when eyes touch - university of michigan

volume21,no.09 may2021

When Eyes Touch

James LaingUniversity of York

© 2021 JamesLaingThis work is licensed under a Creative Commons

Attribution-NonCommercial-NoDerivatives 3.0 License. <www.philosophersimprint.org/021009/>

I f two gazes come into contact, the one with the other, thequestion will always be whether they are stroking or strikingeachother—andwherethedifferencewouldlie.

—JacquesDerrida,On Touching—Jean-LucNancy

§1. Introduction

1.1. The significance of eye contactWhen we make eye contact, we experience a form of interpersonalconnectionthatplaysacentralroleinhumansociallife,communica-tion, and interpersonal understanding. From the earliest days of in-fancy,humansaresensitivetotheeyesofothers,preferringtolookatfacesoverotherkindsofstimuli,andfacesthatreturntheirgazemostofall(Farronietal.2002).Byaroundsixweeksofage,theybecomeca-pableofholdingeyecontactwiththeircaregiverand,asDanielStern(1977,p.46)puts it, thecaregiver “experiences for thefirst time theverycertain impression that the infant is really lookingather,evenmore, intohereyes…thatsheandthebabyarefinally ‘connected’.”Later thisconnection takesacommunicative form in theplayofex-pressionandresponsethatpsychologistscall‘protoconversation’and,byaroundnine to twelvemonthsofage, in the initiationandmain-tenanceofjointattention.1Themotivationtoengageinthisformofinterpersonalconnection for itsownsake is thoughtbymanytobeadistinctivefeatureofhumansociallifeandtohaveplayedaroleintheevolutionofhumanlanguageandthought(Tomasello2019).Thisis arguably reflected in the peculiar morphology of the human eye,whichisrelativelyelongatedandhasagreateramountofvisiblewhitesclera,therebyfacilitatingeyecontactandgazefollowing(KobayashiandKohshima2001).2

1. SeeStern(1977),Trevarthen(1979),Tronicketal.(1979),Bruner(1983),andReddy(2008,Chs.5–6).

2. Thisisnottoimplythatallhumansareorientedtoeyecontactinthesameway.Childrenontheautismspectrumengageineyecontactmuchlessfre-quentlythanotherchildrenandtendtofinditmuchmoreunpleasantwhentheydo(fordiscussion,seeHobson2002andHobson&Hobson2011).Ialsodonotmeantoimplythatthisformofconnection(orsomesimilarformof

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attemptstomakeeyecontactinvasiveandwhichmakesprolongedep-isodesofeyecontactuncomfortable,evenamongfriends.Strikingtherightbalanceofeyecontactisadelicatetask,onewhichcangeneratefeelingsofself-consciousnessandsocialanxiety.Prolongedepisodesofeyecontactusuallyoccurduringepisodesofheightenedemotionaland physical arousal, especiallyduringepisodesofmutual intimacyoraggression.Theavoidanceofeyecontact,moreover,playsasalientroleinthephenomenologyofshame,guilt,andhumiliation.InKing Lear,CornwallblindsGloucesterinordertoavoidhisshame-inducinggaze(seeCavell1969).Sophocles’sOedipus, incontrast,blindshim-selfanddoessooutofadesiretoseverallcontactwiththeinterper-sonalrealm:

Thusbrandedasafelonbymyself,HowhadIdaredtolookyouintheface?Nay,hadIknownawaytochokethespringsOfhearing,IhadnevershrunktomakeAdungeonofthismiserableframe,Cutofffromsightandhearing;for’tisblissTobideinregionssorrowcannotreach.

(Oedipus the King,p.127)

1.2. Eye ‘contact’Despite itssignificance,eyecontacthasreceived little in thewayofdedicatedphilosophicalexploration.Yetinsomuchasraisingthetop-ic,weemploylanguagewhichis,onreflection,fascinating.Wedisplayadeepandpervasivetendencytodescribeeyecontactonthemodeloftouch.Wespeakofeyecontact,ofcatchinganother’seye,andofhold-inganother’sgaze.Andindoingso,wemakecontactandconnectwiththem—thus,intheliteratureon‘joint’attention,eyecontactisoftencalled‘contactattention’.Moregenerally,theeyesaredescribedasbe-ingabletopierce, probe,andpenetrate.Aguidingthoughtofthispaper

Theeyesandfacehaveaspecialplaceinourcommunicativereper-toire.Notonlyaretheythemostexpressivepartsofthehumanbody,butit is ‘tothem’thatothersaddressusand‘fromthem’thatwead-dress others in turn. These points, paired with the fact that the ap-pearanceofone’sfaceanditsmannerofexpressionaretypicallythefeaturesmostdistinctiveofone’sindividualappearance,contributetocommontendencyofthinkingofourselvesas,insomesense,locatedinoureyesandfaces(forfurtherdiscussionofthesepoints,seeCock-burn1985andMoran2017).

Eyecontact thereforeconstitutesa fundamental formof interper-sonalcontact.Wherethereisnopossibilityofeyecontact,asduringphonecallsoronlinevideocalls,wefeeldistantordetachedfromoneanother.ThisisacuriousomissionfromKieranSetiya’s(2020)obser-vationthat,duringvideocalls,“thereisavoidbetweenus.Wecannotfeeleachothers’breathsormovements;wecannotlookatthesameobjectinoursurroundings;wecannotsenseeachothers’warmthorstandtogetherorapart;wecannottouch.”Afterall,beingabletomakeeyecontactisatypicalfeatureofmostface-to-faceinteractions,where-asmanyofthethingsonSetiya’s listaregenerallyreservedforonlyourmostintimaterelationships.

Eyecontactalsoseemstoplayasignificantroleinourpre-reflec-tiveunderstandingofethicallife.JoelFeinberg(1970,p.252),forone,writesthat“havingrightsenablesusto…lookothersintheeye,andtofeelinsomefundamentalwaytheequalofanyone,”andStephenDarwall (2004,p.43)observes that theetymological rootof respect,theLatinrespicere,means‘tolookback’atanother,whichhesuggestsisrelatedtotheideaofmeetinganother’sgazeasawayofreciprocat-inganother’sactofsecondpersonaladdress.

Finally, eye contact plays an important role in human emotionallife.Theinteractionbetweenaninfantandacaregiverisaprolonged,enjoyableone,butmostformsofeyecontactbetweenadultsinvolveafeelingofexposure,afeelingwhichrendersuninvitedorexcessive

connection)canbeestablishedthroughmutualtouch,conversation,orjointspeech.

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withoutinteractingwithit,totouchsomethingistypicallytoactuponit,topressagainstitandmoveitfromhandtohand:theobjectchecksmyactivity,maintainingitsshapeagainstmygrip,weighingmedownasItrytoliftitup(MacMurray1957,p.107).Eyecontactisanalogoustotouchinthisrespect:whenwemakeeyecontact,wearenotmerelyrelatedasspectatorsofoneanother’smentallives;wehavetocatchanother’seyeandholdtheirgaze,oftenwitheffort,and,whenwedo,wetherebyinteractwithoneanother.

