weaponised information in brazil: digitising hate...policy brief no. 20 apln/cnnd1 weaponised...

Policy Brief No. 20 APLN/CNND 1

WeaponisedInformationinBrazil:DigitisingHate

DiegoCasaesandYasodaraCórdova

Abstract

Inthelastfewyears,theworldinformationecosystemhasbeenfloodedbythe“fakenews”phenomena,augmentedbythewidespreaduseofsocialmedia.Thefragmentationandscaleofthenewcommunicationtoolshelpspreadoldideologies,thatupholdracism,homopho-bia,andoppression.Thisphenomenonparticularlyafflictsdevelopingcountries,becauseofthe persistent inequality and political polarisation. The results of this socio-economicinequality,likethedigitaldivide,highratesofilliteracyandthelackoftrustininstitutions,pavethewaytoanexpansionofindiscriminatehateasapoliticaltoolChristianevangeli-cismprovidesaconduciveenvironmentforneoconservatismandintolerance.Thispolicybrief analyses theweakest points inBrazilian information ecosystem anddemonstrateshowthatstructurecreatedanurturingenvironment fordisinformationandhatespeechbeforeandafterthe2018elections.Itconcludeswithshort-andmedium-termstrategiesforgovernments,institutionsandcivilsociety,aswellastechandsocialmediacompaniesthatwillmitigatethenegativesocietaldisturbancesofhatespeechanddisinformation.

Background

BrazilisthelargestdemocracyinLatinAmerica,withapopulationofapproximately208millionpeople.Thecountryisclassifiedasa“flaweddemocracy”bytheDemocracyIndex20181andranked105outof175on the2018CorruptionPerceptions Index2.Although66%ofBrazilianshaveaccesstotheInternet,49%accesstheInternetonlythroughmobilephones. According to a survey developed by the Center of Studies on Information andCommunicationTechnologies,(CETIC.br),theclassesC,DandEpredominantlyaccesstheInternet throughmobile, having no access to computers3or game consoles. These data

1Unit,E.I.,2016.Democracyindex2010.Availableathttps://www.eiu.com/topic/democracy-index.2CorruptionPerceptionIndex,InternationalTransparency2018.Availablehttps://www.transpar-ency.org/cpi2018 3Domicílios,T.I.C.,2017.SãoPaulo,CentroRegionaldeEstudosparaoDesenvolvimentodaSociedadedaIn-formação(Cetic.br)doNIC.breCGI.br,2016.

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reflectacontinentalcountrywithoneofthehighestratesofinequalityintheworldandanequivalent violence rate. The understanding over the contextual size of Brazil is key tocomprehendingthedisinformationphenomenoninthecountry,foritisdeeplyconnectedwithitssocialandeconomiccontrasts.Brazilisacountryinwhichthedemocraticsystemhasnotyetsettledin4,pavingthewayforcyclesthatalternatebetweenviolentandrepres-sivegovernmentsandmoredemocraticandparticipativeperiods.Evenwithinthelatter,repressionandviolencetakeplacefromtheperspectiveofminorities,likeLGBTQandin-digenouspeoples.Structuralviolenceandinequality,notyetfullyaddressedbygovernmentauthorities,continuetorise,andit isnowboostedbyastrongpoliticalpolarisation5andsocial media dynamics, characterising the weaponisation of certainplatforms.TheInternetecosystem,especiallysocialmediasuchasFacebook,WhatsAppandYouTube,hasbeenusedtospreaddisinformationandincentivisehateandprejudiceagainstminority and marginalised groups, a role that has been particularly and historicallyconductedbytraditional institutions,suchasthemedia, thathasplayedacrucialrole increating imagery against African-descendents, indigenous peoples, LGBTQ communitiesandwomen,depictingtheminawaythatcreatesdivisionandprejudice.Theroleof themediainspreadingprejudiceandboostinghatehasthereforebeenreplacedbynew/digitalmedia,duetostrongerregulationsandpublicandgovernmentscrutinyoverTV,radioandnewspapers.Thesamedynamicsapplytocertainreligiousgroupsthatalsomaintainamis-ogynisticandhomophobicdiscourse.Theseoldsystemswereeasilytransferredtosocialmedia,wherethereisfertilegroundforthefortificationofprevious/offlinenetworks.TheSocialConfidenceIndex,whichmeasurestheBraziliangeneralpublicconfidenceininstitu-tionshasseentraditionalmediaoutletslose20pointsinlessthan10years,from71%in2009to51%in20186.

In 2016, a Buzzfeed Brazil report 7 showed that the top 10 disinformation stories onFacebookoutperformedverifiedstories,inthecaseofnewsontheanti-corruptionopera-tioncalled“Carwash”,(orLavaJato).Anti-corruptionmotivatedpopulistcampaigns,feed-ingrisingdemandsforresponsiveinstitutions,asinothermomentsoftheBraziliandemoc-racy8,butalsotransformingthesedemandstohatemongeringusinginternetcampaigns.Astheeconomiccrisisworsened,a2017reportbythePublicPolicyResearchGrouponAccesstoInformationoftheUniversityofSaoPaulo(GPOPAI/USP),ledbyProfessorPabloOrtel-lado,mappedover400Facebookgroupsdeemed"political"andclaimed that12millionpeople9inBrazilwere,atsomepoint,involvedinspreading"fakenews"inthatsocialmedia

4Power,TimothyJ."Braziliandemocracyasalatebloomer:ReevaluatingtheregimeintheCardoso-Lulaera."LatinAmericanResearchReview(2010):218-247.5McCarty,Nolan,KeithT.Poole,andHowardRosenthal."Politicalpolarizationandincomeinequality."Availa-bleatSSRN1154098(2003).6“ConfiançaDoBrasileiroNasInstituiçõeséaMaisBaixaDesde2009|IBOPEInteligência,”accessedNovem-ber5,2019,http://www.ibopeinteligencia.com/noticias-e-pesquisas/confianca-do-brasileiro-nas-institui-coes-e-a-mais-baixa-desde-2009/.7“TheTopFakeNewsStoriesOutperformedRealNewsAboutAMajorScandalInBrazil,Too,”accessedNo-vember5,2019,https://www.buzzfeednews.com/article/alexandrearagao/noticias-falsas-lava-jato-facebook-1.8CarlosAlbertoMilaniBertozzi,“CollordeMello:ABrazilianNeopopulistLeader?”(OhioUniversity,2001),https://etd.ohiolink.edu/pg_10?::NO:10:P10_ETD_SUBID:62163. 9“ Naweb,12milhõesdifundemfakenewspolíticas-Política,”Estadão,accessedNovember5,2019,https://politica.estadao.com.br/noticias/geral,na-web-12-milhoes-difundem-fake-news-politi-cas,70002004235.

