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U N C L A S S I F I E D
Tools and Techniques for State Evaluation
Rick Wallace Los Alamos National Laboratory
George Anzelon Lawrence Livermore National Laboratory
International Nuclear Safeguards Policy and Information Analysis Course
MIIS Center for Nonproliferation Studies
Monterey, California, June 2013
Work supported by DOE/NNSA’s Office of Nonproliferation & International Security
Based on LA-UR 10-04295
Non-traditional information used in safeguards State Evaluation
• Environmental sampling
• Satellite imagery
• Open Source Analysis
• IAEA/TC projects
• Nuclear trade information
• AP declarations
Ph
oto
: IA
EA
Today, we’ll talk mostly
about these
These tools were first applied to IAEA verification in 1991-93 and later became part of strengthened safeguards
Iraq
, D
PR
K, S
ou
th A
fric
a
New challenges
for safeguards:
DPRK, Iran,
Libya, . . .
Development
& consolidation
of strengthened
safeguards
Traditional
safeguards
1
2
3
10
9
8
7
6
5
4
0
1992 1994 1998 2000 2002 2004 2006 1988 1986 1990 1996 2008
Environmental sampling
Extremely powerful technique for detecting undeclared nuclear material and activities
Ad hoc use in early 1990s cases illustrated potential
93+2 field trials established feasibility as an IAEA tool
IAEA has an “in-house” lab and a network of analytical laboratories in Member States
More than 5,000 samples collected and analyzed
Ph
oto
: IA
EA
The technical basis for environmental sampling
• Nuclear processes emit trace amounts of material to the environment
• This material can settle on equipment and surfaces within buildings, and can be transported outside to deposit on vegetation or soil or reach water systems
• Techniques exist that can detect and characterize these extremely low levels of nuclear material
A one-micron-diameter uranium particle (Photo: V. Stebelkov, Laboratory for Microparticle
Analysis, Moscow, Russian Federation)
Source: IAEA STR-348, Environmental Sampling for Safeguards, September 2005
Early ad hoc IAEA use of environmental
sampling
Iraq
DPRK Ph
oto
: IA
EA
Ph
oto
: IA
EA
CN
N
Program 93+2 field trials
• Swipe sampling was determined to be a viable, cost-effective technique – Use at declared sites
authorized in 1995
– Use at other locations authorized in 1997 for AP States
• Wide-area monitoring seen as useful but too expensive – AP provides for wide-area
environmental sampling only after Board of Governors approves its use
Ph
oto
: IA
EA
P
ho
to:
IAE
A
IAEA Network of Analytical Laboratories (NWAL)
(Number of laboratories in the State)
(As of Fall 2006)
Major steps in the process
Inspection
planning
Sampling kit
preparation
Shipment
to IAEA
Archive
Receipt and
encoding
Shipment
to NWAL Laboratory
analysis
ES Database
Input to State Evaluation
and Safeguards Conclusions
Evaluation of
ES results
Results sent
to IAEA
Sampling
Laboratory
analysis
Ph
oto
: IA
EA
Photo: IAEA
Sampling
• The most common method
involves wiping surfaces with
a specially prepared cloth
• Specific procedures are
followed to avoid cross-
contamination and ensure
audit trail
• Other methods: – Vegetation
– Soil
– Water sampling Ph
oto
: IA
EA
Ph
oto
: IA
EA
Laboratory analysis
• Two main types of analysis
– Bulk analysis looks at a whole sample
– Particle analysis looks at individual microscopic particles (more sensitive, more expensive)
• Analytical instruments include
– Radiation detectors
– Mass spectrometers
– Scanning electron microscope, electron microprobe
• Isotopic ratios, age, chemical form, morphology, etc. all can provide clues
Sources:
--IAEA STR-348, Environmental Sampling for Safeguards, September 2005;
--Safeguards Techniques and Equipment, 2003 Edition (IAEA Nuclear Verification Series)
Ph
oto
: IA
EA
P
ho
to:
IAE
A
Fission track method for
locating U and Pu particles
Example Equipment:
Mass Spectrometer
Source: http://science.howstuffworks.com/mass-spectrometry.htm/printable
What can be measured and inferred?
