voice over ip security

Voice Over IP Security

Mark D. CollierChief Technology OfficerSecureLogix Corporationmark.collier@securelogix.com

David EndlerDirector of Security Research

TippingPointdendler@tippingpoint.com

Overview

Gathering Information: Footprinting Scanning Enumeration

Attacking the Network: Network Infrastructure Denial of Service Network Eavesdropping Network and Application Interception

OutlineOutline

Attacking Vendor Platforms: Avaya Cisco

Attacking the Application: Fuzzing Disruption of Service Signaling and Media Manipulation

Social Attacks: Voice SPAM/SPIT Voice Phishing

OutlineOutline

VoIP systems are vulnerable: Platforms, networks, and applications are vulnerable VoIP-specific attacks are becoming more common Security isn’t always a consideration during deployment

The threat is increasing: VoIP deployment is growing Deployments are critical to business operations Greater integration with the data network More attack tools being published The hacking community is taking notice

IntroductionIntroductionIntroduction

This is the process a hacker goes through to gather information about your organization and prepare their attack

Consists of: Footprinting Scanning Enumeration

Gathering InformationGathering Information

Steps taken by a hacker to learn about your enterprise before they start the actual attack

Consists of: Public website research Google hacking

FootprintingGathering InformationFootprinting

An enterprise website often contains a lot of information that is useful to a hacker: Organizational structure and corporate locations Help and technical support Job listings Phone numbers and extensions

Public Website ResearchIntroduction

Gathering InformationFootprinting

Public Website ResearchCorporate Locations

Public Website ResearchJob Listings

Job listings can contain a ton of information about the enterprise VoIP system.

Here is a portion of an actual job listing:Required Technical Skills:

Minimum 3-5 years experience in the management and implementation of Avaya telephone systems/voicemails:

* Advanced programming knowledge of the Avaya Communication Servers and voicemails.

Public Website ResearchPhone Numbers

Google can be used to find all phone numbers on an enterprise web site: Type: “111..999-1000..9999 site:www.mcgraw-hill.com”

Public Website ResearchVoice Mail

By calling into some of these numbers, you can listen to the voice mail system and determine the vendor

Check out our voice mail hacking database at: www.hackingvoip.com

Public Website Research Countermeasures

It is difficult to control what is on your enterprise website, but it is a good idea to be aware of what is on it

Try to limit amount of detail in job postings

Remove technical detail from help desk web pages

Google is incredibly good at finding details on the web: Vendor press releases and case studies Resumes of VoIP personnel Mailing lists and user group postings Web-based VoIP logins

Google HackingIntroduction

Vendors and enterprises may post press releases and case studies: Type: “site:avaya.com case study” or “site:avaya.com company”

Users place resumes on the Internet when searching for jobs Search Monster for resumes for company employees

Mailing lists and user group postings: www.inuaa.org www.innua.org forums.cisco.com forums.digium.com

Google Hacking Gathering InformationFootprinting

Use Google to search for: Type: inrul:”ccmuser/logon.asp” Type: inurl:”ccmuser/logon.asp” site:example.com Type: inurl:”NetworkConfiguration” cisco

Google HackingWeb-Based VoIP Logins

Determine what your exposure is

Be sure to remove any VoIP phones which are visible to the Internet

Disable the web servers on your IP phones

There are services that can helpyou monitor your exposure: www.cyveilance.com ww.baytsp.com

Google HackingCountermeasures

Steps taken by a hacker to identify IP addresses and hosts running VoIP

Consists: Gaining access Host/device discovery and identification Port scanning and service discovery

ScanningIntroduction

Gathering InformationScanning

Several attack vectors include: Installing a simple wired hub Wi-Fi sniffing Compromising a network node Compromising a VoIP phone Compromising a switch Compromising a proxy, gateway, or PC/softphone ARP poisoning Circumventing VLANs

