world bank budget support to ida countries anjali kumar independent evaluation group, world bank
Post on 24-Feb-2016
27 Views
Preview:
DESCRIPTION
TRANSCRIPT
World BankBudget Support
toIDA Countries
Anjali KumarIndependent Evaluation Group, World Bank
Presentation to the Overseas Development Institute
London, 24 September 2010
1
PRSCs were introduced in2001, to improve aid effectiveness, and…
2
► Promote country ownership (Killick 1996, Collier et al. 1997, Killick et al. 1998, Dollar and Pritchard 1998, Dollar and Svensson 2000)
► Ease conditionality (Gilbert, Powell, Vines 1999)
► Increase predictability to permit incorporation in domestic budgets (Koeberle 2003)
► Support domestic governance/institutions (Barro and Sala-i-Martin 1997; Barro 1998; Mauro 1995)
► Increase efficiency through the fungibility of budget support aid (Devarajan, Swaroop, and Zou 1999)
► But concerns remain – Crowding out local initiative (Moyo 2009); potential for leakage (Collier 2007, 2009); or waste (Calderisi 2006)
From 2001-09, 99 PRSC operations were approved
FY01 FY02 FY03 FY04 FY05 FY06 FY07 FY080
5
10
15
20
25
24
8
13
20 2018
19
2 2
7
10
17
15
19
15
…worth $8 billion, in 27 countries
Countries with ongoing PRSCs
New PRSCs approved
From 2001 to September 2009, 99 PRSC operations were approved
► 20 more operations ($1.7billion) under preparation (for FY10)
► One-fourth of Bank policy lending but 30-40% of disbursements to PRSC countries
► But PRSC share of country budgets is declining (7 % in 2001; 1.5% in 2008) 3
Objectives of Budget Support
through the PRSC: ► Help strong performing IDA
countries with responsible fiduciary environments to implement domestically owned Poverty Reduction Strategies
► Support poverty-oriented growth and emphasize pro-poor service delivery
► Strengthen domestic planning and budgeting with predictable medium-term aid commitments
► Provide a framework for aid harmonization
► Strengthen the institutional framework for budget and public financial management
► Focus on the achievement of results, in a clearly articulated Results framework
4
Evaluation Objective and Scope
► Assess the extent to which PRSCs were able to meet their core objectives
► Examine their relevance and effectiveness as a vehicle to support growth, improve social conditions, and help alleviate poverty
► Scope: All PRSC operations from their introduction in 2001 until end June 2008
5
Building Blocks: Data Sources
6
► Sources of information:• Desk review: objectives, design, effectiveness, results
framework of 88 PRSC projects• Field evaluations: 7 country case studies covering 31
PRSC operations, 8 completed PRSC series, 4 four ongoing series, and 33 percent of PRSC disbursements over FY01-FY08. Available at the IEG website.
• Surveys: Task team leaders, Sector specialists, Government stakeholders
• Relevant databases, including: WB evaluative data, ALCID, POVCAL, CPIA,
ROSCs, OECD Aid Aggregates, Monitoring of Paris
Declaration, IMF IFS► Extensive literature including other case studies► Quality control: 3 internal peer reviewers; three
external experts
Evaluation Methods
7
► Triangulate data to establish plausible causality• Establish a Results chain• Account for other determinants
► Compare ‘before and after’ changes in performance of PRSC beneficiaries • But: ‘before’ and ‘after’ comparisons of
outcomes are limited by problems of identification due to the endogeneity of policy responses within each country
► Therefore, also compare changes in PRSC countries to changes experienced by IDA countries that have not benefited from PRSCs • “Difference in difference” approach• Add controls for ‘better performing’ IDA
countries