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platformalone.FacebookispartofanecosystemcomposedmainlyofWhatsApp,themostusedchatappinBrazil(120millionusers);Instagram,animagesplatformfuelledbysub-celebrities;YouTube,forfreevideos;andalternativesites,blogsandforums,usedtohostandnurturethecoreofagrowinghatecommunity.Additionally,socialandeconomicfac-torsplayakeyroleinsettingthestagefordisinformationcampaignsinBrazil.Thesemainfactorsare:theadvancedcapacitytouseandcontrolsocialmediabycertainactorsinBrazil,attributedtotheinequalityineducationandbaddistributionofcomputationalresources10,allied to the high functional illiteracy rates (55% amongscholars,accordingtotheNationalLiteracyAssessment-ANA)andpreviouslyexistentnet-worksofdiscrimination,formedbychurches,sexistandmisogynist,orwhitesupremacistgroups,amongothers.

BrazilianInternetEcosystem:HowHateDigitises

Fig.1.GraphshowstheinternetecosystemofhateinBrazil.

TheunevendistributionofresourcesplayswellwiththeBrazilianpolarisedsociety.Badbusinesspracticesandinefficientinstitutionsarecrucialelementsinthespreadofonlinehate.

Harmfulbusinesspractices

a) ZeroRating

FacebookwasthefirstapptocircumventthenetneutralityrulesinBrazil.Bypartneringwith telecommunication companies, Facebook App and WhatsApp (also Instagram,recently),arepre-installedonmobilephonesandarefreeofcharge,intermsofbroadbandaccess.ThispracticetransformedFacebookintoabehemoth,whichsince2012hasbeen

10Abdin,Latifa."BotsandFakeNews:TheRoleofWhatsAppinthe2018BrazilianPresidentialElection."CaseyRobertson41:1.

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abletospreaddisinformationandorganiseprotests,mobsandpoliticalactions11.Braziliansdo everything overWhatsApp, since it's “free”. Frommusic classes to e-commerce andmedicalappointments,theappbecamecentraltothefunctioningofbusinessandfamilylife,especiallyforthemostvulnerablecommunities.Braziliancitizensaresomeofthehighestsocialmediausersintheworld,behindonlythePhilippines12.Citizens,however,areoftenlimitedbythecontenttheyreceiveviaWhatsApp,andtherefore,theylosethecontext,andtheopportunity,tocheckfordifferentversionsonlineorexpandtheirknowledge.

TheviralisationofpseudosciencepiecesonWhatsApp,forexample,wassovirulent,spread-ingfalsecuresandfearovertheZikavirusandotherdiseases,thatthecompanyhadtomakealgorithmicchangesinordertodiminishthenumberofforwardsavailableinsidetheapp13.Thedynamicsaroundhealthinformationareparticular:researchersfoundthatinformationabouttheZikavirusthatarrivedviaWhatsAppwasmostlywronganddeceptive14.ThefactthateverythinggoingthroughWhatsAppisfreeofinternetchargesmakesiteasyforpeopletospreadaudiosorYouTubevideos(thatopeninsidetheWhatsApp).Duetothisdesign,WhatsAppcanbeconsideredaconduittodisinformationinmanyformats,butisespeciallyharmfulforaudiosandvideos.“Eitherplatformhadplentyofweaknessesonitsown.But,together(YouTubeandWhatsApp),theyhadformedapipelineofmisinformation,spread-ing conspiracy theories, campaignmaterial andpoliticalpropaganda throughoutBrazil.”(Fisher,2019)

b) Algorithmicimbalance

ArepresentativeoftheBrazilianCongresselectedin2018,KimKataguri,explainedforadocumentarythat“YouTubeistheperfectenvironmentfortheBrazilianright-wingcom-munity”15.ThevideosharingwebsitebothoffersfreecontentandrewardsvideoproducersindollarswithGoogleAds,creatingincentivesforviralcontentthatengages,andbecomingthemainrepositoryofvideodisinformationforthefarright,asHarvardresearchshowedinApril2019.Researchersfoundthatthealgorithmusedontherecommendationsystemsystematically learns to suggest far-right videos, falling in the rabbit roles of extremecontent. Other research16that analyses implicit bias on channels and comments on theplatformshowsthatchannelshavebiasagainstimmigrantsandMuslimsincaptionsandahigher bias against LGBTQ people among comments. YouTube favours content that isquestionable,notjustinpoliticsbutalsoforhealthissues,presentingpseudoscienceasa

11Barbosa,Sérgio(2017),WhatsAppeciberativismo:novosespaçosnademocracia,inGuilhermeGodoy,Ma-riaJoãoInácioeStevenS.Gouveia(org.),PensaraDemocracia.Charleston,USA:GuilhermeGodoy,MariaJoãoInácioeSteven,227-25412“Digitalin2018:World’sInternetUsersPassthe4BillionMark-WeAreSocial,”accessedNovember5,2019,https://wearesocial.com/blog/2018/01/global-digital-report-2018.13KieronO’HaraandWendyHall,“FourInternets:TheGeopoliticsofDigitalGovernance,”December7,2018,https://www.cigionline.org/publications/four-internets-geopolitics-digital-governance.14AmandaTaubandMaxFisher,“HowYouTubeMisinformationResolvedaWhatsAppMysteryinBrazil,”TheNewYorkTimes,August15,2019,sec.World,https://www.nytimes.com/2019/08/15/the-weekly/how-youtube-misinformation-resolved-a-whatsapp-mystery-in-brazil.html.15“ TheWeekly|WhatIsYouTubePushingYoutoWatchNext?,”TheNewYorkTimes,August9,2019,sec.TheWeekly,https://www.nytimes.com/2019/08/09/the-weekly/youtube-brazil-far-right.html. 16RaphaelOttonietal.,“AnalyzingRight-WingYouTubeChannels:Hate,ViolenceandDiscrimination,”Pro-ceedingsofthe10thACMConferenceonWebScience-WebSci’18,2018,323–32,https://doi.org/10.1145/3201064.3201081.

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curefordiseaseslikeZika,DengueandMalaria,allpredominantinBrazil17.Theresearchershighlight the fact that the lackof goodcontent is alsoaproblem for spreadingdisinfor-mation,concluding:“This,intheend,alsohighlightsthedouble-edgedswordthatistherec-ommendation algorithm: often times contentious issues will be targeted by thecreatorsofdisinformation.Andifthereislittlecontent,YouTubewillrecommendwhateverisavailable,nomatterthesource.”

c) Mediapaywallsversusfreecontent

Anothereconomicincentiveforuser-generatedcontentandwidespreaddisinformationinBrazilisthechallengeofthepaywall.Eveniftheuseriswillingtousetheirphonecreditstoaccess the internet and check information, they face the paywall as another barrier tofindingcrediblefact-checkedinformationonanysubject.Thiscreatesyetanotherincentiveforusers to resort towebsitesandblogs thathostandshare “alternative facts” for free.Blogsandalternative factswebsitesareoftenconnected toundergroundnetworks, thatplayakeyroleinspreadinghateanddisinformationinthecountry.OneexamplewastheRFA18 Network, uncovered by an investigation by Avaaz/Estadão 19 . The investigationrevealedthatinaperiodofjust30days,anetworkof28pagesonFacebookconnectedto15blogsandwebsitesmanagedbythisgroup,reached12.6millionFacebookinteractions(posts,comments,shares)andhadacountof16millionpeoplefollowingtheirFacebookpages.ThisundergroundnetworkwasthenexcludedbyFacebook,whichpublishedanotesayingtherewasatotalof68pagesand43accountsexcludedfromtheplatform20.

