tough_lesson. money. will not help

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ost discussions about gov-ernment policies on educa-tion presume by and large

that increasing public funding of schools will improve educationquality. But research in economicsprovides strong evidence that poli-cies focused on increasing schools’resources have little or no effect onacademic achievement.

Under the current system, theinterests of teachers and school dis-

trict administrators are often inconsis-tent with an efficient use of schoolfunds to improve performance.Individual teachers’salaries and thesecurity of administrators’jobs are notusually linked to students’academicperformance. This lack of accounta-bility stems from a lack of competitionamong public schools.

This article reviews some of themain ideas of the economics of publicschools, including the apparent lack of a relationship between spending poli-

cies and education quality as meas-ured by standardized test scores. Toillustrate these points, a snapshot of the characteristics of a few school dis-tricts in the St. Louis area is presented.

School Districts in St. Louis

Tables 1 and 2 present severalinput and outcome variables forschool districts in the St. Louis area.Education quality is measured with

the mathematics index test score forelementary schools (fourth grade)from the Missouri AssessmentProgram (MAP). All variables are forthe academic year 1999-2000. Table 1presents the characteristics of schooldistricts with test scores that are wellbelow the state average, and Table 2presents the characteristics of schooldistricts with scores that are wellabove the state average. Even thoughthe two sets of school districts repre-sent opposite extremes of academic

performance, they have comparablemeasures of expenditures per pupiland student-teacher ratios. (Note thatalthough Clayton and Ladue havemuch larger expenditures than otherhigh-score districts, they have only slightly better test scores than WebsterGroves, another district in the samegroup that has much lower expendi-

tures and a much higher student-teacher ratio.) Where they reallydiffer is that the high-score districtshave much larger shares of house-holds with a bachelor’s or higherdegree (a proxy for the parents’

education attainment) and muchlarger median incomes for house-holds with children. This suggeststhat student achievement dependsmore on family characteristics thanon spending policies.

Public Spending on Education

If there were no public schools—if education were provided by a com-pletely free market with no subsidiesto households or schools—investment

in schooling would fail to attainsocially optimal levels. This is becauseof what economists refer to as marketfailures. Government intervention inthe provision of education services islargely motivated by an attempt toalleviate the effects of these marketfailures. Economist Caroline Hoxby highlights two important kinds of 

market failures. The first kind arisesbecause individuals consider only their own benefits and costs whendeciding how much to invest in theirchildren’s education. From a socialstandpoint, however, an individual’s

education may generate positive ben-efits to other persons; for example,less-educated people learn from inter-acting with more-educated people.Individuals do not account for thesebenefits to others and, therefore,invest less in education than what

 would be socially optimal. The secondkind of market failure is liquidity con-straints. These constraints occurbecause people are unable to borrow against their children’s future incometo pay for their education today. As a

result of this, constrained parents alsoinvest less in their children’s educationthan they would want to spend.

In general, underinvestment ineducation because of market failurescan be addressed in one of two ways(or a combination of the two). Thegovernment can provide subsidies—either to parents or to schools—while

[12]

 M 

By Rubén Hernández-Murillo and Deborah Roisman

 Tough Lesson: More Money Doesn’t  Help Schools; Accountability Does  Tough Lesson: More Money Doesn’t  Help Schools; Accountability Does 

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the actual provision of education isleft to the private sector. Alternatively,the government can provide educationitself and charge little or no tuition.

 With rare exceptions, the latter solutionhas prevailed. The government provi-sion of education, however, introducesadditional distortions. Economist EricHanushek argues that under the cur-

rent organizational structure of many public school districts, teachers andadministrators often do not have thesame incentives as private schoolshave to use resources effectively.Primarily, he says, this is because thedecisions of how to allocate funds inpublic schools are not tied to the per-formance of students and becauseschool districts fail to respond to com-petitive pressures from other publicschool districts or from the private

school system.

Education Reforms

For these reasons, many econo-mists believe that policies tied to stu-dents’outcomes (test scores) might bemore useful than policies based oninput variables (such as student-teacher ratios and spending per pupil)at improving competition among schools, in spite of the claims thatstandardized test scores do not accu-

rately reflect academic achievement.The No Child Left Behind Act,

signed by President George Bush in2002, is an example of a policy thatexplicitly recognizes the failure of pastspending efforts to improve students’academic performance. The actamends the Elementary and Second-ary Education Act of 1965 and is now the most important federal law regard-ing public education. The new law isdesigned to improve the incentives for

school officials, teachers and parentsby holding schools accountable for theperformance of students.