Evaluation Questions and Results Chain
8
Inputs
• Appropriate program design and analytical underpinning
• Aligning resource flow with domestic processes and timetable
• Enhancing donor collaboration
Outputs
• Implementation of a strategic subset of the PRSP• More predictable resource flows and resource use
aligned with PRS • Harmonization of donor programs• Improved domestic accountability
Outcomes
• Improved climate for growth and improved pro-poor service delivery
• More effective public administration
Impact
• Sustained growth• Reduction of income and non-income poverty
Challenges and Caveats
9
► Parallel changes affecting all World Bank Development Policy Lending occurred over the period of analysis• New Bank guidelines in August 2004 for all
DPLs; • PRSC Interim Guidelines were not formalized
though PRSC operations continued • Analysis adds a filter for two sub-periods,
2001 to 2004 and 2005 to 2008 ► PRSC is usually one part of a larger basket of
donor funded general budget support ► Both the Bank and other donor partners use a
range of instruments to support country development programs. • Account for role of other donors and other
instruments
Evaluating the PRSC aid process
10
Evaluating Conditionality
11
► Did conditionality ease with PRSCs? Was conditionality more flexibly applied? • Compare numbers of prior actions (legally
binding) and program benchmarks (not legally binding) in PRSCs compared to non-PRSC policy based loans during FY80-00 period – prior adjustment
lending during the PRSC period FY01-08 during PRSC subperiods FY01-04 and FY05-08
► Triangulate with Client Perceptions of Conditionality• Nature and numbers of Conditions• Program Implementation and Political Change• Recognition of Implementation Constraints
1219
9019
9119
9219
9319
9419
9519
9619
9719
9819
9920
0020
0120
0220
0320
0420
0520
0620
0720
080
10
20
30
40
50
Conditions in Bank adjustment loans, FY1980 -- FY2008
Ave
rage
# o
f con
ditio
ns p
er o
pera
tion
28 383336303842 3228 23483629292727 323032322931 23161699 144
2 1916171072 15
PRSC legal conditions
Non-PRSC legal conditions
…conditionality declined in all policy lending
Eased conditionality -
13
1990
1991
1992
1993
1994
1995
1996
1997
1998
1999
2000
2001
2002
2003
2004
2005
2006
2007
2008
0
10
20
30
40
50
Ave
rage
# o
f con
ditio
ns p
er o
pera
tion
Conditions in Bank Adjustment loans, FY1980 -- FY2008
28 383336303842 3228 23483629292727 323032322931 23161699 144
2 1916171072 15
PRSC program benchmarks
Non-PRSC program benchmarks
…conditionality declined in all policy lending
Eased conditionality -
Evaluating Flexibility– Modification of Conditions
14
► Numbers of adjustments made to proposed future prior actions (triggers):• Modifying content• Modifying timing or• Dropping conditions if they proved
unrealistic. ► Comparisons with numbers of waivers of
tranche release conditionalities across pre-PRSC adjustment operations
► Triangulation: survey of task team leaders; government stakeholders
► Triggers between FY01 and FY08:
• 59% met• 15% downgraded• 9% amended• 8% dropped• 9%
replaced/postponed► Sometimes new prior
actions were included15
More flexibility in interpreting conditionality…
► PRSCs introduced ‘triggers’ - indicative prior actions in place of legally binding tranche release conditions
Evaluating the Predictability of PRSCs
16
► Predictability measured by:• Likelihood, based on past frequencies, of a PRSC
recipient country receiving a PRSC in a given year, compared to previous adjustment loans.
• Likelihood, based on observed past frequencies, of a PRSC country receiving any policy-based budget support, compared to previous adjustment lending.