AnotherexampleistheexistenceoftheChans,anonymousimageboardswhichoriginatedinJapanbutareverypopularintheEnglish-speakinginternet,whereuserscanshareanytypeofcontentwithoutneedingtodisclosetheiridentity.Suchimageboardsareoftenanonlinemeetingpointformisogynisticcommunities,liketheonethathasbeenattackingtheBrazilianfeministbloggerLolaAronovichandotherinternetcontentproducers21.Theuseof Chans to attack individuals online and run character assassination campaigns hassparkedadebateinBrazilthatledtothecreationofalawthattransformedgenderviolenceintoafederalcrimein2018.TheChansandalternativemediawebsitesoperateasameetingplacetoexchangeideaswithotherradicalisedusers,likeaheadquarter,thatthenspreadcontentthroughouttheinternetinsocialmediaplatforms.Paywallpracticesare,indeed,analternativesourceofrevenuefornewsoutletsotherthanadvertising.However,thepracticeincountrieslikeBrazil,withnoavailableopeneducationalresources,alackofgoodcontent

17FightingZikawithHoney:AnAnalysisofYouTube’sVideoRecommendationsonBrazilian.JonasKaiser,Ber-kmanKlein;AdrianRauchfleisch,NationalTaiwanUniversity;YasodaraCórdova,WorldBankGroup(forth-coming)18RFAstandsforRaposoFernandesAssociates,surnamesofthehusbandandwifeinchargeofthewholeop-erationofthisdisinformationnetwork.19“ RedePró-BolsonaroEngajaMaisDoQueMadonnaeNeymar-Política-Estadão,”accessedNovember5,2019,https://politica.estadao.com.br/noticias/eleicoes,rede-pro-bolsonaro-engaja-mais-do-que-madonna-e-neymar,70002544629.20“ Maiorredepró-BolsonarodoFacebookéexcluídaapósdenúnciado‘Estado ’-Política,”Estadão,accessedNovember5,2019,https://politica.estadao.com.br/noticias/eleicoes,maior-rede-pro 21PatríciaElenaSantosEscobar,“MisoginiaeinternetamanifestaçãodoódiocontramulheresnoambientevirtualeaspossíveisimplicaçõesdaLeino13.642/2018,”April30,2019,https://reposito-rio.ufpb.br/jspui/handle/123456789/14671.

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onWikipedia(inPortuguese-BR)andwithalackoffundingforpubliclibraries,isextremelyexcluding,reinforcingknowledgebubbles.

d) Useofpersonaldata/infringingprivacylaws

By law,every telephonenumber inBrazilhas tobe linked toaCPF(cadastrodepessoafísica),thetaxpayernumberforBrazilians.Thisnumberissomewhatpublic22,availabletocreditcheckingandotheruses,notyetdefinedbythelaw.ThetelecommunicationssysteminBrazilallows for the fraudulent registryofmobilenumberswithCPFsofdeceasedor“laranjas23”,sincethesetaxpayernumbersarerelativelyeasytoobtain.Oncethesenumbersare registered with fraudulent IDs, they are used to automate messages onWhatsAppgroups.TheautomationisonlypossiblebecauseWhatsApphasafeaturethatallowspeopleandmachinestofindgroupsontheweb,the“invitelink”24.Technically,theinvitelinksworkas a gate to everything that is published inside a group: from telephone numbers tomessages,andallowsviralisationofcontent.

BrazilianjournalistPatriciaCamposMelloreportingforFolhadeS.PaulouncoveredseveralcontractswithsocialmediaagenciesandadvertisingcompaniesrelatedtothencandidateJairBolsonaro.AccordingtoMello'sreport,upto300,000WhatsAppaccountscouldhavebeenusedtoautomatebroadcastsofdisinformationandcoordinatenon-reportedpoliticaladvertisingtothousandsofWhatsAppgroups.

Benevenuttoetal(2019)25mappedover350WhatsAppgroupsinBrazil,labeledas"publicgroups",andofferedjournalistsandfact-checkersaccesstoprivatecommunicationswithingroups in a so called "WhatsApp Monitor" interface. During the 2018 elections, theWhatsAppMonitorwassaidtobeoneofthemainsourcesforjournalistsandfact-checkersto pinpoint disinformation.Wewould like to stress that further analysis is required toexplorewhetherWhatsApp’sinvitelinkfeatureisinbreachoftheBrazilianGeneralDataProtectionLaw,aswellasagateforfurtherscrutinyontoprivatecommunications.Recentlythecompanyadmittedthatautomationwasusedfordisinformationcampaignsduringthe2018Brazilianelections26,and“Theplatformalsodenouncespublicgroupsintheplatformthatareaccessedthroughlinks,urgingusersnottojointhesegroups”.

FocalPointsofHateandDisinformation

RegulationsagainsthatecrimesalreadyexistinBrazil,includingcriminalizationofracism,homophobiaandseverepenalties forviolenceagainstwomen.However, institutions fallshortinenforcingthelegislation.Therefore,hatespreadsinmanydifferentdirectionsand

22“CPF:OneDatabasetoRuleThemAll-PrivacyInternational-Medium,”accessedNovember5,2019,https://medium.com/@privacyint/cpf-one-database-to-rule-them-all-6343d802705c.23LaranjasareusuallypeoplethathavetheirnamesandIDsusedbycriminalsinthepracticeoffraudulentstratagems,likemoneylaundryforexample.Usually,illiterateandpoorpeoplehavetheirIDsusedintheseschemes,unawarethattheyarebeingusedtosuchschemes.24“WhatsAppFAQ-HowtoCreateandInviteintoaGroup,”WhatsApp.com,accessedNovember5,2019,https://faq.whatsapp.com/ko/android/26000123/?category=5245251.25PhilipeMeloetal.,“WhatsAppMonitor:AFact-CheckingSystemforWhatsApp,”n.d.,2. 26“ WhatsAppAdmitsIllegalMassMessagingUsedinBrazil’s2018Elections|TheRioTimes,”accessedNo-vember5,2019,https://riotimesonline.com/brazil-news/brazil/whatsapp-admits-to-illegal-mass

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with impunity, boosted by the disinformation ecosystem. Often, as described above, itspringsoutoftheacutepoliticalpolarisationofthecountryanddeeproutesofconservatismand religious fundamentalism. This section identifies three different categories or focalpointswherehateanddisinformationintertwine.