The No Child Left Behind Act callsfor federal funds, particularly thosetargeted at improving the test scoresof the disadvantaged (Title I), to besubjected to an accountability mecha-nism by which schools’progress willbe measured every year. The goal isfor all children in the public schoolsystem to be proficient in reading andmath by 2014. Students’performance

 will be measured primarily with testscores: Schools will be rewarded orsanctioned, depending on the tests’results. Schools that continually failto achieve progress could be forced toprovide students with supplementalprograms, such as tutoring, or, if needed, options to transfer out of fail-ing schools. On the positive side,

teachers who receive academicawards will be eligible to obtain finan-cial rewards, too.

In Missouri, the accountabilitysystem will continue to be based onthe existing assessment program, butit will be complemented in the nextfew years to conform to the federalrequirements. The state already 

makes available to the public reportcards detailing the continuousprogress of schools, but the No ChildLeft Behind Act contemplates support-ing additional involvement of parentsin the school districts’efforts to meetthe accountability requirements.

Conclusion

The accountability mechanismimplemented by the No Child LeftBehind Act highlights the use of stan-dardized test scores to measure edu-cation quality. Although such scoresmay be imperfect measures of educa-

tion quality, their use is meant to shiftattention to outcomes and to avoidreliance on input measures, such asstudent-teacher ratios or spendingper pupil. Some economists believethis is important because an account-ability system opens the door foradditional reforms that would helpprovide parents and school officials

 with the right incentives to makesocially optimal choices on educationinvestment. Incentives based on stu-dents’outcomes are more likely to be

effective and to have a long-termimpact on academic achievementthan the incentives provided by merely increasing spending in education.

 Rubén Hernández-Murillo is an economist,and Deborah Roisman is a research associate,both at the Federal Reserve Bank of St. Louis.

REFERENCES

Hanushek, Eric A. “Measuring Investment in Education.” The Journalof Economic Perspectives , Fall 1996, Vol. 10, No. 4, pp.9-30.

Hanushek, Eric A. “The Failure of Input-Based Schooling Policies.” NationalBureau of Economic Research , Working Paper No.9040, July 2002.

Hanushek, Eric A. and Rivkin,Steven G.“Does Public School Competition

 Affect Teacher Quality?”in Caroline M.Hoxby, ed., The Economics of SchoolChoice , pp.23-47, Chicago: TheUniversity of Chicago Press, 2003.

Hoxby, Caroline M. “Are Efficiency andEquity in School Finance Substitutesor Complements?” The Journal of Economic Perspectives , Fall 1996,

 Vol. 10, No. 4, pp.51-72.

www.stlouisfed.org

The Regional Economist    April 2004

[13]

14,158

31,041

21,925

33,053

35,891

29,353

34,353

24,897

56,872

50,018

41,711

50,028

71,448

84,324

58,174

Medianhousehold

income(1999)

152.4

176.3

182.9

187.5

187.6

188.9

189.8

183.3

227.9

228.5

232.3

235.2

237.5

238.7

230.5

MAPindex

7,981.2

7,563.3

9,543.9

6,546.7

8,909.2

6,723.8

8,065.9

8,967.3

7,430.5

7,171.5

9,711.2

7,160.2

14,787.4

11,536.1

8,270.4

Spendingper pupil

13.1

16.2

14.0

16.3

13.0

16.0

17.1

14.7

17.2

15.4

12.6

15.7

11.5

12.5

15.9

Student-teacher ratio

0.7

14.8

16.7

4.8

27.1

7.3

10.7

15.1

41.0

30.6

51.3

45.4

67.1

62.3

43.9

Percentageof households

with bachelor orhigher degree

Wellston

Normandy

St. Louis City

Hancock Place

Maplewood-Richmond Heights

Jennings

Riverview Gardens

 Averages

Rockwood R-VI

Lindbergh R-VIII

Brentwood

Webster Groves

Clayton

Ladue

 Averages

District

   T   a   b   l   e 

   2

   T   a   b   l   e 

   1

Comparable Inputs, Different Results

Most of these school districts in the St. Louis

area have comparable inputs—spending per

pupil and student-teacher ratios. But the

academic performance of their students

varies dramatically, as measured by a test

from the Missouri Assessment Program (MAP).

School districts with scores on the MAPtest below the state average of 209.9.

School districts with scores on the MAP

test above the state average of 209.9.

NOTES:

1. Test score data are from the Missouri

Department of Elementary and Secondary

Education; other variables are from the

Common Core of Data available from the

National Center for Education Statistics.

2. Averages were computed using the number

of students in each district as weights.

The state average MAP Index computed

for 521 school districts was 209.9.

3. Spending per pupil represents total expen-

ditures for instruction divided by the total

number of students.

4. Median household income refers to house-

holds with children.