Thisbringsustothethirdandfinalreasontoattendtothesemeta-phors. Doing so serves as a corrective against two widespread ten-denciesinmodernphilosophy:visuocentricismandcontemplativism.Visuocentricism is, as John MacMurray (1957, p. 104) remarks, thetendencytotreat“visionasthemodelofallsensoryexperience”andto “proceedas though itwerecertain thata theoryofvisualpercep-tionwillapply,mutatismutandis,toallothermodesofsense-percep-tion.” Though this revolt against visuocentricism is a rallying cry ofrecentdiscussionsinthephilosophyofperception(e.g.,O’Callaghan2007,pp.3–4),MacMurray’searlystatementofthetendencyisinter-esting insofar as he associates it with something more general: thetendency of treating knowledge and experience on the model of vi-sualcontemplation.It’sthistendencyG.E.M.Anscombe(2000,§32,p.57)describeswhenshecomplainsthatmodernphilosophershavean“incorrigiblycontemplativeconceptionofknowledge.”Thishasasaconsequencetheassimilationofpracticalknowledgetothemodeloftheoreticalknowledge,andtheresultingpicturepresentspracticalknowledge“asiftherewereaveryqueerandspecialsortofseeingeyeinthemiddleoftheacting.”Surprisinglyperhaps,Ithinkasimilarten-dencyisatworkinphilosophicalthoughtabouteyecontact,insofarasvisualmetaphorsof ‘seeingoneself reflected through theeyesofanother’areoftenprivilegedoverthetactilemetaphorsthatareusedmorecommonlyinordinarycontextstodescribeeyecontact.

isthatthesemetaphorsdeserveattention.3Theyplayapowerful,oftenunacknowledged,roleinourthought,andtheyaresofamiliarthatweoftenusethemwithoutrealizingthatwearedeployingmetaphors.Iwillnowofferthreereasonstotakethesemetaphorsseriously.

First,theyhavethepowertomisleadus,especiallywhenweforgettheyare informingour thought.This issometimessaidof themeta-phorofthemindasaninner‘theatre’(e.g.,Kenny1971)orthememoryasa‘storehouse’(e.g.,Margalit2002).BrianO’Shaughnessy(2003,p.183)warnsagainstover-interpretingthenotionofperceptualcontactasakindof“concretecontactofthemindwithitsobject…apalpableconnectionofsomekind,ratherasifthegazeliterallyreachedoutandtouchedit.”Later,Iwillsuggestthatthereisariskofbeingmisledinour thoughtabouteyecontactbycertainvisualandcommunicativemetaphors (of theeyesasa ‘window’ to thesoulandof the faceasmakinga‘claim’onus).

Nevertheless,itisplausiblethatthesemetaphorshavethepowertomisleadusonlyinsofarastheyhavesomeintuitiveappeal,insofaras they pick up on some genuine feature of what it is like to makeeyecontact.Thisisthesecondreason:reflectingonwhatmakesthesemetaphors apt can reveal something about our experience whichmightotherwiseevadeournotice.Ithinkthesemetaphorsdrawatten-tiontotwointuitionsinparticular.

Oneintuitionisthateyecontactisaformofintersubjective contact, justas touchingsomeone isa formofphysical contact. JohnHeron(1970, p. 243) observes that “[i]n mutual touching as in mutual gaz-ing,eachpersonbothgivesandreceivesinthesameactandreceivesmoreoverwhat theotherperson isgiving.”Eyecontact isarelationwithin which two subjects stand together, each being immediatelypresenttotheotherinawaytheywouldnotbeiftheywerenotbothpresenttoeachotherinthisway,inasinglerelation.

The second intuition is that eye contact is an engaged practical re-lation. Unlike vision, which enables us to survey our environment

3. InthisrespectIhavebeeninfluencedbyKalderon(2018).

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(i)Revelatory Looks.First,theeyesandfaceare‘windowstothesoul’whichrevealourmentalstates.Theycanthereforebesaidto‘commu-nicate’ inabroadsense, insofaras theyrevealormanifestourmen-talstates:as,forexample,whenHumewritesof“acommunicationofsentiments”(Treatise of Human Nature,2.1.11.19).AsWittgenstein(1967,§220)observes,“Lookintosomeoneelse’sface,andseetheconscious-ness in it,andaparticularshadeofconsciousness.Youseeonit, init, joy, indifference, interest, excitement, torpor and so on.” Thoughintentional actions might manifest, and in this sense ‘communicate’, one’sstateofmind,theyarenotnecessarilydonewiththeintentionofcommunicatingone’sstateofmindtoanother,andtheydonotgen-erallyaimatrecognitionfromanother.Nevertheless,therearesomerevelatory lookswhichcan take the formof intentionalcommunica-tiveacts.Forexample,thoughmyexpressionoffearatthesoundofanexplosionisnotvoluntary,ImightvoluntarilyforbearfromgivingintomyinclinationtohideorsuppressmyreactionwiththeintentionthatothersseehowIfeel.Indoingso,Imightvoluntarilyturntowardsthem,soastomakemyfacialexpressionsvisibletothem(cf.Camp-bell2017,p.123).

(ii) Illocutionary Looks. Suppose we are sitting together in a traincompartmentwhen thesmellofpetrolfills thecarriage. I lookoverto you and say, “Yuck, that smells nasty.” In uttering these words, Iperformthespeechactoftellingyouthatit’snasty(orperhapsofac-knowledgingitsnastinesstoyou).Perhapsit’spossibletoperformthesame illocutionary act non-verbally by looking up to you, blockingmynose,andmakingthekindof‘yuckyface’whichisallbutimpos-sibletodescribeandyetwhichisalltooeasytorecognize(seeGilbert2014,p.328).Inothercircumstancesyoumightperformtheactofdis-agreeingwithmebysaying‘Nopisfalse’byshakingyourheadandmakingan‘incredulous’face.Inperformingillocutionarylooks,one’sfacialconfigurationwillundoubtedlyberelatedininterestingwaystoourinstinctiverevelatoryexpressions,buttheywillalsobepermeatedbylocalconventions.Aswithillocutionaryspeechacts,illocutionarylooksarenecessarilyintentional:thesubject’sunderstandingofwhat

1.3. OutlineIhavethreeaimsinthispaper.First,Iwillarguethatthestandardwaysofthinkingabouteyecontactinthephilosophicalliteratureareunsat-isfactory.Indoingso,Imakeacaseforthinkingthatthesourceofthisdissatisfactionandthepathforwardcanbeidentifiedbyreflectingonourtendencytodescribeeyecontactonthemodeloftouch.Finally,Iwilloutlineaneglectedaccountofeyecontact,onewhichisabletoavoidthedifficultiesfacedbyitscompetitors.

I begin by identifying three ways in which the eyes and face fig-ureincommunication:byrevelation,illocution,andtransaction(§2).EachaccountofeyecontactIconsiderprivilegesoneoftheseformsof ‘facial communication’. In §3, I consider Christopher Peacocke’s(2014)reductiveaccountofeyecontactandarguethatitiscommittedtoviewingeyecontactasafundamentallycontemplativerelationandfailstoofferasatisfyingexplanationoftheintuitionthateyecontactisaformofintersubjectivecontact.In§4,Iconsiderthemainalternativetothisaccount,accordingtowhicheyecontactshouldbethoughtofasinvolvingaprimitivesecondpersonrelation(e.g.,Eilan2016,Forth-coming).However,thisisfoundtobeimplausibleasageneralaccountof eye contact. Rather than thinking eye contact is constituted by asecondpersonrelation,thereisgoodreasontothinkofitasamorefundamental form of relation which makes second person relationspossible.Reflectionontheanalogiesbetweeneyecontactandmutualtouchleadstotherecognitionofaneglectedaccountofeyecontact,whichtakestransactionallookstobecentral.Accordingtothisview,whentwosubjectsmakeeyecontact,theyarerelatedastwoagentsactingandbeingacteduponbyeachotherinasingle,primitivetrans-action(§5).

