the time of our life historical ontology and creative events

The Time of our Life: Historical Ontology and Creative Events

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Deleuze'sHume:Philosophy,CultureandtheScottishEnlightenmentJeffreyA.Bell

Printpublicationdate:2008PrintISBN-13:9780748634392PublishedtoEdinburghScholarshipOnline:March2012DOI:10.3366/edinburgh/9780748634392.001.0001

TheTimeofourLife:HistoricalOntologyandCreativeEvents

JeffreyA.Bell

DOI:10.3366/edinburgh/9780748634392.003.0003

AbstractandKeywords

Thischapterconcentratesonthehistoryof,andmorepreciselyonadiscussionof,therelationshipbetweencreative,noveleventsandthealreadyconstitutedhistoricalconditionswithinwhichtheseeventsappear.CentraltoGillesDeleuze'saccountofproblematizinghistoryistheconceptof‘counter-actualization’.Deleuzemakesclearthatcounter-actualizationoperatesasaquasicause.MichelFoucaultisalsoconsideredinordertoclarifyproblematizinghistoryfurther.ThechapterturnstoDeleuze'sfinalpublishedessay,‘Immanence:alife...,’inordertodetailfurthertherelationshipbetweencreativeeventsandtheactual,historicalsituationswithinwhichtheseeventsoccur.TheguidingexampleforthisdiscussionisthelifeandworkofKafka,forKafkawouldindeedbeforDeleuzeoneoftheveryfewwhocouldcallhimselfawriter.ItiscriticaltounderstandtheimportanceoftheindefiniteinDeleuze'sdiscussion.

Keywords:GillesDeleuze,historicalontology,creativeevents,problematizinghistory,counter-actualization,MichelFoucault,Kafka

InWhatisPhilosophy?DeleuzeandGuattariechoBergson'sclaimthatphilosophyought‘toremounttheinclinethatphysicsdescends’(Bergson[1907]1911,208),arguinginthiscontextthattodophilosophy‘Itwouldbenecessarytogobackupthepaththatsciencedescends,andattheveryendofwhichlogicsetsupitscamp(thesamegoesforHistory,wherewewouldhavetoarriveattheunhistoricalvapourthatgoesbeyondtheactualfactorstotheadvantageofacreationofsomethingnew)’(WP140).Thishistoryentailsadoublereadingofevents.Thereisfirsttheefforttoreadhistoryasaccuratelyaspossible,todiscernaswellasonecanwhatactuallyhappened.Suchanapproachtohistoryisnotunproblematic,evenamonghistorians.DeleuzeandGuattari,however,willlargelyleavethesedebatestohistorians,andfortheirpartwillgenerallyacceptandrelyuponthefindingsofhistorians.Thesecondreadingiswhatwewillcalltheproblematizingreadingofhistory.Thisreadingtakesthefirstreadingasitsstartingpointbutthenmoves‘backupthepathsciencedescends’inaneffortto‘arriveattheunhistoricalvapour’thatwillbetheconditionforthe‘creationofsomethingnew.’ItisthissecondreadingthatistheprimaryconcernofDeleuzeandGuattari.Thepointofhistoryforthemisnottounderstandhowactualitiesbecameactual,butratherhowtofacilitateacreativemovebeyondtheactualitiesofthepresent.ThiseffortwasalsoHume'sprimaryconcernforphilosophyingeneralandhistoryinparticular.‘InEngland,’HumenotesinhisTreatise,‘manyhonestgentlemen,whobeingalwaysemploy'dintheirdomesticaffairs,oramusingthemselvesincommonrecreations,havecarriedtheirthoughtsverylittlebeyondthoseobjects,whichareeverydayexpos'dtotheirsense’(T272).Andinhisessay,‘OfCommerce,’Humewillrefertosuch‘honestgentlemen’as‘shallowthinkers’,thinkerswho‘fallshortofthetruth’;andsuchthinkersaretobecontrastedwith‘abstrusethinkers,whogobeyondit[thetruth].Thelatterclass,’Humeconcludes,‘arebyfarthemostrare:andImayadd,byfarthemostusefulandvaluable’(EMPL253).ForHume,therefore,asfor(p.60) Deleuze,thegoalisnotsimplytoarriveatthetruthofhistory[firstreading],buttogobeyondthistruth,toproblematizethistruth[secondreading]forthesakeofgoingbeyonditandcreatingsomethingnew.

