value of information in information security investment_v2.0

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VALUE OF INFORMATION IN INFORMATION SECURITY INVESTMENTSPresented by Kristina Egorova

kristina@comp.nus.edu.sg

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Introduction: Security as a Process

Context

Information Security Process

Q2

Outcomes

Q4

Q4.2

Threats Protection

Q3

Information Assets

Q1

Q2

Info Security: How much do we spend?(1)

Investments are suboptimal

• Companies tend to underinvest• Gordon et al. 2015

• Overinvestments are possible, as well• Chen et al. 2011, Zhao et al. 2013

• Companies tend to be myopic• Kwon and Johnson 2014

How the problem was solved before?• How much to invest? (Gordon and Loeb 2002)

• What is the optimal amount of money?• What are the critical points for decision-making?

• When to invest?• Reactive or Proactive? (Kwon and Johnson 2014)• Respond immediately or remotely? (Tatsumi and Goto 2010)

• How to assess the critical variables?• Risks (Baskerville 1991, Rainer et al. 1991, Sun et al. 2006)• Losses (Wang et al. 2008)

• How to evaluate the investments?• How to evaluate the security software (Cavusoglu 2005)

How the problem was solved before?• How much to invest? (Gordon and Loeb 2002)

• What is the optimal amount of money?• What are the critical points for decision-making?

• When to invest?• Reactive or Proactive? (Kwon and Johnson 2014)• Respond immediately or remotely? (Tatsumi and Goto 2010)

• How to assess the critical variables?• Risks (Baskerville 1991, Rainer et al. 1991, Sun et al. 2006)• Losses (Wang et al. 2008)

• How to evaluate the investments?• How to evaluate the security software (Cavusoglu 2005)

Example: Gordon and Loeb set up

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Example: How much to spend?

(Gordon and Loeb 2002): determine the optimal amount to invest to protect a given set of information

1. Consider the information set and list out the following:1. λ – loss if case of successful attack

2. t – threat probability, t ϵ [0, 1]

3. v – probability that attack is successful, v ϵ [0, 1]

2. Thus,1. Information is completely vulnerable if v = 1 and vice versa

2. λ*t*v – expected loss associated with the information set

3. Assume, that1. v is constant within a period time

2. L = λ*t, potential loss

3. C > 0 – investment

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Example: How much to spend?

(Gordon and Loeb 2002): determine the optimal amount to invest to protect a given set of information

1. Consider the information set and list out the following:1. λ – loss if case of successful attack

2. t – threat probability, t ϵ [0, 1]

3. v – probability that attack is successful, v ϵ [0, 1]

2. Thus,1. Information is completely vulnerable if v = 1 and vice versa

2. λ*t*v – expected loss associated with the information set

3. Assume, that1. v is constant within a period time

2. L = λ*t, potential loss

3. C > 0 – investment

Money loss ($)

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Example: How much to spend?

(Gordon and Loeb 2002): determine the optimal amount to invest to protect a given set of information

1. Consider the information set and list out the following:1. λ – loss if case of successful attack

2. t – threat probability, t ϵ [0, 1]

3. v – probability that attack is successful, v ϵ [0, 1]

2. Thus,1. Information is completely vulnerable if v = 1 and vice versa

2. λ*t*v – expected loss associated with the information set

3. Assume, that1. v is constant within a period time

2. L = λ*t, potential loss

3. C > 0 – investment

Money loss ($)

Money spent to prevent money loss

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Simply: How much to spend?

How much to spend?

Maximize the security:v0

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Simply: How much to spend?

How much to spend?

Minimize the loss L=λ*t

Maximize the security:v0

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Simply: How much to spend?

How much to spend?

Minimize the loss L=λ*t

Maximize the security:v0

Maximize the wealth:WMax

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Simply: How much to spend?

How much to spend?

Minimize the loss L=λ*t

Maximize the security:v0

Minimize the spend:C0

Maximize the wealth:WMax

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Simply: How much to spend?

How much to spend?

Minimize the loss L=λ*t

Maximize the security:v0

Minimize the spend:C0

Maximize the wealth:WMax

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Simply: How much to spend?

How much to spend?

Minimize the loss L=λ*t

Maximize the security:v0

Minimize the spend:C0

Maximize the wealth:WMax

A risk-neutral firm compares the benefits of the investment with cost of it

How the problem was solved before?• How much to invest? (Gordon and Loeb 2002)

• What is the optimal amount of money?• What are the critical points for decision-making?

• When to invest?• Reactive or Proactive? (Kwon and Johnson 2014)• Respond immediately or remotely? (Tatsumi and Goto 2010)

• How to assess the critical variables?• Risks (Baskerville 1991, Rainer et al. 1991, Sun et al. 2006)• Losses (Wang et al. 2008)

• How to evaluate the investments?• How to evaluate the security software (Cavusoglu 2005)

Problems in current literature• Level of analysis

• Most of the studies model the organizational decision making• The role of individual contributions is not clear• The decision-making process is not clear

• Lack of behavioral research• Investment literature is based on economic assumptions of

rationality

• Ignorance of information assets and their role• Investment and bigger security literature implicitly assumes that

information assets have non-zero value

Problems in current literature• Level of analysis

• Most of the studies model the organizational decision making• The role of individual contributions is not clear• The decision-making process is not clear

• Lack of behavioral research• Investment literature is based on economic assumptions of

rationality

• Ignorance of information assets and their role• Investment and bigger security literature implicitly assumes that

information assets have non-zero value

• Objective• To understand if the knowledge about information value leads to

more optimal investment in information security

Why knowing more is important in investment?