§2. Three forms of ‘facial communication’

Theeyesandfacefigureincommunicativeinteractioninavarietyofdifferentways.Wecandistinguishatleastthreewaysinwhichone’sgaze,ora‘look’,canfigureinhumancommunication.

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tendtobeneglectedbyphilosophers,so,too,doestheaccountofeyecontactwhichtakesthemtobefundamental—theTransactionalAp-proach.Thisisunfortunatebecauseitisthemostpromisingaccountofthemall.OrsoIwillargue.

§3. Eye contact as reciprocal revelation

3.1. The Reductive ApproachWhenwemakeeyecontact,Iattendtoyouasyouattendtome,andthatwearesocomportedtooneanotherismutuallymanifesttoeachofus.Howarewetounderstandthemetaphorsof‘interpersonalcon-tact’and‘mutualopenness’?AsPeacocke(2005,p.298)asks,canwecharacterize what is going on between us without employing thesemetaphors?

Acommonapproachtothisquestionseekstoprovideareductiveaccountofthekindofinterpersonalrelationthesemetaphorsdescribe.According to the Reductive Approach, these relations can be under-stoodintermsofthekindofactsandstatesofeachindividualthatarethemselvesontologicallypriortotherelationofeyecontact.Thepar-simonyofthisaccounthaswideappeal:itpromisestoexplainwhatmightappeartobeasui generis relationintermsoftheactsandstatesofindividualswhicharearguablybetterunderstood,andwhichareinanycaserequired,tounderstandtheirrepresentationoftheworldingeneral.

Peacocke(2014)articulatesanaccountwiththisgeneralstructure(seealsoNagel 1969).Hisaccountofeyecontact isas follows.4Wehavetwosubjects,xand y:

(1)x seesy.

(2)y seesx.5

4. Since my aim is not to pursue the Reductive Approach but to identify theproblemsthatanysuchapproachfaces,IwillstayclosetoPeacocke’sformu-lation.Forthesakeofsimplicity,Iwillthereforepassoverseveraldifficultiesconcerningtheformulationofthisaccount.

5. Or(1*)xseesy’seyesand(2*)yseesx’seyes,toexcludethecaseinwhich

they are doing in expressing themselves in this way is an essentialfeatureofthesespeechacts(Moran2018,p.149).Moreover,theseactsareovertlydirectedtowardsanother,fromwhomtheyaimatreceiv-ingacertainkindofuptake,withoutwhichtheywillbe‘unhappy’,un-successful,or incomplete(Austin1962,pp.115–6).Whatthisuptakeamountstowillvarywiththespecificspeechact,butingeneralitre-quiresthattheotherrecognizestheonetryingtoperformtherelevantspeechacttowardsthemandentertainsaspecificfirstpersonthought.Typically,myrecognitionthatyouaretryingtotellmesomethingissufficientforyoutohavesucceededintellingmesomething(Hornsby1994;Moran2018).

Byandlarge,philosophershavetendedtofocusontherevelatoryandillocutionaryaspectsoflooks,butthisistoneglectathirdformoffacialcommunicationwhichIwillcall‘transactionallooks’.

(iii)Transactional Looks.Unlikemererevelatorylooks,transactionallooksareoftenintentionalacts,butunlikeillocutionarylooks,theydonotnecessarilyseektoachievetheirpurposeviatherecognitionofacommunicativeintention,noristheotherperson’srecognitionoftheintention with which the looks are done sufficient for their success.Transactionallooksinvolveonesubjectactinguponanother,exertingaforceuponthem,aswhenonestaresatanothertomakethemfeelself-conscious, ‘looksdaggers’atthemtointimidatethem,orpullsafunnyfacetomakethemlaugh.

Eachoftheseformsof ‘facialcommunication’canbeinstantiatedbyasinglefacialexpression.WhenIshoutatsomeone,forexample,Imightrevealmyfrustrationwiththem,barkanorderatthem,andinduceafeelingofshameinthem.

My purpose in drawing attention to these different forms of ‘fa-cial communication’ is to identify the motivations behind two com-monwaysofthinkingabouteyecontactandtoidentifyathird, lesscommonlyacknowledgedunderstandingofeyecontact.Eachaccounttakesitscuefromoneoftheseformsoffacialcommunication:theRe-ductiveApproachprivilegesrevelatorylooks;theSecondPersonAp-proachprivilegesillocutionarylooks.And,justastransactionallooks

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Andlikewise,fory:

(8)y isawarethatx isawarethaty isinastateinwhichy wouldsincerelysay‘Heseesme’.

Peacockeclaimsthatwemuststipulatethat‘heseesme’isineachsuit-ablybasedontheindividual’svisualexperience(2014,p.241).

Therearetwogroundsfordissatisfactionwiththisaccount,eachrelatedtoourtendencytodescribeeyecontactonthemodeloftouch.

3.2. Eye contact as an engaged relationFirst, thisaccountsitsuneasilywiththe intuitionthateyecontact isanengagedrelation(asdescribedin§1.2).Itenvisageseyecontactasgroundedinrevelatorylooks:x encountersy,andy’sfacialexpressionandcomportmenttowardsx revealsy’s psychologicalstate,whichrep-resentsx asbeingaparticularkindofway.Thisprioritizesthemeta-phoroftheeyesas ‘windowstothesoul’whichrevealone’smentalstates.x’sawarenessofy’sawarenessisalsorevealedtoy throughtheirfacialexpressionandcomportmenttoy,enablingytoseethemselves‘reflected in x’s eyes’, refracted through their beliefs, values, and ide-als.Whentheymakeeyecontact,therefore,theyareliketwomirrorsreflectingoneanotherad infinitum.

Justasmirrorsreflectpassively,sothisreciprocalrevelationisfun-damentally a passive, spectatorial one. The title of Peacocke’s book,The Mirror of the World,isrevealinginthisrespect.ItalludestoArthurSchopenhauer’s name for the pure subject of aesthetic experiencewhichengagesindisinterestedcontemplationoftheworld,bracketingthe practical significance of objects and contemplating their essenc-es—“apure,cognisingbeing,asanuntarnishedmirroroftheworld”(Schopenhauer1969,p.417;Peacocke2014,p.v).7Eyecontact,how-ever,seemstobeanengagedrelation;somethingwemustengagein

7. Therevelatoryaspect, forexample, isarguablypresent inGrice’s (1957) re-ductiveaccountofcommunication(fordiscussiononthispoint,seeMoran2018,especiallyCh.4§1‘Grice:TheProductionofBelief(inOthers)throughtheRevelationof(One’sOwn)Belief’).

Thisisconsistentwitheachsubjectthinkingthattheotherisn’tawareofthem.Werequirethereforeanembeddingofmentalstates:

(3)x seesthaty seesx (andxrecognizesthatx* = x).

(4)y seesthatx seesy (andyrecognizesthaty* = y).

Theparenthesizedsectionismeanttocapturethewayinwhich xsees,notmerelythatyseessomeone, x,butthatysees x himself (thus‘x*’ and‘y*’followingCastañeda’s1966notation).Thisdescribesthekindofexperiencex mightreportbysaying‘Theyseeme’.

