechanized counterattack against the beachhead.Countermechanized planning is an integral part ofoperations planning and continues throughout the planningand execution phase. The enemy’s mechanized capability isone of the major factors considered by the CLF indetermining his scheme of maneuver, landing plan, conceptof supporting fires, and other operational decisions. Theenemy’s mechanized capability must be appraised accuratelyso that the commander’s decisions properly reflectappropriate countermechanized tactics and techniques in thetactical plan. Countermechanized planning by the LF mustprovide for allocation and coordinated employment of allcountermechanized means available. Concurrent and parallelplanning within the ATF ensures effective employment ofthese means.

e. Defense Against Airborne and Helicopterborne Attack

(1) Scope of Airborne and/or Helicopterborne Attack.Airborne and/or helicopterborne operations against theLF may range from a large-scale effort, usuallylaunched in conjunction with other forces, tosmall-scale raids initiated for the purpose ofdestroying critical installations, disruptingcommunications, or gaining information. The scale ofthe attack will depend on the size of the forcesavailable to the enemy, availability of deliveryaircraft, purpose of the effort, and the degree oflocal air superiority the enemy is able to achievebefore and during the attack.

(2) Air Superiority Deterrent to Airborne and/orHelicopterborne Attack. Major airborne orhelicopterborne operations will seldom if ever beundertaken by the enemy unless he can achieve local airsuperiority or, as a minimum, air parity. Althoughfriendly air superiority may serve as a deterrent tomajor attack, small-scale attacks or sneak raids may beattempted without air superiority and, consequently,may be a continuing threat to the LF.

(3) Quick Response to Airborne and/or HelicopterborneAttack. Defense against airborne or helicopterborneattack is directed toward destroying the enemy withminimum delay, thus preserving the offensive momentumof the LF.

V-18

f. Defense Against Guerrilla Action and Infiltration

(1) Early Analysis of Enemy Capability. Early in theplanning for an amphibious operation, a thoroughanalysis must be made of the degree and nature of theguerrilla and infiltration operations the enemy iscapable of initiating and supporting. Commanders ofevery echelon of the LF must develop plans to prevent,minimize, and combat such activities in their area ofresponsibility.

(2) Tradeoff Between Countering the Guerrilla Attackand Primary Mission. Operations are conducted toprevent the guerrilla attack from interfering with theoperations of the LF. Many measures, passive andactive, offensive and defensive, make up the wholeeffort. These measures require manpower, means, andvaluable time that may have to be diverted from theaccomplishment of the primary mission. The LFcommander must weigh carefully the degree ofinterference he is willing to accept before decidingthat reduction of the effectiveness of the guerrillaattack is necessary to the achievement of his primarymission. The uneconomical application of force tocombat guerrillas will seriously lessen the combateffectiveness of the LF, often enabling the guerrillaattack to achieve its objective.

(3) Nonmilitary Measures. Nonmilitary measures,although often effective, are predominately politicalin nature and generally will not fall within thepurview of the landing force commander. However, thelanding force commander must be informed andknowledgeable of these measures and the conditions thatrequire them.

(4) Infiltrators. The plans and measures foroperations are equally applicable to defense againstinfiltrators. However, the major effect in defenseagainst infiltration is directed toward preventing theentry of infiltrators into the protected area.

g. Defense Against Nuclear, Biological, and Chemical Attack

(1) Defense Requires Overall Effort. Defense againstnuclear, biological, and chemical weapons involves athorough intelligence effort, the timely destruction ofthe enemy means of delivery, and the adoption ofmeasures that will limit or reduce the effectiveness ofthe enemy’s weapons.

V-19

(2) Intelligence. Intelligence efforts are directedtoward the determination of the capabilities andlimitations of enemy nuclear, biological, and chemicalweapons and his capability for defense against suchweapons. Specific information is also sought on theenemy’s detection, protection, and decontaminationequipment. The presence of this material is anindication not only of his defensive capability butalso of his offensive capability and possibleemployment of NBC weapons. An adequate biological andchemical defense is a prerequisite to the offensive useof these weapons.

(3) Commander, Landing Force, Responsibilities. Thelanding force commander determines and prescribes theactive and passive NBC defense measures required forthe LF. Requirements for active defense measures to beprovided by other forces are presented to the CATF.

(4) Additional References. JCS Pub 3-02 providesinstructions concerning planning responsibility andpreparation of the NBC defense plan. See Servicemanuals for specific planning requirements, and ChapterVIII, paragraphs 41-47 of this manual for additionalinformation.

V-20

CHAPTER VI

SHIP TO SHORE MOVEMENT

1. Introduction

a. Ship-to-Shore Movement. The ship-to-shore movement isthat portion of the assault phase of an amphibiousoperation which includes the deployment of the landingforce (LF) from the assault shipping to designated landingareas (JCS Pub 1-02). Ship-to-shore movement planning is acorporate effort produced by Navy and LF chains of command,epitomizing the concept of concurrent, parallel, detailedplanning.

b. Most Critical Part of Assault Phase. Although theship-to-shore movement is only a part of the assault phase,it is the most critical part for several reasons. Duringthis period, the LF and assault shipping are mostconcentrated. Troops, whether transported by surface orair-cushion landing craft, amphibious vehicles, orhelicopters, are particularly vulnerable to enemy fire ofall types. Movement control requirements are complex andmust be coordinated precisely with the fires of supportingarms. Finally, the natural hazards of weather, sea, andsurf conditions must be overcome. For these reasons, theship-to-shore movement deserves separate and detailedconsideration.

2. Purpose and Scope. This chapter provides information onthe organization, control, planning requirements, and executionof the ship-to-shore movement from the perspective of the LF.This chapter extends and complements information in Chapters 11and 16 of JCS Pub 3-02. Additional detailed information may befound in NWP 22-3/FMFM 1-8, "Ship-to-Shore Movement," ATP-36,"Amphibious Operations, Ship-to-Shore Movement." The Appendixof this publication provides a discussion and examples ofdocumentation required for the ship-to-shore movement.Over-the-horizon operations involving LCAC in the ship-to-shoremovement are conducted using the same principles as those fortraditional ship-to-shore operations and in accordance with NWP22-3/FMFM 1-8. Definitions necessary to an understanding ofship-to-shore operations are in the Glossary.

3. General

a. Concept of Operations. The ship-to-shore movement isdesigned to ensure the landing of troops, equipment, andsupplies at the prescribed times and places and in theformation required by the LF concept of operations ashore.

VI-1

The movement may be executed by waterborne means (LCAC,displacement landing craft, amphibian vehicles, and landingship tank (LST)) or helicopterborne movement, or acombination of both.

b. Commencement and Conclusion. Ship-to-shore movementcommences on the order of the CATF to "land the landingforce." Movement is concluded when all troops, equipment,and supplies loaded in assault shipping has landed. Theship-to-shore movement is divided into two periods:

(1) Initial Unloading Period. The initial unloadingperiod is primarily tactical in character and must beinstantly responsive (selective unloading) to LFrequirements ashore.

(2) General Unloading Period. The general unloadingperiod is primarily logistic in character andemphasizes speed and volume of unloading operations.The order to commence general unloading is given by theCATF once he and the CLF mutually agree that conditionsashore are favorable. The LFSP is disbanded and theCombat Service Support Element (CSSE) commander assumesthe responsibility for CSS ashore. The PCSorganization, except for regulation of traffic, ceasesto operate but remains intact in a standby status,ready to resume selective unloading if required.

4. Responsibilities

a. Commander, Amphibious Task Force. The CATF has overallresponsibility for preparation of plans for theship-to-shore movement, including the allocation of shipsand landing craft. Further, the CATF retains control ofthe execution of movement through the Navy controlorganization (paragraph 7 below) until offloading,including the AFOE, is completed.

b. Commander, Landing Force. The CLF is responsible fordetermining LF requirements for the ship-to-shore movementand presenting them to the CATF. The CLF providesinformation on the availability of organic assets(helicopters and amphibious vehicles) to the CATF andprepares the documents contained in the LF landing plan.

c. Other Commanders. Commanders of other major forcesassigned to the amphibious task force (ATF), includingthose assigned for movement to the objective area for theinitiation of tasks not a part of the amphibious operation

VI-2

(e.g., base development), are responsible for determiningand presenting their requirements for the ship-to-shoremovement to the CATF. Normally, these requirements will beincluded in the plans prepared by the ATF and the LFcommanders.

5. Planning Considerations. Planning for the ship-to-shoremovement follows a general sequence of development. Detailedplanning for the ship-to-shore movement cannot begin untilafter the concept of operations ashore (including the scheme ofmaneuver) is formulated and approved. The landing plan must besubstantially completed before embarkation planning can begin.The landing plan must be carefully integrated with the plan ofsupporting fires and must provide for the requisite combatservice support of all forces ashore.

a. Basic Considerations

(1) Basic Requirements. The basic requirements formaximum support to initial tactical operations ashoreare the maintenance of tactical integrity in the LF andachieving the required degree of concentration ordispersion of assault shipping.

(a) Tactical Integrity. The organization forlanding must ensure adequate control upon landingwith a rapid achievement of overall tacticalcontrol by commanders of each echelon.Maintenance of tactical integrity is accomplishedby proper combat loading of assault shipping andby proper assignment of troops to landing ships,landing craft, amphibious vehicles, andhelicopters in the landing plan. The tacticalintegrity of a given unit does not require anentire unit to embark in a single ship. A BLT,for example, may be embarked in several LSTs, withone reinforced rifle company assigned to each LSTfor landing by assault amphibious vehicles.

(b) Concentration or Dispersion of Assault Shipping. The required degree of concentration ordispersion of assault shipping is reflected in theorganization of sea areas in the objective area,including preparation and implementation of thesea echelon plan.

(2) Availability of Amphibious Shipping andShip-to-Shore Movement Assets. The type and quantityof available assault shipping and ship-to-shoremovement assets will influence every aspect of theplanning and execution of an amphibious operation.

VI-3

(3) Defense of the Amphibious Task Force. Theprotection of the ATF is a matter of mutual concern toand cooperation between the CATF and the CLF. Twotypes of threats must be considered in planning andexecuting an amphibious operation: threats to the LFand threats to ATF shipping. LF planning must considerthe use of LF assets (e.g., aircraft, REDEYE missiles)in the defense of the ATF. Protection comprising bothactive and passive measures must be provided during allphases of the amphibious operation. Of particularimportance during the ship-to-shore movement is theprotection acquired through speed of execution andaggressiveness in the conduct of the assault.

(a) Active Protection. Active protectionincludes offensive air operations, air defense,antisubmarine and anti-small-boat screens,covering forces, electronic countermeasures,smoke, and naval gunfire.

(b) Passive Protection. Passive protectionplaces major emphasis on dispersion and mobility.Dispersion is achieved initially through unitseparation afforded by the proper embarkation ofunits in assault shipping. Dispersion within andseparation between assault waves must be acompromise between the degree of dispersionconsidered essential and the concentration ofcombat power requisite to success. Lateralseparation of boat lanes and approach lanes ismaximized to obtain the greatest spread consistentwith the convergence required by location oflanding beaches and landing zones and lanes forreturn of surface craft, amphibious vehicles, andhelicopters to ships. Mobility permits speed inmovement, which denies the enemy accurate targetinformation.

(4) Flexibility. Planning must incorporate sufficientflexibility to respond to changing situations and toexploit weaknesses in enemy defenses when discovered.Alternate plans and plans for employment of reservescontribute to flexibility.

(5) Fire Support. Planning must include the use andcoordination of all fire support means.

(6) Speed and Control. The requirement for speed andpositive control in executing an amphibious operationmust be emphasized in each phase of the operation.

VI-4

b. Special Considerations

(1) Concept of Operations. The LF concept ofoperations ashore is the principal determinant indevelopment of the landing plan. As the basis for thelanding plan, the concept of operations ashore itselfis influenced by many factors; e.g., intelligence onenemy dispositions, the combat power available,hydrographic conditions in the landing area, and thebeaches and landing zones available. The concept ofoperations is the basis on which all subsequent,inverse planning for the amphibious operation as awhole is predicated.

(2) Combat Loading. The arrangement of personnel andthe stowage of equipment and supplies in a mannerdesigned to conform to the anticipated tacticaloperation of the organization embarked. Eachindividual item is stowed so that it can be unloaded atthe required time (JCS Pub 1-02).

(3) Organization for Embarkation. The organizationfor embarkation must support both the plan for landingand the concept of operations ashore. It must alsoprovide for maximum flexibility to support alternateplans that may be adopted. The landing plan is basedon conditions and enemy capabilities known or believedto have existed in the AOA before embarkation of theassault troops. A change in conditions affectingeither friendly or enemy forces during the transit tothe objective area may necessitate modifications to thelanding plan without the opportunity for reconfiguringthe embarkation organization. The extent to which suchchanges to the landing plan can be accommodated dependson the flexibility within the organization forembarkation. (See Chapter V, paragraph 8.)

6. Supply and Movement Categories. Ship-to-shore movements ofLF troops, equipment, and supplies are broadly classified bytype as waterborne movement and helicopterborne movement. Forconvenient reference in planning the ship-to-shore movement andto promote flexibility during its execution, two categories ofsupplies and five categories of movement are employed:

a. Supply Categories. (See Chapter V, paragraph 10 foradditional details.)

VI-5

(1) Landing Force Supplies. LF supplies are all thosesupplies and equipment that accompany the LF in assaultechelon (AE) and assault follow-on echelon (AFOE)shipping and comprise the projected initial supplysupport to sustain the LF until the ATF mission isaccomplished. This supply category is further brokendown into prescribed loads, pre-positioned emergencysupplies, and remaining supplies.

(2) Resupply. Resupply consists of the supply supporttransported into the objective area by the follow-upshipping subsequent to the landing of the assault andassault follow-on echelons of shipping. Resupply alsoincludes host-nation and inter-Service support.

b. Movement Categories

(1) Scheduled waves (see paragraph 8 below).

(2) On-call waves (see paragraph 9 below).

(3) Nonscheduled units (see paragraph 10 below).

(4) Pre-positioned emergency supplies (see paragraph11 below).

(5) Remaining LF supplies (see paragraph 12 below).

7. Landing Serials. Discussion of the movement categorieslisted above requires an understanding of landing serials andserial numbers.

a. Serials. A serial is an element or group of elementswithin a series which is given a numerical or alphabeticaldesignation for convenience in planning, scheduling, andcontrol (JCS Pub 1-02). For embarkation purposes, a serialis a troop unit or grouping of supplies and equipment thatare to be:

(1) Embarked entirely in one ship.

(2) Landed as a unit on one beach or helicopterlanding zone.

(3) Landed at approximately the same time.

b. Serial Numbers. A serial number is an arbitrary numberassigned to each serial to identify each element of the LF,in either the AE or the AFOE, to be landed before generalunloading. Included those Navy elements landed with the LF

VI-6

before general unloading. Serial numbers are a means ofidentification, not a statement of priority, and arepublished in the Serial Assignment Table, which is includedin the landing plan. The planned order for landing serialsis published in the Landing Sequence Table of the landingplan.

c. Purpose of Serial Numbers. Serial numbers areprimarily reference numbers and in no way indicate, inthemselves, a priority or sequence of landing. Thepurposes of serial numbers are to:

(1) Act as a code to identify the grouping of units orequipment.

(2) Provide speed, brevity, and security incommunication. (This does not preclude the use of codenames, designations, or unit titles when appropriate.However, OPSEC requirements must be stressed in allphases of the operation.)

(3) Provide a means of preparing status reports andverifying that all elements ordered to land are landed.

d. Allocation of Serial Numbers. Early in planning, theCLF allocates blocks of consecutive serial numbers to eachLF element on the basis of the administrativeorganization. Further sub-allocations are made to allsubordinate organizations until each unit has been given ablock of serials. While the allocation of blocks of serialnumbers to units is based on the administrativeorganization, the actual assignment of individual serialnumbers is based on the organization for landing. That is,serial numbers are not finally assigned until theorganization for landing is determined. For example, Co A,BLT 1/23 will be allocated serial numbers 1601-1625. Afterdetermining that Co A will land in the assault amphibiousvehicles of the first wave, the entire wave would bedesignated serial 1601. Accordingly, serial numbers1602-1625 would not be reflected in the Serial AssignmentTable.

e. Serial Assignment Table. The serial assignment tableis a table that is used in amphibious operations and showsthe serial number, the title of the unit, the approximatenumber of personnel; the material, vehicles, or equipmentin the serial; the number and type of landing craft and/oramphibious vehicles required to boat the serial; and theship on which the serial is embarked (JCS Pub 1-02).

VI-7

8. Scheduled Waves. Scheduled waves transport the initialassault elements of the LF with their prescribed loads ofequipment and supplies, either by waterborne or helicopterbornemeans. The time, place, and formation for landing arepredetermined jointly by the CATF and CLF. For waterbornemovement, forces in scheduled waves are assigned first priorityof use for landing craft and assault amphibious vehicles. Forhelicopterborne movement, scheduled waves may require multiplelifts to completely land the helicopterborne assault elements.

a. Commencement. Scheduled waves begin landing atH-hour. They are landed at the direction of the CATF andin accordance with a precise time schedule.

b. Priority. After waterborne waves have crossed the lineof departure (LOD), or helicopterborne waves have left thedeparture point, the landing of scheduled waves proceedswithout change except in extreme emergency in order tomaintain the necessary momentum of the assault and toensure the required rapid buildup of combat power ashore.

c. Composition. Scheduled waves are composedpredominantly of elements of the initial assault BLTs andtheir prescribed loads. Designated elements of the LFsupport party necessary to establish initial control andcoordination of unloading operations on the landing beacheswill also be included in scheduled waves.

d. Serialized. Scheduled waves are serialized.

e. Listing of Scheduled Waves. Waterborne waves land inaccordance with the Assault Schedule (Appendix).Helicopterborne landings proceed in accordance with theHelicopter Employment and Assault Landing Table (HEALT)(Appendix).

9. On-Call Waves. On-call waves consist of the elements ofthe LF with their initial combat supplies whose need ashore atan early hour is expected, but whose time and place of landingcannot be accurately predetermined. They are elements subjectto immediate or emergency call and are positioned so as to beavailable for landing shortly after H-hour.

a. Commencement

(1) Waterborne. For waterborne movement, on-callwaves are usually boated at the same time as, orshortly after, the scheduled waves and may be held inreadiness at the line of departure. However, if

VI-8

adequate numbers of landing craft are not available,some on-call elements may be required to wait for asecond trip of landing craft.

(2) Helicopterborne. Helicopterborne on-call wavesare retained in a standby status aboard ship untilcalled ashore.

(3) Other Means of Landing On-Call Waves. When thetactical situation and oceanographic conditions permit,LSTs as well as landing craft, amphibious vehicles, andhelicopters, may be employed to land on-call waves.

b. Priority. Because the units in on-call waves have ahigh priority for landing, their number should be kept to aminimum consistent with transportation asset availabilityand expected requirements ashore. The landing of any otherelements may be preempted to permit the landing of on-callwaves.

c. Composition. Such units as the assault unit reserves,direct support artillery, combat engineers, tanks, andlanding support elements not contained in scheduled wavesare usually boated in this category.

d. Serialized. On-call units are serialized.

e. Listing of On-Call Waves. Waterborne units are listedin the Assault Schedule, after the scheduled waves.Helicopterborne units are listed in the HelicopterEmployment and Assault Landing Table.

10. Nonscheduled Units. Nonscheduled units are the remainingunits of the LF, in either the AE or AFOE, with their initialcombat supplies, whose landing is expected before thecommencement of general unloading.

a. Commencement. Nonscheduled units are not landed untilrequested and normally are not boated until requested.They are second in priority for use of landing craft orhelicopters. The need for such elements ashore is usuallynot of an emergency nature. Therefore, they are landedwhen their employment ashore is appropriate.

b. Priority. Once started, landing of nonscheduled unitsmay be interrupted to permit landing of on-call waves,pre-positioned emergency supplies, or other selectedsupplies or equipment for which there is a greaterrequirement ashore.

VI-9

c. Composition. This category includes the combat, combatsupport, and CSS elements of the LF not included in thescheduled or on-call waves. Examples are LF reserve,general support artillery, LF support party elements,antiaircraft units, aviation ground support units, andheadquarters elements of LFs, division, aviation, and CSSelements.

d. Serialized. Nonscheduled units are serialized.

e. Listing of Nonscheduled Units. Insofar as practical,nonscheduled units are landed in accordance with theLanding Sequence Table (Appendix) prepared by the CLF.Nonscheduled units to be landed by helicopter will belisted in the Helicopter Employment and Assault LandingTable.

11. Pre-positioned Emergency Supplies. Pre-positionedemergency supplies are designated by the LF commander to meetexpected critical needs for supply replenishment early in theship-to-shore movement. These supplies are available forimmediate delivery to units ashore. This category is furtherdivided into floating dumps and prestaged helicopter-liftedsupplies.

a. Floating Dumps. This category is a temporary groupmentof selected supplies (normally Classes I, III, V, and VIII)that are prepackaged and placed in landing craft, ships, oramphibious vehicles for emergency delivery to unitsashore. Floating dumps are employed primarily in supportof surface assault elements.

(1) Standby Status. Floating dumps are boated andreport to the primary control ship after H-hour. Theyusually are directed to remain in the vicinity of theprimary control ship, prepared to land as directed bythe primary control officer.

(2) Dispatch. Floating dumps are dispatched to thebeach when requested by the troop commander ashore.Their availability in dedicated landing craft avoidscritical delays in the delivery of needed supplies tothe beach.

(3) Reconstituted. Once a floating dump has beencommitted, it should be immediately reconstitutedunless supply levels ashore are sufficient to obviatethe further requirement for such assets.

VI-10

(4) Dissolved. Uncommitted floating dumps aredissolved once sufficient supply levels have beenestablished ashore. The landing craft or amphibiousvehicles are landed and the supplies stored in thebeach support area(s). The craft and amphibiousvehicles are then released for other uses.

(5) Serial Numbers. Floating dumps are notserialized. However, vehicles on which floating dumpsmay be mobile-loaded may be allocated serial numbers bytheir owning unit for identification purposes.

b. Prestaged Helicopter-Lifted Supplies. Similar tofloating dumps, prestaged helicopter-lifted supplies areprepackaged units of selected supplies that are positionedaboard helicopter transports and other suitably configuredships for rapid air delivery to units ashore. Prestagedhelicopter-lifted supplies may be employed in support ofboth helicopterborne and surface assault units.

(1) Dispatch. Supplies are dispatched to the beach orlanding zones when requested by the troop commanderashore.

(2) Reconstituted. Once a unit of prestagedhelicopter-lifted supplies has been committed, itshould be immediately reconstituted unless supplylevels ashore are sufficient to obviate the furtherrequirement for such assets.

(3) Dissolved. Uncommitted prestagedhelicopter-lifted supplies are landed as transportation(surface or air) becomes available and stored indesignated combat service support areas ashore.Movement of these supplies ashore should be coordinatedclosely with the Landing Force Support Party tominimize handling and maximize aircraft and landingcraft utilization.

(4) Serial Numbers. Prestaged helicopter-liftedsupplies may be assigned serial numbers in order tofacilitate the identification and delivery of specificsupplies.

(5) Listing of Prestaged Helicopter-Lifted Supplies.These supply packages are included in the HelicopterEmployment and Assault Landing Table.

VI-11

12. Remaining Landing Force Supplies. Remaining LF suppliesconsist of replenishment supplies and equipment not included inthe unit commander’s prescribed loads, floating dumps, orprestaged helicopter-lifted supplies. These suppliesconstitute the major portion of supplies transported into theamphibious objective area in assault echelon and assaultfollow-on echelon shipping. Certain supplies in this categorymay be selectively unloaded to ensure prescribed dump levelsare maintained ashore. However, the bulk of remaining suppliesare landed during general unloading.

13. Free Boats. While not a landing category, free boats areused, as available, to transport unit commanders, commandgroups, or liaison elements to the beach. Free boats can beeither amphibious vehicles, landing craft, or helicopters.

a. Requirements. Free boat requirements are establishedby the LF based on its requirements for command and controlas expressed in the landing plan. Requirements are weighedagainst landing craft and amphibious vehicle availabilitybecause assets for this purpose are assigned a lowerpriority than either scheduled or nonscheduled waves.

b. Commitment. When available, free boats load and landat the request of the senior officer assigned to the freeboat through the primary control officer or helicopterdirection center.

c. Serialized. Free boats are serialized foradministrative purposes.

14. Command and Control Helicopters. For a helicopterborneunit, a command and control helicopter may be assigned. Inpurpose and function, it is similar to the free boat.

a. Helicopter and Helicopterborne Unit Commanders in SameHelicopter. Depending on the tactical situation, thehelicopter and helicopterborne unit commanders or theirrepresentatives should be carried in the same helicopter.This facilitates command and control and permits jointconsultation if changes in the landing plan are required bythe situation.

b. Serialized. Command and control helicopters areserialized.

15. Organization for Landing. Planning for the ship-to-shoremovement involves the coordinated efforts of the LF and navalforce, with particular consideration for the LF concept ofoperations ashore and the characteristics of assault shipping

VI-12

assigned and ship-to-shore movement means available. As adistinct phase of the amphibious operation, the ship-to-shoremovement has a unique organization for command, control, andcoordination. This section discusses the separate LF and Navyorganizations for landing.

a. Organization of the Landing Force

(1) Composition and Functions. Refer to Chapter II,paragraph 7.

(2) Divisions. Although smaller organizations may beemployed in appropriate cases, the reinforced infantrydivision is the basic self-contained tacticalorganization for the conduct of amphibious assaultoperations. When the LF includes two or moredivisions, it is organized for landing into two or morereinforced divisions and supporting units. Landingsupport and aviation units are included in the LForganization for landing. Those specificallydesignated combat service support and aviation unitsscheduled to land during the initial assault and overthe same beaches as the assault divisions are includedin the landing plans of the assault divisions.

(3) Regiments or Brigades. The regimental or brigadelanding team (RLT or BDELT) is a task-organized assaultelement consisting of an infantry regiment or brigadereinforced by those support elements required. Thisreinforcement usually includes subordinate BLTs andelements of such units as the LF support party, tanks,and combat engineers.

(4) Battalions. The BLT is the basic organization ofthe LF for ship-to-shore movement planning. The BLTconsists of an infantry battalion or similar unitreinforced by such supporting and service units as maybe attached for the assault. It may include otherunits attached for landing (see Chapter V, subparagraph10b(4)). Because the battalion landing team is aspecific tactical organization for landing and assault,it should be differentiated from the infantry battalionor similar organization that forms its nucleus and theembarkation team, which is a temporary administrativeorganization of all troops, supplies, and equipmentembarked in a single ship. For ship-to-shore movement,the BLT is further organized for waterborne orhelicopterborne movement as follows:

VI-13

(a) Waterborne. For movement by landing craftand amphibious vehicles, the BLTs are formed intoboat flotillas, boat groups, boat waves, and boatteams. Insofar as practicable, the tacticalintegrity of troop units should be maintainedwithin boat waves and boat teams.

(b) Helicopterborne. For movement by helicopter,the BLTs are formed into helicopter flights,waves, and teams. See the Glossary for furtherdefinition of these terms.

(5) Task Groupments. Task groupments of tanks,artillery, antitank, engineer, and other supportingarms or service units may be formed to support initialoperations ashore. In those instances where theseunits are required to land early, they would becomepart of the organization for landing the BLT.

(6) Reserve Forces. Reserve RLTs or BDELTs and BLTsare organized in a manner similar to their assaultcounterparts. Although not tailored for assault of aspecific beach or landing zone, the reserve is preparedto conduct an assault landing if directed. If planscall for the reserve to be landed by water, it islanded early in order to exploit situations developedby the assault units. Helicopterborne reserve unitsusually are not landed until the requirement arises fortheir employment.

(7) Special Organizations for Landing. The use ofhelicopters in amphibious operations normally does notnecessitate the creation of a separate, subordinate LForganization for landing of the helicopterborne units.Only in exceptional circumstances would such a separateorganization be required. The helicopterborne unitsand the surface units are component elements of the LFand the CLF is their common commander. When a special,subordinate organization is required to conduct ahelicopterborne landing, it will consist of a commandand control element and designated aviation, ground,and service support units required to accomplish themission assigned. Its special status not withstanding,such an organization would remain within the overallstructure of the LF in the same manner as thesurface-landed elements of the LF.

VI-14

b. Organization of the Navy Task Force. The organizationof the Navy forces afloat provides task groups totransport, protect, land, and initially support the landinggroup(s) and includes the necessary movement control andlanding craft organizations. (See paragraph 224, JCS Pub3-02.)

(1) Types of Amphibious Assault Ships. Amphibiousassault ships (LHD, LHA, LPH) are the basic units ofassault shipping. Normally, infantry elements, liaisonteams, and reconnaissance parties of supportingelements of a BLT are embarked in this type ship. Theremainder of the BLT (tanks, artillery, assaultamphibious vehicles, and CSS elements) is normallyembarked in landing ships (LSD, landing ship dock; LST,landing ship tank; and LPD, amphibious transport dock)and attack cargo ships (LKA).

(2) Amphibious Command Ships. The Navy currently hasfour dedicated amphibious command ships (LCCs). Two,LCCs of the BLUE RIDGE class, were originally designedas amphibious force command ships but were redesignatedin 1969 as amphibious command ships. The other twocommand ships, converted LPDs, were designed as fleetflagships.

(3) Navy Command and Control Seaward. The amphibiousassault ships, landing craft, and LF amphibiousvehicles are organized to support the organization forlanding. Navy organization within the objective areais designed to meet control and maneuverabilityrequirements. Control of the ship-to-shore movementdirectly or indirectly involves the organization of thesea areas, the establishment of a number of controlagencies, and the employment of various controltechniques and devices. The number and arrangement ofbeaches and the corresponding types of movement alsoplay a part in the control system to be established fora particular operation.

16. Organization of Sea Areas

a. Organization. For a discussion of the organization ofsea areas in its entirety, see paragraph 1434 of JCS Pub3-02. Sea areas in the vicinity of the objective area areselected and designated by the ATF commander or higherauthority in order to minimize the possibility ofinterference between components of the ATF and othersupporting forces.

VI-15

b. Categories. These areas are generally categorized aseither the ocean operating area surrounding the landingarea or the sea areas in the landing area. In addition tothe control devices listed below, those portions of the seaareas in the landing area in which the ship-to-shoremovement is conducted are of particular concern to the LF.The ATF commander, in coordination with the LF commander,plans the necessary approach and retirement lanes,checkpoints, rendezvous areas, and aids to navigation inorder to facilitate the control of helicopters employed inthe ship-to-shore movement and for the control of aircrafttransporting airborne elements in the landing area. Thefollowing terms reflect the coordination and controldevices typically employed during the ship-to-shoremovement. For further definition of these terms, seeGlossary. For representative schematics showing therelationship of the following terms, see the Appendix.

(1) Line of departure.

(2) Boat lanes.

(3) Approach lanes.

(4) Floating dump area.

(5) Special unloading berths.

(6) Casualty receiving and treatment ship (CRTS) berth.

(7) Transfer line.

(8) Transfer berth.

(9) Assault amphibious vehicle launching area.

(10) Causeway launching area.

17. Navy Control Group. Control of the movement of landingships, landing craft, amphibious vehicles, and helicopters fromthe transport and landing ship areas to landing beaches andhelicopter landing zones is exercised through a Navy controlgroup. The control group keeps the CATF, the CLF, and otherdesignated commanders informed of the progress of the movementfrom ship to shore, the landing of various waves, and thevisible progress of operations on shore. The organization ofthe Navy control group is based on the arrangement and numberof landing beaches to be used. Control officers and control

VI-16

ships are designated by the CATF and Navy transport groupcommanders for their respective levels of command. The controlorganization is designed and organized to support the LForganization for landing.

a. Control Responsibilities. The CATF is responsible forcontrol of the ship-to-shore movement of both waterborneand helicopterborne assault forces. Initially, the entireship-to-shore movement is centrally controlled to permitcoordination of support with the landing of the assaultelements. Later, as circumstances permit, control of thewaterborne movement is decentralized for efficient andrapid handling. The helicopterborne movement, however,remains under centralized control.

b. Control Organizations. The CATF exercises control ofthe ship-to-shore movement through the Navy control group.The CLF influences the execution of the ship-to-shoremovement through the tactical-logistical group (TACLOG)afloat and the LF support party ashore. The system for thecontrol of the ship-to-shore movement is governed by the LFplan for landing. The maximum area over which effectivecentralized control of the ship-to-shore movement may beexercised varies in each situation and is, in large part,governed by communications capabilities.

c. Waterborne Control Agencies. The primary agencies ofthe Navy control group concerned with the waterborneship-to-shore movement are:

(1) Central (Force) Control Officer. This Navyofficer is normally located aboard the CATF’s flagshipto coordinate the overall ship-to-shore movement ofsurface assault units, including LCAC operations. TheLF TACLOG is located with the Central (Force) ControlOfficer (CCO).

(2) Primary Control Officer. A primary control shipand primary control officer (PCO) are designated foreach transport organization landing an assaultregimental or battalion landing team or equivalentformation. The PCO is usually the executive officer oroperations officer (N-3) of the primary control shipand is embarked in the primary control ship to controlthe movement of the waterborne assault waves and othercraft to and from his assigned beach. He and theregimental or battalion landing team TACLOG, collocatedaboard the primary control ship, use the LF landingplan to maintain the status of all serials debarkedfrom ships of their group.

VI-17

(3) Combat Cargo Officer. This officer is the CATF’srepresentative for all phases of embarkation. He isthe LF TACLOG’s link for planning and coordination withall ship combat cargo officers, operation officers, andfirst lieutenants. The TACLOG OIC must brief the CATFcombat cargo officer, in detail, about the landingplan, alternative plans, the CSS concept as it affectsship-to-shore supply replenishment, and other expectedlogistical requirements during operations ashore. Thisinformation will allow the CATF combat cargo officer tocoordinate directly with the appropriate CATF staffofficers.

(4) For definitions and functions of additionalcontrol group agencies that may be included in the Navycontrol organization for waterborne operations, seeGlossary.

d. Helicopterborne Control Agencies. Control of thehelicopterborne ship-to-shore movement is exercised by theCATF. Helicopter units employed in the ship-to-shoremovement are subordinate elements of the LF. These unitsexecute the ship-to-shore movement in accordance with theCATF’s plans for landing and control that, in turn, areestablished on the basis of LF requirements. Plans includeprovisions for reversion of control of helicopteroperations to the CLF when the situation ashore permits.Agencies concerned with the helicopterborne movement andthe procedure for control are as follows:

(1) Tactical Air Officer. Helicopter movements mustbe closely coordinated with the other users ofairspace; e.g., fixed-wing aircraft and supportingfires. The tactical air officer (TAO), located in thetactical air control center (TACC), is responsible forthis coordination. The LF TACLOG provides liaison tothe TAO.

(2) The Helicopter Transport Group Commander. Thisindividual is responsible for matters related to flightcontrol of helicopters. This control is exercisedthrough the helicopter direction center (HDC) and thehelicopter logistics support center (HLSC). Thehelicopterborne assault force TACLOG, collocated withthe HDC and HLSC, provides the necessary liaison.

(3) Tactical Air Control Center Afloat. The tacticalair control center (TACC) afloat is organized andequipped to exercise control and/or coordination of all

VI-18

aircraft, including helicopters, in the AOA. Duringthe helicopter ship-to-shore movement, the TACCexercises control over all helicopters; coordinateshelicopter movements with supporting arms and other airoperations; and maintains the current status ofhelicopters and landing platforms and the progress ofthe helicopterborne assault(s).

(4) Helicopter Coordination Section. As an integralpart of the TACC afloat, the helicopter coordinationsection (HCS) is the specific section that coordinatesall helicopter operations decentralized under thecontrol of subordinate helicopter control agencies.The HCS is organized in two units: A helicoptercoordination unit, concerned with the actual employmentand coordination of helicopters; and a helicopteradvisory unit, concerned with maintaining current dataon the status, availability, locations, and progress ofthe helicopterborne assault(s). Additionally, the HCSis normally augmented with personnel from the aviationelement of the LF.

(5) Helicopter Direction Center. The actual controland direction of the helicopterborne ship-to-shoremovement is decentralized to the helicopter directioncenter (HDC), which is subordinate to the TACC afloat.(See figure VI-1.) The HDC is embarked aboard theflagship of the helicopter transport group unitcommander--normally the commanding officer of an LPH orLHA.

(a) Major functions of the HDC, under the overallsupervision of the TACC afloat, are as follows:

1. Control the movement of all helicoptersoperating within its assigned control areasand in accordance with the concept ofoperations.

2. Control escort aircraft when directed bythe TACC.

3. Maintain and report to the TACC thestatus and location of assigned helicopters.

4. Advise the TACC on all matters pertainingto the movement of the helicopters within itscontrol area that may require coordinationwith supporting arms.

VI-19

VI-20

Figure VI-1. Helicopter Control During the Ship-to-Shore Movement

5. Coordinate all changes to the Helicopter Employment and Assault Landing Table with the helicopter logistic support center.

6. Control the movement of medical evacuation (MEDEVAC) helicopters based on the advice of the medical regulating section (MRS).

(b) The HDC is collocated or closely integratedwith the TACLOG, HLSC, and MRS. Duringoperations, the helicopter assault force TACLOGmonitors requests from assault units or their CSSelements ashore. Requests for delivery byhelicopter are forwarded through the HLSC, whichcoordinates the debarkation of serials inaccordance with the landing plan. The requestsare then forwarded to the HDC for execution. TheMRS recommends to HDC the particular medicalfacility to which MEDEVAC helicopters should bedirected.

(c) When the direct air support center (DASC) isestablished ashore, it assumes responsibility forHDC operations as directed by the TACC. Withinthe DASC is the helicopter director, who isresponsible for the coordination and control ofhelicopters operating under control of the DASC.When and to the extent that air control ashore isexercised by US Air Force elements, agencies areestablished in accordance with US Army-US AirForce procedures for air-ground operations.During amphibious operations, however, air controlagencies ashore must be compatible and capable offunctioning with other air control agencies of theATF.

(6) Helicopter Coordinator (Airborne) (HC(A)). Thehelicopter coordinator (airborne) (HC(A)) is anexperienced naval aviator operating from an aircraft todirect airborne coordination and control ofhelicopterborne assaults. The HC(A) is responsible forthe airborne control of all helicopters in his assignedarea and coordinates with the TAC(A) or FAC(A), asappropriate, for support of close air support aircraft,as determined by the tactical air commander. When anHC(A) has not been designated, the helicopter transportflight leader may, within the limits of his authority,discharge the duties of the HC(A) requisite to missionaccomplishment. If employed in conjunction with theTAC(A), the relationship between the two will beestablished by the tactical air commander or hisdesignated representative. The HC(A) may function asan extension of the DASC or HDC in situations in whichthose agencies delegate specific authority to him forspecific missions. The HC(A) and helicopterborne unit

VI-21

commander should normally be assigned to a singleaircraft where feasible in order to facilitate timelyand coordinated decisions affecting the helicopterborneassault. They should determine during the planningphase who will decide on such matters as:

(a) Final selection of LZs.

(b) LZ selection for succeeding waves.

(c) Mission abort criteria.

(7) Tactical Air Coordinator (Airborne). The TAC(A)is an officer who coordinates from an aircraft theaction of combat aircraft engaged in close support ofground or sea forces. The TAC(A), as an on-siteairborne extension of the DASC or TACC or TADC, isnormally the senior air coordinating authority over allaircraft operating within his assigned area ofresponsibility. However, the specific authorityexercised by a TAC(A) will be as specified or delegatedby the DASC or TACC or TADC, as appropriate. Duringhelicopterborne assault operations, and otheroperations where an HC(A) is employed, the relationshipbetween the TAC(A) and the HC(A) will be establishedduring the planning phase by the tactical air commanderor his designated representative. The TAC(A)’sprincipal responsibilities are to deconflict aircraftand coordinate employment of supporting aircraft withother supporting arms. In fulfilling thisresponsibility, the TAC(A) coordinates as necessarywith the HC(A), ground commanders’ tactical air controlparties, fire support coordination centers, subordinateforward air controllers (airborne) (FAC(A)), and thefire direction centers of artillery and naval gunfire.The TAC(A) may or may not be assigned depending onmission requirements and aircraft availability. Whenassigned, the TAC(A) is subordinate to the DASC or theTACC or TADC.

(8) Airborne early warning and observation aircraftmay be used to assist in controlling assaulthelicopters as well as in defense of the ATF.Primarily, they provide information beyond thecapabilities of shipboard electronic equipment, thusextending the effective range of HDC control.

VI-22

(9) Flight leaders are in command of all helicoptersin the flight or wave from the time they are formeduntil they are disestablished. Although the flightleaders command the flights or waves, they arecontrolled during the entire movement by the helicoptercontrol agencies discussed above.

(10) Reconnaissance teams are delivered to the LZ inadvance of the helicopter support teams to establishand operate signal devices for the purpose of guidingthe initial helicopter wave from the initial point tothe LZ. If the landing is of modest size andcomplexity, reconnaissance teams, augmented byadditional communication means, may function as LZcontrol teams.

(11) The supporting arms coordination center (SACC),the Navy equivalent of the fire support coordinationcenter (FSCC), coordinates all fire support while thecontrol of supporting arms is afloat. The TACC keepsthe SACC informed concerning the movements ofhelicopters and other aircraft.

(12) Individual ships control the launching of theirembarked helicopters and direct them either to flightrendezvous points located in the immediate vicinity ofthe ship or to report to the HDC on a designatedhelicopter direction control net. The HDC then directsthe flight to a rendezvous point or a wave rendezvouspoint where it may form, as required by plan, withflights from other ships into a helicopter wave.

(13) The HLSC coordinates the debarkation of airserials in accordance with the landing plan, under thecontrol of the helicopter logistics coordinator (HLC).The HLC is a Navy officer, comparable to the PCO of awaterborne movement. The troop commander ashore or theLFSP (or HST) will request on-call, nonscheduledserials and emergency resupply based on priorities.The HLSC processes all air requests through the HDCand, once approval is given, notifies the debarkationcontrol officer on the applicable ship to prepare forhelicopter operations and the nature of the mission(e.g., follow-on serial, replenishment). Thecoordination that the HLSC performs is dependent on thecommunications nets available. The helicopter assaultforce TACLOG, located aboard the central control ship,monitors such requests and assists as required. TACLOGinforms the requesting ground commander or the

VI-23

supporting CSS element of mission approval, the typeand number of aircraft, the expected time of arrival athis position, and the helicopter route (lane) ifapplicable. This information is required by the groundunit FSCC for fire support coordination. Oncehelicopter control is passed ashore, the DASC willprovide this information.

18. Tactical-Logistical Group

a. Characteristics and Purpose. A Tactical-LogisticalGroup (TACLOG) is the LF commander’s counterpart to theNavy control organization. TACLOG is a temporary taskorganization consisting of LF personnel that isestablished, as required, by the commanders of majorassault echelons. It functions as the commander’s staffliaison representatives for the principal purpose ofadvising corresponding Navy control groups of LFrequirements for both the waterborne and helicopterborneship-to-shore movements. The TACLOG is not part of, but isclosely associated with, the Navy movement controlorganization.

(1) During the ship-to-shore movement, TACLOGs at thevarious echelons serve as the coordinating link betweenthe Navy control organization and troop commandersashore. The groups advise their Navy counterparts onthe location of troop units, supplies, and equipment;boating requirements for serials; adjustments in thelanding sequence; and special requirements of thecommanders ashore. The group keeps the appropriatetroop commanders informed on the progress of theship-to-shore movement, including serials dispatchedand landed and the status of unloading. In addition,TACLOG maintains detailed records of the times whenserials are requested, dispatched, and landed.

(2) When helicopterborne forces are employed, aHelicopter Assault Force TACLOG is established and actsas the principal adviser to helicopter control agencies(HCS and HDC) and the debarkation control agency (HLSC)during the ship-to-shore movement. TACLOGs monitorrequests from helicopterborne assault units. Theserequests normally are transmitted through helicoptersupport teams attached to the helicopterborne assaultunit. (See paragraph 35 below.)

VI-24

b. Organization. Officers detailed to the TACLOG musthave intimate knowledge of the operation order, theembarkation order, the concept of CSS, and the individualship’s loading plans of their parent unit. TACLOG isnormally composed of representatives from the operations(G/S-3) and logistics (G/S-4) sections, the CSS element,and the embarkation officer of the LF or troop headquartersembarked. Representatives from artillery, tank, air, andother units may be assigned, particularly during the periodwhen the main elements of those units are being boated andlanded.

(1) G/S-3 Representative. Because the initial wavesof an amphibious assault are, in reality, a tacticalmaneuver to establish combat power ashore,consideration should be given to initially designatingthe G/S-3 representative as the officer-in-charge (OIC)of the TACLOG. As the operation progresses into thegeneral unloading phase, the CSS or G/S-4 member mayassume OIC responsibilities. As the initial OIC,however, the G/S-3 representative has theresponsibility for organizing the TACLOG and planningits operation. He must possess a thorough knowledge ofthe capabilities and limitations of Navy ship-to-shoremovement (air and surface) during the planning andexecution phases. This knowledge, coupled with hisgrasp of the tactical plan, the landing plan, and theconcept of CSS, will enable the TACLOG to respond tothe needs of the units afloat or ashore. His operatingrequirements (personnel, communications, and shipspaces) should be identified to the appropriate Navypersonnel (CATF, control officer, and combat cargoofficer) early in the planning phase. Once embarked,the TACLOG OIC must conduct watch officer classes forselected personnel in his 24-hour support center.

(2) G/S-4 Representative. This officer mustunderstand the CSS concept and assist in the properemployment of CSS resources. He continually informsthe CSS element (CSSE) about its relationship with theTACLOG and advises the commanding officer of the CSSEon logistical planning and execution for all phases ofship-to-shore operations.

(3) Embarkation Officer. This officer, with adetailed knowledge of ship loading plans, isresponsible for advising the TACLOG on the exactlocation of all classes of supply and equipment. Healso advises the TACLOG OIC of the nature of stowage

VI-25

and Navy requirements that may affect ship-to-shoremovement. He will indoctrinate assigned embarkationrepresentatives on each ship about TACLOG proceduresand how the representatives will function ascoordinators when their ship receives a TACLOGmission. The embarkation officer may coordinate thegeneral unloading phase while the TACLOG OIC and otherdesignated personnel move ashore. Upon completion ofgeneral unloading and subject to the tacticalrequirements, the TACLOG will cease functioning.

(4) Combat Service Support Element Representative.This officer is usually from the operations section ofthe CSSE. His in-depth knowledge of the capabilities,limitations, and employment of the LF support party andother CSS units greatly aids the TACLOG in evaluatingand processing support requests submitted by the LFelements. Additionally, he advises the TACLOG of anyspecific requirements that apply to CSS vehicles andequipment during ship-to-shore movement or thewithdrawal phase (if one is planned).

(5) Communication Personnel. The number of radiooperators and supervisors required will depend on thenumber of communication nets allocated to TACLOG.Communication equipment and personnel to support TACLOGoperations may be provided by the supported combatelement, the CSS element, the control ship on which theTACLOG is located, or a combination thereof. However,responsibility for providing the TACLOG withcommunications means rests with the CLF and thosesubordinate commanders responsible for establishing aTACLOG.

(6) Representatives or Liaison Personnel from Other Units. Augmentation personnel may be required whenspecific expertise is needed to coordinate the movementof large amounts of equipment and/or supplies duringjoint and/or combined operations.

(7) Administrative or Messenger Personnel. The numberof personnel needed to perform this task is determinedby the TACLOG OIC.

c. Collocated with Navy Control. The TACLOG of eachechelon of the LF is embarked in the same ship with theNavy control officer exercising control over theship-to-shore movement of that echelon. Figure VI-2 showsthe relationship of the Navy control organization, LForganization, and TACLOG organization.

VI-26

VI-27

Figure VI-2. TACLOG Structure and Relationship of Commanders.

(1) Landing Force TACLOG. The LF TACLOG is normallyestablished by the CLF and embarked aboard the centralcontrol ship where it is collocated with the centralcontrol officer. It monitors the operations of the LFsupport party and the TACLOGs of all subordinate LFelements, intervening only when coordination at the CLFlevel is necessary.

(2) Subordinate TACLOGs. Subordinate TACLOGs arenormally established by each ground commander havingresponsibility for conducting a surface assault over acolored beach; e.g., regimental landing teams (RLTs) ofthe LF are embarked in the same ships as theircorresponding Navy control elements. BLTs normally donot establish a formal TACLOG unless they areconducting independent operations or are landing over aseparate beach beyond the control of the RLT.

(3) Separate TACLOGs. A separate TACLOG may beestablished by the ground commander involved whenhelicopterborne assault operations involve abattalion-size force or larger. This TACLOG is locatedaboard the flagship of the helicopter transport groupcommander and collocated with the HDC and the HLSC. Ifa helicopterborne assault operation involves more thanone RLT, or is conducted from widely dispersedshipping, more than one special purpose TACLOG may benecessary.

d. Functions. Specific responsibilities of TACLOG’s ateach echelon are described below:

(1) Landing Force TACLOG

(a) Provide movement control liaison through thecentral control officer (CCO) with the TACC andSACC.

(b) Coordinate the activities of and assistsubordinate unit TACLOG groups in resolving issuesrequiring CATF or CLF attention.

(c) Advise the CCO, the TACC, SACC, and CLF inmatters pertaining to changes in the landingsequence or plan, emphasizing their effects on thetactical situation ashore.

(d) Receive periodic serial status reports fromsubordinate unit TACLOG groups and provide thisinformation to the CLF.

VI-28

(e) Coordinate and assist in control ofwithdrawal operations with the CCO, TACC, SACC,and CATF combat cargo officer. Priorities anddesired mode of transportation should beestablished by CLF.

(2) Subordinate Unit TACLOG (Waterborne Assault)

(a) Coordinate pre-D-day and pre-H-hour transfersinvolving LF personnel and equipment.

(b) Monitor the landing of scheduled waves andprovide information and recommendations to the PCOto facilitate the landing of on-call andnonscheduled serials and supplies.

(c) Process and coordinate requests for supportreceived from the tactical commander. Requestsfrom the tactical commander will normally bereceived from the CSS elements accompanying theassault force.

(d) Advise the PCO of the location of requesteditems and recommend the type of landing craft orhelicopter(s) required to transport the items.The tactical situation ashore and the availabilityof transportation assets should be taken intoconsideration when making this recommendation.

(e) When necessary, during periods of congestionon the beach or when shortages of transportationassets affect the tactical or CSS situationashore, advise the PCO of the priority for landingserials.

(f) Advise the PCO and the LF TACLOG in matterspertaining to changes in the landing sequence orlanding plan, emphasizing their effects on thetactical situation ashore.

(g) Maintain a record by date time group (DTG) ofscheduled, on-call and nonscheduled serials, andLF supplies, indicating those requested and thoselanded.

(h) Send a periodic serial status report to theCLF concerning the buildup ashore.

VI-29

(i) Predetermine LF requirements and coordinatelanding of nonscheduled and nonserialized elements.

(j) Represent the tactical commander informulating decisions that may affect tacticaloperations ashore (within the limits of theauthority delegated to the TACLOG OIC by thecommander).

(k) Coordinate with LF support party and otherCSS personnel on the buildup of supplies in thebeach support area(s) and/or CSS area(s).

(l) Coordinate and assist in control ofwithdrawal operations with the PCO and ships’combat cargo officers. Priorities and desiredmodes of transportation should be established bythe supported commander.

(3) Subordinate Unit TACLOG (Helicopterborne Assault)

(a) Coordinate pre-D-day and pre-H-hour transfersinvolving LF personnel and equipment.

(b) Monitor the landing of scheduled waves andprovide information and recommendations to thehelicopter logistics coordinator and thehelicopter direction officer to facilitate thelanding of on-call and nonscheduled serials andsupplies.

(c) Process and coordinate requests for supportreceived from the tactical commander. Requestsfrom the tactical commander will normally bereceived from the helicopter support team (HST)accompanying the assault force.

(d) Advise the helicopter logistics coordinator,or appropriate agency, of the location ofrequested items and recommend the type and numberof helicopters required to transport the items.

(e) When necessary, during periods of congestionin the LZ or when a shortage of helicopter assetsaffects the tactical or CSS situation ashore,advise the helicopter logistics coordinator of thepriority for landing serials.

VI-30

(f) Advise the helicopter logistics coordinatorand the LF TACLOG on matters pertaining to changesin the landing sequence or landing plan,emphasizing their effect on the tactical situationashore.

(g) Maintain a record by DTG of scheduled,on-call, and nonscheduled serials and LF suppliesto indicate those requested and those landed.

(h) Send a periodic serial status report to CLFconcerning the buildup ashore.

(i) Predetermine LF requirements and coordinatelanding of nonscheduled and nonserialized elements.

(j) Represent the tactical commander informulating decisions that may affect tacticaloperations ashore (within the limits of theauthority delegated to the TACLOG OIC by thecommander).

(k) Coordinate and assist the helicopterlogistics coordinator and ships’ combat cargoofficers in the control of withdrawal operations.Priorities should be established by the supportedcommander.

e. Landing Force Support Party. The LFSP is a temporary,special category task organization of the ATF containing ashore party support element, a helicopter assault supportelement, and a Navy beach group element. The mission ofthe LFSP is to facilitate the landing and movement oftroops, equipment, and supplies across beaches and intolanding zones, ports, and airfields; to assist inevacuating casualties and prisoners of war from the beachesand landing zones; and to assist in the beaching,retraction, and salvaging of landing ships and craft. TheLF support party is task organized from elements of boththe Navy and the LF with command and control normallyprovided by the LF. See NWP 22-5 (The Naval Beach Group).Its buildup ashore parallels the tactical buildup,beginning with the landing of advance parties andreconnaissance teams.

(1) Shore Party Group or Team. The shore partygroup(s) or team(s) conducts shore party operationsacross a colored or numbered beach in support of thesurface assault. The beach party group is the navalcomponent of the shore party group.

VI-31

(2) The HST is a task organization composed ofpersonnel and equipment of the helicopterborne forceand the supporting helicopter unit, with augmentationas required. An HST has no standard organization. Itfacilitates landing and movement of helicopterbornetroops, equipment, and supplies and the evacuation ofselected casualties and prisoners of war. If planscall for establishing a LZ support area, then thenucleus of the HST would be drawn from the landingsupport units of the combat service support element.

19. Types of Movement and Control

a. Control Factors. The type of control exercised in theship-to-shore movement is based largely on the type ofmovement, which, in turn, is based on the concept ofoperations ashore. Ship-to-shore movements may range fromthose requiring several coordinated landings, conducted atdifferent times and widely separated, to schemes ofmaneuver requiring the concentrated assault by a denseformation of troops. Within this range, the ship-to-shoremovement may include one of the following types:

(1) The type of movement when the LF is to launch aconcentrated assault on contiguous beaches.

(2) The type of movement required when the beaches ofthe LF are separated, and exceed the limits foreffective ship-to-shore control.

(3) The type of movement required when the beaches ofthe LF are separated, but effective ship-to-shorecontrol distances are not exceeded at any level in theLF.

(4) Combinations of the foregoing types.

b. Flexible Control System Required. Figures VI-3, VI-4,and VI-5 are examples of the control systems that may beused in connection with the types of movement mentionedabove. Regardless of the type of movement, the controlsystem is not rigid. Variations may occur as a result ofsuch things as control ship availability and the desires ofthe CATF or attack group commander.

VI-32

VI-33

Figure VI-3. Concentrated Landings on Contiguous Beaches.

VI-34

Figure VI-4. Separated Landings Beyond Effective Central Control Distance.

VI-35

Figure VI-5. Separated Landings WithinEffective Central Control Distances.

20. Ship-to-Shore Planning Sequence

a. Concurrent Planning. As is true for other plans inamphibious operations, ship-to-shore plans are preparedconcurrently by the parallel chains of command and by theseveral echelons of command. Recognizing this necessaryoverlap, plans are usually developed in the followingsequence:

(1) The CLF publishes his outline plan. Subordinateunits issue outline plans using those of the nexthigher command as a guide.

(2) Troop requirements and recommendations aresubmitted by subordinate echelons to the next highercommand.

(3) LF requirements as to means are submitted to theCATF, along with a statement of organic LFship-to-shore means (helicopters and amphibiousvehicles) that are available.

(4) Naval requirements are determined.

(5) LF and naval requirements are consolidated by theCATF.

(a) Based on consolidated requirements, thenumber of helicopters, landing ships, MSC ships,landing craft, and amphibious vehicles required tosupport the operation are determined by the CATFand CLF.

(b) Available means are then assigned andapproved troop requirements are incorporated inthe movement plans.

(6) Detailed LF and naval ship-to-shore plans areprepared to support the LF tactical plan.

b. Requests for Additional Assets. If the assetsavailable to the ATF cannot satisfy the requirements forthe ship-to-shore movement, the CLF and the CATF requestadditional resources be made available. If additionalmeans cannot be made available by higher authority, theCATF and CLF must adjust their plans accordingly.

VI-36

21. Ship-to-Shore Movement Plans. Detailed LF and Navyship-to-shore movement plans are prepared after the finalallocation of resources has been made. These consolidatedplans, prepared at the ATF and LF levels, represent the sum ofdetailed plans for waterborne and helicopterborne movementsprepared by parallel Navy and LF echelons at all levels.

a. Documentation. The documentation that supports theship-to-shore movement provides detailed information on theorganization for landing, control of both waterborne andhelicopter movements, allocation of resources for landing,and sequencing of movement categories. Figure VI-6summarizes the major documents in support of theship-to-shore movement.

b. Annex R. Ship-to-shore movement plans are in Annex R,Amphibious Operations, in both the ATF and LF operationsorders. Because these annexes are designed to serve therespective needs of the Navy and LF, the overall content ofeach will differ. Sample documentation is in the followingpublications: NWP 22-1/FMFM 1-4, "The Amphibious Task ForcePlan"; NWP 22-3/FMFM 1-8, "Ship-to-Shore Movement"; FMFM3-1, "Command and Staff Action"; and ATP 36, "AmphibiousOperations, Ship-to-Shore Movement." (Also see Appendix.)

22. The Landing Plan. Ship-to-shore movement planning for theLF is given final form and expression in the landing plan(Appendix 3 to Annex R). The body of this appendix is usuallyshort, with information of interest to all units. The bulk ofthe plan is a compilation of documents included as tabs andenclosures that contain the facts and figures essential for theorderly and timely execution of the assault.

a. Responsibilities. Landing plan documentation is aresponsibility of both Navy and LF staffs. Figure VI-6indicates the responsibility for preparation of the mostcommonly required forms.

b. Description and Samples. Description and samples ofthe forms commonly incorporated in, or related to thelanding plan are in the Appendix to this publication.

c. Purpose and Scope. The landing plan is concernedprimarily with establishing relative landing prioritiesamong the various elements of the LF and with overallcoordination of ship-to-shore movement planning.Specifically, it must provide:

VI-37

VI-38

Figure VI-6.Navy and Landing Force Responsibility for Preparation of

Documents in Support of the Ship-to-Shore Movement.

(1) Priority for landing of elements of the LF.

(2) Allocation of resources.

(3) Allocation of serial numbers.

(4) Correlation of the sequence for landing of allunits not being landed with assault elements, butlanding before general unloading.

(5) Coordination of the landing plans of separatelanding groups, if required.

d. Sequence of Preparation. After the available means forship-to-shore movement have been assigned (see paragraph 19above), LF plans are prepared in the following sequence:

(1) LF allocates or specifies landing assets tosubordinate elements on the basis of availability andin accordance with the concept of operations and schemeof maneuver ashore.

(2) LF allocates blocks of serial numbers to elementsof the force.

(3) LF determines the relative landing priorities forthe various elements of the force.

(4) Assault divisions, RLTs, BLTs, and comparableunits prepare a plan for landing based on assignedtasks and priorities. Landing plans for other forcesnot landing with ground combat forces are submitted tothe LF commander.

(5) LF correlates these recommendations and publishesthem in the LF landing plan.

(6) Subordinate echelons make pertinent extracts fromthe LF landing plan, as necessary, for control andcoordination.

(7) Planning for the movement of supplies ashore, forthe composition of floating dumps, and for the levelsof supply ashore is conducted concurrently with othership-to-shore movement planning.

23. Mutual Responsibility for Debarkation and EnplaningSchedules. The landing documents prepared jointly by thecommanding officer of the ship and the corresponding commandingofficer of troops include the Debarkation Schedule and theHelicopter Enplaning Schedule.

VI-39

a. Debarkation Schedule. The Debarkation Schedule is aplan that provides for the orderly debarkation of troopsand equipment, and emergency supplies for the waterborneship-to-shore movement. It shows:

(1) The sequence in which landing craft, by type, comealongside the debarkation stations, or depart the welldeck.

(2) The individual boats and boat teams or supplyloads that load from each troop debarkation station andthe boats into which they are loaded.

(3) Heavy equipment to be unloaded from each hatch,and the type of boat into which it is to be loaded.