A few examples:
• Uranium isotope ratios that differ from natural composition indicate enrichment activity
• Minor isotope ratios can indicate additional detail about enrichment processes and feed materials
• Presence of fission products can indicate processing of spent fuel
• Plutonium isotope ratios (240Pu/239Pu) indicate fuel burnup
• Radioactive parent-daughter ratios (e.g., 241Am/241Pu) serve as “chronometers” to indicate time since last chemical separation
Source: IAEA STR-348, Environmental Sampling for Safeguards, September 2005
Most work of enrichment is done at lower levels
From DOE GNEP Nonproliferation Impact Assessment
http://nnsa.energy.gov/nuclear_nonproliferation/documents/GNEP_NPIA.pdf
U-Thorium
Reactor
Illustrative particle data from sampling at a
gas centrifuge plant
Source: W. Bush, G. af Ekenstam, J. Janov, E. Kuhn, and M. Ryjinski, “IAEA Experience with Environmental
Sampling at Gas Centrifuge Plants in the European Union, IAEA-SM-367/1-/04
Pu Isotopic Composition as a function of Burn-
Up for LWRs
Data points are from: B. Pellaud, “Proliferation Aspects of Plutonium Recycling,” J. Nuc. Mat. Management XXXI, 30 (2002)
Graph courtesy Bathke, Charles, LANL D-5, 2007, Private Communication
Environmental sampling is used in synthesis
with other information streams
An example: South Korean uranium AVLIS research:
• From its open-source review of ROK scientific literature, the IAEA was aware of KAERI research on atomic vapor laser isotope separation (AVLIS) of stable isotopes
• In order to rule out the possibility of undeclared uranium AVLIS work, the IAEA on 2002 and 2003 requested (and was refused) access to KAERI’s laser technology R&D center
• In March 2004, after ROK’s AP entered into force but before submission of ROK’s initial declaration, IAEA was allowed to visit the laser center but:
– ROK did not permit IAEA take environmental samples
– ROK said its AVLIS work did not involve nuclear material
• Once it receives a State’s initial AP declaration, the IAEA gains the right to conduct environmental sampling anywhere on a site
• In August 2004, the ROK proactively disclosed its past uranium AVLIS and U-metal conversion activities
Source: “Implementation of the NPT Safeguards Agreement in the Republic of Korea, GOV/2004/84, 11 November 2004
Environmental sampling: Issues
• Implications for intelligence sources and methods
• States’ concerns about potential disclosure of sensitive or proprietary process details
• Ruling out cross-contamination or deliberate falsification – Confirmatory analysis (2 labs); blind samples
• States don’t want AP Article 5.a(iii) to be used as an excuse to access sensitive military sites with no nuclear connection
• Sample turnaround time
Questions on environmental sampling?
Satellite Imagery
Background
Cold
War Satellites for intelligence and national verification means
Early
1990s
IAEA receives and uses Member-State satellite
information on Iraq and DPRK
1995 Satellite imagery becomes a commercially available “open” source”
1998 IAEA Office of Legal Affairs study assessed legal issues
regarding safeguards use of commercial satellite imagery
2000
Commercial satellite imagery offers sufficient spatial
resolution (~1 meter) to enable analysis of detailed
structures; deemed viable for use in Safeguards
Today Multiple commercial satellites offer a range of providers,
resolutions, and capabilities, down to 0.5m resolution.