ScanningGaining Access

Attacking The NetworkGaining Access

Consists of various techniques used to find hosts: Ping sweeps ARP pings TCP ping scans SNMP sweeps

After hosts are found, the type of device can be determined

Classifies host/device by operating system

Network stack fingerprinting is a common technique for identifying hosts/devices

Host/DeviceDiscovery and Identification

Host/Device DiscoveryUsing nmap

nmap -O -P0 192.168.1.1-254

Starting Nmap 4.01 ( http://www.insecure.org/nmap/ ) at 2006-02-20 01:03 CSTInteresting ports on 192.168.1.21:(The 1671 ports scanned but not shown below are in state: filtered)PORT STATE SERVICE23/tcp open telnetMAC Address: 00:0F:34:11:80:45 (Cisco Systems)Device type: VoIP phoneRunning: Cisco embeddedOS details: Cisco IP phone (POS3-04-3-00, PC030301)Interesting ports on 192.168.1.23:(The 1671 ports scanned but not shown below are in state: closed)PORT STATE SERVICE80/tcp open httpMAC Address: 00:15:62:86:BA:3E (Cisco Systems)Device type: VoIP phone|VoIP adapterRunning: Cisco embeddedOS details: Cisco VoIP Phone 7905/7912 or ATA 186 Analog Telephone AdapterInteresting ports on 192.168.1.24:(The 1671 ports scanned but not shown below are in state: closed)PORT STATE SERVICE80/tcp open httpMAC Address: 00:0E:08:DA:DA:17 (Sipura Technology)Device type: VoIP adapterRunning: Sipura embeddedOS details: Sipura SPA-841/1000/2000/3000 POTS<->VoIP gateway

Host/Device DiscoveryPing Sweeps/ARP Pings

Host/Device DiscoverySNMP Sweeps

Use firewalls and Intrusion Prevention Systems (IPSs) to block ping and TCP sweeps

VLANs can help isolate ARP pings

Ping sweeps can be blocked at the perimeter firewall

Use secure (SNMPv3) version of SNMP

Change SNMP public strings

Host/Device DiscoveryCountermeasures

Consists of various techniques used to find open ports and services on hosts

These ports can be targeted later

nmap is the most commonly used tool for TCP SYN and UDP scans

Port Scanning/Service Discovery Gathering InformationScanning

Using non-Internet routable IP addresses will prevent external scans

Firewalls and IPSs can detect and possibly block scans

VLANs can be used to partition the network to prevent scans from being effective

Port Scanning/Service DiscoveryCountermeasures

Involves testing open ports and services on hosts/devices to gather more information

Includes running tools to determine if open services have known vulnerabilities

Also involves scanning for VoIP-unique information such as phone numbers

Includes gathering information from TFTP servers and SNMP

EnumerationIntroduction

Gathering InformationEnumeration

Vulnerability TestingTools

Vulnerability TestingCountermeasures

The best solution is to upgrade your applications and make sure you continually apply patches

Some firewalls and IPSs can detect and mitigate vulnerability scans

SIP EnumerationDirectory Scanning[root@attacker]# nc 192.168.1.104 5060

OPTIONS sip:test@192.168.1.104 SIP/2.0Via: SIP/2.0/TCP 192.168.1.120;branch=4ivBcVj5ZnPYgbTo: alice <sip:test@192.168.1.104>Content-Length: 0

SIP/2.0 404 Not FoundVia: SIP/2.0/TCP192.168.1.120;branch=4ivBcVj5ZnPYgb;received=192.168.1.103To: alice sip:test@192.168.1.104>;tag=b27e1a1d33761e85846fc98f5f3a7e58.0503Server: Sip EXpress router (0.9.6 (i386/linux))Content-Length: 0Warning: 392 192.168.1.104:5060 "Noisy feedback tells: pid=29801req_src_ip=192.168.1.120 req_src_port=32773 in_uri=sip:test@192.168.1.104out_uri=sip:test@192.168.1.104 via_cnt==1"