I.ProblematizingHistoryCentraltoDeleuze'saccountofproblematizinghistoryistheconceptof‘counter-actualization.’Incontrasttoascientificexplanationthatseekstoexplainhowasetofcausalfactors,factorsthatarethemselvesactual,givesrisetoanotheractuality,aproblematizinghistorybeginswiththeactualandproblematizesitbycounter-actualizingtheveryactualityoftheactualitself.Butwhatdoesitmeantocounter-actualizetheactualityoftheactualitself?InLogicofSense,Deleuzeofferstheexampleofanactorplayingarole.Althoughtheroleisindeedsomethingactual,asisthealreadywrittenscript,andeventhoughtheactordoesindeedactualizethisroleonthestage,‘theactor,’Deleuzeclaims,‘delimitstheoriginal[therole],disengagesfromitanabstractline,andkeepsfromtheeventonlyitscontouranditssplendor,becomingtherebytheactorofone'sownevents–acounter-actualization’(LS150).Whenanactorcounter-actualizestheirroletheybothembodyandactualizethisroleasaneventofthepresent,andyet,Deleuzeargues,thereisthe

futureandthepastoftheeventconsideredinitself,sidesteppingeachpresent,beingfreeofthelimitationsofastateofaffairs,impersonalandpre-individual,neutral,neithergeneralnorparticular…Ithasnootherpresentthanthatofthemobileinstantwhichrepresentsit,alwaysdividedintopast-future,andformingwhatmustbecalledthecounter-actualization.(LS,151)

Tocounter-actualizetheactualityoftheactual,therefore,istoaccessthepre-individualsingularitiesthatareinseparablefromtheindividuatedactualities.

Counter-actualizationalsooperates,asDeleuzemakesclear,asaquasi-cause.Thisquasi-causeispreciselytheparadoxicalelement,thefuture-pastthatsidestepseachpresent,or‘thealeatorypointwhichcirculatesthroughoutsingularities,’andwhich‘doesnottoleratethesubsistenceofGodasanoriginalindividuality,northeselfasaPerson,northeworldasanelementoftheselfandasGod'sproduct’(LS176).Whatisaffirmed,instead,is‘a“chaosmos”andnolongeraworld;thealeatorypointwhichtraversesthem[theseriesofpre-individualsingularities]formsacounter-self,andnolongeraself’(ibid.).Inotherwords,counter-actualizationentailsaccessingthevirtualmultiplicity–the‘unhistoricalvapour’–thatcannotbereducedtotheindividuatedidentitiesandactualitiesthatitneverthelessconditions;anditisinthisroleasconditionthatthealeatorypointfunctionsas(p.61) quasi-cause.InWhatisPhilosophy?DeleuzeandGuattaricontinuetoarguethatanevent‘isactualizedinastateofaffairs,inabody,inalived,butithasashadowyandsecretpartthatiscontinuallysubtractedfromoraddedtoitsactualization’(WP,156).This‘shadowyandsecretpart’is‘thevirtualthatisdistinctfromtheactual,butavirtualthatisnolongerchaotic,thathasbecomeconsistentorrealontheplaneofimmanencethatwrestsitfromthechaos–itisavirtualthatisrealwithoutbeingactual,idealwithoutbeingabstract’(ibid.).Itispreciselythisrealityofthevirtualthatthenfunctionsastheconditionfortheactualizationofeventsthatarenewandcannotbereducedto,orbeexplainedintermsof,anyprecedingactualities.Fortheactortocounter-actualizetheirrole,then,istoaccessthe‘virtualthatisnolongerchaotic,’a‘chaosmos’thatthenfunctionsasaconditionforthetransformationoftheroleitself,atransformationthatisinturnsusceptibletoafurthercounter-actualization.Tocounter-actualizeisthustounleashthepowerofAND.

ItisinthissensethatoneistounderstandDeleuze'sclaimsregardingtheautonomyoftheeffect.InCinema1,Deleuzearguesthat‘Activecausesaredeterminedinthestateofthings:buttheeventitself,theaffective,theeffect,goesbeyonditsowncauses,andonlyreferstoothereffects,whilstthecausesfortheirpartfallaside’(Deleuze1986,106).Inotherwords,asactivecauseinthestateofthings,theactoractualizestheirroleuponthestage.Inseparablefromthisactualization,however,istheevent(thealeatorypoint,paradoxicalelement)thatdrawsthechaosintoaplaneofconsistency,a‘virtualthatisnolongerchaotic’,andthiseventisaneffectoftheactualizationitself–itis,afterall,theeventofanactualstateofaffairs(theactor'srole)–andyetitisaneffectthatcannotbereducedtotheactualityoftheactual.Itisinthisway,then,thattheeventisanautonomouseffect,foritisirreducibletotheactualitiesitisyetinseparablefrom,andaseffectit‘onlyreferstoothereffects’foritisonlythevirtualasautonomouseffectthatwill

conditionnovelactualitiesandhencetheautonomouseffectsoftheseactualities.