(4) Free boats and their boat team numbers.

b. Helicopter Enplaning Schedule. The helicopterenplaning schedule plans for the orderly enplaning oftroops, supplies, and equipment for the helicopterborneship-to-shore movement. It shows:

(1) The enplaning stations on the flight deck of theship.

(2) The sequence in which helicopters are spotted atthe enplaning stations.

(3) The serialized heliteam with equipment andsupplies assigned to each helicopter in each designatedflight.

24. Ground Combat Element Landing Plan. The major portion ofdetailed planning and immediate supervision of the waterborneand helicopterborne ship-to-shore movements is conducted at thelevel of the senior ground combat element (division, regiment)and the related Navy organization(s). The CLF and CATF mustfurnish the following information to their subordinate unitsbefore this planning may begin:

a. Forces to be Landed. LF aviation, Navy, and combat orservice support elements to be landed.

b. Landing Assets Available. Availability of helicopters,boats, and amphibious vehicles.

VI-40

c. Contents. The ground combat element landing plan ispublished as Appendix 3 to Annex R (Amphibious Operations)to the LF’s operation order. The body of the plan includesa general description, a statement of the ship-to-shorecontrol procedures, the organization of TACLOGs, andinformation on the use of pontoon causeways.

d. Assault Units. All available information pertinent tothe landing of subordinate units is furnished tosubordinate units by higher headquarters. On the basis ofthis information, the units make their plan recommendationsto their respective headquarters which, in turn, prepareand publish their landing plan appendixes. The final planincludes the following tabs and enclosures, when relevant:

(1) Assault Schedule.

(2) Organization for Embarkation and Assignment toShipping Table.

(3) Landing Sequence Table.

(4) Serial Assignment Table.

(5) Helicopter Wave and Serial Assignment Table.

(6) Assault Amphibian Vehicle Employment Plan.

(7) Landing Craft Availability Table (prepared byCATF).

(8) Helicopter Availability Table.

(9) Helicopter Employment and Assault Landing Table.

(10) Helicopter Landing Diagram.

(11) In some situations, additional enclosures andtabs may be required.

e. Reserve Units. A reserve unit prepares a landing planannex in the same manner as an assault element. However,if the entire organization is placed in the nonscheduledunit category, its landing is prescribed in the HelicopterEmployment and Assault Landing Table and/or the LandingSequence Table. Serial Assignment Tables are prepared forall units landing before general unloading.

VI-41

25. Subordinate Ground Combat Element Landing Plan

a. Regimental Landing Plan

(1) Assault RLTs. The RLT commander considers therecommendations of his BLT commanders and submits hisconsolidated recommendations to the division. Afterthe division landing plan appendix is published, theRLT commander extracts pertinent information andinstructions from the division appendix and publishesit in his landing plan appendix. The documentscomprising the RLT landing plan appendix are the same,by title, as those of the division appendix.

(2) Other Regiments. Reserve RLTs and regiments otherthan infantry prepare plans according to the landingcategory to which they are assigned. All units to belanded before general unloading prepare serialassignments tables. Landing of nonscheduled units isprescribed in the HEALT and/or Landing Sequence Table.Elements of regiments and reserve RLTs to be landed inon-call waves appear in the Assault Schedule, LandingDiagram, or HEALT.

b. Battalion Landing Plan

(1) Battalion Landing Teams. BLT commanders preparethe following documents as appropriate:

(a) Helicopter Employment and Assault LandingTable.

(b) Helicopter Wave and Serial Assignment Table.

(c) Landing Craft and Assault Amphibious VehicleAssignment Table.

(d) Landing Diagram.

(e) Consolidated Landing and Approach Plan(prepared jointly at the BLT and transportorganization level, in lieu of using separateemployment plans and approach schedules).

(f) Debarkation Schedule (prepared jointly by COof ship and by CO of troops embarked).

VI-42

(2) Battalions Other Than Infantry. Commanders ofcombat support units prepare those landing documentsrequired to ensure orderly debarkation and movementashore.

26. Aviation Combat Element Landing Plan

a. Purpose. The Aviation Landing Plan outlines thecommander’s plans for establishing aviation units ashore inthe landing area by both air and surface means during theamphibious operation. It provides detailed plans for thelanding of air elements that are embarked in assaultshipping and landed with assault divisions or asnonscheduled units.

b. Contents. The aviation landing plan is published asAnnex R, Appendix 3 (Amphibious Operations) to the LFaviation operation plan. It contains:

(1) Plans for the echelonment and landing sequence ofall aviation units to be established ashore within thelanding area.

(2) Detailed landing documents for air elements thatmove ashore before general unloading.

(3) Applicable ship-to-shore control provisions.

(4) Information on pontoon causeways, fuel handlingsystems, and the landing of engineering elements andequipment necessary for aviation support ashore.

c. Composition of Echelons. Elements of air controlsquadrons and helicopter groups comprising the firstechelon are landed by helicopter to initiate operationsashore. The second echelon of these units is landed overthe beaches with the heavy equipment and personnel requiredfor sustained operations.

(1) Fixed-wing fighter and attack groups land in aninitial echelon composed of personnel and heavyequipment for base operations and maintenance. Thisechelon is surface-lifted into the landing area andlanded over the beaches. A second echelon composed ofpilots, aircraft, and crew is flown into the area fromland bases.

VI-43

(2) The LF aviation organization for landing willdiffer greatly from the task organization because ofthe division of air groups and squadrons into elementsfor landing, and wide variation in the time and methodof landing these elements. The landing plan mustprovide for a groupment of the air elements into aseries of echelons based on time and method oflanding. Several surface-lifted and flight echelonsmay be formed. These echelons, and the time and mannerof their movement to the landing area, are shown in thegeneral paragraph in the body of the Aviation LandingPlan. Detailed composition of echelons is in aseparate appendix.

d. Scheduled, On-Call, and Nonscheduled Elements. Aircontrol units, elements of the LF aviation headquarterssquadrons, aviation groups, headquarters support squadrons,air base, and aviation logistics squadrons may be landedbefore commencement of general unloading to initiateestablishment of air facilities ashore. These units areeither embarked with and landed as part of the assaultdivision(s) or are landed as nonscheduled units.

(1) Detachments of the aviation units and the CSSelements that form part of the helicopter support teamsare often landed in scheduled waves. Air support radarteams usually will be landed in on-call waves. Suchelements are shown in the Assault Schedules (orHelicopter Employment and Assault Landing Table, andHelicopter Wave and Serial Assignment Table) of thedivision(s). Other aviation elements that are landedearly in the ship-to-shore movement are serialized andshown in the division or LF Landing Sequence Table.

(2) The LF Aviation Landing Plan lists separatelythose air elements that are landed in scheduled,on-call, or nonscheduled units. The landing plan alsocontains additional landing documents, as extractedfrom division and force landing plans, necessary todescribe the method and sequence for landing theseelements. This information is shown in the followingenclosures:

(a) Extracts from appropriate Assault Schedules.

(b) Extracts from Helicopter Employment andAssault Landing Tables.

VI-44

(c) Extracts from Helicopter Wave and SerialAssignment Tables.

(d) Serial Assignment Table.

(e) Landing Sequence Table.

(3) Serial numbers for nonscheduled aviation elementsare allocated by the LF. The assigned serials and anitemized list of personnel and equipment of airelements that are to land in scheduled or on-call wavesare submitted to the CLF for coordination andapproval. The division is then furnished the necessaryinformation to provide for landing air elements withthe division. Nonscheduled aviation elements areincorporated into the force Landing Sequence Tables.

e. Ship-to-Shore Control. To monitor the landing of airelements early in the ship-to-shore movement, the LFaviation commander provides representatives to the seniorTACLOG. As changes or delays in the landing of airelements occur, the commander may then be apprised of thesituation. Schedules and tables required by aviationrepresentatives in the HDC and the tactical air controlcenter, in addition to those in the LF Aviation LandingPlan, may be in the air annex to the operation plan.

f. Airfields, Pontoon Causeways, Fuel Handling Systems,and Engineering Operations. The availability ofoperational facilities required to establish aviationashore determines the time of landing aviation elements.Information on the projected dates when these facilitieswill be complete, or engineering work will begin, isprovided in the landing plan when available. Thisinformation includes estimated dates for:

(1) Airfields achieving operational status.

(2) Installation of pontoon causeways for landingheavy aviation assets.

(3) Completion of fuel handling systems from the beachto the airfields or helicopter operating sites.

(4) Landing engineers and commencement of work onairfields.

VI-45

27. Conduct of the Ship-to-Shore Movement

a. Based on H-Hour. As the ATF assault shipping startsthe final approach to assigned positions for the assault,individual ships prepare for the debarkation or enplanementof the embarked troops, equipment, and supplies inaccordance with previously prepared plans. Thecommencement of boating and enplaning and the timing ofother ship-to-shore movement preparations are dependent onthe designated H-hour. All elements must be prepared tomodify plans on short notice to conform to changes inH-hour.

b. Movement of Personnel to Control Stations. Inscheduled pre-H-hour cross-deck operations, surfacemovement control group personnel are transferred, asrequired, from transports to ships of the control group,which then take station as planned. Helicopter movementcontrol groups take assigned stations and initiate actionsas required to meet the time schedule for initial landings.

c. Importance of Timing. The debarkation of the initialassault elements of the LF involving loading of personnel,equipment, and supplies into landing craft, amphibiousvehicles, and helicopters is accomplished on a strict timeschedule. This schedule is based on the established timeof landing in relation to H-hour and takes into account thetime required for loading and the ship-to-shore transit.Preparations are made for debarkation of on-call andnonscheduled units and for dispatching these units whenrequired.

d. Waterborne Movement

(1) Scheduled Waves. Scheduled waves are landedaccording to plan. When practicable, the firstscheduled wave is dispatched by the CCO with otherwaves being regulated by the various PCOs.

(2) On-Call Waves and Pre-positioned Emergency Supplies.The landing of on-call waves and pre-positioned

emergency supplies is initiated as the situationrequires and continues until these categories areashore. On-call waves are usually located in thevicinity of primary, assistant central control, orapproach lane control ships in order to be availablefor landing with as little delay as possible. Sincetheir use in this manner may represent an uneconomicalor even hazardous employment of landing craft, ships,

VI-46

or amphibious vehicles, the number of units place in anon-call category is kept to a minimum consistent withthe requirements of the LF. Control of on-call wavesis a function of the cognizant control officer. Whenthe commander ashore desires the landing of an on-callunit, he notifies his TACLOG of the desired place andtime (if appropriate) of landing. The Navy controlofficer then directs the landing of the unit.Pre-positioned emergency supplies are located inproximity to the appropriate control officer whodirects their landing as requested by the troopcommander concerned.

(3) Nonscheduled and Remaining Landing Force Supplies.As the assault progresses, nonscheduled units andremaining LF supplies are landed in accordance with therequirements of the LF. On occasion, these categoriesmay be required before completion of the landing ofon-call waves and pre-positioned emergency supplies.Nonscheduled units and previously designated suppliesare normally requested by serial until the commencementof general unloading. The responsibility for theirlanding is assigned by the CATF to the commanders ofthe cognizant control organizations. In the landing ofnonscheduled units, the maximum coordination between LFand Navy control organizations is essential to ensureresponsiveness and efficient use of landing ships andcraft. The control officers concerned regulate thelandward movement of the ships and craft containingthese units and supplies in accordance withinstructions from appropriate transport organizationcommanders and requests from the TACLOG. The followingbasic procedures apply whether the landing ofnonscheduled units is centralized at the ATF level ordecentralized:

(a) Initiation of the Movement. As soon as thesituation ashore permits, the CLF requests theCATF land the required nonscheduled units. Inorder to provide maximum support to the LF, reducethe communications load, and enhance the efficientuse of landing craft, the request includes as manyunits as are expected to be required ashore duringa specified period. Unless a need for change isindicated, the list of units requested follows thesequence shown in the Landing Sequence Table.

VI-47

Requests for modification of the landing sequenceof nonscheduled waves are made by the LF commanderas soon as possible after the need for each suchchange arises.

(b) Continuation of the Movement. The CLFcontinually reviews the progress of the landing.Periodic and timely requests are submitted to theCATF for landing such units and items of supply asare desired.

(c) Changes to the Landing Plan. Because unitsand supplies must be placed on the beaches asrequired by the situation ashore, altering theplanned sequence for landing may be necessary.However, this action may be done only with anattendant sacrifice of speed. The CLF may specifychanges in the sequence or place of landing of anyunit. A combat-loaded ship, however, is adaptableto only minor changes in the plan for unloadingequipment and supplies. By request of the CLF,the landing of nonscheduled units may be suspendedentirely for a temporary period if required by thesituation ashore. Likewise, the LF support partycommander may request the appropriate controlofficer to stop the landing of units on his beachwhen conditions justify such temporarysuspension. Units whose landing has been deterredupon request of the LF are not landed until againspecifically requested. In requesting suchdeferment, the LF takes note of the fact that suchaction may disrupt the planned use of lighterage.The size of a unit, or the stowage of supplies ina ship, may be such that if it is not unloaded,the deferment will interfere with subsequentunloading. In such cases, the CATF notifies theCLF.

e. Helicopterborne Movement

(1) Landing of Scheduled Waves. The helicopterborneship-to-shore movement normally is completed during theinitial unloading period when tactical considerationsare the dominant factor. Helicopters must usually makeseveral trips between ships and landing zones to landand supply the helicopterborne forces. The movement ofscheduled waves is conducted on a prescribed timeschedule and subsequent trips are made as rapidly as

VI-48

possible in accordance with the requirements of the LFin order to ensure a rapid buildup ashore. Afterlaunching, helicopters proceed to the landing zone inaccordance with the control procedure discussed inparagraph 16 above. The senior troop commanderenplaned, in conjunction with the senior helicopterunit commander enplaned, may make minor modificationsin the plan for landing to accommodate variations inthe tactical situation. For this purpose, alternatelanding zones and sites are selected during theplanning phase. After discharging their loads,helicopters take off, rendezvous by flights, andproceed via a specified breakup point to the designatedship. Helicopters employed in the tactical troop liftwill not normally be utilized for casualty evacuationuntil troop buildup in the landing zones reaches apoint that permits such utilization. Exceptions tothis would include casualties picked up at the landingzone and returned to the assault LPH, LHA, or LHD.

(2) Landing of On-Call Waves. Because of the urgencythat may be attendant to landing on-call waves,elements or items in other landing categories may bepreempted to permit their landing. The number ofon-call units or items must be kept to a minimum iftheir high-priority status is to be preserved. On-callwaves are listed in the Helicopter Employment andAssault Landing Table. They are landed at the requestof the CLF.

(3) Landing of Nonscheduled Waves. The landing ofnonscheduled waves commences upon completion ofscheduled landings in accordance with LF requirements.Once started, it may be interrupted to permit thelanding of on-call or other selected units or supplies,or to respond to unforeseen conditions, such as arequirement of the LF to employ LF helicopters forother tactical or logistical purposes. Modificationsshould be kept a to a minimum because alterations willcomplicate the helicopter ship-to-shore movement.

(4) Subsequent Employment of Helicopters. Once thehelicopterborne ship-to-shore movement is completed,transport helicopters are employed to meet tactical andlogistical requirements of LF operations ashore asdirected by the CLF. Helicopter movement in theseoperations will be controlled by appropriate tacticalair control agencies ashore, afloat, or both.

VI-49

CHAPTER VII

INTELLIGENCE

1. Introduction

a. Need for Accurate and Timely Intelligence. Accurateand timely intelligence is the keystone for planning anddecision making. Because of the difficulty in alteringplans significantly during the initial assault, therequirement for intelligence has special relevance in anamphibious operation. Many of the basic requirements canbe answered through the use of existing data bases such asNaval Intelligence Processing System (NIPS), DIAcompendiums, area studies, etc. If plans are based on whatis later found to be an inaccurate intelligence estimate,the initial phase of the assault may have to be conductedas planned with higher than expected losses of personneland equipment and with a possible early commitment of thereserves. Therefore, the commander, landing force (CLF)must be continuously and rapidly informed of any changes inthe primary intelligence factors: enemy, weather, andterrain.

b. Objectives of Intelligence Process. The primaryobjective of the intelligence process for amphibiousplanning is to reduce, as much as possible, theuncertainties regarding the physical environment and theenemy situation. A second major objective is theformulation and supervision of OPSEC andcounterintelligence measures designed to conceal landingforce (LF) intentions and activities, and to destroy theeffectiveness of the enemy intelligence effort.

2. Purpose and Scope. As in all aspects of the amphibiousoperation, the need for total coordination of efforts betweenthe amphibious task force (ATF) and LF is of paramountimportance. This chapter describes how the intelligence needsof the LF are met within the overall intelligence effort of theATF. This chapter complements information in Chapter VI, JCSPub 3-02, with emphasis on the requirements of the LF and theenvironmental factors that are unique to amphibiousoperations. The material includes information on the JointIntelligence Center, the Naval Intelligence Processing Systemdata base, and the nature of amphibious reconnaissance.Planning considerations, collection, dissemination, control,security, and target intelligence are discussed. Foradditional information, see the following publications:

VII-1

a. FMFM 3-21, "Marine Air-Ground Task Force IntelligenceOperations." Chapter 21 of this manual provides detailedinformation on topography, hydrography, climate, andweather in the amphibious environment. Appendix I providesa guide for determining intelligence requirements foramphibious operations.

b. FMFM 3-24, "Reconnaissance Operations." This manualdescribes the techniques of collecting intelligenceinformation on beaches and coastal and inland areas byreconnaissance elements. Standard report formats areprovided in Appendix D.

c. ATP-38, "Amphibious Reconnaissance." This documentprovides NATO-agreed doctrine, paralleling FMFM 3-24.

d. NWP 22-4, "Underwater Demolition Teams in AmphibiousOperations." This classified manual provides informationon organization, employment, and mission planning for UDToperations.

e. Joint Service Tactical Exploitation of National Systems(JTENS) Manual.

3. General

a. Functions of Intelligence Process. The functioning ofthe intelligence process differs markedly betweenamphibious operations and land combat, particularly in thedirection and collection phases. This difference existsbecause the LF organic collection assets are not capable ofcollecting intelligence information before advance forceoperations, the LF is therefore totally dependent onnational, theater, and ATF assets. The needs of the LF areall encompassing, ranging from the location of underwaterobstacles, to trafficability of soil on the beach, to thecapacity of bridges on egress routes, to the ground slopeand conditions in potential helicopter landing zones.Enemy capabilities must be determined based on detailedstudy of all order of battle factors, in-depth terrain,hydrography, and weather analysis. From the assessment ofenemy capabilities, the intelligence officer must developand present his appraisal of the enemy’s capabilities andthe probable courses of action the enemy commander iscapable of executing.

b. Basic Requirements. The CLF must have all pertinentintelligence on the weather, terrain, and hydrographywithin the objective area, and the enemy forces within oradjacent to it that may affect the amphibious operation.

VII-2

Beaches and helicopter landing zones receive specialemphasis. Also, he needs intelligence concerning thepeople who live in the area, and the extent to which theymay hinder or assist the operation. Existing natural andmanmade obstacles must be evaluated, and those areas thatoffer the best potential for emplacement of offensiveminefields and barriers must be determined. Theavailability of maps and recent imagery must be determinedimmediately and requirements forwarded so that adequatequantities are available for planning and operations. SeeAppendix I of FMFM 3-21, "Marine Air-Ground Task ForceIntelligence Operations," for a guide to intelligencerequirements for amphibious operations.

c. Current Intelligence. Current intelligence on theenemy is highly desirable. However, the importance of theintelligence must be carefully weighed against the risk ofcompromise and loss of surprise if the collection effort isdiscovered.

(1) Accurate current intelligence on enemydispositions may not be available before the assault,or may be received only shortly before the assault whentimely dissemination is difficult.

(2) In some cases, to avoid compromise of theoperation, the only current intelligence availablebefore the assault will be in forms such as imagery,communications and electronics intelligence, or humanintelligence reports. These sources of information,although valuable supplements, may be susceptible todeception or manipulation and may not be timely.

d. Close Association of Intelligence and Operations Staffs.The traditionally close association of intelligence and

operations staffs is particularly important in theamphibious operations for several reasons:

(1) The development of possible courses of action,other staff estimates, the commander’s estimate, andthe concept of operations are heavily dependent on thepreliminary studies and initial estimates prepared bythe intelligence staff.

(2) The development of a deception plan, whether atthe strategic or tactical level, should focus on therequirement for a specific collection plan to supportthe deception. This plan must at every phase considerthe enemy’s capabilities to interpret the indicators

VII-3

associated with friendly collection efforts so thatadjustments can be made, if necessary, to ensure theplan is believable. During the development of theplan, coordination between operations and intelligencestaffs at all echelons is crucial. During theexecution of the plan, intelligence collection andcounterintelligence measures must be in harmony withthe deception plan. The intelligence estimate mustaddress the enemy’s ability to collect and react to thefriendly deception means.

(3) The development of data for the ATF requires closecoordination between operations and intelligencepersonnel.

e. Naval Intelligence Processing System. The NavalIntelligence Processing System (NIPS) is a combination ofdigitized and nondigitized encyclopedic data representing aconsiderable volume of planning information on a worldwidescope. The digital data base is available when the LF isembarked on NIPS-configured vessels such as LCCs, LHDs, andLHAs. This data base is also available to holders of theNIPS augmentation package through computer microfiche.

f. Joint Intelligence Center. The commander, amphibioustask force (CATF) and CLF have similar intelligencerequirements. To eliminate duplicate procedures andstreamline intelligence functioning, a single intelligenceorganization known as the Joint Intelligence Center (JIC)may be formed. The decision to establish the JIC is madejointly by the CATF and CLF.

(1) The ATF N-2 and the LF G-2 or S-2 have coequalstatus in the operation of the JIC.

(2) On naval vessels that possess the NIPS, the ship’sN-2 maintains direction of the technical aspects of theJIC and assists in providing automated intelligencesupport to the embarked staff.

(3) The JIC prepares joint briefings; maintains ajoint ground, air, and naval situation map; andparticipates in maintaining the currency of estimates,studies, and intelligence graphics of mutual interestto the CATF and the CLF.

VII-4

4. Responsibilities

a. Commander, Amphibious Task Force. During planning, theCATF is responsible:

(1) Determination of intelligence requirements forplanning by the naval forces, review of intelligencerequirements of the LF and other forces, andconsolidation of intelligence requirements for the ATFas a whole.

(2) Collection and processing of information anddissemination of intelligence to major elements of theamphibious task force in accordance with specialrequirements of each.

(3) Procurement of maps, charts, town plans, port andharbor studies, trig lists (lists of geodetic data),gazetteers, photographs, and other graphic aids for theLF.

(4) Preparation of intelligence estimates affectingthe force as a whole.

(5) Preparation of intelligence studies that relate tothe mission and area of operations.

(6) Establishment of liaison with operationalintelligence agencies that are not part of the ATF,including area and departmental agencies as necessary.

(7) Initiation of requests and directives for thecollection of information by reconnaissance,observation, friendly or indigenous forces, and otheroperating agencies.

(8) Determination of security and counterintelligencemeasures applicable to the ATF as a whole, in additionto those specified by higher authority.

(9) Preparation and distribution of an intelligenceannex to the ATF operation plan.

(10) Establishment of a target information center.

(11) Establishment of a JIC at the outset of planning,in conjunction with the CLF, as required.

VII-5

b. Commander, Landing Force. During planning, the CLF isresponsible for:

(1) Determination of intelligence requirements for theLF as a whole; preparation of a collection plan tosatisfy those requirements; and submission of requestsfor required information and intelligence to the CATFor through him to higher commands.

(2) Collection and processing of information anddissemination of information including targetinformation and derived intelligence to the LF and theATF.

(3) Establishing liaison with intelligence agencies ofthe ATF and with area intelligence agencies, incooperation with the CATF, to assist in the collectionof information of primary interest to the LF.

(4) Dissemination of map, chart, photograph, and othergraphic aids requirements; submission of requirementsfor these to the CATF when beyond the capability of theLF to satisfy; and distribution of such material to theLF.

(5) Preparation of intelligence estimates, summaries,studies, and Annex B for the LF, and dissemination ofinformation, including target information andintelligence, as developed, to the LF, ATF, andadjacent commands.

(6) Assisting in the determination of the requirementfor a JIC and providing representatives as required.

(7) Assignment of reconnaissance and observationmissions and other intelligence tasks to subordinateelements of the LF.

(8) Execution of reconnaissance and observationmissions and other intelligence tasks assigned by theCATF or by higher authority.

(9) Preparation of intelligence estimates, summaries,and studies for the LF.

(10) Preparation of counterintelligence estimates andplans for the LF, including determination and executionof security measures required to protect informationagainst espionage, material against sabotage, andpersonnel against subversion.

VII-6

(11) Preparation for counterintelligence actionsashore, both offensive and defensive, to destroy theeffectiveness of hostile intelligence activities.

c. Other Force Commanders. Other force commanders areresponsible for determining and stating their intelligencerequirements, and for preparing and executing anintelligence plan compatible with the specific needs oftheir respective forces. Requests for intelligencepeculiar to the specialized operations of these forces mustbe submitted by the force commanders to the CATF.

5. Preliminary Studies and Estimates

a. Use of Preliminary Studies and Estimates. Preliminaryintelligence studies and estimates will be developed forthe CLF on receipt of the initiating directive or on beingalerted for the potential operation. Preliminary planningmay include an analysis of the area of operations and thepossible effects of terrain, hydrography, weather, andcultural features on the proposed operation. The mostfavorable areas for executing the landing are determinedand additional intelligence requirements defined. Studiesof beaches, ports, communications networks, existing airfacilities, and terrain provide an initial basis fordetermining the number and types of LF elements that can beaccommodated and supported within possible landing areas.On the basis of these studies, initial engineer and otherservice support requirements may be estimated. Theintelligence necessary to support preliminary planning iscontained in intelligence publications and studies preparedby higher headquarters.

b. Initial Intelligence Estimate. The primary purpose ofthe initial estimate prepared for the CLF is to assist himin the process of making the basic decisions, formulatingcommander’s guidance to the staff and subordinatecommanders, and developing EEIs. As a minimum, the initialestimate should provide the commander with information onthe general weather conditions expected in the objectivearea; key terrain features and avenues of approach; thelocation, nature, and extent of available beaches; and thegeneral composition, strength, and disposition of enemyforces in the area, including all available information onthe enemy’s nuclear, biological, and chemical capabilities.

VII-7

6. Detailed Intelligence Estimates

a. Must Be Kept Current. Subsequent to issuance of thecommander’s planning guidance, a detailed intelligenceestimate is prepared. The detailed estimate must becontinuously revised to reflect new information received.

b. Estimate for Specific Purpose. An intelligenceestimate might be prepared to assist the commander inarriving at a decision relative to a particular aspect ofthe mission.

c. Studies and Reports. In order to expedite the flow ofnecessary intelligence to the command, certain portions ofthe continuing intelligence estimate are prepared anddistributed as separate studies and reports. Examples are:

(1) Weather studies.

(2) Astronomical and tidal data.

(3) Beach studies.

(4) Helicopter landing zone (HLZ) and drop zone (DZ)studies.

(5) Trafficability studies.

(6) Airfield and potential airfield studies.

(7) Special studies on enemy forces.

(8) Survey of civilian populace.

(9) Terrain masking of communications-electronicsequipment studies.

7. Intelligence Annex

a. Purpose. The intelligence annex to the operation planor order is the formal intelligence order for the conductof intelligence operations and activities. It is a mediumthrough which information and intelligence may bedisseminated, reconnaissance and observation missionsassigned, and other intelligence tasks and proceduresstated. Drafts of the intelligence annex should normallybe distributed to other commanders in advance of theoperation plan for use as planning guides.

VII-8

b. Appendixes. The volume and complexity of the materialin the intelligence annex dictates the use of appendixes.In addition to those appendixes normally prepared for landoperations, the following are representative of others thatmay be attached:

(1) Hydrographic information.

(2) Meterological tables.

(3) Tidal data.

(4) Beach studies and sketches.

8. Collection of Information. The CATF directs andcoordinates the collection and assembly of intelligencematerial for the ATF. All collection agencies and sources ofinformation will be considered and exploited, consistent withother requirements and priorities.

a. Other Operations to Collect Information. In somecases, operations may be undertaken in conjunction with theamphibious operation for the purpose of collectinginformation; e.g., raids, supporting operations, preassaultoperations, and advance force operations.

b. Landing Force Tasked to Collect Information. Thecollection resources of the LF may be tasked within the ATFcollection plan with missions before the assault, and allassets of the LF will contribute to the collection effortduring the assault.

c. Commander, Amphibious Task Force, and Commander, LandingForce, Collection Responsibilities. The CLF forwards hisrequests for collection to the CATF, who in turn forwardsrequests beyond the organic capabilities of the ATF tohigher headquarters if a JIC has not been established. AnATF-LF JIC is normally established during the embarkationphase of an amphibious operation. Once the JIC has beenestablished, joint collection, processing, anddissemination is accomplished by the ATF and LF personnelin the JIC. Before the establishment of, or after thedisestablishment of the JIC, the LF intelligence collectionrequests to external commands and agencies are forwarded upthe operational chain of command.

VII-9

9. Amphibious Reconnaissance

a. Amphibious Reconnaissance. Amphibious reconnaissanceis an amphibious landing conducted by minor elements,normally involving stealth rather than force of arms, forthe purpose of securing information, and usually followedby a planned withdrawal (JCS Pub 1-02).

b. Characteristics and Functions. The need for physicalreconnaissance of the objective area may require theemployment of amphibious reconnaissance units. Anamphibious reconnaissance may be conducted before or duringthe assault phase of an operation. Amphibiousreconnaissance before D-day should be conducted when theinformation to be collected justifies the risk of discoveryand loss of strategic or tactical surprise. Reconnaissanceunits are employed to obtain information on hydrographicand beach conditions, terrain features, routes ofcommunication, and enemy installations, forces, anddefenses. They may also be used to capture selectedpersonnel and to contact, evacuate, or land agents andinformants in the objective area. They may be landed priorto the assault to reconnoiter helicopter landing zones andestablish homing beacons and/or other navigationalequipment. Amphibious reconnaissance missions arecharacterized by strict security; adequate time and spacefactors between planning, execution, and reporting; anddetailed coordination with all forces that may operateconcurrently in the area concerned.

10. Planning Considerations. Intelligence planning to supportthe amphibious operation must satisfy the CLF’s requirement forintelligence to arrive at the basic decisions, to conductsubsequent operations, and to execute the operation.

a. Initial Intelligence Resources. Intelligence tosupport the CLF during preliminary planning results frominitial studies and estimates prepared by the ATF and LFstaffs or the JIC. The preponderance of this informationwill be derived from encyclopedic intelligence data orcurrent assessments prepared by higher headquarters andexternal agencies.

b. Subsequent Intelligence Resources. Intelligence tosupport detailed planning normally relies on informationcollected by sources external to the ATF, acting inresponse to the requests to satisfy essential elements ofinformation and other intelligence requirements.

VII-10

c. Organic Intelligence Resources. The intelligenceresources organic to the LF may be involved in collectionmissions during preassault operations; conversely, they maynot be employed until commencement of the amphibiousassault. In either event, LF collection resources areemployed within the overall ATF collection plan.

11. Special Considerations. The major factors that influencethe collection, production, and dissemination of intelligencein support of LF requirements are as follows:

a. Dependent Upon Higher Echelons. Assault landing teamsare committed to action with no opportunity for groundreconnaissance and must depend on orientation conductedbefore arrival in the objective area. Before landing,lower echelons of the LF are entirely dependent on higherechelons for information and intelligence.

b. Limiting Factors During Planning. LF planning is basedprimarily on information provided by higher commands. Theability of these agencies to provide accurate and currentintelligence may be inhibited by time, the remoteness ofthe objective area, enemy capabilities, and the need forOPSEC.

(1) The elapsed time between the initiation ofplanning, or the initiation of a request forcollection, and receipt of intelligence may be of suchduration that major changes could occur during theperiod.

(2) The achievement of strategic or tactical surprisemay be of far greater tactical value to the LF thanspecific items of intelligence.

c. Limiting Factors During Movement. During the movementto the landing area, the problem of dissemination iscomplicated by the physical separation of LF elements andby restrictions, imposed for security reasons, on the useof electronic communications means.

12. Basic Considerations

a. Requirements. The intelligence requirements of the LFare extensive, and at any given time the desired knowledgeof the objective area and the enemy force may beunavailable. In these circumstances, the commander mustprovide definitive guidance to separate the "nice to know"

VII-11

from the critically important information. Thus, thecommander seeks to verify the assumptions on which the planis based; e.g., "That the enemy will not reinforce thebeachhead before D-day."

b. Essential Elements of Information. The commander’sguidance is expressed in the form of essential elements ofinformation (EEI). These are the prioritized and criticalitems of information concerning the enemy, weather,terrain, and hydrography that he needs in order to make asound decision and formulate details of a plan ofoperations. Essential elements of information aredeveloped throughout all phases of the operation andconstitute the commander’s priority intelligencerequirements. Intelligence planning must be continuallyredirected to satisfy these requirements as they develop.

c. Other Intelligence Requirements. The great variety ofquestions posed by planners may not be critical enough tobe considered EEIs, but must be answered. Close liaison isrequired between the intelligence officer, other staffofficers, and subordinate echelons to ensure timely receiptof the other intelligence requirements (OIRs) and theirincorporation into the overall collection effort.

13. Collection Plan

a. Requirements. A collection plan must be prepared andimplemented early in the planning phase of an amphibiousoperation. Collection planning must provide for thecontinuous collection of information throughout all phasesof the operation. The commander provides guidance to thecollection effort by determining and announcing hisessential elements of information. The collection planmust be integrated with the overall scheme of maneuver andplan for fire support. This close integration ofintelligence collection, scheme of maneuver, and firesupport ensure no wasted resources in the targeting effortby the ATF. This result is achieved by close andcontinuous coordination with other staff officers.Additional guidance will be by OIRs submitted by otherstaff officers and subordinate commanders.

b. Format. During the planning phase, the collection planis consolidated and published as paragraph 3 to theintelligence annex. Subsequent to the publication of thecollection plan, additional EEIs or OIRs appear asdirectives or requests for information.

VII-12

14. Intelligence Tasking and Control. Requests for collectionand orders to subordinate elements of the LF are in theintelligence annex.

a. Intelligence Personnel Attached to Subordinate Echelons.An amphibious operation may require the attachment of

intelligence specialists at subordinate echelons, includinginterpreters, interrogator-translators, andcounterintelligence personnel. Additionally, the potentialearly requirement for intelligence specialists to assist atprisoner collection points, in population control measures,and with document translation and captured materielexploitation must be considered.

b. Overcoming Problems in the Initial Assault. The fullpotential of the LF’s intelligence resources will not berealized until after the initial assault. During theinitial assault, the tempo of battle may inhibitinformation exchange from the best available source--the LFunits in contact with the enemy. This problem, inherent inall operations, is minimized through training, adherence tostandardized procedures, intelligence staff involvement andsupervision, and adequate provision for intelligencecommunication channels.

c. Control. During the assault, intelligence informationflows through the command and control agencies of the ATFand LF from all available sources--tactical radio nets,deployed reconnaissance teams, sensors, aerial observers,etc.

(1) During the initial phase of the assault, theprimary agency to collect, process, and disseminate theinformation is the JIC. Other agencies (supportingarms coordination center, tactical air control center,etc.) must be attuned to passing intelligenceinformation to the JIC.

(2) During the later stages of the assault, as membersof the LF intelligence staff depart the JIC and arephased ashore, control of the intelligence flow ismanaged in accordance with normal Service procedures.Information exchange between LF and ATF agencies iscontinuous throughout the operation.

15. Dissemination

a. Distribution Plan. Dissemination is accomplished ateach command level of the ATF, in accordance withrequirements determined during the planning phase. Adistribution plan is prepared, listing the intelligence

VII-13

aids to be promulgated, the commanders who are to receivethem, methods of delivery, number of copies, and deliverydates.

b. Intelligence Reports. The scope, contents, time ofsubmission, method of transmission, and responsibility forpreparation of intelligence reports and summaries aredetermined by the CATF as early as possible during theplanning phase. After the planning phase has ended,additional intelligence reports and summaries are preparedand distributed by the CATF and subordinate commanders asrequired.

c. External Dissemination. Intelligence informationgathered by the ATF will be disseminated outside the ATF bythe CATF in accordance with theater, national, DefenseIntelligence Agency (DIA), and Service-coordinatedreporting requirements and formats.

d. Dissemination Before the Assault and During the Initial Stages of the Assault. Dissemination of information to theLF is most difficult immediately before and during theinitial stages of the assault. Critical intelligence maybe received as the force is moving into the area ofoperations. Normally, radio silence will have been imposedby the CATF. During the early phases of the assault, thephysical separation of units and the operational tempo mayinhibit dissemination of intelligence. These limitationscan be overcome in part by a variety of methods, toincluding fleet broadcasts, couriers, visual signals, andthe like during the movement into the objective area.During the initial phases of the assault, secure voice andredundant communications channels may be employed.However, the extent of the radio electronic combat threatagainst the force must be considered because it may alsoinhibit dissemination.

16. Counterintelligence and Security

a. Command Responsibilities. The CATF force prescribesthe special security and counterintelligence measures to betaken during planning and preparation for the operation.Counterintelligence operations are defined as militarysecurity. Other commanders issue necessary directives to,and supervise the activities of, their forces. Specialmeasures may include:

VII-14

(1) Establishment of secure planning areas, includingoperations security, civil security, embarkationsecurity, wartime information security program, andspecial operations, including counterespionage,countersubversion, countersabotage, andcounterterrorism.

(2) Use of code names and symbols.

(3) Classification of material used in planning.

(4) Restrictions on dissemination of information andcompleted plans.

(5) Restrictions on employment of communications.

(6) Cover and deception plans.

(7) Measures for handling civilians.

(8) Armed Forces censorship.

(9) Control of accredited correspondents, includingfield press censorship.

(10) Measures to counter subversion within andespionage, sabotage, and terrorism directed against theamphibious task force.

(11) Security of classified documents and material.

b. Staff Responsibilities. The intelligence staffcontributes to the development of the OPSEC plan developedat the outset of planning. Counterintelligence personnelsupport the commander’s OPSEC program by providingassessments of friendly vulnerabilities; briefings on enemythreats of espionage, sabotage, subversion, and terrorism;and assistance in establishing safeguards against thosesecurity threats.

c. Additional Information. See Section 3, FMFM 3-25,"Counterintelligence," for specific information pertainingto counterintelligence combat operations.

17. Target Intelligence

a. Definitions

(1) Target Intelligence. Target intelligence isintelligence which portrays and locates the componentsof a target or target complex and indicates its

VII-15

vulnerability and relative importance (JCS Pub 1-02).The term "target intelligence" implies that availableinformation has been processed and evaluated to produceintelligence.

(2) Target Information. Target information isunevaluated data of every description concerningtargets that, when processed, may produce targetintelligence. Target information may be accurateenough for supporting arms use in raw form. The callfor fire on a target of opportunity is a common example.

(3) Target Data. Target data is a collective term fortarget information and target intelligence.

(4) Target List. The listing of targets maintainedand promulgated by the senior echelon of command; itcontains those targets which are to be engaged bysupporting arms, as distinguished from a "list oftargets" which may be maintained by any echelon asconfirmed, suspect, or possible targets forinformational and planning purposes (JCS Pub 1-02).

b. Development of Target Data

(1) Close Coordination Required. The efforts of theintelligence staffs and supporting arms representativesin the operations staffs must be closely integrated inthe development of target data. In some cases, raw,unevaluated information may be adequate for supportingarms purposes. In other cases, information must beanalyzed to determine relative importance orvulnerability of a target. For example, a hardenedsite that must be destroyed will require preciselocation data.

(2) Before the Assault. The majority of targets areusually developed from various sources, includingaerial multisensor imagery and electronicreconnaissance. Target data on fixed installationssuch as bridges and airfields, and choke points alongroutes of communication, are derived from basic terrainstudies, basic encyclopedias, target materials, andimagery. The intelligence effort must be responsive tothe requirements of nuclear and chemical operations.For example, when a potential target exists, detailedinformation for a nuclear target analysis must bedeveloped.

VII-16

c. Additional Information. See Chapter VIII, paragraphs 2and 4 of this manual and NWP 22-2/FMFM 1-7, "SupportingArms in Amphibious Operations," for additional information.

VII-17

CHAPTER VIII

SUPPORTING ARMS

1. Introduction

a. General

(1) This chapter provides general guidance on the roleof the landing force (LF) in planning and providingfire support for an amphibious operation. Chapters 7,8, and 16 of JCS Pub 3-02 provide the basic guidance onfire support in amphibious operations. This chapterrepeats little of the material from JCS Pub 3-02.Rather, this publication provides additional guidance.

(2) The following publications should be consulted formore specific information on fire support than isprovided in this chapter.

(a) ATP 37, "Supporting Arms in AmphibiousOperations."

(b) NWP 22-2/FMFM 1-7, "Supporting Arms inAmphibious Operations."

(c) FM 6-20, "Fire Support in Combined ArmsOperations."

(d) FMFM 6-8, "Fire Support Planning andCoordination."

b. Supporting Arms Coordination and Fire Support Coordination. In amphibious operations, the term "supporting armscoordination" refers to the activity of the supporting armscoordination center (SACC). The term is synonymous withfire support coordination.

c. Principal Supporting Arms. The principal supportingarms in amphibious operations are aviation, naval gunfire,and artillery. The discussion in this publication onsupporting arms is also applicable to missile and rocketdelivery systems, and to chemical and nuclear as well asconventional munitions delivered by the supporting arms.

d. Importance of Supporting Arms and Coordination.Properly planned and executed supporting arms fires areusually critical to the success of an amphibious assaultoperation. At the beginning of the assault, the LFs haveno organic supporting arms other than infantry weapons,

VIII-1

such as mortars and shoulder-fired weapons, to supporttheir advance. Once sufficient area is seized ashore,artillery can be landed to provide additional support. Butinitially the infantryman relies upon his organic weaponsand air and naval gunfire for fire support. Planning forand coordinating the use of supporting arms is complex andrequires that all the organizations involved work closelytogether.

2. General

a. Requirements. Both the amphibious task force (ATF) andthe LF will require fire support during the amphibiousassault.

(1) Naval forces in the AOA normally require firesupport for operations such as beach reconnaissance,hydrographic survey, removal of beach and underwaterobstacles, and minesweeping. In addition, aircraft andships capable of providing fire support must beallocated to protect the task force from air, surface,or subsurface attack.

(2) Landing forces normally require fire support onshore targets before, during, and after the initialassault landings. Until ground fire support means(e.g., mortars, tanks, and field artillery) of the LFare landed and ready to provide fire support, thesupport that would otherwise be rendered by theseweapons must be provided by naval gunfire and aircraft.

(3) Since the availability and contemplated employmentof one supporting weapon system influences therequirements for the others, the fire supportrequirements of all components of the ATF must beconsidered together in planning the employment of firesupport means. Air, naval gunfire, and artillery tosome extent have overlapping capabilities. However,all are required in an amphibious operation becauseeach has unique characteristics not duplicated by theothers.

b. Command and Control

(1) Command of the ATF is vested in the commander,amphibious task force (CATF), making him responsiblefor the accomplishment of the assigned mission andgiving him authority over the activities of all

VIII-2

elements of the ATF. This authority is exercisedthrough the chain of command and through various staffagencies; e.g., the SACC and the TACC.

(2) As stated in the definition of control above,control is the authority a commander exercises overpart of the activities of subordinate or otherorganizations. Authority, or control, unlikeresponsibility, can be delegated. Before an amphibiousassault begins, the CATF usually delegates appropriatecontrol to the staff officers who are supervising ATFstaff agencies such as the SACC and TACC. In anamphibious assault, combat power is built up ashore asrapidly as possible. As the various units (e.g.,infantry battalions and artillery battalions) land andestablish the facilities and communications needed fortheir commanders to exercise control over the elementsof their units, the commanders assume control(authority) over their units. This control was vestedin these commanders by their appointment as commanders,the assignment (in the case of combat units) of zonesof action, and the assignment of missions. Theplacement of these commanders in the chain of commandof a command under the CATF does not lessen theauthority (control) of these commanders.

(3) The rapid buildup of combat power ashore causessome of the landing force staff agencies to be ready tofunction before others. The senior fire supportcoordination center is often one of the first. Whenthese agencies are established ashore, the CATF maypass control (i.e., delegate authority) over certainfunctions to the commander, landing force (CLF) so thathe may exercise authority through his own staffagencies rather than having to request the CATF todirect the actions that are part of these functions.For example, control of naval gunfire (the authority toassign missions to NGF support ships) is vested in theCATF. If the CATF passes control of naval gunfire tothe CLF, the CATF delegates the authority to the CLF todesignate directly to the commander of the gunfiresupport ships what landing force units will be providedwith direct and general support ships. Before thecontrol of naval gunfire is passed to the CLF, the CLFmust request the changes of direct and general supportmissions from the CATF.

VIII-3

(4) The definition of control is very general. For anexpression using the term to be useful in militaryoperations, the meaning of control in that particularcircumstance must be stated. Specifically, theauthority must be defined and the activities over whichthis authority can be exercised must be stated.Without such clarification, a statement using the wordcontrol is useless because of its vagueness. The mostcommon forms of control connected with supporting armsare:

(a) Control of Supporting Arms by SupportedCommanders. When a commander is assigned a zoneof action or sector, he is given the authorityover all activities, including the use ofsupporting arms, within his zone of action orsector. He exercises this authority through hisfire support coordination center, forward aircontroller, naval gunfire spotter, artilleryforward observer, or mortar forward observer asappropriate. Members of fire support coordinationcenters and supporting arms controllers, spotters,and observers do not have any inherent authorityover supporting armsfires. They are all staffofficers of the supported commander.

(b) Control of Aircraft by Pilot

1. OPNAVINST 3710.7J states: "Pilot inCommand. Pilot in command is a termreferring to the pilot of an individualaircraft. The pilot in command isresponsible for the safe and orderly flightof his aircraft and the well-being of hiscrew. The pilot in command may also be themission commander or formation leader when sodesignated. In the absence of direct ordersfrom higher authority cognizance of themission, responsibility for starting orcontinuing a mission with respect to weatheror any other condition affecting the safetyof the aircraft rests with the pilot incommand. The authority and responsibility ofthe pilot in command is independent of rankor seniority in relation to other personsparticipating in the mission or flight exceptthat, (1) a wing, group, or squadroncommander if embarked on a mission involving

VIII-4

aircraft of his command, retains fullauthority and responsibility regarding hiscommand, including the mission in which he isparticipating, and (2) the pilot in commandof an aircraft, with a flag or generalofficer may, under certain circumstances, besubject to the instructions of the flag orgeneral officer." (See OPNAVINST 3710.7J fordetailed information on this last point.)

2. The provisions of OPNAVINST 3710.7J citedabove require pilots to consider the safetyof their aircraft, passengers, and crew asstrongly as they consider missionaccomplishment. Given the cost of modernaircraft and the time required to trainflight personnel, it may be in the bestinterest of the force that aircraft not berisked on a particular mission. If anaircraft and its crew are to be risked, thecommander responsible for determining whichmissions will be flown should make thedecision. (The ACE, MAGTF, or CATF isresponsible for determining which missionswill be flown.) However, for this to happen,the request must note the extent of the riskto the aircraft.

(c) Control of Firing Batteries by ArtilleryBattalion Commanders. Commanders of artillerybattalions control all aspects of their batteries’operations except that:

1. The fires of the batteries must becleared by the commander whose zone of actionor sectors through which the rounds will passthrough or into which they will impact.

2. Battery positions must be approved by thecommander who controls the zone of action orsector in which the battery position islocated. Battalion commanders control, amongother things, selection of battery positions,assignment of fire missions to individualbatteries, resupply of ammunition to firingbatteries, personnel replacement prioritiesand maintenance priorities within the

battalion.

VIII-5

(d) Control of Artillery by Landing ForceCommander. The CLF has authority to assigntactical missions (e.g., direct support, generalsupport, reinforcing, and generalsupport-reinforcing) to artillery battalions.

(e) Control of Naval Gunfire Support Ships byNaval Commanders. Naval commanders are alwaysresponsible for the following:

1. Allocation of available ships for firesupport duties.

2. Ammunition resupply and logistic supportof fire support ships.

3. Operational control of fire support ships.

(f) Control of Naval Gunfire Support Ships by theSupported Commander. When ships are placed indirect or general support of specific landingforce units, the selection of targets, the timingof fires on the targets, specifications of line offire (when not inconsistent with safe navigation),and the adjustment of fires are functions of thesupported troop unit. (JCS Pub 3-02)

(g) Control of Naval Gunfire (the Control that isPassed from CATF to CLF). The authority to assigndirect or general support missions to navalsurface fire ships.

(h) Control of Offensive Air Support by the ACECommander. Authority over the following is vestedin the ACE commander:

1. Selection of aircraft to conduct mission.2. Selection of ordnance for mission.3. Specifying if aircraft is to be risked inconduct of mission (see subparagraph 1b(5)(b)above).4. Diverting of aircraft from assignedmission.

VIII-6

(i) Control of Direct Air Support. The authorityto direct an aircraft to support a specific unit.

3. Responsibilities of Commanders

a. Tasks. This paragraph discusses the tasks involved inplanning fire support and associated responsibilities ofthe commanders concerned and amplifies the guidanceprovided in article 710 of JCS Pub 3-02.

(1) Target Selection. Target selection is theprerogative of the supported commander.

(2) Target Analysis. After the targets are selected,they are analyzed and the following is determined foreach target:

(a) Classification.

(b) Priority.

(c) Method of attack. Often this is only thedetermination of the degree of damage to beachieved and the assignment of the target to aparticular supporting arm (e.g., artillery, navalgunfire, or air) although it may also include thedecision to use two or three of the supportingarms simultaneously.

(3) Selection of Means. This selection encompassesthe assignment of targets to particular firing units oraircraft units and the allocation of fire support meansto elements of the landing force. The assignment oftactical missions to artillery battalions and navalgunfire ships are two forms of allocating fire supportmeans. The following factors are important to note:

(a) The selection and allocation of ships and airelements to deliver fire support is a function ofthe CATF or designated commander.

(b) The selection and allocation of artilleryunits is a function of the CLF.

(c) The selections and allocations of firesupport assets by both commanders areinterdependent, and continuous liaison andexchange of information on the subject areessential.

VIII-7

(4) Timing of Missions. The timing of fire supportmissions is the prerogative of the supported commander;however, factors such as aircraft availability may makeit necessary to adjust these times. Close coordinationbetween the supported and supporting units is essentialon this matter.

(5) Adjustment of Fire. When the supported commanderpossesses adequate facilities, the conduct andadjustment of naval gunfire are troop functions of thesupported commander. When he lacks adequate facilitiesfor the conduct and adjustment of naval gunfire, thesupported troop commander designates targets and timingof fires and recommends the type and amount ofammunition to be used. Adjustment is accomplished bythe supporting units.

(6) Nuclear and Chemical Weapons. Command guidancefor the employment of nuclear and chemical weapons isprovided in the initiating directive and is amplifiedby the CATF and CLF. Command guidance should includetypes or targets to be attacked, allocation of weaponsto subordinate units, desired weapons reserve, and anymodifications to policies contained in the nuclear andchemical SOP.

(7) Mines. The CATF will establish policy andpromulgate guidance relative to the employment ofmines, including scatterable mines, delivered by anymeans within the AOA. He may do this by specifyingauthority to approve mine employment or controlmeasures (e.g., restricted fire area where no mines maybe employed).

b. Consolidation of Requirements. The sequence of eventsdiscussed above and in article 710 of JCS Pub 3-02 startswith the CLF’s selection of targets. Before targets can beselected at the CLF level, certain tasks must be performedat lower echelons within the landing force. These tasksare:

(1) Plan fires to support the development of thecommanders’ concepts of operations.

(2) Determine the overall fire support requirements(see subparagraph 8a(2)(b) below) and the detailed firesupport requirements (see subparagraph 8a(2)(c)below). Usually, a battalion is the lowest level atwhich requirements are determined. These requirements

VIII-8

are forwarded through successive levels of command tothe CLF. At each headquarters (e.g., regiment), therequirements from the subordinate headquarters areconsolidated. These consolidated requirements arereviewed to eliminate duplications, etc., and forwardedto higher headquarters.

c. Commander, Amphibious Task Force, Responsibilities.Fire support planning responsibilities of the CATF are:

(1) Coordinating the planning for employment of allaircraft, naval gunfire, and artillery.

(2) Preparing coordinated naval gunfire and air plansfor all phases of the operation.

(3) Establishing a supporting arms coordination agencyat the ATF level during planning and execution of theoperation.

(4) Planning for the establishment of a supportingarms coordination agency at the subordinate navalechelons when appropriate.

d. Commander, Landing Force, Responsibilities. Firesupport planning responsibilities of the CLF are:

(1) Establishing a fire support coordination agency ateach appropriate level of the LF for accomplishment oflanding force fire support coordinationresponsibilities during planning and execution of theoperation.

(2) Determining LF requirements for air, navalgunfire, and artillery fire support and ensuring thatthe fire support requirements, if filled, will providethe support needed, and that the fire support plan andthe scheme of maneuver are integrated.

(3) Coordinating requests of the LF for fire support.

(4) Presenting the coordinated requests for navalgunfire and air support to the CATF.

(5) Preparing the field artillery fire support plan.

e. Air Force Participation. When Air Force forcesparticipate in an ATF, planning responsibilities of the AirForce commander are:

VIII-9

(1) Providing staff representation.

(2) Establishing a tactical air control system orelements thereof.

f. Attack and Landing Groups. When subordinate amphibiousattack groups and landing groups are formed and whereseparate landing areas are designated, each subordinateattack group commander is normally assigned responsibilityfor the overall coordination of supporting fires in hislanding area.

4. Target List Responsibilities and Target Information Center

a. Target List Responsibilities. The CATF is responsiblefor the preparation and promulgation of the target list.All available target data are collected in the JIC. TheJIC provides target data to the supporting arms coordinator(SAC), who prepares the target list. The landing forcecommander and tactical air officer provide lists of targetsdesired to be destroyed or neutralized (see subparagraph2a(2) below) and assist the SAC in preparation of thetarget list. The SAC assigns classification andpriorities. The target list is approved by the CATF and isdisseminated in the Operations Annex to the Amphibious TaskForce Operation Order. When advance force operations areconducted, the target list will be controlled initially bythe advance force commander. Control of the target listmay be passed to the CLF as the operation progresses.

b. Target Information Center. During planning, a targetinformation center is formed. It consists of ATF and LFrepresentatives, if the geographical location of thecommand permits. If geographical separation prevents thisduring the planning phase, the LF representatives will jointhe center immediately after embarkation. This center iscomposed of the ATF target intelligence officer andappropriate assistants and the LF target informationofficer and other appropriate personnel of the targetinformation section of the landing force FSCC. Thesepersonnel work in the SACC and maintain close coordinationwith the air support section intelligence officer and theLF target intelligence officer (who is in the JIC).Although the target information center is dissolved whenthe LF headquarters is displaced ashore, the targetintelligence center must be prepared to resume normaloperations if required.

VIII-10

5. Planning Considerations. Fire support planning inpreparation for an amphibious operation is more centralizedthan that for subsequent operations ashore. For example, inpreparation for an amphibious operation, fire supportrequirements are integrated and coordinated at each echelon andthen forwarded to the next echelon for approval and furtherintegration and coordination. In subsequent operations ashore,landing force elements may develop and execute fire supportplans in their areas of responsibility that are neitherintegrated nor coordinated at the higher levels.

6. Special Considerations

a. Supervision by SACC and Senior FSCC. The CATF isresponsible for the overall coordination of supportingfires. Overall coordination of supporting fires, whetherby the SACC or later by the senior FSCC, is overallsupervision rather than the detailed coordinationaccomplished at lower echelons. The SACC and senior FSCCsbecome directly involved only when lower level fire supportcoordination agencies are unable to perform the necessarycoordination. This procedure is consistent with thefollowing principles:

(1) Coordinate each fire at the lowest possibleechelon.

(2) A commander has the authority to approve the useof supporting arms within his zone of action. He andhe alone has the authority to authorize fires into hiszone of action.

b. Commander, Landing Force, Coordinates all Landing ForceRequests. The CLF is responsible for coordination of LFrequests for fire support during all phases of anamphibious operation.

c. Coordination and Control Under One Commander. Toobtain the most effective fire support coordination, ahighly desirable situation is that the commanderresponsible for the overall coordination of supportingfires also has control over all supporting fires in thesense control of supporting arms is defined insubparagraphs 1b(5)(d), (g), and (i) above. When controlof direct air support is passed from the CATF to the CLF,the situation normally permits a concurrent shift inresponsibility for control of naval gunfire and for theoverall coordination of supporting fires. If, after such a

VIII-11

shift of responsibility, returning control of one functionor another to afloat facilities becomes necessary, thedifficulties in the separation of responsibility forsupporting arms may be accepted on a temporary basis. Theprinciple of concurrent shift of responsibility for controland coordination of supporting fires is similarlyapplicable to attack groups and landing groups.

d. Command and Control. Command of all supporting armsrests with the CATF. Control initially rests with the CATFfor:

(1) Air.

(2) Naval gunfire.

(3) Artillery used to support the initial landing, asopposed to artillery landed with the LF. Control ofartillery landed with the LF is provided by the CLF.The CATF can pass control of air, naval gunfire, andartillery used to support the initial landing to theCLF after the required control agencies are establishedashore. Command remains with the CATF until thetermination of the amphibious operation.

e. Vital Role of Aviation. Aviation plays a major rolethroughout the operation. Pre-D-day air support providesfor aerial reconnaissance, attack of enemy positions andfortifications, air defense for preassault operations, andminelaying and clearing operations. On D-day andsubsequently, air support is expanded to include deliveryof personnel and cargo into the objective area, electronicwarfare, and offensive air support of ground forces. Inthe early stages of the assault, air-delivered munitionsplay a vital role, complementing and supplementing navalgunfire, filling the void for landing force artillery notyet ashore, and attacking targets tasked to othersupporting arms or beyond their range.

7. Basic Considerations. The fires of aircraft, navalgunfire, and artillery must be coordinated to ensure that thosearms are economically employed with maximum effectiveness andthe requisite degree of safety. Accordingly, coordination isachieved through the application of the sets of principles inarticle 720, JCS Pub 3-02 and in FM 6-20, "Fire Support inCombined Arms Operations."

VIII-12

8. Unique Supporting Arms Organizations. Special supportingarms organizations have been formed by the Marine Corps and AirForce, which will play an important role in amphibiousoperations involving US Army and/or allied forces. A briefdiscussion on these organizations follows. (See subparagraphs14 and 15 below.)

a. US Air Force Tactical Air Support Control Elements.The US Air Force tactical air support system elements thataccompany Army or other land force combat elements are thedirect air support center (DASC) and the tactical aircontrol parties (TACPs). (See paragraph 15 below foradditional information.)

b. Air and Naval Gunfire Liaison Company. The Air andNaval Gunfire Liaison Company (ANGLICO) is a Marine Corpsunit whose mission is to provide liaison and control teamsfor a US Army or allied divisions, including airborneunits, for the control of fires from naval close supportaviation and from naval surface fire ships. These teamsare provided at every level from the division headquartersdown to the forward line companies, with the requisitepersonnel and equipment. The ANGLICO provides US Navy andMarine Corps personnel to advise on the capabilities,limitations, and employment of naval gunfire and airsupport and the organization and communications needed torequest, direct, and control this support.

9. Supporting Arms Planning

a. General. Fire support planning for an amphibiousoperation has two distinct but related aspects. Oneinvolves the preparation of the objective area and includessupporting, preassault, and prelanding operations. Theother involves the provision of fire support means to theLF and its combat elements subsequent to landing. Early inthe planning phase, the CLF determines and submits to theCATF his overall requirements for air and naval gunfiresupport. These requirements result in a tentativeallocation of aircraft and ships as a basis for planning.

(1) Preparation of the Objective Area. Preparation ofthe objective area involves the determination oftargets to be attacked, the general timing of attack,the selection of fire support means, the effectdesired, and a statement of the probability, orassurance, that the effect will be attained.

VIII-13

(a) A statement of the desired probability, orassurance, that the desired effect will beattained on a target results in a determinablecommitment to that target, and in a broader sense,the extent to which the objective area will beprepared before the landing of assault troops.

(b) The fire support means available, the timeavailable, and the number of targets to beattacked are interrelated. An increase in meansor time obviously increases the number of targetsthat can be attacked. The time required toprepare the objective area with the meansavailable is a significant factor in determiningthe extent of supporting and/or preassaultoperations.

(c) Prelanding operations consist primarily ofneutralization and suppressive fires in thevicinity of the landing areas. Fires are notlimited to confirmed targets but may include fireson suspected targets or areas that, if occupied,will present a threat to the ship-to-shoremovement and initial operations ashore.Destruction of targets may be an additionalrequirement during prelanding operations.