(3)and(4)areconsistentwitheachthinkingthattheothertakesthemtobeamereinanimateobject.Therefore,weneedanadditionallayerofembeddedcontent:

(5)x isawarethat(4).

(6) y isawarethat(3).6

However,thisiscompatiblewitheachsubjectnotrecognizingtheoth-erascapableofself-ascribingI-thoughts(orDegree2Self-Represen-tation).Thiscomeswithafurtherlevelofembedding,whichPeacockeformulatesasfollows:

(7)x isawarethaty isawarethatx isinastateinwhichx wouldsincerelysay‘Heseesme’.

each is lookingat theother’s feet.This isopen toadditionalobjections; itdoesn’tdistinguishbetweengenuineeyecontactandeachperson lookingatanother’seyesoveravideocall,forexample.Iputthesedifficultiestooneside,concedingthattheymightbeavoidedinamoresystematicformulation.

6. Peacocke(2014)formulates(3)and(4)asfollows:

(3*)xseesthatyseesx. (4*)yseesthatxseesy.

Theproblemisthat(5*)thencomesoutas‘x isawarethat(4*)’.Butthisiscompatiblewithx notknowingthatitishehimselfwhoistheobjectofy’sawareness,orperhapslosingtrackofwhichofthem,x ory, heis(seeMartin2014,p.37).Inthisrespect,myformulationisclosertoO’Brien(2011).(3)and(4)arenotthemselveswithoutdifficulty(seeRödl2007,p.189).

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consciousoftheotherasaself-conscioussubject,buttheydonotcon-nectinthewaycharacteristicofeyecontact.Thattheyarebothinter-personallyself-consciouswithrespecttoeachotherisnot‘outintheopen’betweenthem,since theyarebothcovertlyattending toeachother.NorwoulditbesufficienttocharacterizeeyecontacttosaythatJuliet becomes aware that Romeo is interpersonally self-consciouswithrespecttoherandthatRomeobecomesawarethatJulietisinter-personallyself-consciouswithrespecttohim.Afterall,theymightalsoeachbecomeawareofthisthroughcovertattention.Thisconstitutesasituationofsymmetricalinterpersonalself-consciousnessasdescribedbyPeacockeinconditions(1)–(8),butbecauseex hypothesi,eachisco-vertlyattendingtotheother,itdoesnotcapturethemutualopennessorconnectioncharacteristicofeyecontact.

Thereductivetheoristislikelytorespondtothisbyappealingtoyetfurtherlayersofiteratedcontent.Themorecomplextheseinten-tionalcontents, themoredifficult theybecometostate, letalone torefutebycounterexample.Nevertheless,theseconsiderationsaresuf-ficienttorevealaproblemwiththeReductiveApproach.Theproblemis that Peacocke treats the form of awareness each has of the otherin eye contact as being of the same form as Romeo’s awareness ofJulietwhentheyarecovertlyattendingtoeachother.Romeo’s inter-personalself-consciousnessofJulietasaself-conscioussubjectwhoisconsciousofhim, in thiscase, iscompatiblewith Julietnotbeinginterpersonallyself-consciouswithrespect tohim.This iswhatgen-eratestheneedtoappealtoherawarenessofRomeo’sawarenessofher,hisinterpersonalself-consciousnesswithrespecttoher,Romeo’sawarenessofJuliet’sawarenessofthis,andsoon,potentiallyad infini-tum.Butnomatterhowmanyfurtherlayersofembeddedcontentthereductivistappealsto,theywon’tcapturewhatissharedbetweentwosubjects ineyecontact, thewaytheymakecontact.Ateachlevelofembedding,weareleftwithtwosubjectswhoareinconstitutivelyin-dependentpsychologicalstatesandwhosepsychologicalstateshavenointentionalcontentsincommon.AsMalindaCarpenterandKristinLiebal(2011,p.166)putit,thisaccountleavesuswith“twoindividual

andactivelymaintain,oftenwitheffort.Theother’sgazehasimpactonouractivityandemotional life,oftenmakingusactand feelself-conscious.Peacocke’saccountthereforeincurstheburdenofexplain-ingthisintuitiononthebasisofhisviewthat,atthefundamentallevel,theformofinterpersonalawarenessinvolvedineyecontactisoneoftwospectatorsofeachother’smentallives.

Itisopentoareductivetheoristtoinsistthatmystateofbeingin-terpersonallyself-consciouswith respect toanother—myconscious-nessthattheyareaself-conscioussubjectwhoisconsciousofme—in-herentlyinvolvesanemotionalresponse,whichinturnwillmotivatecertainformsofaction.ThomasNagel(1969,p.11),forexample,usesthephrase‘xsensesy’todescribeaformofperceptualawarenessofanother’s arousal which eo ipso involves being affected with arousalanddesire.Perhapsthispointcouldbemademoregenerally.

Inorderforthisapproachtosucceed,however,itmustbeabletoaptlycharacterize theway inwhich Iamaffectedbyanother’sgazewhenI’mmakingeyecontactwiththemand,inparticular,thewayinwhichIfeel‘exposed’totheirgaze:this,afterall,isessentialtothewayin which eye contact can be anxiety inducing, intimate, or invasive.This,inturn,suggeststhattheintuitionthateyecontactisaformofengagedrelationcannotbeseparatedfromtheintuitionthateyecon-tactisaformofinterpersonalcontact.

3.3. Eye contact as interpersonal contactThe Reductive Approach faces a serious difficulty in explaining theintuitionthateyecontactisaformofinterpersonalcontact.ConsideraversionofNagel’s(1969)exampleofRomeoandJuliet.Satatoppositeendsofabar,eachiscarefullyandcovertlywatchingtheotherthroughnervoussidelongglances,withoutmakingeyecontact.Afterawhile,RomeobecomesawarethatJulietiswatchinghimandbeginscovertlywatching her watching him. Romeo is therefore interpersonally self-consciouswithrespect to Juliet. Juliet, in turn,mightbecomeawarethatsheisbeingwatchedbyRomeoandonthisbasisbecomeinter-personallyself-consciouswithrespecttoRomeo.Inthiscase,eachis

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Yet, if theanti-reductiveapproachsimply insists that the ‘mutualopenness’ofeyecontact is tobeunderstoodasa sui generis featureofourpsychologicallivesaboutwhichlittlefurthercanbesaidinthewayofanalysisorexplanation, then theReductiveApproachmightcontinue to have some appeal, these phenomenological objectionsnotwithstanding.ThereasonforthisisthattheReductiveApproachseekstoprovideapositiveexplanationoftheformof‘intersubjectivecontact’characteristicofeyecontactintermsthatarearguablybetterunderstood.Thisneedfor furtherexplanationcanseemparticularlyattractiveinsofarasweareinneedof(a)anexplanationofwhythisformof‘interpersonalcontact’isestablishedthrougheyecontactbutnotthroughreciprocalcovertattentionand(b)anexplanationofthewayinwhicheyecontactisaninherentlyengagedpracticalrelation.11

Ifthisisright,adialecticalstalematethreatenstoensue.Ontheonehand,theAnti-ReductiveApproachseemstobetruertothephenom-enologyofeyecontactandyetmightseemtolackexplanatoryambi-tion;ontheother,theReductiveApproachseekstoprovideapositiveexplanationof thestructureofeyecontactbut facesseriousdifficul-tiesindoingso.IwillarguetheAnti-ReductiveApproachcanavoidthisstalematebydenyingthatthemostsatisfyingexplanationofeyecontacttakestheformofareductiveanalysis.Withthisaiminmind,Iwillconsidertwowaysinwhichonemightprovideanon-reductiveexplanationofeyecontact,onewhichunderstandsitintermsofillo-cutionarylooks(theSecondPersonApproach)(§4),anotherintermsoftransactionallooks(theTransactionalApproach)(§5).