SIP EnumerationDirectory Scanning

TFTP EnumerationIntroduction

Almost all phones we tested use TFTP to download their configuration files

The TFTP server is rarely well protected

If you know or can guess the name of a configuration or firmware file, you can download it without even specifying a password

The files are downloaded in the clear and can be easily sniffed

Configuration files have usernames, passwords, IP addresses, etc. in them

TFTP EnumerationUsing TFTPBRUTE[root@attacker]# perl tftpbrute.pl 192.168.1.103

brutefile.txt 100tftpbrute.pl, , V 0.1

TFTP file word database: brutefile.txtTFTP server 192.168.1.103Max processes 100 Processes are: 1<snip>Processes are: 12*** Found TFTP server remote filename : sip.cfg*** Found TFTP server remote filename : 46xxsettings.txt Processes are: 13 Processes are: 14*** Found TFTP server remote filename : sip_4602D02A.txt*** Found TFTP server remote filename : XMLDefault.cnf.xml*** Found TFTP server remote filename : SipDefault.cnf

TFTP EnumerationCountermeasures

It is difficult not to use TFTP, since it is so commonly used by VoIP vendors

Some vendors offer more secure alternatives

Firewalls can be used to restrict access to TFTP servers to valid devices

SNMP EnumerationIntroduction

SNMP is enabled by default on most IP PBXs and IP phones

Simple SNMP sweeps will garner lots of useful information

If you know the device type, you can use snmpwalk with the appropriate OID

You can find the OID using Solarwinds MIB

Default “passwords”, called community strings, are common

SNMP EnumerationSolarwinds

SNMP Enumerationsnmpwalk

[root@domain2 ~]# snmpwalk -c public -v 1 192.168.1.53 1.3.6.1.4.1.6889

SNMPv2-SMI::enterprises.6889.2.69.1.1.1.0 = STRING: "Obsolete"SNMPv2-SMI::enterprises.6889.2.69.1.1.2.0 = STRING: "4620D01B"SNMPv2-SMI::enterprises.6889.2.69.1.1.3.0 = STRING: "AvayaCallserver"SNMPv2-SMI::enterprises.6889.2.69.1.1.4.0 = IpAddress: 192.168.1.103SNMPv2-SMI::enterprises.6889.2.69.1.1.5.0 = INTEGER: 1719SNMPv2-SMI::enterprises.6889.2.69.1.1.6.0 = STRING: "051612501065"SNMPv2-SMI::enterprises.6889.2.69.1.1.7.0 = STRING: "700316698"SNMPv2-SMI::enterprises.6889.2.69.1.1.8.0 = STRING: "051611403489"SNMPv2-SMI::enterprises.6889.2.69.1.1.9.0 = STRING: "00:04:0D:50:40:B0"SNMPv2-SMI::enterprises.6889.2.69.1.1.10.0 = STRING: "100"SNMPv2-SMI::enterprises.6889.2.69.1.1.11.0 = IpAddress: 192.168.1.53SNMPv2-SMI::enterprises.6889.2.69.1.1.12.0 = INTEGER: 0SNMPv2-SMI::enterprises.6889.2.69.1.1.13.0 = INTEGER: 0SNMPv2-SMI::enterprises.6889.2.69.1.1.14.0 = INTEGER: 0SNMPv2-SMI::enterprises.6889.2.69.1.1.15.0 = STRING: "192.168.1.1"SNMPv2-SMI::enterprises.6889.2.69.1.1.16.0 = IpAddress: 192.168.1.1SNMPv2-SMI::enterprises.6889.2.69.1.1.17.0 = IpAddress: 255.255.255.0...SNMPv2-SMI::enterprises.6889.2.69.1.4.8.0 = INTEGER: 20SNMPv2-SMI::enterprises.6889.2.69.1.4.9.0 = STRING: "503"

