why uploading will not work - patrick hopkins - h+ summit @ harvard
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Why Uploading Will Not Work
How Ghosts Haunt Transhumanism
Patrick D. Hopkins
H+ 2010
Transhumanist Tendencies
Naturalism
• Materialism
• Empiricism
Religious Analogs
• Transcendence
• Enlightenment
• TransubstanGaGon
• Singularity
• Universal consciousness
• Immortality
Immortality and Uploading
• The language of uploading
– Uploading is the transfer of the brain’s mindpa6ern onto a different substrate (such as an advanced computer) which be6er facilitates said en=ty’s ends. Uploading is a central concept in our vision of technological ascension…. (Kadmon, 2003)
– In transhumanism and science fic=on, mind transfer…refers to the hypothe=cal transfer of a human mind either into a computer or other non-‐human receptacle, or from one human body to another. (Knowledgerush, 2009)
– Mind uploading is a radical form of human enhancement, whereby the human mind is transferred from the vulnerable organic medium of the brain to a computer system of some kind. (Human Enhancement and Biopoli=cs, 2009)
Immortality and Uploading
• The language of uploading
– In transhumanism and science fic=on, mind transfer…refers to the hypothe=cal transfer of a human mind, body and environment to an ar=ficial substrate. (Fact-‐Archive.com, 2005)
– Mind uploading, some=mes called whole brain emula=on, refers to the hypothe=cal transfer of a human mind to a substrate different from a biological brain, such as a detailed computer simula=on of an individual human brain. (Sen=ent Developments, 2009)
– Involving the transference of a mind from biological brain to computer hardware—or, for that ma6er, any other substrate…mind uploading is a tenet of transhumanist hopes and science fic=on. (Keim, 2009)
– The last stage, mind uploading, leads as logically on from brain emula=on as brain emula=on does from neuroprosthe=cs. Once it is possible to emulate a brain, it should be possible to transfer the mind within that brain from one set of hardware to another. (Virtual Worldlets Network, 2006)
Metaphor and Language
• SomeGmes obvious
• SomeGmes subtle
• SomeGme hidden literaliGes
Metaphor and Language
Argument and War
• Win an argument
• Weak points in the posiGon
• CriGcisms on target
ConversaGon and Conduit
• Got the idea across
• Put ideas into words
• Full of meaning
Language of Uploading
The Language
• “Transfer the mind from the brain to a computer”
The Metaphors
• Loca=on– The mind is “in” or “within” a
brain and can be put “into” a computer
• Mo=on– The mind can be “moved” or
“transferred” or “put” into a computer
• Substance– The mind is a thing that can be
moved from one “receptacle” to another
Problems
• Is the mind an an object that is housed “inside” a brain and through technology can be “moved” from one “receptacle” to another?
• Not according to most materialist, naturalist, versions of mind that inform transhumanism
Problems
• If we look for posi=ons that have held the view that minds or consciousnesses are actually substan=al objects that have loca=on and can be moved from one body to the next, we do not have far to look—only so far as popular religion.
• Souls, spirits, ghosts
• Uploading advocates have fallen prey to using the language of dualism, with its transmigratory souls and displaceable ghosts
Making Too Much of the Language?
ObjecGon
• Just a metaphor, uploading proponents are not taking this literally
Response
• Something very important depends on metaphors of loca=on and mo=on
• Specific minds are “transferred”• Preserva=on of iden=ty treated as
unproblema=c because of moving a singular object
• The mind “in” the computer is the same mind as the one “in” in the brain
• Not the same type, not a copy, but the same one
Problem of IdenGty
• If minds are not literally movable substances, the preservaGon of idenGty is sGll a problem, even though the language hides it
• The word “transfer” includes preservaGon of idenGty
• When an object is simply moved from one locaGon to another, preservaGon of idenGty is easy
• But if the mind is not literally “moved” or “transferred”, then how is idenGty preserved?