• Information Economics• Additional information changes the decision optimality* (Nadiminti

et al. 1996)• Decision accuracy depends on mental model & variables weights

(Heuer 1999)

• Information security: if you ignore…• Structure of the assets ~ overinvestment (Chen et al. 2011)• Interdependent risks ~ overinvestment (Zhao et al. 2013)• Interactions with hackers ~ loose the game (Cavusoglu et al. 2008)

• Accounting: Judgement Performance Model• Judgement performance depends on knowledge content and

structure, more task relevant content improves judgement** (Libby and Luft 1993)

Why knowing more is important in investment? (2)

• How knowing can value of the information asset help?• … I’m looking for the answer

• Investments / Behavioral finance• What are the critical information points?

• Insurance• Why do people buy insurance?• How does the value of insurance subject affect the decision?

• Psychology • What changes protective behaviors?• How protecting oneself is different from protecting others?

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Problem Setting• We have

• Q1: Information assets with value V • Q2: Threat(s) with probability P & severity S, Risk = P*S• Q3: Protection - Investment with cost C• Q4: Outcome - Efficiency of investment

• They are related:• Expected loss EL = V*Risk• Investment decreases probability and severity: as C↑, Risk• As we invest money, excepted loss is decreasing: as C↑, EL

0 5 10 15 200

2

4

6

8

10

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Expected loss

C, investment

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Problem Setting• They are related:

• Expected loss EL = V*Risk• Investment decreases probability and severity: as C↑, Risk• As we invest money, excepted loss is decreasing: as C↑, EL

• How to calculate the efficiency of investment?• Remember,

we minimize expected loss EL and cost C

• Thus, we minimize them together:Total security cost = EL + C => TSC = EL + C => TSC = V*Risk + C

0 5 10 15 2005

1015

Expected loss

C, investment

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Problem SettingHow to calculate the efficiency of investment?

• Remember, we minimize expected loss EL and cost C

• Thus, we minimize them together:Total security cost = EL + C => TSC = V*Risk + C

• Assume the values:V=10 000, Risk = 0.80, C = 1000, 2000, …

• Investing C decreases risk by ½

0 1000 2000 3000 4000 5000 6000 7000 80000

1000

2000

3000

4000

5000

6000

7000

8000

9000

Expected Loss Investment

Total Security Cost

C Risk Expected Loss

0 80% 8000

1000 40% 4000

2000 20% 2000

…

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Problem Setting: Underinvestment

0 1000 2000 3000 4000 5000 6000 7000 80000

1000

2000

3000

4000

5000

6000

7000

8000

9000

Expected Loss Investment Total Security Cost

Total cost = 5000

Expected loss = 4000

Investment = 1000

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Problem Setting: Optimal Investment

0 1000 2000 3000 4000 5000 6000 7000 80000

1000

2000

3000

4000

5000

6000

7000

8000

9000

Expected Loss Investment Total Security Cost

Total cost = 4000

Expected loss = 2000

Investment = 2000

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Problem Setting: Overinvestment

0 1000 2000 3000 4000 5000 6000 7000 80000

1000

2000

3000

4000

5000

6000

7000

8000

9000

Expected Loss Investment Total Security Cost

Total cost = 5250

Expected loss = 250

Investment = 5000

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So far… • We can fix these values

• Risk • Investments impact factor [aka protection efficiency]

• We can manipulate the information value• Unknown VS known ~ basic case

• We can calculate the investment efficiency• To have a baseline for performance for each individual

• We can test the conjecture:• Knowledge about the value of information assets will lead to more

optimal investment decisions

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Methodology: An Experiment• The variable of interest – value of information:

• Group I: Value of information is given• Group II: Value of information is not given

• Series of tasks:• Several rounds of training • Vary probability – from 20% to 80% (with ∆20%)• Vary severity – from 20% to 80% (with ∆20%)• Vary investment impact – from , ,

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Methodology: An Experiment• The variable of interest – value of information:

• Group I: Value of information is given• Group II: Value of information is not given

• Series of tasks:• Several rounds of training • Vary probability – from 20% to 80% (with ∆20%)• Vary severity – from 20% to 80% (with ∆20%)• Vary investment impact – from , ,

Make sure subjects understand the task

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Methodology: An Experiment• The variable of interest – value of information:

• Group I: Value of information is given• Group II: Value of information is not given

• Series of tasks:• Several rounds of training • Vary probability – from 20% to 80% (with ∆20%)• Vary severity – from 20% to 80% (with ∆20%)• Vary investment impact – from , ,

These two are Risk

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Methodology: An Experiment• The variable of interest – value of information:

• Group I: Value of information is given• Group II: Value of information is not given

• Series of tasks:• Several rounds of training • Vary probability – from 20% to 80% (with ∆20%)• Vary severity – from 20% to 80% (with ∆20%)• Vary investment impact – from , ,

This is response efficacy from Protection

Motivation theory

Methodology: Controls & Design• Controls

• Demographics (age, gender, income, education…)• IT & Information security background / knowledge• Difficulty of the task (perception)• Information processing ability (psychometric)

• Experiment design highlights• 4 levels of risk probability x 4 of severity x 3 of investment impact =

48 tasks ~ randomized order of tasks • Performance-based incentives (show up fee + premium)• Calculator to reduce the brain damage task load

Methodology: Participant View (1)• Group I: No information value

Methodology: Participant View (2)• Group II: Information Value is given

Methodology: Discussion• Group II: Information Value is given

Is it realistic number?

Fix or vary?

Do I need to explain what information

assets are?

Is the place right?Need to highlight

more?

Is the company size necessary?

Show the risk reduction, reduced risk probabilities or

reduced loss?

Show 0$ or 1000$ initially?

Methodology: Post Experimental Survey

• How did you determine the investment amount?

• How difficult was the task?• What was the purpose of the study?

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3 4

5 6

Thank you!

Privacy Calculus Model

Protection Motivation Theory

Losses due to information security