Beginnings: UNSCR 687 (1991) gave the IAEA exceptional
authorities and tasks with respect to Iraq’s nuclear
program
• IAEA needed, and had latitude to use, new tools and methods
• Member-State satellite imagery information was provided to the IAEA
– At first, as general background on suspect sites and for inspection planning
– Then, more tactically, to pursue actionable leads
– Later received U-2 (“Olive Branch”) aerial imagery
The first IAEA Iraq inspection team received Member-
State information, including line drawings of two sites
Baghdad Nuclear Research Centre,
Al-Tuwaitha Al-Tarmiya, site of suspected
uranium enrichment activities
Familiarized inspectors with suspect locations;
served as an aid to systematic verification
Sourc
e: U
N S
ecurity
Council,
S/2
2788, 15 J
uly
1991
Sourc
e: U
N S
ecurity
Council,
S/2
2788, 15 J
uly
1991
The second IAEA mission team received actionable
imagery-derived information support on a short-
turnaround basis
For example, the IAEA was informed of
specific locations where EMIS equipment was
being hidden at Qasr Tal, west of Baghdad
Image: DigitalGlobe via GoogleEarth
(See Jere Nichols, “Uncovering the Secret Program (I) -- the Initial Inspections,” http://www.isis-online.org/publications/iraq/nichols.html)
One of these leads provided confirmation of an alleged
undeclared uranium enrichment program
Dust clouds from trucks
carrying EMIS gear
EMIS magnet
photographed
by IAEA team
Ph
oto
: IA
EA
Ph
oto
: IA
EA
(See J. Nichols, “Uncovering the Secret Program (I) -- the Initial Inspections,” http://www.isis-online.org/publications/iraq/nichols.html)
Director General Blix highlighted three conditions
needed for the IAEA to uncover clandestine nuclear
activities
- Statement by the Director General, Dr. Hans Blix before the Board of Governors, 18 July 1991
2. Unequivocal right of access, even at short notice, to
such sites
3. Necessary backing and support from the Security
Council
1. Access to information obtained, inter alia, through
national technical means, regarding sites that may
require inspection
DPRK 1992-93: Member-State satellite imagery was used
to support verification under an INFCIRC/153 agreement
Sources: Monterey Institute of International Studies (MIIS) Center for Nonproliferation Studies; and David Fischer, History of the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA, Vienna, 1997)
(Image: GeoEye IKONOS 0.8m, February 2006)
(Graphic: MIIS Center for Nonproliferation Studies)
1992-1993: Member-State satellite imagery used
in support of verification under DPRK’s NPT
safeguards agreement
Lawrence Livermore National Laboratory
(Image: GeoEye IKONOS 0.8m, February 2006)
(Image source: GeoEye IKONOS February 2006)
Building 500 Undeclared
waste storage
Ridge
High-resolution satellite imagery became commercially available at just the right time for strengthened
safeguards
1
2
3
10
9
8
7
6
5
4
0
1992 1994 1998 2000 2002 2004 2006 1988 1986 1990 1996 2008
Sp
ati
al re
so
luti
on
(G
SD
) -
metr
es
SPOT-1
IRS-1C/D Ir
aq
, D
PR
K, S
ou
th A
fric
a
KVR-1000
(archival)
Worldview Orbview-3
SPOT-5
EROS-A
IKONOS
ALOS/PRISM
Traditional
safeguards
New challenges
for safeguards:
DPRK, Iran,
Libya, others
Development
& consolidation
of strengthened
safeguards
IAEA SIAU
established
IAEA/OLA
legal review
PDD-23
Quickbird
GeoEye-1
Cincinnati CVG Airport – old Satellite image
30
Dubai International Airport GeoEye-1, 0.5m, 16 Nov 2009, from 423 mi at 4 mi/sec
31
Moscow, Russia – Red Square GeoEye-1, 0.5m on 9 May 2010, 40 min after Victory Day Parade
32
33 From Frank Pabian, 2009, LANL
IAEA policy places certain limitations on the use of commercial satellite imagery
• Imagery analysis only for safeguards verification process
• All state-declared locations are subject to imaging
• No systematic, countrywide searches for undeclared activities permitted, but:
• Imagery may be used in conjunction with complementary information that localizes any suspected activity
• Other requirements • Security and confidentiality
• Source diversification
The IAEA uses commercial satellite imagery in a range of safeguards applications
• Supporting evaluation of newly revealed and alleged clandestine programs and activities
• Monitoring on-going development at critical nuclear fuel cycle facilities
• Support to Complementary Access inspections
• Supporting the verification of States’ declarations – Facility design information verification (DIV)