1.Womenasatarget

Brazilhasonecaseofviolenceagainstwomeneveryfourminutes,accordingtoofficialdatafromtheMinistryofHealth27.Genderdiscrimination,misogynyandviolencemigratefromtheofflineculturetotheonlineculture.Webringafewcasestoillustrateit:

Fabianede Jesuswaskilledbyanangrymobafter thepopularFacebookpageGuarujáAlerta(thenwith50,000followers)endorsedadisinformationpiecesayingthatawomanwaskidnappingbabiestoperform'blackmagic'ritualsandprovidedadrawndescriptionoftheallegedwoman.Thepagewaswellknownamongthelocalsinthatbeachtown,andareliablesourceofnews.SomepeoplethoughtFabianelookedlikethewomaninquestion(shedidn't).Themobthenperformedalynchingthatledtoherdeath.Fabiane'shusbandwasabletobringfivementojusticewhowereinvolvedinthelynching,butwasnotabletogettheowneroftheFacebookpage(laterdisabled)totakeresponsibilityforsharingthefakedrawndescription.

BrunadaSilva,themotherofMarcosViniciusdaSilva,ateenagerwhowaskilledbythepolice inRiodeJaneiro,duringaraidatthefavelaComplexodaMaréwhilewearinghisschooluniformhadherlifedevastatedtwice.Oncewithherson’sdeath,andanotherwhenfakenewsabouthimstartedtospreadonsocialmedia.Afterhewaskilled,atleast17Face-bookprofiles28accusedtheboyofdrugtrafficking,andseveralfakephotosandtextsstartedtospreadonsocialmedia,includingaphotosharedbythousandsofpeopleofaboywhoallegedly looked likeMarcos Vinicius holding a gun. To the BBC29, Bruna said that thisdefamationbyfakenewswasa"seconddeath"ofherson.Daysafterhewaskilled,acourtdecision30demandedFacebookremovethedisinformationfromtheplatformandidentifythosespreadingit.Asthelawsuitisconfidential,itisimpossibletodeterminewhichlinkswerecomprisedinthejudicialdecision.But,despitewhichlinksweretargetedornot,itisworthmentioningthatitisstillpossibletofindtwotypesofdisinformationconnectedto

27“ Brasilregistra1casodeagressãoamulheracada4minutos,mostralevantamento,”FolhadeS.Paulo,Sep-tember9,2019,https://www1.folha.uol.com.br/cotidiano/2019/09/brasil-registra-1-caso-de-agressao-a-mulher-a-cada-4-minutos-mostra-levantamento.shtml.28“ JustiçaDeterminaQueFacebookRemovaFakeNewsContraEstudanteMortoNaMaré-29/06/2018-UOLNotícias,”accessedNovember5,2019,https://noticias.uol.com.br/cotidiano/ultimas-noti-cias/2018/06/29/justica-determina-que-facebook-apague-fake-news-contra-menino-marcos-vinicius.htm. 29“Brasilregistra1casodeagressãoamulheracada4minutos,mostralevantamento,”FolhadeS.Paulo,Sep-tember9,2019,https://www1.folha.uol.com.br/cotidiano/2019/09/30LuizaFranco, “‘ Elemorreuduasvezes’:abatalhadeumamãeparatirardainternet‘fakenews ’queacusamfilhomortodesertraficante,”BBCNewsBrasil,March11,2019,sec.Brasil,https://www.bbc.com/portu-guese/brasil-47518522.

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thiscaseonline:11)Facebookpoststhatwereremovedfromtheplatform,butarestillavail-ablethroughVPNtools31orfromoutsideBrazil;andb)Facebookpoststhatarestillpub-lishedandreachablewithoutVPN32atall.AlthoughitisnotpossibletofindtotalreachofthedisinformationagainstBruna'sson(asmanypostsweredeleted),oneofthemainpostsisstillaccessibleviaVPN.Itisalsopossibletofindsharesofthispost,accessiblewithoutVPNandopentothepublic33.AsecondpostwassharedinapopularFacebookgroupcalled"NOTÍCIASDENOVA IGUAÇUE REGIÃO"withmore than 100,000members and is stillreachablebymembersofthegroup.

AninhaMoura34,aconservativeyoungwomanfromasmalltownwith14,000inhabitantswas forced todoHIV testingandpublishresultsonherFacebookpage,afterWhatsApprumoursinherownsmalltownspreadsayingthatshewasinfectedbythevirusandwasintentionally having sexual relationshipswithmen in the townwithout protection, andwithout letting them know her status. This is a case about a very common practice ofdisinformationthatadaptsfast,giventhattheauthorofthestorycreatedaphotoofAninhato illustratea fakeWhatsAppprofile, togetherwitha fabricatedconversationwheresheallegedlyconfirmsherintention.Thestorywasadaptedtodifferentcontextsseveraltimes.Aninhawasabletoidentifythatthefakenewspieceaboutherhadbeenedited(wheneverit reached another small town, people changed the name of the city where she wouldallegedlyresidetoupdatethefakestoryandcausepanicinthelocalcommunity).Despitereportingthistopoliceauthorities,Aninhawasneverabletoidentifytheoriginalcreatoroffabricatedscreenshot.

Women'shealthatthecenterofdisinformation. In2016,FabianeVasconcellos,whowasrunningforaseatattheBrazilianNationalCongress,madeavideoclaimingthatthemammographyexamcausesthyroidcancer,andthat it isaneffectofthe"medicalmafiabosses".Thisisacaseinwhichawomandistributesdisinformationonanissuerelatedtowomen'shealth,basedonconspiracytheoriesspreadontheweb.Whiletheoriginalvideocannotbefound,therumorsrestartedin201735.

Womenpoliticalfiguresareanevengreatertarget.Amongstthem,wecouldcitevice-presidentcandidateManuelaD’Avila,RiocouncilwomanMarielleFranco,formerEnviron-mentMinisterMarinaSilva:

31VPN(VirtualPrivateNetwork)isasystemtoenableinternetuserstoextendaprivatenetworkstowardsapublicorsharednetwork,channelingdatainandoutofthisprivatenetworkwithprivacy,hidingtheInternetAddress(IPnumber).32“ JustiçaOrdenaQueFacebookRetireFakeNewsQueApontamJovemMortoNaMaréComoTraficante-Jor-nalOGlobo,”accessedNovember5,2019,https://oglobo.globo.com/rio/justica-ordena-que-facebook-retire-fake-news-que-apontam-jovem-morto-na-mare-como-traficante-22837526.33“ AdrianoLima,”accessedNovember5,2019,https://www.facebook.com/groups/152117161598126/per-malink/1159149004228265/.34“JovemDecideColocarExamedeHIVNegativoEmPerfilDoFacebookParaNegarBoato:‘NãoDavaNemPraSairdeCasa ’|ÉOuNãoé?|G1,”accessedNovember5,2019,https://g1.globo.com/e-ou-nao-e/noti-cia/jovem-decide-colocar-exame-de-hiv-negativo-em-perfil-do-facebook-para-negar-boato-nao-dava-nem-pra-sair-de-casa.ghtml. 35FaçamMamografiaComProteção,accessedNovember5,2019,https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=5F1lmrmvybA

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Manuela D'Avila, vice-president candidate on the Workers Party ticket in 2018 wasconsideredoneofthebiggesttargetsofdisinformationintheBrazilianelections.Ononeoccasion only, Manuela's attorney requested the Brazilian Electoral Justice remove 33Facebook publications that accumulated 146,480 shares and 5,190,942 visualizations36.Pieces included alleged connections of Manuela with Jair Bolsonaro's stabber, abortionclaims,fakematerialsaccusingherofpedophiliaandmanymore.