Toclarifythesearguments,wecouldreturntoourearlierexampleofDavidSudnow'sattemptstolearnimprovisationaljazz,wherebyheexperiencedthevirtualmultiplicityof‘waysofhand’andactualizedthisvirtualthroughthemelodyingofimprovisationaljazz.However,soastomaintainourfocusuponproblematizinghistory,wewillturninsteadtoMaxWeber'sessay,‘CriticalStudiesintheLogicoftheCulturalSciences.’HereWeberisconfrontedwithadifficultysimilartoSudnow's–namely,how,withavirtuallyinfinitenumberofhistoricalcircumstances,doesonedeterminewhichofthesearerelevanttowhatactuallyoccurred.IsBismarck'sdecisiontogotowar,touseWeber'sexample,asufficientcausalexplanationoftheFranco-PrussianWar?InthisessayWeberattemptstoovercomewhat(p.62) heseesasthedifficultiesinapplyingthescientificconceptionofcausalitytohistoricalevents.Inscience,causalexplanationsgenerallytaketheformofrelatinganeventtothegenerallawofwhichtheeventisaparticularinstance.Toexplainwhyaparticularleveebrokeandleftanentirecityflooded,ascientificexplanationwouldapplythegeneralrulesandprinciplesofengineering,soilanalysis,andsoon,toshowthatthefailureoftheleveeisanaturalconsequenceofapplyingthesegeneralrulestotheparticularfactsassociatedwiththisevent.Giventhesamesetoffactsandthesamegeneralrules,onewillandshouldexpectthesameresults.Weber,however,makesacrucialdistinctionbetweenfactsthatareinstancesofaclass-concept(breachedleveeasaninstanceofthegenerallawsofengineering)andfactsthatserveastheconcretelinkinanhistoricalsituation(forexample,Bismarck'sdecisiontogotowar).ForWeber,‘noonewilleversucceedinunderstandingthelogicalcharacterofhistoryifheisunabletomakethisdistinctioninaclear-cutmanner’(Weber1949,136).Webermakesthispointevenmoreclearlyinhisessay‘Objectivity,’whenhestatesoutrightthat‘Weseekknowledgeofanhistoricalphenomenon,meaningbyhistorical:significantinitsindividuality’(Weber1959,78);andthissignificancecannotbedeterminedbywayofgeneral,analyticallaws:

Thesignificanceofaconfigurationofculturalphenomenaandthebasisofthissignificancecannothoweverbederivedandrenderedintelligiblebyasystemofanalyticallaws,howeverperfectitmaybe,sincethesignificanceofculturaleventspresupposesavalue-orientationtowardstheseevents.Theconceptofcultureisavalueconcept.(Ibid.76)

Andthisvalue-conceptisneededforWeberbecause,aswasthecaseforHumeaswell,theobjectivefactsunderdeterminetheirsignificance.AsWeberexpressestheproblem:‘Thenumberandtypeofcauseswhichhaveinfluencedanygiveneventarealwaysinfiniteandthereisnothinginthemselvestosetsomeofthemapartasalonemeritingattention’(ibid.78).

WhatWeberproposesasasolutiontothisproblemistoofferanexplanationofhistoricaleventsintermsofwhathascometobecalled‘singularcausality’(thoughWebermostoftenreferredtoitasparticularcausalityincontrasttothescientificcausalityofgenerallaws)thattherebyenablesthehistoriantodeterminethecausalsignificanceofhistoricalevents.Thisapproachentailsbothavalue-judgmentofgeneralsignificance,orwhatwillbecomeWeber'stheoryoftypes,andacounterfactualanalysis.Initsmostsuccinct

formulation,theapproachisasfollows:

Thejudgmentthat,ifasinglehistoricalfactisconceivedasabsentfromormodifiedinacomplexofhistoricalconditions,itwouldconditionacourseofhistoricaleventsinawaywhichwouldbedifferentincertainhistoricallyimportantrespects,seemstobeofconsiderablevalueforthedeterminationofthe‘historicalsignificance’ofthosefacts.(Weber1949,166)