Transferring & Copying
• proponents of uploading do not believe that a mind is literally being carried from one place to another
• “transference” is supposed to be accomplished by emula8on, simula8on, or replica8on—all terms that boil down to the concept of copying
Copying = Transferring?
Method
• Example: Moravec’s “Transmigra=on”
• robot brain surgeon microscopically scans the layers of your brain, constructs a 3-‐D chemical map, writes a program modeling the neural =ssue’s behavior, and then installs and ac=vates the
Consequences
• Though you have not lost consciousness, or even your train of thought, your mind has been removed from the brain and transferred to a machine (110).
• Ul8mately your brain would die and your mind would find itself en8rely in the computer (112).
• You may choose to move your mind from one computer to another that is more technically advanced…(112).
• The program can also be copied to a future equivalent of magne8c tape. Then, if the machine you inhabit is fatally clobbered, the tape can be read into a blank computer…(112).
• As a computer program, your mind can travel
Metaphysics of Copying
• Does copying “move” something?
• For example, copying a page from a book (even if you slowly destroy the original page) does not “move” the page
Metaphysics of Copying
• Does the copying of personal idenGty work by different rules?
• Moravec says yes, because “pa^ern-‐idenGty” not “body-‐idenGty” is key to the mind
Metaphysics of Copying
• Moravec: “PaMern-‐iden8ty, conversely, defines the essence of a person, say myself, as the paMern and the process going on in my head and body, not the machinery suppor8ng that process. If the process is preserved, I am preserved. The rest is mere jelly (116-‐117). “
• Lets grant it is correct to say that the process (of cogniGon) is what defines an individual
• The problem is in thinking that copying the process “preserves” the process
Metaphysics of Copying
• We must be aware of the very strong sense of the terms needed for this topic
• Moravec says that copying preserves iden8ty because the copy is indis8nguishable and because copying simply transfers a paMern
• “Iden8ty”– Not simply exactly similar, but the very same thing; A is iden=cal to B only if A and B are the very same one thing
• “Preserve”– To maintain iden=ty over a process; e.g.,
• “Indis8nguishable”– There are no proper=es A has that B has
Metaphysics of Copying
• Does copying preserve idenGty?
• No
• It makes a new thing that is exactly structurally and behaviorally similar, but that’s not good enough
Why?
• DisGnguishability
• Pa^ern IdenGty
• Understanding Thought Experiments
Why?
DisGnguishability
• The copied mind is a process produced by different ma^er in a different place with a different history
• The relaGonship between the original and the copy is not nearly as strong as the “relaGonship” between the original and itself
Why?
Pa^ern IdenGty
• PaMern “iden8ty” in the strong sense is not preserved either
• PaMerns are not abstracted things (that are then treated as concrete things)
• There is no “paMern” above and beyond the actual maMer. Take away the maMer and you have no paMern leT.
• PaMerns are not real. “They” are just nouns that we use to talk about the fact that material systems are organized in par8cular ways.
• Exactly similar organiza8ons of maMer produce exactly similar processes, but there is no “paMern” that is “moved” any more than there is a mind that is “moved”
• Thinking of paMerns as movable things is trea8ng them like souls
Why?
Thought Experiments
• Photocopying example
– Material ink organized in exactly similar ways
• Moravec’s destrucGve uploading
• But imagine this.
• Gun to your head example
• Just Kidding variaGon
• You are in exactly the same relaGonship to the copy as you would have been had you been killed.
Conclusion
• Uploading sounds at first like a wondrous marvel of technology that promises immortality, but on closer inspec8on it depends on vague, inaccurate, and faulty assump8ons that are holdovers from supernaturalism and dualism.
• Trea8ng minds and paMerns as objec8ve moveable substances or proper8es is just as mysterious as beliefs about ghosts and souls and vital spirits.
• The discourse on uploading has inherited a language that tricks us into thinking minds work much the same way as souls.
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