MarielleFranco,theRiocouncilwoman,whowasambushedbyarmedmilitiaandkilled,sufferedamassivedisinformationcampaigninthenextfewhoursafterherdeath.StoriesincludedadisinformationpiecespreadonWhatsAppsayingthatMariellehadbeenmarriedtoatopdrugdealerofoneofRio'sfavelasandwasassociatedwiththetraffic.ThisstorywassharedonFacebookbyRiodeJaneirocourtjudgeMaríliaCastroNevesandtweetedbyFederalRepresentativeAlbertoFraga (DEM-DF). In another case, aYouTubevideowithmore than 3,000 views claimed that she had received campaign money from the RedCommand,oneofRio'sbiggestcriminalgroups37.Theoriginalstoryofherallegedinvolve-mentwiththeRedCommandwaspostedbyalternativefactwebsiteCeticismoPolitico38andbeforebeingremoved,hadmorethan400,000shares39.

Marina Silva, former presidential candidate by REDE, suffered severe disinformationattacksbytheWorkersPartyinthe2014elections.Duringthe2018campaign,thesamedisinformationpieceswererecycledbythefar-rightin2018.Piecesincludednewsthatherhusband was involved in grave deforestation accusations (for context, Marina Silva isconsideredachampiononanti-deforestationeffortsinBrazil,reducingitbyupto80%inthe7yearsshestayedinoffice).ButdisinformationaboutMarinaalsocoveredthemeslikeherinvolvementwithevangelicalgroups,claimsthatshewouldmakeabortionacrimeforanycaseinBrazilandthatsheherselfinvolvedwasincorruptionscandals.

2.Homophobiaanddisinformationforpoliticalgain

OneofthekeycharacteristicsofdisinformationinthelastBrazilianelectionsisitsabilitytotokenise LGBTQminorities in order to exploit the positions of the twomajor polarisedpoliticalgroupsofthecountryforpoliticalgain.Whileleft-wingpoliticiansandsocialmediapagesandgroupscondemnfarright'saccusationsagainstLGBTQpeopleanduse this toseducetheprogressives'vote,far-rightgroupsoftenresortedtodisinformationandhatespeechtowardsLGBTQcelebritiesandpersonalitiesoftheBrazilianpoliticalandculturallifetorallytheirbases.

OneofthemajordisinformationpiecesinvolvingtheLGBTQcommunityisthe"gaykitcase"thatdatesbackfromtheperiodinwhichFernandoHaddad,thenaMinisterofEducation

36“TSEMandaFacebookTirarDoAr33LinksComNotíciasFalsasContraManuelaD’Ávila,”accessedNovem-ber5,2019,https://extra.globo.com/noticias/brasil/tse-manda-facebook-tirar-do-ar-33-links-com-noticias-falsas-contra-manuela-davila-23141190.html.37“ MariellenãofoicasadacomMarcinhoVPnemeleitapeloComandoVermelho,”accessedNovember5,2019,https://noticias.uol.com.br/confere/ultimas-noticias/2018/03/18/marielle-foi-casada-com-marcin38“CeticismoPolítico,”CeticismoPolítico,accessedNovember5,2019,https://ceticismopolitico.com/.39“PostmaiscompartilhadosobreMarielleFrancoéum‘fakenews ’comprovado,”PragmatismoPolítico(blog),March27,2018,https://www.pragmatismopolitico.com.br/2018/03/ceticismo

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(2005-2012), intendedtoissueabookongendereducationforpublicschools.However,conservativeevangelicalforceslikePastorSilasMalafaia,positionedthemselvesagainstthepublicationofsuchabook,labelledthe"gaykit",thatintendedto"teachkidshowtoturngay".Thegaykitcasewaswidelyreportedbythemedia,andthebookwasneverpublished.However, the “gay kit” is possibly one of the most well documented disinformationcampaignsfromBrazil,havingrepositoriesallovertheweb,includingtheblogspotofthePresidentBolsonaroandhisfamily.Ittakesonlyawebsearchtofindthedescriptionofthefalsestory,videosandotherpiecesthatareusedtodeceiveusers.

Itisimportanttonotethatthepresenceofalternativesitesandblogspopulatingthewebwith disinformation campaigns is crucial to successful viralisation of false information.Blogs on Wordpress, Blogspot, images on Flickr and other well-maintained structuresguaranteethelifeofthesestoriesbeyondthelifeofpostsonFacebookorevenWhatsAppmessage chains. Furthermore, these documented stories fuel Google’s search algorithm,that feeds frommetadataandSEOstrategies,alsoweaponisedbyradicalgroups.Duetothat, years later, the “gay kit” story came back to life just before the election campaignstarted.Suddenly,oldnewsclipsaboutthecasewentviralonsocialmedia,andfabricatedphotoswithFernandoHaddadandaso-calledprintcopyofthe"gaykit"wentviral,withincumbentpresidentJairBolsonarobringinganallegedcopyofthebooktoamajorTVnewsinterviewatGloboTV(Brazil'sbiggestTVchannel).AccordingtoanAvaaz/IDEABigDatapoll run during the second round of the elections in October 2018, the story was sowidespreadthat85.2%ofBolsonaro'svotersreportedthathadseenit,and83.7%ofthemsaidtheybelievedit.OfHaddad'svotershowever,alowerscore(61%)reportedthattheysawthisdisinformationpiece,andonly10.5%believedit.40Accordingtointernalmonitor-ingfromAvaaz,thiswasoneofthebiggeststoriesoftheelectiondayonOctober28,2018withFacebookposts(stillavailable)reaching275,000viewsand30,000shares.

40“EstudoDizQue90%DosEleitoresdeBolsonaroAcreditaramEmFakeNews|Política|ValorEconômico,”accessedNovember5,2019,https://valor.globo.com/politica/noticia/2018/11/02/estudo-diz-que-90-dos-eleitores-de-bolsonaro-acreditaram-em-fake-news.ghtml

D Casaes & Y Córdova Weaponised Information in Brazil: Digitising Hate 11

Fig.2.ImagefromasearchperformedonBolsonaro’spersonalblogspoton10/09/2019available

on:https://familiabolsonaro.blogspot.com/search?q=kit+gay

AnothermajortargetofLGBTQ-relateddisinformation is JeanWyllys,a formerBrazilianmember of Congresswho escaped the country after several death threats and disinfor-mation.MostofthedisinformationonJeanWyllysexploreshissexualityasagaypolitician.ClaimsincludethathewasgoingtobeFernandoHaddad'sMinisterofEducation(toimple-mentthe"gaykit"mentionedabove),thathewasapedophileorthathehad"wagedwaronChristianity".AnothergraveexampleoffakenewstriedtoconnectJeanWyllystothestab-berofcandidateJairBolsonaro,andsaidhewasleavingthecountrynotbecauseofdeaththreatsbuttoescapejustice.Onthelatter,theinvestigativejournalismwebsite"APública"41

41“RastreamosahashtagqueespalhoufakenewssobreJeanWyllys,”AgênciaPública(blog),February11,2019,https://apublica.org/2019/02/rastreamos-a-hashtag-que-espalhou-fake-news-jean-wyllys/.