Disable SNMP on any devices where it is not needed

Change default public and private community strings

Try to use SNMPv3, which supports authentication

SNMP EnumerationCountermeasures

The VoIP network and supporting infrastructure are vulnerable to attacks

Most attacks will originate inside the network, once access is gained

Attacks include: Network infrastructure DoS Network eavesdropping Network and application interception

Attacking The NetworkAttacking The Network

Some techniques for circumventing VLANs: Without MAC filtering, disconnect a phone and connect a PC Even if MAC filtering is used, you can easily spoof the MAC Be especially cautious of VoIP phones in public areas

Some other VLAN attacks: MAC flooding attack 802.1q and ISL tagging attack Double-encapsulated 802.1q/Nested VLAN attack Private VLAN attack Spanning-tree protocol attack/VLAN trunking protocol attack

Attacking The NetworkGaining Access

The VoIP network and supporting infrastructure are vulnerable to attacks

VoIP media/audio is particularly susceptible to any DoS attack which introduces latency and jitter

Attacks include: Flooding attacks Network availability attacks Supporting infrastructure attacks

Network Infrastructure DoSAttacking The NetworkNetwork DoS

Flooding attacks generate so many packets at a target, that it is overwhelmed and can’t process legitimate requests

Flooding AttacksIntroduction

Attacking The NetworkNetwork DoS

Some types of floods are: UDP floods TCP SYN floods ICMP and Smurf floods Worm and virus oversubscription side effect QoS manipulation Application flooding

Flooding AttacksTypes of Floods

Layer 2 and 3 QoS mechanisms are commonly used to give priority to VoIP media (and signaling)

Use rate limiting in network switches

Use anti-DoS/DDoS products

Some vendors have DoS support in their products (in newer versions of software)

Flooding AttacksCountermeasures

This type of attack involves an attacker trying to crash the underlying operating system: Fuzzing involves sending malformed packets, which exploit a

weakness in software Packet fragmentation Buffer overflows

Network Availability AttacksAttacking The NetworkNetwork DoS

A network IPS is an inline device that detects and blocks attacks

Some firewalls also offer this capability

Host based IPS software also provides this capability

Network Availability Attacks Countermeasures

VoIP systems rely heavily on supporting services such as DHCP, DNS, TFTP, etc.

DHCP exhaustion is an example, where a hacker uses up all the IP addresses, denying service to VoIP phones

DNS cache poisoning involves tricking a DNS server into using a fake DNS response

Supporting Infrastructure AttacksAttacking The NetworkNetwork DoS

Configure DHCP servers not to lease addresses to unknown MAC addresses

DNS servers should be configured to analyze info from non-authoritative servers and dropping any response not related to queries

Supporting Infrastructure AttacksCountermeasures

VoIP configuration files, signaling, and media are vulnerable to eavesdropping

Attacks include: TFTP configuration file sniffing (already discussed) Number harvesting and call pattern tracking Conversation eavesdropping

Network EavesdroppingIntroduction

Attacking The NetworkEavesdropping

By sniffing signaling, it is possible to build a directory of numbers and track calling patterns

voipong automates the process of logging all calls

Wireshark is very good at sniffing VoIP signaling

Numbers/Call Patterns Attacking The NetworkEavesdropping

Conversation RecordingWireshark

Attacking The NetworkEavesdroppingConversation Recording

Wireshark

Attacking The NetworkEavesdroppingConversation Recording

Cain And Abel

Other tools include: vomit Voipong voipcrack (not public) DTMF decoder

Conversation RecordingOther Tools

Use encryption: Many vendors offer encryption for signaling Use the Transport Layer Security (TLS) for signaling Many vendors offer encryption for media Use Secure Real-time Transport Protocol (SRTP) Use ZRTP Use proprietary encryption if you have to