§4. Eye contact as mutual address

4.1. The Second Person ApproachInrecentyears,theReductiveApproachhasbeenmetwithresistancebyphilosopherswhothinkthatwhensubjectsengageincertainformsofface-to-faceinteraction,theytherebystandinanontologicallybasicsecond personal relation and that each has, in virtue of doing so, a

11. Carpenter&Liebal(2011,p.167)andEilan(Forthcoming,pp.5,10,15–16).

perspectivesthatnevermeetinthemiddle.”8Theproblemhereisnotthattherearetwoperspectives,two‘sides’totherelation—thismuchisundeniable.Itisratherthateachsubject’sawarenessdoesnot‘reachout’totheother,and,asaresult,thereisa‘gap’betweenthem:theydonotmake contact.9

TheReductiveApproachtherefore fails toexplaintheformof in-terpersonalcontactcharacteristicofeyecontact.Therearetwoaspectstothisintuition.First,eyecontactseemstobeabasicformofsharedexperience,a‘meetingofminds’.Second,whentwosubjectsmakeeyecontact,eachisconsciousoftheotherinawaywhichconstitutivelydependsontheotherbeingawareoftheminthatselfsameway.JustasIcannotshakehandswithanotheriftheyaren’talsoshakinghandswithme,soIcannotmakeeyecontactwithanotheriftheyaren’tac-tivelylookingintomyeyesasIlookintotheirs.

3.4. Going forwardTherearethereforeseriousobstaclestoprovidingareductiveexplana-tionofthe‘mutualopenness’ofeyecontact.Andthoughtheseobjec-tionsdonotleavetheReductiveApproachwithoutanyroomforma-neuver,theydocallintoquestionwhetheritprovidesthemostnaturalwayofthinkingabouteyecontact.

Inthisrespect, itappearsmorefaithfultothephenomenologyofeyecontacttothinkofitasanontologicallybasicrelationandtothinkofeachsubject’sstateofawarenessoftheotherasspecifiableonlyintermsofthisbasicrelationwhichholdsbetweenthem.Thiskindofanti-reductiveapproachneednotdeny thepotential for thekindofrecursivementalstatesemphasizedbythereductiveapproach;itneedonlydenythattherelationofeyecontactreducestorecursivestatesofthissort.Rather,onemightsuggestthebasicinterpersonalcontactinmanycasesconstitutesthebasisformanyformsofrecursivethinking.10

8. SeealsoEilan(Forthcoming,pp.9–10)

9. Thisparallelsintuitionsaboutperceptualcontact.See,forexample,Putnam(1994,p.453).

10. CompareCampbell(2005)onjointattention.

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towardstheotherandmeetssomeanalogueofthefirstpersonpick-uprequirementwithrespecttotheother’sawarenessofthem(EilanForthcoming,pp.5,12;Eilan2016,p.319).

Eilan’saccountofthiscommunicativerelationcanbeunderstoodinatleasttwoways,dependingonhowweunderstandthenotionof‘communication’and‘address’:eitherintermsoflinguisticaddressandtheperformanceofanillocutionaryactor intermsofamorefunda-mental,andmoreelusive,formofinterpersonalcommunication.

4.2. Communication and illocutionThemoststraightforwardwayofunderstandingacaseinwhicheachsubjecttakesupan‘attitudeofaddress’totheotheristothinkoftwopartiesinaconversation,eachofwhom,atdifferentpoints,addressestheotherwithanillocutionaryspeechactandacknowledgestheoth-er’sspeechactsdirectedtothem.ThiswouldthereforebetoclaimthattherelationbetweentwosubjectsmakingeyecontactisthesamekindofinterpersonalrelationwhichholdsbetweentwosubjectswhoshareanI-Thouthoughtontheviewsdescribedabove.Justas,onthisviewofI-Thouthought,whenItellyousomethingandyourecognizemytelling,weshareanI-Thouthought,sowhenwemakeeyecontact,Iinsomesenseaddressyouwithmygazeand,whenyoureciprocatemygaze,youtherebyacknowledgemyactofaddress(cf.Darwall2004,p.43).Indoingso,sothethoughtgoes,wetherebystandinaprimitiveI-Thourelation.

EmmanuelLevinasseemstosuggestsomethinglikethiswhenhewritesthat“thefacespeakstome”(Levinas1969,p.198)andthat“[t]hereisacommandmentintheappearanceoftheface,asifamasterspoketome….Iamhewhofindstheresourcestorespondtothecall”(Levinas1985,p.89).AsMichaelMorganputsit,Levinas’sclaimhereisthattheother’sface“addressesmeandmakesademanduponme”(Morgan2007,p.67).

Similarly,Eilanclaims that thereare two ingredients toanycasewhereIexperienceanotherastakingan‘attitudeofaddress’tome:

sui generis formof‘you-awareness’oftheother.Byandlarge,thisap-proachhasbeenadvancedasanaccountofsecondpersonalthought(or ‘I-Thouthought’).Inrecentyears,however,NaomiEilanhasout-linedanaccountwhichisintendedtoapplytonon-conceptualmodesofawarenessincludingeyecontactandjointattention.

To understand this account, we must first understand the viewofsecondpersonthoughtittakesasitsstartingpoint.SupposeIsaytoyou,“You’vegotspinachinyourteeth.”Formetosucceedintell-ingyouthis,youmusthearandunderstandwhatI’vesaidandwhatIunderstandmyselftobedoing.Thisrequiresyoutomeet ‘thefirstpersonpickuprequirement’:youmustentertainthethought‘I’vegotspinachinmyteeth’(Eilan2016,p.321).Manywhothinkthatthereisadistinctiveformofsecondperson thoughtarguethattherelationbetweenmyyou-thought(‘you’vegotspinachinyourteeth’)andyourI-thought(‘I’vegotspinachinmyteeth’)isoneofidentity:itisasingleI-Thou thought with two subject-slots (Longworth 2013, 2014; Rödl2007,Ch.6,2014;Thompson2012a,2012b).

Eilansuggeststhatwecanviewtherelationtwosubjectsstandinduringepisodesof face-to-face interactionanalogously:“TheradicallineIthinkweneedtotakeiftheideaofprimitiveyou-awarenessistosomuchasgetoffthegroundistosaythatthewayAisawareofBinsuchcasesconstitutivelydependsonBmeetingthefirst-personpickuprequirement”(Eilan2016,p.322).Howshouldweunderstandthisformofrelation?Eilan’saccountconsistsoftwoclaims.

Thefirstis‘theInterdependenceClaim’thatA’sawarenessofBisconstitutivelydependentonB’sawarenessofA.Thisisaclaimincom-montoallthosewhomaintainthateyecontactisaprimitiveexperien-tialrelation(EilanForthcoming,p.8;Eilan2016,p.322).