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lookedover300,000postsonTwitter,andpublicationsonFacebook,YouTubeandGAB42(analternativesocialnetworksimilar toTwitter,describedby theNewYorkTimesasa"new digital safe space" for the far-right) and concluded that most of thedisinformationaboutthisclaimhadbeensharedbybotsandpromotedbyfar-rightpoliticalfiguresconnectedtotheincumbentpresidentJairBolsonaro.

Below are listed common titles of LGBTQ-related disinformation stories that werewidespreadduringtheelectionsin2018inordertoattackprogressivesorLGBTQ-friendlycandidates:

1.ThegovernmentpromotedaLGBTseminarforkids

2.“Genderideology”isawaytoteachboystobegirlsandvice-versa

3.FernandoHaddadwillchangethegenderof5-year-oldchildren

4.JeanWyllyswillcreatealawtoforcechurchestomarrygaycouples

5.FernandoHaddadpostedphotoholdingarubberdildo

6.FernandoHaddadwilldistributeababybottlewithapenisshapetonurseries

7.ManuelaDA� ’vilausedat-shirtsaying“Jesusisatransvestite”

8.PedophilesarepartoftheLGBT+community.

9.InthecityofJuizdeFora,adragqueenhasbeenhiredtoteachgenderideologytochildren

10.PabloVittar,isatrans-artistwillbecometheMinisterofEducation,andforcea"gayagenda"intoprimaryschoolsinBrazil

3.Marginalisedcommunities

Marginalised communities in Brazil are both a target, and a product of disinformation.Brazil'sfavelas’residents,forexample,areveryvulnerabletothedisinformationecosystem.RumoursaboutabductedchildrenarenotunusualinBrazil,andhavebeentakentoanotherlevelduetothespreadofcheapphonesinfavelacommunitiesandzero-ratingpractices.ReneSilva,aleadingvoiceofoneofRiodeJaneiro'sbiggestfavelas,affirmsthatWhatsAppdisinformationisadisturbingrealityofsuchcommunities43.Incollaborationwithjournal-ists,hedoesconstantfact-checkingandverificationofdisinformationpiecesthatarespreadbyresidents.

Even though the caseofFabianede Jesusmentionedabovewaswidely reportedby themedia,itallhappenedagainafewyearslaterinafavelacommunity.AreportfromAVozda

42AmandaHess,“TheFarRightHasaNewDigitalSafeSpace,”TheNewYorkTimes,November30,2016,sec.Arts,https://www.nytimes.com/2016/11/30/arts/the-far-right-has-a-new-digital-safe-space.htm 43FelipeSouza-@felipe_dess,“Forçausadaparadifundir‘fakenews’podeserredirecionadaparaalgobené-fico,dizprofessoraeleitaamelhordoBrasil,”BBCNewsBrasil,March12,2019,sec.Brasil,https://www.bbc.com/portuguese/brasil-47501445.

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Comunidade44showedin2018howthiskindoffakenewswerecausingpanic.Beforethat,in2015,EXTRA45alsoshowedhowparentsofchildreninsomeneighbourhoodsinRiodeJaneiroandcitiesclosetothecapitalwerechangingtheirroutineandevencarryingknivestoprotect theirchildrenafterreading falsenewsonkidnappings.Themostseriouscaseoccurred in 2017 in the city of Araruama. Disinformation about a couple kidnappingchildreninawhitecarhasspreadthroughlocalWhatsAppgroups46,andasaconsequence,Luiz Aurélio de Paula and Pamela Martins, falsely accused of being kidnappers, wereattackedbyacrowd.

VenezuelanmigrantshavealsobeenatargetofdisinformationinBrazil.Duetoaninfluxofmigrants at the border with Brazil just months before the election campaign, far-rightgroups fuelledbyhatespeechcandidate JairBoslonarostarted tospreaddisinformationabout these marginalised community, including that they were bringing back longeradicateddiseases likemeasles toBrazil.TheBraziliannorth region,where theborderwithVenezuela is situated, isoneof theBrazilianstatesmostalignedwith far-rightandconservativevalues.

Indigenouspeoplearealsokeyvictimsofdisinformationinthishighlypolarisedcontext.Disinformationagainsttheindigenousincludeclaimsthattheirownindigenousleadersaresellingofftheirlandstoforeigncompanies.47Anotherpiececlaimedthatindigenousleaderswere mining gold and selling it to other countries. One particular video shows menperformingacheckonaloadofgoldthatwasallegedlyminedinindigenouslandsandwasbeingshippedtoFrance.ThevideoemergedamidsttherecentdiplomaticcrisisaroundtheSeptember2019wildfiresintheBrazilianpartoftheAmazon48andtheglobalcommunity'sresponse,includingstrongcriticismfromFrenchpresidentEmmanuelMacron.ThevideowasaccompaniedbyatextthatclaimedthatNGOswerealsoapartofthescheme.However,thatsamevideohasbeencheckedbyFrenchnewspaperLiberation,whichreportedthatthevideohadalreadybeenusedtospreaddisinformationsayingPresidentMacronhadinvolve-mentwithgoldtrafficandotheraccusations49.

ChiefRaoniMetuktire,a89-yearoldindigenousleadernominatedforthe2019Nobelpeaceprize,isaconstantvictimofattacksbyhategroupsandfar-rightindividualsontheweb.

44“BoatosSobreSequestrosNoAlemãoGeramPolêmicasNasRedesSociaiseCausamMedoEntreMoradores–VozDasComunidades,”accessedNovember5,2019,http://www.vozdascomunidades.com.br/geral/boatos-sobre-sequestros-no-alemao-geram.45“BoatosdeSequestrodeCriançasSeEspalhamPeloRio;PolíciaNegaOcorrências,”accessedNovember5,2019,https://extra.globo.com/noticias/rio/boatos-de-sequestro-de-criancas-se-espalham-pelo-rio-polic46“G1-MultidãoTentaLincharCasalApósBoatodeSequestroEmWhatsApp-NotíciasEmRegiãoDosLagos,”accessedNovember5,2019,http://g1.globo.com/rj/regiao-dos-lagos/noticia/2017/04/multidao-cerca-carro-e-tenta-linchar-casal-suspeito-de-sequestrar-crianca.html. 47“Ondadedesinformaçãosobreíndiosincluifalsavendadereservaparaempresairlandesa,”EstadãoVerifica(blog),accessedNovember5,2019,https://politica.estadao.com.br/blogs/estadao-verifica/onda-de-desinfor-macao-sobre-indios-inclui-falsa-venda-de-reserva-para-empresa-irlandesa/48“AmazonFires:What’stheLatestinBrazil?-BBCNews,”accessedNovember5,2019,https://www.bbc.com/news/world-latin-america-49971563.49“(1)Non,LaDouaneDuMalin’aPasDémanteléUnTraficd’orEffectuéParDesMilitairesFrançaisSousLesOrdresdel’Elysée-Libération,”accessedNovember5,2019,https://www.liberation.fr/check-news/2019/09/10/non-la-douane-du-mali-n-a-pas-demantele-un-trafic-d-or-effectue-par-des-militaires-francais-sous-les_1750514?fbclid=IwAR2STGCH3e1Vluyfeq49DTs1vW4uxgbVDsqGFSama8po_xAY7EqfcUO3sXs.