(2) Support of the Landing Force Subsequent to Landing.Support of the LF and its combat elements subsequent

to landing involves the assignment of adequate firesupport means to committed maneuver elements, and toother elements or echelons requiring fire support.Such assignment of fire support increases the combatpower of supported units on an as-required basis.

b. Overall Fire Support Requirements. Overall firesupport requirements consist of the number and type ofaircraft, fire support ships, artillery units, and therespective munitions needed to support each operationalphase of the operation-- pre-D-day, D-day, and post-D-dayoperations ashore. The CLF submits his air and navalgunfire requirements for each operational phase as thebasis for a tentative allocation of fire support means forplanning. These requirements are reviewed and revised asdetailed planning progresses. Artillery requirements aresubmitted to the CLF by commanders of subordinateechelons. In estimating the number and type of aircraft,

VIII-14

naval gunfire ships, and artillery units for anyoperational phase, due consideration is given to themission, the scheme of maneuver, and the requirement forcoordination among the three arms.

c. Detailed Fire Support Requirements. Detailed firesupport requirements are the CLF’s specific recommendationsto the CATF concerning the use of available fire supportmeans to accomplish preparation of the objective area or toprovide fire support to the LF subsequent to landing. Assuch, these recommendations are the basis for detailed firesupport plans of the landing force. These requirementsinclude, as appropriate, specific targets to be attackedand the delivery means recommended, amounts of ammunitionto be expended and schedules for delivery, and specific LFelements to be supported and the types of supportrequired. Detailed requirements should be submitted insufficient detail as to require only approval andimplementation by the CATF.

d. Fire Support Plan. The fire support plan consists ofthe detailed requirements for air, naval gunfire, andartillery for the various operational phases of theamphibious operation. It is prepared jointly by the air,naval gunfire, and artillery representatives under thesupervision of the fire support coordinator. The planaccommodates the fire support requests of subordinateunits. Close and continuous coordination is required amongsupporting arms representatives and with correspondingstaff representatives of the ATF and other components toensure that LF requirements are compatible with andcoordinated with overall ATF requirements. Followingsubmission of the LF fire support requirements to the CATF,the ATF’s naval gunfire and air requirements areincorporated in the ATF naval gunfire and air plansrespectively. Nuclear requirements are incorporated in theATF nuclear support plan, and the chemical requirements areincorporated in the ATF chemical fire support plan. Theseplans are distributed in the form of annexes or appendixesto the operation plan of the ATF and become the basis forsimilar annexes or appendixes to the LF and lower echelonoperations plans. These annexes together with theartillery annex or appendixes and the fire supportcoordination annex (if applicable) form the fire supportplan of the LF.

VIII-15

10. Fire Support Coordination Agencies

a. Supporting Arms Coordination Center. The SACC is theagency through which the CATF (and advance force commanderor attack group commander when appropriate) exercisesoverall coordination of the supporting fires. The SACC islocated in the CATF’s flagship. The supporting armscoordinator is in charge of the SACC and is the CATF’srepresentative. The supporting arms coordinator, with theadvice of the corresponding landing force fire supportcoordinator, integrates the fire plans of the supportingarms to ensure their most effective use in furthering theCLF’s concept of operations ashore. When responsibilityfor the coordination of supporting fires is passed to theCLF, the appropriate supporting arms circuits continue tobe monitored in the SACC.

b. Fire Support Coordination Center. For all Marine Corpsorganizations and for US Army units of brigade or smallersize, the agencies where fire support coordination is doneare called FSCCs. At Army division and higher echelons,these agencies are called fire support elements (FSEs).The fire support coordinator (FSC) at each level isresponsible for the functioning of the respective FSCC orFSE and normally is under the staff supervision of theG/S-3.

(1) Operation While Afloat. While afloat, the landingforce fire support coordinator is the representative ofthe CLF in matters involving fire supportcoordination. LF fire support coordination personnelwork closely with members of the CATF’s staff in theSACC. Figure VIII-1 shows control and coordinationrelationship afloat. Personnel of the two centers whohave similar duties are stationed in the same orcontiguous spaces. The fire support coordinatorscreens the requests for fire support from subordinateLF echelons and advises and assists the supporting armscoordinator in order that the most effective supportcan be delivered. He also keeps the supporting armscoordinator advised of activities of artillery ashore.

(2) Advance Force Representative. Some LF firesupport coordination personnel normally accompany theadvance force to advise its commander on the attack oftargets that present a potential threat to the LF.These personnel normally rejoin their parent unit upondissolution of the advance force.

VIII-16

VIII-17

Figure VIII-1. Fire Support Control and Coordination Afloat.

(3) Displacement Ashore. On order of the CLF (or appropriate subordinate commander), the FSCC or FSE displaces ashore, leaving in the SACC sufficient personnel to provide continuity of coordination until the LF fire support agency is established and functioning ashore.

c. Agencies of Attack and Landing Groups. Whensubordinate amphibious attack groups and correspondinglanding groups are formed, these groups form fire supportcoordination agencies in a manner similar to that used bythe ATF and LF.

11. Fire Support Coordination Measures. Various fire supportcoordination measures and techniques may be employed tofacilitate the control and coordination of fire support.Definitions and techniques of application are covered in FM6-20, "Fire Support in Combined Arms Operations"; NWP 22-2/FMFM1-7, "Supporting Arms in Amphibious Operations"; and FMFM 6-2,"Fire Support Coordination."

12. Fire Support Coordination During The Assault. From thebeginning of the assault until a short time after the firstwaves land, fire support is coordinated mainly by the executionof the prearranged fires scheduled during the planning phase.As the control agencies (e.g., forward observers and navalgunfire spotters) of the LF become operational ashore, allpracticable close support fires from all supporting arms areprovided as requested by troop units. Coordination isaccomplished at the lowest echelon possessing necessaryfacilities. This same principle applies in the planning ofsubsequent prearranged fires. Planning is accomplished asrequired at each level of the LF before daily fire supportplans are transmitted to the next higher level for similaraction.

13. Air Support Planning

a. Extensive and Detailed. Air support of the amphibiousoperation includes all air operations conducted infulfilling air support requirements of all forces assignedto the ATF. Because of the importance of air supportoperations and the necessity for complete coordination ofthe use of airspace within the AOA, air support planning isextensive and detailed.

b. Aviation Tasks. In an amphibious operation, theprincipal tasks of aviation assets are to gain and maintainair superiority in the objective area, to isolate theobjective area, and to provide close support to the groundforces. Other air operations of particular interest to thelanding force may include the use of aircraft forreconnaissance and observation, artillery and naval gunfirespotting, air delivery of troops and supplies, evacuationof casualties, electronic warfare, and deception.

VIII-18

c. Allocation of Aviation Resources. The amount and typeof aviation support provided to the assault elements of theLF is influenced by many factors. In some situations,primary support for tactical air operations will beprovided from aircraft carriers. In other situations, LFaviation or Air Force forces may be capable of providingsupport from air bases in or near the objective area. Thetype of enemy air defenses that can interfere with theoperation are a principal factor in air support planning.For example, if there is a substantial threat of airattacks against the task force, considerable aviationassets must be dedicated to combat air patrol, therebydecreasing the aviation assets’ availability for othermissions. When a substantial threat is present from enemyland-based air defense systems (artillery and missiles),significant resources (EW, naval gunfire, artillery, andaviation) must be dedicated to suppressing the defenses inorder to conduct other missions such as helicopter assaults.

(1) Movement of Landing Force Aviation into theObjective Area. To smoothly move LF aviation into theobjective area, extensive planning is required. Suchaspects as staging and en route support bases, aerialrefueling, and bases in the AOA must be considered.

(2) Fire Support by Aviation. Fire support that canbe provided by attack helicopters and vertical/shorttakeoff and landing (V/STOL) aircraft in the earlystages of the assault is also considered. The spacesavailable on amphibious ships for helicopters and theV/STOL type aircraft, which are more capable ofproviding close air support, are limited. Thus, atradeoff generally must be made between the number ofhelicopters and the number of V/STOL aircraft.

d. Control and Integration of Air Assets. To ensure speedof reaction and positive coordination, control of allfriendly aircraft in the AOA at any given time is exercisedby a single authority responsive to the needs of the CLF,subject to the overall authority of the CATF. Accordingly,all air operations must be integrated into the ATF plan,whether the support is provided by air elements organic tocomponents of the ATF or assigned to, attached to, or insupport of the ATF. Furthermore, the agency responsiblefor airspace control within the objective area controls allfriendly aircraft passing through the objective arearegardless of mission or origin. A tactical air controlsystem capable of providing the requisite centralizedcontrol must be organized. (See Chapter II, paragraphs 12and 13.)

VIII-19

e. Air Superiority. Although the complete destruction ofenemy capabilities for air attack is rarely attainable,success in an amphibious operation requires a distinctmargin of air superiority in the objective area. Defenseagainst attack from the air is discussed in Chapter V ofthis manual.

14. Air Control Responsibilities

a. Centralized Air Control System. In an amphibiousoperation, a centralized integrated air control system isdeveloped through which all air operations within anassigned area of responsibility can be controlled andcoordinated. Control of air operations is exercised byvarious commanders as the operation progresses. Plans mustbe made to provide each such commander with the properfacilities for control of air operations.

b. Control of Pre-D-Day Air Operations. When an advanceforce is employed, the advance force commander isresponsible for pre-D-day air operations in the assignedarea. Control is exercised through the tactical airdirection center (TADC) established in the flagship of theadvance force commander.

c. Shift of Control Upon Arrival of the Amphibious Task Force. The CATF assumes responsibility for control of all airoperations upon arrival in the objective area. Control isexercised through the tactical air control center (TACC),which is established in his flagship. Subordinate TADCs,as designated in advance, monitor air control circuits inreadiness to assume all or part of the duties of the TACCif required.

d. Control by Attack Groups. When subordinate amphibioustask groups are formed for operations in widely separatedlanding areas, the CATF normally delegates to each attackgroup commander authority over air support in hisrespective landing area. The attack group commanderexercises control through a TADC in his flagship. Overallcontrol, which includes daily planning and execution of airoperations, is retained by the CATF and exercised throughthe task force TACC.

e. Shift of Control. As soon as conditions permit, aircontrol agencies are established ashore that parallel theNavy control agencies afloat.

VIII-20

(1) Ashore agencies are provided by the US MarineCorps or US Air Force, depending on the composition ofparticipating forces. The control agencies ashore areinitially in a standby status, monitoring all aircontrol circuits. Upon recommendation of the CLF (orthe appropriate agencies ashore), the CATF may passcontrol of air operations to the CLF or the joint taskforce commander concerned. The passage of control maybe incremental; e.g., control of direct air support maybe passed ashore before control of other aspects of airoperations. After passage of any or all control to theCLF, the Navy control centers afloat continue tomonitor appropriate circuits, ready to resume controlif necessary.

(2) When the CATF passes control of air operations tothe CLF, the latter exercises control of air operationsthrough his TACC. (USMC--Tactical Air Command Center:USAF--Tactical Air Control Center). (See paragraph 15below). If the Air Force provides the preponderance oftactical aviation and a commander other than thecommander landing force assumes control of airoperations for the CLF, the designated commander willestablish and operate a comprehensive airspace controlsystem responsive to the authority of the CLF, subjectto the overall authority of the CATF. The integrationof LF tactical control elements will be effectedthrough the assignment, insofar as practicable, ofblock airspace and/or sectors of responsibility withinwhich authority for control of aerial vehicles organicto each Service and/or belonging to other Services canbe delegated. The commander ashore to whom thisauthority is passed assumes the relatedresponsibilities for the daily planning and executionof those air operations. See Chapter II of this manualand paragraph 737 of JCS Pub 3-02 for additionaldiscussion on control of air support.

f. Period of Control. Emphasis should be placed on thefact that air control responsibilities discussed herein areapplicable only for the period of the amphibious operationas delineated in the initiating directive.

g. Shift of Air Space Control on Termination of theAmphibious Operation. Air support planning must providefor an orderly transition of airspace control from the ATFon termination of the amphibious operation. At thetermination of the amphibious assault, the ATF will be

VIII-21

dissolved, the assigned airspace will be disestablished,and the responsibility for airspace control, defined ascoordination, integration, and regulation of airspace,normally will be exercised by the Air Force componentcommander through a joint air operations arrangement forthe joint force commander. The initiating directive willindicate whether airspace control is to be reassumed by theunified commander, assigned to a joint force commanderexercising airspace control in an adjacent area, orestablished by a joint force commander engaged insubsequent operations. In any event, planning must includeconsideration of those steps required to provide forassumption of airspace control in accordance with JCS Pub3-52, "Joint Doctrine for Airspace Control in the CombatZone."

15. US Marine Corps Air Control Agencies Ashore. The USMarine Corps has a command and control system (the Marine AirCommand and Control System (MACCS)) through which Marine Corpscommanders can control air operations. The following elementsof the MACCS are established ashore when all aspects of airoperations are controlled by US Marine Corps elements:

a. Tactical Air Command Center (TACC). The TACC (ashore)is the principal air control agency of the LF. Through it,all air operations and surface-to-air missile operations inthe objective area can be directed and controlled. Untilauthority for control of air operations is passed to theCLF ashore, the TACC operates as a tactical air directioncenter (TADC) under overall supervision of the TACC afloatand accomplishes such air control functions as may beassigned. To accomplish its tasks, the primary LF aircontrol agency, whether operating as a TACC or a TADC,requires current intelligence on the ground and airsituation, a means to display intelligence data that willpermit rapid evaluation, and communications equipment toprovide the means to shift air power rapidly to meetchanging requirements.

b. Tactical Air Direction Center. If tactical airoperations are of such magnitude or cover areas of suchsize that it is impractical to direct all air operationsfrom a single TACC or TADC, additional TADCs may beestablished.

c. Direct Air Support Center. The DASC controls directair support. It is subordinate to the TACC (afloat), theTACC (ashore), or a TADC and is normally located near thesenior fire support coordination center (FSCC) in the LF.

VIII-22

d. Tactical Air Operations Center. The primary purpose ofthe tactical air operations center (TOAC) is to provide ameans for controlling and directing antiair warfare.Through the TAOC, interceptor aircraft and air defensemissiles are controlled. It may be used to providenavigational assistance to attack aircraft and to provideen route air traffic control of all aircraft within itsassigned sector.

e. Tactical Air Control Party. US Marine Corps divisionshave 14 tactical air control parties (TACPs). A TACP isorganic to each infantry battalion, each infantry regiment,the tank battalion, and the division communicationscompany. The composition of TACPs varies with the tasks tobe performed. At the battalion-level, a TACP is composedof an air officer (AO), two forward air controllers (FACs),and the necessary communications personnel and equipment.At the regimental and division levels, TACPs do not haveFACs.

(1) ANGLICO. (See subparagraph 8b above.)

(2) Purpose of TACPs. TACPs are agencies throughwhich ground commanders can control aircraft. Toprovide this means, TACPs establish and maintain thenecessary communications with other elements of theMACCS, advise ground unit commanders on the employmentof aircraft, transmit requests for direct air support,and transmit directions to aircraft providing CAS andother air support.

f. Forward Air Controller. The forward air controller isan officer (aviator/pilot) member of the tactical aircontrol party who, from a forward ground or airborneposition, controls aircraft in close air support of groundtroops (JCS Pub 1-02). This control may be exercised byaviation personnel such as:

(1) Airborne forward air controller (FAC(A)) (Navy).

(2) Forward air controller (airborne) (FAC(A)) (MarineCorps).

(3) Naval aviation observer (NAO).

g. Tactical Air Coordinator (Airborne). The tactical aircoordinator (airborne) (TAC(A)) is closely allied with theTACP. He is an experienced aviator, airborne in the battlearea for the purpose of coordinating and/or controlling theactions of aircraft engaged in tactical air operations.

VIII-23

h. Air Support Radar Team (ASRT). The air support radarteams (ASRTs) are elements of MACCS equipped with a radarcourse-directing central for control of all-weather airsupport operations.

i. Helicopter Controller (Airborne). During theship-to-shore movement, the helicopter controller(airborne) (HC(A)) operates under the control of thehelicopter direction center (HDC). When the control ofhelicopters is passed ashore, the DASC takes over thecontrol of helicopter operations. When control is assumedby the DASC, the HC(A) may continue to control the movementof helicopters under the overall control of the DASC.

j. Marine Air Traffic Control Squadron. The Marine airtraffic control squadron (MATCS) provides control ofaircraft in the vicinity of an airfield. It operates thecontrol tower, ground controlled approach (GCA), and othernavigational aids.

16. US Air Force Tactical Air Control System

a. Tactical Air Control System. When air control ashoreis provided by elements of the US Air Force tactical aircontrol system (TACS), it is established in accordance withthe US Army/US Air Force Concept for Improved JointAir-Ground Coordination. When these elements perform aircontrol functions before termination of the amphibiousoperation, they will be compatible and capable offunctioning with the Navy control agencies afloat.

b. ASOC and TACPs. The US Air Force TACS elements thataccompany Army or other land force combat elements are theASOC and the TACP.

(1) The Air Support Operations Center (ASOC) isdesigned for control and direction of tactical airsupport (close air support, tactical airreconnaissance, and tactical airlift) and is collocatedwith the tactical air support squadron (TASS) of theappropriate Army tactical operations center (TOC). Theprincipal function of the ASOC is to provide fastreaction capability to requests from Army forces fortactical air support. The TACC allocates sorties,along with the necessary scramble and controlauthority, to the ASOC to satisfy requests forimmediate tactical air support. The TACC may alsoallocate sorties to the ASOC to commit and/or control

VIII-24

preplanned missions as the situation requires. TheASOC is the primary TACS element for exchange ofinformation, coordination, and detailed execution ofrequired tactical air support operations with the Armycomponent. Provision is made for Army G-2/G-3 airrepresentatives in the ASOC. When appropriate, otherService components and Army staff agencies will berepresented. ASOC functions may be accomplished byfacilities airborne or afloat when required.

(2) The TACP, consisting of highly experiencedtactical aircrew members and Enlisted Terminal AttackControllers (ETAC) with the communications equipmentrequired to obtain, coordinate, and control tacticalair support to ground operations, is directlysubordinate to the ASOC. TACPs are collocated atcorps, division, brigade, and battalion levels ofground force organization. They advise and assist thecommander, request and coordinate tactical air support,and meet other requirements of the individual groundforce echelons. The air liaison officer (ALO) is thedesignated Air Force officer located at each groundforce echelon to perform air liaison duties. The ALOsmaintain close coordination with ground forces’ staffsto make sure that tactical air support is coordinatedand integrated into planning and the scheme of maneuverof the land battle. At the battalion level, the ALO’smission is to advise the ground commander and request,monitor, coordinate, integrate, direct, and controltactical air support with the fire and maneuver of thesupported ground force.

c. Operation of the TACS. The operation of the TACS anddetailed descriptions of the following elements of the TACSare in AFM 2-7, "Tactical Air Force Operations--TacticalAir Control System (TACS)":

(1) Tactical Air Control Center (TACC).

(a) Air Support Operations Center (ASOC).1. Tactical Air Control Party (TACP).2. Forward Air Controller (FAC).

(b) Control and Reporting Center (CRC).1. Control and Reporting Post (CRP).2. Forward Air Control Post (FACP).

VIII-25

(c) Wing Operations Center (WOC).

(2) Airlift Control Center (ALCC).

(a) Airlift Control Element (ALCE)

(b) Combat Control Team (CCT)

17. Air Support Planning

a. Dual Responsibility of the CATF and CLF. The planningof air support for amphibious operations is theresponsibility of both the CATF and the CLF.

b. CATF. The CATF has the following responsibilities:

(1) Determination of Overall Requirements of the Amphibious Task Force. Naval requirements remain generallyconstant throughout the operation. Air superioritymust be attained and maintained in the objective area,and the movement of enemy forces into and within theobjective area must be curtailed or halted. Acontinuing requirement is for defense against enemyair, surface, and subsurface attack.

(2) Determination of Air Support Capabilities. TheCATF determines the air support capabilities of theentire task force in terms of sorties, endurance onstation, ordnance loads, and payloads.

(3) Coordination of All Air Support Requests. TheCATF coordinates all requests for air supportoriginating within the task force and allocatesaircraft in accordance with capabilities. He makesrequests for additional support to higher authority.

(4) Preparation of an Air Plan. The CATF prepares anair plan to govern the conduct of air operationsthroughout the operation. The air plans of subordinatecommanders of the ATF must be in conformity with theATF plan.

c. CLF. The CLF has the following responsibilities:

(1) Determination of Landing Force Air SupportRequirements. The CLF coordinates all requests for airsupport originating within the LF, and submits theconsolidated requirements to the CATF.

VIII-26

(2) Determination of Landing Force Air Support Capabilities. The CLF determines the air support capabilitiesof LF aviation units and submits this information tothe CATF.

(3) Submission of Plans for Deployment of Aviation Elements Ashore. The CLF submits recommendations to theCATF for the deployment ashore of LF and other aviationunits.

(4) Preparation of an Air Plan. The CLF prepares anair plan in conformance with the ATF air plan.

d. The Air Force Commander. The planning of air supportfor an amphibious operation in which air support isprovided by the US Air Force is the joint responsibility ofthe CATF, the CLF, and the appropriate Air Forcecommander. The Air Force commander’s air support planningresponsibilities are:

(1) Providing for Air Force Representation. The AirForce commander provides staff representation andliaison to the CATF. When the preponderance of airsupport is being furnished by the Air Force, heprovides an officer as the ATF tactical air officer.See subparagraph 13e(2) above for additionalinformation.

(2) Determining Air Force Support Capabilities. TheAir Force commander determines the air supportcapabilities of assigned units in terms of sorties,on-station endurance, ordnance load, and payloads; andsubmits them to the CATF and the CLF.

(3) Submission of Deployment Plans. The Air Forcecommander submits his recommendations to the CATF forthe deployment of assigned Air Force units.

(4) Preparation of Supporting Air Plans. The AirForce commander prepares plans to implement and supportthe operation of the ATF.

18. Air Support Planning Sequence. The sequence of planningair support, as it affects the landing force, is as follows:

a. Preparation of Initial Estimates of Landing Force AirSupport Requirements. Aviation planning commences with thepreparation of initial estimates of landing force airsupport requirements, including offensive air operations,

VIII-27

antiair warfare (AAW) operations, assault supportoperations, aerial reconnaissance operations, airliftoperations, electronic warfare, and aircraft and missilecontrol operations. These estimates are prepared as soonas initial information of an operation is received by theCLF. At this time, only the broadest estimates can bemade. These initial estimates are usually limited to thoserequired to determine the number and types of units toparticipate, the control agencies necessary, and thelogistic support required. Certain air supportrequirements are deduced based on knowledge of the aviationcapabilities of the force involved, enemy air capabilities,and general mission of the LF. Based on these and otherinitial estimates, the CLF issues his planning guidance.

b. Preparation of an Aviation Estimate of Supportability.The aviation estimate is a special staff estimate preparedby or under the cognizance of the LF tactical aircommander. No set format is prescribed for this estimate,and it may be presented verbally or in writing. Itspurpose is to summarize significant aviation aspects of thesituation as they might influence any course of actionproposed, and to evaluate and determine how aviation unitscan best be employed to support the contemplated LF coursesof action.

c. Determination of Detailed Air Support Requirements ofthe Landing Force. Detailed planning of LF air supportrequirements commences after the CLF issues his concept ofoperations. These air support requirements are concernedwith the use of nuclear weapons, enemy targets in thebeachhead area, enemy targets remote from the beachheadthat may affect the force, aerial reconnaissance necessaryto support the operation, assault support operations in andabout the landing area, and control facilities necessary toadequately support the commander’s concept of theoperation. Attention is given to the time required tolocate and prepare existing facilities and/or sites thatwill assist in the early establishment of aviation unitsashore. This permits better support for the ground forcesin executing their course of action. In addition, specialconsideration is given to the aviation requirement toconduct antiair warfare operations, both active and passive.

d. Determination of Overall Amphibious Task Force AirSupport Requirements. The CATF may require that the LFaviation participate in some or all of the amphibious taskforce support requirements. At this point in the planningsequence, the adequacy of air support means is measured todetermine if sufficient aviation has been assigned tosupport all requirements.

VIII-28

e. Submission of Requests for Additional Air Support Means.When the CLF’s decisions and course of action result in a

requirement for additional aviation means, appropriaterequests are submitted to the CATF.

f. Adjustment of Plans. When additional air support meansare not available, adjustment of plans are made by the CATFin consultation with CLF, and the Air Force commander whenappropriate.

g. Allocation of Means and Formulation of Air Plans. Thefinal step in the planning sequence is the allocation ofaviation sorties available for the operation and thepreparation of air operations plans and orders.

19. Principal Air Support Planning Considerations

a. Centralized Control System. All aircraft operatingwithin the objective area must be under centralizedcontrol. A tactical air control system capable ofproviding the requisite centralized control must beorganized.

(1) CATF Designates System. The CATF will designatethe tactical air control system through which controland coordination of air operations within theamphibious objective area are exercised. He will usethe control system, or combination of Air Force, Navy,or Marine Corps tactical air control system elements,best suited for the amphibious operation.

(2) Access to System. Plans must ensure that all LFcommand levels are provided access to the agencyexercising control of aircraft allocated to their airsupport.

b. Air Support Basing. Initially, air support is providedby aircraft operating from carriers or from land baseswithin effective range of the objective area. Asfacilities for operating land-based aircraft areestablished within the objective area, aircraft operatingfrom such facilities are employed through the tactical aircontrol system on missions in support of task forceoperations.

c. Early Seizure of Airfields. Plans will usually providefor rapid seizure of existing airfields or airfield sitesand sites for early warning and air control facilities to:

VIII-29

(1) Provide for the early deployment ashore of airelements, either from carrier bases or from distantbases by employing aerial refueling techniques. Theseelements then furnish continuing air support to the LF.

(2) Extend the radius of warning and control toimprove the task force air support and antiair warfarecapabilities.

20. Detailed Air Support Planning Within The Landing Force

a. General. The LF plans for the employment of LFaviation to support the ship-to-shore movement and schemeof maneuver ashore. Basic planning also establishesrequirements for air support by the other elements of theATF. Any enemy facilities to be captured intact must bespecified and exempted from destruction.

b. Requests are Consolidated at Each Level.Recommendations and requests from subordinate echelons ofthe LF are evaluated and consolidated with overall LFrequirements into a comprehensive request for air support.In determining overall requirements, considering pre-D-dayrequirements separately from D-day and post D-dayrequirements is advisable.

(1) Pre-D-Day. LF requests for pre-D-day airoperations concern primary intelligence needs andoffensive air operations to reduce enemy forces anddefensive installations in the landing area. The scopeof pre-D-day operations may be limited by the need forsurprise. The request for air operations is in theform of a detailed statement of the mission to beaccomplished and a general recommendation for theordnance and numbers of aircraft to be employed. Therequests will usually cover:

(a) Destruction of located enemy installations,particularly those that cannot be attackedeffectively by naval gunfire.

(b) Imagery, radar, and visual coverage oflanding areas, important terrain localities, andcritical points in the routes of communication.

(c) Interdiction missions, designating types oftargets and effects desired.

(d) Psychological warfare missions.

VIII-30

(e) Deception missions.

(f) Electronic warfare missions.

(g) Missions in support of guerrilla andclandestine operations.

(h) Airborne raids.

(i) Tactical air transport.

(2) D-Day. The LF request for air support ofoperations ashore commencing D-day includes the tasksto be accomplished, number and type of aircraftdesired, ordnance to be employed, times at whichrequired, and coordination provisions. The request maybe in the form of an air schedule with amplifyinginstructions appended.

(3) D-Day, H-Hour. During the ship-to-shore movement,preplanned air strikes assist in achieving a maximumshock effect. During the critical period when landingcraft, amphibious vehicles, and helicopters are makingthe final run to the beach or landing zone, aircraftassist in neutralizing the beaches, landing zones,approach routes, and adjacent key terrain featuresuntil the assault troops are so close to the shorelineor landing zone as to be endangered.

(4) Post-D-day air support can only be planned ingeneral because requirements will depend on thetactical situation ashore and will not be fully knownin advance. Applicable pre-D-day and D-day airoperations are continued.

21. The Air Plan

a. CLF Submits Air Support Requests to CATF. The CLFsubmits his air support requirements to the CATF. Otherelements of the ATF also make their requirements known.The ATF air plan is then developed by the staff of the CATFand published as an air annex to the task force operationplan. The officer responsible to the CATF for thepreparation of the air plan and the subsequent direction ofthe air effort is known as the ATF tactical air officer.This officer is normally the commanding officer of thenaval tactical air control unit attached to the ATF. Whenthe preponderance of tactical air support is provided by

VIII-31

the Air Force for the assault phase of the amphibiousoperation, the Air Force commander will designate an AirForce officer to report to the CATF as the tactical airofficer.

b. Additional Provisions. Plans for air support inaddition to pre-D-day, D-day, and post-D-day includeprovisions for:

(1) Air Control and Warning. Comprehensive plans foraircraft control and air warning for the ATF areprepared, including provisions to echelon landing forceair control organizations ashore.

(2) Air Delivery of Supplies. The basic requirementsfor air delivery of supplies are established by theCLF. Air support plans contain provisions for theirdelivery.

(3) Tactical Airlift Operations. If the tactical planinvolves the movement of troops into the combat area byair transport, the CLF provides a general statement ofaircraft requirements by type for inclusion in hiscomprehensive request for air support.

(4) Liaison and Observation Aircraft. Plans makeprovision for the early arrival of liaison andobservation aircraft in the objective area. They maybe flown to the area or transported in ships.

(5) Airfields Ashore. Air support plans includeprovisions for rehabilitation or construction ofairfields and V/STOL-capable locations in the objectivearea to permit the earliest possible deployment ashoreof land-based tactical aircraft organic to the ATF orprovided from other sources.

(6) Antiair Warfare, Counterair, and Air Defense.Plans must provide for protection of naval and landingforce units from enemy air attack. The coordinatedemployment of air defense artillery and missiles anddefending aircraft is a continuing requirement.

(a) Aircraft are shifted to meet changingrequirements, and, except under conditions ofheavy and prolonged enemy air attack, antiairwarfare and counterair do not exclude theassignment of fighter aircraft to other missions.

VIII-32

(b) As soon as conditions permit, the LF airwarning organization is established ashore inorder to extend the air warning system of the ATF.

(c) LF air defense units are landed andintegrated into the antiair warfare or counteraircontrol system. Air control agencies of the LFare integrated into the overall antiair warfare orcounterair control system and initially aredirected operationally by the tactical air controlcenter afloat.

22. Air Support During The Assault

a. Close Air Support. Close air support will becontrolled as shown in Figures VIII-2, VIII-3 and VIII-4,and will normally be carried out as follows:

(1) Before Air Support Control Agencies areEstablished Ashore. Until the TACPs landed withassault units are established ashore, close air supportmissions are executed under the direction of theTAC(A)s or FAC(A)s. When the TACPs are establishedashore, they request close air support from theTACC/Abn DASC or the TADCs afloat. The TACC/Abn DASC,or TADCs, assigns aircraft to missions as requests arereceived. As the landing progresses, air controlelements to be established ashore land and prepare tooperate shore-based facilities for control of airoperations.

(2) Air Support Control Agencies Established Ashore.As air support control agencies are established ashore,they function initially under the TACC afloat. Theseagencies subsequently operate under the designatedauthority when control of close air support has beenpassed ashore by the CATF. In any case, requests aresent by the TACP directly to the air control agency,which assigns aircraft to close air support missions.TACP requests are monitored by the SACC, FSCC, or FSE.(See subparagraph 13e above and paragraph 1651a, JCSPub 3-02, for additional information on shift ofcontrol).

(3) Terminal Phase. The terminal phase of close airsupport strikes is executed under the control of a FAC(ground and/or airborne), a TAC(A), or an ASRT. Closeair support missions are executed only on the approvalof the commander of the supported landing force unitand commanders of units close enough to the target areato be affected.

VIII-33

VIII-34

Figure III-2. Control of Close Air Support on D-Day or Shortly Thereafter.

VIII-35

Figure VIII-3. Control of Close Air Support When TADC is Ashore and the TACC is Afloat Before Control is Passed Ashore.

VIII-36

Figure VIII-4. Control of Close Air Support When Landing Force Air Control Agencies are Ashore and the TADC is Afloat, After Control is Passed Ashore.

b. Miscellaneous Air Support Operations

(1) As soon as the minimum required facilities can beprovided, observation, liaison, and V/STOL attack-typeaircraft are deployed ashore to support the assaultunits. Before their deployment ashore, observationmissions may be performed by high-performance aircraftfrom carriers or supporting bases.

(2) Smoke, reconnaissance, and other tactical airmissions are continued in support of the assault.

(3) Air transport support of the assault may beprovided by land- or sea-based transport aircraft.

c. CATF Allocates and Tasks. When air operations arecontrolled by the CATF, LF air requirements for each daysubsequent to D-day are consolidated by the CLF andpresented to the CATF. He, in turn, promulgates directivesthat serve not only to inform the CLF of the satisfactionof his requirements, but also to inform the air unitsfurnishing air support of the demands being placed onthem. The CATF determines the degree of emphasis to beplaced on additional supporting operations on the basis ofthe air operations order and changes in the situation. Hemakes a continuing evaluation of targets reported anddamage assessments to determine specific assignments.

23. Artillery Fire Support Planning

a. Initial Phase. During the initial phases of anamphibious operation, fire support is normally provided bynaval gunfire and aircraft. Subsequent to landing,artillery assumes a major role in providing fire support.Aircraft and naval gunfire can then perform those firesupport tasks better suited to their unique operationalcapabilities.

b. Artillery Fundamentals. During an amphibiousoperation, artillery employment is based on the applicationof artillery fundamentals. These fundamentals are listedand discussed in FMFM 6-9, "Marine Artillery Support" andFM 6-20, "Fire Support in Combined Arms Operations."

c. Planning Considerations. The nature of the amphibiousoperation creates peculiar artillery support problems thatmust be considered during planning. These are:

VIII-37

(1) Artillery Does Not Normally Participate in Early Action. Except in those rare cases when artillery can bepositioned on off shore islands or promontories, itdoes not participate in early action ashore. Althoughthe early landing of artillery is desirable, otherequally important requirements may be competing foravailable landing means. In such cases, othersupporting arms must be relied on.

(2) Positions Free of Small Arms Fire. Artilleryshould not be landed until position areas to beoccupied are free of small arms fire.

(3) Restricted Mobility Initially. Initial mobilityashore may be restricted by terrain and lack oftransportation means.

(4) Other Factors on Landing Artillery. The numberand type of ships and landing craft available as wellas the hydrography and terrain ashore may dictate themanner and, frequently, the time of initial commitmentof artillery to action.

24. Artillery Fire Support Planning ResponsibilitiesEarly in the planning phase, an artillery estimate ofsupportability is prepared to determine which of thecommander’s proposed courses of action can be best supported byartillery. The estimate is considered by the CLF in arrivingat his decision. After the CLF has issued his decision andconcept of operations, an estimate of artillery requirements isprepared. The primary purpose of this estimate is to determinethe amount and type of artillery fire support required tosupport the operation. Finally, the plan for the employment ofartillery is prepared and becomes the artillery annex to thelanding force operation plan, or the artillery support appendixto the fire support annex as appropriate.

a. Commander Landing Force. The CLF is responsible forpreparing the artillery estimates and plans required tosupport the operation.

b. Subordinate Commanders of the Landing Force.Commanders of subordinate echelons of the LF must plan foremployment of artillery included in their task organization.

c. Integrated Fire Support Plans. Because artillery firesmust be carefully integrated into the over all fire supportplan, as well as coordinated with the maneuver of thesupported troop units, the LF artillery support plan must

VIII-38

be formulated concurrently, and in conjunction, with thosefor naval gunfire and air support. Interested navalechelons are kept informed of the contents of the plans.

25. Estimate of Artillery Fire Support Requirements

a. Initial Estimate. The estimate of the artilleryrequirements is made initially to determine amount and typeof:

(1) Artillery by caliber.

(2) Ammunition and fuzes.

(3) Special equipment.

(4) Ships, landing craft, amphibious vehicles, andhelicopters required for transporting artillery units.

b. Factors to be Analyzed. In arriving at the estimate,each of the following factors must be analyzed in terms ofthe above requirements:

(1) Mission of the Landing Force. The missionassigned has a direct bearing on all requirements. Ifdeep operations beyond the range of naval gunfire arecontemplated, consideration must be given to increasedallocations of artillery and of artillery ammunition.

(2) Scheme of Maneuver. The scheme of maneuver ofeach supported unit must be studied to determine theartillery needed for adequate support. If landings areto be made over widely separated beaches or inseparated landing zones, artillery requirements mayincrease. If the landings are to be over contiguousbeaches or in relatively close landing zones so as topermit common support from central positions, a lesseramount of artillery may be required.

(3) Enemy Situation. Such factors as numbers, types,and strength of enemy units other than artillery; theirdispositions, armament, mobility, number, and types ofweapons; and combat efficiency must be analyzed. Theamount, type, caliber, and range of enemy artillerywill influence the requirements for artillery weapons,ammunition, and special equipment.

VIII-39

(4) Characteristics of the Area of Operations.Hydrographic conditions affect the types of ships,landing craft, amphibious vehicles, and specialequipment required for the landing of artillery. Thetrafficability of the beaches and terrain conditionsinland affect the type of artillery, vehicles, andspecial equipment needed. Weather conditions mayindicate special requirements for types of weapons,vehicles, and equipment.

(5) Estimated Duration of the Operation. Theestimated duration of the operation affects the amountof supplies required, particularly ammunition resupply.

(6) Integrating Other Fire Support Means

(a) Naval Gunfire. Naval gunfire is capable oflong-range general support missions and may reducethe requirement for some of the heavy artillery inthe early stages of the amphibious assault. Theamount, type, and duration of naval gunfiresupport available will influence the estimate ofthe amount of artillery required, particularly inthe heavy calibers.

(b) Close Air Support. Close air supportprovides an important means of fire support forassault units, particularly in the early stages ofan operation. While close air support is not areplacement for artillery fire, the amount andtype available must be considered in determiningoverall artillery requirements.

(c) Helicopter Gunships. Helicopter gunships canprovide additional fire support to the CLF duringthe assault phase.

(d) US Army Aerial Fire Support Units. US Armyaerial fire support units may be used tosupplement the firepower available to the CLF.They are not a substitute for other fire supportmeans but rather complement and enhance overallfire support capabilities.

(7) Employment of Nuclear Weapons. The availabilityof nuclear weapons and their potential employment willinfluence all requirements to varying degrees dependingon the commander’s concept of operations.

VIII-40

26. Artillery Fire Support Plan

a. Basic Considerations. Based on the CLF’s decision andconcept of operations, an artillery fire support plan isformulated to provide maximum support to the scheme ofmaneuver.

b. Factors to be Considered. In developing the plan forartillery fire support, all of the factors discussed inparagraph 24 above are reevaluated in light of theartillery assigned, in addition to the factors in thisparagraph.

(1) Support of Initial Landings. Whenever offshoreislands, peninsulas, or promontories exist withinartillery range of the landing area and the tacticalconsiderations permit, emplacement of artillery thereonshould be considered. Preliminary operations for theseizure of such geographic features must be conductedsufficiently in advance of the main landings to permitoccupation and fortification of positions, registrationof fires, and participation in the pre-H-hourbombardment.

(2) Available Ships, Landing Craft or Vehicles, andHelicopters. The plan for landing and entry intoaction of artillery units is largely governed by thetype ships assigned and the number and type of boats,landing vehicles, or helicopters available for theship-to-shore movement.

(3) Organization for Combat. The organization forcombat places the commanders of artillery units in thechain of command. In an amphibious operation, the taskorganization has two parts: (1) the developing of atask organization for embarkation and landing and (2)the development of the basic tactical organization.Artillery units assigned to the LF may be attached tothe major subordinate ground component(s), or they maybe retained under command of the CLF and assignedtactical missions. For a LF comprising only oneprincipal ground element; e.g., one division, allartillery units would likely be attached to thedivision. However, the CLF may desire to retain anuclear ground-delivery capability under his directcommand. In the case of a larger LF, some artilleryunits may be attached to the principal ground elements,while others may be assigned appropriate general

VIII-41

support and reinforcing or general support reinforcingtactical missions. In general, the organization forcombat should permit the maximum practicable degree ofcentralized control. However, commanders must nothesitate to include artillery units in regimental andbattalion landing teams when to do so will accelerateentry of artillery into action and delivery of the mosteffective support of the scheme of maneuver. (Suchartillery is detached from the task organization ofregimental and battalion landing teams when the basictactical artillery organization is formed.)

(4) Zones of Fire

(a) Careful planning of fire for all artilleryunits is required to ensure maximum coverage andto permit massing of fires in critical areas whenpracticable.

(b) Artillery zones of fire and naval gunfiresectors of responsibility will be integratedduring planning to permit maximum massing,flexibility of fires, and to avoid unnecessaryduplication of effort.

(5) Position Areas. The CLF coordinates theassignment of position areas for each artillery unit ofthe LF, with priority usually given to direct supportunits. Tentative position areas are selected from astudy of maps and photos, and are verified by earlyaerial and ground reconnaissance.

(6) Reconnaissance. In the normal sequence of alanding, artillery reconnaissance parties are landed incompany with or soon after assault battalions.Following reconnaissance, the artillery commanderrecommends to appropriate authority the time his unitshould be landed. The composition of reconnaissanceparties is usually prescribed in artillery commanders.The size of the party must often be adjusted to conformto the landing plan, number of boat or helicopterspaces available, or security requirements.

(7) Time of Landing. Artillery should be employedboldly, landing as early as conditions ashore permit,usually as soon as preselected position areas have beenuncovered and are free of small arms fire. To ensureflexibility in the time of landing, artillery units

VIII-42

supporting the waterborne assault are usually landed oncall. However, in the case of a helicopterborneassault, selected direct support artillery elements maybe included in scheduled waves in order to occupyinitial positions near landing zones for support of theattack on the initial objective. In scheduling theseelements, sufficient time should be provided betweenthe landing of artillery advance parties and firingunits to permit reconnaissance and completion of theminimum preparation necessary to emplace the weapons assoon as landed. Artillery not in scheduled or on-callwaves is landed on order of the CLF, or a subordinateto whom this authority has been delegated, based on therecommendation of the appropriate artillery commander.See Chapter VI and paragraph 27 below on ship-to-shoremovement.

(8) Observation. Coordination of artilleryobservation means is accomplished by the appropriateartillery commander. Air observers are employed tocomplement the capabilities of ground observers.During the initial stages of the ship-to-shoremovement, air observers in ship-based aircraft mayprovide the only observation capability. Theadjustment of naval gunfire, reconnoitering of positionareas, search for targets, and the reporting of thetactical situation ashore are among the tasks performed.

(9) Countermortar and Counterbattery Fires. Thecommanders of direct support artillery units willusually be assigned responsibility for countermortarfires within the zones of action of their respectivesupported units. Responsibility for executingcounterbattery fires is usually assigned to theartillery commander of the principal ground element(s),except when a force artillery headquarters is employed,in which case this responsibility normally rests withthe landing force artillery officer. Even in thelatter instance, plans usually provide that thesubordinate artillery commanders are responsible forplanning and executing counterbattery fires in theirzones of action until the force artillery headquartersis established and prepared to assume control. TheCLF’s counterbattery policy is stated in the artilleryannex or appendix. All units of the LF haveresponsibility for collecting and forwarding shellreports (SHELREPs) and mortar reports (MORTREPs) to theresponsible artillery counterfire agency. Field

VIII-43

artillery and infantry elements must adhere to therequirement to gather and forward counterbattery andcountermortar information to the agency responsible forprocessing data, locating targets, and recommending themethod of attack of hostile artillery and mortars.Field artillery units supporting infantry elements ofthe LF must be utilized as focal points fortransmission of information and for providing technicalsupervision to infantry shell report teams.

(10) Logistics. Although supply details are includedin the operation order, the commander of each artilleryechelon must make an ammunition plan to ensure thatartillery ammunition is unloaded and delivered to thefiring units without confusion as to caliber, type, orlot numbers. Consideration must be given topalletizing all or a portion of the ammunition toexpedite unloading and handling. Special considerationmust be given the supply, handling, storage, andsecurity of nuclear artillery munitions.

(11) Communications. The artillery communication planmust provide sufficient channels of communication toensure effective liaison, command, coordination, andfire direction. Units assigned a mission ofsupplementing the fires of field artillery must beprovided the necessary equipment and instructions andincluded in the artillery communications plan. The LFartillery annex and the communications annex containinstructions concerning artillery communications.

(12) Gunnery Instructions. Detailed informationconcerning gunnery is required in the artillery plan inorder to ensure delivery of fires of the greatestpossible accuracy and to facilitate massing of fires.Gunnery instructions include information concerningfiring charts, meteorological survey, commonregistration points, and target numbers.

27. Embarkation of Artillery. Special planning and effortsbefore embarkation are necessary to ensure that artillery canbe committed expeditiously to support the attack.

a. Organization. The organization for embarkation shouldpreserve the tactical integrity of task organized units asestablished in the organization for combat and shouldfacilitate early entry into action. Artillery unitsattached to RLTs, BDELTs, BLTs, or comparable size units

VIII-44

are embarked with those units, while units retained intheir parent artillery organization or in a force artillerygroupment are usually organized as separate embarkationunits to facilitate control. Dispersion of artillery inassault shipping should be such that it provides a measureof security against crippling artillery losses at sea, butshould not be carried out to the extent that control ofunits is unduly hampered.

b. Artillery Elements Embarked With Other Landing ForceUnits. Regardless of the organization for embarkation, thefollowing elements are usually embarked with other elementsof the landing force:

(1) Forward Observer Teams. Forward observer teamsare embarked with the infantry or maneuver companies.

(2) Direct Support Battery and Battalion LiaisonParties. Direct support battery and battalion liaisonparties are embarked with the headquarters of the unitsthey are to support.

(3) Senior Artillery Headquarters. Senior artilleryheadquarters personnel necessary to establish thelanding force FSCC and assist the SACC should belocated with the CLF on the command ship.

(4) Artillery Aerial Observers. Artillery aerialobservers are embarked in the ships that transport thelight observation aircraft or in aircraft carriersdesignated to furnish aircraft for initial artilleryobservation.

(5) Reconnaissance Parties. Reconnaissance partiesare embarked in ships from which they can mostexpeditiously accomplish their missions.

c. Embarkation of Firing Units. To facilitate earlylanding, embarking light artillery firing units ispreferable in LHAs, LHDs, LPHs, or LPDs for movement ashoreby helicopter, or in preloaded landing vehicles or craftaboard LSDs or LPDs. Medium and heavy units are embarkedin LSTs and landed directly on the beach.

28. Ship-to-Shore Movement of Artillery

a. Waterborne Movement

(1) Artillery Units Normally Land On Call. During theplanning phase, the exact time and place of landing theartillery units can seldom be determined. The time of

VIII-45

landing will depend on such variables as theavailability of position areas, need for artilleryashore, and the ability to beach the larger landingcraft and landing ships. The exact place of landing iscontingent on beach conditions, beach exits, and roadsto the position areas. Therefore, artillery in awaterborne assault will usually land on call. Thebeaches over which direct support and reinforcingartillery are to land are usually specified in thelanding plan. General support artillery will normallybe ordered to land over beaches as determined byreconnaissance and the tactical situation ashore.

(2) Recommendations for Time and Place of Landing ofReconnaissance Parties. Forward observers land withthe infantry or maneuver companies, and the artilleryliaison parties land with the BLT and RLT or BDEcommand groups. These personnel make recommendationsto the appropriate commanders concerning the landing ofreconnaissance parties of direct support units if thoseparties are not included in scheduled waves. Directsupport unit commanders may also recommend to higherheadquarters the time and place of landingreconnaissance parties of general support units.

(3) Function and Composition of Reconnaissance Parties.The artillery reconnaissance parties are landed as

early as the tactical situation ashore permits. Thesereconnaissance parties are composed of battery andbattalion commanders (or their representatives),communications personnel sufficient to initiate thecommunications systems, survey personnel who beginsurvey operations, and guides to direct firing units toposition areas.

(4) Timing of Request for Landing Artillery Units. Assoon as possible following initiation ofreconnaissance, battery and battalion commandersrequest the landing of their units. For early entryinto action, commanders must carefully estimate timeand space factors involved and, accordingly, initiatethis request in advance of the estimated time thatposition areas will be suitable for occupation.

(5) Actions to Expedite Landing of Artillery Units.Following approval of the request to land firing units,appropriate orders are issued and the units proceedashore. To expedite movement, direct support units maybe boated or launched before initiation of the requestfor landing and rendezvous near the line of departure.

VIII-46

(6) Phasing Ashore of Remaining Artillery Elements.After firing units are ashore, remaining elements,including vehicles, ammunition, supplies, andpersonnel, are phased into the position areas as soonas practicable.

b. Helicopterborne Movement

(1) Direct Support Artillery. Direct supportartillery will normally be attached to the supportedinfantry and will be embarked in the same shipping.This arrangement facilitates the ship-to-shore movementand ensures that the artillery will be landed as earlyas practicable.

(2) Map and Aerial Reconnaissance. Before thelanding, a complete and painstaking map and aerialphotograph reconnaissance must be accomplished todetermine initial position areas, landing sites, androutes from landing sites to position areas.

(3) Forward Observers and Liaison Parties. Theartillery forward observers and liaison parties land inthe same manner as for a waterborne movement.

(4) Reconnaissance Party. The reconnaissance party isusually included in the third or fourth scheduledwave. Because of space limitations, this party willnot be as large as that for a waterborne landing. Thereconnaissance will consist mostly of selecting andmarking a position for each weapon, selecting routes topositions from landing sites, selecting ammunitionunloading points, and preparing for lay of the weaponsand establishing initial fire control.

(5) Fire Support Units May Be On Call. Fire supportunits may be landed on call, following the sameprocedure as in scheduled waves. As an example, a BLTwith both artillery and mortars may find it desirableto land the mortars in scheduled waves and theartillery battery on call.

(6) Guides Assist In Landing Units to Desired Positions.If conditions permit, the helicopters will land the

weapons, ammunition, and personnel directly in thepreselected position areas. Each helicopter carrying aweapon will be guided to its exact position by a memberof the gun section who was landed with the

VIII-47

reconnaissance party. The guide will utilize either anumber board, a signal flag, or a colored smoke grenadefor this purpose. In a night landing, colored lightbatons and other devices may be used by the guides.

(7) Ammunition High Priority. A high priority must begiven to the movement of an adequate initial supply ofammunition. Resupply should be brought in by follow-uphelicopter flights. Additional quantities may bepalletized and air dropped on an on-call basis.

29. Air Defense Artillery. Planning for the coordination ofair defense fires is initially the responsibility of the CATF.Air defense artillery units, which include troop air defensemissile units, are employed as determined by the CLF, who isresponsible for controlling the fires of these units inaccordance with the air defense plans. Only those aspects ofLF air defense artillery that are of mutual interest arementioned here.

a. Types and Numbers. The types and numbers of airdefense artillery units required for an amphibiousoperation are determined by the CLF.

b. Naval Operations. Air defense artillery may be used toassist in providing protection to forces afloat withinrange. This procedure may free ships and support aircraftfor other tasks. The extent of the enemy air threatinfluences the requirements for air defense artillery.

c. Target Acquisition Radars and Target Information. Long-range target acquisition radars of air defense artilleryunits should be phased ashore as soon as the tacticalsituation permits. Once ashore, these radars should becoordinated within the air defense system and theacquisition means of other forces, afloat and ashore.

d. Integrated Control of Fire. A plan for the employmentof air defense artillery will be prepared. This plan willinclude, in light of operational factors pertaining to theparticular operation, a policy with respect to the controlof fires.

30. Naval Gunfire Planning. Naval gunfire plays a vital rolein reducing the enemy defensive capabilities by destroyingenemy personnel and installations before D-day, in protectingand covering the assault on D-day, and in supporting thelanding force operations ashore after D-day.

VIII-48

a. Commander, Amphibious Task, Force Responsibilities.The CATF is responsible for preparation of the overallnaval gunfire support plan, based on the requirementssubmitted by the CLF and on the Navy requirements. Theplanning includes allocation of gunfire support ships andfacilities. He also is responsible for the general policyas to priority of types of targets to be taken under fire.

b. Commander, Landing Force, Responsibilities. The CLF isresponsible for determination of LF requirements for navalgunfire support, including selection of targets to bedestroyed in preassault preparation operations, those to befired on in support of the landing force assault, and thetiming of these latter fires in relation to LF operations.After determining his requirements for naval gunfiresupport, fire support means, and priority of targets, theCLF presents them to the CATF.

c. Subordinate Amphibious Task Groups. When subordinateamphibious task groups are formed and separate landingareas are prescribed, each attack group commander, guidedby the requirements of the corresponding landing groupcommander and by naval requirements, plans the navalgunfire for his landing area, under the policy directionand overall guidance of the CATF.

31. Control of Naval Gunfire. Control of naval gunfire isexercised by, and passes to, different commands and agencies asthe operation progresses. Arrangements must be made to provideappropriate commanders the proper facilities for control ofnaval gunfire. (See Figure VIII-5.)

a. Advance Force Commander. The advance force commanderhas control of naval gunfire during pre-D-day bombardment.Control is normally exercised through the advance forceSACC.

b. Commander, Amphibious Task Force. The CATF assumescontrol of naval gunfire upon arrival in the objectivearea. Control is exercised through his SACC.

c. Subordinate Amphibious Task Groups. When subordinateamphibious task groups are formed and separate landingareas are designated, the CATF may delegate to each attackgroup commander control of naval gunfire in his landingarea, retaining only overall control as it applies to theoperation as a whole.

VIII-49

d. Commander Landing Force. When the CLF establishes thenecessary control facilities ashore, control of navalgunfire may be passed to him. He then has the authority toassign naval gunfire support missions directly to the firesupport ships. The CATF, or his designated subordinate,retains responsibility for:

(1) Allocation of available fire support ships.

(2) Logistic support of fire support ships.

(3) Functions of operational control of fire supportships other than fire control.

32. Naval Gunfire Support Organization

a. Naval Organization. The naval organization (see FigureVIII-5) that provides gunfire support for landing forceunits is operational in character. Briefly, the navalechelons involved in gunfire support are as follows:

(1) Amphibious Task Force. The ATF is the highestechelon directly concerned with the naval gunfiresupport of the amphibious operation. The ATF includesa fire support group that normally contains all thevarious types of fire support ships assigned to providenaval gunfire, rocket fire, and missile support for thelanding and landing force operations ashore. When anattack group is formed by the CATF, it will have thefire support necessary to provide gunfire support forthe corresponding landing group. If the attack groupis organized as an advance force it may contain a firesupport group for pre-D-day operations.Representatives of the CLF will accompany the advanceforce in a liaison and advisory capacity.

(2) Fire Support Group. The fire support group isusually subdivided into fire support units and/orelements for efficient and effective delivery ofgunfire support. The number and type of fire supportships in any particular unit will vary and dependlargely on tasks to be accomplished. Where the numberof ships permits, each assault battalion or comparablesize unit will be assigned a direct support ship. Inaddition, ships will be assigned in general support ofregiment or brigade and higher landing force echelons.Unless specifically directed by the CATF, the firesupport group commander does not deal directly withlanding force agencies.

VIII-50

Figure VIII-5. Amphibious Task Force or Landing Force Naval Gunfire Organization.

VIII-51

(3) Fire Support Unit. When necessary for flexibilityin organization, an echelon called the fire supportunit may be interposed between the fire support groupand fire support element. The fire support unit willfunction similarly to the fire support group. Firesupport unit commanders normally do not deal directlywith LF agencies.

(4) Fire Support Element. Each fire support group(unit) is divided into smaller task elements of firesupport ships, regardless of type operating in the samegeneral locality. Functions of fire support elementsare comparable, on a smaller scale, to those of thefire support group. Fire support element commandersnormally do not deal directly with the landing forceagencies.

(5) Individual Fire Support Ship. The individual firesupport ship is the basic echelon in gunfire support.Its function is to deliver gunfire support under thecontrol or direction of the troop agency to whichassigned. The ship deals directly with the LF agencies.

b. Landing Force Organization. The LF organization (seeFigure VIII-5) for control and employment of gunfiresupport provides special staff or liaison representation atevery level from and including the infantry battalion orcomparable troop unit to the highest troop echelonpresent. In the case of Army or allied divisions, liaisonteams and firepower control teams (FCTs) organic to the airand naval gunfire liaison company (ANGLICO) are attached toprovide the specialists and communications needed for theconduct of gunfire support at every level from divisiondown to the forward line companies. Briefly, the LF forcenaval gunfire agencies are as described below:

(1) Landing Force Naval Gunfire Section. Ifestablished, the LF naval gunfire section providesnaval gunfire communications and facilities for landingforce headquarters, performs naval gunfire specialstaff functions, and directs fires of assigned generalsupport ships.

(2) Division Naval Gunfire Section or Team. Thedivision naval gunfire section or team provides navalgunfire communications and facilities for divisionheadquarters, performs naval gunfire special stafffunctions, and directs employment of assigned supportships.

VIII-52

(3) Regimental or Brigade Naval Gunfire Liaison Team.The regimental or brigade naval gunfire liaison teamprovides communications, liaison, and direction ofnaval gunfire in support of an infantry regiment orcomparable unit. In addition, the team directs thefire of assigned general support ships.

(4) Battalion Shore Fire Control Party. The battalionSFCP includes a naval gunfire liaison team and a navalgunfire spotting team. The naval gunfire liaison teamis specifically organized to handle naval gunfireliaison matters for the supported commander, while thespotting team is charged with requesting and adjustingfires of assigned direct support ships and generalsupport ships.

c. Ships Under Command of CATF. Ships delivering gunfiresupport are at all times under the command of the CATF,even while firing missions controlled by troop agencies.Naval gunfire control, liaison, and spotting personnel areunder command of the CLF. Figure VIII-5 shows theorganizational structure of naval and landing forceechelons involved in naval gunfire support.

33. Naval Gunfire Basic Planning Requirements. Planning foreffective employment of naval gunfire requires recognition ofthe following basic requirements:

a. Ships and Spotting Aircraft. Sufficient ships andspotting aircraft to accomplish the mission are required.

b. Munitions. Sufficient quantities and types ofmunitions to maintain the required volume of fire arenecessary.

c. Sea Room and Hydrographic Conditions. Adequate searoom and suitable hydrographic conditions in the firesupport area for ship maneuver is required.

d. Air and Naval Superiority. Local air and navalsuperiority are required.

e. Observation. Positive observation of the naval gunfiretarget area by one or more agencies is necessary.

f. Communications. Separate communication circuitsbetween ships, landing force organizations ashore, andground and air observers is required.

VIII-53

g. Time. Sufficient time to effect essential destructivefires is necessary.

h. Integrated Effort. Integration of the naval gunfiresupport with the landing force scheme of maneuver andorganic fires, air operations, and associated navaloperations is critical to the success of the operation.

34. Naval Gunfire Planning Sequence. Naval gunfire supportplans are usually developed in the following sequence:

a. Estimate of the situation.

b. Overall requirements.

c. Detailed requirements.

d. Preparation of the naval gunfire annex.

35. Types of Naval Gunfire Plans

a. Pre-D-Day Naval Gunfire Plans. The primary objectiveof pre-D-day naval gunfire is preparation of the landingarea for the assault. The plan usually includes thefollowing elements:

(1) Assignment of ships to fire support areas andzones of fire.

(2) Announcement of ammunition allowances and plansfor replenishment.

(3) Naval gunfire communications instructions.

(4) Designation of targets, provision for damageassessments, and acquisition of target intelligence.

(5) Provision for availability of spotting aircraftand reference to appropriate air support plans.

(6) Provision for coordination with minesweeping,underwater demolition, and air operations.

(7) Provision for recording target information andreporting latest intelligence data to the CATF.

b. D-Day Naval Gunfire Plans

(1) Essential elements of the plan for naval gunfireoperations on D-day include:

VIII-54

(a) Initial assignment of ships to fire supportareas, zones of fire, and in direct and generalsupport of specific LF units.

(b) Announcement of ammunition allowances andplans for replenishment.

(c) Location, when required, of helicopterapproach and retirement lanes, and necessarycoordinating instructions. These sameinstructions will be found in the appropriateportions of the related air support plan.

(d) Naval gunfire communication instructions.

(e) Designation of targets, target areas, deepsupport areas, and probable routes of approach ofenemy reinforcements.

(f) Provisions for spotting aircraft.

(g) Instructions for massing fires of severalships.

(h) Provisions for coordination with theship-to-shore movement, minesweeping, underwaterdemolition, artillery, and air operations.

(2) Plans for naval gunfire operations on D-dayprovide for:

(a) Maximum destruction consistent with timeavailable.

(b) Closely timed neutralization of remainingenemy defenses to cover the waterborne andhelicopterborne ship-to-shore movements, andsupport of the landing, deployment, and advance oftroops.

(c) Prompt and effective delivery of call firesin direct support of troop units.

(d) Disruption of enemy systems of command,communication, and observation by destruction,neutralization, interdiction, and harassment.

VIII-55

(e) Isolation of the landing area and defenseagainst enemy counteroffensive action by massedfires on probable routes of approach withparticular provisions for countermechanized navalgunfire.

c. Post D-Day. Post D-day naval gunfire plans provide for:

(1) Call fires in direct support of units ashore.