Network EavesdroppingCountermeasures

The VoIP network is vulnerable to Man-In-The-Middle (MITM) attacks, allowing: Eavesdropping on the conversation Causing a DoS condition Altering the conversation by omitting, replaying, or inserting media Redirecting calls

Attacks include: Network-level interception Application-level interception

Network/Application InterceptionIntroduction

Attacking The NetworkNet/App Interception

The most common network-level MITM attack is ARP poisoning

Involves tricking a host into thinking the MAC address of the attacker is the intended address

There are a number of tools available to support ARP poisoning: Cain and Abel ettercap Dsniff hunt

Network InterceptionARP Poisoning

Network InterceptionCountermeasures

Some countermeasures for ARP poisoning are: Static OS mappings Switch port security Proper use of VLANs Signaling encryption/authentication ARP poisoning detection tools, such as arpwatch

This section describes unique attacks against specific VoIP vendor platforms, including: Avaya Cisco

Attacking The PlatformAttacking The Platform

The Avaya Communication Manager is Avaya’s enterprise-class offering

Offers strong security, but some default configuration should be changed

Avaya uses Linux and VxWorks as the underlying operating system on many components, which is arguably more secure than Windows

Avaya Communication ManagerAttacking The PlatformAvaya

Open Ports Attacking The PlatformAvaya

Open PortsCountermeasures

Attacking The PlatformAvaya

Open PortsCountermeasures

SNMP and TFTP Attacking The PlatformAvaya

Avaya uses TFTP and SNMP

In 3.0, SNMP is enabled by default on the IP PBX and IP phones

Some components ship with default public and private community strings

SNMP and TFTPCountermeasures

Use the same countermeasures as before

Avaya provides a secure copy feature as an alternative to TFTP

Communication Manager 4.0 disables SNMP by default

Version 2.6 for IP phones does not ship with default community strings

Flooding Attacks Attacking The PlatformAvaya

We used udpflood and tcpsynflood to perform DoS attacks against various components

Unfortunately, these attacks were very disruptive

Flooding AttacksCountermeasures

Use the same countermeasures as before

Avaya C-LAN cards provide some level of DoS mitigation

Newer IP phone software provides better DoS mitigation

http://support.avaya.com/security

Miscellaneous Security Issues Attacking The PlatformAvaya

Avaya signaling and media are vulnerable to eavesdropping

Avaya uses some default passwords on key IP PBX components

Password recommendations for IP phones are weak

By default, Avaya IP phones can be reconfigured when booted

Miscellaneous Security IssuesCountermeasures

Avaya supports proprietary encryption for signaling and media. SRTP will be supported in Communication Manager 4.0

Default passwords should be changed to strong values

Local access to the IP phone can be controlled with a password

The Cisco Unified Call Manager is Cisco’s enterprise class offering

Offers strong security, but requires some configuration

Version 4.1 is based on Windows. Version 5.0 is based on Linux

A Must Read Document is the Solution Reference Network Design (SRND) for Voice communications. (http://tinyurl.com/gd5r4).

Includes great deployment scenarios and security use cases (lobby phone, desktop phone, call manager encryption how-to, etc.)

Cisco Unified Call ManagerAttacking The PlatformAvaya

CiscoIntroduction

Attacking The PlatformCisco

Cisco Discovery Protocol – Cisco’s proprietary layer 2 network management protocol.

Contains juicy information that is broadcast on the entire segment

Cisco Discovery ProtocolAttacking The PlatformCisco

Cisco Unified Call Manager requires a large number of open ports

Port ScanningAttacking The PlatformCisco

Cisco IOS has a great feature called “autosecure” that” disables a slew of services (finger, http, ICMP, source routing,

etc.) enables some services (password encryption, TCP synwait-time,

logging, etc.). And locks down the router and switch (enables only ssh, blocks

private address blocks from traversing, enables netflow, etc.)