Thesecondclaim, ‘theCommunicationClaim’,isapositivespeci-ficationofwhatthisstructureamountstoandthereforeprovidesanalternativeexplanationofthephenomenologicalstructureofeyecon-tact to undercut the Reductive Approach. The idea here is that eyecontact,unlikesymmetricalcovertattention,isanessentially‘commu-nicativerelation’inwhicheachsubjecttakesupan‘attitudeofaddress’

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Inordertoperformanillocutionaryactofthissort,Imustunderstandmyselftobedoingsoandmustthereforepossesstheconceptoftherelevant illocutionary act. These infants, however, fail to meet thisconditionbecause theyhavenotyetdevelopedagraspof languageortheconventionsthatmakespeechactspossible.Theycannotinvitebecause they lack the concept of ‘inviting’. Rather than understand-ingthesedescriptionsoftheother’sgazeas‘demanding’,‘inviting’,or‘commanding’asperformancesofillocutionaryacts,then,weshouldunderstand themasbeingusedmetaphorically todescribesomeas-pectoftheexperienceofmakingeyecontactwithanotherperson.

4.3. CommunionA more defensible version of ‘the Communication Claim’ would betounderstandtherelevantnotionofcommunicationasmoregeneral,ofwhichtheprotoconversationsofearlyinfancyandthefull-bloodedlinguisticconversationsareinstances,withoutassimilatingtheformofintentionalinteractionscharacteristicoftheformertotheexchangeofspeechactscharacteristicofthelatter.Thisisimportantsincetheformof connection established through eye contact which enables proto-conversationandjointattentionisitselfadevelopmentalpreconditionforthedevelopmentofhumanlinguisticcapacities(seeReddy2008;Tomasello2019).

OnestrandinEilan’sdiscussionsuggestsawayforward.Shesug-geststhattherelevantnotionofcommunicationsheisseekingtoar-ticulateismorefundamentalthancommunicationunderstoodastheexchangeofinformation.Rather,sheidentifiesthenotionof‘commu-nication-as-connection’.Onthisconception,tocommunicateis“tobeintouch,toconnect,orto‘commune’withanother”(EilanForthcom-ing,p.13).Asimilarunderstandingofthebasicformofinterpersonalcommunication as a kind of connection in opposition to the under-standingofcommunicationasaformofexchangeofinformationhasbeenoutlinedbyCharlesTaylor(2016).Forbothoftheseauthors,theperformanceof illocutionaryspeechacts isan instanceof thismoregeneralformofconnectionwithanother,insofarasourmotiveisnot

First,theadoptionofanattitudeofaddress,intheformofanexpressionorgesture,isimmediatelyrecognized,inasmile,awave,atouchoraglanceandentersassuchintotheexperienceonehasofone’sco-attender.Thesecondpointisthatthedistinguishingfeatureofthecapacitytoexperience an expression of address within the frame-workofacommunicativeexchangeisthat its recognition entails experiencing it as an invitation, directed at oneself, to re-spond in kind.(EilanForthcoming,p.13,emphasisadded)

Thisaccountseemstoofferanexplanationoftheintuitionsthateyecontactisaformofinterpersonalcontactandanengagedrelation.Itsuggeststhatwhatismissinginsituationsofsymmetricalcovertatten-tionisthewayinwhich,ineyecontact,eachsubjecttakesupanat-titudeofaddresstowardstheother.12Andsinceexperiencinganother’sactofaddressseemstoinvolveexperiencingitasmakingademandupon one to respond in kind, it would arguably capture the way inwhich eye contact is a practically engaged relation. Christine Kors-gaardobservesthatwhensomeoneaddressesyou,thishasanimme-diateimpactuponyourwill.Shesaysthat“[n]owyoucannotproceedasyoudidbefore…ifyouwalkon,youwillbeignoringandslightingme.Itwillprobablybedifficultforyou,andyouwillhavetomusteracertainactiveresistance,asenseofrebellion”(Korsgaard1996,p.140).SimilarlywhenIseesomeonelookingatme,Iexperiencetheminawaythatcallsfor,demands,orinvitesaresponseonmypart.Iamfreetorespondinthisorthatway,butIamnotfreesimplynottorespondatall.

However,theideathatI’maddressedbytheother’sgazewhenwemakeeyecontactistoostrong.WhenImakeeyecontactwithanother,Idonottherebyexperiencethemasliterallyinvitingmetorespondtothem.Infantsofaroundninetotwelvemonthsofageareabletoestablishthisformofconnection,thoughtheyarenotabletoperformthespeechactsofinviting(northoseofcommandingordemanding).

12. CompareTaylor(2016,p.56).

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§5. Eye contact as mutual transaction

5.1. The Transactional ApproachWecanmakeprogressinexplainingthenotionsof‘interpersonalcon-tact’and‘communication-as-connection’byreflectingontheaptnessof these tactilemetaphors. Inparticular, Iwillargue that theyseemtosuggestanaccountofeyecontactgroundedintransactionallooks.Heron(1970,p.243)astutelyobservesthateyecontactisanalogousto mutual touch insofar as “each person both gives and receives inthesameactandreceivesmoreoverwhattheotherpersonisgiving.”Whentwoindividualsshakeeachother’shands,theyareactinguponeachotherandbeingacteduponbyeachotherinasingletransaction.

Thissuggestsanaccountofeyecontactwhichisgroundedintrans-actionallooks.Thisviewconsistsofthefollowingtwoclaims:

(i)WhenIexperiencemyselfas lookedatbyanother, Iamconsciousofmyselfasbeingacted upon bythem.

(ii)Whentwosubjectsengageineyecontact,eachsub-jectactsupontheotherandisbeingacteduponbytheminasingleprimitivetransaction.

Ielaborateeachoftheseclaimsinthesectionsthatfollow.13

5.2. The power of the gazeThisaccountbeginsfromtheidea,familiarinthephenomenologicaltradition, thatmyawarenessof theworld isn’toneofameredisem-bodiedspectator.Roughly,Iamanembodiedagentsituatedinaworldthat is given as having an immediate practical and affective signifi-canceformeandisexperiencedasaffordingcertainpossibilitiesforactionandpassion.Importantlyforpresentpurposes,myawarenessof

13. Rödl (2014) employs the notion of a transaction in his account of I-Thouthought.MyappealtotransactionsismoregeneralthanhisinthatIthinkeyecontactisaformofinterpersonaltransactionmorebasic,ontologicallyanddevelopmentally,thanthenotionofI-Thouthought.

merelytoconveysomeinformation—totellsomeonesomething,forexample—butalso toshareourawarenessofsomething, toengageinacertainkindofconnection(Taylor2016,p.56).Thisiswhywetelloneanotherstories,storieswehavetoldcountlesstimesbefore:notmerelytoremindoneanotherbuttobringtheseeventstomindwiththeaimofsharingourrecollectionofthem.Thiskindofconnection,however, ismoregeneralandmorefundamentalthantheexchangeofspeechacts:itcanbeestablishedthrougheyecontact,throughthemutualexpressionofemotion,bysharingjokes,bysinging,dancing,orplayingmusictogether.