(2) Close and deep fires in general support.

(3) Fires on the flanks of the landing area and firesagainst targets of opportunity.

(4) Defensive targets, night fires, illumination,countermechanized fires, and any special firesutilizing the inherent capability of gunfire ships andavailable munitions as required.

36. Types of Fire

a. Prearranged Fires. Prearranged fires are firesdelivered on known or suspected targets in accordance witha planned schedule, either on a time or an on-call basis.Prearranged fire may be for destruction or neutralization.

(1) Pre-D-Day Fires. Prearranged pre-D-day fires areprimarily for the purpose of destruction of defensiveinstallations and/or weapons that could otherwiseinterfere with the ship-to-shore movement and initialoperations ashore. Targets selected for destructionare those of interest to the LF as a whole. Navalrequirements incidental to naval operations are alsoincluded in pre-D-day fires. A detailed targetanalysis is necessary in planning pre-D-day fires todetermine the ammunition required for the desiredprobability (assurance) of destruction.

(2) D-Day and Post-D-Day Fires. Prearranged D-dayfires are primarily for the purpose of neutralizationof defensive installations and/or areas that couldotherwise interfere with the ship-to-shore movement andinitial operations ashore. Targets or areas selectedfor neutralization are those of interest to the assaultelements of the LF. Destruction fires may be continuedas necessary. For continuity in supporting eitherinitial landings or ground operations to follow,

VIII-56

prearranged D-day fires must be scheduled to continueuntil it is determined that naval gunfire spotters willbe able to conduct call fires. When assault units havelanded, prearranged fires are supplanted by call fireson targets of opportunity. Subsequent to landing, callfires constitute the bulk of the D-day and post-D-dayfires. Major considerations in planning prearrangedD-day and post-D-day fires are:

(a) Terrain. To determine areas that may containweapons capable of delivering direct or indirectfires on assault units as they land and advanceinland, and to the tasks that might interfere withshipboard observation and delivery of fire intodefoliated areas.

(b) Troop Safety. To provide for lifting offires ahead of and to the flanks of advancingtroops at a prescribed distance based on theestimated rate of advance.

(c) Observation of Troop Advance. To provide abasis for modification of schedules of prearrangedfires when the rate of advance is other than asplanned.

(d) Size of Target Areas. To determine theamount of ammunition required to obtain andmaintain neutralization.

b. Deep Fires. To provide for destruction orneutralization of deep targets subject to the availabilityof suitable fire support ships and spotting aircraft.

c. Call Fire. Call fires are fires delivered on aspecific target in response to a request from the supportedunit. Plans for providing call fires require that SFCPs beoperating with the LF units that will request the fires andthat provision be made for air spotters where and whenrequired. Naval gunfire liaison personnel are required inthe fire support coordination element at each commandechelon of the LF. Direct support ships are designated toprovide call fires for specific units, normally no largerthan a battalion, through their respective SFCPs, whileships in general support of a unit (regiment, brigade,combat command, division, or higher level) are provided toanswer calls for fire from the supported unit and itssubordinate elements as directed.

VIII-57

37. Coordination of Naval Gunfire. Each fire supportcoordination agency in the landing force coordinates navalgunfire with the fires of the other supporting arms, with theactivities of aircraft, and with the activities of groundunits. Most of these fire support coordination agencies havenaval gunfire personnel who can advise supported commanders onthe employment of naval gunfire. When ships are placed indirect or general support of specific LF units, the selectionof targets, the timing of fires on targets, specifications ofline of fire (when not inconsistent with safe navigation), andthe adjustment of fires are functions of the supported LF unit.

a. Direct Support. In naval gunfire, a mission of directsupport specifies that a naval surface fire ship willsupport a particular combat battalion. A ship assigned amission of direct support fires at whatever targets arepassed to it by the SFCP of the supported unit. Shipsgiven a direct support mission are usually assigned a zoneof fire. This zone of fire normally coincides with thezone of action of the supported unit. Direct support shipsdo not fire into their zones of fire without authority ofthe supported unit commander.

b. General Support. In naval gunfire, a mission ofgeneral support specifies that a naval surface fire shipwill support a particular headquarters above the battalionlevel. A ship assigned a general support mission answerscalls for fire from the supported headquarters. Generalsupport ships may be directed by the supported units toreinforce or augment the fires of direct support ships.

38. Naval Gunfire Support During the Assault

a. Final Preparation of the Landing Area. This fire isdesigned to destroy or neutralize enemy defenseinstallations that might interfere with the approach andfinal deployment of the ATF, and to assist in isolation ofthe landing area. Naval gunfire is used to supportunderwater demolition and minesweeping operations.Immediately before H-hour, major emphasis is placed on thedestruction and neutralization of enemy defenses mostdangerous to the successful landing of assault landingteams.

b. Fires in Close Support of the Initial Assault. Gunfireis continued on those enemy installations that couldprevent the landing until the safety of the leading wavesrequires these fires to be lifted. The final approach of

VIII-58

the leading waves of assault craft, amphibious vehicles, orhelicopters necessitates a shift of the scheduled firesinland from the landing beaches or outward from the landingzones. The major portion of the fires delivered in closesupport of the landings consists of large- andmedium-caliber prearranged fire delivered on a closelyfixed schedule in the zones of action of assault landingteams. Because the actual rate of advance and theestimated rate of advance may not coincide, the CATF,through the SACC, retards or accelerates the movement ofscheduled fires as requested by the CLF. Prearranged closesupport fires continue until the SFCP with the assaultlanding teams are in a position to conduct the fires of theassigned direct support ships. At this time, the SFCPsstart adjusting fires.

c. Deep Support Fires. Deep support fires usually aredelivered by ships assigned in general support. Each suchship is assigned a zone of responsibility that it covers byfire and observation. Within assigned zones ofresponsibility and on a prearranged schedule, shipsneutralize known enemy targets, interdict enemy routes ofcommunication, attack targets of opportunity, executecounterbattery fire, reinforce fires of direct supportships as directed, and conduct missions assigned by thesupported unit.

39. Post D-Day Naval Gunfire Support. Subsequent to D-day,naval gunfire, in coordination with artillery and air,continues to support the attack until the completion of theoperation. Beginning on D-day, commanders concerned must startplanning the naval gunfire required to continue support of theattack. Routine daily planning must continue throughout theremainder of the operation. The major aspects of these plansare discussed below:

a. Prearranged Fires. In planning prearranged firessubsequent to D-day, the LF coordinates the plan of firesby selection and designation of targets, by timing asrequired, by recommending type and amount of ammunition tobe used, and by designating LF agencies to conduct thefiring. Preparation, defensive (includingcounter-mechanized fires), interdiction, harassing, andillumination fires may be prearranged.

b. Replenishment of Fire Support Ships and SpottingAircraft

(1) Fire Support Ships. Fire support ships must berelieved at timely intervals to replenish ammunitionand fuel. Destroyers may require relief daily, whereas

VIII-59

larger ships remain on station for longer periods oftime. Direct support ships should, whenever possible,relieve on station after a communications check andbriefing by the supported unit and the ship beingrelieved.

(2) Spotting Aircraft. Relief of spotting aircraft iseffected through the tactical air control or directioncenters and after the necessary coordination betweenthe parent carrier or shore base, the ATF, and the LFhas been accomplished.

c. Consolidated Daily Naval Gunfire Request. LF requestsfor fire support ships, shore fire control frequencies,spotting aircraft, and special missions are originated atall LF echelons beginning with the battalion or equivalentunit. These requests are screened, reconciled, andconsolidated at each echelon through which the requestspass. At the LF level, after final screening andcoordination, the requests are collated and constitute theconsolidated daily naval gunfire request. Thisconsolidated request is submitted, at a prescribed time, tothe CATF. On the basis of this consolidated request andthe availability of fire support means, daily assignmentsbest suited to meet the LF requirements are made by theCATF.

40. Nuclear and Chemical Weapons Support Planning

a. Parallels Other Supporting Arms. Although theemployment of nuclear and chemical weapons will introduceadditional areas of concern and additional problems, theplanning and employment closely parallels that of othersupporting fires.

b. Integrated Into Overall Planning Process. Nuclear andchemical employment planning is a part of and integratedinto the overall fire support planning process. Theessential character of fire support coordination is notchanged by the introduction of these weapons; however, themagnitude and range of their effects place added importanceon coordination.

c. Communications. Normally, standard communicationsdoctrine, means, and procedures will be used in amphibiousoperations for employment of nuclear and chemical weapons.

VIII-60

d. Initiating Directive Provides Instructions. Theinitiating directive for the amphibious operation willinform the CATF of the number and type of weapons available(or direct that requirements be determined), the authorityfor using them, and restrictions placed on theiremployment. The CATF may be given tactical andadministrative control of the weapons allocated to him forthe operation, or some of the weapons may be delivered byother forces. In the latter case, authoritative directionover the delivery will be exercised by the CATF. Tacticalcontrol of weapons may be delegated to the CLF.

41. Nuclear Weapons Employment Planning. All aspects of LFnuclear weapons employment are ultimately expressed in thenuclear weapons employment annex or appendix. This documentbrings together all of the planned nuclear fires listed in theair operations annex or appendix, the artillery annex orappendix, and the naval gunfire annex or appendix. The itemsconsidered in preparing the nuclear weapons employment annex orappendix include instructions and restrictions from higherauthority, weapons available, enemy situation, mission, troopsafety, request and warning procedures, and the organic andsupporting delivery means available.

42. Chemical Weapons Employment Planning. Planningresponsibilities and planning sequence for the use of chemicalweapons are the same as for other fires employing severaldelivery systems. Chemical fire plans are included inappropriate elements of the overall fire plan; i.e., navalgunfire, air support, and artillery plans. These fires areconsolidated in a chemical employment annex or appendix. Thearea covered and effects produced from the employment ofchemical fires vary significantly. The factors that influencethe coverage and effect are the agent physiological actions,persistency and viability, delivery means, time of delivery,troop safety, and individual agent’s sensitivity to weatherconditions. Planning must consider all variables for eachavailable agent and delivery means. Plans must allow thecommander selectivity of scaled employment from one nonlethalagent on a continuum through all lethal agents. If applicablevariables preclude execution of portions or all of plannedchemical fires, alternate means of attacking these targets mustbe provided in the overall fire plan. General considerationsfor employment of chemical agents are contained in FM 3-10/NWP36-2/AFM 355-4/FMFM 11-3, "Employment of Chemical Agents"; FM3-10B/NWP 36-4/AFM 355-9/FMFM 11-3B, "Chemical TargetAnalysis"; and FM 101-40/NWP 36 (D)/AFM 355-2/FMFM 11-6, "ArmedForces Doctrine for Chemical and Biological Defense."

VIII-61

43. Responsibilities for Planning Nuclear and Chemical FireSupport. Command responsibility for planning nuclear andchemical fires during amphibious operations rests with the CATFand the CLF.

a. Amphibious Task Force Commander’s PlanningResponsibilities. The CATF is responsible for thefollowing:

(1) Preparation of the Nuclear and Chemical Fire Plans.He prepares the nuclear and chemical fire plans,

allocates the available nuclear and chemical weapons tomeet the needs of all forces assigned to the ATF, andestablishes the level of reserve weapons.

(2) Assignment of Weapons. He’s plans the assignmentof nuclear and chemical weapons, including theircomponent parts, to the various ships of the taskforce. In conjunction with the CLF, he makes plans tomove nuclear weapons ashore when the tactical situationrequires.

(3) Communication Instructions. He prepares anddisseminates of signal instructions related to nuclearand chemical weapons employment, includingcommunications codes to be used in the amphibiousoperation.

b. Landing Force Commander’s Planning Responsibilities.The CLF is responsible for planning for the nuclear andchemical weapons support of troop operations ashore,including the selection of targets to be fired on and thetiming of these fires in relation to troop operations. Heis likewise responsible for planning for the security,maintenance, and movement of nuclear and chemical weaponsthat are displaced ashore. After determining hisrequirements, the CLF presents them to the CATF. Theyinclude:

(1) Target priority list.

(2) A detailed plan for each target, including type,number, timing, and method of delivery if prearrangednuclear and chemical weapons are desired, with yields,ground zeros, and burst heights for nuclear weapons,and concentrations and agents for chemical weapons.

(3) Type and number of on-call and reserve weaponsdesired.

VIII-62

44. Planning Considerations

a. Conditions for Employment. The conditions under whichnuclear and chemical weapons may be employed are indicatedin the initiating directive for the amphibious operationand in other guidance provided by higher authority. Whenappropriate and when not prohibited by higher authority,the authority to employ nuclear and chemical weapons may bedelegated by the CATF. The specific conditions of thisdelegation must be defined.

b. Major Considerations. Major considerations in planningfor nuclear and chemical weapons employment are weaponsupply measures, selection of targets, selection ofweapons, delivery means, coordination measures required fortimely delivery and safety of friendly troops, and theeffect of residual contamination on the present and futureoperations.

45. Planning Sequence

a. Commences with Initiating Directive. The initiatingdirective to the CATF formally initiates planning for theemployment of nuclear and chemical weapons.

b. Sequence. Based on the guidance provided in theinitiating directive, nuclear and chemical weapons supportis planned as follows:

(1) LF requirements are determined.

(2) Naval requirements are determined.

(3) The CATF consolidates the LF and navalrequirements. On the basis of the consolidatedrequirements, the number of nuclear and chemicalweapons required to support the operation isdetermined. Approved troop requirements areincorporated in the ATF nuclear and chemical fireplans. The CATF may request additional nuclear andchemical weapons if those provided do not satisfy thesupport requirements. If additional nuclear andchemical weapons cannot be made available by higherauthority, the CATF, in consultation with the CLF,adjusts plans accordingly.

(4) After the final allocation of nuclear and chemicalweapons, the CATF designates the method of delivery tobe used for each prearranged weapon and specifies theauthority for using weapons on targets of opportunity.

VIII-63

(5) When nuclear and chemical weapons are to bedelivered by a commander external to the ATF, the CATFprovides him with the essential information involved inthe specific delivery. Detailed plans are thenprepared by both commanders.

46. Content of Nuclear and Chemical Fire Plans. The nuclearfire plan usually is a separate document with appropriateportions included in other plans such as naval gunfire,artillery, air, and fire support coordination plans. Thechemical fire plan also is a separate document similar in scopeto the nuclear fire plan.

a. Nuclear Fire Support. The nuclear fire plan containsinstructions concerning the nuclear support of the ATF.The basic plan indicates nuclear fire support provided byelements outside the ATF, delineates the concept of nuclearsupport, and assigns nuclear delivery tasks to elements ofthe ATF. This plan may include procedures for attackingtargets of opportunity.

b. Chemical Fire Support. The chemical fire plan issimilar to the nuclear fire plan. It contains informationconcerning the chemical fire support for the ATF. Thebasic plan indicates the chemical fire support provided byelements outside the ATF, delineates the concept ofchemical fire support, and assigns fire support tasks toelements of the ATF.

c. Poststrike Analysis. Plans may include poststrikeanalysis requirements, alternate targets, and alternateweapons.

d. Targets of Opportunity. Plans for fires on targets ofopportunity include:

(1) Allocation and location of weapons.

(2) Procedures for obtaining their delivery.

(3) Alert status of weapons and delivery means.

(4) Responsibilities of all affected commanders.

47. Defense Against Nuclear, Biological, and Chemical WeaponsDefense against nuclear, biological, and chemical weaponsincludes a combination of intelligence concerning thecapabilities and limitations of the enemy, detection anddestruction of his delivery systems, and defense measures thatwill reduce the effect of enemy nuclear, biological, andchemical weapons.

VIII-64

a. Commander, Amphibious Task Force. The CATF isresponsible for planning overall nuclear, biological, andchemical defense measures for the ATF.

b. Commander, Landing Force. The CLF is responsible fordetermining and prescribing the active and passive nuclear,biological, and chemical defense measures required for theLF. He then presents to the CATF those requirements foractive defense measures that should be provided by otherforces.

c. Factors to be Considered in Planning Defense.Provisions for active and passive defense against nuclear,biological, and chemical weapons are included in operationplans. The particular factors that must be considered inplanning for defense against nuclear, biological, andchemical weapons include the following:

(1) Emphasis must be placed on unit separation,dispersion, mobility, warning systems, detectionsystems, and decontamination systems. Increasedmobility during the ship-to-shore movement will allowfor greater unit separation and will provide forgreater passive defense against nuclear, biological,chemical weapons.

(2) Plans are prepared to provide for the possibilityof attack by nuclear, biological, and chemical weaponsduring the ship-to-shore movement that would result in:

(a) Contamination of the beach or landing zone.

(b) Loss of part of the force and correspondingrequirements for alteration of the tactical plansor for unit replacement.

(c) Mass casualties requiring immediate attention.

VIII-65

CHAPTER IX

COMMUNICATIONS FOR COMMAND AND CONTROL

1. Introduction. Communications to support the amphibiousoperation differ in several respects from the requirements forland combat operations. The primary distinction occurs duringthe assault phase. Initially, communications that support thecommand and control (C2) system are sea based. The landingforce (LF) communications plan must provide the capability tosupport the initial stages of the assault, to support thetransition of command posts and control agencies ashore, andultimately to provide the commander, landing force (CLF) withthe ability to control all aspects of the operation.

2 Purpose and Scope. The purpose of this section is toprovide basic communication planning information of interest tothe LF. Emphasis is placed on the requirements for C2communications during the assault phase of the amphibiousoperation. This section complements Chapter 9, JCS Pub 3-02,focusing on LF requirements. The organization, equipment,procedures, and C2 requirements of the LF will generally beService-unique. This section therefore does not providedetailed information on communications; appropriate joint,Service, and allied communications publications should beconsulted. The following references contain information oncommunications specifically applicable to amphibious operations:

a. NWP 4, "Fleet Communications," Chapter 20 (classified).

b. FMFM 3-30, "Communications."

c. ACP 176, "Allied Naval and Maritime Air CommunicationInstructions" (classified).

3. General

a. Communications Planning. Communications planningbegins simultaneously with the initiation of generalplanning. General operational requirements imposed on thecommunications system are translated into specifictechnical requirements to support tactical and logisticplans. Communications planning representatives of eachechelon must be fully informed of operational planningdetails.

IX-1

b. Initial Requirements. In planning his communicationssystem, the landing force commander establishescommunications liaison with the amphibious task force (ATF)to determine the requirements to be made on the LFcommunications. He effects close liaison with hissubordinate commanders to ensure that he provides them withthe necessary planning guidance and communications means toaccomplish the assigned mission. In the event requests ofsubordinates cannot be met, and where additionalcommunications support is required, the CLF takesappropriate action to ensure that these requirements aremet.

4. Responsibilities

a. Commander, Amphibious Task Force. The commander,amphibious task force (CATF) is responsible for:

(1) Determination of communications requirements ofNavy forces, including requirements of ships providedto the ATF by the Military Sealift Command (MSC) (seeNWP 22-8/FMFM 1-15, "Military Sealift Command inSupport of Amphibious Operations"), review and approvalof communications requirements of the LF and otherforces, and for consolidation of communicationsrequirements for the ATF as a whole.

(2) Acquisition and assignment of necessary technicalfacilities to subordinate elements of the force.

(3) Determination of priorities and allocation ofshipboard communications facilities to eachparticipating force. Certain radio equipment isinstalled aboard amphibious ships for use by the LF aswell as operating spaces.

(4) Determination, consolidation, and coordination ofthe electronic warfare (EW) requirements of allparticipating forces.

(5) Establishment of provisions to ensure adequatecommunications for the Navy elements of the ATF duringthe planning phase.

(6) Preparation of instructions in support of coverand deception plans prescribed for the operation.

(7) Announcement of requirements for establishingliaison between all commands of the participatingforces for communications planning.

IX-2

(8) Preparation and promulgation of a complete andcoordinated plan for the employment of communicationsduring the operation.

b. Commander, Landing Force. The CLF is responsible for:

(1) Establishing provisions for adequate LFcommunications during the planning phase.

(2) Determining requirements for communicationsfacilities controlled by higher headquarters andsubmitting these requirements to the CATF; e.g., jointcommunications support element (JCSE), airborne commandposts, Airborne Warning and Control System (AWACS), etc.

(3) Preparing requests for the allocation of shipboardcommunications services or facilities for use oflanding force units while embarked.

(4) Developing a landing force EW plan and stating therequirements for EW support to the CATF.

(5) Maintaining liaison with the CATF and subordinateLF units in all communications planning matters.

(6) Developing and promulgating a complete andcoordinated communications plan for the landing forceand submitting this plan to the CATF for review,coordination, approval, and inclusion in the ATFcommunications plan as appropriate.

c. Commanders of Other Major Forces. Commanders of othermajor forces of the ATF are responsible for thedetermination of their communications requirements and thesubmission to the CATF of those requirements that must bemet by other elements of the ATF.

5. Landing Force Shipboard Communications

a. Ships Provide Communication Facilities for Landing ForceHeadquarters. During the initial stages of the assault,when the LF headquarters and the headquarters of the majorsubordinate elements of the LF are afloat, LF circuits areprovided by facilities specifically installed in amphibiousships for use by LF personnel. The use of these facilitiesallows LF elements to have their complete allowance oftactical communications equipment for the movement ashore.

IX-3

b. Communications Personnel and Equipment Aboard AmphibiousCommand Ship. Additionally, if the LF headquarters afloatis located in an amphibious command ship (LCC), the Marinecommunications detachment permanently assigned to the LCCprovides personnel to augment the operation of LF circuitssupported by the afloat facilities. This detachment isunder the operational control of the CLF.

6. Communications Plan

a. Administrative Requirements. The LF communicationsplan is normally issued as an annex to the operation plan.It must be compatible with the overall ATF communicationsplan and is prepared in minute detail to facilitate its useby all elements of the LF. As with other plans, sufficientcopies of documents, which can be incorporated intact intothe plans of senior and subordinate echelons, should beprovided to those headquarters. This procedure minimizesthe possibility of error and saves administrative effort.

b. Contents of Plan. The communications plan fulfills thecommunications requirements of the CLF in terms ofcircuits, channels, and facilities required, and policiesand procedures governing the operation and coordination ofthe communications system. The plan includes:

(1) General coverage of communications situation,including assumptions, guiding principles, and theconcept of operational employment.

(2) Announcement of the communications mission.

(3) Assignment of communications tasks andresponsibilities to major elements of the LF.

(4) Detailed instructions relative to theorganization, installation, operation, coordination,and maintenance of the communications system.

(5) Assignment and employment of call signs,frequencies, cryptographic systems, and authenticationsystems.

(6) Instructions concerning electroniccountermeasures, electronic counter-countermeasures,cover and deception, security, recognition andidentification, navigation aids, and othercommunications-electronics functions.

IX-4

(7) Communications-electronics supply and maintenance.

7. Communications Means

a. Dependence on Radio Early in the Assault. The physicalenvironment of the amphibious operation requires an almostcomplete dependence upon radio during the initial portionof the assault phase. Radio, either single ormultichannel, employing telephone, telegraph,teletypewriter, or data equipment is especially adapted toamphibious operations since it requires no physical linksand has sufficient range and mobility to satisfy thecommunications requirements of rapidly moving units.However, the employment of radio is complicated by itsrelative fragility, vulnerability to damage by salt water,traffic handling limitations, multiple frequencyrequirements, vulnerability to enemy interference, and ofnecessity, by imposition of rigid security measures.

b. Wire Multichannel Radio System. A wire-multichannelradio system, consisting of multichannel radio equipmentand terminal facilities installed in amphibious ships fortroop use, is employed under certain conditions of emissioncontrol during the movement phase and, after radio silenceis lifted, during the assault phase to providecommunications between the LF headquarters afloat and majorsubordinate elements. This system is reoriented andexpanded as subordinate elements displace ashore to providethe primary communications means between the LFheadquarters and LF elements ashore. When the LFheadquarters is established ashore, the system is furtherexpanded to provide the primary communications meansbetween the LF headquarters, the CATF, and all majorsubordinate elements of the LF.

c. Messengers. Messengers, including helicopterbornemessengers, are employed extensively during an amphibiousoperation. Under certain conditions, they are the mostsecure and, in some cases, may be the only means fortransmitting bulky matter, overlays, administrativetraffic, and long, low-precedence messages. Messengers maybe either scheduled or unscheduled. Scheduled messengersare those dispatched on regular routes, adhering to a timeschedule. Unscheduled messengers are those dispatched asthe need arises.

d. Visual. Visual means are employed by all echelons ofthe force conducting an amphibious operation. Visualsignaling is accomplished by the use of panels,pyrotechnics, flashing lights, signal flags, andarm-and-hand signals.

IX-5

e. Sound. Sound is a means of communications available toall units conducting an amphibious operation. Soundsignals are transmitted by whistles, bugles, horns, gongs,klaxons, weapons, and other noisemaking devices. Theirchief value is to attract attention, transmit prearrangedmessages, and spread alarms. Sound is satisfactory foronly short distances, and its effectiveness is greatlyreduced by battle noises. Public address systems areemployed extensively for beach and boat control, forpropaganda broadcasts, and for disseminating alerts andwarnings.

8. Planning Considerations

a. Must Provide Necessary Support. Planning thecommunications requirements for an amphibious operation hasthe added dimensions of ensuring that communications cansupport each phase of the operation. Althoughcommunications during the movement phase are provided bythe Navy system, LF communications plans must support theplanning, embarkation, rehearsal, and assault phases of theoperation.

b. Criteria. Changes in command relationships, taskorganization, and disposition of forces require maximumflexibility in communications plans. These plans must notcreate a requirement for a large number of non-essentialfunctional circuits. Multiple purpose circuits must beused to the maximum by all forces. Common agencies must beused where practicable in order to assist in the reductionof mutual interference by decreasing the frequencyrequirements. Use of alternate means other thanelectrical, such as visual, helicopter, or surfacemessenger, must be exploited to ensure the most rapid andsecure delivery of information between widely dispersedforces within the ATF.

9. Special Considerations

a. The Environment. The characteristics of the modernbattlefield will heavily tax the communications system.The necessity for dispersion of forces, mobility, and rapidmovement may overextend what are considered "normal"communications ranges and lead to circuit failures.Requirements for communications security and theprobability of radio electronic combat methods beingemployed against the ATF dictate that the LF not be overlydependent on radio communications. Plans must fullyconsider the electromagnetic propagation characteristics ofthe area and the resultant effect on communications.

IX-6

(1) Thorough training of personnel, includingrealistic rehearsals, is essential to the success ofthe communications effort. Training should includeemphasis on communications security, antijammingprocedures, and the proper use of authenticationsystems.

(2) The shipboard environment and the ship-to-shoremovement pose special problems for maintenance andpreservation of communications equipment. Trainingemphasis should also be placed on corrosion controlmeasures and waterproofing.

(3) The extended ranges required and/or thecharacteristics of the area may require use of airborneor ground-based relay or retransmission systems.

b. Quiet Landings. A quiet landing is defined as theconduct of the initial assault portion of an amphibiousoperation without using voice radio communications. Quietlanding procedures may be ordered by the CATF as a means ofcountering enemy efforts to disrupt the ship-to-shoremovement through use of jamming and/or intrusion on ATFcontrol circuits. The use of quiet landing procedures doesnot imply the imposition of total electronic silence.Although it is desirable to restrict electronic emissionsto the maximum extent possible, the use of radars,ship-to-shore termination, and other radio circuitsnecessary to the amphibious operation may be utilized. Foradditional information see NWP 22-3/FMFM 1-8,"Ship-to-Shore Movement, Chapter 3."

c. Attached Communication Units. Navy communicationsunits or appropriate Army communications units may beattached to the LF whenever it is planned to establish anadvance base within the objective area. These unitsinitiate base communications development at the earliestpracticable time. The facilities established by theseunits may be used to provide the LF with communicationsexternal to the AOA.

d. Military Sealift Command. The CLF is responsible fordetermining and identifying to the CATF any requirementsfor communications facilities on MSC ships to support LFneeds.

IX-7

10. Basic Considerations

a. Commander, Landing Force, Responsibility and StaffCoordination. The CLF has the overall responsibility forproviding an adequate LF communications system for allphases of the amphibious operation. The actual drafting ofthe communications plan is the staff responsibility of thecommunications-electronics officer. Throughout thispreparation, he must coordinate with each staff section ofthe senior command as well as with thecommunications-electronics officers at parallel and lowercommands to ensure that all requirements are satisfied.Examples of specific matters applicable to the amphibiousoperation that require coordination with staff functionalareas are as follows:

(1) Personnel and Administration. The internal spaceorganization, arrangement, and operation ofheadquarters or command posts, as well as theirdisplacement and relocation.

(2) Intelligence. Employment of combat surveillancedevices with respect to their effect on andrelationship with the communications system.

(3) Operations. Task organization, tactics, expectedrate of advance, and location of units; selection andlocation of command posts; plans for physical securityof communication installations; preparation ofcommunications data for inclusion in communicationsguard shift messages; special requirements such ascommunications for tactical-logistical groups(TACLOGs); employment of EW devices with respect totheir effect on and relationship with thecommunications system.

(4) Logistics/Combat Service Support. Location ofcombat service support installations; priorities forcommunications-electronics equipment and supplies in acritical status; priorities for maintenance orevacuation of equipment.

(5) Civil Affairs. Acquisition and utilization ofindigenous communications facilities and resources;procurement and employment of indigenous labor forcommunications; indigenous civilian communicationsproblems; aspects of international communicationtreaties and agreements.

IX-8

(6) Air and Naval Gunfire Officers. Coordinationrequired for frequencies, call signs, special equipmentrequirements, special codes, and technicalcommunications data concerning air and naval gunfireemployment.

(7) Embarkation Officer. Communications requirementsfor the embarkation area and for control of themovement to the embarkation area; priority of loadingand landing communications-electronics equipment andpersonnel; stowage of communications-electronicsequipment while en route to the objective, where it canbe serviced and is available for use, if needed.

b. Communications-Electronics Officer Tasks. The LFcommunications-electronics officer and the ATFcommunications officer conduct concurrent and parallelplanning. Items specifically treated in this planning are:

(1) Evaluation of assigned radio frequencies toprevent mutual interference and to ensure adequacy ofsupport for the operation plan. Consideration must begiven to radio nets and frequencies, which will providecommunications between the parallel ATF and LF commands.

(2) Allocation of shipboard radio equipment for troopuse.

(3) Assignment of call signs. Tactical call signs areassigned by the CATF to major commands of the LF. Thisprocedure is followed to facilitate the handling oftroop traffic over naval circuits during the movementto the objective.

(4) Cryptographic and authentication systems that mustbe used jointly by landing force and ATF units.

(5) Arrangements for naval communications guard forembarked LF units during the movement to the objective.

(6) Communications required during loading.Communications established in an embarkation area arethe responsibility of the CLF; however, coordination isrequired with Navy units embarking troops and suppliesfrom that area.

(7) Development of communications security andelectronic counter-countermeasures procedures toprotect communications from enemy detection,interception, deception, and jamming.

IX-9

(8) Use of LF communications personnel to aid theship’s communications personnel during the movement tothe objective. This serves the twofold purpose ofmaintaining a high state of training for landing forcecommunications personnel and assisting Navycommunications personnel in handling an increasedvolume of traffic.

11. Communications Requirements. The communicationsrequirements to support all phases of the amphibious operationmust be considered in detail. A discussion of requirementsthat pertain to each phase follows:

a. Planning Phase. At the inception of planning,communications are established between all majorparticipating commands and organizations. The preservationof maximum communications security is essential and must bemaintained even though the various planning headquartersare separated by great distances. The worldwide DefenseCommunication System, supplemented by personal liaison,mail, and courier service, provides the majorcommunications means during this phase.

b. Embarkation Phase. The CLF is normally responsible forplanning, providing, or obtaining the communications forcontrol and coordination of embarkation at the piers orbeaches within the embarkation areas. This may include theuse of permanent military or civilian facilities inaddition to means organic to landing force elements.Therefore, early liaison must be established betweencorresponding naval and LF elements to properly determineand coordinate the communications required for the overallcontrol of embarkation. To preclude significant commitmentof organic communications equipment of the LF that must beembarked, additional equipment should be provided for usein the embarkation area. If possible, arrangements shouldbe made with the commander of the area in which theembarkation is to take place to provide the requiredcommunications. Specific considerations include:

(1) Establishment of ship-to-shore radio circuits forthe control of loading. (This responsibility remainswith the CATF.)

(2) Establishment of radio communications for thecontrol of convoys moving to the embarkation area.

(3) Establishment of voice radio or radio teletypecommunications between the embarkation area and theparent base or station.

IX-10

(4) Establishment of voice radio or wirecommunications between control points within theembarkation area.

(5) Establishment of limited communications centerand/or switching center operations within theembarkation area.

c. Rehearsal Phase. One of the primary purposes of therehearsal is to test communications. Under idealconditions, the rehearsal will involve all elements of theATF and provide the opportunity to test the employment ofcommunications techniques, equipment, and systemsprescribed in the plans for the operation. Specificconsiderations include:

(1) Using minimum power for establishment of radiocommunications for the purpose of maintainingcommunications security.

(2) Changing radio frequencies and call signssubsequent to the rehearsal for use in the actualoperation.

(3) Repairing or replacing communications equipmentdamaged during the rehearsal.

(4) Providing expendable items such as wire andbatteries for use during the rehearsal.

(5) Conducting an objective critique of theperformance of communications during the rehearsal.

(6) Modifying appropriate portions of plans as aresult of conclusions reached in the critique, andproviding timely coordination concerning thesemodifications.

d. Movement Phase. During this period, the CATF isresponsible for providing all external communications,including entry into the Defense Communication System, ifappropriate, and communications between ships of the taskforce. However, the use of communications means,particularly radio, is severely restricted to preventdisclosure to the enemy of the locations, movements, andintentions of the task force. Accordingly, the CATFprescribes the conditions of radio silence in effect duringthe movement. Communications within and between various

IX-11

movement groups of the task force are provided byhelicopter messenger, visual means, or line-of-sight radioin consonance with the degree of radio silence in effect.Messages from external sources, which may be addressed tothe ATF or elements thereof, are normally received byscheduled radio broadcasts. Specific LF considerationsduring this phase include:

(1) Ensuring that embarkation information, submittedthrough the ATF prior to the movement, has beenproperly interpreted by external activities to reflectthe communications guard situation for all elements ofthe LF.

(2) Ensuring that ship communications officers havebeen provided with a list of appropriate LForganizations and units (i.e., next senior andimmediate subordinate) and their assigned locations intask force shipping.

(3) Ensuring that all ship communications officershave been provided with a list of LF message releasingauthorities embarked in their respective ships.

(4) Ensuring that all ship communications officershave been provided with a list of LF communicationspersonnel embarked in their respective ships. The listshould contain information relative to securityclearances and authorized access.

(5) Establishing limited LF communications centers, orequivalents, in all ships where major LF organizationsand units are embarked.

(6) Employing landing force communications personnel,and equipment when appropriate, to augment Navycommunications facilities.

e. Assault Phase. During the assault, both Navy and LFelements of the ATF rely primarily on radio communicationsas the means for exercising command and control over theassigned forces. Accordingly, radio silence is usuallylifted by the CATF prior to H-hour in order to test allcircuits before the ship-to-shore movement begins. Duringthe initial portion of the assault, when the LFheadquarters and the headquarters of the major subordinateelements of the LF are afloat, LF circuits are provided byfacilities specifically installed in amphibious shippingfor use by LF personnel. (See paragraph 5 above.)

IX-12

12. Control of Ship-to-Shore Movement. The CATF isresponsible for the control of the ship-to-shore movement ofboth waterborne and helicopterborne assault forces. Continualcoordination is required between the CATF and the CLF to ensurethat all the requirements of the LF are being met throughoutthe ship-to-shore movement. Navy elements of the ATF relyprimarily on radio communications to exercise the requiredcontrol. However, visual, sound, and messenger communicationsmay also be employed extensively during this period. Landingforce communications are complementary and generally parallelto the communications established by the Navy elements of theATF. These parallel systems terminate at each significantcontrol activity (e.g., supporting arms coordination center(SACC), tactical air control center (TACC)) and, therefore,provide alternate communications means for ATF and LF elements.

a. Waterborne Movement. Communications for control andcoordination of landing ships, landing craft, and otherwaterborne vehicles moving from the transport area tobeaches are provided primarily by a Navy control group.However, LF communication assets must be incorporated forcontrol and coordination over the movement of personnel,equipment, and supplies during this period. This isdemonstrated by the formation of the TACLOG and attendantlanding support operations, which are controlled andcoordinated through appropriate LF radio nets.

b. Helicopterborne Ship-to-Shore Movement. Communicationsfor the control and coordination of the helicopterborneship-to-shore movement are established and maintained bythe CATF through the TACC (afloat), helicopter directioncenter (HDC), and other appropriate afloat agenciesconcerned with the helicopterborne movement ashore ofpersonnel, equipment, and supplies. Additional LFrequirements are generated by the necessity forcommunications between HSTs ashore and TACLOGs afloat.

13. Control of Supporting Arms. The CATF is responsible,initially, for exercising overall control and coordination offires delivered by naval gunfire ships and supporting aircraftand LF artillery units. This responsibility is exercisedthrough the SACC which relies primarily on radio communicationsfor this purpose. The LF fire support coordinator (FSC)assists in the decisionmaking process required of SACCrepresentatives by monitoring all activities within the SACCand assists these activities by providing advice andinformation concerning LF fire support requirements. When theLF establishes adequate control and communications facilities

IX-13

ashore, the responsibility for the overall control andcoordination of supporting arms is transferred from the CATF tothe CLF. This responsibility is normally passed ashoreincrementally to permit a smooth transfer of those controlfunctions for which facilities have been established. SpecificLF considerations involving control and coordination ofartillery, naval gunfire, and close air support are as follows:

a. Employment of Wire and Radio. Control and coordinationof artillery, naval gunfire, and close air support ismaintained primarily by radio communications during theinitial portion of the assault. Distance or terrainfeatures may necessitate employment of manual radio relyand automatic radio retransmission. Wire may be employedon an austere basis by appropriate units ashore, consistentwith time and the tactical situation. Additionally, visualcommunications may be employed to satisfy basic controlrequirements to include marking of targets, friendlyfrontline positions, etc.

b. Reliance on Shipboard Communications Facilities.During the afloat period of the assault, the LF firesupport coordinator relies on communications facilitiesprovided in the SACC to monitor fire support requests fromLF units ashore.

c. Transfer of Overall Control and Coordination Ashore.Prior to transfer of overall control and coordination ofsupporting arms ashore, communications must be establishedbetween the DASC, the TACC afloat, the FSCC ashore, and theSACC.

d. Alternate Means of Communications. Supporting armsradio nets that are normally dedicated to a specificfunction may, in certain instances during the assault, berequired to operate on a temporary share basis to supportparallel control functions. This requirement isexemplified when loss of communications occurs on aparticular supporting arms circuit maintained between LFcontrol agencies and Navy control agencies.

14. Control of Air Operations. During the initial portion ofthe assault, the CATF exercises control of all air operationsin the objective area. This control is primarily exercisedthrough the TACC (afloat) and in coordination with the SACC.Subsequently, the control responsibility may be passed to theCLF ashore. It may be passed incrementally, similar to themethod for transferring the responsibility for the control andcoordination of supporting arms. Specific LF considerationsinclude:

IX-14

a. Instructions. Detailed instructions pertaining to aircontrol communications are provided by the CATF during theplanning phase of the operation. The LF plan forcommunications in support of air operations should bealigned in detail with these instructions to preventconflict or confusion relative to radio frequencies, nets,call signs, etc.

b. CLF Relies Upon CATF Facilities Initially. During thetime the LF headquarters is afloat and control of air isbeing exercised at the CATF level, the CLF is kept abreastof the air situation through the Navy air control andsupporting arms coordination communications facilities.

c. Criteria for Transfer of Control of Air Operations.Prior to the complete transfer of control of air operationsto the CLF, it is essential that the landing force TACC,DASC, and tactical air operations center(s) (TAOC) ashoreand the tactical air direction center (TADC), sectorantiair warfare center (SAAWC), and HDC afloat haveestablished common radio communications. Additionally, themajor control agencies of the LF air C2 system ashoreshould have established communications to appropriatecarrier and/or land-based aircraft and to their respectivesubordinate air support and antiair warfare agencies andelements within the LF.

d. Minimum Requirements. The initial installation andemployment of the wire multichannel radio networksupporting the LF air C2 system must be capable ofproviding the minimum C2 requirements when theresponsibility for control of air operations in theobjective area is passed to the CLF.

15. Control of Combat Service Support. The CATF has theoverall responsibility for the control and coordination oflogistic support for the LF during the assault. Thisresponsibility is attendant to his responsibility for thecontrol of the ship-to-shore movement. However, selected unitsand agencies of the LF are required to assist the Navy controlorganization in the area of logistic sustainability byperforming coordinating and advisory functions that areadditional to the handling of equipment and supplies by CSSunits ashore. Landing force communications must provide ameans for the control of medical evacuation, prisoner-of-warcollection, foot and vehicular traffic movement ashore, andsimilar activities in addition to providing a means for thecontrol of the movement and handling of equipment andsupplies. Specific considerations are governed by the type ofship-to-shore movement involved.

IX-15

a. Waterborne Movement. Specific considerations for theemployment of communications for control of logisticsupport in the waterborne movement include:

(1) Landing force TACLOGs rely on shipboardcommunication facilities to exercise their coordinatingfunctions. However, the use of tactical radioequipment and operating personnel should be planned toprovide for any additional support required for TACLOGcommunications.

(2) TACLOGs, landing support and Navy beach unitsashore, HSTs (when a helicopterborne movement isconducted concurrently with the waterborne movement),and the supported combat units of the LF are requiredto establish common radio communications during theassault.

(3) Landing support units ashore are required toestablish communications within the CSS areas,including wire communications with Navy beach parties.

(4) Navy beach parties maintain radio communicationson appropriate nets within the framework of the Navycontrol organization. Under ideal conditions, they mayemploy submarine cable or wire for communications tothe control ships.

(5) Wire communications are normally establishedashore between supported combat organizations and theirsupporting landing support units. The initial wireinstallations are laid from the beach inland by landingsupport communications liaison personnel assigned toappropriate combat organizations.

(6) The overall landing support communication effortduring the waterborne assault represents a gradualbuildup of the means provided by individual landingsupport teams that are assigned to the LF support party.

b. Helicopterborne Movement. Specific considerations forthe employment of communications for control of CSS in thehelicopterborne movement include:

(1) Control of CSS support during the helicopterbornemovement is exercised through the operations of HSTs,TACLOGs, HDC, and the helicopter logistic supportcenter (HLSC). It depends primarily on the use ofradio communications.

IX-16

(2) An HST requires direct radio communications withthe TACLOG of the helicopterborne (afloat) force andthe helicopters transporting the force, and wire orradio communications with subordinate activitiesoperating within the landing zone.

16. Control of Signals Intelligence/Electronic Warfare Operations. Control and coordination of LF SIGINT/EW operations iseffected through the LF SIGINT/EW coordination center (afloat).

a. Initial Stages of Assault. Control and coordination ofSIGINT/EW operations is maintained primarily by secureradio communications during the initial stages of theassault.

b. Afloat Facilities. The landing force signalsintelligence/electronic warfare coordination center(S/EWCC) while afloat relies on special securitycommunications facilities provided in the ship’s signalexploitation spaces (SSES) for special communicationssupport.

c. Ashore Facilities. The S/EWCC will phase ashore byechelon to commence installation and operation of theS/EWCC ashore. Special security communications links willnormally be established from the amphibious command ship(s)to the LF headquarters ashore. These lines may beterminated when a SIGINT communications center link isestablished ashore from the LF headquarters to a specifiedDefense Communication Center entry point.

17. Echelonment of Command Posts. The echelonment of commandposts (CPs) from ship to shore by the various elements andorganizations of the LF is interrelated to the control aspectsdescribed in the preceding paragraphs, particularly controlover supporting arms and air operations. For example, the fullresponsibility for control over supporting arms would not bepassed to the CLF until he had established appropriate controlagencies ashore to perform the requisite functions. Thelanding force FSCC would necessarily be one of the firstcontrol agencies established ashore for this purpose. However,the time of its establishment ashore would be governedessentially by the ground combat element headquarters plan forcommand post echelonment, including composition of echelons,time phasing, employment of communications, and so forth. Thefollowing information outlines general considerations for theemployment of communications during this period:

IX-17

a. Orderly Transition. The echelonment of CPs from shipto shore must be accomplished in a manner that provides forcommunications continuity during the entire assault phase.Throughout this phase, LF communications undergo acontinuous transition. Initially, all LF elements andorganizations are dependent almost entirely on netted radiocommunications operated from stations afloat; andprogressively, as the assault forces land, these stationsare phased from an afloat to an ashore status. Then, asthe CPs of successively higher organizations and elementsare established ashore, the dependence on netted radiocommunications is gradually reduced and more emphasis isplaced on the employment of wire, wire-multichannel radio,messenger communications, etc. The conduct of thistransition governs the orderly development of the LFcommunications system ashore and provides for moreeffective C2 as the assault progresses.

b. Two or More Echelons. A CP movement from ship to shoreis normally made in two or more echelons, depending on thetype and size of the headquarters. Each echelon requires anear equal communications capability, although tacticalresources are usually allocated more heavily in thecommander’s echelon.

c. Headquarters Embarked on Two Ships. The commander,staff, and supporting personnel that make up a particularheadquarters may be embarked in one ship or may be dividedinto two groups embarked in separate ships. In the lattercase, radio communications must be established betweenthese two groups as soon as radio silence is lifted priorto the ship-to-shore movement.

d. Communication Requirements for Advance Party orReconnaissance Party. When an advance party (orreconnaissance party) is sent ashore before the majorechelons of a CP, direct radio communications are requiredbetween the advance party and the major echelons afloat.Additionally, the type and quantity of communicationspersonnel and equipment assigned to an advance party mustbe carefully selected as their initial efforts ashore willprovide the basic installation from which the organiccommunications system will expand.

e. Communications for the Commander in Transit. When acommander, with appropriate members of his staff, is intransit from ship to shore in either the waterborne orhelicopterborne movement, he requires radio communications

IX-18

with his units ashore, including the CP advance party ifemployed, and any of his units remaining afloat. However,the communications facilities available to a commander ineither a command type amphibious tractor, C2 helicopter ortransport helicopter will not normally satisfy his totalcommunications requirements. Therefore, the use of thesefacilities should be carefully considered and the attendantradio means allocated only to the most essential circuits.

f. Criteria for Activating Headquarters Ashore and Terminating Headquarters Afloat. Communications facilities must bemaintained by the final echelon of the CP afloat until thefacilities in the CP ashore are sufficiently developed tosupport C2 functions. Although the facilities ashore maybe initially austere (e.g., lacking a completely installedswitching center, limited communications center operations,control agencies relying primarily on push-to-talk radiocommunications, etc.), C2 functions may be assumed from theCP ashore, providing that essential communicationsrequirements have been satisfied. When this isaccomplished, the final echelon afloat is notified, closesdown its operation and prepares to move ashore to join thenew CP.

g. Priority for the Installation of Electrical Communications. The establishment of predetermined priorities for theinitial installation of electrical communications isessential for the responsive and orderly development of thecommunication system supporting the new CP ashore.Generally, the priorities may be divided into two maincategories: installations required for communications tosenior, subordinate, and adjacent CPs (which are normallyassigned first priority) and installations required forcommunications within the CP itself (which are normallyassigned second priority). Within each of these maincategories, further subdivision of priority assignment willbe necessary to support the immediate and criticalrequirements of specific staff sections and agencies.Based on the number of communications personnel available,major emphasis will be placed on concurrent installation bypriority, rather than consecutive installation.

18. Communications Channels

a. Development of Landing Force Communications Capabilities.During the assault phase, primary reliance must be placed

on radio and multichannel radio communications. Thisrequirement is considered in planning

IX-19

the numbers and types of circuits required and theassignment of available frequencies. Communications plansof both naval and LF provide for sufficient channels ofcommunications during the ship-to-shore movement to permitthe exercise of those measures of control and coordinationthat are required at all echelons. Communications plans ofthe LF provide for the rapid development of LFcommunications systems ashore in order to ensure facilitiesresponsive to the needs of the tactical situation as theassault progresses. These plans must also provide entryinto a worldwide communications system for the CLF ashore.Such external communications initially are provided throughthe CATF and subsequently established ashore by units ofthe LF. This beach facility will become the basis for anadvanced base entry into the worldwide communicationssystem, if required.

b. Total Requirements. The total requirements forcommunications channels will vary with the size of theforce, the complexity of the operation, availableresources, and many other factors. Accordingly thispublication does not provide typical or illustrativerepresentation of overall requirements. For discussion oftype nets and nomenclature, see appropriate Servicepublications. Appendix B to FMFM 3-30 lists typicallanding force nets.

IX-20

CHAPTER XLOGISTICS AND COMBAT SERVICE SUPPORT

1. Introduction

a. Requirements. An amphibious operation is characterizedby the rapid buildup of combat power ashore. Associatedwith this projection of combat power is the attendantrequirement to transfer the logistics support system ashoreto sustain the landing force (LF). The logistics systemand combat service support (CSS) for amphibious operationsmust be designed to transition from sea-based toshore-based support. Plans must be flexible in order torespond to the changing tactical situation ashore. Perhapsthe most significant difference between CSS for landoperations and for amphibious operations is the increasedrequirement for self-sufficiency of the assault echelonduring early stages of the landing.

b. Objectives. Logistics/CSS planning for the amphibiousoperation must provide for accomplishment of the followingobjectives:

(1) The orderly assembly and embarkation of personnel,supplies, and equipment of the LF.

(2) The establishment and maintenance of a responsiveand adequate CSS system in the amphibious objectivearea (AOA) to sustain the LF.

(3) The initiation of a logistics system to supportsubsequent operations ashore after termination of theamphibious operation and to support base developmentand garrison forces (if such development is directed byhigher headquarters).

2. Purpose and Scope. This chapter provides an overview oflogistics matters in the amphibious operation. The primaryemphasis is on operational logistics and planning for CSS ofthe LF. This chapter complements Chapter 10 of JCS Pub 3-02.It includes planning considerations and specific information onthe six functional areas of CSS: supply, engineer,maintenance, transportation, health services, and servicessupport. Deployment and embarkation planning (subfunctions ofthe functional area of transportation) are discussed in ChapterXI. Tactical-logistical Groups (TACLOGs) are discussed inChapter VI. Additional references are cited in appropriatechapters of the text.

X-1

3. General

a. Logistics. Logistics encompasses the total scope ofactivity required to support the formation, movement,engagement, disengagement, and disestablishment of militaryforces in the very broad functional areas of materiel,transportation, health services, and related services.Logistics support is concerned with maintenance and movementof forces on a sustained, continuous basis in war and peace,in garrison, and in the field.

b. Combat Service Support. CSS is a special form ofmilitary operational logistics. It is those essentiallogistics functions, activities, and tasks which support theLF and enhance combat effectiveness in the area ofoperations. CSS organizations do not provide those servicesto supported commands, which are more appropriatelycategorized as "command support" (i.e., personneladministration, chaplain services, financial management,communications, intelligence, billeting, messing, band andmorale, welfare and recreation services). Thus, CSS is thatservice support to the LF which directly affects combatmission accomplishment under tactical combat conditions.

c. Logistics and CSS Planning. Logistics planning foramphibious operations is accomplished in the broad areas ofmateriel, services, health services, and transportation inorder to move and maintain forces for accomplishment of themission. This planning occurs at the LF and higher levels.However, the LF and its subordinate elements place primaryemphasis on CSS planning in the six functional areas notedin paragraph 2 above to support combat and combat supportelements in amphibious operations.

4. Responsibilities

a. Commander, Amphibious Task Force. The CATF isresponsible for:

(1) Determination of the logistics requirements of theNavy forces, including special equipment and shippingrequirements.

(2) Consolidation of those logistics requirements ofall elements of the ATF that must be provided by theNavy forces and determination as to whether or not thoserequirements can be met with the available means.

X-2

(3) Allocation of means of the Navy forces to meetthese consolidated logistics requirements.

(4) Notification to responsible agencies of any unusualrequirements for routine naval items and of requirementsfor special items of naval equipment. Theserequirements should be submitted early in the planningphase to ensure timely arrival at designated embarkationpoints.

(5) Preparation of the overall embarkation schedule,including plans for the assembly of shipping at pointsof embarkation.

(6) Review and approval of embarkation and loadingplans.

(7) Organization of assigned shipping into echelons asnecessary to ensure continuing support of the LFtactical plan.

(8) Provision of the means required for theestablishment and maintenance of an adequate logisticssupport system in the objective area.

(9) Development of plans for handling prisoners of warand civilian evacuees or internees as well asestablishing policy for the administration of civilianaffairs, if not prescribed by higher authority.

(10) Development of overall plans for evacuation andhospitalization.

b. Commander, Landing Force. The CLF is responsible for:

(1) Determination of overall logistics requirements ofthe LF, including units, special equipment, and shipping.

(2) Allocation of available means to meet logisticsrequirements of the LF.

(3) Determination of the LF logistics requirements tobe provided by the air and naval forces, and submissionof these requirements to the CATF.

(4) Development of plans for the assembly of suppliesand equipment to be embarked, including the supplies andequipment of assigned forces that the LF is responsiblefor embarking.

X-3

(5) Preparation of the LF embarkation and ship loadingplans and orders, in coordination with the CATF.

(6) Development of plans for the deployment of LFaviation and other units into the AOA by air.

(7) Planning for the coordination of logistics supportrequired by all elements of the LF.

(8) Preparation of the landing force CSS annex andconcept of CSS.

c. Commanders of Other Forces. Commanders of other majorforces of the ATF are responsible for the determination oftheir logistics requirements and the submission to the CATFof the requirements that must be met by other elements ofthe ATF or external sources.

d. Mutual Responsibilities. The interrelationship oflogistics and CSS responsibilities of the CATF and CLF aresummarized as follows:

(1) The CATF and CLF determine the separate andcombined CSS requirements for the Navy and LF,respectively. The CATF then determines the ability ofavailable naval forces to provide the required support.Unfulfilled requirements are forwarded by the CATF tohigher authority.

(2) The CLF is responsible for the preparation of theembarkation and ship loading plans. Ship loading plansmust be approved by each ship’s commanding officer.CATF provides information for the ship berthing andloading schedule, which is included in the embarkationplan. CATF resolves any unresolved differences betweenindividual ships and troop embarkation teams regardingship loading plans.

(3) The CATF is responsible for the overall plans forhandling prisoners of war and for casualty handling andcare.

(4) The CATF allocates available ATF CSS resources(such as shipping, landing craft, and Navy units) to theCLF. The CLF suballocates these resources, asappropriate, to support the LF.

(5) Logistic plans that concern more than one elementof the ATF because of their content and scope include:

X-4

(a) Assignment to shipping, embarkation, andloading plans.

(b) Plans for supply and resupply, includingprovisions for debarkation and unloading (theship-to-shore movement). (See Chapter VI.)

(c) Medical planning.

(d) LF support party (LFSP) plans.

(e) Engineer planning to support base developmentand garrison forces, if required.

5. Planning Sequence

a. Sequence of Planning. Following receipt of theinitiating directive, logistics/CSS planning proceedsconcurrently at all echelons throughout the ATF. The CATFis responsible for consolidating the total requirements ofthe force and allocating the available means for support.The LF concept of operations ashore is the basis fordetailed CSS planning, which generally proceeds in thefollowing sequence:

(1) Determination of overall requirements.

(2) Statement of requirements to higher authority.

(3) Allocation of resources and assignment ofpriorities.

(4) Preparation of detailed plans and orders.

b. Determination of Overall Requirements. Based on theCLF’s concept of operations, detailed CSS requirements arecomputed for each successive stage of the operation.Quantities and types of required equipment and supplies andother CSS needs are determined at the unit level andforwarded via the chain of command to the higherheadquarters for consolidation.

c. Statement of Requirements to Higher Headquarters. TheCLF compares the needs of the force with CSS assetsavailable internally. Unfilled requirements are thenidentified to higher headquarters, the CATF, or agencies ofthe supporting establishment. Examples of theserequirements include:

X-5

(1) Air movement.

(2) Naval construction forces.

(3) Water and fuel supply and resupply.

(4) Fleet medical services.

(5) Navy cargo handling and port units.

(6) Aviation ammunition supply and resupply.

(7) Staging, holding, and embarkation areas.

(8) Host-nation and inter-Service support.

d. Allocation of Resources and Assignment of Priorities.The CLF allocates to subordinate echelons of the LF thoselogistics support resources available and assigned to himand assigns specific priorities, as necessary, for theiremployment based on his concept of operations.

e. Preparation of Plans and Orders. When all logisticsrequirements and means are determined, the appropriatelogistics, personnel, CSS, and embarkation plans areprepared. These plans may be in the form of annexes orappendixes to the operation plan, or (if unrelated to thetactical operation) may be issued separately. At the LFlevel, normally Annexes D (Logistics/Combat ServiceSupport), and E (Personnel) are prepared. These annexes areinterdependent and to some extent duplicative. Annexes Dand E provide information useful to higher headquarters.Annex D directs the CSS efforts of the LF. At lowerechelons, normally, only Annex D is necessary.

6. Planning Considerations

a. General. Logistic and CSS planning for an amphibiousoperation is a continuous, detailed process. It proceedsfrom the preparation of the logistics and CSS estimates andthe initial statement of overall logistics requirements forsupplies and CSS, to the establishment and operation of alogistics support system in the objective area.

b. Coordination of Logistic and Tactical Plans.Coordination between tactical and logistics plans mustreflect a full recognition of the capabilities of the LF’slogistics support system and naval logistics support

X-6

capabilities. The requirements of LF units for cargo andtroop space in assault shipping must be adjusted preciselyto support the landing plan and operations ashore.

c. Resupply. The requirements for scheduled resupplies andfor on-call resupply from outside the landing area,especially by aerial delivery, must be integrated into aplan that provides for quick, flexible responses to thecombat environment.

d. Logistic Planning Factors. The nature and extent oflogistics and CSS planning is primarily shaped by theconsiderations and objectives for which the operation isundertaken--the mission of the LF and the expected durationof operations. Many other factors must be considered,including:

(1) Characteristics of the area: climate, weather,terrain; indigenous resources and available host-nationsupport; local transportation system; enemy capabilitiesand expected interference with logistics functions; andrequirements to support the civilian population.

(2) Strength and composition of the LF, characteristicsof operations to be supported, and tasks requiringspecial supplies and equipment.

(3) Distance to the objective area and capability anddependability of forces providing resupply to the area.

(4) Employment of nuclear and chemical weapons andnuclear, biological, and chemical defensive measures.

(5) Additional logistics responsibilities ontermination of the amphibious operation.

(6) Requirements for base development andreconstruction or rehabilitation of ports and airfields.

e. Special Planning Considerations

(1) Critical Early Requirements. CSS in the initialstages of the amphibious operation is principallyconcerned with the provision of combat essentialsupplies and rations, water, ammunition, and fuel.These initial requirements are provided from LF suppliestransported to the AOA in assault and assault follow-onshipping. Other essential services, including medical

X-7

support, are provided within capabilities; however,other CSS functions are of secondary importance duringthe early stages of the ship-to-shore movement.Accordingly, the combat units must be provided with thecapability to be self-sustaining during the early stagesof the assault.

(2) Tactical-Logistical Groups and Landing Support.The role and importance of special task organizationsthat control and provide CSS during the ship-to-shoremovement and in the early phases of the assault requirespecial emphasis. These include the organization of thelanding force support party and its subordinate shoreparty and helicopter support units. TACLOGs arediscussed in Chapter VI.

(3) Seabasing and the Sea Echelon.

(a) Seabasing. In some cases, it may beundesirable or unnecessary to transfer substantialLF supplies and CSS organizations ashore.Seabasing provides for limited CSS elements tobecome temporarily established ashore and allowsfor the majority of CSS assets to remain at sea andbe sent ashore only when needed. In such cases,additional consideration must be devoted during theplanning phase to ensure that CSS capabilities arebalanced aboard those amphibious ships best suitedto provide support. For example, when seabasing isemployed, a CSS detachment aboard a ship may beorganized to provide some or all types of support:medical, supply or maintenance; additional workspaces for the CSS detachments may be needed.Additionally, seabasing increases helicoptersupport requirements since it involves an increasedreliance on maintenance contact teams andreplenishment by helicopter.

(b) Sea Echelon. The sea echelon plan providesfor a reduction of the concentration of amphibiousships in areas near the beach. The majority ofshipping will remain in distant sea operating areasuntil called forward in accordance with establishedpriorities. In such cases, the out-of-sequencelanding of supplies and equipment will cause delaysin the established schedule and be less responsivethan for ships in close proximity to the beach.Specific provisions may be required to ensure rapid

X-8

evacuation of casualties to more distant primarycasualty receiving and treatment ships. CSSplanners consider such additional factors indeveloping their plans.

(4) Embarkation, Movement, and Rehearsal Support.Although the primary emphasis of CSS planning is todevelop a CSS system to support the LF in the amphibiousobjective area, the force must also be supported whileen route. Support required in the embarkation areas mayinclude the operation of camps and mess facilities intemporary staging areas; road maintenance may benecessary; equipment must be operated and maintained.CSS requirements while the force is en route will beprimarily provided by the Navy, but administrative andmaintenance requirements of embarked forces must beconsidered. CSS requirements during rehearsals may beextensive if a full rehearsal is conducted, and plannersmust adjust overall requirements accordingly.