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Often, it is spurred by conspiracy theories involving NGOs and foreign governmentsworking together with the indigenous to take over the Brazilian part of the Amazonrainforest.Asanexample,theYouTubechannelBomNoticiasTV(with275,000subscribers)has spread several disinformation pieces about chief Raoni, the latest being his allegedinvolvement in a scheme to raise fundswithPrinceAlbert of II ofMonaco to take overindigenouslandsoftheXingutribe.Thevideoalreadyhas12,000viewsonYouTubeandusesasthetitle"Raoni,traitorofthemotherland"50.InanothervideofromSeptember25,2019 the sameYouTuberpublished a story sayingChiefRaoniwas involved in anotherschemewithNGOstoexportgoldtoFrance.Thevideo,publishedrightafterpresidentJairBolsonaro’sspeechattheUnitedNationsGeneralAssembly,whichisnowsetto'private'mode in thechannel's settingsandno longeraccessible to thepublic,hadover460,000viewsinlessthantwodays.

First-hand accounts from indigenous leaders also indicate disinformation spread bypoliticalenemieslikefarmersandland-ownerswho,intryingtoturndifferentindigenouscommunitiesagainsteachother,spreadrumoursthatentirecommunitieshavebeenfacinghunger,which is not true, in an attempt to try to seduce indigenous leaders into illegalmining or deforestation51. ToAvaaz, several indigenous leaders reported hearing fromhenchmenintheirowncommunitiesclaimsthatthenewadministrationofJairBolsonarowas following through on his campaign promises to revoke indigenous land rights, apromisethathasnotyetbeenrealisedbytheBrazilianpresident,causingfearandanxietyamongstindigenouscommunities.

Additionally,itisimportanttonotetheissuearoundtheindigenousright-wingYouTuberYsaniKalapalo,acentralfigureinthisstruggleofindigenouscommunitiestofightdisinfor-mationandhate.Ysani,whohasclose tieswithpresident JairBolsonaro,appearedonaFacebooklivestreamwiththepresidenttakingtheblameonbehalfoftheindigenouspeopleforthewildfiresintheAmazon.ThevideocausedastirintheindigenouscommunitieswhocriticizeYsaniKalapaloforsidingwiththegovernment,tosaythattheindigenous,andnotcriminals,werebehindthefires.

Lastly, wewould like to also point to vaccine disinformation as having a key effect onmarginalisedcommunitiesinthecountry.TheBrazilianImmunizationSocietyandMinistryofHealthhavereportedthatnationalvaccinationratesformeasleshavedecreasedduetoanti-vaccinationmovements andWhatsApp disinformation. A recent report52suggestedthatPoliovaccinationin2019isonaverageat52%,with100citieshavinglessthan1%ofchildrenvaccinated,growingtherisksoflongeradicateddiseasescomingbacktolife.

50ATENÇAOBRASIL :CACIQUERAONITRAIDORDAPÁTRIA!!ENTREGOUTUDOPARAPríncipeAlbertIIAMAZÔNIA,accessedNovember5,2019,https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=_JJU26W809s.51“Comunicadoresindígenascontraasfakenews,”ISA-InstitutoSocioambiental,accessedNovember5,2019,https://www.socioambiental.org/pt-br/blog/blog-do-rio-negro/comunicadores-indigenas-contra-as-fake-news. 52“BaixaCoberturaVacinalAcendeAlertaParaNovosCasosdePólioNoBrasil-25/10/2019-Cotidiano-Fo-lha,”accessedNovember5,2019,https://www1.folha.uol.com.br/cotidiano/2019/10/baixa-cobertura-vaci-nal-acende-alerta-para-novos-casos-de-polio-no-brasil.shtml.

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SolvingtheProblem:PolicyRecommendations

Fixing thedisinformationandhate epidemicson socialmedia shouldbe a collaborationbetween tech companies, legislators and government authorities, and civil society.However, any solution must be grounded in shared values of freedom of expression,protectionofprivacyand transparencyandensuringnetneutrality rules arepreserved.Responsibilityof allplayers involved iskey. Therefore, the following recommendationsshouldbetakenintoaccount:

Togovernments

1. Governmentauthoritiesarekeytoupholdingtherelevantlegislationagainstcrimescommitted on socialmedia. Therefore, both Federal government and theBrazilianJudiciaryshouldworktogethertobetterenforcethecurrentlegislationandtocurbfraudulentactivityand identitytheft insocialmediaplatformsthataimtoproducedisinformationinpublicdebates.Authoritiesshouldalsoensurenetneutralityrulesarerespected,tocreateahealthierinternetecosysteminthecountry,curbingzero-ratingandmonopolypractices.

2. TheBrazilian Judiciary shouldalso invest resources to train judges tomakebetterdecisionsincaseswheredisinformationandhatespeechiscentral.Thisshouldnotbeisolatedtoelectionperiods.Actionscouldincludeseminarsandtrainingaboutthethreat of disinformation for electoral processes and the public debate, as well asupdating the Judiciary's norms towards electoralmoney spending on socialmediaplatformsduringanelectionperiod.

3. Enforce the legislation toensure identity theft and fraudulentactivityonSIMcardregistrationformobilephonesisreduced,inordertocurbWhatsAppbotcreationandfraudulentactivityinmessagingappsthatusemobilephonenumbersasaregistrationrequirement.ANATEL(BrazilNationalTelecommunicationRegulator)shouldworkwithtelecommunicationsproviderstoofferzero-ratingpolicytonewsmediaoutletsduringtheelectionperiod,toensureinternetuserscouldgetqualityinformationandaccess to fact-checking for free. Introduce legislation to give the digital usermorefreedomtowardstheirdata,includingrulesfordataportability,aswellasintroducelegislationtobringaccountabilityandresponsibilitytoplatforms,including,butnotonly,adutytocooperatewithpublicauthoritiesandpublicisesolutionsandtranspar-encymeasures.