– Additional Protocol Article 2.a(iii), others
Highest
priority
As feasible
within
resources
Example: In August 2002, NCRI alleged that Iran was building a secret nuclear fuel plant 40 km SE of Kashan on the road to Natanz
A candidate location is
seen even on 30-meter
Landsat-7 imagery
A September 2002 high-resolution IKONOS image
shows construction of two large, hardened,
underground production halls
20 JUN 04
Natanz
uranium
enrichment
complex
DigitalGlobe Quickbird commercial satellite image
Lawrence Livermore National Laboratory
4 OCT 05
Monitoring
changes at a site
DigitalGlobe Quickbird commercial satellite image
(Image annotations by
Frank Pabian, LANL)
High-resolution optical imagery also is useful for monitoring changes near critical sites
ISIS published its analysis of possible tunneling activity (above) near Iran’s Natanz uranium enrichment site and also (right) near the Esfahan uranium conversion facility
Source: Institute for Science and International Security, April 2006 and July 2007, www.isis-online.org
Imagery analysis can support design information verification
Imagery of UCF, Esfahan,
Iran, via GlobalSecurity.org,
(c) Space Imaging
IR-40 Radioisotope Production Reactor seen
under construction at Arak, Iran
42
Iran s refusal to grant the Agency access to IR-40 could adversely impact the Agency’s ability to
carry out effective safeguards at that facility, and has made it difficult for the Agency to report further
on the construction of the reactor, as requested by the Security Council. The completion of the
containment structure over the reactor building, and the roofing for the other buildings on the site,
makes it impossible to assess further progress on construction inside the buildings without access
to the facility. However, satellite imagery suggests that construction is continuing at the reactor site.
IR-40 Radioisotope Production Reactor seen
under construction at Arak, Iran
43
The research community is developing tools to
assist image analysts in extracting key content
Other sensor types can selectively
complement optical imagery
• Synthetic aperture radar (SAR)
• Thermal infrared
• Hyperspectral
An optical image of the Arak heavy water plant
Optical imagery is only available in daytime and in clear weather
Gra
ph
ic:
IAE
A
A synthetic-aperture radar (SAR) image of the Arak heavy water plant
0.3m TerraSAR X Graphic:
IAEA
Coherent change detection with radar imagery
SAR image Optical image (Source: http://www.sandia.gov/radar/images/ccd.jpg)
Vehicle tracks that are not
apparent in optical image
Hyperspectral analysis relies on spectral
information to identify materials
HYPERION © NASA
Most promising near-term safeguards application
appears to be monitoring mining/milling sites,
where there are large, open stockpiles of materials
Source: G. Borstad, Borstad Associates, Ltd., Sydney, BC, Canada
Multispectral Satellite Photos identify materials
from space, using spectral absorption
50
The images produced by M3 can be thought of as a
cube of information. The width is 600 pixels (each of
which has a spatial resolution of 70 m at the
instrument's altitude of 100 km), the length is an infinite
strip along the spacecraft's orbital path (or wherever
one chooses to "crop" the picture for an individual
study), and the depth is 261 spectral channels.
From NASA: Moon Mineralogy Mapper website
51
Satellite imagery: issues
• Image acquisition is expensive
• SIAU has small staff relative to workload
• It takes considerable time for nuclear imagery analysts to gain proficiency, which is at odds with the IAEA’s rotation policy
• Shutter-control and resolution control by States that operate satellites; competition for coverage
• Some states (notably Iran) still question IAEA’s authority to use satellite imagery
• Facilitating integration with other information sources needed for analysis
Questions on satellite imagery?
Open Source Analysis
R. Wallace, G. Anzelon, J. Essner, F. Pabian
Usefulness of Open Source Information
• May provide the first clues to clandestine nuclear activities
• May provide clues to specific locations for application of
more detailed technologies (imagery, ES, inspections, etc.)
• May provide relationships between entities that suggest
further investigation needed
No
. of re
po
rts (av/y
r)
Year
Publications from nulear institute
Examples of OS Questions
• Can the country make x (magnetic top bearings for centrifuges for example)?
Where? Who's involved?