(5) Landing Force Aviation. During amphibiousoperations, it is not uncommon for fixed-wing aviationelements to be located initially at airfields outsidethe landing area or later to be located at remotedistance from the remainder of the LF. A CSS detachmentdesigned to support the remote airfield operation may benecessary. Additionally, when LF aviation is to bephased ashore in the AOA, CSS requirements forengineering support and transportation will be extensive.

f. Basic Planning Considerations

(1) Selective and General Unloading. From the CSSstandpoint, the ship-to-shore movement is divided intotwo clearly distinguishable time periods:

(a) Selective Unloading. The selective unloadingperiod is primarily tactical in character and mustbe instantly responsive to the requirements of LFunits. During the early part of the ship-to-shoremovement, CSS is provided on a selective basis fromsources afloat. Movement of CSS elements to thelanding beaches or landing zones closely followsthe combat elements. As the attack progresses, CSSunits are established ashore, and support isprovided both from within the beach support areaand from sources afloat. The shore party group orteam is responsible for the initial support ofcombat units landing across the beaches.

X-9

Helicopter support teams perform a similar functionfor helicopterborne units. As the operationproceeds, the development of CSS areas inlandcommences. Balanced stocks of supplies and austeremaintenance facilities are established in theseareas as early as possible.

(b) General Unloading. Normally, generalunloading is undertaken when sufficient troops andsupplies have been landed to sustain the momentumof the attack and when areas are adequate to handlethe incoming volume of supplies. When adequateassault supplies are ashore, and the beach supportarea is organized and operating satisfactorily, theCLF recommends to the CATF that general unloadingbegin. When the order to commence generalunloading is issued, the control organization forthe initial unloading period of the ship-to-shoremovement ceases to operate but remainssubstantially intact, ready to resume selectivedischarge if required. TACLOG activity is reducedto that related to general unloading procedures.Transports are unloaded as rapidly as CSSfacilities and landing craft availability permitwithout regard to type of cargo.

(2) Beach Support Area and Combat Service Support Area.As the operation progresses and CSS units are phasedashore, the initial landing support organization isdisestablished and its functions are assumed by the LFsupport party. Beach support areas (BSAs), initiallydeveloped by the landing support elements may beconsolidated or expanded into combat service supportareas (CSSAs) to provide continued support to the LF.The need for CSSAs and their number, size, andcapabilities are situation dependent, but they areprimarily influenced by the scope and duration of theoperation.

(a) CSS detachments (CSSDs) established in CSSAsprovide support to LF organizations as prescribedby the logistics/CSS annex to the operation order.

(b) CSS areas will be primary, lucrative targetsfor the enemy. The possibility of nuclear,chemical, or biological attack against theseinstallations must be considered. The extendedrange of indirect fire weapons will place CSS areas

X-10

at risk in many situations; further, the likelihoodof small- scale attacks against CSS installationsis a distinct possibility in the amphibiousenvironment. For these reasons, specific provisionmust be made by the CLF during the planning stageto protect CSS areas.

(3) Beach/CSS Area Defense

(a) Responsibility. The CLF normally assigns themission of defending the BSA or CSSA, as a clearlydefined portion of the beachhead area, to thesenior tactical element commander ashore. Toclarify responsibility, the LF operation order willspecify the rear area security commander and thetask organization designated to perform thismission.

(b) Defensive Plan. The plan for defense of theBSA or CSSA is organized as an area defense.Within the assigned area, the rear area securityforce commander has complete responsibility forcoordinating all ground defense, including airfieldground defense of forces located therein. Detailsof the defensive plan will provide for artilleryand naval gunfire support, air and counter-mechanized defense, offshore defense, NBC defense,and defense against guerrillas and sabotage. Amobile reserve should be considered and formed fromavailable assets.

7. Landing Force Supply

a. General. The guiding principle in CSS planning for theLF is responsiveness. The limited shipping available foramphibious operations also dictates the requirement foreconomy in planning. The ability to discriminate between"must have" and "nice to have" plays a singularly importantrole in the success or failure of the LF. The types andquantities of supplies which are taken into the AOA directlyaffect the requirement for air and surface transportation.For ease of control and planning for an amphibiousoperation, requirements for supply support are stated undertwo major categories--LF supplies and resupply. See ChapterVI for a detailed discussion of LF supply categories.

X-11

b. Determination of Requirements. Overall requirements forsupply support of the LF indicate the total tonnage to bemoved into the AOA during a given period. Based on thestatement of overall requirements for supply support,general requirements for the logistics support of the LF,including requirements for assault shipping and aerialresupply, are stated to higher authority.

(1) Days of Supply. The first step in estimatingoverall requirements for supply support is to determinethe days of supply (DOS). The DOS is based on standardService planning factors and logistics planning factorsfor the operation (see paragraph 6 above). Incalculating the DOS, the requirements for each separateclass of supply are considered.

(2) Stockage Objective. The second step is tocalculate the stockage objective for each class ofsupply. In operations of limited scope, limiting thestockage objective to 30 DOS may be desirable. However,even the limited objective may not be reached until thelatter stages of the assault. The stockage objective isthe sum of the operating level plus the safety level:

(a) Operating Level of Supply. The quantities ofmateriel required to sustain operations untilarrival of resupply shipments; e.g., 15 DOS.

(b) Safety Level of Supply. The quantity ofmateriel required to be on hand to permitcontinuous operations in the event of minorinterruption of normal resupply or unpredictablefluctuations in demand; e.g., 15 DOS.

(3) Factors Influencing Stockage Objective. Theamounts and types of supplies carried in the assaultshipping must be compatible with the shipping spaceavailable and must meet the minimum requirements forsupport of the LF until termination of the amphibiousoperation. Lower stockage levels increase thelikelihood of the requirement for emergency resupply.Relying too heavily on emergency resupply instead of onadequate levels of landing force supplies increases therisk of not achieving the ATF objectives. Before thestockage objective can be finally determined, thefollowing factors must be carefully considered:

X-12

(a) Enemy Capabilities. The enemy’s capability todestroy supply installations ashore or to disruptresupply shipments at sea must be carefullyevaluated in determining the stockage objective tobe maintained in the objective area.

(b) Availability of Fixed-Wing Cargo Aircraft.The lower the stockage objective maintained in theAOA, the greater the need for a means of providingrapid emergency resupply from outside the objectivearea.

(c) Availability of Shipping and Distances Involved.This requirement is a function of

distancebetween the emergency resupply loading point andthe AOA. The greater the distance between theemergency resupply source and the objective area,the greater the time emergency resupply will take.To be effective, the emergency resupply loadingpoint is relatively close to the landing area, andshipping is readily available.

(4) Landing Force Operational Reserve Material/Mission Load Allowance (LFORM/MLA). Landing force operationalreserve material/mission load allowance (LFORM/MLA) is apackage of contingency supplies that is pre-positionedin amphibious warfare ships to reduce loading time incontingencies and is computed as a part of USMCpre-positioned war reserve materiel stocks (PWRMS). TheLFORM package comprises Classes I (packaged operationalrations), III(A) and III(W) (petroleum, oils, andlubricants), IV (field fortification material), andV(A) and V(W) (ammunition). However, other selecteditems can be included to support specific deploymentsand/or contingency operations at the discretion of theforce commander.

(5) Automated Planning Systems. Automated planningsystems, such as the Marine air-ground task force(MAGTF) lift model, may be used to calculate and refineestimates of supply requirements.

c. Supply Planning Responsibilities

(1) Based on the tactical plan for operations ashore,the CLF develops a plan of supply support. Supplysupport planning includes the levels of supply to bemaintained in the objective area for each period of the

X-13

operation, including priorities of issue. It alsocontains the type and location of supply installationsto be established ashore and the policies and proceduresfor their operation. Together, the CLF and CATF developplans for supply support of the landing force in theobjective area. These plans include the schedule forsupply buildup ashore, requirements for on-call aerialresupply, the ships and aircraft to be employed in thesupply buildup, and the types and amounts of suppliesthat are to be furnished by the Navy.

(2) The CATF and CLF responsibilities for supplysupport in subsequent phases of the operation areinterrelated as described below:

(a) Planning. The CLF determines his requirementsfor supplies to be lifted into the objective areaby all means of transportation. The CLF alsodetermines the types and quantities of supplies tobe carried ashore by LF units as prescribed loads,as well as the types and quantities to be availablefor establishing pre-positioned emergency supplies(floating dumps and prestaged helicopter-liftedsupplies) and for selective unloading. The CLFstates his requirements for supplies throughroutine supply request channels. Agencies of thesupporting establishment plan for the delivery ofsupplies directly to LF units, to embarkationpoints, or for preloading such supplies intoassault ships of the ATF, as requested by the CLF.

(b) Embarkation. Supplies are embarked inconformity with LF embarkation plans, which aredeveloped in coordination with correspondingechelons of the ATF. The CLF plans the assembly ofsupplies and equipment to be embarked, includingthe supplies and equipment of other forces forwhich the LF has embarkation responsibility. TheCATF is responsible for the determination of ship’sloading and berthing schedules, including plans forthe assembly of shipping at ports of embarkation(POE). Based on types and quantities of supplies,the requirements for resupply may then bedetermined together with their scheduled arrivaltime in the objective area.

(c) Rehearsal. Both CATF and CLF must plan foradequate stocks of consumable supplies andreplenishment of spares for equipment items damagedduring the rehearsal.

X-14

(d) Movement to the Objective Area. The CLF, incoordination with the CATF, plans the routinesupply support of units embarked aboard ATF shipsfor movement to the objective area. This normallyincludes repair parts for the support of embarkedhelicopters.

(e) Assault

1. The Plan for Landing Supplies. Incoordination with the CATF, the CLF developsplans for selective unloading of supplies inthe objective area. The CATF allocateslanding ships and craft required to carrysupplies from ship to shore and to establishfloating dumps. Together, in the plan forlanding supplies, the CLF and CATF plan theship-to-shore movement of supplies andequipment so that it is responsive to LFrequirements. TACLOGs are established toensure that responsiveness is achieved. Indeveloping the plan for landing supplies, thefollowing factors are considered:

a. Types and amounts of supplies to becarried ashore by LF units as prescribedloads. For helicopterborne units, theprescribed load normally does not exceeda one-day level of supply. The prescribedload of surface-landed units may exceedthat of the helicopterborne elements,since the former normally are equippedwith more and larger vehicles and hencepossess a greater cargo-carryingcapability.

b. Types and amounts of supplies to beestablished in floating dumps andprestaged, helicopter-lifted supplies. Asthe availability of cargo-carryinghelicopters increases, more reliance isplaced on the use of prestaged,helicopter-lifted supplies establishedaboard ships equipped with landingplatforms, thereby permitting rapidreplenishment of units by helicopter.

c. Levels of supply to be establishedashore.

X-15

d. Techniques that ensure the orderly,rapid buildup of supply levels ashore,such as:

(1) Use of landing craft and vehiclescarrying assault troops to ferrydesignated types and amounts of supplyashore on each trip.

(2) Provision for the mobile loadingof each vehicle of the LF not involvedin the lift of the assault elementsashore.

(3) Means for facilitating thetransfer of supplies fromship-to-shore, including the mostefficient use of such items aspallets, containers, cargo nets, andslings.

2. Supply Operations Ashore. During theearly stages of the attack, the ATF ships arethe primary supply source for the LF. Priorto the establishment of landing supportashore, critical supplies are furnisheddirectly to the requesting unit by the CSSelement, through the TACLOG, from amphibiousshipping. Subsequent to the establishment oflanding support units ashore, combat elementsare supplied through shore-based CSSfacilities. As the operation progresses,several widely separated supply installationsare established within the beachhead by otherCSS units of the LF. When adequate supplylevels have been attained in installationsashore and transportation means are available,supply support of LF units will be providedfrom these areas. Supply sources may beaugmented by the aerial delivery of suppliesby fixed-wing aircraft operating from basesoutside of landing area. The ships of the ATFcontinue as the primary source of immediateresupply for the LF.

(3) Supply Control and Distribution. Supply controland distribution are accomplished at both the LF leveland at the lowest levels that have an organic supplycapability; e.g., battalion. These levels are most

X-16

important within the overall function of supply,especially during the critical transition from sea-basedto shore-based supply support during an amphibiousoperation. Adherence to the following principles duringthe transitional and ashore stages of the operation willresult in a control and distribution system that isreliable, flexible, and responsive.

(a) Control. The flow of supply should be directfrom source to consumer; supplies should berehandled as infrequently as possible.

1. The control and distribution systemprovides the supplies required to meetspecific needs, but the mobility of combat andcombat support units must not be impeded by anoverburden of supplies.

2. Supply points should be dispersedthroughout the landing area to provide aresponsive and flexible system as well as toprovide passive security against enemy attack.

3. Control procedures to correlate supply anddemand should be as simple as possible.Record keeping should be uniform and simple.

4. Supplies should be safeguarded from enemyaction, weather, and waste by friendly forces.

(b) Distribution. The distribution system mayprovide either supply point distribution, whereinthe unit draws supplies from a central location, orunit distribution, wherein the supplying agencydelivers supplies to the unit. During the initialstages of the amphibious assault, unit distributionis normally required and is effected through theorganization for landing support in conjunctionwith the TACLOG and consists of delivery ofpre-positioned emergency supplies. During laterstages of the operation, as additional CSS unitsphase ashore and supplies are built up, supplypoint distribution may be employed. Combinationsof both systems will normally be needed and specialconsideration will be required for helicopterborneforces and mechanized forces.

X-17

(4) Salvage. Salvage is the term applied to materielthat has become unserviceable, lost, abandoned, ordiscarded, but which is recoverable. It includescaptured enemy equipment (see STANAG 2084). Unitcommanders at all levels are responsible for salvagecollection and evacuation within their respective unitareas. Designated salvage organizations receive andprocess salvage received from combat units. The flow ofsalvage to the rear follows two general channels:

(a) Salvage Channel. The salvage channel, orsupply channel in reverse, is used for all salvagethat can be carried or loaded into availabletransportation. Such items include small arms,rations, clothing, ammunition, and individualequipment. The flow usually follows the normalsupply channels rearward from small forward dumpsto the beach dumps.

(b) Maintenance Channel. The maintenance channelis used for heavy salvage items such as disabledtanks, artillery pieces, and trucks.

8. Engineer. The nature of engineer support for the LF inamphibious operations ranges from combat engineer support of apioneer nature for the assault units to general engineer and CSSfunctions for the LF. The normal engineer tasks (mobility,countermobility, survivability, and general engineering) areapplicable.

a. Combat Engineers. Combat engineer elements willnormally be attached to the assault infantry units toperform a variety of tasks such as engineer reconnaissance,obstacle breaching and installation, development of beachsupport areas, helicopter landing and V/STOL sitepreparation, construction of beach exits, combat trails andpioneer roads, tactical bridging, and water and bathservices.

b. General Support Engineers. General support engineerelements will normally perform specific tasks, to include:deliberate clearing of obstacles that interfere with LFoperations, vertical and horizontal construction, provisionof utilities (including potable water and mobile electricpower), installation and operation of bulk fuel systemsashore, maintenance and repair of routes of communication,topographic support, advanced airfield preparation, andbridge construction/maintenance. It is desirable for

X-18

general support engineer elements to relieve combat engineerelements of responsibilities in rear areas as early aspossible.

c. Other Tasks. All engineers may be required to providetechnical assistance in the areas of demolitions,fortifications, and camouflage. When requirements for thesetasks exceed the supported unit’s capabilities, engineersare tasked to provide technical expertise and specializedequipment; the supported unit provides manpower support.

d. Engineer Groups. In special cases, it may beappropriate to form a separate engineer group within thelanding force. This may be necessary when the scope of thetasks and comparatively limited assets can best be managedby centralized effort. Regardless of whether an engineergroup is formed, engineer units establish liaison andcoordinate efforts with supported units.

e. Naval Construction Forces. The Naval constructionforces (NCF) are the combined construction units of theNavy, including primarily the mobile construction battalionsand the amphibious construction battalions. These units arepart of the operating forces and represent the Navy’scapability for advanced base construction. (JCS Pub 1-02)

(1) Naval Mobile Construction Battalion. The Navalmobile construction battalion (NMCB) providesconstruction support to Navy, Marine Corps, and otherforces in military operations; constructs basefacilities; and conducts defensive operations asrequired by the circumstances of the deploymentsituation. The NMCB provides a major deliberateconstruction capability and is employed to providefacilities that require extensive technical control andconstruction capability. The NMCB can be employed inexpanding or constructing airfield complexes, repairingor developing ports, constructing major temporary orsemipermanent camps, extensively repairing or rebuildingprincipal bridges, and installing large-scale utilitiessystems. When naval construction forces are assigned tothe landing force, these units will normally be attachedto the CSS element. If an engineer group is formed, thenaval construction force will normally become part ofthe engineer group. The high priority of some NMCBtasks may require early introduction into the AOA.

X-19

(2) Amphibious Construction Battalion (PHIBCB). Theamphibious construction battalion provides designatedelements to CATF; supports the naval beach group duringthe initial assault and early phases of an amphibiousoperation; and assists the landing support element inoperations that do not interfere with the primarymission. Organizationally, the PHIBCB or elementsthereof will be operationally controlled by the navalbeach party under the LF support party. This unit isnot intended for prolonged field employment. Tasks arenormally of a temporary nature. (See subparagraph12d(5)(a)2 below.)

(3) NCF Planning Considerations. Engineer planningproceeds concurrently with tactical planning and otherCSS planning. The organization for engineer support isbased on the tasks to be accomplished and the priorityestablished for principal tasks. The engineer appendixto the operation plan will include priorities forconstruction, road and bridge repairs, airfielddevelopment, concept of engineer operations, and controlof class IV engineer material. Planning considerationsinclude the following:

(a) Capabilities of assigned engineer units.

(b) Requirement for new construction.

(c) Requirement for repair, maintenance, andimprovement of facilities such as ports, railroads,roads, and airfields.

(d) Requirement for the repair, rehabilitation,and operation of existing utilities systems.

(e) Announced priorities for semipermanentconstruction.

(f) Requirements for base development asestablished by higher authority.

9. Maintenance. Maintenance operations of the LF are plannedand organized to provide for the administrative and tacticalsupport of all types of LF equipment at the organizational andintermediate levels. Responsibilities for maintenance planningwithin the LF are shared by the major element commanders, theCSS organization, and the LF logistics (G/S-4) staff.

X-20

a. General. An effective maintenance plan is based on theestablishment of an austere maintenance capability withinthe AOA consistent with expected support requirements.Plans should be developed that provide for:

(1) Clearly defined maintenance capabilities,missions, and responsibilities during each phase of theamphibious operation, both afloat and ashore.

(2) Early landing of the maintenance elements ofequipment-intensive units and provision of pre-expendedcritical repair parts as mobile loaded unit supplies.

(3) Simplified maintenance request procedures and,insofar as practicable, direct delivery of support tothe requesting unit.

(4) Centralized control of maintenance support;decentralized execution of maintenance action throughmaintenance contact teams and mobile repair facilities.

(5) Equipment repairs as rapidly and as far forward asthe tactical situation and available resources allow.

(6) Coordinated employment of maintenance support withother CSS functions.

(7) Provisions for alternate channels of support.

(8) Provisions for battlefield salvage of large combatsystems or vehicles via maintenance channels.

b. Resources. Each unit of the LF accomplishesmaintenance within the limits authorized and resourcesavailable. In addition, the CSS element providesmaintenance contact teams and may establish mobile orsemimobile repair facilities ashore to provide higherlevels of maintenance support. Maintenance contact teamsprovide direct support to forward units and may assist inthe performance or organizational maintenance. They focuson the rapid repair and return to service of equipment asfar forward as possible through component replacement.Major repairs, calibration, and the repair of subassembliesand assemblies are accomplished at semimobile repairfacilities or outside the AOA.

c. Maintenance Planning Considerations

(1) Requirements and Capabilities. Units at alllevels within the LF determine maintenance requirementsand their organic capabilities to meet them.Shortfalls in

X-21

required capabilities are identified during the planningprocess, and higher and/or supporting unit headquartersare so advised. Action to correct unsatisfactoryconditions through the assignment of additionalresources or the realignment of responsibility may benecessary.

(2) Estimate of Requirements. An estimate ofmaintenance requirements includes an in-depthexamination of each of the following:

(a) Personnel, by quantity and skill level.

(b) Repair parts, both consumable and secondaryrepairable items required for operating stocks andsafety stocks.

(c) Tools and equipment, by type, quantity, andlocation.

(d) Facilities support requirements duringembarkation, movement, and rehearsal within theAOA. Includes requirements within beach supportareas and CSS areas.

(e) Requesting and reporting procedures, includingdata requirements, routing, distribution, and meansof transmission.

(f) Transportation, including lines ofcommunication, equipment recovery and salvage,maintenance contact teams, semimobile facilitiesand equipment, and distribution of repair parts andmateriels.

(g) External maintenance support units or agenciesavailable for support and their capabilities.

(3) Maintenance Facility Construction. Construction ofmaintenance facilities, their service roads, orhelicopter landing sites and the availability of routesof communication are coordinated with transportation andengineer planners.

(4) Transportation for Maintenance Requirements. Plansfor moving semimobile facilities, recovery operations,movement of maintenance contact teams, and thedistribution of repair parts are coordinated with motortransport, aviation (helicopter), and supply planners,as appropriate.

X-22

d. Control. During the initial phases of the assault,maintenance requests are submitted via the TACLOG or landingsupport elements, as appropriate. Once the CSS organizationis established ashore, maintenance requests and control areprovided through normal CSS channels.

10. Transportation

a. General. Transportation consists of movement ofpersonnel, supplies, and equipment by water, air, or surfacemeans. Requirements for transportation support are based ontwo main factors--the character of the operation to besupported and the types and quantities of supplies requiredin the objective area. Transportation tasks may includeunloading and transfer operations at beaches, ports,airfields, and CSS installations, forwarding of supplies andmateriel required by landing forces, and the scheduling andoperating of transportation means to move personnel andcargo from place to place.

b. Transportation Requirements

(1) Source of Tactical Requirements. Tacticalrequirements for transportation are derived from the CLFconcept of operations and amplified in the concept ofCSS.

(2) Requirements. Requirements for transportationsupport are normally stated in tons of supplies andequipment, gallons of fuel, or number of personnel to bemoved during a particular period and the distance to bemoved. Requirements for bulk fuel facilities, vehicles,ships, and aircraft are derived from an analysis of thepersonnel and materiel to be carried, the distancesinvolved, the terrain to be traversed in the case ofland transportation, and the means available.

(3) Overall and Detailed Requirements. Requirementsfor transportation support are classified as overall ordetailed, according to the stated purpose.

(a) During the initial planning for an operation,overall requirements for transportation support arestated to provide planning guidance with respect to:

X-23

1. The allocation of assault shipping(assault echelon and assault follow-onechelon) required to bring personnel,equipment, and supplies to the AOA and tomaintain the levels prescribed for the LF.

2. The allocation of transportation means forengineer and service support necessary tomaintain the transportation system ashore, aswell as the requirements for combat serviceunits to operate it.

(b) Detailed requirements for transportationsupport are determined concurrently as tactical andlogistic plans evolve. These detailed requirementsstate the specific numbers, types, and capacitiesof vehicles, bulk fuel facilities, and aircraftrequired at specific times and places. They alsostate the schedules of operation and routes to betraversed. Based on these requirements, plans forthe employment of engineer, maintenance, service,and control personnel can be developed. Particularconsideration must be given to the supply ofaviation fuel. Although initiating air operationsashore through the use of packaged fuel ispossible, continuing supply of aviation fuelrequires the installation of bulk fuel systems anda high-capacity mobile liquid fuel transportcapability ashore as soon as possible. Deliveringfuel ashore is a naval responsibility; however,delivering and transporting the fuel to internalfuel storage distribution areas at the airfacilities is a LF responsibility. The demarkationline between Navy and LF responsibilities for bulkPOL supply is the high water mark at the shore.

c. Transportation Planning Responsibilities

(1) Predeployment. The CLF is responsible fortransportation planning pertaining to movement oflanding forces and assault supplies to embarkationareas. The CATF schedules shipping into the embarkationareas in accordance with loading schedules developed incoordination with CLF. Embarkation plans are developedthat ensure efficient use for all available spaceconsistent with the prerequisite that ships must be ableto off load in consonance with the landing plan.

X-24

(2) Movement to the Objective Area. The CATF plans forthe movement of assault shipping to the AOA. Because ofdifferent speeds of ships and the requirement fordefense against air and surface or subsurface attack,ships carrying the LF may be divided into severalmovement groups.

(3) Commander, Amphibious Task Force, TransportationRequirements. The CATF coordinates requirements fortransportation support from outside the objective area.

(4) Transportation in the Objective Area

(a) The CLF, in coordination with the CATF, plansfor the employment of helicopters, landing craftand ships, and assault amphibians in theship-to-shore movement.

(b) The CATF provides the Navy means for theship-to-shore movement and schedules the movementof ships to support the landing plan and the planfor landing supplies and ensures that sufficientlighterage to unload it is available.

(c) Ashore, the CLF plans the balanced employmentof all means of transportation, including trucks,helicopters, assault amphibians, and the bulk fuelsystem. The CLF establishes priorities formovement and ensures adequate movement and trafficcontrol within the LF area of responsibility. Thisensures optimum utilization of transportation meansand facilities.

(d) The CSS plan makes provision for:

1. Transportation means to be landed withassault units.

2. Loads to be carried in each vehicle uponlanding.

3. The assignment of transportation units tocombat, combat support, or CSS elements of theLF.

4. Traffic control measures fortransportation means ashore

X-25

d. Planning Considerations. In addition to other logisticfactors discussed in paragraph 6 above, transportationplanning is influenced by:

(1) Adequacy of LOCs. The adequacy of the lines ofcommunication (LOC) in the AOA (roads, rail, andwaterway).

(2) Degradation of LOCs. The extent to which theavailable LOC will be degraded by weather, enemy action,and use.

(3) Bulk Fuel and Water. The extent of requirementsfor handling bulk fuel and water.

(4) Organic Assets of the Landing Force. To conservehelicopters, ground transportation is used wheneverpossible. However, the frequent shifting of combatelements and the distances to be traveled to providetheir support, coupled with an undeveloped orextensively damaged road net, may require the extensiveuse of helicopters for logistic support.

11. Medical Support. Medical service in support of the LF hasas its principal goal the maintenance of the strength of thatforce through the prevention and control of disease and therestoration to duty of as many sick and injured as possible.Casualties whose medical needs exceed the treatment capabilitiesavailable or whose periods of recovery exceed the establishedevacuation policy are stabilized and prepared for movement toother medical treatment facilities.

a. General

(1) Commander, Landing Force. The CLF identifies andconsolidates LF medical support requirements as early aspracticable in the planning phase and transmits thoserequirements to the CATF.

(2) Landing Force Capabilities. Medical serviceelements of the LF will generally include the means toestablish medical treatment facilities ashore to provide:

(a) Casualty collection, triage, and evacuation.

(b) Emergency treatment.

(c) Emergency surgery and stabilization.

X-26

(d) Temporary hospitalization.

(e) Preventive medicine.

(f) Emergency dental care.

(3) Amphibious Task Force Capabilities. Medicalservice capabilities of the ATF may vary with thecomposition of the force but will generally include, asa minimum, medical treatment facilities afloat toprovide emergency treatment, resuscitative surgery andstabilization, temporary hospitalization, and dentalcare.

(4) Primary Emphasis. Landing force medical elementsplace primary emphasis on the performance of lifesavingmeasures, resuscitation, stabilization, and promptevacuation of casualties.

(5) Hospitalization. ATF ships that have beensupplementally manned and augmented providehospitalization support during amphibious operations.

(a) The CATF designates specific ships, usuallyLHAs and LPHs, to serve as Casualty Receiving andTreatment Ships (CRTS).

(b) Other ships of the ATF may be designated toprovide medical support to the LF.

b. Medical Planning Responsibilities. The medical supportresponsibilities and medical planning responsibilities ofthe CATF and the CLF are listed in paragraph 1062 of JCS Pub3-02. The extent to which the LF must rely on medicalsupport from the ATF after embarkation, during movement, andin the assault prior to the establishment of medicaltreatment facilities ashore requires a high degree ofcoordination and cooperation between medical staffofficers. Medical planning considerations are listed inparagraph 1061 of JCS Pub 3-02. Medical service planning isas specific and detailed as possible to ensure a responsiveand coordinated medical support system. Although a widevariety of factors must be considered by the medicalplanner, the principal determinants of medical supportrequirements are the casualty estimate and the evacuationpolicy.

X-27

(1) Casualty Estimate. The casualty estimate isprepared in accordance with standard planning factorsprescribed in FM 101-10-1, "Staff Officer’s FieldManual," or in accordance with current operation plans.The estimate is normally a coordinated effort of thepersonnel and operations staffs. The LF medical officermay contribute to the estimate in such matters as thehealth of the command, diseases and disease vectors inthe AOA, and physical and psychological aspects of theplanned operation.

(2) Evacuation Policy. Command decision, indicatingthe length in days of the maximum period ofnoneffectiveness that patients may be held within thecommand for treatment. Patients who, in the opinion ofresponsible medical officers, cannot be returned to dutystatus within the period prescribed are evacuated by thefirst available means, provided the travel involved willnot aggravate their disabilities (JCS Pub 1-02).

(a) The evacuation policy for the theater ofoperations is prescribed at higher levels. Theevacuation policy for the AOA is established by theCATF in conjunction with the CLF. The evacuationpolicy provides a guide in determining whetherpatients should continue to be temporarilyhospitalized or evacuated from the AOA.

(b) The use of any specific evacuation policy forthe AOA serves only as a guide for medicalplanning. The evacuation policy must remainflexible to meet the changes in demand placed onthe limited medical treatment capability initiallyavailable in the AOA.

(c) The length of the evacuation policy has littleeffect on medical personnel requirements. The mostdemanding medical support is needed during thecasualty’s admission, initial workup, resuscitativesurgery and stabilization. This manpower-intensiveeffort is the same whether the evacuation policy is5 or 15 days.

(d) It is advantageous for the commander to beable to apply the longest practicable evacuationpolicy. This reduces demands on transportationresources for casualties and their replacements andretains as many trained and experienced personnelas possible.

X-28

(3) Support of Other Forces. In addition to themedical support requirements identified in the casualtyestimate, the medical planner must consider potentialworkload generated by attached units of other Servicesand allied forces, where appropriate; prisoners of war;and noncombatant personnel when applicable.

c. Medical Service Plan. The medical plan is published asAppendix 3 (Medical) to Annex D (Logistics/Combat ServiceSupport) to the LF plan. The appendixes provide detailedinformation on all aspects of medical support. For exampleplans, see FMFM 4, Combat Service Support, and FMFM 4-50,"Health Service Support."

d. Casualty Evacuation

(1) Responsibilities. Casualty evacuationresponsibilities during LF operations are shared by theCATF and CLF.

(a) The CATF is responsible for seaward evacuationfrom the beach and coordination of evacuation fromthe AOA by ship or air.

(b) The CLF is responsible for evacuation ofcasualties from the front lines to LF medical unitsand to beach evacuation areas.

(2) Contents of Evacuation Plan. Plans for casualtyevacuation must be well defined and widelydisseminated. These plans must include as a minimum:

(a) Identification of casualty receiving andtreatment ships (CRTS).

(b) Locations of medical treatment facilitiesashore.

(c) Communications procedures for casualtyevacuation coordination.

(d) Provisions for mass casualty evacuation.

(3) Aircraft Evacuation Preferred. As a matter ofpolicy, the preferred mode of casualty evacuation is theaircraft. The speed, range, and flexibility of aircraftserve to enhance the medical support capability of thelanding force. However, casualty evacuation plans mustnot be aircraft-dependent and must include provisionsfor maximum use of ground and surface means.

X-29

(a) CATF plans include provisions for medicalboats in support of each colored beach. If the seaechelon plan stations afloat medical treatmentfacilities in distant sea operating areas,allocation of appropriate resources for casualtymovement must be considered.

(b) LF plans include provisions for the earliestpossible landing of evacuation personnel andambulances in support of surface-landed forces andfor the pickup of casualties in helicopter-landedforces by returning aircraft.

(4) Chain of Evacuation. Casualty evacuationexperience during LF operations has demonstrated thatthere is no normal or typical chain of evacuationthrough which a casualty is moved from the place wherewounded or injured to the medical treatment facilitybest suited to meet specific treatment needs. Pastexperience in no way eliminates the need for afunctioning and coordinated chain of evacuation toenhance the casualty’s chances for survival and toeffectively employ available transportation means. Inplanning casualty evacuation, the guiding principlesinclude:

(a) Each successive echelon of care in the medicalsupport system has greater treatment capabilitythan the preceding echelon.

(b) Each casualty should move through the medicalsupport system only as far as needed to meet hisspecific treatment needs.

(c) Medical vehicles should be substituted fornonmedical vehicles at the earliest opportunity.

(d) Patient movement between medical treatmentfacilities is usually administrative in nature andcan be preplanned.

e. Medical Regulating

(1) Medical Regulating. Medical regulating is theadministrative control and coordination of patientsevacuated to treatment facilities capable of providingappropriate medical care. Medical regulating is amanagement system that ensures the best match of medicalneeds with available medical capabilities.

X-30

(2) Medical Regulating Agency

(a) The CATF, in conjunction with the CLF, isresponsible for the establishment of procedures forthe medical regulating of casualties in the AOA.The control mechanism established by the CATF isknown as the Medical Regulating Agency (MRA). TheMRA is responsible for coordinating casualtyevacuation between the medical treatment facilitiesof the LF ashore, and to and between CRTS.

(b) The MRA includes the ATF medical regulatingcontrol officer, a medical administrative officerwho controls and coordinates seaward evacuation.He is normally located on the primary control shipas a member of the Navy control organization.

(c) The primary LF representative to the MRA isthe LF medical regulating control officer, locatedashore in the CSS operations center.

(d) Functions of the MRA include:

1. Maintaining inventory of locations andavailability of operating rooms, beds, andmedical/surgical specialty teams on varioustreatment ships.

2. Maintaining inventory of locations andcapabilities of treatment facilitiesestablished ashore.

3. Directing or recommending casualtydestinations to medical evacuation vehicles.

4. Monitoring medical materiel, blood andblood products, and medical personnelreplacement requirements.

5. Consolidating patient movement requestsfor casualties requiring onward evacuation.

f. Hospitalization

(1) Initial Hospital Support. Hospitalization supportof LF operations is provided initially in ships of theATF and by medical elements of the landing force whenthey are established ashore. In either instance, the

X-31

staff and equipment of these medical treatmentfacilities limit the hospitalization mission to thetemporary holding of LF casualties. Overloading isavoided to ensure that the capability to support currentand future operations is not degraded.

(2) Follow-on Hospital Support. Follow-onhospitalization and treatment support of the landingforce is provided by Navy support elements such as fleethospital system components or hospital ships.

12. Miscellaneous Services. The requirement for other servicesassociated with CSS vary widely with the nature of theoperations. Generally, planning for these services does notdiffer significantly in the amphibious operation.Considerations that apply to several of the areas are discussedin the following paragraphs.

a. Automated Data Processing Support. The usefulness ofautomated information systems and the reliance on automateddata processing (ADP) support are such that in many casesthere is no practical manual alternative to assist thecommander in his responsibilities. ADP support for thelanding forces is categorized as tactical or administrative.

(1) Tactical ADP Support. Tactical ADP supportconsists of that automated or computerized supportprovided as an integral part of a C2 system, a weaponssystem, or such other application directly related tosupport of tactical operations.

(2) Administrative ADP Support. Administrative ADPsupport consists of that automated or computerizedsupport related to the general management, maintenance,and welfare of the personnel and materiel of the LF, andany other automated or computerized support not directlyrelated to support of tactical operations.

(3) Planning for ADP Support. ADP support, bothtactical and administrative, is a tool available toassist the commander in the accomplishment of hismission and should be considered and planned for by thecommander and his staff in all phases of an amphibiousoperation.

X-32

(4) Resources

(a) Deployable automated services centers (ASCs)provide a deployable ADP support capability for thelanding force. Deployable ASCs are normallyvan-mounted suites of computer equipment capable oftransport by air, ship, rail, or motor tractortrailer. A deployable ASC may be operated fromremote sites outside the landing area, from aboardship, or from positions ashore in the landing area.

(b) Table of equipment mini computer resourcesprovide an organic ADP support capability to thebattalion/squadron/separate company level. Thisequipment may be operated aboard ship or ashore.

(c) Navy shipboard computer equipment may beavailable on a limited basis to provide additionalADP support capability.

(5) Planning Considerations

(a) The requirement for data communications mustbe incorporated into the overall communicationssupport plan. Data communications will be subjectto the same restrictions as other forms ofcommunications, such as electronic emissionscontrol measures.

(b) The physical separation of elements of the LF,or the demands of the tactical situation, maylimit, interrupt, or preclude interconnection ofADP support resources. This is particularlyevident when elements of the LF, dependent on thesame ADP support resource, are embarked on separateshipping, and during the assault phase.

(c) The ability of the various fixed and mobileautomated service centers to interconnect with oneanother for necessary support must be determinedearly.

(6) Priorities

(a) During the planning and embarkation phases,administrative ADP support will be given precedenceover tactical ADP support. During these phases,the thrust of administrative ADP support should betoward preparation of the force for tacticaloperations.

X-33

(b) During the movement phase, relative precedenceof ADP support should be assigned on the basis ofoverall value of such support to the LF withoutregard necessarily to general category.

(c) During the rehearsal and assault phases,tactical ADP support will be given precedence overadministrative ADP support. During these phases,only minimum essential, high priority,administrative ADP support functions should beplanned.

b. Prisoners of War and Refugees

(1) General. The nature of the amphibious operationmay result in the capture of prisoners and detainment ofrefugees trapped or isolated by the maneuvering LFelements, particularly during the early stages of theassault. At this initial stage, the capability of theLF to identify, segregate, and safeguard prisoners andrefugees is minimal. Further, it is not desirable tooverburden the combat forces with theseresponsibilities. Accordingly, adequate instructionsmust be provided and training conducted in advance inorder to minimize the problem.

(2) Planning Considerations

(a) Battalions in the initial landings willdesignate prisoner of war (POW) collecting points.As soon as a landing support organization isashore, it is the responsibility of thatorganization to establish POW collecting points andto collect and evacuate prisoners of war. Militarypolice attached to the LFSP (shore party orhelicopter support team/group) carry out thisfunction.

(b) As the landing progresses, regimental andhigher POW collecting points will be established.The chain of evacuation of POW is normally from thebattalion collecting point to the divisioncollecting point to the landing force POWstockade. Intermediate collecting points areestablished only to serve as temporary detentionpoints for prisoners selected at the battalioncollecting points for further interrogation at theregimental level. They may also serve as thecollecting point for any prisoners captured byattached or supporting units operating near theregimental headquarters.

X-34

c. Base Development. Based on requirements of theinitiating authority or higher level, the CATF may assignspecific responsibilities for initiating base development orconstruction to the CLF. Such base development constructionresponsibilities as may be assigned to CLF must becoordinated with construction required to support thetactical plan. Naval or Army construction units willnormally be required for base construction purposes.Implementing instructions for these responsibilities arecontained in LF engineer plans. (See paragraph 1090 of JCSPub 3-02.)

d. Landing Support

(1) CSS Sustains the Assault. One of the prerequisitesfor success of an amphibious operation is the rapidbuildup of combat power ashore. The development ofcombat power ashore must be complemented by the buildupof CSS necessary to sustain the assault.

(2) Landing Support. Landing support is an overallterm to describe the support functions performed duringthe initial stages of the amphibious assault prior tothe arrival ashore of the normal CSS organizations. TheCLF will normally task organize an LFSP to providecritical support.

(3) Categories. Landing support is categorized by thetype of movement supported during the ship-to-shoremovement:

(a) Waterborne. The task organization to supportsurface movement is called the shore party team.It includes both landing force and Navy elements.Navy elements are called the beach party.

(b) Helicopterborne. The task organization tosupport helicopterborne movement is called thehelicopter support team. Helicopter supportteams/groups are provided by the LF.

(4) LFSP Functions. The LFSP supports the LF duringthe ship-to-shore movement by assisting in the executionof the landing plan, providing a uniform flow ofmateriel as required by units ashore, and preventingexcessive concentrations of equipment and supplies.LFSP functions include the following:

X-35

(a) Facilitate the landing and movement of troops,equipment, and supplies across beaches and intolanding zones, ports, and airfields.

(b) Assist in the evacuation of casualties andprisoners of war during the early stages of theassault.

(c) Assist in the beaching, retraction, andsalvage of landing ships, craft, and amphibiousvehicles.

(5) Sources of Landing Support. Both the Navy andMarine Corps maintain forces specifically organized,trained, and equipped to provide the nucleus for landingsupport. These organizations are the Naval Beach Groupand the Marine Corps landing support battalion,described below:

(a) Naval Beach Group and Landing Force Support Party. A naval beach group is a permanent Navyorganization consisting of a commander, his staff,and three units, a beachmaster unit, an amphibiousconstruction battalion, and an assault craft unit.The group provides the beach party, pontooncauseway teams, self-propelled pontoon barge,elements for lighterage or transfer lineoperations, warping tug teams for causeway tendingand salvage, ship-to-shore bulk fuel elements, andan underwater wire communications system fromprimary control ship to the beach. The group isalso capable of limited beach improvements requiredto facilitate the landing and evacuation ofcasualties and prisoners of war. The naval beachgroup is an administrative organization and neverfunctions as an operational unit. For operationalemployment, it is task organized to accomplishspecific tasks for the landing support element.This task organization is called a shore partyteam. The shore party element is an integral partof the LF shore party and is under operationalcontrol of the landing force support partycommander. The commander, naval beach group,retains administrative control. For additionalinformation on the naval beach group, see NWP22-5/FMFM 4-2, "The Naval Beach Group."

X-36

1. Beachmaster Unit. This unit is thenucleus around which the naval beach unit isorganized. The unit is organizedadministratively and tactically into aheadquarters and two beach parties. Eachgroup consists of a headquarters and two beachparty teams. The LF beach party headquartersprovides the control and supervision for beachparty operations. It is necessary that thebeachmaster unit be augmented with navalspecialist units before it can function as aLF beach party. The commanding officer of thebeachmaster unit is the LF beach partycommander and is under the operational controlof the LF support party commander.

2. Amphibious Construction Battalion. TheAmphibious Construction Battalion (PHIBCB) isorganized administratively into a headquarterscompany, equipment company, constructioncompany, and three pontoon companies. Foroperational employment, the companies are taskorganized based on assigned missions. Themission of the battalion is to support thebeach party during the initial assault andearly phases of the amphibious operation. Thebattalion is organized and trained to provideand operate causeways, self-propelled pontoonbarges, warping tugs, and ship-to-shore bulkfuel systems. In addition, it provides beachsalvage teams, transfer barges, and assistancein eliminating shoreline obstacles. It alsoprovides assistance in the construction ofunloading points and ramps, limitedconstruction on the beach, and general beachimprovements.

3. Assault Craft Unit (Squadron). Assaultcraft units or squadrons provide landing craftto assist in the ship-to-shore movement andcan be organized as an assault craft squadron,which is organized administratively into threeassault craft divisions, or as an assaultcraft unit, which is organized into aheadquarters and task organization tailoredfor specific operations. The squadron or unithas organic facilities for administration,operations, maintenance, boat repair, and

X-37

bivouac. Landing craft are used primarily toaugment the lighters carried in assaultshipping. In addition, specialized craft areprovided for purely naval tasks such ascauseway tenders, ship-to-shore bulk fueltransfer boats, and salvage boats.

(b) Navy Cargo Handling and Port Group.Employment of MSC or MSC-chartered shipping insupport of amphibious operations presents uniquedischarge and control problems. The Navy cargohandling and port group (NAVCHAPGRU) providesadvisers and supervisors for planning and executionof cargo handling from MSC or MSC-charteredshipping. Additional information is provided inJCS Pub 3- 02.2, "Amphibious Embarkation," and NWP22-3/FMFM 1-8, "Ship-to-Shore Movement."

(c) Sea, Air, and Land Team. The hydrographicsection of the beach party is provided by the Sea,Air, Land (SEAL) team. SEAL teams may haveassignments early in the operation with the advanceforce. They generally do not report to the beachparty until shortly after H-hour on D-day. Aftercompleting their pre-H-hour assignments, SEAL teampersonnel continue to clear obstacles from thebeach under the direction of the beach partycommander.

(d) Landing Support Battalion. The Marine Corpslanding support battalion, organic to the forceservice support group (FSSG), has the capability toprovide the nucleus of landing support forlarge-scale operations.

1. Organization. The battalion includesthree landing support companies, each capableof operating a colored beach or helicopterlanding zone during the amphibious assault.In addition, a beach and terminal operationscompany is capable of managing cargothroughput operations. The beach and terminaloperations company includes three longshoremanplatoons and an aerial delivery platoon. Thebattalion also contains a landing supportequipment company.

X-38

2. Concept of Employment. Elements of thelanding support companies of the battalion areaugmented with other elements through taskorganizations to provide the initial CSS foramphibious or helicopterborne operationsrequiring substantial CSS in excess of thesupported unit’s organic capability. Thebeach and terminal operations company isaugmented to provide for management andoperation of ports, railheads, airheads, andother cargo terminal operations, as required.

3. For additional information, see FMFM 4-3,"Landing Support Operations."

13. Organization of Landing Force Support Party

a. Organizational Factors. The LFSP is a temporary taskorganization composed of LF and Navy units. It may includeunits or detachments from the CSS, aviation, or groundcombat elements of the LF. The composition of the LFSP isdetermined by the organization and mission of the LF and theplan for landing. It is also dependent on the number ofbeaches and/or helicopter landing zones and the size of theforces that pass through the beaches and landing zones. TheLFSP is relieved by the appropriate CSS organization whenthat organization is phased ashore.

b. Structure. The LFSP organization will normally includeboth shore party and helicopter support teams in order tosupport landings by waterborne and helicopterborne units.The general organization, principles of planning, andtechniques of controlling the operation are the same forboth elements. Although the organization and structure ofan LFSP vary widely, a basic structure is depicted inFigure X-1.

c. Composition

(1) Landing Force Support Party Headquarters. The LFSPheadquarters will normally be formed when a requirementexists for more than one task-organized support element;e.g., one shore party group, and one helicopter supportgroup. The headquarters provides necessary command andcontrol capability to coordinate the separate elements.The LFSP headquarters may include a command andadministrative section, medical section, military policesection, communications section, motor transportsection, and liaison section.

X-39

Figure X-1. Organization of the Landing Force Support Party.

X-40

(2) Shore Party. The shore party is a taskorganization formed and equipped to facilitate landingand movement of waterborne troops, equipment, andsupplies and evacuation of selected casualties andprisoners of war.

(a) The shore party group provides CSS to an RLTlanding over a colored beach. It is subordinate tothe LF support party when that organization isestablished ashore.

(b) The shore party team provides CSS to a BLTlanding over a numbered beach. It is subordinateto a shore party group. Teams are consolidatedunder the group when its headquarters isestablished ashore. See Figure X-2 for typicalorganization.

(3) Beach Party. The beach party is the Navy componentof the shore party. It is made up of Navy elementspredominantly from the naval beach group.

(a) In determining the composition of the beachparty in an operation, the CLF, prior to activationof the shore party, estimates in detail the navalassistance required. He makes these requirementsknown to the CATF, who, in turn, estimates his ownrequirements for the naval component of the shoreparty. The CATF then task organizes the beachparty to satisfy both requirements.

(b) See Figure X-2 for typical composition of abeach party team within the shore party teamorganization.

(c) Landing Force Beach Party Headquarters. TheLF beach party headquarters includes a command andadministrative section and a communicationssection. Upon arrival ashore, this headquartersassumes control of all beach party group operationsthen in effect. In addition, it maintains contactwith forces afloat and maintains liaison with thetransport group commander and other appropriateNavy task component commanders. It maintains arecord of the positions of various ships and thetimes at which they are to depart and arrive fromthe sea echelon. The LF beach party commandernormally is the senior Navy line officer on the

X-41

beach. Other Navy units operating on the beach report to him for coordination and control. The LF beach party commander must perform certain duties ashore for the transport group commander without referring to the landing support commander except on an informational basis. The initially decentralized beach party operations are consolidated simultaneously with consolidation of the various shore party echelons.

Figure X-2. Shore Party Team.

X-42

(4) Helicopter Support Team. The helicoptersupport team is a task organization formed andequipped for employment in a LZ to facilitatelanding and movement of helicopterborne troops,equipment, and supplies and evacuation of selectedcasualties and prisoners of war. The helicoptersupport team is initially a part of thehelicopterborne troop unit which it is designed tosupport. It performs functions within a LZ thatare similar to, and parallel to those accomplishedby the shore party in the beach support area.

(a) A helicopter support team (HST) supportsa BLT, and a helicopter support group supportsan RLT or similar size organization. There isno standard organization for the team. Thenucleus for the team may come from thetactical ground unit or a landing supportcompany. Normally, when a CSS buildup isplanned in the vicinity of the LZ, the nucleusof the HST is drawn from the landing supportcompany. With no buildup planned, the nucleuscomes from the service elements of thehelicopterborne unit. The initial helicopterterminal guidance for the early assault wavesmay be provided by reconnaissance units, ifrequired. The HST normally consists of anadvance party, headquarters, helicoptercontrol element, and LZ platoon as shown inFigure X-3.

(b) For additional information on helicoptersupport operations, see FMFM 6-21, "TacticalFundamentals for Helicopterborne Operations."

(5) Ships’ Platoons. When replacement draft personnelare available, they are assigned to ships’ platoons forthose amphibious ships carrying supplies and equipmentnot organic to organized units. When replacement draftpersonnel are not available or the ships contain onlysupplies and equipment organic to the embarked unit orunits, the ships’ platoons are formed from availableassets and trained to load and unload shipping assignedto the LF. When they have completed unloading theirships at the objective area, they are available forreassignment. Replacement draft personnel may beassigned to unload assault follow-on shipping, utilizedto assist in beach support areas, or released as

X-43

Figure X-3. Helicopter Support Team.

X-44

replacements for tactical units. Personnel fromembarkation teams revert to their parent unit. Inoperations of short duration involving back loading, thesame ships’ platoons will be utilized for back loadingwhen possible.

d. Planning Considerations

(1) Considerations. Many considerations affectaccomplishment of the landing support mission. Thesefactors are carefully considered in landing supportplanning. The principal considerations include:

(a) Early detailed analysis of the landing area.

(b) Detailed planning for organization of beachsupport areas and LZ support areas.

(c) Combat loading of each assault ship.

(d) Employment of the sea echelon.

(e) Adequate communications between tacticalunits, control elements, and landing supportelements.

(f) Defense requirements of BSAs and landing areas.

(g) Composition of the assault echelon (AE) andassault follow-on echelon (AFOE).

(h) Enemy activity and installations in theobjective area.

(i) Scheme of maneuver and landing plan of the LF.

(j) Hydrographic conditions off the beaches andterrain inland from the beaches to include LZs.

(k) Plans after seizure of the force beachheadline.

(l) Quantity and types of supplies to be landedfrom assault shipping.

(m) Availability of personnel, supplies, andequipment for shore party operations.

(n) Plans required for handling prisoners of war.

X-45

(o) Casualty evacuation and disaster recoveryplans.

(p) Concept of CSS.

(2) Landing Force Support Party Plan. The LFSP plan isthe formal statement of the CLF that providesinformation and instructions required by the shore partyor helicopter support team commanders to implement thecommander’s decision and concept of operations for aspecific mission. It is normally published as anappendix to the logistics/CSS annex.

(3) Command Relationships. Command of the LFSP is afunction of the CLF. When directed by the CATF, thoseelements of the naval beach groups designated to formthe beach party report to the CLF for planning of theoperation. The CLF will direct the LFSP commander (orother subordinate commanders when appropriate) toconduct the planning. Operational control of the beachparty elements may be passed to the CLF at this time, orlater, as the CATF may direct. Naval beach partycommanders, as subordinates of the appropriate LFSPcommanders, retain command of the Navy elements ashoreat all times.

(4) Employment. The responsibility for embarking andlanding the landing support units rests with thetactical unit supported; for this reason, the landingsupport units are attached to the tactical unitsupported for embarkation and landing purposes only.The buildup of the LF support party ashore parallels thetactical buildup ashore. Landing support operationsbegin with the landing of the advance parties andcontinue until the operation is completed or until theparties are relieved. Throughout the operation, thelanding support task organization changes as required tomeet the situation until the operation is terminated orthe LF support party is relieved of its responsibilitiesby the CSS element commander. The operation of shoreparty and helicopter support is described below ingeneral terms:

(a) Shore Party Team Operations. The pattern ofshore party team operations varies with eachoperation according to the plan for landing and thescheme of maneuver ashore. The shore party teamadvance party, including the shore party and beach

X-46

party team commanders, is the first service supportelement ashore. It reconnoiters the beach and roadnet and verifies tentatively selected sites forvarious beach installations. A communicationssection establishes contact with the appropriateTACLOG and with the shore party liaison personnelat BLT headquarters. The command section marks thebeach center and flanks and begins development ofthe BSA. During this initial stage, the shoreparty team organizes the BSA, establishescommunications, and locates dump sites inland fromthe beaches. It is important that congestion beavoided at this time when only troops and equipmentare moving across the beach. Unloading operationsare selective and limited to high prioritymateriel. Support operations are decentralized.The primary source of CSS for tactical elements isaboard ship. Only those service and support unitsthat operate in direct support of combat units arelanded before suitable CSS operations areas areuncovered and secured. At this time, the primaryoperation on the beach is the preparation andmaintenance of beaching points and access roads.Operations of CSS elements in the BSA are directedby the shore party team commander. He allocatesareas to all units in the BSA and coordinates localdefense and security. Shore party team personnelunload, segregate, store, safeguard, and issuesupplies as they are brought ashore. Facilitiesfor limited repairs to equipment are established.Evacuation stations are set up on the beach and inthe BSA. As the tactical situation develops andadditional shore party equipment, personnel, andsupplies are landed, minimum preplanned levels ofsupply are established ashore. Shore party teamoperations are then centralized under a shore partygroup. Consolidation of control usually does notinvolve physical consolidation of CSS installations.

(b) Helicopter Support Team Operations. HSToperations ashore parallel those of the shore partyteam. The advance party lands early, makes itsreconnaissance for the CSS installations,establishes the HST advance command post, andplaces unloading point markers identifying theappropriate landing sites. These markers are thesame as those used by the shore party taskorganizations. They indicate where the various

X-47

categories of supplies are landed and from wherecasualties are evacuated. Communications areestablished as soon as possible between the HST inthe LZ, the TACLOG aboard the helicopter transportship, the tactical unit being supported, thehelicopter units subsequently arriving in the LZand in adjacent LZs, and the LF support partycommander. Emergency supplies and troop serialsrequired out of sequence are requested by thetactical unit through the HST commander. However,the overall complexity of helicopterborne movementrequires that changes to the assault schedule bekept to an absolute minimum.

X-48

CHAPTER XI

EMBARKATION AND DEPLOYMENT PLANNING

1. Introduction

a. General. In amphibious operations, the embarkationphase is the period during which the forces, with theirequipment and supplies, are embarked in the assignedshipping. The modern large-scale amphibious operation willinvolve deployment of the landing force (LF) from variousseparate locations and will require both airlift and sealiftsupport. Thus, the commander, landing force (CLF) isconcerned with the broader aspects of planning thedeployment of his entire force into the theater ofoperations. This section discusses principles applicable toboth sealift and airlift.

b. Embarkation Phase. The embarkation phase encompassesthe orderly assembly of personnel and materiel and theirsubsequent loading aboard ships and/or aircraft in asequence designed to meet the requirements of the LF conceptof operations ashore. (See Chapter VI, subparagraph 5b(2).)

c. Developments Affecting Embarkation Planning. Ongoingdevelopments and improved techniques for projection ofcombat power ashore and the subsequent support of the LFthrough enhanced mobility and sustainability systems requirecontinued emphasis on flexible and responsive embarkationplanning. Examples of such developments are: sea echelonconcept, amphibious assault ship modernization, LCAC,maritime pre-positioning, and logistics over the shoretechniques.

2. Purpose and Scope. This section provides general guidanceon embarkation and deployment planning for movement by sea andby air from the perspective of the CLF. The majority of thesection is devoted to embarkation planning for sealift. Thismaterial parallels and complements Chapter 12 of JCS Pub 3-02.For additional information, consult the following references:

a. JCS Pub 3-02.2, "Joint Amphibious Embarkation."

b. ATP 39, "Amphibious Embarkation."

c. FMFM 4-6/AFR 76-6/FM 55-12/OPNAVINST 4630.27, "Movementof Units in Air Force Aircraft."

XI-1

3. General

a. Deployment Planning. General plans for deployment maybe contained in various operation plans or contingency plansprepared in accordance with the Joint Operations PlanningSystem (JOPS). These theater-level plans are validated andrefined during the planning stage of the operation inaccordance with JOPS procedures. From the LF perspective,deployment planning includes the following actions:

(1) Determination of total lift requirements fortroops, equipment, and supplies.

(2) Determination of lift availability by type(airlift, amphibious shipping, and MSC shipping).

(3) Determination of staging bases, airfields, roads,railroads, and other facilities available for thedeployment.

(4) Organization of LF troops, equipment, and suppliesinto temporary organizations for embarkation, movement,and unloading/landing.

b. Echelonment of Forces

(1) Under ideal conditions, the CLF would reach theamphibious operations area (AOA) with the preponderanceof his force embarked aboard amphibious assaultshipping. LF fixed-wing tactical aviation would deployinto air bases within striking distance of the objectivearea. This ideal situation; however, is unlikely toexist except for relatively small-scale operations.Therefore, in the majority of amphibious assaults, theforces that must be projected onto a hostile shore andsustained in battle for an extended duration willrequire significant strategic and tactical airlift andsealift. Further, the amphibious task force (ATF), inmany cases, will be in competition for limitedtransportation resources with other forces during thedeployment.

(2) During deployment planning, decisions are reachedto provide for a time-phased echelonment of troops,equipment, and supplies into the objective area.Echelonment is required not only because of the limitedavailability of airlift and sealift but also for controlpurposes to ensure both the orderly buildup of forces

XI-2

ashore and their sustainment. Normally, four separatetransportation echelons are required for the amphibiousassault: assault echelon (AE), assault follow-on echelon(AFOE), and follow-up.

(a) The assault echelon (AE) of the LF consists ofthose assault troops, vehicles, aircraft,equipment, and supplies required to initiate theassault landing. The AE includes the elements thatarrive in the AOA on or, in some cases, prior toD-day aboard amphibious assault shipping;air-transported units such as airborne forces thatare scheduled for the initial assault; andself-deploying aircraft and air- transportedsupport units required for the initial assault.

(b) The assault follow-on echelon (AFOE) isrequired to support and sustain the assault. Inorder to accomplish its purpose, the AFOE isnormally required in the objective area no laterthan 5 days after commencement of the assaultlanding. Shipping assigned to the commander,amphibious task force (CATF) is called assaultshipping. When sufficient amphibious assaultshipping is not available, a portion or all of theAFOE may be transported in MSC or commercialshipping. AFOE shipping may arrive on a timeschedule, with some elements required as early asD-day, or remain in a specified operating areauntil called forward by the CATF as requested bythe CLF.

(c) Follow-up personnel, equipment, and suppliesmay be transported by sealift or airlift. Thisechelon provides the logistics pipeline to sustainthe LF. In addition, the follow-up echelon mayprovide forces for base development and tacticalforces for subsequent operations ashore. Follow-upforces and the ships carrying these forces are nota part of the ATF.

c. Deployment Decisionmaking Process

(1) The initiating directive will normally contain alisting of forces assigned, including transportationassets for sealifted forces. The initial task of theCLF is to compare, in gross terms, what must be liftedwith the lift capacity of the transportation assets

XI-3

allocated. The initial, notional lift requirements arecontinuously refined to develop the detailed actual liftrequirements of the forces involved. This process isconducted in coordination with other staff agenciesuntil the detail required to complete deploymentplanning has been developed.

(2) The process of determining which forces, supplies,or equipment are to move with a particular echelon isnormally in a constant state of change and does not lenditself to a formal estimating process. For that reason,there is no formally established deployment estimate.However, with automated support, the CLF can assess liftrequirements for various mixes of the forces consideredfor deployment.

(3) No formally established procedures serve to assistthe CLF in determining which units, supplies, andequipment are to be moved in a specific echelon. Thedecisions are normally dictated by operationalconsiderations or orders. For example, the enemysituation may demand the early landing of mechanizedcombined arms task forces in strength or earlyestablishment ashore of the LF aviation element.