(p.63) IfBismarckhadnotdecidedtogotowar,andiftheabsenceofthisfactaltersthecourseofhistoricalevents–namely,theFranco-Prussianwardoesn'thappen–thenBismarck'sdecisionbecomes‘historicallysignificant.’Bycontrast,ifremovinganeventfromtheconstellationofhistoricalfactsdoesnotaltertheexpectedoutcome,thentheeventishistoricallyinsignificant.Whatiscrucialtothisapproach,forourpurposes,isthatitreliesuponafieldofpossibilitiesthataretaken,throughwhatWeberreferstoas‘imaginativeconstructs,’tobeinseparablefromactualeventsgivena‘modificationinoneormore“conditions”(e.g.,Bismarck'sdecision)’(ibid.173).InseparablefromtheactualityoftheFranco-Prussianwar,therefore,aretheco-determinantsoftheevent;or,asBergsonandDeleuzewouldsay:thepastcoexistsinthepresent.Itisthispresenceofthepastinthepresent,ortherealityofthevirtual,thatallowsfortheimaginativeconstructionofalternativehistoricalpossibilities,animaginativeconstructionthatinturnallowsforabettersenseofwhicheventsareorarenothistoricallysignificant.

Inanticipationofthecriticismthatthismethodopens‘thedoorwideopentosubjectivearbitrarinessin“historiography”’(ibid.180)byallowinganyonefreerangetodeterminewhatwillorwillnotcountashistoricallysignificant,Weberbringsinanexampleofamotherwhostrikesherchild.Whenthemothertellsherhusbandthatshedidnotreallymeanit,thatitwasreallyanaccident,shebasesherclaimonthefactthatheractionwasanomaloustohergeneralbehavioralresponsestoherchild,responsesherhusbandshouldhimselfacceptbasedonhisownempiricalknowledge.AsWeberputsit,whenthemother

refershimtherebytohis‘empiricalknowledge’regardingher‘usualmotives,’whichinthevastmajorityofallthegenerallypossibleconstellationswouldhaveledtoanother,lessirrationaleffect.Sheclaims,inotherwords,thattheblowwhichshedeliveredwasan‘accidental’andnotan‘adequately’causedreactiontothebehaviorofherchild…(Ibid.178)

ForWeber,then,althoughfactsunderdeterminetheirsignificance,itdoesnotmeanthatthesignificanceorvalue-judgmentwecometoholdisarbitraryandrelative,orthatonevalue-judgmentisasgoodasanyother.Thefacts,overtime,cometobeassociatedwithcertaingeneralrules,andtheserules(thatis,Weber's‘types’),insofarastheyareassociatedwithempiricalfacts,setlimitstowhatonecancountassignificant(‘adequate’)orinsignificant.Andyetananomalous,atypical,unpredictedeventmayverywelltransformthesubsequentsituation.Thechild'srelationshipwithhismothermaywellbeforeveralteredasaresultoftheblow,buttoverifythisonewouldhavetobeable,throughWeber'smethodofimaginativeconstruction,todeterminethattheactuallifeand

situationofthechildwouldhavebeendifferenthadtheblownotoccurred,giventhegeneralpattern(type)ofbehaviorsthatsubsequentlyunfoldfollowingtheblow.AsWebersums(p.64) upthisapproach,‘Inordertopenetratetherealcausalinterrelationships,weconstructunrealones’(ibid.185–6).

Weber'shistoricalapproach,however,isnotaproblematizinghistory.AlthoughWeber'sapproachtothesignificanceofhistoricaleventsdoesentailanimaginativeconstructionthatconsiderspossibilitiesthatarenottobeconfusedwithwhatactuallyoccurs,thegoalofthisapproachistodeterminethesignificanceofhistoricaleventsbyascertainingtheircausalrolewithinagivenconstellationofhistoricalfacts.FromDeleuze'sperspective,whatisimportantisthatWeberrefusestoreducethehistoricalsignificanceandmeaningofeventstoeithertheirconcreteparticularityaloneortogeneralanalyticalrulesandlaws.Nonetheless,whereasWeber'suseofimaginativeconstructiondoesaccountforthesignificanceofeventsbymovingbeyondtheactualtoitsimagined,counterfactualpossibilities,andeventhoughWeber'stheoryoftypesisnottobeconfusedwithgeneralanalyticallawsandrules,Weber,incontrasttoDeleuze(andHume),seekstoarriveatthetruthoftheactualratherthanforceacreativemovebeyondtheactual.Tounleashcreativeevents,toforceamovebeyondtheactual,entails,aswewillseeinthenextsection,afundamentalnon-relationshipwiththeactualityitmakespossible.