• Country technology assessment - does the country have the capability to
conduct a nuclear weapons program, what key organizations and people
would likely be involved, what technologies are lacking?
• Is there a relationship between organization x and organization y and
individual z?
• Where might a secret enrichment plant be located?
• Are the high-voltage switches recently reported as being illegally sold by x to
y, suitable for use in a nuclear weapon detonator firing set?
• Is Iranian Speaker of the Majlis (parliament) and former Chief Nuclear
Negotiator Ali Larijani related to M J A Larijani, Director of the Iranian
Institute for Studies in Theoretical Physics and Mathematics (leading center
for computational modeling)? (yes, they're brothers)
Slide 56
Open Sources include:
• Publicly available information (found on internet, provided by NGOs,
companies, the news media, and governments).
• "Fee-based" information such as published scientific and technical
literature or subscription data bases, maps, guidebooks, statistical
compilations of data, textbooks.
• Information normally only made available on request or to specific
individuals including:
– Company financial reports
– Conference information (participant lists or paper titles, abstracts, or full
text)
– Internal publications of various organizations
– Internal travel reports
– Technical cooperation summaries
– Unpublished scientific papers and pre-prints
– Patent applications
Slide 57
Scientific papers
• Bhatti, J.A., Aijazi, M.K., Khan, A.Q., “Design characteristics of molecular drag pumps,” (2000) Vacuum, 60 (1-2), pp. 213-219.
• Ahmed M., Ali A., Hasnain S.K., Hashmi F.H., Khan A.Q., “Magnetic properties of maraging steel in relation to deformation and structural phase transformations,” (1994) Acta metallurgica et materialia, 42 (3), pp. 631-638.
• F. Habiby, T. N. Siddiqui, H. Hussain, M. A. Khan, A. ul Haq, A. Q. Khan, “Machine-induced phase transformation in a maraging steel,” Materials Science and Engineering A, Volume 159, Issue 2, 30 December 1992, Pages 261-265.
• F. Habiby, A. ul Haq, A. Q. Khan, “Influence of austenite on the coercive force, electrical resistivity and hardness of 18% Ni maraging steels,” Materials & Design, Volume 13, Issue 5, 1992, Pages 259-264.
• M. Alam, M.A. Atta, J.A. Mirza and A.Q. Khan, “Flow induced vibrations in gas tube assembly of centrifuge,” Journal of Nuclear Science Technology. 23 (1986) (9), pp. 819–827.
Slide 58
Proliferation Pathway Analysis
• Consider the Nuclear Fuel Cycle
• Consider activities required to successfully produce &
deliver nuclear weapon
• Analyze State to determine which components are
present or missing.
Slide 59
60
A fuel cycle with reprocessing recovers unburned 235U
and plutonium from spent reactor fuel.
From Fred Wehling, MIIS
Storage
Enrich
ment
U ore
Yellow-
cake
UF6
LEU-
UO2
LEU
-
UF6
Value of Open Sources to Safeguards
• “Part 1” measures under strengthened safeguards allows IAEA, inter
alia, to evaluate open-source information as part of safeguards
process
• Value of open sources evident in 2004 in two cases
1. South Korean publications suggested AVLIS activities took place in
ROK, leading to clarified declaration from ROK authorities. a
2. Publications suggested nuclear material, facilities and activities related
to U conversion and reprocessing taking place in Egypt, leading to
Egyptian cooperation in resolving anomalies. b
61
a “Implementation of the NPT Safeguards Agreement in the Republic of Korea, GOV/2004/84, 11 November 2004
b Implementation of the NPT Safeguards Agreement in the Arab Republic of Egypt, GOV/2005/9, Date: 14 February 2005
ROK Uranium enrichment experiments of 2000
• KAERI has published over a dozen papers on the spectroscopy of
uranium and uranium compounds between 1991-2004, most of which
involved the same research team. Many were published in Optics
Communications in 1993, 1994, 1998, and 1999.