(4) CLF’s primary concern in most cases will be toplace maximum combat power in the amphibious shipping ofthe assault echelon, together with adequate CSS andsupplies to sustain the LF during the initial stages ofthe assault pending the arrival of the AFOE. Whenshipping is limited, commanders at all levels must makedifficult choices of what to take, what to leave behind,and what to assign to each echelon. There are noabsolute truths in the selection process since eachsituation differs. The following examples illustratethe types of decisions that may be required:

(a) Units embarked in the assault echelon need notembark with their full complement of equipment.For example, BLTs may not require all their galleyequipment for the assault. The same may be said ofother organizations, including higher headquarters.

(b) The LFSP may be the only portion of the CSSelement embarked in the assault echelon andavailable for support until arrival and unloadingof the assault follow-on echelon. Its taskorganization must be carefully received to ensurethat the required capabilities are present.

XI-4

(c) In terms of supply, priority is normally givenaboard AE shipping to petroleum, ammunition, andmedical items (Classes III(W) and III(A), V(W) andV(A), and VIII).

d. DOD Transportation Agencies. Several DOD transportationagencies may influence the movement of amphibious assaultforces from their CONUS bases to the amphibious objectivearea.

(1) Joint Transportation Board. The JointTransportation Board (JTB) exercises cognizance over allDOD transportation assets and is made up of flagofficers from the Joint Staff and each militaryService. The Deputy Director for Logistics (StrategicMobility), Joint Staff, is the chairman. The JTBmaintains cognizance over the existing and forecastedrequirements and capabilities of all movement modes.Problems and conflicts that cannot be resolved byUSCINCTRANS are brought to the JTB for resolution.

(2) US Transportation Command. USTRANSCOM is theagency responsible for the management and coordinationof the strategic transportation assets. Figure XI-1reflects the organization of USTRANSCOM.

(a) USCINCTRANS. The commander of the unifiedcommand who support CINCs with strategictransportation. USCINCTRANS:

1. Provides common user military and civilianairlift, sealift, terminal services andin-land transportation through his componentsfor deployment, employment, and sustainment ofUS forces on a global basis.

U. S. TRANSPORTATION COMMAND

MILITARY MILITARY TRANSPORTATION MILITARYSEALIFT MANAGEMENT COMMAND AIRLIFTCOMMAND COMMAND

Figure XI-1, Organization of USTRANSCOM.

XI-5

2. Is responsible for the transportationaspects of worldwide mobility planning,including refinement, administration, andoperation of the joint deployment system (JDS).

3. Is responsible for the development andrefinement of joint transportation proceduresand directives, and participates in therefinement of time-phased force and deploymentdata (TPFDD).

4. Provides deployment data to the NCA, JointChiefs of Staff, and supported and supportingcommands and agencies.

5. Participates in transportation allocationdecisions.

(b) Military Sealift Command. MSC, atransportation component command of USTRANSCOM, isthe Executive Director for Ocean Transportation(Sealift). The MSC force consists of threesubsets: common ocean transportation, Naval FleetAuxiliary Force (NFAF), and mobility supportforce. The NFAF and mobility support force shipsare manned, in large part, by US Government civilservice mariners. The detailed supportrelationship between amphibious forces and the MSCis outlined in Chapter 12 of NWP 22-8/FMFM 1-15,"MSC Support of Amphibious Operations"; NWP 80,"Strategic Sealift Planning and Operations Doctrineof the U. S. Navy"; and Chapter 13 of JCS Pub3-02.2, "Joint Amphibious Embarkation." MSC’sfunctions and responsibilities include:

1. Monitoring the readiness of sealift shipsof the Ready Reserve Force (RRF) that areunder the care and custody of the MaritimeAdministration (MARAD).

2. Planning for sealift for the Joint Chiefsof Staff, the CINCs, and other members of theJDC.

3. Ensuring that prescribed emergencyreadiness standards are maintained throughoutthe sealift forces by providing oversight ofoperational material and command and control(C2) functions.

XI-6

4. Providing program and budget requirementsfor strategic sealift and associatedenhancement programs.

(c) Military Transportation Management Command.The Military Transportation Management Command(MTMC), a transportation component command ofUSTRANSCOM, is the single manager operating agencyfor military traffic, land transportation, andcommon-user ocean terminals. MTMC provides trafficmanagement services and internodal containermanagement. MTMC also operates in CONUS andoperates overseas ocean terminals under agreementswith appropriate overseas commanders. MTMCfunctions and responsibilities include:

1. Planning for Joint Chiefs of Staff, CINCsand other members of the JDC for strategicmobility, contingency and deployment plans,and other military operations, as required,including sustainment of theater logistics.

2. Managing traffic of DOD passengers andfreight in CONUS; of the CONUS portion of DODinternational passenger, air cargo, andfreight movements; of sealift passengerbooking and port calls for DOD components.

3. Being the sole negotiator with for-hiretransportation carriers or their associationson rates and other matters incidental to DODfreight traffic in CONUS.

4. Single point of contact for thecontracting of commercial stevedore, relatedterminal services and union labor matters.

5. Planning for efficient use and control ofmilitary-owned and commercial surfacetransportation resources that have been madeavailable to DOD under mobilization or otheremergency conditions.

6. As directed by the Secretary of Defense,controlling the use of military-owned CONUSland transportation resources required tosupplement the capability of commercialtransportation carriers.

XI-7

7. Controlling and directing the operationsof military-owned railway rolling stockregistered for interchange service other thanthat permanently assigned to intra-base orintra-plant operations, including supplyaccountability and maintenance of the DefenseFreight Railway Interchange Fleet.

8. Planning, programming, scheduling, andmanaging the flow of CONUS-originatedpassenger movements to and through air orocean terminals between inland CONUS points.

9. Developing, administering, and maintainingtransportation security procedures for thecommercial movement of classified material andsensitive conventional arms, ammunition, andexplosives.

(d) Military Airlift Command. Military AirliftCommand (MAC), a transportation component commandof USTRANSCOM, is the single manager operatingagency for Airlift Service. MAC’s functions andresponsibilities include:

1. Organizing, training, equipping,providing, and sustaining operationally readyforces for the unified and specified commands.

2. Providing common-user, strategic airliftcapability to deploy, employ, and sustain USforces on a worldwide basis during wartime,JCS exercises, and unit moves, including MACaerial port terminal services.

3. Maintaining a worldwide C2 system todirect, coordinate, and monitor airliftdeployment.

4. Providing airlift planning support to theCATF and CLF.

5. Supporting unit airlift moves.

(3) Transportation Operating Agencies. MSC, MTMC, andMAC are known collectively as the transportationoperating agencies (TOAs).

XI-8

4. Sealift Planning Considerations. The guiding principle ofembarkation planning is to embark the LF in such a way as toaccommodate the concept of operations ashore. Each operationpresents a unique set of embarkation requirements. Theembarkation plan for each operation will provide for loadingarrangements and an organizational structure that arespecifically tailored to support the operation.

a. Basic Considerations

(1) Types of Loading. The manner in which a ship isloaded determines the availability of troops for landingand the order in which equipment and supplies will beunloaded. Task forces are seldom alike; equipment andsupplies differ, and the priority in which materiel isrequired ashore varies with the assigned mission. Thesefactors require detailed study to determine the bestmanner of loading to support the operation. There aretwo general methods of loading amphibious ships:administrative loading and combat loading.

(a) Administrative Loading. Administrativeloading is a loading system that gives primaryconsideration to achieving maximal utilization oftroop and cargo space without regard to tacticalconsiderations. Equipment and supplies must beunloaded and sorted before they can be used (JCSPub 1-02). Administrative loading is generallylimited to nontactical movements. Inadministrative loading, commodity or selectiveloading may be employed.

1. Commodity Loading. Commodity loading is amethod of loading in which various types ofcargo are loaded together, such as ammunition,rations, or boxed vehicles, in order that eachcommodity can be discharged without disturbingthe others (JCS Pub 1-02).

2 Selective Loading. Selective loading isthe arrangement and stowage of equipment andsupplies aboard ship in a manner designed tofacilitate issues to units (JCS Pub 1-02).

(b) Combat Loading. Combat loading gives primaryconsideration to the facility with which troops,equipment, and supplies can be unloaded, ready forcombat on landing, rather than to the economical

XI-9

use of ships’ space. Insofar as possible, eachship is loaded to enhance flexibility, to supporttactical plans in the most effective manner, and tofacilitate discharge of cargo to meet emergencycalls for equipment or supplies. Three types ofcombat loading may be employed, depending on themission, organization, types of equipment assignedto the force (including ships), and the plannedtactical employment of the force:

1. Combat unit loading is the method by whichall or part of a combat unit, such as anassault battalion landing team, is completelyloaded in a single ship, with essential combatequipment and supplies, in such a manner as tobe immediately available to support thetactical plan upon debarkation. Combat unitloading provides maximum flexibility to meetpossible changes in the tactical plan and isthe most common type of combat loading inembarkation load planning.

2. Organizational combat loading is themethod by which a unit with its equipment andinitial supplies is loaded into a single shiptogether with other units in order to beavailable for unloading in a predeterminedorder. Combat organizational loading differsfrom combat unit loading in that it providesmore economical use of this ship’s space. Itpermits debarkation of complete units inaccordance with the assigned priority, but isless responsive to tactical requirements.

3. Combat spread loading is one method bywhich desired dispersion of troops, equipment,and supplies among various ships is achieved.A troop organization is loaded on two or moreships. This method is commonly used to loadorganizations equipped with numerous vehiclesand/or large amounts of heavy equipment. Byloading critical combat support units such asartillery and armor in this fashion, thelanding force’s tactical capability is lessvulnerable in the event of the loss ordiversion of a single ship. Combat spreadloading also contributes to achieving a morerapid buildup ashore.

XI-10

(2) Methods of Stowage. Stowage is the method ofplacing cargo into a single hold or compartment of aship to prevent damage or shifting. There are severalmethods by which equipment, supplies, and materialsrequired in an amphibious operation are stowed. Thesemethods are designed to afford rapid and selectiveaccess to cargo in support of landing forcerequirements. Normally, a combination of stowagemethods could be used in combat loading a single ship.

(a) Horizontal Stowage

1. When used in relation to a single ship,the term horizontal stowage means the fore andaft distribution of equipment and supplies sothat similar items can be simultaneouslyunloaded from two or more holds.

2. When the term is applied to a single hold,it means the distribution of like items inhorizontal layers throughout the hold.Horizontal stowage within a single holdpermits the best discharge rate of like itemsand normally results in better use of space.However, it limits selectivity of discharge.

(b) Vertical Stowage. Vertical stowage of unitequipment or a given class of supplies is a methodof stowage within a single compartment by which theitems are continually accessible for unloading, andthe unloading can be completed without priorunloading of other cargo. Like items are availableat any stage of the unloading. Vertical stowage isemphasized in combat loading because it providesmaximum selectivity of supplies and materiel.

(c) Block Stowage. Block stowage is a methodwhereby an assortment of equipment or supplies ismade up and loaded together. In this manner, abalanced proportion of the entire cargo may bedischarged without disturbing the remainder of thecargo. Equipment, materiel, and supplies to beoffloaded as pre-positioned emergency supplies arenormally loaded aboard ship as blocks.

(3) Organization for Embarkation. The organization forembarkation consists of a temporary task organizationestablished by the CLF and a parallel temporaryorganization of Navy forces established by the CATF.

XI-11

These task groupings are formed to simplify planning andto facilitate planning and execution of embarkation atall levels of command. No standard troop or Navyorganization is applicable to all embarkationsituations. For this reason, the organization forembarkation conforms to the circumstances of thedeployment and to the requirements of the expectedtactical situation. Upon completion of the embarkationphase, these task organizations dissolve.

(a) Amphibious Task Force Organization for Embarkation. Assault shipping assigned to transport the LFto the AOA is formed into tactical groupings by theCATF. The number and types of ships assigned toeach of these groupings is determined by the sizeand composition of the corresponding echelon of theLF organization for embarkation.

(b) Landing Force Organization for Embarkation.The LF organization for embarkation is composed ofembarkation groups, units, elements, and teams.Formation of the various embarkation echelonsdepends on the degree of decentralization necessaryto coordinate and control the embarkation phase.The embarkation group and embarkation teams arealways formed, since these organizations representthe essential ingredients for embarkation. Thatis, the group is the major troop organization andthe team is the smallest subordinate echeloncapable of planning and executing embarkation. Theembarkation unit is usually formed to bridge thegap between the group and team echelons. Theembarkation element is organized when a complexsituation requires additional echelons for controlin planning and execution of embarkation, timedifferences in the embarkation of units, or ageographic difference in location of embarkationareas for units of the LF.

(c) Parallel Organizations. Correspondingembarkation echelons are formed within the landingforce and Navy organizations. (See Figure XI-2.)

1. The embarkation group is the highestechelon in the organization for embarkation.The embarkation group is normally formedaround a major subdivision of the LF

XI-12

(division, wing, Marine expeditionary brigade(MEB) as the forward element of a Marineexpeditionary force (MEF)). It consists oftwo or more embarkation units, elements, orteams as appropriate. The parallel Navyechelon is called the transport group.

2. The embarkation unit is the nextsubordinate embarkation echelon below theembarkation group level. It consists of twoor more embarkation elements when formed ortwo or more embarkation teams when elementsare not formed. The number of embarkationunits formed will vary, depending primarily onthe LF organization for landing and geographiclocations of the embarkation areas and of thetroop units. When a division makes up theembarkation group, an embarkation unit willusually be built around each major groundcombat organization (regiment or comparableorganization), one for ground combat supportorganizations such as artillery, and one forCSS organizations. The parallel Navy echelonis called the transport unit.

3. The embarkation element, when formed, isthe next subordinate echelon below theembarkation unit. Its characteristicsparallel those of the embarkation unit exceptthat its nucleus is normally the next lowerechelon in the operational chain of command.The embarkation element consists of two ormore embarkation teams grouped to conform tothe organization for landing. The parallelNavy echelon is called the transport element.The transport element is formed when thenumber of ships in a transport unit is greaterthan can be properly controlled by a singlecommander.

4. The embarkation team is a temporaryadministrative formation of all personnel withsupplies and equipment embarking or to beembarked (combat loaded) aboard one ship.(JCS Pub 1-02). The parallel Navyorganization is the ship.

XI-13

Landing Forces Organization Navy Organization

for Embarkation for Embarkation

Embarkation Team Ship

Embarkation Element Transportation Ship

(two or more teams) Element

Embarkation Unit Transportation Ship

(two or more elements) Unit

Embarkation Group Transportation Ship

(two or more units) Group

Figure XI-2. Parallel Navy and Landing ForceOrganization for Embarkation

(4) Embarkation Training and Readiness. For a detaileddiscussion of related information, see JCS Pub 3-02.2,"Joint Amphibious Embarkation."

b. Special Considerations

(1) Sea Echelon. A decision to employ the sea echelonconcept will introduce additional considerations in theembarkation planning process. When the sea echelon isemployed, ships will be phased into unloading areas in

XI-14

proper sequence to support the landing plan. If thetroops, equipment, and supplies are not correctlyembarked to correspond with the phased entry of shipsduring the ship-to-shore movement, the results mayinclude inadequate logistics support, disruption of theplanned sequence, or unacceptable concentration ofshipping.

(2) Seabasing. In amphibious operations of limitedscope, logistics support for the LF may be provided fromamphibious task force shipping, with minimal buildup ofCSS ashore. Seabasing will influence embarkationplanning in such areas as the need for adequatepermanent work spaces for LF staffs and maintenanceoperations, and the need for accessibility to certainclasses of supply (II, VII, VIII, and IX).

(a) The transition from a seabase supporting modeto a conventional mode may be made at any timeafter completion of the initial assault. From anembarkation point of view, seabasing of supply,medical, and maintenance functions requires thatthe embarked configuration be structured to performthese functions for the duration of operations, ifrequired.

(b) Balanced capability to perform CSS functionssuch as supply, maintenance, medical, and otherservices may be needed on more ships of the taskforce than would otherwise be necessary.

(3) Ships’ Loading Characteristics Pamphlet. Ships’Loading Characteristics Pamphlets (SLCPs) are preparedby the Navy for each amphibious ship and by MSC forMSC-provided ships. The format and contents of the SLCPare illustrated in Appendix B of JCS Pub 3-02.2. Thepamphlet contains all ship’s data required by the LF forembarkation planning. The diagrams and capacity totalsin the pamphlet show the accommodations and cargo spacefor each ship. Each SLCP includes:

(a) A listing of the general transportcharacteristics of the ship, including principalcharacteristics, troop accommodations, landingcraft, and such other information as may beappropriate under this listing. Pamphlets forlarge ships such as LHA, LKA, LPH, LPD, and LSDalso include an inboard profile of the ship, to

XI-15

approximate scale, showing the relative location ofcompartments and cargo holds, and a plan viewshowing debarkation stations and location oflanding craft.

(b) Troop berthing diagrams, in approximate scale,showing troop officer and enlisted berthing spaceswith the number of bunks in each berthing space.

(c) Troop cargo space diagrams, drawn to scale,showing information on square footage of deckspace, hatches, locations of stanchions and otherobstructions or irregularities, overall dimensions,and indicating the bale cubic capacity andclearance under frames and hatch coamings. If thecompartment is fitted for the stowage of specialcargo such as gasoline, ammunition, pyrotechnics,or vehicles, such information is included.

(4) Military Sealift Command. MSC ships are used inboth peacetime and wartime for large scale troop andcargo movements.

(a) MSC ships are US naval vessels and areincluded in the official "List of Naval Vessels.’There are two types: "in commission" (black stack)and "in service" (blue and gold stripes on stack)ships. In commission ships are manned by Navypersonnel. In service ships are manned by eithercivil service personnel or by commercial shippingcompanies. In commission ships carry the prefixUnited States Ship (USS); in service ships carrythe prefix United States Naval Ship (USNS). Inaddition and when necessary, MSC can chartercommercial ships for particular missions or periodsof time. (For additional information on theMilitary Sealift Command, refer to NWP 22-8/FMFM1-15, "MSC Support of Amphibious Operations.")

(b) MSC ships differ from the Navy’s amphibiousships primarily in that they are intended for theadministrative rather than tactical movement of menand materiel. Because of this fundamentaldifference, MSC ships must undergo certainmodifications to outfit them for amphibiousoperations. Also, MSC ships’ organizations andoperations differ from those of amphibious ships.Loading procedures, tables, and reports vary. (Foradditional information, refer to JCS Pub 3-02.2.)

XI-16

(5) Command Relationships

(a) Commanding Officer of a Ship. The highestauthority aboard ship is the commanding officer ofthe vessel. All personnel aboard ship, includingembarked troops, are subject to his orders. Allorders from the commanding officer of the ship toembarked troops, so far as practicable, will betransmitted through the commanding officer oftroops. Regulations governing troop life aboardship, as promulgated by the commanding officer ofthe ship, usually are contained in ship’sregulations for embarked units. These regulationsnormally contain information on command relationships, discipline of embarked troops, security,embarkation, debarkation, messing, berthing,uniform requirements, emergency drills, ship’splatoon and other work details, ammunition andhazardous material handling, and general troopadministration.

(b) Commanding Officer of Troops. The seniortroop commander of each organization embarked on atransport is usually designated by higher authorityas the commanding officer of troops (CO of troops)and is responsible for the discipline andefficiency of his command. The CO of troops willmake necessary arrangements with the commandingofficer of the ship relative to embarkation,including assignment of embarked troop spaces,berthing spaces, messing, and other administrativematters.

(6) Embarkation Officers. Officers specially trainedin the techniques of planning and supervising shiploading for an amphibious operation are assigned to LForganizations, to major amphibious ships, and to navalstaffs involved in embarkation. In the trooporganization, such officers are entitled embarkationofficers and serve as special staff officers in theheadquarters in which they are assigned. In the navalorganization, Marines assigned to a ship for thispurpose are entitled combat cargo officers (CCOs). TheNavy officer aboard ships without a Marine CCO assignedwith whom the troop embarkation officer works is theship’s first lieutenant. The troop embarkation officersand ship’s combat cargo officers or first lieutenantsadvise and assist their respective commanders in

XI-17

planning the embarkation and supervising its execution.The embarkation officers and combat cargo officers orship’s first lieutenants of corresponding troop andnaval organizations maintain liaison during theembarkation.

5. Embarkation for Sealift. Amphibious operations aredependent on the rapid, orderly projection of combat powerashore. Amphibious shipping is specifically designed to providethis capability; however, the key to effective employment ofamphibious shipping is proper embarkation of the LF. Theembarkation plan is designed to ensure optimum use of amphibiousshipping to support the commander’s concept of operationsashore, to provide flexibility to execute alternate plans ifnecessary, and to facilitate responsiveness to opportunitiesthat arise during the assault. The development of the sealiftembarkation plan epitomizes the detailed, parallel, andconcurrent nature of amphibious planning.

6. Principles of Embarkation Planning. The following fourprinciples must be observed in planning embarkation of the LFfor an amphibious assault:

a. Support Concept of Operations. Embarkation plans mustsupport the plan for landing, scheme of maneuver ashore, andthe plan for landing supplies. Personnel, equipment, andsupplies must be loaded in such a manner that they can beunloaded at the time and in the sequence required to supportoperations ashore.

b. Unit Self-Sufficiency. Embarkation plans must providefor the highest possible degree of unit self-sufficiency.Troops should not be separated from their combat equipmentand supplies. Thus, weapon crews should be embarked in thesame ship with their weapons, radio operators with theirradios, drivers with their vehicles, and commanders andstaffs with their units. In addition, each unit should beembarked with sufficient combat supplies such as ammunition,gasoline, and radio batteries to sustain its combatoperations during the initial period ashore.

c. Speed of Unloading. Plans must provide for rapidunloading in the objective area. At higher echelons, thiscan be achieved by a suitable distribution of units amongsubordinate embarkation organizations. At the individualship level, this can be achieved by a balanced distributionof equipment and supplies throughout the ship to ensuresimultaneous unloading of all holds in approximately thesame period of time.

XI-18

d. Dispersion. Plans must provide for dispersion ofcritical units and supplies among several ships. Ifcritical units and supplies are not dispersed, loss of oneship, or a relatively few ships, could result in a loss ofcombat capability that might seriously jeopardizeaccomplishment of the mission.

7. Content of Embarkation Plans and Loading Plans

a. The CATF and subordinate Navy commanders prepare loadingplans that are issued as a part of the operation plan.These loading plans prescribe:

(1) The organization of the Navy forces for loading.

(2) Availability of shipping for the embarkation of theLF, including schedule of arrival and departure fromembarkation points.

(3) Availability of special handling equipment.

b. The CLF and appropriate subordinate commanders prepareembarkation plans. They are issued to accompany theoperation plan. These embarkation plans prescribe:

(1) The organization for embarkation and assignment toshipping.

(2) Supplies and equipment to be embarked.

(3) Location and assignment of embarkation areas.

(4) Control and communication arrangements that willprevail during embarkation.

(5) Schedules, movement details, and embarkationsequence of personnel and materiel in conformity withembarkation schedules announced by the CATF.

(6) Instructions covering the operation of materielhandling equipment (MHE).

(7) Additional instructions covering the loading andhandling of special weapons.

c. Each embarkation team commander prepares a detailed shiploading plan.

XI-19

(1) Ship loading plans are normally prepared by theteam embarkation officer, in coordination with theship’s combat cargo officer. The loading planconsolidates information provided by the embarking unitsor detachments. All weights, cubic footage, and squarefootage to be entered on the loading forms are actualweight, volume, and area of the items of cargo as theyare to go aboard ship. Inaccurate figures can result ininefficient utilization not only of amphibious shipping,but also of the landing craft, amphibious vehicles, orhelicopters with which the ship-to-shore movement is tobe executed.

(2) The plan is reviewed and approved on the loadingplan cover page by the CO of the ship from the viewpointof his ability to carry it out and in terms of thesafety of his ship. At the present time, there are twosystems of embarkation documentatio n - a manual system(used primarily by US Army forces) and an automatedembarkation management system (used by US Marine andNavy forces).

(a) The manual documentation system forembarkation is described in Chapter 7, JCS Pub3-02.2.

(b) The present automated documentation system forembarkation, known as the Standard EmbarkationManagement System (SEMS), is described in MarineCorps Order 3120.6.

d. Sample Documentation. A sample LF embarkation plan iscontained in Appendix D of JCS Pub 3-02.2, which showssample organization for embarkation and assignment toshipping tables, which are part of the embarkation plan.

8. Embarkation Planning. Embarkation planning involves all themeasures necessary to ensure timely and effective outloading ofthe amphibious task force. These measures range from adetermination of overall shipping requirements and embarkationschedules at high levels to detailed loading plans forindividual ships at the embarkation team level. Embarkationplanning must begin early and proceed concurrently with allother planning. It requires constant coordination between alltroop and naval command level, and a mutual understanding of theproblems of each. It requires detailed knowledge of thecharacteristics, capabilities, and limitations of ships, andtheir relationship to the troops, supplies, and equipment to beembarked.

XI-20

a. Embarkation planning includes:

(1) Determination of shipping requirements. Annex B ofJCS Pub 3-02.2 contains a procedure to determine shiprequirements.

(2) Development of detailed troop and navalorganizations for embarkation.

(3) Determination of desired assignment of troops,equipment, and supplies to each ship.

(4) Preparation of detailed loading plans and loadingschedules.

b. Responsibilities

(1) The CATF is responsible for:

(a) Allocating shipping space to the LF.

(b) Organizing naval forces for embarkation.

(c) Preparing the over-all embarkation schedule,to include movement of assault shipping toembarkation points in accordance with theembarkation plans and loading plans.

(d) Reviewing and approving the over-all landingforce embarkation plans and loading plans.

(e) Providing Ships’ Loading CharacteristicsPamphlets to the CLF.

(f) Developing plans for the procurement andcoordination of assets required from externalagencies to support the embarkation.

(g) Advising the CLF as to personnel and materielof the Navy and other forces that are to beembarked.

(2) The CLF is responsible for:

(a) Determining assault (assault and AFOE)shipping requirements of the LF and advising theCATF.

(b) Developing the organization of the LF forembarkation. The CLF recommends if necessary,adjustments in transport organization so that the

XI-21

shipping assigned by type for troop use by themajor units of the LF will conform to theorganization for embarkation which, in turn, willconform to the organization for landing.

(c) Determining the support required from ATFassets and external agencies at the embarkationpoints during loading and advising the CATF thereof.

(d) Designating shipping in which troop units willbe embarked, preparing the detailed embarkation andloading plans, and submitting them to the CATF forreview and approval.

(3) Commanding officers of individual ships areresponsible for the detailed planning required to embarkthe troops and equipment of the embarkation teamassigned to their ships in accordance with theembarkation plan prepared by the embarkation teamcommander. The commanding officer reviews and approvesthe detailed loading plans of the embarkation teamcommander from the viewpoint of the safety andperformance of his ship.

(4) The embarkation team commander, a LF officer, isresponsible for the preparation of detailed loadingplans for that ship embarking the troops, equipment, andsupplies of the embarkation team. He submits theseplans to the individual ship commander for review andapproval. Unresolved differences would be forwarded viaNavy and LF channels for decision by the CATF.

c. Assembly and Movement Plans. Plans for the assembly ofassault shipping and for movement of troops to embarkationpoints are prepared by the CATF and CLF, respectively.These plans must be coordinated and are distributed as soonas possible to commands having operational control of theassault shipping and troop units scheduled to join the ATF.The plans are also distributed to area and base commandersconcerned. This permits the initiation of preliminarymovements and preparations to ensure that embarkation isbegun without unnecessary delays. The assembly and movementplans are usually issued by the CATF and CLF, respectively,as separate documents in the form of embarkation schedulesand movement orders.

d. Sequence of Planning. Following receipt of theinitiating directive for an amphibious operation,embarkation planning begins at all echelons and proceedsconcurrently. Major steps will overlap but are usuallyaccomplished in the following general sequence:

XI-22

(1) Establishment of liaison between correspondingnaval and troop levels of command.

(2) Provision of planning data by the CATF concerningpersonnel and materiel of naval and other forces to beembarked with the LF.

(3) Determination by the CLF of his assault shippingrequirements and the submission of these requirements tothe CATF.

(4) Allocation of shipping by the CATF. If sufficientshipping to meet stated LF requirements is notavailable, consultation is required between commandersin order to adjust plans or to justify a request tohigher echelon for additional shipping.

(5) Distribution of SLCPs to the CLF by the CATF.

(6) Establishment of the LF organization forembarkation by the CLF.

(7) Establishment of the Navy organization forembarkation by the CATF.

(8) Assignment to shipping for subordinate echelons ofthe LF by the CLF and issuance of the SLCPs.

(9) Selection and preparation of embarkation areas.

(10) Selection and preparation of LF marshalling areaswhen required.

(11) Determination of control, security, communicationfacilities, and MHE required during embarkation.

(12) Development of berthing and loading schedules andschedules for movement of personnel and materiel toembarkation areas.

(13) Preparation, review, approval, and promulgation ofdetailed embarkation plans and loading plans.

e. Detailed Embarkation Planning Considerations. Detailedplanning for both embarkation and the assault phases cannotbe intelligently initiated by subordinate echelons untilsuch time as the organization for embarkation, together withshipping assigned, has been promulgated. In planning forembarkation, consideration must be given to the following,all of which will affect the embarkation plan:

XI-23

(1) Mission of the force.

(2) Limiting dates of the embarkation, rehearsal,movement, and assault phases. The time frames for thesephases establish dates against which embarkationplanning and execution must proceed.

(3) The organization for embarkation of the LF must becompatible with the plan for the ship-to-shore movementwhich, in turn, must support the scheme of maneuver.This organization, that is, the composition of therespective embarkation echelons together with theirassigned shipping, is completely dependent on theearliest promulgation of the following:

(a) Task organization for landing.

(b) Basic concepts of the landing plan such aswhich elements are to be landed by helicopter,landing craft, assault amphibious vehicle, or anyother means.

(c) Quantity and types of LF supplies to be loadedand the basic plan for landing supplies.

(4) Size and characteristics of the troop and navalforces involved, both troop and naval, includingavailability and characteristics of shipping, andquantity and types of materiel to be embarked. Use ofthe minimum number of ships necessary to meet therequirements is an objective in embarkation planning.Units of the LF not required initially in the assaultphases, or whose employment is deferred, should beloaded and dispatched so that arrival in the landingarea is scheduled to coincide with their contemplatedemployment.

(5) Troop commanders and their staffs should beembarked in the same ships as corresponding navalcommanders.

(6) Embarkation areas and points must be selected.Selection is influenced by:

(a) Available space on docks, piers, and beachloading areas.

(b) Time available for loading.

(c) Availability of suitable storage facilities.

XI-24

(d) Adequacy of road nets and space available forprocessing supplies and equipment brought into theembarkation areas.

(e) Availability of harbor services and otherusable facilities.

(f) Availability of a suitably protected anchorageor roadstead.

(g) Suitability of beaches for the beaching oflanding craft and ships and for the operation ofamphibious vehicles.

(h) Availability of adequate airfield facilitiesadjacent to, or within a reasonable distance of,the embarkation site.

(i) Availability of landing craft to supportembarkation aboard ships at anchor or not otherwiseaccessible to pierside loading facilities.

(j) Availability and suitability of embarkationpoints to support staging, movement, and loading ofammunition; petroleum, oils, and lubricants (POL)products; and/or other dangerous material.

(7) Marshalling areas may be required when bivouac orcamp areas are so located that movement to embarkationareas cannot be accomplished without interruption. Tofacilitate final movement to embarkation areas, the CLFselects sites for troops close to the embarkationareas. A marshalling area must provide adequate spaceand facilities to accommodate designated units.Consideration must be given to the dispersion ofmarshalling areas to avoid vulnerable concentrations.To preserve troop combat readiness when marshallingareas are used, movements are scheduled to keep them inthese areas for a minimum length of time consistent withtransportation, security, and maintenance requirements.This may require the maintenance of a marshalling areaorganization after the principal elements of the forcesail. A marshalling area organization will alsofacilitate the accommodation of the troop echelons thatmay proceed to the AOA in later increments. Embarkationtask organization should be used during marshalling sothat a final check of troops and equipment may be madeand deficiencies corrected.

XI-25

(8) Use of Helicopters. If it is feasible anddesirable to use helicopters to embark personnel andequipment, the following factors are considered:

(a) Suitable area ashore, either in base camps,marshalling areas, or embarkation areas, to satisfyrequirements for flight operations (takeoff,landing, fueling, maintenance), cargo operations(assembly in accordance with loading plans,movement to helicopter loading points, cargo hookupto helicopter), and personnel operations (assembly,forming heliteams, movement to helicopter loadingpoints).

(b) Logistics requirements, such as fuel andmaintenance facilities necessary to supporthelicopter operations during loading.

(c) Time available for loading. This isinfluenced by the number and types of helicoptersavailable for loading, their lift capability, thedistance to be traversed, speed, and number ofpersonnel and amount of cargo to be loaded.Further, the variables introduced by weather, orother factors that affect optimum flightoperations, may require more time than ifembarkation is accomplished at dockside.

f. Personnel Embarkation Planning. The personnelembarkation plan must give consideration to priority fordebarkation and the tactical grouping of personnel asdictated by the plan for landing. Further, it must providefor the control of personnel and permit the accomplishmentof required administrative and training functions during thevoyage. A good personnel embarkation plan contributes tothe comfort of personnel and prevents unnecessaryadministrative burdens. More importantly, it specificallyprovides for rapid and orderly debarkation of troops forlanding and entry into combat.

(1) Personnel Planning Considerations. Planning theembarkation of personnel must take into account thefollowing:

(a) Liaison and coordination with the ship inwhich troops are embarking.

(b) Organization of troop units for embarkation.

(c) Provision and arrangement for administrativerequirements.

XI-26

(d) Provisions for personnel accounting andreporting in accordance with established proceduresfor troop movements.

(e) Provisions for ensuring the health and comfortof embarked troops.

(f) Preparation of training and physical fitnessprograms for embarked troops.

(2) Responsibilities

(a) Commanding Officer of a Ship. The CO of aship is charged by Navy regulations with theoperating and fighting efficiency of his ship aswell as the safety of all personnel aboard. He isresponsible for making troop spaces designated inthe ship’s plans (and reflected in the SLCP)available in acceptable condition for use of thetroops. He promulgates instructions in the form ofship’s regulations for the conduct of embarkedtroops and outlines the assistance necessary fromembarked troops to ensure their health and comfort.

(b) Commanding Officer of Troops. Since troops ofseveral different organizations may be embarked inthe same ship, designating an officer as commanderof all embarked troops is necessary foradministrative purposes. Accordingly, a commandingofficer of troops for each ship is designatedduring the planning phase by the next senior troopechelon. Usually, the senior troop commander ofthe organizations embarked is designated. Thus, inmany instances, he is the same officer who is theembarkation team commander. While embarked, he isresponsible for the administration, discipline, andtraining of all embarked troops.

(c) Embarkation Team Commander. The embarkationteam commander is responsible for the preparationand organization of the team for embarkation. Hemust plan for and provide personnel to accomplishcertain tasks while embarked.

9. Execution of Embarkation

a. General. Embarkation is executed in accordance withapproved embarkation plans and is a mutual responsibility ofthe Navy forces, LF, and external supporting agencies. (Seefigure XI-3.)

XI-27

Figure XI-3. Schematic of the Mounting Area, Marshalling Area, Embarkation Area, and Embarkation Points.

XI-28

(1) Mounting is all preparations made, in areasdesignated for the purpose, in anticipation of anoperation. It includes the assembly in the mountingarea, preparation and maintenance within the mountingarea, movement to loading points, and subsequentembarkation into ships, craft, or aircraft if applicable(JCS Pub 1-02).

(2) Marshalling is the process by which unitsparticipating in an amphibious or airborne operation,group together or assemble when feasible or move totemporary camps in the vicinity of embarkation points,complete preparations for combat or prepare for loading(JCS Pub 1-02).

(3) Embarkation is the loading of troops with theirsupplies and equipment into assigned ships and/oraircraft (JCS Pub 1-02).

(4) The mounting area is a general locality whereassigned forces of an amphibious or airborne operation,with their equipment, are assembled, prepared, andloaded in shipping and/or aircraft preparatory to anassault (JCS Pub 1-02).

(5) The embarkation area is an area ashore, including agroup of embarkation points, in which final preparationsfor embarkation are completed and through which assigned

personnel and loads for craft and ships are calledforward to embark (JCS Pub 1-02).

b. Specific Responsibilities. Specific responsibilitiesfor the execution of embarkation are as follows:

(1) Commander Amphibious Task Force

(a) Exercises overall control and generalsupervision of the execution of embarkation inaccordance with the embarkation schedule andloading plans.

(b) Moves assault shipping to embarkation pointsin accordance with the embarkation schedule.

(c) In coordination with CLF, controls embarkationand movement to embarkation points.

XI-29

(d) Provides communication facilities requiredafloat, including adequate security measures.

(e) Coordinates for provision of lighterage and/orlanding craft from agencies external to the ATF andLF.

(2) Commander Landing Force

(a) Prepares the landing force for embarkation.

(b) Requests any loading assistance required fromCATF.

(c) Moves embarkation components to and withinembarkation areas and assembles cargo and personnelon shore in accordance with the embarkationschedule and loading plans.

(d) Provides for security of embarkation areas orcoordinates security measures with externalagencies as prescribed by higher authority.

(e) Provides an embarkation control officer ashorefor coordination and control of embarkationevolutions with CATF, ship representatives, and/oroutside agencies.

(f) Provides for communications ashore in theembarkation area, including adequate communicationssecurity measures. To conserve organic LFcommunications equipment to be embarked, additionalequipment should be available for use in theembarkation area. Where possible, arrangementsshould be made with the commander of the area inwhich embarkation is to take place to provide forshore communications requirements.

(3) External Agencies. Agencies external to the ATFand LF may be given responsibilities by higherauthority. Such responsibilities may include:

(a) Specifying and making available requiredmarshalling areas, embarkation areas, andembarkation points and developing and operatingfacilities therein.

XI-30

(b) Providing authorized supplies and services tothe ATF, including supplies to be loaded andcommunications facilities for use duringembarkation.

(c) Coordinating and controlling administrativemovements within the embarkation areas.

(d) Ensuring security of embarkation areas.

(e) Providing at each embarkation point theloading equipment required on docks, dunnage,technical assistance, stevedores, and other loadingaids.

(4) Commanding Officers of Individual Ships

(a) Ensure that all troop spaces are ready fortroop use and are configured in accordance withship’s general plans, ship’s characteristics card,authorized ship’s alterations, and the SLCP.

(b) Handle, secure, and stow cargo in their shipsin accordance with approved loading plans. A CO’sresponsibility for cargo commences with the actuallifting or transportation of each piece of cargo bypersonnel under his control. When transported,lifted, or loaded by personnel not under hiscontrol, his responsibility begins when the cargois safely stowed on board and accepted by him.

(c) Make provisions for winchmen, hatch tenders,hatch officers, and other personnel for handlingcargo, except for the ship’s platoon, which isprovided by the landing force.

(d) Coordinate with CATF for provision forlighterage or landing craft requirements beyond theship’s organic or embarked craft.

(e) Provide cargo handling and lashing gear,including slings, lowering lines, and guide linesas prescribed by ship’s allowances.

(f) Billet and feed personnel of the advance party.

XI-31

(5) Embarkation Team Commander

(a) Ensures that personnel, equipment, andsupplies are ready for embarkation in accordancewith the loading plan for his embarkation team.This includes preparation of equipment andsupplies, such as filling fuel tanks, loadingprescribed loads in trucks and tanks, waterproofing vehicles, marking supplies and equipment,crating, and packaging.

(b) Provides an advance party for his assignedship to arrive at the embarkation port prior to thecommencement of loading.

(c) Organizes and operates an embarkation teamcontrol office at the embarkation port.

(d) Provides shoring and dunnage material.

(e) Provides slings and lashing gear required inexcess of that furnished by the ship.

(f) Ensures that work details required ashore forpier or beach working parties and for helicopterloading are provided.

10. Embarkation for Airlift

a. General. Airlift will be necessary to support mostamphibious operations. Requirements will be generated bythe need for early arrival of forces and equipment in thetheater of operations, which cannot be transported inassault shipping.

(1) Support for Landing Force Aviation. Airliftsupport for LF aviation is significant and includespersonnel, equipment, and supplies necessary to sustainself-deploying fixed-wing aircraft at advanced bases.

(2) Support for Airborne Assault. If an airborneassault is to be conducted in conjunction with theamphibious operation, significant lift assets will berequired to airdrop and sustain the force.

(3) Support of Maritime Pre-positioned Forces. If anMPF is included in the ATF, airlift will be required totransport MPF brigade size forces into the AOA formarriage with maritime pre-positioned supplies.

XI-32

(4) Strategic and Tactical Airlift. Both strategicairlift into the theater of operations and tacticalairlift to forward locations may be required.

b. Airlift Planning Considerations

(1) Air Movement. Air movement of a LF or elementsthereof will normally be by MAC organic or contractaircraft. Air movement requires special considerationin:

(a) Planning of loads.

(b) Staging of transported units at the aerialports of embarkation (APOE).

(c) Selecting and inspecting equipment.

(d) Processing personnel.

(e) Outloading procedures.

(f) Receiving and providing for disposition offorces at the aerial ports of debarkation (APOD).

(g) In-theater transportation, if required.

(2) Mutual Responsibilities. These tasks are themutual responsibility of the transported unit, itsparent organization, and MAC control and liaisonelements as discussed below.

(a) Departure Airfield Control Groups. Departureairfield control groups (DACGs) are normallyprovided by parent headquarters from the base orcamp resources that support the LF. The mission ofthe DACG is to coordinate and control theoutloading of units for deployment orredeployment. The DACG personnel and equipmentresources should be provided by units that will notaccompany the deploying force. If required, theDACG must be capable of continuous 24-houroperations.

(b) Arrival Airfield Control Groups. The missionof the arrival airfield control group (AACG) isessentially the same as for the DACG, except thatthe AACG is primarily concerned with the offloading

XI-33

operations. If practicable, the AACG will bepre-positioned at the arrival airfield; otherwise,it will move to the arrival airfield in the leadelements of the transported force.

(c) Airlift Control Element. The airlift controlelement (ALCE) is an element of the Air Forcecommand and control system. An ALCE is employedwhen required at departure, en route, and atarrival airfields used by the airlifted units. Themission of the ALCE is to plan airlift controloperations for a given base, to survey thefacilities of the base, and to control, coordinate,and report airlift operations at that base.

1. The ALCE maintains control over Air Forceairlift units and all airlift aircraftparticipating in an operation at the ALCEsite. The ALCE coordinates all Air Forceoperational aspects of the airlift mission.It is responsible for aircraft movementcontrol, communications, technical supervisionof loading and offloading operations,aeromedical evacuation, and marshalling ofaircraft. It provides continuous liaison withall interested agencies to ensure that theoperation is proceeding according to plan.

2. In smaller operations, a mission supportteam (MST) may be assigned to perform ALCEfunctions.

(d) Airlift Operations Center. The Air Force willestablish an airlift operations center (AOC) atboth the departure and arrival airfield. The AOCis jointly manned by Air Force and deploying forcerepresentatives and provides for the exchange ofinformation on progress of the operation.

c. Airlift Planning and Preparation

(1) Deploying Unit. The deploying unit plans andcoordinates assistance in the areas of administrativesupport, unit movement training, air movement planning,logistics, and maintenance support. Training of thedeploying unit should include indoctrination in thestandard safety practices of operation in and aroundaircraft. In addition, the deploying units will:

XI-34

(a) Identify the number of personnel and types andquantity of cargo and equipment to be moved.

(b) Establish priorities for arrival.

(c) Establish liaison with the supporting ALCE,DACG, AACG, and others.

(d) Identify cargo or equipment in its proposedshipping configuration that, because of its size,weight, or fragile and hazardous characteristics,cannot be loaded aboard Air Force aircraft or willrequire special equipment or handling.

(e) Identify cargo or equipment that is hazardousand/or sensitive and that requires specialpreparation (AFR 71-5/TM 38-250/NAVSUP PUB 505(Rev)/MCO P4030.19 applies).

(2) DACG and AACG. The DACG and AACG must bestructured to provide essential support for thetransported force. As a minimum, each group consists ofa command and an operations element and otheradministrative and support personnel as determined bythe size and scope of the operation. The DACG or AACGis the transported unit’s point of contact with the AirForce ALCE at the departure or arrival airfield. Wherepractical, a survey of the marshalling and outload areashould be accomplished in advance by DACG and AACG. Thesurvey will provide current and accurate information onfacilities available and support considerations required.

(a) All personnel responsible for supervision ofthe outloading must be thoroughly familiar with theloading procedures applicable to the types ofaircraft to be loaded. It is also desirable thatthey be formally trained in air movement operations.

(b) Designated DACG-AACG personnel must undergoappropriate training in preparation for carryingout their functional responsibilities in support ofan air movement operation. Periodic rehearsals andjoint airborne/air transportability training(JA/ATT) are particularly helpful where personnelturnover is a significant factor.

(3) Conferences. At a minimum, two planningconferences should be held, one upon receipt of airmovement orders and one prior to the initiation of the

XI-35

move. However, formal conferences do not rule out theneed for continuous coordination throughout the planningcycle. Security and counterintelligence planning mustbe integrated in all aspects and phases of the overalldeployment plan.

(a) Preparation for movement by all units requiresthe use of normal embarkation procedures withregard to all aspects of load planning andpassenger/cargo documentation. MAC representativesmust be involved from initial conception of the airmovement plan through the actual deployment.

(b) Specific guidance in DACG, AACG, and ALCEresponsibilities in this area is to be found in FM55-12/FMFM 4-6/AFR 76-6/OPNAVINST 4630.27,"Movement of Units in Air Force Aircraft."

11. Execution of Airlift Operations

a. Departure airfield operations are described below interms of areas of responsibility as shown in Figure XI-4.

(1) Unit Area/Marshalling Area. Unit or marshallingarea activities take place at the airfield or in thedeploying unit’s permanent area when this willfacilitate movement control. These activities are theresponsibility of the deploying unit commander.Marshalling area activity should not cause unnecessarycongestion or create undue hardship on the deployingunit.

(2) Alert Holding Area Activities. The alert holdingarea is a vehicle and passenger traffic control area inthe vicinity of the departure airfield used to assemble,hold, and service aircraft loads (chalks). Control ofthe load is transferred to the DACG at this point.

(3) Call Forward Area Activities. The call forwardarea is that portion of the airfield where the jointinspection is conducted, a final briefing is provided tothe deploying troops, and manifests are reviewed foraccuracy.

(4) Loading Ramp Area Activities. The loading ramparea is controlled by the aerial port unit. Aircraftloads are guided to an established ready line. At theready line, the aircraft load is placed under thecontrol of the aircraft primary loadmaster/aerial portload team for aircraft loading.

XI-36

b. Arrival airfield operations are outlined in threeseparate areas of activity as shown in Figure XI-5 anddescribed below. These operations ensure that aircraft areoffloaded in a timely manner and that the equipment,supplies and personnel of each plane load are expeditiouslyprocessed to the holding area.

(1) Offloading Ramp Area Activities. The offloadingramp area activities are controlled by the ALCE.Aircraft loads are offloaded from the aircraft andreleased to the AACG for return to unit control.

(2) Holding Area Activities. These activities arecontrolled by the AACG and consist of the receipt andprocessing of plane loads for release to the deployedunit.

(3) Unit Area Activities. The deployed unit receivesplane loads from the AACG, terminating the air movement.

XI-37

PAGES 38 AND 39 BLANK

XI-38

XI-38

CHAPTER XII

REHEARSAL

1. Introduction

a. General. The rehearsal is that phase of an amphibiousoperation during which the prospective operation isrehearsed for the purpose of:

(1) Testing adequacy of plans, the timing of detailedoperations, and the combat readiness of participatingforces.

(2) Ensuring that the rehearsal is executed underconditions approximating those of the contemplatedamphibious operation, in accordance with a plan thatapproximates the plan for the specific operation, andshould include all units that are to take part in theoperation. It is expected that, prior to undertakingrehearsals for a specific amphibious operation, theelements of the amphibious task force (ATF) would haveachieved a satisfactory state of training foramphibious operations in general.

b. Operations Security. The conditions that give rise tothe need for an amphibious operation, in times of war orinternational tension, will generate great interest in themovements of amphibious forces. The use of all resourcesof the enemy intelligence capability can be expected totrack the movement of the amphibious task force; heightenedinterest of the news media must be expected. Accordingly,the requirement to heed and enforce OPSEC measures cannotbe over stated. The need for rehearsal remains, but thesize, scope, number, and types of rehearsals must bebalanced with OPSEC and the necessity to achieve strategicor tactical surprise in the amphibious objective area.This does not preclude rehearsals, but it does demandgreater awareness and discretion in planning and conductingrehearsals than in the past. Therefore, the questionshould not be whether or not a rehearsal will be conducted,but how it will be conducted.

2. Purpose and Scope. This chapter explains the purposes ofrehearsals and discusses the considerations that determine thesize, scope, and number of rehearsals conducted prior to anamphibious operation. This chapter complements Chapter 13, JCSPub 3-02, and provides additional information on preparationand participation of the landing force (LF) in the rehearsalfor amphibious operations.

XII-1

3. General

a. Purpose. As an exercise planned and conducted in amanner to simulate the conditions that will exist in thespecific amphibious operation, the prospective operation isrehearsed in order to test the adequacy of plans andcommunications and gauge force readiness before the ATFarrives in the AOA.

b. Rehearsal plans are prepared during the planning phaseonce the determination of the feasibility of conductingrehearsals (including at least one full-scale rehearsal) ismade. Responsibilities for the preparation of these plansare the same as for the preparation of the actual operationplan. Rehearsal plans should be prepared in the samedetail as those for the actual operation and issuedseparately. In keeping with the concept of simulating theactual operation as closely as practicable, the rehearsalplans should be as similar to the operation plan aspossible.

c. Preoperational Briefings. Prior to rehearsal, andagain prior to the assault, preoperational briefings shouldbe held, involving and providing coordination between oramong all levels of command. The movement to theobjective, especially where a long transit is involved,provides an excellent opportunity for final briefings.

d. Critiques. In addition to commanders makingon-the-spot corrections during the conduct of therehearsal, critiques must be conducted to analyze theweaknesses revealed during the rehearsal and to implementremedial actions before the actual operation.

4. Special Planning Considerations. In planning forrehearsals, consideration must be given to the number, nature,and scope of rehearsals, the date and time for each, and thearea in which they will be conducted.

a. The number, nature, and scope of rehearsals will beinfluenced by the following considerations:

(1) The complexity of the tasks assigned the ATF.

(2) The time available for rehearsals.

(3) The state of training of the forces.

(4) Suitability of available rehearsal areas.

XII-2

(5) Special or unusual problems to be faced in the actualoperation, the solution to which must be accorded specialattention in rehearsal.

(6) Intelligence and counterintelligence considerations.

(7) Adequacy of the communications plan.

(8) Adequacy of combat service support (CSS) resources tosupport the rehearsals without degrading capabilities andassets required in the amphibious operation.

b. The dates on which rehearsals are conducted and the timeallocated for them must provide for:

(1) Complete and careful execution of the entirerehearsal.

(2) Reembarkation of all troops, equipment, and suppliesin a manner that conforms to the embarkation assault plan.

(3) Rehabilitation or replacement of equipment andsupplies and repair or replacement of any damaged or lostlanding craft, ships, or aircraft.

(4) Critiques at all levels of command in order toevaluate the rehearsals and to emphasize and correctmistakes.

(5) Revision of operation plans in those areas therehearsals disclosed to be inadequate.

c. Selection of the rehearsal area is influenced by thefollowing:

(1) Suitability.

(2) Similarity to the actual landing area.

(3) Feasibility of employing live ammunition.

(4) Security.

(5) Susceptibility to enemy interference.

(6) Location in relation to the objective and to ports ofembarkation.

XII-3

(7) Health conditions at the rehearsal area.

(8) Activity of civilians, vehicles, shipping, and smallcraft that may interfere with the rehearsal.

d. Testing the adequacy of the communications plan will beinfluenced by the following:

(1) The state of training of assigned communicationspersonnel.

(2) The ability to maintain COMSEC during rehearsals.

(3) The time available for communications warmup.

(4) The material status of communications equipment.

(5) Advanced training time available prior to therehearsal phase.

5. Basic Considerations

a. Enemy Threat. In the case of a general war, the mostsignificant factor to be considered is the threat of an enemynuclear attack on the ATF. This threat may be such as topreclude all but staff or command post exercises (CPXs), orseparately conducted integrated rehearsals for parallelelements of the naval and landing forces.

b. Time Available. In an emergency situation, therequirement for timeliness in executing the amphibiousoperation may preclude the conduct of a full-scale rehearsal.In such cases, the feasibility of conducting a limitedrehearsal should be considered.

c. Security

(1) Because of similarity between the rehearsal and theactual operation, strict security measures must beenforced during rehearsals. The reconnaissance for,selection of, and arrangements for the use of the areas inwhich rehearsals are to be held must be accomplishedcarefully. Deception measures may be necessary to ensurethe security of the rehearsal.

(2) Unauthorized observation by personnel not part of theATF, or unauthorized communications by personnel of theATF with external agencies, must be prevented.Restricting the movements of personnel and ships, and

XII-4

establishing security perimeter patrols around therehearsal area, both at sea and ashore, are primary meansof achieving security. Special precautions must be takento achieve communications security. (See Chapter IX.)

d. Essential equipment that cannot be immediately replaced,from a readiness viewpoint, should be excluded from therehearsal. An important factor to be considered is therehabilitation and/or replacement of equipment and suppliesfollowing the rehearsal.

6. Types of Rehearsals. Several types of rehearsals can beconducted, ranging from staff exercises or CPXs, to fullyintegrated live-fire rehearsals wherein the forces are landed andthe entire LF, including the CSS element, is exercised.

a. Separate Rehearsals. Separate rehearsals are thoseconducted by elements of an ATF whose tasks are not intimatelyassociated with those of the main body of the ATF. Theadvance and demonstration forces are examples of forces thatusually conduct separate rehearsals, rather than rehearsalsintegrated with the main body of the ATF. Supporting forces,not a part of the ATF and that do not participate directly inthe actual initial assault phase of an amphibious operation,may not be required to participate in integrated rehearsals ofthe ATF. Such forces hold separate rehearsals or may berehearsed with other participants of an amphibious operationwith whom coordination of mutual support is required. Navalstriking and covering forces and submarine forces are some ofthe forces for which separate rehearsals for amphibiousoperations may suffice. Separate forces whose operationsdemand close integration with the assault may be required toparticipate with integrated rehearsals.

b. Staff exercises or CPXs are those conducted by all staffsscheduled to participate in the amphibious operation. Theyare conducted prior to integrated rehearsals. Wheneverpossible, such rehearsals should include the exercising ofcommunications personnel, facilities, and circuits that willbe used during the actual amphibious operation.

c. Limited Landing Exercises. Prior to the main landingrehearsals, it will frequently be possible for embarkedlanding teams to engage in limited landing exercises oversimulated beaches. Such exercises are desirable because theyenable troops to perfect their debarkation procedures andprovide opportunity for boat groups to rehearse the formationsand control of landing craft.

XII-5

d. Simulated Landing Exercises. Another type of limitedrehearsal involves elements of the LF only and may beconducted ashore prior to embarkation. This type of rehearsalinvolves a number of artificialities, including a simulatedship-to-shore movement; nevertheless, many aspects of theoperation, including the landing plan, can be rehearsed.Troops are formed into boat teams, scheduled waves, etc.,identical to the actual landing plan. A line of departurerepresenting the line of departure of scheduled waves isestablished. Boat teams, by scheduled waves and in properformations, move to the simulated beach line, deploy, andcontinue the attack against objectives. Vehicles andequipment are phased into the situation as appropriate.Higher headquarters and such agencies as TACLOG, naval gunfiresupport ships, etc., may be represented by individuals withappropriate communications equipment and operators.

e. Integrated Rehearsal (Preliminary). It is desirable thatat least two integrated rehearsals be conducted. Thepreliminary rehearsal omits actual bombardment and unloadingof supplies while stressing communications and control of theship-to-shore movement. Only token numbers of landing craft,helicopters, and landing ships may be employed.

f. Integrated Rehearsal (Final). The final rehearsal isconducted as nearly as possible in accordance with the plansfor the actual operation in order to test the tactical andsupporting plans. If practicable, it includes the following:

(1) The use of all special equipment that will be used inthe operation.

(2) Naval gunfire and air support with live ammunition.

(3) Extensive troop participation, including landing,engaging simulated targets, and moving in and todesignated objectives.

(4) Combat support and CSS unit, including participationof naval components, such as the Naval Beach Group, to thedegree necessary to test the adequacy of plans involvingsuch units and their communications.

XII-6

CHAPTER XIII

MOVEMENT TO THE OBJECTIVE AREA

1. Introduction

a. General. Movement to the objective area may includepassage through rehearsal, staging, and/or rendezvous areas.

b. Elements of the Movement Phase. Movement of theamphibious task force (ATF) to the amphibious objective area(AOA) includes: departure of ships from loading ports in anembarkation area; the passage at sea; and the approach to,and arrival in, assigned positions in the landing objectivearea.

c. Movement of Shore-Based Air Units. Shore-based airunits of the ATF deploy to assigned bases as directed.Control of air units passes to the commander, amphibioustask force (CATF) upon his arrival in the AOA or asprescribed by higher authority.

2. Purpose and Scope. The purpose of this chapter is todiscuss this essentially Navy phase of the amphibious operationand to provide information on how this phase of the amphibiousoperation can be put to best use by the landing force (LF).This chapter complements Chapter 14 of JCS Pub 3-02. Theinformation is primarily applicable to movement of LF unitsaboard assault shipping; however, portions of the discussion maybe applicable to movement by other modes of transportation.

3. Generala. Movement Groups. The ATF organization for movement tothe AOA must closely parallel, or facilitate rapid formationinto, the organization for landing and support of LFoperations ashore. Accordingly, the ATF is subdivided intovarious movement groups based on various criteria; e.g.,speed and characteristics of the ships, and the time theships are needed in the landing area. Some ships willarrive before D-day, some on D-day, and the remainder afterD-day. The commander, landing force (CLF) ensures that thephasing of these ships into the landing area is consistentwith his plans.

b. Landing Force Activities During Movement. The CLFensures that adequate plans are made to provide for neededtraining, briefings, administration, and maintenance ofequipment during the movement phase.

XIII-1

4. Responsibilities

a. The CATF is responsible for preparing a movement planduring the planning phase. In operations involving severaltask groups, he usually prepares a general movement plan inwhich coordinating measures are included as necessary.Subordinate force or group commanders prepare their owndetailed movement plans. Since the details of the movementdepend on the overall requirements of the operation, themovement plans are generally among the last plans to becompleted during the planning phase. Each movement isusually included as an annex to the appropriate operationsplan or order.

(1) Alternate Plans. The CATF is also responsible fordrafting alternate plans. The alternate plan for anamphibious operation may so differ from the preferredplan that separate movement or approach plans arenecessary. It will seldom be possible to determine farin advance the time at which an alternate plan will beplaced in effect. Therefore, movement plans must beflexible enough for execution of alternate plans at anypoint between the final staging area and a point asclose as practicable to the landing area.

(2) Routes. The CATF selects the routes to the landingarea if they are not prescribed by higher authority.Other responsibilities of the CATF are set forth inChapter 14 of JCS Pub 3-02.

b. The CLF ensures that the various movement plans supporthis plans for landing and LF operations ashore. The CLFparticipates in the selection of the following areas (Seealso Chapter VI, paragraph 15, of this publication).

(1) Helicopter Transport Areas. The helicoptertransport area is used when wind and other conditionsare such that operations cannot be conducted fromregularly assigned stations in the transport area.

(2) Fire Support Areas. The fire support areasselected should provide optimum fields of fire, be asclose to the shore as depths of water and hazards tonavigation permit, and be so located that the operationsof fire support ships will not cause hazards orinterfere with landing operations.

XIII-2

(3) Amphibious Launching Areas. Amphibious launchingareas located in the near vicinity and to seaward of theline of departure to which landing ships proceed andlaunch amphibious vehicles.

c. En Route Support. The LF may be requested by the CATFto provide certain operational support to the ATF while enroute; e.g., helicopters for messenger service or assistancein air defense. The CLF should provide the requestedsupport if it will not interfere with the landing force’sability to perform its assigned mission.

5. En Route Considerations

a. Command/Discipline

(1) Commanding Officer of a Ship. The CO of a ship ischarged by Navy regulations with the operating andfighting efficiency of his ship as well as the safety ofall personnel aboard. He is responsible for makingtroop spaces designated in the Ship’s Berthing Plan andreflected in the Ship’s Loading and CharacteristicsPamphlet (SLCP) available in acceptable condition foruse of the troops. In the form of ship’s regulations,he promulgates instructions for the conduct of troopsand outlines the assistance necessary from embarkedtroops to ensure their health and comfort while embarked.

(2) Embarkation Team Commander. The embarkation teamcommander is responsible for the preparation andorganization of the team for embarkation. He must planfor and provide personnel to accomplish certain troopsupport tasks while embarked.