Thateyecontactcanbeunderstoodasa formofcommunicationinthissenseismoreplausiblethantheideathatineyecontacteachsubjecttakesupanattitudeof‘address’inthesensediscussedin§4.2.However,untilmoreissaid,thissenseofcommunicationdoesn’tpro-videexplanationofthe‘mutualopenness’and‘connection’involvedin eye contact but rather presupposes it. The motivation for under-standingeyecontactasacommunicativerelationis,inpart,toprovideanon-reductiveexplanationofitsstructureinsuchawayastoexplainwhytherelevant formofmutualopenness ispresent ineyecontactbutnotincovertattention.Butevenifthisnotionofinterpersonalcon-nectionisabasicfeatureofourpsychology,weneedanexplanationofwhyitisestablishedthroughtheformsofinteractiondescribedbyEilan(e.g.,conversing,singing,dancing,andsharing jokes)butnotthroughreciprocalcovertattention,which isalsoa formof interper-sonalinteraction.Themostobviousthingtheformerhaveincommonwhichcovertattentionlacksisthattheyallinvolveaformof‘mutualopenness’or ‘interpersonalcontact’betweensubjects,but thesearetheverythingswearetryingtoexplain.Inthenextsection,Iprovideanalternativeexplanationofthesephenomena.

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acutelyawareofmybody’snaturalexpressiveness,itstendencytore-vealaspectsofmymentallifethatIwanttokeephidden,suchasmyfeelingofembarrassmentorself-consciousnessbeforethem.WhenIexperienceanotheraslookingatme,Ithereforebecomeawareofmybody(particularlymyface)asbeingexposedtotheirgaze,asbeingpronetothwartmywill,presentingmeinawayatoddswiththeim-pressionIwanttomakeontheotherandthereforeassomethingtobecontrolled.

Third, the other’s gaze can be experienced as transforming myemotional comportment.Because I typicallywant tomakeacertainkindof impressiononothers,whenIexperiencetheother’sgazeasnecessitatingaresponsefromme,Iwanttorespondwell.Asaresult,theirattentionisexperiencedasexertingakindofpressureonme.Apressure,moreover,whichisexacerbatedbythefactthetimingofmyresponsemattersastotheimpressionImake.IfIamconfident,Imightbeabletobearthispressure,butifIamnot,Iwillbeovercomewithself-consciousness.Theother’sgazecanhaveanemotionalimpactinotherways:forexample,beinglookedatcanbeintimidatingandin-vasive;itcanleadtoattraction,annoyance,andaggression.Evencold-ness,inthiscontext,isawayofbeingemotionallycomportedtowardsanotherasopposedtoan‘emotionalblank’(Cavell1969,p.264).

EachofthesethreepointsisanaspectofthewayinwhichIexperi-enceanotherasacting upon me throughtheirgaze.15Itisessentialtothenon-reductiveaccountIamofferingthatwhattheotherisdoing to me andwhatIamtherebyundergoing arenotunderstoodastwoconstitu-tivelyindependentevents.Instead,theyaretobeunderstoodastwoaspects of an ontologically basic interpersonal transaction. There isphenomenologicalmotivationforthis;wecannotfullydescribethesewaysinwhichIambeingaffected bytheother’sgazeindependentlyofmyconsciousnessofthewaytheother’sgazeisactinguponme.Inthisrespect,theexperienceofbeinglookedatisanalogoustotheexperi-enceofbeingtouched.WhenI’mtouchedbyanother,myexteroceptive

15. Foramoreelaboratediscussionanddefenseoftheclaimsofthissection,seemymanuscript“OrdinarySelf-ConsciousnessasaPhilosophicalProblem.”

myself,mybody,andmyactivityareinterdependentwithmyaware-nessoftheworldsounderstood.14

Aswellasbeingembodiedagents,wearealsoself-conscioussocialanimals.Wefindourselvesinaworldwithotherswhosepracticalsig-nificanceforusisnotinquestion.WhenIapprehendanotherhumanbeingassuch,theyarenotgivenasthekindofthingthepresenceofwhichImayormaynottakeaninterestin,dependingonwhetherIhappentoformadesireeitherway.Rather,otherpeoplearegiveninawaythathasanimmediateimpactonmywillandemotionalcomport-ment.AndwhenIbecomeconsciousthatIamtheobjectofanother’sattention,Idonotbecomeconsciousofthisinawaythatispracticallyneutral.Rather,theotherisexperiencedasactinguponmethroughtheirgaze, transformingmypracticalsituation,myconsciousnessofmybody,andmyemotionalcomponent.IwillnowelaborateoneachofthesewaysIcanbeaffectedbyanother’sgaze.

First,Iexperiencetheirgazeasrestructuringmypracticalfield,de-terminingthesituationfromwhichIact,anddoingsoinsuchawaythattheirpresencetomecannotbeavoided.Imustrespond,becausethoughIamfreetochooseamongavarietyofpossibilitiesofresponse(tosmileorfrownatthem,toask‘whatareyoulookingat?’),I’mnotfree to simply not respond at all. Anything I do will constitute a re-sponse. Even if I studiously avoid their gaze or stare through them,this will constitute a response, a way of registering their presencewhichwill involvesustainedandself-consciouseffort.AsKorsgaard(1996,p.140)putsit,Iwillhavetomusteracertainkindofactiveresis-tancetothem.Thepossibilitiesthatdefinemysituationarethereforedeterminedbyandorientedaroundtheotherwhoiswatchingme.It’sinthissensethattheface‘callsfor’or‘demands’aresponse.

Second, thisexperienceofa transformationofmypracticalsitua-tionisinterdependentwithatransformationofmyawarenessofmybody. Iamconsciousof theother’sgazeasnecessitatingaresponsefrom me, and since I care about the impression I make, I become

14. See,forexample,Heidegger(1962),Merleau-Ponty(1962),andRatcliffe(2015,Ch.2).

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them.Thishasthreeaspects,correspondingtothethreeaspectsofthetransformationdescribedin§5.2.

First,justastheother’sgazere-orientsmypracticalsituationandnecessitatesaresponsefromme,sowhenwemakeeyecontact,itisnotasifweeachdeterminethepracticalsituationoftheotherwhileremaininginourownseparatepracticalsituation.Rather,wearenow‘in it together’.Weare inasinglemutuallydeterminedpracticalsitu-ation,openlyandself-consciously ‘attuned’tooneanother, inawaythatinvolvesthemutualassimilationofourpracticalfields.Thiscon-nectionnecessitatesaformofcommunicativeinteraction,whetheritbethepeekaboosofinfantprotoconversationorthespeechacts(orillocutionarylooks)characteristicofmatureadultcommunication.Wemightexpressemotionandtherebyseektomakeanimpressionontotheother,bymakingfacesortellingjokes.Wecanrespondinanywaywechoose,but,asbefore,wecannotchoosenottorespond;wemustdosomething.Thinkofhowdifficultitistolookintosomeone’seyeswithoutrespondingtotheireffortsatcommunication.Justasacold-nessisnotitselfanemotionalblank,somaintaininganappearanceofnon-responsivenesswhilelookingintoanother’seyesrequiresagreatdegreeofeffortandmustitselfbeunderstoodasakindofcommuni-cativeresponse,onewhichinvolvesintentionallyandeffortfullycom-portingoneselftowardstheotherinresponsetotheirgaze,somethingwhichitselfwillnecessitatearesponseontheirpart.