• On August 17, 2004, South Korea's Ministry of Science and
Technology (MOST) reported to the IAEA that South Korea had
conducted experiments to enrich U. The Laboratory for Quantum
Optics at KAERI conducted experiments to enrich uranium three
times during January and February 2000. The experiments were
conducted using atomic vapor laser isotope separation (AVLIS) and
yielded about 0.2 grams of uranium enriched to an average of 10
percent in the three experiments. The peak level of enrichment in the
experiments was 77 percent. Korean scientists separated the U235.
Slide 62
Source: “Implementation of the NPT Safeguards Agreement in the Republic of Korea, GOV/2004/84, 11 November 2004
ROK Uranium Spectroscopy – Ex. paper
• Author(s): Jung, EC; Kim, TS; Song, K; Kim, CJ
• Title: Diode laser-excited optogalvanic and absorption measurements of uranium in a hollow
cathode discharge
• Source: SPECTROSCOPY LETTERS, 36 (1-2): 167-180 JAN-MAR 2003
• Abstract: Optogalvanic spectra for fifty two transition lines of uranium in the wavelength ranges
of 662-683, 774-792, and 834-862 nm were measured by using external-cavity diode lasers.
Among these transitions, 860.795 nm and 682.691 nm were chosen for a detailed investigation of
the detection limit for uranium by wavelength modulation spectroscopy due to its stronger signal
magnitudes. A detection limit of about 2 x 10(-5) absorbance achieved at 860.795 nm is more
sensitive than that obtained at 682.691 nm, but the absorption spectrum at 682.691 nm is
preferable to determine the isotope ratio due to the narrower hyperfine structure as well as
the larger isotope shift. A preliminary result for an isotope ratio determination in a depleted
sample is presented.
• Addresses: Korea Atom Energy Res Inst, Lab Quantum Opt, Taejon 305600, South Korea
63
Egypt Irradiation & Reprocessing (2004-2005)
• IAEA analysis of open-source publications suggested the possibility of nuclear material, activities, and facilities in Egypt related to uranium extraction and conversion,
irradiation of uranium targets and reprocessing that had not been reported as required
• During a series of meetings and inspections from October 2004 – February 2005, Egypt cooperated with the IAEA in resolving these relatively small-scale issues and making proper declarations
• The Board did not ask for Egypt’s reporting failures to be reported to the Security Council
Source: “Implementation of the NPT Safeguards Agreement in the Arab Republic of Egypt, GOV/2005/9, 14 February 2005
Example Publication on reprocessing
“Kinetic separation of uranium from selected fission products”,
Daoud, J.A.; Rahman, N.A.; Aly, H.F. (Atomic Energy Authority, Cairo
(Egypt). Hot Laboratories Centre), International conference on
evaluation of emerging nuclear fuel cycle systems, Versailles
(France) 11-14 Sep 1995, Anon. Global 1995 Paris (France) Edition
ANS 1995 2032 p. p. 1227-1233.
Slide 65
NCRI 8/14/2002 Revelation led to Confirmation of Natanz
66
Five Greatest Challenges for Open Source
Analysis
Challenges to using open sources in attempt to answer specific
nonproliferation questions
1. Scarcity of information
– (e.g., DPRK uranium enrichment in 2005)
2. Information overload
– (e.g., nuclear fuel cycle in Japan: 21,400,000 Google results)
3. Validation
– (e.g., inaccurate & deliberately false or misleading info)
Slide 67
Slide 68
Iran Missile Test – Sepah News (IRG), 7/9/08
Slide 69
Iran Missile Test –News & TV Broadcast, 7/10/08
Slide 70
Internet Blog - July, 2008
Five Greatest Challenges for Open Source
Analysis
Challenges to using open sources in attempt to answer specific
nonproliferation questions
1. Scarcity of information
– (e.g., DPRK uranium enrichment in 2005)
2. Information overload
– (e.g., nuclear fuel cycle in Japan: 21,400,000 Google results)
3. Validation
– (e.g., inaccurate & deliberately false or misleading info)
4. Language barriers
5. Information analysis
– Collecting, organizing, determining associations, tracking, and
drawing conclusions
Slide 71
Search Terms – Language Issues
Abd Al-Qadir Khan, Abdel Kader Khan, Abdel Qadeer Khan, Abdel Qader Khan,
Ab-del-Qadeer Khan, Abdoul Qadeer Khan , Abdoul Quadeer Khan, Abdul Kadeer Khan, Abdul Kader Khan, Abdul Kadir
Khan , Abdul Qadeer, Abdul Qadeer Kahn, Abdul Qadeer Khan, Abdul Qadir Khan,
Abdul Quadeer Khan, Abdul Quadir Khan, Abdul Quader Khan, AQ Khan, A.Q. Khan, A Q Khan, عبد القدير خان (ar), عبدالغدير خان (fa),
,(fa) عبدالقديرخان
Recent Advances
• Advances in collection • Expanded range of online sources
• “Federated” search
• Anonymous searching
• Name-alias reconciling, phonetic searching
• Advanced machine translation
• Advances in processing • Duplication removal
• Automatic entity extraction
• Machine translation
• Improved relevance ranking
73
Recent Advances
• Advances in analysis • Integrated analysis of different types of information (unstructured
text, graphics, geographic, etc.)