(3) Commanding Officer of Troops. Since troops ofseveral different organizations may be embarked in thesame ship, it is necessary, for administrative purposes,to designate an officer as commander of all embarkedtroops. Accordingly, the organizations responsible forproviding a commanding officer of troops (CO of troops)for each ship are designated during the planning phaseby the next senior troop echelon. Usually, the seniortroop commander of the organizations embarked isdesignated CO of troops. Thus, in many instances, hewill be the same officer designated as the embarkationteam commander. While embarked, he is responsible forthe administration, discipline, and training of allembarked troops.

XIII-3

(4) See Chapter II for a more detailed discussion ofcommand relations and Chapter XI for embarkation matters.

b. Logistics

(1) Minimum Requirement. Normally, the movement phasepresents the least difficulties in terms of logisticssupport. Troops receive subsistence and medical supportfrom the ship in which they are embarked. CSS activityis limited in large measure to servicing and maintenanceof equipment and to modification of support plans asmade necessary by direction of higher authority orchanges in the tactical plan. Naval commanders shouldafford every assistance practicable to embarked troopcommanders in the servicing and maintenance of LFequipment during movement to the objective.

(2) Support of Embarked Aircraft. Ships that transporttactical aircraft, including helicopters, usuallyprovide repair parts (except the amphibious transportdock (LPD)), maintenance facilities, and fuel for the enroute support of embarked aircraft.

(3) Fresh Water. Instructing all personnel in theeconomical use of fresh water while embarked must beemphasized.

c. Training. An ATF proceeding toward an AOA conducts suchtraining exercises as are practicable during the transit.Training conducted while a ship is underway is limitednecessarily to activities that do not interfere with theship’s operating procedures. Congested conditions aboardship require that shipboard routine be highly organized.Consequently, troop training on board ship must bethoroughly planned, organized, and cleared with the ship’scommanding officer in order to avoid conflict with othershipboard activities.

(1) Shipboard Training. While the ships are under way,embarked troops participate in ship’s emergency drills;conduct debarkation drills; conduct LF training asappropriate with particular emphasis on combatorientation, indoctrination, and briefings on theoperation; and hold physical training drills. Shipsprovide facilities insofar as they are able to assist introop training.

XIII-4

(2) Landing Force Training. In many operations, inorder to maintain operations security, LF personnel atlower echelons will not be informed of the prospectiveoperation until they are aboard ship. Thus, during themovement phase, troops are informed on appropriateaspects of the operation, including the mission andtasks of their unit. Within the confines of the ship,imaginative training can be conducted to better preparesmall units--information on the nature of the AOA,sanitation and hygiene, code of conduct, arm and handsignals, NBC, marksmanship techniques, weapons cleaningprocedures--the possibilities for small unit trainingare numerous. The guidance of CLF and other commandersis necessary to give focus to the desired types oftraining and how the available time can be best used.Test firing of weapons may be possible during theperiod. Ships of the LHA class have the ability tocontrol temperature in certain spaces to provide adegree of acclimatization experience. Embarked staffscan conduct command post exercises using maps of thelanding area and simulating radio traffic over theship’s phone system.

d. Emission Control

(1) Responsibility. The CATF establishes emissioncontrols (EMCON) and also controls the employment ofelectronic warfare assets within the ATF during movementto the landing area.

(2) Emission Controls. Radio transmitters, radar, andother electronic emitters must not be operated fordrill, test, or other purposes until securityrestrictions are removed or without specific permissionof the movement group commander. An emergency situationinvolving the immediate safety or security of one ormore units of a group may necessitate the breaking ofEMCON. This is normally the only permissible exceptionto an established EMCON condition, unless otherwiseprovided for by the CATF, and is usually of a temporarynature. The test and repair of equipment may bepermitted by ship commanders, provided that positivemeasures are taken to prevent radiation beyond theship’s hull. Provisions are made, whenever practicable,for helicopter or fast-ship guard mail and messengerservice within movement groups and for air delivery toflagships of other movement groups by carrier aircraft.

XIII-5

e. Intelligence

(1) En Route. An ATF, or elements thereof, may receivesignificant intelligence information while en route tothe landing area. This is particularly true insituations wherein forces exterior to the ATF, such astheater air, carrier strike forces, or unconventionalwarfare forces conduct pre-D-day operations in the AOA.Another valuable source of information is remote sensordata obtained from sensors tactically emplaced by air orreconnaissance units. Such information may generatemodifications to existing operation plans.

(2) Dissemination. The CATF and subordinate commandersare responsible for timely dissemination of pertinentintelligence information received en route to theircounterpart commanders in the LF. Commanders ofindividual ships receiving such information areresponsible for passing information pertinent to the LFto the senior troop commander embarked as appropriate.Likewise, the CLF is responsible for disseminating tothe CATF information that the LF receives through itssources that may be of interest to the Navy.

XIII-6

CHAPTER XIV

SUPPORTING AND PREASSAULT OPERATIONS

1. Introduction. Supporting operations and preassaultoperations are conducted by task organized forces in order toenhance the chances for the successful execution of theamphibious task force (ATF) mission.

2. Purpose and Scope. The purpose of this chapter is toprovide information on supporting and preassault operationsrelevant to landing force (LF) operations and to provideguidance on the planning and execution of preassault operationsinvolving LF elements. This chapter complements Chapter 15 ofJCS Pub 3-02, and provides details concerning aspects ofsupporting and preassault operations of particular interest tothe LF. In a broad sense, these include reconnaissance,preparation of the landing area, landings, and deception. LFinterest in such activities ranges from receiving andprocessing information derived from preassault operations topreparing troop requirements relating to such operations or toactively participating in their conduct.

3. General

a. Purposes. Supporting and preassault operations areconducted by forces assigned to the ATF to:

(1) Isolate the landing area.

(2) Gain information on the enemy.

(3) Prepare the landing area.

b. Supporting Operations. Other operations may beconducted prior to the arrival of the advance force byforces other than those assigned to the ATF. Thesesupporting operations are undertaken by direction of higherauthority at the request of the commander, amphibious taskforce (CATF). The CATF is responsible for consolidatingrequirements from all elements of the ATF and forwardingthose that cannot be accomplished by his own forces tohigher authority for decision. (Those that he canaccomplish with his own force would normally be assigned tothe advance force.) Any or all of the following tasks maybe accomplished prior to the arrival of the advance force:

(1) Isolation and attainment of superiority.

XIV-1

(2) Destruction of specific targets.

(3) Harassment.

(4) Psychological warfare.

(5) Collection of information on the enemy.

(6) Destruction or neutralization of distant forces.

c. Clandestine and Overt Preassault Operations.Preassault operations range from clandestine reconnaissanceto bombardment of the landing area by air, naval gunfire,and artillery (if firing positions are available). Theovert actions can be for the purpose of preparing the areafor invasion or deceiving the enemy as to the area thatwill be assaulted.

d. Tradeoffs. Key decisions are made by the CATF and thecommander, landing force (CLF) regarding the desirabilityand feasibility of conducting preassault operations. Thesedecisions involve certain tradeoffs:

(1) Refraining from or limiting preassault operationsin order to maintain the element of surprise versusgathering maximum intelligence or conducting extensivebombardment to reduce the enemy’s defenses.

(2) Drawing down on LF assets to conduct a subsidiarylanding to deceive the enemy as to the location of themain landing versus applying all LF assets to the mainlanding.

(3) The advantages versus the disadvantages oflimiting the availability of naval gunfire and mineclearing ships.

4. Responsibilities. After the decision has been made toemploy an advance force, specific responsibilities are:

a. The CATF is responsible for consolidating therequirements of the landing force with those of the otherelements of the ATF and for issuing directives to theadvance force commander to prepare the detailed plans foroperations of the advance force. The CATF reviews thedetailed plans of the advance force to ensure that theymeet the stated requirements.

XIV-2

b. The CLF is responsible for the preparation of trooprequirements for naval gunfire, air strikes, pre-D-dayseizure of supporting positions, demonstrations, andreconnaissance and for the identification of theserequirements to the CATF. The CLF is also responsible forindicating the LF representation he desires to accompanythe advance force commander. If pre-D-day landings ordemonstrations are to be conducted, the CLF will form alanding group or a subordinate task organization and directthe landing group commander to report to the advance forcecommander for planning.

c. The advance force commander is responsible for thedetailed planning for operations of his force. He ensuresthat his plans will fulfill the overall requirements of theATF. He prepares naval gunfire, air operations,minesweeping, landing site reconnaissance, underwaterdemolition, mine and net laying (if required), andpre-D-day landing plans. Any landings or demonstrations tobe conducted are planned in consultation with the landinggroup commander of the advance force. In this planning,the advance force commander follows the same procedures theCATF observes when planning the main landing.

d. When the advance force includes a landing group, thelanding group commander plans his operations in conjunctionwith the advance force commander, following the sameprocedures the CLF observes when planning the main landing.

5. Planning Considerations. If not directed by higherauthority, the decision to employ an advance force is madeearly in the planning phase by the CATF, after consultationwith the CLF. The decision is made after weighing the relativeadvantages and disadvantages of strategic and/or tacticalsurprise and requirements for preparation of the landing area.In preparing his plans, the landing group commander considersthe same factors that the CLF considers in the preparation ofhis plans. The factors are discussed throughout thispublication; e.g., sufficiency of means, enemy capabilities,and targets to be attacked, etc.

a. Surprise

(1) Complete strategic surprise is difficult to attainagainst an alert enemy because hostile air andsubmarine reconnaissance, and US preliminaryreconnaissance and bombardment all militate againstit. The prospects of achieving strategic surprise willdecrease with efforts to isolate the AOA.

XIV-3

(2) Tactical surprise also may be difficult to attainwhen the objective is a small geographic locality.Against large land masses, however, tactical surprisemay be achieved, regardless of the intent shown by thepreassault preparation of the objective area. Thesepreassault operations should cover areas in addition tothose selected for the landing. ATF movements andtheir timing should not indicate the areas toward whichthe attack is directed until the ship-to-shore movementactually commences. Tactical surprise, whiledesirable, may not always be necessary if theeffectiveness of the preparation is sufficient tooffset the disadvantages incurred by the loss ofsurprise.

(3) When surprise is a principal consideration forsuccess, but is not attained, severe losses andpossible failure may result. Consequently, thecommander must, in all cases, weigh carefully thispossibility against the known advantages of a thoroughpreparation of the landing area by a properlyconstituted advance force.

b. Preparation of the Landing Area. The extent of enemyfixed defenses, including air defenses, mines, beach andhelicopter landing zone obstacles, and shore defenses mustbe taken into account.

(1) The need for advance force operations is indicatedwhen the landing area selected is extensively organizedfor defense, the offshore areas are heavily mined, andthe main defending forces are occupying fixed defenseswith corresponding light reserves.

(2) The need for advance force operations is notindicated when the landing area selected is lightlydefended and the main defending force is held inreserve. The advantage of conducting advance forceoperations for the purpose of destruction is weighedagainst the disadvantage of disclosing the selectedlanding area. Unless the objective area can beisolated and reinforcements excluded, the enemy groundforces may build up their local strength rapidly duringadvance force operations, regardless of the destructiveand disruptive effects of the attacks. Under theseconditions, pre-D-day operations are directed towardattacking the enemy troops, destroying enemy reserves,and creating bottlenecks in the enemy communicationsnets.

XIV-4

6. Appropriate Preassault Missions and Tasks. The followingmissions and tasks are appropriate to an advance force properlytask organized to conduct specified operations:

a. Destruction of defenses ashore.

b. Preparation of sea areas, including mine and underwaterobstacle clearance.

c. Preparation of beaches and beach approaches.

d. Beach reconnaissance.

e. Isolation of the landing area and attainment andmaintenance of local air superiority.

f. Pre-D-day landings.

g. Demonstrations.

h. Electronic warfare.

i. Meteorological data.

7. Reconnaissance. Reconnaissance is a mission undertaken toobtain, by visual observation or other detection methods,information about the activities and resources of an enemy orpotential enemy or to secure data concerning themeteorological, hydrographic, or geographic characteristics ofa particular area. The basic principles of reconnaissanceapplicable to any type of operation are valid forreconnaissance conducted during an amphibious operation. (Foradditional information on reconnaissance see Chapter VII.)

8. Preparation of the Landing Area

a. Preparation of the landing area is of particularinterest to the LF. Preparation of the landing area may beaccomplished by forces not a part of the ATF and/or by theadvance force. Upon arrival in the landing area, the mainbody either initiates or augments preparation of thelanding area. These operations are intensified as H-hourapproaches.

b. Means. The following means may be employed to preparethe landing area: naval gunfire, offensive air, artillery,SEAL teams, amphibious raids, and friendly guerrillaoperations.

XIV-5

c. Tasks. Tasks appropriate to the these means mayinclude the destruction of specific targets, such as beachand landing zone defenses, gun emplacements, command andobservation posts, and any other similar enemyinstallations; destruction and/or marking of all natural ormanmade obstacles, including mines that make passage to thebeach and landing hazardous; isolation of the area; andattainment and maintenance of local air superiority.

9. Landings. Landings that may be conducted in the AOA insupport of the main landing include:

a. Subsidiary landings conducted by either the advanceforce or main body of the ATF (see Chapter XVI).

b. Amphibious raids conducted by either the advance forceor by forces not a part of the ATF. (See Chapter XVII)

10. Deception

a. Purpose. Deception to conceal or support the landingis normally achieved prior to, or during the early stagesof, the assault. Such operations are designed to disguiseATF capabilities and intentions and to mislead the enemy sothat he will react in a manner that is advantageous to theATF.

b. Forces. Deception operations are conducted as follows:

(1) Strategic deception is conducted by forces not apart of the ATF.

(2) Tactical deception is conducted by the advanceforce or the main body of the ATF.

c. Strategic Deception

(1) The decision to conduct strategic deceptionoperations may be made independently by higherauthority or in direct response to requirements statedby the CATF who, in turn, may derive his requirementsfrom or in consultation with the CLF.

(2) Strategic deception may include such techniques asthe intentional disclosure of information of operationsnot intended for execution, and may includeembarkation, rehearsal, and departure thereto.Amphibious raids may be conducted to achieve strategic

XIV-6

deception. In addition, bombing and bombardmentoperations may be conducted over a wide area withsimilar intensity at several points.

d. Tactical Deception

(1) The decision to conduct tactical deceptionoperations is of such consequence that it is madeduring preliminary planning by the CATF in consultationwith the CLF.

(2) The equipment and other means necessary to conductan amphibious assault are the very means required toorganize and implement an effective tactical deceptionoperation. Tactical deception operations vary inmagnitude and may include the following:

(a) Amphibious Demonstration. An amphibiousdemonstration is a landing deception operationthat is largely naval in character; therefore, itis discussed separately in Chapter XVII.

(b) Helicopter Landings. Helicopters can be usedin tactical deception operations to conductlandings in the deception target area, with orwithout embarked troops. The speed with whichthey can approach and withdraw from potentiallanding zones presents a problem to the defenderwho must decide whether such movements are feintsat landing or actual assault operations and reactaccordingly. The use of helicopters may berestricted because of conflicting requirements fortheir use in actual operations.

(c) Subsidiary Landings. Subsidiary landings maybe conducted to induce an enemy reaction that willfavor the main landing. (See Chapter XV.)

(d) Amphibious Raids. Amphibious raids may beconducted to create a diversion. (See ChapterXVII.)

(e) Bombings and Bombardments. Although moreappropriately used in strategic deception, bombingand bombardment other than in support of thelanding may be used as a tactical deceptionmeasure.

XIV-7

(f) Smoke. Smoke may be used to draw enemyattention to areas where nothing of importance isoccurring or, conversely, to conceal actualoperations.

(g) Electronic Deception. Actions may beundertaken to manipulate friendly unitelectromagnetic energy radiation in order toeliminate revealing, or convey misleadingtelltale, indicators that may be used by enemyforces. Also, through simulation, actions may beundertaken to represent friendly unit notionalcapabilities in order to mislead enemy forces.

(3) In general, tactical deception is used to:

(a) Preserve friendly forces.

(b) Cause the enemy to reveal his strength,disposition, and intentions.

(c) Cause the enemy to redispose his forces in amanner to favor friendly operations.

(d) Induce the enemy to execute actions favorableto friendly operations.

(e) Achieve maximum surprise.

(f) Offset an enemy advantage in men, equipment,and tactical disposition.

(4) Successful tactical deception operations requirethat the following factors be considered:

(a) A careful examination of the advantages,disadvantages, and risks involved when anopportunity for tactical deception arises. Ifsuccessful, the deception should further actualoperations, but more importantly, if the deceptionis unsuccessful, it must not cause the operationto fail.

(b) The tactical deception plan must be closelyintegrated with other operational planning andmust be prepared with the same degree ofthoroughness as the operation plan.

XIV-8

(c) A thorough understanding is required of theenemy’s command organization, intelligence system,ethnic characteristics and habits, and, whenpossible, the personal characteristics of theenemy commander. Success at deception ispredicated on the ability of the deceiver topredict the enemy’s probable reaction.

(d) Adequate time must be allowed for creatingthe deception plan and for the enemy to react todeception operations. Further, deception iseffective only for a limited period of time.

(e) Active deception measures must havecontinuity with past and future operations.

(f) The deception operation must be sufficientlyflexible to counter unexpected enemy reactions.

(g) The deception operation must be realistic andplausible.

(h) Tactical deception calls for strict secrecy.Information concerning the deception plan isdisseminated strictly on a need-to-know basis.The deception plan should not be an annex to theoperation plan unless the distribution of theannex is rigidly limited.

11. Supporting Arms

a. The CATF provides the advance force support for variousATF elements as they accomplish their tasks in preparingthe AOA for assault.

(1) Air and Naval Gunfire. All elements of an advanceforce engaged in preparing the landing area for assaultare provided with air and naval gunfire support asnecessary.

(2) Artillery. Advance force operations may includepre-D-day landing of artillery to be employed inpositions from which it can support units makingpre-D-day or D-day landings.

(3) Control and Coordination

(a) The advance force commander establishes anadvance force supporting arms coordination center(SACC). The advance force supporting arms

XIV-9

coordinator maintains an up-to-date target list topass on to the SACC of the ATF.

(b) An advance echelon of the LF fire supportcoordination center (FSCC) usually accompanies theadvance force SACC. The officer in charge of thisadvance echelon functions as the LF representativein the SACC during advance force operations. Headvises the advance force supporting armscoordinator on LF fire support matters. Hemaintains a complete record of all targetsdiscovered and engaged by air and naval gunfireelements of the advance force.

(c) Control of tactical air operations isexercised by the advance force commander throughthe tactical air control system.

12. Coordination with Other Forces. The advance forcecommander coordinates the operations of his force with those ofother forces in the same area.

a. Air. All aircraft operating in the amphibiousobjective area during advance force operations are underthe control of the commander of the advance force. Inorder to avoid confusion and to ensure the safety offriendly forces, coordinated planning is necessary betweenthe advance force and other forces whose aircraft may enterthe area. Such forces may include carrier task forces,hunter-killer forces, striking and covering forces, and AirForce forces. Coordinated planning is necessary forstrikes, identification, search and rescue, warning,approach to the area, and reconnaissance matters.

b. Demonstration Forces. Generally, deception plans to becarried out by demonstration forces are made at the ATF orhigher level. The advance force commander, however,coordinates his efforts with those of such demonstrationforces in order to increase the chances for tacticalsurprise by the main body of the ATF. The plans of theadvance force and demonstration forces operating in otherareas must be coordinated in order to provide the requisitedegree of deception.

c. Other Forces. Prior to the arrival of the advanceforce in the AOA, other forces may have conducted attacksor reconnaissance therein. The CATF should request theresults of such operations from higher headquarters toensure that pertinent information is made available to theadvance force during its planning.

XIV-10

CHAPTER XV

SUBSIDIARY LANDING

1. Introduction

a. Definition. A subsidiary landing is, in an amphibiousoperation, a landing usually made outside the designatedlanding area, the purpose of which is to support the mainlanding (JCS Pub 1-02).

b. Application. Subsidiary landings support the mainlanding by:

(1) Capturing specific positions for emplacement ofartillery, airfields, logistic support facilities, andair warning and control installations to providesupport to the main landing.

(2) Capturing an area to deny its use to the enemy inopposing the main landing.

(3) Using deception to induce a hostile reaction thatwill favor the main landing.

c. Subsidiary Landings Forces. Subsidiary landings can beconducted by assets internal (organic) or external(nonorganic) to the amphibious task force (ATF) and can beconducted prior to, during, or after the main landing.

d. Similarity to an Amphibious Raid. An amphibious raidbears a close resemblance to a subsidiary landing exceptthat specific provision is made for withdrawal. Certain ofthe factors listed above concerning subsidiary landingsapply to amphibious raids. (See Chapter XVII below and JCSPub 3-02, for detailed coverage of amphibious raids.)

2. Purpose and Scope. This chapter, which complements theinformation provided in Chapter 5 of JCS Pub 3-02, providesadditional information from the perspective of the commander,landing force (CLF) on planning and executing subsidiarylandings.

3. General. An amphibious operation may require one or moresubsidiary landings to be conducted outside the main landingarea to support the main operation. These landings may beconducted before, during, or after the main landing. If madebefore, the effect on the main effort in terms of possible lossof surprise should be fully considered. Diversion of organic

XV-1

ATF forces to effect subsidiary landings is justified only whensuch employment will be of greater expected value thancommitment to the main landing. Organic ATF forces employed insubsidiary landings that precede the main landing, in somesituations, can be reembarked and employed as reserves for themain landing. These operations may be conducted by the advanceforce concurrently with preliminary air support, navalbombardment, and underwater demolition tasks or with the fullsupport of the entire ATF.

4. Responsibilities. Responsibilities for the planning andexecution of a subsidiary landing are based on many factors,the most significant of which is the forces tasked to conductthe subsidiary landing.

a. Forces External to the Amphibious Task Force. If thesubsidiary landing is conducted by forces external to theATF and the commander, amphibious task force (CATF) is notin control of the area in which the subsidiary landing isto take place, then neither the CATF nor CLF have anydirect responsibility. However, they will both have agreat deal of interest in the success of the operation.They may be consulted in the formulation of the plans andexecution of the subsidiary landing. They may be affordedthe opportunity to provide liaison personnel to the forcesconducting the subsidiary landing.

b. Forces Internal to the Amphibious Task Force. If thesubsidiary landing is conducted by forces internal(organic) to the ATF, then both the CATF and CLF will havemajor responsibilities. The CATF and CLF may determinethat the scope of and/or distances involved are beyond therange of their effective control. In such cases, an attackgroup and a corresponding landing group may be formed toaccomplish the subsidiary landing. The responsibilitiesand relationships of the attack group commander and landinggroup commander to plan the operation parallel those of theCATF and CLF. During operations, several commandrelationship arrangements are possible. (See Chapter 2,subparagraph 9b above.)

5. Planning Considerations

a. Factors. In arriving at a decision to conductsubsidiary landings and in planning for such landings, thefollowing factors are considered:

(1) The effect on the main landing relative to loss ofsurprise.

XV-2

(2) The requirement for seizure of specific positionsessential for support of the main landing.

(3) The requirement for seizure of areas that woulddeny use by the enemy opposing the main landing.

(4) The requirement to create a deception that wouldfavor the main landing.

(5) A careful computation of time and space factorsrelative to the subsidiary landing and the main landingthat it is to support.

(6) Whether it is desirable or feasible for the forcesemployed in subsidiary landings to be reembarked andemployed as reserves for the main landing.

(7) The necessity for planning and executing thesubsidiary landing with the same precision andcomparable support as the main landing.

(8) The relative merits of the advance force or mainbody to conduct the landings.

b. Deception. Subsidiary landings may be conducted forthe purpose of diverting hostile attention and strengthfrom the main landing. Although deception plans to beexecuted by forces not a part of the ATF are normallyprepared by higher authority, the CLF may recommend thatdeception by such forces be carried out in support of hisoperations. Raids and demonstrations may be conducted forthe same purpose--deception--and are discussed in ChapterXVII. (See also Chapter XIV, paragraph 10 above.)

XV-3

CHAPTER XVI

ASSAULT

1. Introduction

a. Definition. In an amphibious operation, the assaultphase is the period between the arrival of the majorassault forces of the amphibious task force in theobjective area and the accomplishment of their mission (JCSPub 1-02).

b. Assault phase. The assault phase of an amphibiousoperation encompasses:

(1) Preparation by air strikes and naval gunfire.

(2) Ship-to-shore movement of the landing force (LF)by helicopters, landing craft, amphibious vehicles, andlanding ships.

(3) Landings in landing and drop zones and on beachesby the assault elements of the LF.

(4) Operations inland to effect juncture betweenwaterborne, helicopterborne, airborne, and/orair-landed assault forces and to seize the beachhead.

(5) Provision of logistics, air, and naval gunfiresupport of the attack throughout the assault.

(6) Landing of remaining LF elements for the conductof such operations as may be required to complete theamphibious task force (ATF) mission.

c. Stages of the Assault. The assault phase of anamphibious operation includes the planned progressionthrough a series of intermediate stages. The initialstages include preparatory fires before H-hour and theship-to-shore movement of the scheduled waves of the LF bysurface and helicopter means. Operations ashore may bedivided into distinct phases by the commander, landingforce (CLF) and will progress through a series ofcoordinated attacks to capture assigned objectives. Thebuildup of combat power and sustaining supplies ashorecontinues throughout the assault. Certain tasks, such asbase development, may be initiated during the assault inpreparation for subsequent operations. The assault phaseis terminated when the ATF mission has been accomplished

XVI-1

and other conditions contained in the initiating directivehave been met. (For additional information on terminationof the amphibious operation, see Chapter I, paragraph 14above and paragraph 113 of JCS Pub 3-02.)

2. Purpose and Scope. This chapter provides an overview ofthe assault phase of the amphibious operation, from its initialstages of preparatory fires and ship-to-shore movement, throughthe seizure of LF and ATF objectives, to consolidation of thebeachhead and the initiation of other tasks incident to theoperation. To avoid repetition, detailed information is notpresented herein; however, the reader is referred toappropriate chapters of this publication and to Chapter 16 ofJCS Pub 3-02, which provides a comprehensive discussion of theassault phase.

3. General

a. Concept of Operations and Flexibility. The primarytask of the LF is to secure objectives ashore in order toaccomplish the mission of the ATF. Operations of otherelements of the ATF are directed toward supporting thelanding force during the assault. The LF concept ofoperations ashore is the basic factor in determining thepattern of the assault. Flexibility of plans and speed intheir execution are the essential factors in its conduct.

b. Command and Control. The commander, amphibious taskforce (CATF) remains in command of all aspects of theamphibious operation, providing unity of command, until theoperation is terminated. The complex nature of amphibiouswarfare requires, at least initially, that control becentralized. Thus, CATF initially controls all aspects ofsupporting arms, air operations, the ship-to-shoremovement, and CSS through his control agencies. Later, asthe LF is established ashore and its control facilitiesbecome operational, the CATF may incrementally pass controlof various functions to the CLF. Certain functions, suchas waterborne movement and combat service support (CSS) maybe decentralized as the operation progresses; others,including aviation operations, remain centrally controlled.

c. Cooperation and Coordination. The need for closecoordination and cooperation during the assault cannot beoveremphasized.

XVI-2

4. Authority

a. CATF’s authority during the assault phase is discussedin Chapter II, subparagraph 9c(1) above.

b. CLF’s authority during the assault phase is discussedin Chapter II, subparagraph 9c(2) above.

c. Planning. The responsibilities for planning for theassault are discussed in Chapters III through XI above.

5. Organization for the Assault

a. Parallel Organizations. The organization for theamphibious assault is based on the parallel organization ofthe LF and the naval forces that transport, land, andsupport the LF. The LF organization for landing is thespecific tactical grouping of forces for the assault. Thetactical unity of the assault elements is maintainedinsofar as practicable during the ship-to-shore movement.The corresponding organization afloat must parallel that ofthe troops to facilitate execution of the landing plan andthe scheme of maneuver ashore.

b. Additional Information. Chapter II, paragraphs 8 and9, and Chapter VI, paragraph 15, provide additionalinformation on the organization for assault.

c. Navy Organization. Chapter 16 of JCS Pub 3-02 providesadditional information on the organization of Navy forcesand area organization. An overview of the Navyorganization and information on the area organization arepresented in Chapter VI, paragraphs 15 and 16 above.

6. Control

a. Ship-to-Shore Movement. The CATF is responsible forcontrol of the ship-to-shore movement of both waterborneand helicopterborne assault forces. Initially, theship-to-shore movement for both waterborne andhelicopterborne assault forces is centrally controlled inorder to permit coordination of support with the landing ofassault elements. Later, as circumstances permit, controlof the waterborne movement is decentralized for efficientand rapid handling. The helicopterborne movement, however,remains under centralized control.

XVI-3

b. Supporting Arms and Air Operations. The CATF exercisescontrol of all supporting arms during the initial stages ofthe assault, through the supporting arms coordinationcenter (SACC) and the tactical air control center (TACC).Control of supporting arms may be passed to the CLF whenthe LF has the capability to exercise control. Control ofair operations may also be passed to the CLF, or to anappropriate commander who has the capability to control airoperations, during the assault. Control of various aspectsof supporting arms and air operations may be passed on anincremental basis when the necessary control facilities areestablished ashore; e.g., control of naval gunfire, controlof close air support, control of helicopter operations, andresponsibility for air defense of the landward sector ofthe landing area. Normally, the afloat control agenciescontinue to monitor communication circuits, and are capableof resuming control if required.

c. Combat Service Support. The CATF initially exercisescontrol of CSS, in consonance with his responsibility forcontrol of the ship-to-shore movement.

d. Control System. The system for the control of theship-to-shore movement is governed by the landing forceplan for landing. The maximum area over which effectivecentralized control of the ship-to-shore movement may beexercised varies in each situation and is, in large part,governed by communications capabilities.

e. Backup Control Capability. The control system mustprovide the means for rapid fulfillment of landing forcerequirements during the ship-to-shore movement. Backupcontrol systems are kept in a standby status so thatcontrol can be quickly regained if lost due to enemyaction, communications outages, or other failures.

f. Additional Information on Control. Additionalinformation on control during the assault is provided inChapter VI, paragraphs 21 through 27; Chapter VIII; ChapterXI, paragraphs 11 through 18; and Chapter X above.

7. Prelanding Operations

a. General. Prelanding operations encompass the initialevents of the assault phase and include final preparationof the landing area and final preparation for theship-to-shore movement. Prelanding operations areconducted by the ATF and normally take place on D-day.

XVI-4

b. Preassault Operations. Preassault operations are notthe same as prelanding operations. Preassault operationsare normally conducted by an advance force and take placebefore D-day, and prior to the arrival of the ATF in thelanding area.

c. Prelanding Operations. Prelanding operations normallyare conducted by the ATF on D-day. Prelanding operationsare discussed Chapters VI, VII, VIII, and IX above. Navyprelanding operations are discussed in Chapter 16 of JCSPub 3-02.

8. Final Preparation of the Landing Area

a. Final Preparation. Final preparation of the landingarea includes minesweeping operations, underwaterdemolition team operations, air operations, and navalgunfire.

b. Air Preparation. Air attack measures includepreplanned air strikes conducted against enemy defensiveinstallations on and in the vicinity of the landing beachesand helicopter landing zones.

c. Naval Gunfire Preparation. Naval gunfire preparationof the landing area is intensified as H-hour approaches.This fire is designed to destroy or neutralize hostiledefense installations that might interfere with theapproach and final deployment of the ATF, and to assist inisolation of the landing area.

d. Additional Information. See Chapter VIII above foradditional information on final preparation of the landingarea.

9. Final Preparation for Ship-to Shore Movement. As the ATFstarts the final approach to assigned positions for theassault, ships prepare to debark or enplane the embarkedtroops, equipment, and supplies in accordance with previouslyprepared plans. The commencement of debarkation and/orenplanement and the timing of the ship-to-shore movement aredependent on the designated H-hour. All elements must beprepared to modify plans on short notice to conform to changesin H-hour.

XVI-5

10. Initiation of the Assault

a. Primary or Alternate Plan. Before the assault elementsof the ATF arrive in the landing area, the decision is madeto execute either the primary plan or one of the alternateplans for the assault. After arrival of assault shippingin the assigned sea areas, the CATF initiates the landingby signal. H-hour is confirmed as soon as practicable, oris changed as necessary, by the CATF following consultationwith the CLF.

b. Assault Operations. Assault operations by the landingforce begin with the ship-to-shore movement and the landingof the first scheduled waves and continue until terminationof the amphibious assault operation. Other forces continueto provide logistics and fire support during the assaultoperations of the LF and continue to provide overallprotection of the ATF.

c. Additional Information. See Chapter VI above foradditional information on ship-to-shore movement; andChapter VIII and Chapter 16 of JCS Pub 3-02, and NWP22-3/FMFM 1-8, for additional information on supportingarms in the assault. Initial CSS provided by the landingsupport organization is discussed in Chapter X, paragraph 3above.

11. Capture of the Beachhead. Operations are directed towardestablishing a secure beachhead that is large enough to ensurethe continuous landing of troops and materiel and to providethe terrain features and maneuver space required for initiatingplanned further operations ashore. Intermediate objectives aredesignated to enable troop commanders to coordinate theirefforts during operations to capture the beachhead. An earlyjuncture between the waterborne forces and troops landed byhelicopter, parachute, or transport aircraft may be desirable.Based on the threat and friendly scheme of maneuver, reservesof the assault units are landed as required in order tomaintain the momentum of the attack.

12. Combat Support Units

a. Employment of Combat Support. The employment of combatsupport (CS) units in the assault varies with the scheme ofmaneuver of the LF.

XVI-6

b. Flexibility in Landing. The landing of such units isplanned to provide flexibility in order that they may beused at the time and place best suited for fullexploitation of their capabilities. Certain CS units mayland in the scheduled waves. Under such circumstances, theinitial employment of these units is preplanned. Other CSunits for which an early requirement is expected may beplaced in the on-call waves.

c. Additional Information. Chapters V, VI, and VIIIprovide additional information on the employment of CS inthe assault.

13. Combat Service Support Units

a. Landing Sequence. CSS units may be assigned toscheduled, on-call, or nonscheduled waves. Equipment andsupplies required to support helicopterborne units, and notcarried with those units, are landed as requested by thehelicopter support team concerned, through the cognizanttactical-logistical group (TACLOG) and naval controlagency. The majority of CSS units are placed in anonscheduled status. Their degree of readiness for landingis governed by tentative plans for their use.

b. CSS Operations Ashore. During the assault phase, thelogistics and CSS for the landing force are developedprogressively ashore, starting from a sea-based status,proceeding through a period of decentralized supportconducted through several beaches and landing zones, andeventually consolidated ashore into a single centrallycontrolled effort. Since the supplies and equipmentcarried as basic loads by individuals and organizations inthe initial landing are limited, a flexible yet positiveCSS system is established to provide timely replenishmentof supplies and to build up stocks ashore to sustain theassault and diminish the dependence of the landing force onsupplies that are still afloat.

c. Additional Information. Chapters VI and X provideadditional information on CSS in the assault.

14. Landing of the Reserves

a. Landing Priority. Landing of the reserve of assaultBLTs (or similar formations) is usually scheduled.Reserves of higher echelons, including the LF reserve, aremaintained in immediate readiness as on-call waves forlanding as required.

XVI-7

b. Additional Information. Chapters V and VI provideadditional information on landing of the reserves.

15. Continuation of the Attack

a. General. The attack is continued by coordinatedoperations conducted by the LF for the capture of alldesignated objectives within the force beachhead.Continuation of the attack beyond the beachhead depends onthe completion of a satisfactory buildup ashore of CS, CSS,and reserve units. Tactical reorganization andreorientation for the attack are accomplished as necessarybefore the coordinated attack from the beachhead islaunched.

b. Additional Information. Chapter V provides additionalinformation on continuing the attack ashore.

16. Initiation of Other Tasks During the Assault Phase

a. General. During the assault, it may be desirable toinitiate, as required and as conditions permit, certaintasks such as base development, area defense, and thebuildup of forces and supplies for subsequent operationsashore following the amphibious operation. Such tasks arenormally undertaken by units that, while initially attachedto the ATF for this purpose, are designated to remain inthe AOA following termination of the amphibious operation.

b. Initiating Directive. The initiating directive maydirect that additional tasks be undertaken by the CATFbefore to termination of the operation.

17. Termination of the Assault Phase. The termination of theamphibious assault marks the termination of the amphibiousoperation in accordance with the principles set forth in JCSPub 3-02. Dissolution of the ATF, reassignment of forces, andtransfer of responsibility for subsequent operations in the AOAare accomplished as prescribed in the initiating directive orby other authority.

XVI-8

CHAPTER XVII

RAIDS, DEMONSTRATIONS, AND WITHDRAWALS

1. Introduction. Raids, demonstrations, and withdrawals areother types of amphibious operations in which an entire landingforce (LF) or elements thereof may participate. While no twoamphibious operations are alike, all are sufficiently similarthat basic doctrine and techniques are applicable. These othertypes of amphibious operations differ from the amphibiousassault inasmuch as they do not involve the establishment of aLF ashore.

2. Purpose and Scope. This chapter provides information andplanning considerations of interest to the LF on amphibiousraids, demonstrations, and withdrawals. The information inthis chapter complements the material in Chapters 17, 18, and19 of JCS Pub 3-02.

3. General. The organizational and command relationships andthe planning techniques discussed throughout this manual aregenerally applicable to amphibious raids, demonstrations, andwithdrawals. The salient distinction between these operationsand other amphibious operations is that they are designed toachieve limited objectives; therefore, the LF will not need tobe firmly established ashore.

4. Responsibilities. The mutual responsibilities ofcommander, amphibious task force (CATF), commander, landingforce (CLF), and other major commanders for the planning andconduct of an amphibious assault generally apply to theplanning and execution of amphibious raids, demonstrations, andwithdrawals. Such modifications as are required by thesituation may be addressed in the initiating directive for theoperation or resolved during planning.

5. Amphibious Raids

a. Definition. An amphibious raid is a type of amphibiousoperation involving swift incursion into or temporaryoccupation of an objective followed by a planned withdrawal(JCS Pub 1-02).

b. Additional Information. See Chapter 19 of JCS Pub 3-02for additional information.

XVII-1

6. Characteristics and Purposes

a. Covert or Overt. Amphibious raids may be supported tosuch a degree that they will resemble the early stages ofan amphibious assault or may be accomplished largely bystealth.

b. Independent or Support Other Operations. Raids may beindependent operations or support other operations such asanother landing, land campaign, or air or naval operation.

c. Aims of Amphibious Raids. Typical aims of amphibiousraids are to:

(1) Destroy certain targets, particularly those thatdo not lend themselves to destruction by other means.Targets for destruction may include military, naval, orindustrial installations; communications facilities;and transportation facilities such as bridges andtunnels. Raids aimed at destruction may have eitherstrategic or tactical significance, or both.

(2) Harass the enemy by attacks on isolated posts,patrols, and headquarters and to capture or kill keypersonnel. In addition to specific aims, harassmentlowers the enemy’s morale.

(3) Attack the enemy rear or flank positions on aseacoast, in support of forces engaged with the enemy.

(4) Obtain information on hydrography, terrain, andthe enemy, including enemy dispositions, morale,strength, movements, and weapons.

(5) Create a diversion in connection with strategic ortactical deception.

(6) Evacuate individuals, including agents, ormateriel.

(7) Establish, support, or coordinate unconventionalwarfare activities.

7. Planning Considerations

a. General. The amphibious raid is planned and executedin the same general manner as the attack of an objectiveashore in an amphibious assault. Plans will invariably be

XVII-2

made for withdrawal of the force conducting the raid. Inmost cases, the raid relies on the element of surprise toaccomplish the mission; thus it may be possible to conductthe operation without local naval and air superiority. Thelimited objectives and short duration of the amphibiousraid normally simplify tactical and logistic supportrequirements. Executing the small-scale raid with limitedcommunications means may be possible.

b. Mission. The raiding force must be given a simplemission. Assignment of alternate missions is undesirableunless the object is to create a diversion. In that case,contingent missions may be assigned or permission given toengage targets of opportunity. However, the assignment oftasks to subordinate elements of the raiding force shouldbe such that failure of one will not cause the entireoperation to fail.

c. Sequence of Planning

(1) The amphibious raid will be conducted in thefollowing sequence:

(a) Attack of the objective.

(b) Movement from the landing beach or LZ to theobjective.

(c) Ship-to-shore movement.

(d) Withdrawal to reembarkation sites.

(e) Reembarkation.

(2) In planning the raid, the attack of the objectiveis considered first. Plans required for a raid aresimilar to those for the amphibious assault; i.e.,scheme of maneuver, landing plan, and plan ofsupporting fires, except that the scheme of maneuvermust provide for withdrawal and reembarkation.

d. Scheme of Maneuver

(1) Selection of Landing Zones and Beaches. After allintelligence on the area and the enemy has beenassembled, the size and type of raiding force isdetermined concurrently with the plans for attackingthe objective. In developing the scheme of maneuver,

XVII-3

the selection of the landing beach(es) or zone(s) is ofparticular importance. The beaches or zones selectedshould permit easy access to the objective; however, ifsurprise is of paramount importance, a less suitablebeach or landing zone (or one more distant from theobjective) may be chosen.

(2) Size and Composition of Force. The size andcomposition of the raid force will vary with thesituation. A covering force or detachment may berequired to prevent interference with both the attackand the withdrawal of the main body.

(3) Nature of a Raid. The nature of a raid requiresthat plans be detailed and explicit. The raid forcemay well be attacking an area where the enemy hasvastly superior forces and must compensate by surprise,concentration, and massed firepower to achieve decisiveresults. Specific tasks for each element of the force,individuals, the covering element, and the reserve, aswell as alternate procedures for each, may benecessary. In general, the raid will require moreprecise timing and more specific taskings than otheroperations. However, if precise timing is important tothe operation, flexible procedures to slow or advancethe time schedule should be provided.

(4) Withdrawal. Withdrawal is the final step in thescheme of maneuver. Factors considered in planning thewithdrawal are the time required to attack and reducethe objective, the expected enemy reaction, the delayexpected because of this reaction and friendlycasualties, and availability of a covering force. Areembarkation point(s) is selected while planning thescheme of maneuver. Once the operation begins, thispoint is not changed unless it becomes absolutelynecessary, since changes at any time during the raid isconfusing and may be disastrous. Although raidingforce will usually reembark at the point at which itlanded, circumstances may dictate that a differentpoint or beach be designated. For example, if theraiding force lands on a small island or narrowpeninsula, consideration should always be given toreembarking on the opposite side. In addition,landings or withdrawals by water may be combined withair entry or evacuation.

XVII-4

e. Fire Support. If supporting fires are desirable andfeasible, they are planned in great detail. Preliminarynaval gunfire and air support are seldom employed inadvance of covert raids but may be employed as fully as inan amphibious assault in a large raid. Between these twoextremes, the CLF determines the extent to which supportingfires are of value to him. For example, to achievesurprise during a predawn landing, fires may be withhelduntil the objective is attacked or the force discovered.Supporting fires are especially valuable during thewithdrawal.

f. Ship-to-Shore Movement

(1) Daylight. The techniques employed to land theraid force are dependent on such factors as the missionand enemy situation. If the situation permits,transporting ships move close inshore so landing craft,amphibious vehicles, and helicopters have a relativelyshort run to the beach. In other situations, the forcemay be launched by helicopter or LCAC fromover-the-horizon. Support ships may then move closerto the beach to provide fire support or effect awithdrawal by surface means. If supporting orpreparatory fires are used, the ship-to-shore movementfor a raid is similar to that for a major amphibiousassault. Control ships and lines of departure offlanding beaches are normally used only for large-scaleraids.

(2) Limited Visibility. Since a primary reason forlanding at night or under other limited visibilityconditions is to gain surprise, preparatory fires willrarely be used. Other techniques that preservesurprise are emphasized, including communicationsrestrictions, late deployment of landing craft, andalternate plans for changing landing sites in the eventof discovery. Consideration is also given to thepossibility of landing either a pre-H-hour coveringforce or the first troop waves in rubber boats to seizeimmediate objectives and to cover the landing of theremainder of the raid force in other types of craft.

8. Rehearsals. Rehearsals assume even greater importance inpreparation for an amphibious raid than for other operations.All participating forces must be drilled in every detail ofdebarkation, movement and operations ashore, withdrawal, and

XVII-5

reembarkation. Precise timing, which may be a prerequisite tosuccess, cannot be accurately estimated without adequaterehearsal of the entire force.

9. Execution of the Raid

a. Ship-to-Shore Movement. The ship-to-shore movementcommences with the arrival of transports off the beach orhelicopter or LCAC launches from more distant areas. Acovering element may be landed first to protect the mainbody during its movement from the beach or LZ to theobjective. The raiding force attempts to arrive at theobjective without being engaged en route.

b. Rapid Withdrawal. After accomplishing its mission, theraiding force withdraws rapidly. The covering forcedevelops its disposition to ensure an orderly withdrawaland reembarkation. Supporting fires may be intensified asthe withdrawal progresses. Withdrawal and reembarkationproceed concurrently until the last man is reembarked.

10. Command and Control

a. Similar to Amphibious Assault. Command and controlarrangements for large-scale raids will be similar to thosefor the amphibious assault.

b. Decentralized. Small-scale raids may rely heavily onsurprise and stealth to reach the objective. The CATF andCLF (unless ashore) generally will not be in a position toinfluence the conduct of the raid unless assistance inrequested. Thus, C2 of the raid force will bedecentralized. The raid force commander operates from atactical command post located where he can best control hisforces.

11. Amphibious Demonstrations

a. Amphibious Demonstration. An amphibious demonstrationis a type of amphibious operation conducted for the purposeof deceiving the enemy by a show of force with theexpectation of deluding the enemy into a course of actionunfavorable to him (JCS Pub 1-02).

b. Turn-Away Landing. This amphibious demonstration is afeint at landing involving only an approach to a beach orLZ without actually landing. It is a deception operationthat is largely naval in character. Thus, although LF

XVII-6

assets (helicopters, amphibious assault vehicles) may beemployed to promote the deception, no actual landing ismade; the involvement of LF personnel is minimal. In thoseinstances where troops are actually landed, the operationis appropriately termed a raid or subsidiary landing, bothof which may be conducted for deceptive purposes.

c. Additional Information. See Chapter 18 of JCS Pub 3-02for additional information.

12. Characteristics and Purposes

a. Conducted In or Outside Objective Area. In the AOA, anamphibious demonstration may be conducted in or near thelanding area, in conjunction with an amphibious assault.In other cases, a demonstration may be conducted outsidethe AOA by a separate ATF to divert or immobilize enemystrategic reserve forces that could threaten the amphibiousassault.

b. Purpose. The demonstration is intended to confuse thedefender as to the time, place, or strength of the mainattack. It normally includes preparatory and supportingfires.

13. Planning Considerations

a. Early Decision Required. The decision to conduct anamphibious demonstration in support of the main landing ora separate amphibious operation must be made as early aspossible so that plans for the two operations may bethoroughly coordinated for the desired deception effect.This decision is made by the CATF, after consultation withthe CLF and the Air Force commander, when appropriate.

b. Commander, Landing Force, Interest. Althoughparticipation by the LF in the execution of a demonstrationis limited, the CLF is active in the planning of thedemonstration to ensure proper support of the main attack.Other interests include the role of the LF reserve orhelicopter units when such forces are to be employed in thedemonstration. The CLF is particularly interested in theevaluation of the results of the demonstration to determineits precise effect on the main landing.

XVII-7

c. Risk to the Main Landing. A demonstration involves acalculated risk to the main landing. This risk must beevaluated when plans for the demonstration and the mainattack are made. The demonstration should enhance thesuccess of the main landing but, if unsuccessful, must notjeopardize it.

d. Flexibility. A demonstration is directed at causingthe enemy to misuse his capabilities, thus weakening hisresponse to the main landing. However, the demonstrationmay produce an unexpected reaction; and sufficientflexibility must exist in the execution of the main landingeither to exploit unexpected successes or to react tounexpected negative effects resulting from thedemonstration.

e. Limited Effect. An amphibious demonstration is onlyeffective for a limited period of time and every effortmust be made to achieve its full potential. An accurateestimate of the probable duration of its effectivenessrequires a knowledge of the enemy’s psychology andintelligence capabilities.

f. Avoid Stereotyped Demonstrations. When a succession ofamphibious assaults has been made or is contemplated,particular attention must be paid to varying the size ofthe demonstration, fire support, and means of conductingthe ship-to-shore movement. The repeated use of astereotyped demonstration will eventually terminate itsusefulness. Variation may be obtained by alternatelyemploying waterborne and helicopterborne ship-to-shoremovements or a combination of the two, or the occasionaluse of smoke and by conducting a night demonstration, whenfeasible. If demonstrations have been used in each of asuccession of operations, there may be deceptive value inoperating without a demonstration in a subsequent operation.

14. Amphibious Withdrawals

a. Amphibious Withdrawal. An amphibious withdrawal is atype of amphibious operation involving the extraction offorces by sea in naval ships or craft from a hostile orpotentially hostile shore (JCS Pub 1-02).

b. Purpose. Amphibious withdrawal operations areconducted to evacuate forces to preclude their loss or toretract them for employment elsewhere.

XVII-8

c. Additional Information. See Chapter 17 of JCS Pub 3-02for additional information.

15. Characteristics

a. Forced or Voluntary Withdrawal. An amphibiouswithdrawal may be forced or voluntary. The amphibiouswithdrawal begins with initial measures in defense of theembarkation area and ends when all elements of the forcehave been embarked.

b. Distinguishing Characteristics. While sharing thebasic maritime features of the amphibious assault, in thatit depends upon the sea for support and transportation, theamphibious withdrawal embraces the following distinguishingcharacteristics:

(1) Except in the case of withdrawal associated withamphibious raids, planning processes will usually beabridged.

(2) Where enemy action against the LF is substantialor when the requirement for the forces elsewhere isgreat, the time available for execution of thewithdrawal will be brief.

(3) Facilities for embarkation and loading may beextremely restricted, with consequent intensificationof logistic problems.

(4) Where the withdrawal is conducted in the face ofstrong enemy action, the requirements for security areof paramount importance.

(5) All of the requisite fire support means may not beavailable.

(6) Means for controlling the withdrawal may belimited.

(7) The operation may, of necessity, be conductedunder adverse conditions of weather, terrain, andhydrography.

(8) Circumstances may render it advisable to conductthe operation under conditions of limited visibility.

XVII-9

16. Command Relationships

a. General. The amphibious withdrawal may be viewed as anamphibious assault in reverse. As such, CATF exercisescommand authority as specified by the joint force commanderhaving overall authority for the operation. The CLF isresponsible for the conduct of operations ashore, subjectto the overall authority of CATF.

b. Dictated by Conditions. The conditions that give riseto the need to conduct a forced withdrawal require that therelationships of the CATF, CLF, and other commanders ashorebe most carefully prescribed by the authority who issuesthe initiating directive. The need for clearly establishedlines of command authority and control responsibility isillustrated by the following examples:

(1) A withdrawal may involve forces of more than oneService or nation.

(2) Prior to or during the amphibious withdrawal, itmay be necessary to conduct a linkup of forces, arelief in place, passage of lines, or withdrawalthrough a rearward position. Such operations areconducted in accordance with the appropriate doctrinefor land warfare.

(3) A covering force will be required to ensure thesafety of the withdrawing forces. The mission of thecovering force is to prevent enemy interference withthe withdrawal, beginning with the initial defenseuntil final embarkation of covering force elements (ifrequired).

(4) The CLF will normally be the commander of thewithdrawing force and will provide the covering force.In some cases, however, the commander of the coveringforce could be designated as CLF. Conceivably, a LFmight be inserted ashore for the specific purpose ofcovering the withdrawal.

(5) Control of aviation and fire support initially maybe ashore. Plans must provide for phasing control ofthe withdrawing force’s aviation elements to afloatagencies of the CATF as the operation progresses.

XVII-10

17. Planning Considerations

a. Planning Process Shortened. The planning process willnormally be abridged since it may not be possible topredict the need for withdrawal in advance. Nevertheless,the plans for the operation must be of adequate detail andflexibility to respond to a situation that may changerapidly.

b. Landing Force Liaison Officers. The CLF may not bepersonally available to participate in plan preparation.Liaison officers, empowered to make decisions, should beprovided to assist the CATF in planning the withdrawal.

c. Security. Operations security is essential. Securecommunication means between the withdrawing forces and thenaval forces must be provided.

d. Night Withdrawal. To facilitate deception (ifemployed) and reduce the effectiveness of enemyobservation, an amphibious withdrawal may be conductedpartially or totally at night. Whenever possible, it isdesirable to withdraw and embark priority elements such astanks and artillery under cover of darkness. To minimizeconfusion, night withdrawal plans are carefully prepared,kept as simple as possible, and are rehearsed by, as far aspracticable, key personnel.

e. Selection of Beaches and Embarkation Areas

(1) Factors. The embarkation area and beaches areselected by the CATF in consultation with the CLF. Toachieve maximum speed in embarkation and to providepassive protection against mass destruction weapons,multiple embarkation beaches within the embarkationarea are desirable. Other factors to be considered inselecting the location and number of embarkationbeaches include hydrography, distance from transportarea, availability of suitable assembly areas,proximity to the withdrawing force as a whole and thecovering force in particular, and protection from enemyobservation and fires.

(2) Terrain Considerations. When all factors involvedin the selection of embarkation beaches or theembarkation area as a whole are more or less equal,terrain may be the deciding factor in final selection.Good observation and fields of fire toward the shore

XVII-11

are desirable so that the enemy can be engaged at longranges. Natural and manmade obstacles, includingbarrier systems, mine fields, chemical agents, anddemolitions, are exploited in combination with theterrain to minimize enemy interference with thewithdrawal. Cover and concealment are sought forassembly areas and routes of movement to embarkationbeaches.

f. Covering Force

(1) Minimum Size. The size of the covering forceshould be held to the minimum consistent with providingadequate protection. The strength and composition ofthe covering force may vary in different portions ofthe embarkation area. A unit occupying a sectorprotected by a formidable obstacle may require onlyminimum security posts, while units under attack may berequired to remain at full strength.

(2) Supporting Forces. Supporting forces are attachedto the covering force consistent with requirements.Support requirements may conflict with the requirementfor the early embarkation of heavy support equipment.A careful evaluation of these conflicting requirementsis necessary to achieve effect and acceptable balance.As a minimum, reconnaissance, engineer, and medicalpersonnel are included as part of the covering force.

g. Supporting Arms

(1) Increased Need for Supporting Fires. Therequirement for supporting fires increases as thecovering force withdraws and its capability to repelthe enemy diminishes. Emphasis is placed upon maximumuse of external fire support agencies, including airsupport and naval gunfire support.

(2) Air Support. To accomplish part of thewithdrawal, air support requirements may includetransport helicopters, naval gunfire spotting, closeair support, and protection from enemy air,reconnaissance, and interdiction. Forward aircontrollers with the covering force control airstrikesin support of the withdrawal. In the final stages,this function is assumed by the tactical aircoordinator (airborne) (TAC(A)).

XVII-12

h. Logistics

(1) Special Considerations. The impact of thewithdrawal on logistics support must be anticipated inorder to ensure adequate support for the operation,prevent the unnecessary destruction or loss ofsupplies, provide for the destruction of supplies andequipment (other than medical materiel) not evacuated,and provide prompt evacuation of casualties.

(2) Refugees and/or Foreign Nationals. Thepossibility of large numbers of refugees, or therequirement to evacuate foreign nationals, must beanticipated.

i. Embarkation

(1) Embarkation Plan. Movement to embarkation beachesis controlled through the use of assembly areas, routesof withdrawal, initial points, and checkpoints. Theplan for embarkation must emphasize speed and providefor maximum coordination between the arrival of unitsat embarkation beaches and the arrival, loading, anddeparture of landing craft. The amount of detailincluded in the plan is determined by the size of theoperation, experience of personnel, and the timeavailable. The following should be included:

(a) Announcement of whether the embarkation is tobe in accordance with normal procedures for combatloading or for administrative loading.

(b) Designation of embarkation beaches.

(c) Designation of the landing support element asa control agency and the assignment of specificresponsibilities to shore party teams orhelicopter support teams.

(d) Detailed instructions concerning embarkation.

(e) Schedule for movement of units to embarkationbeaches.

(f) Evasion and escape procedures to be followedin event personnel are inadvertently left behind.

XVII-13

(2) Control Agencies. Embarkation is controlled bythe landing support element, assisted by ships’platoons and embarkation personnel. Control agenciesprovided for each embarkation beach summon and guideunits from the assembly areas to the embarkationbeaches and expedite loading. Combat loading isfacilitated by the fact that heavy equipment andsupplies, which would normally be loaded first, arewithdrawn first.

XVII-14

CHAPTER XVIII

LANDINGS IN LIMITED VISIBILITY

1. Introduction

a. Landing in Limited Visibility. A landing in limitedvisibility is one in which the ship-to-shore movement isexecuted and at least the initial objectives captured undercover of darkness or under limited light conditions imposedby fog, rain, snow, or smoke.

b. Terms. For the purposes of this chapter, the termslow, reduced, and limited visibility are synonymous.However, the term "limited visibility" will be usedherein. It is consistent with NATO usage and avoidspossible confusion in the use of the term "low visibility,"a JCS Pub 1-02 defined term connoting some of thecharacteristics of covert operations.

c. Requirement to Conduct Landings in Limited Visibility.With the increase in capabilities of potential enemies todefend or reinforce a landing beach and with theavailability of improved night vision devices andnavigational aids, consideration must be given toconducting amphibious operations under conditions oflimited visibility.

2. Purpose and Scope. Chapter 20 of JCS Pub 3-02 providesinformation on landings under limited visibility to includesome landing force (LF) considerations. This chapter willreiterate the LF considerations and add those developed fromrecent operational experiences.

3. General

a. Element of Surprise. In today’s environment, potentialenemies have the ability to organize strong defenses ofthreatened areas and the mobility to reinforce rapidly.Consideration should be given to conducting amphibiouslandings under conditions of limited visibility in order togain the element of tactical surprise and reduce theeffectiveness of enemy defenses and reinforcements. It isapparent that to conduct such a landing, a tradeoff isrequired, i.e., to gain the element of surprise,preparation of the landing area has to be considerablyreduced.

XVIII-1

b. Other Reasons for Conducting Landings in LimitedVisibility. Other reasons, such as changes in thesituation ashore, unexpected changes in the weather, ordirection from higher authority may require the amphibiousoperation to be conducted under conditions of limitedvisibility.

c. Covert Operations. Additionally, operations underlimited visibility may be required to covertly landreconnaissance or raiding units.

d. Difficulty in Landing in the Correct Location. Whenlandings are made under limited visibility a much higherprobability exists that forces may be mistakenly landed(either by surface or helicopter) in places other than theplanned location.

4. Responsibilities. The responsibilities of the commander,amphibious task force (CATF) and commander, landing force (CLF)are basically the same as for any amphibious operation.However, because of the difficulty in landing forces in thecorrect locations, these responsibilities are highlighted:

a. Commander, Amphibious Task Force. The CATF isresponsible for landing the surfaceborne forces on thecorrect beaches. This is accomplished with specialnavigational procedures and equipment to guide the craft tothe beach and by sea-air-land (SEAL) team personnel and/orlanding force reconnaissance personnel on the beach toguide craft to the correct beaches. The CATF is alsoresponsible for providing directional guidance forhelicopters en route to the landing zones (LZs).

b. Commander, Landing Force. The CLF is responsible forproviding terminal guidance in the helicopter landing zones(HLZs). This can be accomplished by inserting LFreconnaissance personnel into the area in advance.

5. Planning Considerations. Planning considerations for anamphibious operation under conditions of limited visibility aresimilar to those for other amphibious operations. Plans forsuch operations require the greatest possible detail on thelanding beaches and HLZs and the approaches thereto, terrain,enemy dispositions, and obstacles to movement. The plan ofattack must emphasize simplicity and provide for the seizure oflimited ground objectives and use of approaches that are easilyrecognizable.

XVIII-2

a. Basic Considerations

(1) Primary Questions. In considering a limitedvisibility landing, the primary questions are:

(a) Can the landing force capture initialobjectives that will place the force inadvantageous positions to defend against acounterattack? Are the chances of successincreased or decreased?

(b) Does the absence or minimal employment ofpreparatory fires endanger the landing force?Will the LF potentially suffer greater casualtiesif tactical surprise is not achieved?

(c) If tactical surprise is lost prior to thelanding, should the landing be postponed?

(2) Flexible and Alternate Plans. These questionsillustrate the need for flexibility in plans, the needfor alternate plans, and the requirement thatsupporting fires be planned as carefully as those forother operations in the event that preassault orprelanding fires are needed.

b. Special Considerations

(1) Navigation and Control. Landing the LF at thecorrect location either by surface or helicopter meansmay be critical to the success of the operation. Inoperations under limited visibility, and possiblyduring radio silence, the individual on the ground hasdifficulty orienting himself. Thus, a major assumptionis that he was landed correctly. Accordingly, allmeasures possible must be taken to ensure the correctpositioning of all units.

(2) Weather. Weather conditions that may be tolerablein daylight may be disastrous during limitedvisibility; e.g., heavy rain, snow, or fog.