Totechandsocialmediacompanies

1. Adopt a "correct the record" policy, working with independent fact-checkers andtraditional media to ensure fact-checked corrections on disinformation and hatespeech reach users who have seen or interacted with it. Providing swift factualresponsestodisinformationonsocialmediaisakeyfactorinraisingpublicawarenessaboutitsthreatsandeducatingthepopulace.

2. Adoptastrongertransparencypolicy, informingusersofpoliticalandnon-politicaladvertisingexpenditure,includingmakingavailabletoeveryonecompletesetsofadsthatthey'rebeingtargetedinduringelectoralperiods.Itisessentialthatgovernments,

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civilsocietyandthegeneralpublicbeinformedbytechcompaniesaboutthenatureandscaleofthethreatofdisinformationandthemeasuresbeingtakentoprotecttheirservicesagainstit.

3. CorrecttheAlgorithms:Algorithmprioritisationcanincreaseuserengagementwithdisinformation and other harmful content as seen in the radicalisation of hate inYouTube channels in Brazil, deepening the political polarisation and spreadingpseudoscience.Platformsneedtobeproactiveincorrectingalgorithmstoensurethattheyarenotacceleratingdisinformation.

4. TransparencyontheBotandautomationpolicies:Botsareusedforgoodreasonsandfillthegapsofacrescentdemandforautomation.Usersshouldbeawarethattheyareinteractingwithservicebotswhenevertheyinteractwithautomatedcontentonline.

5. Zerotolerancetowardautomatedbotsinsocialmedia,includingFacebookmaliciousaccountsandnon-registeredTwitterbots.

6. TransparencyoverWhatsAppdeletedaccountsinBrazil.WhatsAppdeletednearly1.5millionaccountinthelastBrazilianelectionsthatweretosomeextentengagingonautomatisationofcontent,oranyothermalpractice,andshouldcontinuetodosoonaregularbasis,butincollaborationwiththeBrazilianauthoritiesinordertofacilitatetheidentificationofmaliciousplayers,especiallyduringelections.

Tomediaoutlets

1. Mediaoutletsandindependentmediaprofessionalsshouldinvestincoverageofdis-informationvictims’personalstories,ensuring that thenarrativeofdisinformationgoesbeyondpolitical/partisan"fakenews".Thisincludesinvestigativepiecesonun-derground networks, far-right radicalised groups and other malicious actors thatcouldbetakingadvantageofhateforpoliticalgain.

2. Westronglyrecommendthemediadropthepaywallduringelectionperiods,ensuringthat theircontentcanbeeasilyaccessibleto lower-incomecitizens,andvulnerableindividualswho could fall prey to disinformation and hate speech. Outlets shouldencouragenewsdeskstopromotefact-checkingpracticesandstories,anddistributethisthroughtheirsocialmediachannels.

Tootherrelevantactors

1. Associationsofminoritygroups(LGBTQ,indigenous,women'srightsassociationsandothers)shouldworkinpartnershipwithNGOsanddigitalrightsmovementssuchasthe Coalizão Direitos na Rede (Coalition Rights in the Network) to deepen theirknowledgeof theirdigital rights,online freedomofexpressionanddisinformation,and devise a strategy together to provide firsthand accounts of disinformation topolicy-makersandthemedia,aswellastotechcompanies.

2. We encourage telecommunications companies operating in the country to expandtheirserviceoffersofapplicationstogobeyondsocialmediacompanies,andincludemedia outlets as potential partners. Furthermore, telecommunications companiesneedtoupdatetheirprivacyandsecuritypractices,aimedatprotectingtheidentityofthe owners of phone numbers. The phone number itself needs to be consideredpersonaldata,thereforeprotectedbytheGeneralDataProtectionLaw.

D Casaes & Y Córdova Weaponised Information in Brazil: Digitising Hate 17

TheAuthors DiegoCasaesisaSeniorCampaignerwithAvaaz,aglobalcivicmovementthatcampaignsonissuesfromclimatechange,disinformation,humanrights,andothertopics.Hehasnearly10yearsofexperienceinadvocacyandcampaigningintheBrazilianCongressinthefieldsofanti-corruption,digitalrights,andenvironmentalprotection,havingbeeninvolvedinkeyBrazilianpolicyprocessesliketheFichaLimpaLaw(CleanSlateLaw),theInternetRightsLaw(MarcoCivildaInternet),the"openvote"ConstitutionalAmendmentthatbroughttolightcorruptionpracticesinsidetheBrazilianCongress,andmore.RecentlyheledAvaaz’santi-disinformationwork in the lastBrazil2018elections,helping takedownanetworkwith16millionfollowersthatwerespreadingdisinformationduringtheelections.BeforeAvaaz,heworkedintheTransparencyHackerCollectiveattheHouseofDigitalCulture,acollectiveoftechnologistsandpolicy-geeksthathelpedpushtheagendaofdigitalculture,transparency,opendata,anddigitalrightsinBrazil.Rightnow,he'salsofinishinganMBAinInternationalRelationsatFGV(GetúlioVargasFoundation)inSãoPaulo,Brazil.

YasodaraCórdovaisaPublicInformationTechnologist,formerSeniorFellowbothattheDigital Kennedy School, a Belfer Center’s project at Harvard and at the Berkman KleinCenter. She worked as a Web Specialist at the World Wide Web Consortium, leadingstandards’developmentfordataontheWebandparticipatinginthedevelopmentofwebpaymentstandards.ShewastheDirectorofthe“SerenatadeAmorOperation”,acivictechprojectinBrazil.Previoustothat,sheworkedfortheUNasaconsultantingovernmentandInnovationattheBraziliangovernment,developingplatformsandpublicpoliciesforpublicconsultation and participative law-making processes. She alsoworkedwithmultimediajournalismanddatavisualization, and she's the recipientofoneof thebiggestprizes inJournalism and Human Rights in Brazil. Yaso is a Board Director of the CiudadaniaInteligente,aLatinAmericanCivicTechfoundation,andwaspartoftheadvisor'steamofthe Open Knowledge Foundation Brazil and the CodingRights think tank. Yaso is aco-founderoftheCalangoHackerspace,inBrasilia,Brazil.

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TodaPeaceInstitute

TheTodaPeaceInstituteisanindependent,nonpartisaninstitutecommittedtoadvancingamorejustandpeacefulworldthroughpolicy-orientedpeaceresearchandpractice.TheInstitute commissions evidence-based research, convenesmulti-track andmulti-discipli-naryproblem-solvingworkshopsandseminars,andpromotesdialogueacrossethnic,cul-tural,religiousandpoliticaldivides.Itcatalysespractical,policy-orientedconversationsbe-tweentheoreticalexperts,practitioners,policymakersandcivilsocietyleadersinordertodiscerninnovativeandcreativesolutionstothemajorproblemsconfrontingtheworldinthetwenty-firstcentury(seewww.toda.orgformoreinformation).ContactUsTodaPeaceInstituteSamonElevenBldg.5thFloor3-1Samon-cho,Shinjuku-ku,Tokyo160-0017,JapanEmail:contact@toda.org