Port ScanningCountermeasures

Network Flooding Countermeasures: Another great feature from Cisco is AutoQos, a new IOS feature

(auto qos command). Enables Quality of Service for VoIP traffic across every Cisco

router and switch Scavenger class QoS also a relatively new Cisco strategy – rate

shape all bursty non-VoIP traffic

FloodingCountermeasures

Patch Management is key – use the Cisco Voice Technology Group Subscription Tool (http://www.cisco.com/cgi-bin/Software/Newsbuilder/Builder/VOICE.cgi)

DoS and OS ExploitationCountermeasures

Eavesdropping and Interception Countermeasures: Enable port security on Cisco Switches to help mitigate ARP

Spoofing Enable Dynamic ARP inspection to thwart ARP Spoofing Dynamically restrict Ethernet port access with 802.1x port

authentication Enable DHCP Snooping to prevent DHCP Spoofing Configure IP source guard on Switches

Eavesdropping and InterceptionCountermeasures

Eavesdropping and Interception Countermeasures: Configure VTP Transparent Mode Change the default Native VLAN Value to thwart VLAN

hopping Disable Dynamic Trunk Protocol (DTP) to thwart VLAN

Hopping

Eavesdropping and InterceptionCountermeasures

Eavesdropping and Interception Countermeasures: Activate authentication and encryption of the signaling and

media streams Skinny over TLS SRTP Requires creating and distributing certificates on phones

Attacking The PlatformCisco Eavesdropping and Interception

Countermeasures

VoIP systems are vulnerable to application attacks against the various VoIP protocols

Attacks include: Fuzzing attacks Flood-based DoS Signaling and media manipulation

Attacking The ApplicationAttacking The Application

Fuzzing describes attacks where malformed packets are sent to a VoIP system in an attempt to crash it

Research has shown that VoIP systems, especially those employing SIP, are vulnerable to fuzzing attacks

FuzzingIntroduction

Attacking The ApplicationFuzzing

INVITE sip:6713@192.168.26.180:6060;user=phone SIP/2.0Via: SIP/2.0/UDP 192.168.22.36:6060From: UserAgent<sip:6710@192.168.22.36:6060;user=phone>To: 6713<sip:6713@192.168.26.180:6060;user=phone>Call-ID: 96561418925909@192.168.22.36Cseq: 1 INVITESubject: VovidaINVITEContact: <sip:6710@192.168.22.36:6060;user=phone>Content-Type: application/sdpContent-Length: 168

Attacking The ApplicationFuzzingFuzzing

Example

INVITE sip:6713@192.168.26.180:6060;user=phone SIP/2.0Via: aaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaa…From: UserAgent<sip:6710@192.168.22.36:6060;user=phone>To: 6713<sip:6713@192.168.26.180:6060;user=phone>Call-ID: 96561418925909@192.168.22.36Cseq: 1 INVITESubject: VovidaINVITEContact: <sip:6710@192.168.22.36:6060;user=phone>Content-Type: application/sdpContent-Length: 168

Attacking The ApplicationFuzzingFuzzing

Example

There are many public domain tools available for fuzzing: Protos suite Asteroid Fuzzy Packet NastySIP Scapy

FuzzingPublic Domain Tools

SipBomber SFTF SIP Proxy SIPp SIPsak

There are some commercial tools available: Beyond Security BeStorm Codenomicon MuSecurity Mu-4000 Security Analyzer Security Innovation Hydra Sipera Systems LAVA tools

FuzzingCommercial Tools

Make sure your vendor has tested their systems for fuzzing attacks

Consider running your own tests

An VoIP-aware IPS can monitor for and block fuzzing attacks

FuzzingCountermeasures

Several tools are available to generate floods at the application layer: rtpflood – generates a flood of RTP packets inviteflood – generates a flood of SIP INVITE packets SiVuS – a tool which a GUI that enables a variety of flood-

based attacks

Virtually every device we tested was susceptible to these attacks

Attacking The ApplicationFlood-Based DoSFlood-Based DoS

There are several countermeasures you can use for flood-based DoS: Use VLANs to separate networks Use TCP and TLS for SIP connections Use rate limiting in switches Enable authentication for requests Use SIP firewalls/IPSs to monitor and block attacks