(3) Landing Force Reconnaissance. Landing forcereconnaissance personnel may be inserted covertly toprovide intelligence, to mark HLZs and landing beaches,and/or to guide the helicopters and landing craft intothe respective zones or beaches. SEAL teams can alsobe used to mark the landing beaches.

XVIII-3

(4) Protection. Protection provided the landingforces by the conditions of limited visibility servesthe enemy as well in that the landing force’s abilityto receive close support, particularly from air andnaval gunfire, is restricted. Special measures willhave to be taken to provide for close support.

(5) Special Preparation. If surprise is an objective,steps are required to maintain noise and lightdiscipline throughout the force.

(6) Special Equipment. Special equipment such asnight vision devices, visual signal apparatus ofdirectional and secure nature, luminous markings, radarbeacons, and radar reflectors are required for enhancedvision, direction finding, position location, andidentification.

(7) Ship-to-Shore Movement. Under conditions oflimited visibility, ship-to-shore movement requiresadditional navigational and terminal control equipmentfor both the helicopterborne and waterborne forces.

(8) Radios and Radars. The use of radios and radarsis restricted until the last possible moment in orderto preserve tactical surprise.

(9) Plans. Plans must be kept simple, sincecoordination and movement are far more difficult underconditions of limited visibility. However, even thoughthe plan is simple, the orders may need to be moredetailed.

(10) Rehearsals. Extensive rehearsals are required toensure that participants are familiar with theirresponsibilities. Unless reconnaissance has beenconducted on the ground in advance, guides will not beavailable.

6. Supporting Arms Considerations

a. Tradeoff-Tactical Surprise and Preparation of LandingArea. As stated earlier, a tradeoff is required betweentactical surprise and preparation of the landing area. Ifassets and time are available, areas in addition to theprospective landing area can receive preparation fires inan attempt to deceive the enemy as to the actual landingarea.

XVIII-4

b. Naval Gunfire. The preliminary bombardment must notdivulge the intended landing places and thereby sacrificesurprise. Preliminary bombardment emphasizes thedestruction of the defender’s radar and other detectiondevices. Effective close support of troops ashore by navalgunfire can be accomplished by the use of radar beacons andby special training of fire support ships and shore firecontrol parties. Sight contact or positive radar plot ofthe leading wave is required if fire is to be delivered onthe beaches or LZs just before H-hour.

c. Air Support. Preassault air operations must bedesigned so as not to disclose either the intent to land orthe selected landing area. Timing air strikes on theactual landing beaches or LZs just before H-hour isdifficult since pilots may not be able to observe theapproaching waves during darkness. Close support fortroops ashore can be delivered by utilizing suitable meansfor identifying targets and fire support control measuresand compatible electronic control systems such as thePPN-18 (RABFAC).

XVIII-5

CHAPTER XIX

COLD WEATHER OPERATIONS

1. Introduction. The potential requirement to conductamphibious operations in arctic or subarctic conditions existsin many areas of the world. Historic examples of cold weatheroperations indicate that success or failure is most dependenton the knowledge, training, and physical stamina of the forcesinvolved. The basic considerations of training and equippingpersonnel and preparing equipment for cold weather operationson land apply to amphibious warfare.

2. Purpose and Scope This chapter provides information onplanning and conducting landing force (LF) operations in coldweather. The various definitions of cold weather conditionsand detailed discussions of various types of cold weatheramphibious operations are contained in applicable Servicepublications. This chapter complements Chapter 21 of JCS Pub3-02, which addresses cold weather operations primarily fromthe Navy point of view. Service reference publications includethe following:

a. ATP 17 (A), "Naval Arctic Manual."

b. FMFRP 7-10, "Cold Weather Operations (USMC)."

c. FM 31-70, "Basic Cold Weather Manual."

3. General. Amphibious operations conducted under coldweather conditions and in sea-ice areas follow the same basicprinciples as amphibious operations under other conditions.Cold weather amphibious operations, however, impose certainlimitations on the amphibious task force (ATF) because ofreduced visibility; effects of sea-ice on mobility of ships,landing craft, and amphibious vehicles; possible loss ordecreased reliability of communications; effects of lowtemperatures on efficiency of personnel and materiel; and poorcross-country mobility. These limitations require careful anddetailed consideration during planning and preparation for coldweather amphibious operations, including provision for:

a. Adaptation and preparation of ships, aircraft, landingcraft, vehicles, and equipment for operations underconditions of extreme cold.

b. Adequate and flexible plans for logistic support oflanding forces during the operation.

c. Special equipment and supplies required for the landingand operations ashore.

XIX-1

d. Acclimatization of personnel, including training insurvival, special operating techniques and procedures, andmaintenance of equipment.

4. Responsibilities. The responsibilities of the commander,amphibious task force (CATF) and commander, landing force (CLF)do not change from those associated with a normal amphibiousoperation.

5. Planning Considerations

a. Basic Considerations

(1) Flexibility Required. Cold weather amphibiousoperations impose unique stresses on the efficiency andeffectiveness of personnel and equipment. Suchoperations require flexibility and an increasedcapability to modify plans as a result of adverseweather conditions.

(2) Training and Equipment. Cold weather operationsare best conducted by experienced forces properlytrained in cold weather fighting and survivaltechniques. Specialized personnel and supportequipment will be required.

(3) Additional Time Requirements. From the planningperspective, it must be understood that everythingtakes longer to accomplish than under normalconditions. Time must be allowed for starting andwarming equipment. Additional time is also required toembark troops in landing craft. Bulky cold weatherclothing inhibits movement.

(4) Cancellation or Postponement. Under extremeweather conditions, consideration should be given tocanceling or delaying the operation. Experience hasshown that under such conditions, men and equipment areall but inoperative and casualties from the elementsincrease significantly. Low lying coastal fogs, lowcloud cover in coastal areas, snow stirred up by highwinds, and periods of long winter darkness may delay orcause cancellation of landing operations. Supportingaviation, naval gunfire, and artillery are extremelylimited in such situations. However, limitedvisibility may provide a LF with the advantage ofconcealment for assembly and movement.

XIX-2

(5) Care of Personnel. Troop exposure to cold weathermust be minimized to ensure fighting effectiveness.Troops should remain inside the ship until they arerequired to embark in landing craft and/orhelicopters. Troops should don extreme cold weatherclothing just before leaving the protective shelter toavoid the discomfort and unnecessary expenditure ofenergy that comes with overheating.

(6) Rotation of Personnel. Personnel working outsidemust be rotated regularly and frequently.

(7) Care of Equipment. Equipment, particularly thatwhich is exposed aboard ship; e.g., deck loaded, mustreceive cold weather preparation and, if possible, beoperated at least daily.

(8) Hypothermia. Extreme sea temperatures requirethat personnel be landed dry. Immersion for more thana few minutes can be fatal. Provision must be made,both aboard ship and ashore, for the handling ofimmersion cases.

(9) Sea-Air-Land Teams. Reconnaissance units andunderwater demolition teams (UDT) require specialindividual clothing and equipment and will berestricted in their activities by the water temperature.

(10) Surf and Swell Conditions. Surf and swell arenonexistent in sea-ice areas because of the dampingeffect of the ice. In areas where ice does not inhibitthe action of the sea, the same consideration will haveto be given to surf and swell as in other areas of theworld.

(11) Raised Beaches. In parts of the Arctic, "raisedbeaches" commonly occur. They exist as a series offlat topped gravel ridges, left by rising landsurfaces, some of which have water or ice-filledmarshes behind them. These beaches, resembling giantgravel terraces, parallel the shore line and may extendseveral hundred yards inland, increasing therequirement for beach matting.

(12) Obstacles to Movement. Glacial action has leftmany coastal areas encumbered with great quantities ofrocks and boulders, both on the beach and inland.These can constitute a formidable obstacle to the

XIX-3

movement of land and amphibious vehicles. Beaches canalso become littered with heavy ice floes left by anebbing tide, making it difficult for boats to land andfor men and cargo to be moved ashore.

(13) Combat Service Support. The hazards inconducting combat service support (CSS) operationsincrease significantly. Changes of wind or current maychoke open areas with pack ice so dense as to bringoperations to a halt and to stop the movement ofsupporting ships.

(14) Critical and Emergency Supplies. It is essentialthat critical supplies be put ashore as rapidly aspossible. CSS plans for an operation must providealternative methods of delivering emergency supply. Ifweather conditions permit, consideration should begiven to the extensive use of helicopters andfixed-wing aircraft for emergency drops. The landingsupport element should be given the means for handlingthis commitment.

(15) Seabased Support. In consideration of therequirements for establishing and maintaining logisticsinstallations ashore in an arctic or subarcticenvironment, consideration should be given to operatingfrom the seabase.

(16) Effect of Arctic Nights. Naval gunfire supportships and air support will be hampered by winterdarkness and will have to rely on radar beacons fordirection.

(17) Spotting and Target Designation, and Effects onTargets. Air and naval gunfire support may encounterdifficulties in spotting and target designation. Snowwill obliterate landmarks and deep snow will cushionexplosions by absorbing energy and reducing theeffectiveness of high explosive fragmentationprojectiles.

(18) Helicopter Assault Considerations

(a) Increased Launch Cycle Time. Helicopterlaunch cycle times increase in cold weatherbecause of:

XIX-4

1. Fatigue among flight deck personnel,which results from exposure to wind chillfrom rotor wash.

2. Subfreezing temperatures, which requireaircraft and ground support equipment toremain below decks until just before flightquarters.

3. Decreased mobility of embarking troops,which is imposed by restrictive cold weatherclothing or equipment, bulky life preservers,and slippery decks. During cold weather, anadditional 5 minutes may be required toembark each medium helicopter and anadditional 7 minutes to embark each heavyhelicopter.

(b) Reduced Lift Capability. Cold weatherreduces the lift capacity of assault helicopters.This is due to the increases in space requirementsand weight that are imposed by the cold weatherclothing and equipment worn or carried by embarkedtroops. For general planning purposes, eachcombat-equipped individual weighs about 300 poundsand requires about one and one-half aircraft seats.

(c) Minimum Use of Aircraft Heaters. Pilotsshould be cautioned to make minimum use ofaircraft heaters in assault helicopters, sinceembarked troops are dressed for cold weather andcan easily become overheated. Overheating willincrease the potential for hypothermia and frostbite once embarked personnel are exposed to coldweather.

(d) Difficulties in Enplaning and Deplaning.Assault troops may encounter extreme difficulty inembarking and debarking helicopters overice-covered surfaces and, in particular, in deepsnow. Hot engine exhaust, blown downward by rotorwash, may melt the top layer of snow, which willsubsequently turn to ice and cause the surface tobecome extremely slippery. Rotor wash can alsodrive personnel into the ground in slippery LZs,thus delaying debarkation or reembarkation.Consideration should be given to using lines to

XIX-5

assist troop embarkation in snow-covered or icylocations and to using the helicopter’s side doorsrather than its rear ramp, since the rear ramp issubjected to greater rotor wash.

b. Special Planning Considerations

(1) Impact of Weather Changes on Plans. Variations intemperature, wind, and visibility, which occurthroughout the Arctic, require special emphasis in thefollowing areas:

(a) Flexible Plans. Flexible operation plansthat allow latitude in time of landing andselection of landing area are required.

(b) Alternative Plans. Alternative plans arenecessary, particularly where weather is subjectto sudden and severe change.

(c) Alternative Means of Support. Alternativemeans of logistic support and employment ofsupporting arms should be provided in theoperation plan. These must be rehearsed before anoperation to determine applicable time anddistance factors. Time must be allowed to clearice and snow from exposed equipment; e.g.,helicopters and trucks. Additional time must beallowed for starting and warming equipment.Additional time is also required to embark troopsin landing craft. Bulky cold weather clothinginhibits movement.

(2) Landing Operations in Sea-Ice Areas

(a) Avoid Areas Where Sea-Ice Predominates. Asurface assault within an area where sea-icepredominates may be too risky to attempt.Instead, a landing should be made where ice willnot jeopardize operations and enemy interferencewill not be a factor. The landing force wouldthen travel overland to its objective. Once theattack has been initiated, speed in landing and inproviding logistic support will be criticallyimportant.

(b) Flexibility Needed. Reports of iceconditions can be meaningless since conditions areconstantly changing under the influence of wind

XIX-6

and tide, making it all the more necessary toretain flexibility in the planning and conduct ofthe operation.

(c) Effects of Limited Landing Sites. Areduction in the landing sites available will makeachievement of tactical surprise more difficultand could increase the requirement for preassaultoperations.

(d) Landing Means Available Will Govern Operation.In an area protected by unnavigable ice,

helicopters or air cushion vehicles may be theonly means of ship-to-shore movement.Accordingly, the manner in which the operationwill be conducted will be governed, bothtactically and logistically, by the landing meansavailable.

(e) Helicopters Supported. The ship-to-shoremovement normally relies on helicopters, withlanding craft or LCAC as a second choice.Amphibious operations without helicopters,conducted over pack ice impenetrable toice-breakers, must be limited in scope.Operations of this type would normally be raidsmounted against undefended or lightly held enemypositions and conducted by lightly armed, fastmoving, highly trained units.

(f) Air Support. If weather conditions permit,air support for a raid force may include thedropping of trail markers to simplifycross-country navigation and the use of aircraftfor the withdrawal. The evacuation of wounded isbest done by helicopter.

(g) Neutralization Supporting Arms. Ice canrestrict the movement of naval gunfire supportships, thus effectively neutralizing this type ofsupport. Air strikes should be available as analternative. Fog and ice occurring together couldprevent both means of providing fire support.

(h) Ice can Preclude Landing of Heavy Equipment.Ice will impose difficulties upon the landing ofheavy equipment and the operation of amphibiousvehicles over the beach. Divers, explosives, and

XIX-7

considerable time may be required to clear thelanding beach. In such circumstances, infantryorganizations may have to remain unsupported byheavier weapons or equipment.

6. Rehearsals for Amphibious Operations in Cold Weather.Rehearsals assume an even greater importance in the coldweather environment because of the special considerationsinvolved in conducting cold weather amphibious operations andthe unique factors that affect timing. The rehearsal must beconducted in an area that closely duplicates the assault areain order that the effects of adverse weather and sea conditionscan be accurately measured and necessary corrective actionstaken before the actual assault. One or more well executed,integrated rehearsals, followed up by a meaningful critique,will significantly enhance the success of cold weatheramphibious operations.

XIX-8

CHAPTER XX

RELATED OPERATIONS

1. Introduction. Routine peacetime naval operations frequentlyinvolve the employment of afloat forward deployed landingforces. These operations may be conducted in a secureenvironment, during times of international tension, or duringperiods of open hostilities. The landing force (LF) is normallya forward-deployed Marine expeditionary unit, but larger sizeforces may be involved. Further, such LF operations may be of ajoint or combined nature. For purposes of the discussion, suchoperations are considered related operations; they are naval incharacter and may involve many of the characteristics ofamphibious operations, but are not amphibious operations such as.

2. Purpose and Scope. The purpose of this chapter is toprovide information on operational matters that relate toemployment of forward deployed landing forces. These relatedoperations include disaster relief, noncombatant emergencyevacuation, operations in times of tension, and administrativelandings, which are discussed in the following chapters. Briefdiscussions of seabasing and the Maritime Pre-positioned Ships(MPS) Program are also included.

3. General

a. Afloat Forward Deployed Landing Forces. The UnitedStates has maintained forward deployed landing forces fordecades. These forces are normally embarked in amphibiousshipping and are capable of a rapid, although limited,response to a myriad of crisis situations; e.g., they:

(1) Assist US diplomatic efforts through peacefulprojection of influence and, during periods of crisis,provide a selective show of force and interest.

(2) Permit early commitment of US forces to combat whenrequired.

(3) Preserve options limiting the degree, direction,and character of US involvement.

(4) Assist allies through provision of flexible andselective levels of military assistance.

(5) Provide humanitarian assistance or disaster relief.

(6) Protect or evacuate noncombatants.

(7) Protect installations.

XX-1

b. Limited Capability of Forward Deployed Landing Forces.Forward deployed landing forces have limited combat powerand are not intended to be committed independently forextended periods. Any commitment of forward deployedlanding forces must include consideration of the requirementfor rapid reinforcement and/or support. Certain programshave been instituted to pre-position ashore and/or afloatsupplies and equipment for the Services that would join withairlifted forces and/or provide a source for rapid resupplyof forces. (See paragraphs 11 and 12 below.)

c. Evolving into Joint or Combined Operation. The variousactivities involving forward deployed forces may quicklyevolve into joint or combined operations.

4. Responsibilities

a. Command and Control of Forward Deployed Forces. Thecommitment of forward deployed forces will be at thedirection of the National Command Authorities (NCA) and mayinvolve US unilateral or bilateral action. Combatantcommand (command authority) may be exercised only bycommanders of unified and specified combatant commands;operational control may be exercised by commanders at anyechelon at or below the level of command. Further, certainaspects of these operations will be at the direction of, andmust be coordinated with, the US ambassador or otherdesignated officials.

b. Commitment of Naval Forces. In actions that involve theUS unilateral commitment of naval forces, including embarkedlanding forces, responsibilities do not vary significantlyfrom those associated with amphibious operations.

c. Command Relationships. The command relationships forafloat forward deployed landing forces requireamplification. The afloat forward deployed commander,landing force (CLF) retains coequal status with thecommander of the amphibious ready group (ARG) in whose shipshe is embarked. Operational control of the LF is vested inthe ARG commander as directed by the initiating directive orby a common senior directing the conduct of a specificoperation or exercise and designating the commander ARG ascommander, amphibious task force (CATF). This authorityceases upon termination of the specific operation orexercise. Such transition in command relationships shouldbe stipulated in the initiating directive and/or activation

XX-2

order. Command relationships in other than amphibiousoperations will be established in the appropriate operationorder and will be reflected in the LF activation order.

5. Planning Considerations. Situations that have required thecommitment of landing forces to the related operations discussedin this chapter historically have presented unique sets ofcircumstances. From the perspective of CLF, however, thefollowing factors will be common to most related operations:

a. Planning Time. Planning time will be reduced.

b. Command Lines. Command lines of authority will becomplex and must be clearly understood.

c. Amphibious Objective Area. An AOA may not beestablished.

d. Rules of Engagement. Rules of engagement maycircumscribe the use of force except under carefullycontrolled conditions. Constraints that are imposed must bebalanced to ensure that the LF is not at undue risk.

e. Requirements Versus Capabilities. The requirements ofthe operation may exceed organic capabilities. Thepotential need for special equipment, additionalcommunications, or units with special expertise must beassessed early and steps taken to acquire the neededcapability.

6. Noncombatant Evacuation Operations

a. Characteristics. Noncombatant evacuation operations(NEO) will normally occur in a hostile or potentiallyhostile environment and involve the evacuation of USnationals and/or other civilians. These operations requireliaison, security forces, supporting forces, screening ofevacuees, and transportation of evacuees by surface and/orair. The decision to employ afloat forward deployed landingforces would be made by the NCA, and the CATF normally wouldbe tasked through the commander of the unified command.Operations in foreign countries are characterized by a highlevel of interest and detailed media coverage. Overallresponsibility is normally vested in the ambassador orsenior Department of State representative. The commandchannels for military forces are separate and distinct fromthe channels of the diplomatic agencies. NEO may requirethe withdrawal and delivery of evacuees to safe havens.

XX-3

b. Plans

(1) Embassy Plans. Embassy emergency and evacuationplans, distributed to the appropriate militaryheadquarters, include the projected numbers of evacuees,options for evacuation, standing operating procedures,and communications and support capabilities.

(2) Unified Command Plans. Noncombatant evacuationplans are published by commanders of the unifiedcommands and coordinated with current embassy plans.

(3) Evacuation Force Plans. Afloat forward deployedforces and forces activated for NEO develop operationplans or orders for each evacuation operation in supportof existing plans as directed.

c. Operations

(1) Communications/Liaison. Upon arrival in the area,the CATF establishes and maintains positivecommunications and effects liaison with local diplomaticrepresentatives. The CLF must be prepared to augment orduplicate communications as needed.

(2) Security. The LF may be tasked to augment existingsecurity forces or to provide forces to secure theevacuation area. Specific and detailed rules ofengagement will be promulgated.

(3) Screening and Identification. This is a primaryresponsibility of the diplomatic agency. Whenoperational considerations dictate, screening andidentification may be executed ashore by other securityforces, by the LF, or by elements of the ATF aboardship. Shipboard screening may be centralized orconducted aboard each ship. The LF may be required toaugment emergency medical and dental treatment ashore orafloat.

d. Evacuation

(1) Surface

(a) Shipping. Evacuation may be made by ATFshipping or commercial shipping arranged by higherauthority. Shore-to-ship movement may be made withorganic landing craft or helicopters of the ATF.

XX-4

(b) Motor March. Evacuation may be by motorvehicle arranged by higher authority. The LF maybe tasked to provide convoy control,communications, and security.

(2) Air. Evacuation by air may be via aircraft fromairfields arranged by higher authority or by use of LFaviation assets.

e. Delivery to Safe Haven. Delivery to safe haven may beaccomplished by ships of the ATF. The LF may be tasked toprovide guides, baggage handlers, shipboard security, andmedical and dental augmentation.

7. Operations to Protect Noncombatants and Installations

a. Characteristics. Operations to protect noncombatants orinstallations are characterized by the necessity fordetailed planning and liaison, extensive coordination andcommunications between military and civilian agencies, highlevel interest requiring additional reporting, positive C2,and restrictive rules of engagement.

b. Operational Environment. Operational environments mayrange from civil disorders to full-scale combat operationsrequiring a LF supported by ATF shipping and supporting arms.

c. Landing Force Functions. The LF could be expected toprovide:

(1) Ground combat elements for security or to reinforceexisting defense forces.

(2) Aviation combat element assets for transport oraerial gunfire support.

(3) CSS to forces ashore or to the installationinvolved.

d. Flexibility. Military participation will be kept to theminimum required, with the task force maintaining a tacticalposture permitting a rapid shift to combat operations ifrequired.

8. Disaster Relief

a. Characteristics. The provision of US military supportto disaster relief operations in foreign countries isconducted under the overall authority of the commander of

XX-5

the appropriate unified command in response to requests fromthe US Department of State. Deployed naval forces are oftentasked to provide such support on short notice. Therefore,afloat deployed landing forces are normally tasked bystanding fleet operation orders to be prepared to providedisaster relief to foreign countries. The most common typeof disaster relief operation is one conducted in response toa natural disaster and in a permissive environment with thecomplete cooperation of the foreign government concerned.Security requirements, in most cases, are either notrequired or minimal. This section will focus on the specialconsiderations inherent to disaster relief operationsconducted in a permissive environment. In the eventsecurity of US forces becomes a basic consideration, normaltactical planning procedures are followed.

b. Planning Considerations. Each disaster relief situationwill have its own peculiarities. Standing operatingprocedures should be developed by afloat forward deployedlanding forces to expedite planning and should include:command, control, communications, intelligence, operations,and logistic support.

c. Task Organization. Developing a responsive andefficient task organization for the operation may be asignificant and complex problem. In some cases, taskorganizing into a disaster control organization (e.g.,disaster control teams, elements) to best fit the situationand mission is necessary. The estimate of capabilities madeupon deployment should serve as a guide to task organizingthe skills and capabilities related to the situation andmission.

d. Types of Disasters. Types of disasters include storms(hurricanes, typhoons, and tornadoes), floods, earthquakes,tidal waves, and major fires.

e. Results of Natural Disasters. The effects of a naturaldisaster vary in intensity, the environment in which itoccurs, the amount of advance warning, and the preparationmeasures taken. Most result in fatalities and injuries,stranded or dispossessed people, widespread property damage,contamination or elimination of water sources, anddisruption of public utilities. Certain disasters canproduce, as one of the effects, another equally devastatingdisaster.

XX-6

f. Types of Disaster Relief Assistance. Based on thecommonalities addressed above, the functions included inmost disaster relief operations are damage assessment, firefighting, medical assistance, engineer and maintenancesupport, graves registration, mass feeding and housing,explosive ordnance disposal, chaplain support, security, andtransportation.

g. Landing Force Estimate of Disaster Relief Capabilities.Upon deployment, the LF should prepare an estimate ofdisaster relief capabilities. This estimate would includean analysis of personnel skills, equipment, supplies, andspecial capabilities of units as they individually relate tolikely disaster relief functions and tasks. The ATF staffwould prepare an estimate of Navy capabilities includinghousing, feeding, supplies and equipment for medical anddisaster relief, personnel availability and their skills,and the extent of contingency funding.

9. Seabasing

a. Combat Service Support from Ships of the Task Force. Inmany operations, projecting a buildup of CSS ashore isunnecessary or undesirable. Seabasing provides for themajority of CSS to be provided from the ships of the taskforce. This concept may be employed when the LF mission isconsistent with seabasing concepts. That is, seabasing ispossible when the nature of the operation is such thatfacilities ashore to perform major CSS tasks such as supply,transportation, medical, intermediate level maintenance,automated data processing, and engineer support are notdesired; further, seabasing requires that shipping remain inthe area to provide continuous support.

b. Embarkation Considerations. From an embarkation pointof view, seabasing requires that supply stocks be loaded andstowed for easy access by supply and maintenance personnel.Also, selected ships must be dedicated to maintenanceoperations and spaces reserved for repair facilities.Moreover, maintenance personnel must be embarked aboardships that will allow either surface or helicopter deliveryof maintenance contact teams to support units engagedashore. Seabasing of supply, medical, and maintenancefunctions requires that the embarkation configuration bestructured to perform these functions for the duration ofthe operation, if required.

XX-7

c. Size of Units to be Supported From a Seabase. Seabasingis normally appropriate for a reinforced battalion sizeorganization. For larger landing forces, increasedconsideration should be given to placing some, if not most,of the support ashore.

d. Transition from Seabase to Shorebase Support. Thetransition from a seabase supporting mode to a conventionalmode may be made at any time after completion of the initiallanding.

e. Resupply Operations. For extended deployments of afloatforward deployed landing forces, resupply operations must beconducted while ships are at sea or in friendly ports.Embarkation officers, working in conjunction with the LFstaff and CATF staff officers, must plan for and be preparedto coordinate embarkation and debarkation of personnel,equipment, and supplies throughout the deployment.

10. Operations in Times of Tension

a. Employment of Amphibious Forces. Amphibious forces maybe employed in times of tension to support a nationalstrategy of credible deterrence, forward defense, andflexible response, and to demonstrate resolve andsolidarity. Amphibious forces can remain offshore for longperiods, providing a presence without having to put forcesashore. If forces are required ashore, they must be capableof landing rapidly.

b. Flexibility. Operations in times of tension can beconducted in either a hostile or a nonhostile environment.Planning must provide for the support necessary in the eventa secure environment changes to a hostile environment.

c. Responsibilities. CATF and CLF responsibilities andcommand arrangements are as described in Chapter II aboveand as set forth by higher authority.

d. Guidance for Operations. In any hostile or potentiallyhostile situation, the initiating directive will prescribethe boundaries of the AOA (if established), provide rules ofengagement, and provide guidance for landing forces ashore.CATF and CLF may develop or request additional guidanceappropriate to eventualities of the operation, such asconditional rules of engagement in the event of hostilities.

XX-8

e. Air Space Control. In the event an AOA is notestablished, specific procedures for airspace control mustbe arranged.

f. NATO Operations. For operations in times of tensioninvolving a NATO country or forces, see Chapter 22 of ATP 8.

11. Maritime Prepostioning Ships Program

a. Characteristics. The MPS Program provides for rapidcommitment of sizable Marine forces to crisis areas andcombines the best features of the total force airlift andsealift capabilities. As a primary mode of rapid response,the MPS Program is designed for unloading in a secure portor beach with an airfield in close proximity. The conceptalso provides a means to rapidly reinforce previouslycommitted forces and thus complements an amphibious forcibleentry capability.

b. Not a Forcible Entry Capability. The MPS Program isdesigned to complement, not replace, the forcible entrycapability of amphibious operations. In time of crisis,Marines can be airlifted to a contingency area for linkupwith pre-positioned supplies and equipment and subsequentlyform for combat.

c. MPS Support Capability. The MPS Program providesforward deployed, specially designed ships with embarkedequipment and supplies to support three brigade-sized MarineAir-Ground Task Forces (MAGTFs). Each of the three MPSsquadrons possess a self-load and off-load system forpierside and instream cargo discharge.

d. Flexible Alternative. The MPS concept is naval incharacter and, when married with designated combat forces,provides an independently employable force of combined armscapable of stand-alone operations. This concept providesresponse capability with a wide range of flexiblealternatives, including:

(1) Preemptive Occupation and Defense of Key Points AlongLines of Communications.

(2) Reinforcement/Support of an Ally or Friendly Nation.Use of a maritime pre-positioning force operation in

support of an allied or friendly nation prior tocommencement of hostilities can demonstrate US resolve,establish a credible force to support allied combatoperations, and provide a secure area for furtherintroduction of US forces.

XX-9

(3) Reinforcement of an Amphibious Operation. Maritimepre-positioning force operations provide the capabilityto rapidly surge forces into a beachhead area secured byamphibious assault forces.

(4) Occupation/Reinforcement of Advanced Naval Bases.MPF operations can be conducted to either initiallyoccupy or provide rapid reinforcement and subsequentprotection of existing naval bases.

(5) Augmentation of Fleet Defense by Supporting FleetAir Operations From Ashore. MPF operations provide thecapability to add additional forces and providealternate or divert airfields in support of fleet airoperations.

(6) Establishment of a Sizable Force Ashore in Supportof a Continental Campaign. Maritime pre-positioningforce operations facilitate establishment of a Marineexpeditionary brigade ashore in a relatively shortperiod of time to provide a theater commander asubstantial force for use in a variety of options; e.g.,force or theater reserve, main or supporting attack, orreembarkation aboard amphibious ships for furtheremployment.

(7) Political Signalling. The freedom of shipping tomove in international waters allows sending politicalsignals by relocating an MPS squadron to positions inproximity to crisis areas.

12. Administrative Operations

a. Purpose. An administrative load, offload, oradministrative landing of an afloat forward-deployed landingforce may be conducted in a nonhostile environment for avariety of reasons, such as:

(1) Reorganization for a combat mission.

(2) Reorganization or change in shipping.

(3) Return from deployment to home base.

(4) Preparation for and termination of withdrawaloperations.

(5) Disaster relief operations.

XX-10

b. Characteristics. Administrative operations generallyare characterized by procedures that promote speed andefficiency. Logistic considerations rather than tacticalconsiderations predominate. In other cases, such asreorganization for a combat mission, combat loading will berequired.

c. Scope of Operations. Administrative operations may takeplace in a port, at anchor, or on a beach. They may alsoinvolve transfers between ships by landing craft orhelicopter.

d. Nature of Operation. Command relationships, planningprocedures, and responsibilities of the LF will vary withthe nature of the operation.

e. Additional Information. For additional information onadministrative movements, see Chapter 12 of JCS Pub 3-02.2.

XX-11

APPENDIX

THE LANDING PLAN

1. Composition of the Plan for Landing

a. The plan for landing is composed of specific documentsthat present, in detail, all instructions for execution ofthe landing. The documents are incorporated intoappendixes, tabs, and enclosures to the operation plans ofthe amphibious task force and the landing force.

b. Commanders responsible for the preparation of thenumerous landing documents furnish copies to interestednaval and landing force commanders for the purpose ofextracting or otherwise using pertinent portions of thedocuments as required.

2. References. The following publications contain similar andadditional illustrations of landing plan documentation:

a. NWP 22-1/FMFM 1-14, "The Amphibious Task Force Plan."

b. NWP 22-3/FMFM 1-8, "Ship-to-Shore Movement," Chapter 3.

c. ATP 36, "Amphibious Operations - Ship-to-ShoreMovement," Chapter 3.

d. FMFM 3-1, "Command and Staff Action," Chapter 2.

3. Responsibility and Application. Documents that support thelanding plan are prepared by both the Navy and the landingforce. The purposes and illustrations of the most commonly useddocuments are presented in this annex. Not all theNavy-prepared documents will be contained in the landing forcelanding plan. The documents illustrated have been developed forgeneral use and have been employed on many occasions. This doesnot imply that all sample documents will be required on everyoperation or exercise, nor that additional documents cannot beprepared when needed. Further, the documents may be modified asnecessary to meet specific requirements. For example, times anddistances displayed are for illustration purposes, actual timesand distances are dependent on the tactical situation.

a. Navy Documents. Responsibility rests with Navy officersfor preparation of the following documents:

A-1

A-2

TITLE PAGE

Landing Craft Availability Table A-4 Landing Craft Employment Plan A-5 Sea Echelon Plan A-6 Debarkation Schedule (jointly prepared by A-7 CO of ship and CO of embarked troops) Ship's Diagram A-8 Approach Schedule A-9 Assault Area Diagram A-10 Transport Area Diagram A-11/A-12 Assault Wave Diagram A-13/A-14 Beach Approach Diagram A-15/A-16

b. Landing Force Documents. Responsibility rests with commanders at various levels within the landing force for preparation of the following documents:

TITLE PAGE

Allocation of Serial Numbers A-17 Landing Priority Table A-18

Surface Landings Amphibious Vehicle Availability A-19 Table Landing Craft and Assault Amphibious A-20/A-21 Vehicle Assignment Table Landing Diagram (Surface) A-22 Assault Schedule A-23 Assault Amphibious Vehicle A-24 Employment Plan Landing Sequence Table A-25

Helicopter Landings Helicopter Availability Table A-26 Heliteam Wave and Serial A-27 Assignment Table Helicopter Landing Diagram A-28 Helicopter Employment and A-29 Assault Landing Table (HEALT) Serial Assignment Table A-30/A-31

A-3

Sample Landing Plans RLT Landing by Surface and Helicopter A-32/A-33 BLT Landing by Surface A-34/A-35 -- Preparation of the Surface A-36 Landing Plan BLT Landing by Helicopter A-37/A-38 -- Preparation of the Helicopter A-39 Landing Plan

Organization for Embarkation and A-40/A-41 Assignment to Shipping Tables -- Sample Unit Table A-42 -- Sample Group Table A-43

A-4

LANDING CRAFT AVAILABILITY TABLE

This table lists the type and number of landing craft that willbe available from each ship of the transport group, specifiesthe total required for Navy use, and indicates those availablefor troop use. The table is the basis for assignment of landingcraft for the ship-to-shore movement. It is prepared by thetransport group commander or, in his absence, by the amphibioustask force commander.

Landing Craft Availability Table

A-5

LANDING CRAFT EMPLOYMENT PLAN

This plan provides for the assigned movement of landing craftfrom the various ships to satisfy Navy and landing forcerequirements. It indicates the number of landing craft, theirtype, their parent ship, the ships to which they will report,the time at which they will report, and the period attached.The plan is prepared by the transport group commander or in hisabsence, by the amphibious task force commander.

Sample Landing Craft Employment Plan

A-6

SEA ECHELON PLAN

1. This plan is not always employed, but when used, results ina reduction in the concentration of amphibious shipping in theinner transport area and a reduction in the area to be swept ofmines. Since its use influences the landing force landing plan,decisions on the use of a sea echelon and the extent of its useare reached jointly by the amphibious task force commander andthe landing force commander. The sea echelon plan is preparedby the amphibious task force commander.

2. Specific information relating to individual ships iscontained in enclosures to this plan.

Sample Sea Echelon Plan

A-7

DEBARKATION SCHEDULE

1. This schedule is prepared jointly by the commanding officerof each ship carrying troops and by the commanding officer oftroops embarked. It is usually prepared after the troops areaboard and is distributed to all personnel responsible forcontrol of debarkation. Debarkation schedules ordinarily arenot prepared for units landing in amphibious vehicles departingfrom landing ships, since other forms are available.

2. Instructions in the schedule are supplemented and clarifiedby a ship's diagram (see following chart) of the debarkingstations that lists alongside each station the boat teams thatload there. Those teams that load their craft or vehicles whilein the well deck are also to be noted on the ship's diagram ofthe debark stations.

Sample Debarkation Schedule (BLT)

A-8

SHIP'S DIAGRAM

This ship's diagram supplements a debarkation schedule,graphically showing the location where boat teams will load.

Sample Ship's Diagram

A-9

APPROACH SCHEDULE

1. This schedule indicates, for each scheduled wave, the timesof arrival at and/or departure from various points: the parentship, rendezvous area, LOD, and other control points; and thetime of arrival at the beach. It gives wave numbers; coursesthe landing craft follow; names of control officers, boat groupcommanders (BGCs) and assistants; numbers of control ships; andother necessary information.

2. The approach schedule is prepared by the transport groupcommander embarking an assault battalion (or equivalent) landingteam. Schedules of subordinate units are submitted to highercommand for coordination and consolidation. The amphibious taskforce commander, together with the landing force commander,makes any modifications necessary to coordinate the overallship-to-shore movement.

Sample Approach Schedule

A-10

ASSAULT AREA DIAGRAM

1. This diagram is prepared as an overlay for an appropriatescale chart. It shows graphically the most important details;beach designations, boat lanes, lines of departure, landing shipareas, transport areas, and fire support areas in the immediatevicinity of the boat lanes.

2. The assault area diagram contains extracts from otherdocuments. It is prepared by the transport group commander.

3. Numerous enclosures to the diagram contain specificinformation such as individual archorage assignments, boat lanebuoyage instructions, etc.

Sample Assault Area Diagram

A-11

TRANSPORT AREA DIAGRAM

The transport area diagram is prepared as an overlay for a chartof the objective area. The overlay will show the area extendingfrom at least 1,000 yards off the beach to seaward and at least1,000 yards to seaward beyond the outermost berth in thedesignated transport area. Two diagrams will be required ifboth an outer and inner transport area are to be used. Overlayswill include the following as appropriate:

a. Transport area(s) and assignment of all deep-draft ships to berths.

b. Landing ship areas and assignment of all landing ships to berths.

c. LHD/LHA/LPH operating areas, if applicable.

d. Position of all control ships.

e. Boat and approach lanes.

f. Line of departure (to include separate LOD for AAV control when appropriate).

g. Assault amphibian vehicle launching area.

h. Causeway launching area.

i. Beaches.

j. Position of bowser tender LST.

k. Distances:

(1) From beach to center of transport area.

(2) From beach to line of departure.

(3) From approach lane marker ships to line of departure.

(4) Lengths of beaches.

l. Courses (true and magnetic):

(1) From line of departure to beaches.

(2) From approach lane marker ships to line of departure.

A-12

Sample Transport Area Diagram

A-13

ASSAULT WAVE DIAGRAM

This diagram displays the assault waves as they will appear at aspecified time prior to H-hour. The diagram is consolidatedjointly at the amphibious task force/landing force level andgiven wide distribution.

Sample Assault Wave Diagram

A-14

Sample Assault Wave Diagram (Con't)

A-15

BEACH APPROACH DIAGRAM

The diagram is prepared by the transport group commander as anoverlay for a large-scale chart of the landing beaches. Theoverlay extends from the beach seaward, 300 to 500 yards beyondthe LOD. The overlay incorporates the following, as appropriate:

a. Designation (color and number) and dimensions of landing beaches.

b. Line of departure.

c. Distance from beach to LOD.

d. Position of the following: (1) Primary and secondary control ships. (2) Control tender boats. (3) Casualty evacuation boats. (4) Medical boats. (5) Salvage boats. (6) Bowser boats. (7) Traffic control boats. (8) Boat group commander. (9) Assistant boat group commander. (10) Transfer line control boats. (11) Assault amphibious vehicle control boats.

e. If a cargo transfer line is established, position of: (1) Cargo transfer line. (2) Cargo transfer barges. (3) Cargo transfer line control boats.

f. Return boat lanes.

g. If a personnel transfer line is established, position of: (1) Transfer line. (2) Assault amphibious vehicle assembly area. (3) Transfer line control boats. (4) Assault amphibious vehicle control boats.

A-16

Sample Beach Approach Diagram

A-17

ALLOCATION OF SERIAL NUMBERS

1. A serial is a group of landing force units and theirequipment that originate from the same ship and that, fortactical or logistic reasons, will land on a specified beach ora specified helicopter landing zone at the same time. A serialnumber is assigned to each serial (group). Serial numbers areabstract numbers and do not in themselves prescribe a priorityin landing. They are assigned only for reference purposes andthe assignment in no way precludes the use of code names,designations or unit titles when such a use is expedient.

2. Early in the planning stage, the landing force commanderallocates a block of consecutive serial numbers, on the basis ofadministrative organization, to each landing force unit and Navyelement to be landed, regardless of their location in theassault echelon (AE) or assault follow-on echelon (AFOE).Allocation begins at the highest echelon; each unit thenallocates a consecutive portion of its block to its subordinateunits; and allocation continues until each element within thelanding force has a block of consecutive numbers for assignmentto its subordinate and attached elements.

3. After the landing and embarkation plans have beendetermined, each planning echelon assigns serial numbers fromits allocated block to its units, parts of units, or groupings.It is important to note that, while allocation of blocks ofserial numbers to units is based on the administrativeorganization, the actual assignment of individual serial numbersis based on the organization for landing. The method ofassignment does not depend either on the priority or on theestimated sequence of landing of nonscheduled units.

ALLOCATION OF BLOCKS BY LANDING FORCE

H&S I MEF 0-500 1ST FSSG 501-1200 UNASSIGNED 1200-1300 1ST MARDIV 1301-2200 3D MAW 2201-3100 - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - -

ALLOCATION OF BLOCKS BY DIVISION

HQBN 1301-1350 1ST MAR 1401-1600 - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - -

ALLOCATION OF BLOCKS BY REGIMENT HQCO 1ST MAR 1401-1425 1ST BN 1ST MAR 1426-1475 Allocation Of Serial Numbers

A-18

LANDING PRIORITY TABLE

1. This is a worksheet used at the landing force level that maybe prepared and issued to prescribe the planned buildup of thelanding force ashore. The table is based on the commander'stactical plan and provides a foundation for the orderlydeployment of landing forces in support of the plan. It listsall major units to be landed, the order of priority, the plannedtime of landing, and the designated beaches and/or landingzones, if known. Format of the table is determined by thecommand using it.

2. As indicated by the example below, the landing prioritytable is used principally when the landing force is complex orwhen a phasing of landing force units is required.

Sample Landing Priority Table

A-19

AMPHIBIOUS VEHICLE AVAILABILITY TABLE

This is a list of the type and number of vehicles available forassault landings and for support of other elements of theoperation. It also indicates the ships in which the assaultamphibious vehicles are carried to the objective area.

Sample Amphibious Vehicle Availability Table

A-20

LANDING CRAFT AND ASSAULT AMPHIBIOUS VEHICLE ASSIGNMENT TABLE

1. This table indicates the organization of landing force unitsinto boat teams and the assignment of boat teams to scheduledwaves, on-call waves, or nonscheduled units. It may alsoinclude instructions for assigning floating dump supplies tolanding craft or assault amphibious vehicles. The table,together with the debarkation schedule, furnishes the ship'scommanding officer with information for debarking troops andfloating dump supplies. The landing craft and assaultamphibious vehicle assignment table is prepared and promulgatedat the same time as the landing diagram. Both tables areprepared by the landing force.

2. Boat Space. The space and weight factor used to determinethe capacity of boats, landing craft and amphibious vehicles, itis based on the requirements of one person with individualequipment, who is assumed to weigh 224 pounds and to occupy 13.5cubic feet of space. (JCS Pub 1-02).

3. Allowance of boat spaces must be made for troop equipment,such as mortars, machine guns, vehicles, and heavy equipment. Asmaller number of personnel embark in craft carrying suchequipment. The number of boat spaces the equipment occupies isincluded in column three of the table.

4. Tactical integrity required by the tactical plan must bemaintained. Units must land in proper tactical formations. Forexample, a rifle squad and its equipment takes its place in thewave formation in proper relation to the other squads of theplatoon. Nonscheduled units are also boated tactically in asimilar way. The example on page A-21 shows the columnformation of AAVs in the first wave, and vee formation of LCMsin wave 3.

5. Guidelines for Assignment to Boat Teams. The assignment ofcommand elements and any attached or supporting troops, such asforward observers, naval gunfire spotters, and communicationspersonnel, is made to the craft carrying the rifle units towhich they are attached or which they directly support. If suchunits are assigned to separate craft, the craft are givenpositions in the waves that will facilitate small unitemployment on beaching. A separate wave may be organized forcommand elements, mortar platoons, and antitank platoons.

a. The risk of heavy losses in command elements is reduced by distributing elements of command and liaison personnel among two or more landing craft. For example, the BLT commander and a skeleton command group is boated in a free boat; the executive officer and his skeleton command section are boated in another craft. Each staff is capable of conducting the operations of the BLT if the other staff is

A-21

lost. Similarly, the risk of heavy loss in one arm or service is reduced by distribution among several craft. For example, personnel of a communications platoon are boated in several landing craft.

b. The priority of craft assignment is in the following order: assault platoons, supporting units, and reserve units.

6. Serials landing directly by beached LST are not normallyincluded on the landing craft and amphibious vehicle assignmenttable. Such serials would be indicated and specified in theassignment to shipping document.

Sample Landing Craft and Amphibious Vehicle Assignment Table

A-22

LANDING DIAGRAM (Surface)

This diagram provides information on the tactical deployment ofunits for the beach assault. It is based on the recommendationsof subordinate commanders. The landing diagram is prepared andpromulgated at the same time as the landing craft and amphibiousvehicle assignment table. It is distributed to all personnelresponsible for controlling the formation of the boat group andits waves during the movement. Information contained in thetable is used in the preparation of assault schedules.

Sample Landing Diagram (Surface)

A-23

ASSAULT SCHEDULE

This schedule prescribes the formation, composition, and timingof waves landing over the beaches. In preparing the schedule,the landing force or landing group commander considers therecommendations submitted by subordinate unit commanders inregard to the number of waves and the number and types oflanding craft and amphibious vehicles required in each wave.

Sample Assault Schedule

A-24

ASSAULT AMPHIBIOUS VEHICLE EMPLOYMENT PLAN

This table shows the planned employment of assault amphibiousvehicles in landing operations, including employment afterinitial movement to the beach. The landing force or landinggroup commander is responsible for preparation of the plan. Heis guided in the preparation of the table by recommendationsfrom subordinate commanders. The employment plan is completedbased on information contained in landing diagrams and assaultschedules.

Sample Assault Amphibious Vehicle Employment Plan

A-25

LANDING SEQUENCE SCHEDULE

1. This table is a complete list of the estimated landingsequence of the nonscheduled units of the landing force(including appropriate combat support, combat service support,and aviation units). It is used by troop and Navy agencies asthe principal document in executing and controlling theship-to-shore movement of these units and is the basis for theirembarkation and loading plans. The landing force commanderprepares the landing sequence table and issues it as part of thelanding plan. Subordinate commanders extract pertinent parts ofthe table for their use.

2. The landing proceeds in accordance with the estimatedsequence shown in the landing sequence tables, unless specificrequests for changes are made during the execution of theship-to-shore movement. If suitable beaching areas for landingships are limited, it may be desirable to reduce the exceptionsto the planned landing sequence table for units embarked inlanding ships that are to be beached for unloading.

3. This document answers two questions: (a) In what order arevehicles and equipment of nonscheduled units to be loaded so asto be available when requested from the beach? (b) Whatsequence is preferred to beach the LSTs that will landnonscheduled serials? The document is a guide to theembarkation officer in preparing his loading plans. Itindicates to him the commander's priorities in offloadingnonscheduled serials aboard the assigned shipping. In thisregard, only items of heavy equipment are of major consequence.

Sample Landing Sequence Table

A-26

HELICOPTER AVAILABILITY TABLE

The table shows the number and models of helicopters availablefor a proposed helicopterborne operation. It lists thehelicopter units, the number of helicopters available for firstand subsequent lifts, their tentative load capacity, and theships on which the helicopters are transported. The table isprepared by the senior helicopter unit commander.

Sample Helicopter Availability Table

A-27

HELITEAM WAVE AND SERIAL ASSIGNMENT TABLE

1. This table indicates the tactical units, equipment, andsupplies that are to be loaded into each helicopter. Itidentifies each heliteam (person and equipment) by its assignedserial number, and the serial number with the flight and wave.The weight column ensures that maximum helicopter payloads arenot exceeded by troop units.

2. This table is prepared by the commander of thehelicopterborne unit, assisted by the helicopter unit commander,and in coordination with the ship's commanding officer, and issubmitted to the next higher echelon for approval.

3. All landing categories are included in the heliteam wave andserial assignment table. The scheduled waves will be organizedinto helicopter waves and listed in numerical sequence. On-calland nonscheduled serials will be listed by wave and serialfollowing the scheduled waves.

4. This table is not normally prepared above the BLT or similarunit level. The serials listed will be included in the serialassignment tables at regimental and higher levels of the landingforce.

Sample Heliteam Wave and Serial Assignment Table

A-28

HELICOPTER LANDING DIAGRAM

The routes to and from LZs are illustrated in these diagrams.They include the helicopter transport area, rendezvous points,approach and retirement routes, departure and initial points,other control points, LZs and sites, and such other details andremarks as are necessary for clarity. The diagrams are preparedby the senior helicopter unit commander in coordination withcognizant helicopter transport group/unit commanders and aresubmitted through the chain of command to the amphibious taskforce commander for approval and coordination with plannedsupporting fire.

Sample Helicopter Landing Diagram

A-29

HELICOPTER EMPLOYMENT AND ASSAULT LANDING TABLE (HEALT)

1. This table is a detailed plan for the movement ofhelicopterborne troops, equipment, and supplies. It providesthe landing timetable for the helicopter movement and indicatesthe assignment of specific troop units to specific numberedflights.

2. This document is the basis for the helicopter unit's flightschedules and the control of helicopter movement by theappropriate air control agency. It is prepared by the commanderof the helicopterborne unit and the associated helicopter unitcommander, working in close coordination.

3. This table is analogous to the assault schedule and landingsequence table prepared by surface-landed units. On-call wavesand nonscheduled units (serials) will be listed in the priorityof landing following the listing of the scheduled waves.

Sample Helicopter Employment and Assault Landing Table

A-30

SERIAL ASSIGNMENT TABLE

1. This table lists by identifying serial numbers all units,except floating dumps, that are to be landed prior to generalunloading. The serial numbers are listed in numerical order, sothat the table may be a ready reference for information on thecomposition and landing requirements of each unit to which anumber is assigned.

2. This document is prepared by BLT commanders and thecommanders of separate task organizations of the landing forcethat are expected to land before commencement of generalunloading. These tables are promulgated in the appropriateunit's landing plans and are forwarded to higher echelons forapproval and ultimately for consolidation into the landing forceserial assignment table. Other subordinate units prepare listsof assignments by serial number from the block of serial numbersallocated to them. These lists are forwarded to the next higherechelon for approval and inclusion into their serial assignmenttable. When finally compiled at landing force level, it becomesa consolidation of facts obtained from documents prepared by allelements of the landing force. The table contains: adescription of the unit comprising the serial, the number ofpersonnel in the serial, the ship from which the serial is to belanded, the materiel and equipment in the serial, the number andtype of landing craft or amphibious vehicles required to landthe serial, and special instructions where needed.

3. Serial numbers assigned to helicopterborne units in the BLTheliteam wave and serial assignment tables will be consolidatedinto the serial assignment tables of higher echelons of thelanding force.

4. Information to complete this table is obtained from:

a. Allocation of serial numbers.

b. Assignment to shipping documents.

c. Landing Diagram.

d. Landing Sequence Table.

e. Landing Craft and Amphibious Vehicle Assignment Tables.

f. Heliteam Wave and Serial Assignment Tables.

A-31

Sample Serial Assignment Table

A-32

SAMPLE LANDING PLAN APPENDIX FOR AN RLT LANDING BY

SURFACE AND HELICOPTER CLASSIFICATION

Copy No. of CopiesRLT-23, 4th MarDiv (Rein), FMFc/o FPO, San FRANCISCO, CALIF012000Z June 1981-PDG-6

APPENDIX 3 (Landing Plan) to Annex R (Amphibious Operations) To Operation Plan 3-8

Ref: (a) CTF 76.2 Operation Plan 9-8 (b) NWP 22-3/FMFM 1-8 (c) FMFM 6-2

Time Zone: H

1. General

a. This plan calls for: (1) Landing one BN by helicopter in Landing Zone WREN. (2) Landing one BN over Beach RED in amphibious vehicles with two companies abreast. (3) Landing the RLT Reserve by helicopter, landing craft, and/or amphibious vehicles. (4) Landing combat support and combat service support elements by surface and helicopter as required.

b. For detailed instructions, see Tabs A thru J.

2. Control Measures

a. Ship-to-shore control in accordance with references (a), (b), and (c).

b. TACLOGs organize, embark, and function in accordance with Appendix 5, Annex R to the Operation Plan.

3. Pontoon Causeways, Barges, and Transfer Lines See Annex P to reference (a).

J. F. DOUBLEDAYColonel, U. S. Marine CorpsCommanding

CLASSIFICATION

A-33

CLASSIFICATION

Tabs:

A. Assault ScheduleB. Helicopter Availability TableC. Landing Craft Availability TableD. Amphibious Vehicle Availability TableE. Serial Assignment TableF. Landing Sequence TableG. Amphibious Vehicle Employment PlanH. Helicopter Landing DiagramJ. Helicopter Employment and Assault Landing Table

Distribution: Annex Z (Distribution) to Operation Plan 3-8 .

CLASSIFICATION

Sample Landing Plan Appendix for an RLT Landing by

Surface and Helicopter (Con't)

A-34

SAMPLE LANDING PLAN APPENDIX FOR A BLT LANDING

BY SURFACE MEANS CLASSIFICATION

Copy No. of CopiesBLT 2/23, 4th MarDiv (Rein),FMF c/o FPO SAN FRANCISCO, CALIF050930Z June 19815-DEF

APPENDIX 3 (Landing Plan) to Annex R (Amphibious Operations) toOperation Plan 3-8

Ref: (a) CTF 76.2 Operation Plan 9-8 (b) RLT-23 Operation Plan 3-8 (c) NWP 22-3/FMFM 1-8 (d) FMFM 6-3

Time Zone: H

1. General

a. This plan provides for: (1) Landing BLT 2/23 in amphibious vehicles over Beach RED ONE with two assault companies abreast and the reserve company in column. (2) Landing H&S Co (-) over Beach RED ONE in landing craft.

b. For detailed instructions, see tabs.

2. Control Measures

a. Ship-to-shore movement control in accordance with reference (a), (b), (c), and (d).

b. BLT embarkation officer designated TACLOG representative to transfer aboard PCS, Beach RED at H-2 hours. Functions in accordance with 4th MarDivO 4000.4A (CSS SOP).

TWO-Dash TWENTY-THREE

Lieutenant Colonel, U. S. Marine Corps

Commanding

CLASSIFICATION

A-35

CLASSIFICATION

Tabs:

A. Landing Diagram B. Serial Assignment Table C. Landing Craft and Amphibious Vehicle Assignment Table D. Landing Sequence Table E. Landing Craft Availability Table F. Amphibious Vehicle Availability Table G. Amphibious Vehicle Employment PlanDistribution: Annex Z (Distribution) Operation Plan CLASSIFICATION

Sample Landing Plan Appendix for a BLT Landing

By Surface (Con't)

A-36

PREPARATION OF THE LANDING PLAN (SURFACE)

1. Preparation of the landing plan appendix with necessary tabsis the culmination of all efforts in the preparation of the planfor landing.

2. The information needed to complete the landing plan ofhigher echelons of the landing force will be dependent on inputfrom subordinate elements. Correspondingly, before subordinateelements can begin preparation of their landing plans, they willrequire certain information: allocation of shipping, landingcraft availability, assignment of serial numbers, etc.

3. Tabs contained in a landing plan appendix will depend on thelevel of the landing force involved. Some are prepared at alllevels. Some are common only to the higher or to lowerechelons. Final preparation of some tabs will depend uponcompletion of others.

4. The sequence of the preparation of the Landing Plan and tabswith related planning considerations for a surface ship-to-shoremovement are as shown on the following page.

NOTE: The tabs are shown in the sequence at which time informationshould be available to prepare the completed document.

Preparation of the Landing Plan (Surface)

A-37

SAMPLE LANDING PLAN APPENDIX FOR A BLT

LANDING BY HELICOPTER

CLASSIFICATION

Copy No. of CopiesBLT /3, 4th MarDiv (Rein),FMFc/o FPO SAN FRANCISCO, CALIF031430Z June 19823 - RIQ

Appendix 3 (Landing Plan) to Annex R (Amphibious Operations) toOperation Plan 6-8

Ref: (a) CTF 76.2 Operation Plan 9-8 (b) 11th MEB Operation Plan 3-8 (c) NWP 22-3/FMFZM 1-8 (d) FMFM 6-3

Time Zone: H

1. General. This plan provides for landing BLT /3 byhelicopter in the Landing Zone WREN (Alternate LZ-GULL).

2. Control Measures

a. Ship to shore movement control: (1) HDC aboard LPH-4 will control the ship-to-shore movement. (2) Authority to change: (a) Approach and Retirement Routes - By request to TACC, HDC, or HC(A). Flight leaders may change in emergency if safety of helicopters is involved. (b) Landing Zone-BLT commander in conjunction with flight leader if change does not involve a change of route. In the event a change of route is required, the flight leader will request HDC to get permission from CATF or designated authority.

b. TACLOG will function aboard LPH-4 in accordance with Appendix 5. Annex R to the Operation Plan.

ONE-DASH TWENTY-THREE

Lieutenant Colonel, U. S. Marine Corps

Commanding

CLASSIFICATION

A-38

CLASSIFICATION

Tabs:

A. Helicopter Availability Table B. Helicopter Employment and Assault Landing Table C. Heliteam Wave and Serial Assignment Table D. Helicopter Landing Diagram E. Serial Assignment Table

Distribution: Annex Z (Distribution) to Operation Plan 6-8

CLASSIFICATION

Sample Landing Plan Appendix for a BLT

Landing by Helicopter (Con't)

A-39

PREPARATION OF THE LANDING PLAN (HELICOPTERBORNE)

1. Preparation of landing plan appendix and tabs will be thefinal steps in the preparation of the plan for landing.

2. The information needed to complete the landing plan ofhigher echelons of the landing force will be dependent on inputfrom subordinate elements. Subordinate elements will requirecertain information; allocation of shipping, helicopteravailability and lift capacity, assignment of serial numbers,etc., before they can prepare their landing plans.

3. Tabs contained in the landing plan appendix will depend onthe level of the landing force involved.

4. The sequence of the preparation of the landing plan andtabs with related planning considerations for helicopterborneship-to-shore movement are as shown on the opposite page.

NOTE: The tabs are shown in the sequence at which time informationshould be available to prepare the completed document.

Sample Preparation of the Landing Plan (Helicopterborne)

A-40

ORGANIZATION FOR EMBARKATION AND ASSIGNMENT TO SHIPPING TABLES

1. These documents are developed based on the shippingassigned to the CATF for the mission. The commander landingforce (CLF) evaluates the shipping available to support hisconcept of operations. Based on this evaluation, the landingforce is embarked to provide maximum flexibility and forceintegrity for the operation. Serial numbers are assigned tothe units or elements on assigned ships.

2. Preparation. The organization for embarkation andassignment to shipping table is prepared at the embarkationgroup and unit levels and, if desired, at the landing forcelevel. This table is not part of any landing plan but isincluded as an annex to the embarkation plan or order. Itspurpose is twofold: it serves as a convenient form or worksheetto facilitate allocation of units and supplies to assignedshipping, and it also serves as the means of promulgating thisinformation in embarkation plans and orders. The followingpages illustrate forms prepared at the embarkation unit andgroup levels. In final form, the tables show:

a. Capacity of assigned shipping.

b. Number of personnel to be embarked.

c. Distribution of troop units.

d. Proportion of vehicles, equipment, and supplies to be embarked in assigned shipping.

3. Ship's Capacity. Each ship's capacity is obtained from theinformation contained in its ship's characteristics pamphlet.The embarkation officer studies the pamphlets to determineembarked personnel spaces, square feet capacity, cubic feetcapacity for general cargo, and capacity for special stowagecargo such as drums, ammunition, and bulk fuel.

4. Explanation of Table. The organizations comprising theembarkation group (A-42) are indicated in the left columns ofthe form under the heading "organizations." The liftrequirements for these respective organizations are in thesecond column under the heading "lift requirements." Theorganization for embarkation is reflected in columns Alfa,Bravo, etc. The equipment and supplies indicated in thisportion of the table are the authorized allowances of the trooporganizations making up each embarkation unit.

A-41

a. The lower portion of the table indicates the distribution of landing force supplies by classes to be embarked with each embarkation unit. These supplies are differentiated from those of the troop units comprising the force only in that they are the supplies required to support the operation and have not been issued to a specific unit. Grand totals are computed by adding troop unit personnel and cargo totals to landing force totals.

b. An example of the organization for embarkation and assignment to shipping table prepared at the embarkation unit level is shown (A-43). This form reflects the organization and composition of respective embarkation teams and allocation of landing force supplies.

A-42

Sample Embarkation Group Organization for Embarkation and Assignment to Shipping Table

A-43

Sample Embarkation Unit Organization for Embarkationand Assignment to Shipping Table