II.CreativeEventsandCounter-causalityToclarifyproblematizinghistoryfurther,wecanturntoDeleuze'scontemporary,Foucault.DuringalecturehegaveneartheendofhislifewhileatBerkeleyin1983,Foucaultarguesthathisworkhasbeenaneffortdoa‘historyofthought’ratherthana‘historyofideas.’Foucaultdescribesthedifferencebetweenthetwoasfollows:

Mostofthetimeahistorianofideastriestodeterminewhenaspecificconceptappears,andthismomentisoftenidentifiedbytheappearanceofanewword.ButwhatIamattemptingtodoasahistorianofthoughtissomethingdifferent.Iamtryingtoanalyzethewayinstitutions,practices,habits,andbehaviorbecomeaproblemforpeoplewhobehaveinspecificsortsofways,whohavecertaintypesofhabits,whoengageincertainkindsofpractices,andwhoputtoworkspecifickindsofinstitutions.Thehistoryofideasinvolvestheanalysisofanotionfromitsbirth,throughitsdevelopment,andinthesettingofotherideaswhichconstituteitscontext.Thehistoryofthoughtistheanalysisofthewayanunproblematicfieldofexperience,orsetofpractices,whichwereacceptedwithoutquestion,whichwerefamiliarand‘silent,’outofdiscussion,becomesaproblem,raisesdiscussionanddebate,incitesnewreactions,andinducesacrisisinthepreviouslysilentbehavior,habits,practices,andinstitutions.(Foucault2001,49)

Byraisingdiscussionanddebatewithinan‘unproblematicfieldofexperience,’Foucault's‘historyofthought,’ineffect,problematizesthis(p.65) unproblematicfieldandthusallowsfor‘newreactions’otherthanthealreadygivenactualitiesofthefield.FromFoucault'searlyworkonmadnesstohislatework,aconsistentthemewastheanalysisofwhathetooktobetheproblemsinseparablefromourcurrent,actualwaysofthinking,problemsthatmayliehiddenbeneathcertainunquestionedassumptions.1Jacques

Rancièrehasmorerecentlysetforthasimilarapproachtohistory:

Anepisodefromthepastinterestsusonlyinasmuchasitbecomesanepisodeofthepresentwhereinourthoughts,actions,andstrategiesaredecided…Whatinterestsusisthatideasbeevents,thathistorybeatalltimesabreak,arupture,tobeinterrogatedonlyfromtheperspectiveofthehereandnow,andonlypolitically.(Rancière1991,xxi)

ForbothFoucaultandRancière,then,historyoughttoforce‘abreak,arupture’withtheactual,withhowthingsarethoughtanddone.ThesameisnolesstrueforDeleuze.Whatweneedtoclarify,however,isthenatureofthisbreakandrupture.Whatenables,fromwithinandamidstanactual,unproblematicfield,theruptureandbreakthatwilltransformthisfield?ForDeleuze–andthissimplyfollowsfromhisHumeantranscendentalempiricism–anycreativemovesbeyondtheactual,andhenceanybreaksandruptureswiththeactual,areirreducibletoanythingwithintheactualitself.Thecreative,thenovelandnew,iscreativepreciselybecauseitaccessesareality(therealityofthevirtual)thatisirreducibletotheactual.Itisthismovetoaccessarealityirreducibletotheactualthatisthemoveofcounter-actualization–itisthetaskofaproblematizinghistory,anditisataskDeleuzeshareswithFoucaultandRancière,amongothers.

AmongtheseothersisAlainBadiou.Badiouisquiteforthrightinarguingfortheabsoluterupturethatisthenew,andfortheirreducibilityofthenewtoanythingwithintheactual,orwhathecallsthe‘situation’.Anewtruthappears,forBadiou,asarupturewithinasituation,arupturethatisunnameablewithinthesituation,oriswhathecallsthevoidofthesituation.Bywayofexample,BadiouarguesthatHaydn'smusicis

absolutelydetached,orunrelatedto,alltherulesofthesituation.Hencetheemergenceoftheclassicalstyle,withHaydn…concernsthemusicalsituationandnoother,asituationthengovernedbythepredominanceofthebaroquestyle.Itwasaneventforthissituation…[aneventthat]wasnotcomprehensiblefromwithintheplentitudeachievedbythebaroquestyle;itreallywasamatterofsomethingelse.(Badiou2001,68)