Whateverformthisinteractiontakes,whenwearemakingeyecon-tact, the fact we are doing so will be ‘out in the open’ between us:weareeachlookingintotheeyesoftheotherandholdingtheirgazeoveraninterval(howevershort)inawaythatisbothvisibleandvis-iblyintentional.Anycommunicativeact(inthesenseoftheprecedingparagraph)thatisperformedwithinthismutualpracticalsituationwillbeoutintheopeninthesensethatwhoeverperformsitcannotdenythattheyperformedit.IfIlookyouintheeyeandsayp,thenourmu-tualsituationwillleavenoroomforthepossibilityofstraightforwardlylookingyouintheeyeandoutrightdenyingthatIsaidp.This‘mutual

awarenessof theirhandasacting upon me,pressingagainstme,andmy interoceptive awarenessofmybodyasbeingactedupon,pressedagainst,are,asMartin(1992)observes,twoaspectsofasinglestateofmind.Thisisnotmerelytrueofthepatient,itisalsotrueoftheagent.WecanadaptAnscombe’sclaimthat‘Idowhathappens’tomakethispoint.Whattheotherisdoing to meandwhatistherebyhappening to me aretwoaspectsofasingle,irreducible,practicalrelation(Ford2014,p.15).16

5.3. Mutual transactionEyecontact isnotsimply tobeunderstood in termsofeachsubjectactingupontheotherinthewaydescribedabove.ThiscanholdtrueofthecaseinwhichRomeoandJulietcovertlyattendtoeachother.Insuchacase,RomeowillbeaffectedbyJuliet’sgazeandJulietbyRo-meo’sgaze,buttheywillnotexperiencetheformofmutualawarenesscharacteristicofeyecontact.Indeed,thismightbetheverythingtheyaretryingtoavoid(iftheyfeelself-conscious,forexample).

In the covert attention case there are two transactions: one inwhichRomeo’sgazeactsuponJulietandanotherinwhichJuliet’sgazeactsuponRomeo.ThisisanalogoustoacaseinwhichRomeograspsJuliet’s(non-grasping)handasJulietusesherotherhandtograspRo-meo’sother(non-grasping)hand.Eyecontact,however,isanalogoustothecaseinwhicheachgraspsthehandwhichis,atthesametime,grasping theirhand. In thiscase,asHeron(1970,p.243)pointsout,eachsubjectgivesandreceivesinthesameact;eachsubjectisbothagentandpatientinone and the same transaction.Iwillcallthiskindoftransactiona ‘mutualtransaction’.Whateachsubject isdoingtotheotherandundergoingattheirhandscanbefullyunderstoodonlyasanabstraction from theontologicallybasic interactionwhichunites

16. ThisisakintoAristotle’sthoughtthatoneandthesameactistheactiveca-pacityofonething(thesoundsource’s‘sounding’)andthepassivecapacityofanother(thehearer’s ‘hearkening’).This‘acting-and-being-acted-upon’is,Aristotleclaims,‘oneactuality’(On the Soul, 3.2).

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Thisbringsustothethirdfeatureofeyecontactunderstoodasaprimitive interpersonal transaction: it involves a kind of emotionalattunementbetweeneachsubject.WhenRomeoexperiencesJuliet’sarousinggaze,forexample,hisarousedreactiontohergazemightbemanifestinhisfacialreaction.Whenitis,JulietwillbeabletoseetheimpactofhergazeonRomeo inhisexpression,andwhen theyaremakingeyecontact,thiswillmodifythemannerinwhichRomeo’sfa-cialexpressionaffectsheremotionalcomportmenttowardsRomeo.Ineyecontact,therefore,wecansaythateachsubject’semotionalcom-portment towards the other is interdependent with the other’s emo-tionalcomportmenttowardsthem;thewayeachaffectsandisaffectedbytheotherisconstitutivelydependentonthewaytheotheraffectsandisaffectedbythem.Moreover,theemotionalreactionofeachwillbe‘outintheopen’betweentheminsofarasitisperceptible.Itisthismutualemotionalexposurewhichmakeseyecontactsointimate,of-tensoinvasive,andthereforesomethingthatcantakegreatefforttomaintain.

Thisformofemotionalattunementismostapparentwhentheemo-tionalexpressionsofeachsubjectareattheirmostvisibleandintense,aswhentwoindividualsareintimatelystaringintoeachother’seyesoraggressivelystaringeachotherdownovera relativelyprolongedinterval.Thesecasesdrawattentiontoaformofattunementwhichcanariseeveninthemorefleetingepisodesofeyecontactinwhicheachsubject’semotionalreactionisnotasperceptibleorasclearlydefined.Suchcasesservetoinitiateepisodesofface-to-faceinteraction,aswellas constituting the glue by which they are held together; these epi-sodesofeyecontactwillresultinthemanifestationofacertainkindofattunementbetweenthesesubjects,whetheritbeoneoffriendlyrapportormutualawkwardness.

§6. Conclusion

There is a deep and pervasive tendency to describe eye contact onthe model of touch, through tactile metaphors and analogies. If theargumentsofthispaperaresound,reflectingontheaptnessofthese

openness’isanontologicallybasicphenomenonandisthereforenotreducibletoourrespectivepsychologicalstates.

Thisbringsustothesecondaspectofthemutualtransactioncon-stitutiveofeyecontact.Sincewhatoccursbetweenusinthismutualsituationis‘outintheopen’betweenus,eyecontactinvolvesakindof‘mutualexposure’.Inotedearlierthatanother’sgazecantransformmyexperienceofmybody,makingmeacutelyawareofitspropensitytorevealaspectsofmyexperiencethatIwouldliketokeephiddenfromview.Thisisespeciallytrueoftheeyesandtheface.Theseare,afterall,themostexpressivepartsofthehumanbody;theyarethemeansbywhichwemakecontactwiththeotherandtheplaceatwhichourreac-tiontotheotherismostvisible.17Assuch,theimpacttheother’sgazehasuponme—whetheritmakesmeexcited,self-conscious,orintimi-dated—isoftenitselfrevealedinmyfaceandcantherebymodifythewayinwhichIactupontheotherthroughmygaze.RomeoisaffectedbyJuliet’sgazewhenshe isvisiblyself-conscious inresponsetohisgazeinawayverydifferenttothewayheisaffectedbyhergazewhenshemeetshisgazeconfidently.Wecanputthisbysayingthat,duringeyecontact,myvisible facialexpressionofmyreactiontotheother’sgazeeo ipsomodifiestheimpression mygazemakesuponthem.Thisistheinsightbehindthemetaphoroftheeyesasa‘windowtothesoul’.

Theotheracts upon me throughtheirgaze,transformingmysitua-tion,butaswithmanyacts,themannerinwhichitisdoneisalteredby theemotion that itexpresses.Weapprehendanother’sgaze inaway that is affectively laden: it might be aggressive, as when some-one‘looksdaggers’atme,itmightbeconfidentorself-conscious,oritmightexpresssexualinterestandarousal.This, inturn,willaffectthewayinwhichweareaffectedbytheirgaze:aself-consciousgazemight induceself-consciousness,a feelingofwarmthandsympathy,ora feelingof contemptdependingonone’s character (andparticu-larly,whetheroneisshy,confident,orexcessivelyarrogant).

17. SeeMoran(2017,p.95).

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metaphors enables a non-reductive explanation of the phenomeno-logicalstructureofeyecontact—‘theTransactionalApproach’.AswithPeacocke’sReductiveApproachandEilan’sSecondPersonalApproach,thishasbeenpresentedinoutlineonly,andthereismuchworktobedonetoelaboratethenotionofamutualtransactionanditsplaceinhumanlife.Myaimherehasbeentoshowthatthisapproachisanat-tractiveoneandthatthisworkwouldthereforebeworthwhile.18

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