Flood-Based DoSCountermeasures

Attacking The ApplicationFlood-Based DoS

In SIP and RTP, there are a number of attacks possible, which exploit the protocol: Registration manipulation Redirection attacks Session teardown SIP phone reboot RTP insertion/mixing

Attacking The Application Sig/Media ManipulationSignaling/Media Manipulation

Introduction

Attacker

HijackedMedia

HijackedSession

Registration Manipulation Attacking The Application Sig/Media Manipulation

Inbound CallsAre Redirected

Attacker

Proxy Proxy

Attacker Sends“301/302 – Moved”

Message

Redirection Attacks Attacking The Application Sig/Media Manipulation

Attacker SendsBYE Messages

To UAs

Attacker

Proxy Proxy

User User

Session Teardown Attacking The Application Sig/Media Manipulation

Attacker Sendscheck-sync Messages

Attacker

Proxy Proxy

User User

IP Phone Reboot Attacking The Application Sig/Media Manipulation

Attacker SeesPackets And

Inserts/Mixes InNew Audio

Attacker

Proxy Proxy

User User

Audio Insertion/Mixing Attacking The Application Sig/Media Manipulation

Some countermeasures for signaling and media manipulation include: Use digest authentication where possible Use TCP and TLS where possible Use SIP-aware firewalls/IPSs to monitor for and block attacks Use audio encryption to prevent RTP injection/mixing

Attacking The Application Sig/Media ManipulationSignaling/Media Manipulation

Countermeasures

There are a couple of evolving social threats that will affect enterprises: Voice SPAM or SPAM over Internet Telephony (SPIT) Voice phishing

Social AttacksSocial Attacks

Voice SPAM refers to bulk, automatically generated, unsolicited phone calls

Similar to telemarketing, but occurring at the frequency of email SPAM

Not an issue yet, but will become prevalent when: The network makes it very inexpensive or free to generate calls Attackers have access to VoIP networks that allow generation of a

large number of calls

It is easy to set up a voice SPAM operation, using Asterisk, tools like “spitter”, and free VoIP access

Voice SPAMIntroduction

Social AttacksVoice SPAM

Voice SPAM has the potential to be very disruptive because: Voice calls tend to interrupt a user more than email Calls arrive in realtime and the content can’t be analyzed to

determine it is voice SPAM Even calls saved to voice mail must be converted from audio to

text, which is an imperfect process There isn’t any capability in the protocols that looks like it will

address Voice SPAM

Voice SPAM Social AttacksVoice SPAM

Some potential countermeasures for voice SPAM are: Authenticated identity movements, which may help to identify

callers Legal measures

Enterprise voice SPAM filters: Black lists/white lists Approval systems Audio content filtering Turing tests

Voice SPAMCountermeasures

Social AttacksVoice SPAM

VoIP PhishingIntroduction

Similar to email phishing, but with a phone number delivered though email or voice

When the victim dials the number, the recording requests entry of personal information

The hacker comes back later and retrieves the touch tones or other information

Social AttacksPhishing

VoIP PhishingExample

“Hi, this is Bob from Bank of America calling. Sorry I missed you. If you could give us a call back at 1-866-555-1324 we have an urgent issue to discuss with you about your bank account.”

Hello. This is Bank of America. So we may best serve you, please enter your account number followed by your PIN.

VoIP PhishingExample

VoIP PhishingCountermeasuresTraditional email spam/phishing

countermeasures come in to play here.Educating users is a key

voice over ip security

enterprise web site

enterprise voip system

voice mail system

voip deployment

ton of information

lot of information

voice mail hacking database

vendor press releases

Documents

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