Badiou'spositionfollowsfromhisanti-Heideggereanontology.Heidegger'sontologicaldifference,accordingtoBadiou,isadifferencesubservienttothenatural,totheactual;moreprecisely,Heidegger'sphilosophyisthephilosophyofthenaturalizationofnature,theactualizationoftheactual,andoftheopening,phusisandaletheia,thatallowsforthe(p.66) ‘remaining-there-in-itself’thatistherealmofbeingandnature.2Badiou,bycontrast,understandstheeventastheanti-naturaleventthatisnotthehistoricizationofthenatural,asHeideggerwouldhaveit,butratheranabsolutebeginningandseparationfromthenatural,anhistoricaleventthatcanthenbenaturalized.Haydn'smusicwasthereforeanabsolutebeginning,thevoidofthebaroquesituation,anditisonlyasaresultoffidelitytothiseventthatitthenbecamenaturalizedastheclassicalstyle.Despitebeingnaturalizedastheclassicalstyle,theeventthatisHaydnistobesubtractedfromtheseriesofnaturalevents,anditisthisseparationthataffirmsthe‘basisofthe

characteroftruthsasirreduciblyoriginal,created,andfortuitious’(Badiou2000,75).

InhiscritiqueofDeleuze,BadiouarguesthatDeleuzeultimatelyfailedtounderstandthecreativityofeventsinawaythatdidnotreducethemtobeingmerelyafoldorextensionofthenaturalandactual.WhereasDeleuzeaffirmstheindiscernibilityofthevirtualfromtheactual,andfromeachandeveryactual,thatoperatesastheconditionforcreativeruptureswiththeactual,Badiou,ontheotherhand,arguesthatcreativeeventsarethoroughlyactualthoughrare,andthat‘nocountcangrouptheevents,novirtualsubjectsthemtotheOne’(ibid.,p.76).Deleuze,inshort,doesnot,onBadiou'sreading,acceptthenotionof‘absolutebeginnings’butholdsratherthatthe‘newisafoldofthepast’(Badiou2004,91).ForBadiou,therefore,Haydn'smusicwasaneventforthebaroquesituation,andonlyforthissituation,butitwasitsunnameablevoid.Deleuze,bycontrast,withhisHumeantranscendentalempiricismandpragmaticsinhand,pursuesanexperimentationwithandwithintheactual,anexperimentationwithoutapredeterminingend-in-view,andindoingsoheseekstoforcethevirtualitiesthatareindiscerniblefromtheactual.TheimportantissueforDeleuze,subsequently,istodiscernthefactorsthatinhibitthereleaseofvirtualities,andtoattempttodeterminehowsuchinhibitingfactorscanbechallengedandovercome.TotakethecaseofHaydnagain,numerousfactorscomeintoplay.Haydn'smusicalsensibilitiesweregreatlyinfluencedbyCarlPhilippEmanuelBach,whosesixkeyboardsonatasHaydnplayed‘innumerabletimes’until,asHaydnsays,he‘hadmasteredthemall’(Geiringer1968,31–2).C.P.E.Bach,thesecondoffivesonsofJohannSebastianBach,thehighbaroquecomposer,isalsoconsideredtobeoneofthefoundersoftheclassicalstyle.Haydnwasalsoabletoexperimentinrelativeisolation,beingundertheemployofNicholasEsterhazyandhencelargelyremovedfromthecourtcomposersofVienna.Andfinally,thoughnotexhaustively,whenHaydnleftforLondonafternearlythirtyyearsofservicetoPrinceEsterhazy,hewrote,‘howsweetthisbitoffreedomreallyis!IhadakindPrince,butsometimesIwasforcedtobedependentonbasesouls.Ioftensighedforrelease,andnowIhaveitinsomemeasure’(Landon1959,118).(p.67) Thisrelease,coupledwiththenoveltyoftheexperienceofLondonitself,ledtowhatmanyseeasthemostcreativeperiodofHaydn'scareer.3Haydn'screativemovesbeyondthebaroquesituationwerethustheresultofexperimentationsmadepossiblewithinthesituation,evenifthecreativeresultsofthisexperimentationareirreducibletothegivensofthesituation.Itisthiscreativeadvancethatisjustwhattheexperimentalismoftranscendentalempiricismandpragmaticsseekstoaccomplish.Theseexperimentations,however,arenotguaranteedofsuccess.Ratherthantransformanactualitythroughthesuccessfulreleaseofvirtualitiesthatcomethentobeactualizedinanewidea,concept,belief,invention,ormusicalstyle,theeffortsmaysimplycometorepeatthesamewell-wornformsandpaths(asthecourtcomposersinViennawerelargelydoingatthetime);or,theexistingpatternsandpathsmaybecomeutterlydestroyedandnothingcoherentresultsfromtheexperimentation.Whethersuccessfulornot,aproblematizinghistory,pragmatics,andsoon,willallowforcreativemovesbeyondtheactualonlybybeginningwiththeactual,byforcing,throughexperimentationwithandwithintheactual,itsproblematization.Thisproblematizedactualthenbecomesunproblematicasitbecomestransformedintoastableactuality,justasHaydn'sproblematizationofthebaroquestylebecomestheunproblematicclassicalstyle.