• Automatic extraction of relationships, links, associations
• Geospatial Information System to organize data spatially
• Simplified user interfaces
• Minimal training and maintenance requirements
• Visual and graphical link/association analysis • Improved collaboration analysis tools
• Improved security of electronic distribution systems
• Overall analysis and resource efficiencies and improvements
result in lower overall costs
74
Open Source Analysis Future Needs
• Many desired needs are for the continued improvement of
recent advances • Improvement on overall ease-of-use
• Better computerized language translation and searching
• Better entity extraction
• More efficient duplicate elimination
• Development of a nuclear-proliferation-specific database
containing information that contribute to State Evaluation
Process and a Integrated Collaborative Environment for
nonproliferation analysis
75
76
Open Source Analysis Summary
• Advancements in information collection and analysis will
continue to improve the use of open source information
for nuclear nonproliferation detection
• Key technologies – Anonymously ferreting out obscure information from numerous
sources that are in different formats & a variety of languages,
using simple interfaces (with a single query!)
– Combining that information & extracting relevant data
– Rapidly analyzing the relevance of vast amounts of information
and presenting an integrated, intuitive summary to the analyst
Other non-traditional information used in safeguards State Evaluation
• Environmental sampling
• Satellite imagery
• Open Sources
• IAEA/TC projects
• Nuclear trade information
• AP declarations
Ph
oto
: IA
EA
There’s more to it than just “detection”
• Assessing likely risk that a clandestine nuclear program exists
• Detecting (or receiving from 3rd parties) specific actionable indications
• Follow-up investigations, possibly at suspect locations
• Confirmation of undeclared activities
• Assessment and characterization
• Verification of elimination
Detection: Where did actionable leads come from that
allowed probing of undeclared nuclear activities?
Case At sites with
declared facilities? IAEA Third Parties
2002-2004 Iran No X
2003-2004 Libya No X
2004 South Korea Yes X
2004 Egypt Yes X
2007-2008 Syria No X
The IAEA needn’t be the main defense for detecting
activities away from declared locations
• Actionable leads more often come from member-state intelligence or other 3rd-party sources than as a product of the IAEA’s independent detection means
– The IAEA doesn’t necessarily have to be the first line of defense with respect to detecting indications of undeclared activities, especially at undeclared sites
– But the IAEA often is best positioned to act on and investigate indications
• Equipping, empowering, and encouraging the IAEA to fully investigate and report indications of undeclared activities is essential
The State Evaluation process puts it all
together
Lawrence Livermore National Laboratory
Safeguards Conclusions
Resolution of Inconsistencies & Questions
State Evaluation Report • Assessment • Follow-up Action
Analysis and Evaluation
Safeguards verification information
• Inspector observations
• Inspection data &analysis
• Environmental sampling
results
• Material balance evaluations
State-declared information
• Design information
• Operating records
• Accountancy reports
• Voluntary export reporting
• Additional Protocol reporting
Other information • Internal databases
• Scientific & technical literature
• News media articles
• Research institutions
• Trade publications
• Internet
• Satellite Imagery
The End
Slide 82
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