• Stability of volumes of budget support received via PRSCs compared to previous adjustment lending, in absolute terms and as a proportion of total IDA/IBRD flows received
► Comparison of PRSC lending projections envisaged in country strategy documents vs. actual disbursements
► Other studies measured predictability by comparing:• Actual budget vs. predicted budget support
disbursements• Commitments vs. disbursements
Evaluating the regularity and timing of PRSC disbursements
17
► Alignment of budget support relative to the budget needs: • Timing of disbursements
relative to country budget year: • Percentage of operations that
disbursed in last quarter of the preceding fiscal year
• Or in the first quarter of the current fiscal year
► Regularity of disbursements measured by:• Percentage of operations in a
series that disbursed in the same quarter, in each successive year
Burkina Faso is a good example…
18
1991
1992
1993
1994
1995
1996
1997
1998
1999
2000
2001
2002
2003
2004
2005
2006
2007
2008
0
10000000
20000000
30000000
40000000
50000000
60000000
70000000
80000000
90000000
100000000
Q4
Q3
Q2
Q1
PRSC 1
PRSC 2
PRSC 3
PRSC 4
PRSC 7
PRSC 6
PRSC 5
PRSC 1
PRSC 2
PRSC 3
PRSC 4
PRSC 7
PRSC 6
PRSC 5
PRSC 1
PRSC 2
PRSC 3
PRSC 4
PRSC 7
PRSC 6
PRSC 5
PRSC 1
PRSC 2
PRSC 3
PRSC 4
PRSC 7
PRSC 6
PRSC 5
PRSC 1
PRSC 2
PRSC 3
PRSC 4
PRSC 7
PRSC 6
PRSC 5
PRSC 1
PRSC 2
PRSC 3
PRSC 4
PRSC 7
PRSC 6
PRSC 5
PRSC 1
PRSC 2
PRSC 3
PRSC 4
PRSC 7
PRSC 6
PRSC 5
PRSC 1
PRSC 2
PRSC 3
PRSC 4
PRSC 7
PRSC 6
PRSC 5
A steady volume of disbursements, in the same quarter per series…
More predictable resources …
Evaluating Alignment, Ownership and Operationalization of National
Plans
19
► Country Case Studies and Client and Team leader interviews were the main instruments. They suggest that: • PRSCs are well aligned with national
development strategies and enjoy greater ownership than preceding adjustment lending, at least in core ministries
• PRSC countries improved their operationalization of national development strategies better than other IDA-eligible countries
• PRSC countries have been more successful at operationalizing national development strategies, but gap is closing
• PRSCs are effective in raising the importance of the budget as a tool for policy formulation
• Inter-ministerial dialogue improved, but the quality of sector dialogue may have lost some depth
20as in other DPLs
Education
Finance
Health
Ind. & Trade
Public sector
0% 10% 20% 30% 40% 50% 60% 70%
non-PRSC PBL (IDA) FY95-00 - 92 projects
Education
Finance
Health
Ind. & Trade
Public sector
0% 10% 20% 30% 40% 50% 60% 70%
PRSC (01-08) 87 Operations
Education
Finance
Health
Ind. & Trade
Public sector
0% 10% 20% 30% 40% 50% 60% 70%non-PRSC PBL (IDA) FY05-08 - 57 projects
Evaluating sector support through PRSCs: Increased spending on education, health, PFM
21
► PRSCs were initially perceived a potential vehicle for all lending, including sector lending
► But ultimately, PRSC support complemented sector lending; replacement was rare
► IEG’s comparison of PRSC operations with the Country Assistance Strategies for PRSC countries shows that:• Many countries tried to channel sector lending
through the PRSC: Of 15 CASs in health & education, only 2
achieved sustained results Of 6 CASs in nutrition, water supply,
agriculture or environmental management, 1 on a sustained basis
Evaluating Budget support through PRSCs compared to sector lending…
22
► How well defined were PRSC results frameworks, in particular regarding the definition of measurable end-of-series, intermediate, and baseline targets and indicators?
► Was the PRSC results framework well adapted to the implementation of the PRSC?
► How consistent was the reporting of results?► To what extent did the PRSC draw on national
M&E systems used for domestic accountability outside the framework of aid flows?
► Was capacity building for developing national M&E addressed?
Evaluating PRSC Results Frameworks: Evaluative questions - examples
► On average PRSC countries score better than others on results frameworks, but this is not obviously linked to the PRSC
Need for:► More clearly defined
indicators► Better baseline data,
intermediate and end-of-series indicators, milestones
► Consistency over timeShortcomings due to:
► Weak upstream PRSPs/ CASs ► Multi-donor process
differences► Modest M&E frameworks,
often reflecting weak country statistical capacity
23
Results Frameworks – Findings: Weak but improving
24
Often as member of a multi-donor group
e.g., in many countries in Africa, notably
Mozambique and Ghana, via a joint ‘PAF’
Evaluating PRSC’s role in improving donor harmonization
Did PRSCs serve as a focal point? Sometimes
e.g., Vietnam, where the Bank-led PRSC matrix was adopted by the government
Achievements► Did the PRSC process help to
harmonize donor matrices and align them with the national plans? Yes, PRSCs played a supporting role
► Were transaction costs for recipients reduced? Yes, to some extent
► Did other donors benefit? Yes, Bank expertise was made available to recipients and other donors
► Based on OECD data, the Bank harmonized more missions than other donors - in PRSC as well as non-PRSC countries, especially in weaker IDA countries
25
Donor harmonization through PRSCs had notable achievements…
► Limited integration of PRS reviews with the joint matrix (PAF)
► Initial perception of increased conditionality
► Increased transaction costs for Bank (e.g. Mozambique, Ghana)
► Some loss in Bank relevance alongside undue influence of small donors
26
Donor harmonization: challenges remain
PRSC Outcomes –
Public Financial Management
Easier objectives accomplished
27
28
Methodology of PFMP Evaluation of PRSCsDiagnostics• Were diagnostics comprehensive?• Extend of coverage• Treatment of fiduciary risk
• Were weaknesses addressed by PRSC program?• Was PRSC reform program consistent with action plans from
diagnostics?Design & Implementation• How well designed was results framework for PFMP?• Integrated action plan supported by key donors?• Significant delays in reforms?• Extent and quality of capacity building
Results• Before/After reform improvement in PFMP performance
where PRSC reforms focused• Achievement of PFMP objectives in PRSCs• General improvement in PFMP systems (CPIA etc.)