InhisbookonLeibniz,DeleuzearguesthatLeibnizwasalsoconcernedwithdeterminingtheconditionsthatwillallowfortheemergenceofcreativitywithintheactual.‘ForwithLeibniz,’Deleuzeclaims,‘thequestionsurgesforthinphilosophythatwillcontinuetohauntWhiteheadandBergson:nothowtoattaineternity,butinwhatconditionsdoestheobjectiveworldallowforasubjectiveproductionofnovelty,thatis,ofcreation?’(FL79).InourearlierdiscussionsofBergson,wesawthatcreativeevolutionsdonotproceedbysubtractingfromthesituation,orbytheruptureofavoidwithintheplentitudeofasituation;tothecontrary,theyemergewhentheexcessesinseparablefromtheactual,thepowerofAND,promptacontractionthatbecomesactualizedasanewentity.Historicalontologyispreciselytheprocessualoutsidepresupposedbyanydeterminateidentity.Individuationitselfpresupposes,Deleuzeargues,‘concentration,accumulation,coincidenceofacertainnumberofconvergingpreindividualsingularities’(FL63).‘Inthissense,’Deleuzeconcludes,‘theindividualistheactualizationofpreindividualsingularities,andimpliesnopreviousdetermination.Thecontrarymustbenotedbyobservingthatdeterminationitselfsupposesindividuation’(FL,64).Itisthisaccumulation,filtering,anddrawingofpreindividualsingularitiesthatisthehistoricalontologyinseparablefromanydeterminate,individualentity.ForBadiou,bycontrast,historyonlybeginsinthewakeofanevent,andunfoldsonlyaftertheeventthroughthosewhomaintainfidelitytothetruthoftheevent.Thehistory(p.68) ofclassicalmusiconlyarose,forexample,asaresultofthefidelityofmusicianstotheeventthatwasthetruthofHaydn'smusic.Onlyasthiseventbecamenaturalizeddowehavethehistoryofclassicalmusic.Ratherthanconcerninghimselfwiththequestionofhowtounleashcreativitywithinactualhistoricalsituations,Badiouisinterestedinmaintainingfidelitytoatruththathasnohistory.

Wecangainaclearersenseoftheissuesatplayherebyturningtoworkinsciencestudies.Acentralclaimofsciencestudies,especiallyintheworkofDavidBloor,BrunoLatour,andothers,isthatscientificfactsandentitieshaveahistory.This,asLatourandWoolgarargueinLaboratoryLife,contrastswiththetraditionalnotionthatscientificfactsandentitieshavearealityindependentoftheprocessesthatledtotheirdiscovery.AsLatourandWoolgarputit,‘Afactonlybecomessuchwhenitlosesalltemporalqualificationsandbecomesincorporatedintoalargebodyofknowledgedrawnuponbyothers’(LatourandWoolgar1986,106).TouseanexampleofLatour's,letussupposethatuponexaminingthebodyofRamesesII,aswasdonein1976,itis‘discovered’thathediedoftuberculosis.Formostpeople,Latourclaims,theywouldassumeasamatterofcoursethattheKochbacilluswhichcausestuberculosiswasthesameentityin1000BCEasitisnow,eventhoughtheKochbacilluswasn'tdiscovereduntil1882.Bycontrast,thesesamepeoplewouldlikelyfindit‘impossible…toimaginethatamachineguncouldbetransportedintothepast’(Latour2000,250),orthatRamesesIIcouldhavebeenkilledbymachine-gunfire.Thedifferencebetweenthetwocasesisthatwhiletechnologicalobjects‘neverescapetheconditionsoftheirproduction,’forscientificentitieswetendtobelievetheycananddo.Inotherwords,ifyoutakeawaythetechnologicalskills,materials,andresourcesnecessaryfortheproductionofamachinegun,thenyoutakeawaythepossibilityoftherebeingamachinegun;andyetifyoutakeawaythetechnologicalskills,materials,andresourcesnecessarytoisolateandidentify

theKochbacillusyoudonot,sotheusualstorygoes,takeawaytheKochbacillus.Itwasthereregardless.