► Reforms well grounded in diagnostics led to well sequenced strategy agreed with donors
► Program achievements were in easier areas (e.g., budget classification reform)
► More difficult reforms show less success (e.g. bringing extra-budgetary funds and donor funds on budget; timely resource transfer to sector ministries)
29
Most PRSCs achieved their PFMP reform objectives, with minor shortcomings
PRSC Outcomes in Growth and Poverty Alleviation…
are difficult to establish
30
1985-1999 2000-2007
Per Capita GDP growth
PRSC countries 0.8 4.2
Better Performing Non-PRSC 0.5 3.3
All IDA countries 0.2 3.0
31
Attribution to the PRSC is difficult
PRSC countries grew faster in the PRSC period…but so did other
countries
Poverty Rates for PRSC and Non-PRSC Countries (% of population below $38 per month)
PRSC countries
(20)
Better performing non-PRSC
(24)*
Non-PRSC counties
(36)
All IDA countries
(56)
% change (1984-99) -16.2 -12.6 -2.1 -7.8
% change (1999-2005)
-19.3 -13.0 -10.8 -14.1
but the decline began before the PRSC was introduced
33
PRSC countries had more income poverty reduction…
PRSC and Other Countries: Millennium Development Goal Achievement
Difference (%)(% of population) (1990/1–2000/1) (2001–06)Primary enrollment, net PRSC 9.7 14.8 All IDA countries 11.6 9.1Infant mortality (per 1000) PRSC -19.0 -13.3 All IDA countries -14.5 -9.6Access to safe water PRSC 20.2 7.3 All IDA countries 12.6 4.8
…and progress was faster than before the PRSC period …and faster than all other IDA countries in the
PRSC period
34
PRSC Countries had greater progress with Millennium Development Goals…
► Income poverty rates fell faster in PRSC countries, in the PRSC period, but also fell faster prior to the PRSC
► In non-income measures of poverty PRSC countries did better, and improvement in the PRSC period was faster
► Most PRSC programs do not trace links between actions and poverty outcomes
► Parallel sector projects increase the difficulty of attribution
32
Attribution of declining poverty rates to the PRSC remains difficult
1. PRSCs improved aid processes• Enhanced country
ownership • Eased, flexible,
conditionality• Better predictability -
volume, frequency and budget alignment
• More pro-poor service delivery
2. Growth and poverty outcomes are unclear
• Weak Results frameworks• Partial Support to Sectors
3. Other Policy Based Lending converged to a similar design
35
Evaluation Findings - Three Key Messages
1. Strengthen results frameworks, link with underlying PRS; increase poverty focus
2. Focus sector content on high-level or crosscutting issues
3. Further simplify the language of conditionality and eliminate the term ‘triggers’
4. Synchronize Bank’s internal processing with country and donor processes to enable greater ‘voice’ for Bank in multi-donor budget framework
5. Underpin PRSCs/DPLs with comprehensive pro-poor growth diagnostics
6. Phase out PRSC “brand name” or clarify when it is to be used
a
36
Evaluation Recommendations
IEG INDEPENDENT EVALUATION GROUP
37
Thank youwww.worldbank.org/
ieg/prsc
top related