ItisthiscontrastbetweentheontologyoftechnologicalobjectsandthoseofscientificobjectsthatLatourchallenges.LatourarguesthatfactssuchastheexistenceoftheKochbacillus‘cannotescapetheirnetworksofproduction’(ibid.).WhatLatourproposesisatheoryof‘relativeexistence’thatwillavoideithertheWhiggishoranti-Whiggishpositions.TheWhiggishpositionassumesthatourcurrentknowledgeiswhatscientificprogresshasbeenleadingtoallalongandthatitwasalreadyatplaythroughouthistoryandwassimplyawaitingitsinevitablediscovery.FromtheWhiggishperspective,thereisnodifficultyinextendingourknowledgeoftheKochbacillusintothepast.Theanti-Whiggishposition,bycontrast,holdsthatitwouldbeanachronistictoextendourcontemporaryknowledgetothepast.(p.69) Latour,however,believesthatthe‘Kochbacilluscanbeextendedintothepasttobesure–contrarytotheradicalanti-whiggishposition–butthiscannotbedoneatnocost’(ibid.249).Thiscostistherecognitionthat‘noneoftheelementsnecessarytoproveit[theexistenceoftheKochbacillusinRamesesII]canthemselvesbeexpandedortransportedbacktothreethousandyearsago’(ibid.).AsLatourwillargueatlengthinPandora'sHope,whatneedstobechallengedistheassumptionthatbeingconstructedimpliesartificialityorlackofreality,whenforLatour‘itisbecause[reality]isconstructedthatitissoveryreal,soautonomous,soindependentofourownhands’(Latour1999,275).

TounderstandLatour'sclaimthat‘theterms“construction”andautonomousrealityaresynonyms’(ibid.),weneedtoreturntoHume,andtotheunderdeterminationoftheoriesandbeliefsbyimpressions.IndiscussingthecontrastingtheoriesofPasteurandPouchet,theformercallingforfermentationandthelatterforspontaneousgeneration,Latourclaimsthat

PasteurandPouchetdisagreeabouttheinterpretationoffactsbecause,sothehistorianssay,thosefactsareunderdeterminedandcannot,contrarytotheclaimsofempiricists,forcerationalmindsintoassent.Sothefirsttaskofsocialhistoriansandsocialconstructivists,followingHume'slineofattack,wastoshowthatwe,thehumans,facedwithdramaticallyunderdeterminedmattersoffact,havetoenrollotherresourcestoreachconsensus–ourtheories,ourprejudices,ourprofessionalorpoliticalloyalties,ourbodilyskills,ourstandardizingconventions,etc.(Latour2000,263–4)

ThisHumeanlineofattackiscentraltowhatiscalledthestrongprogrammeinsciencestudies.Aguidingthesisofthisprogramme,asspearheadedbyDavidBloor,isthatsociologistsoughtto‘seekthesamekindofcausesforbothtrueandfalse,rationalandirrationalbeliefs’(Bloor1991,175).Whereassocialcausesareoftensoughttoexplainwhycertainfalsebeliefswereoncemaintained,suchcausesarenotlookedforinaccountingforwhyweholdtotruebeliefs.TheassumptionBloorchallengesisthattruebeliefsarenotsociallycausedbutarecausedbytheautonomousrealityofthefactsthemselves.ItisatthispointthatthetheoryofunderdeterminationandHume'slineofattackcomesin.Iffactsunderdeterminethetheoriesoneadheresto,thenonemustlook

elsewherethanthefactsthemselves,andforBloorandthestrongprogrammeweshouldlookforsocialcausestoaccountforthetheorieswesupport.Thisapproachismoregenerallyknownassocialconstructivism,andithasbeenusedtoarguefortheviewthateverythingfromquarkstomentalillnessissociallyconstructed.4

AtfirstitmightappearthatLatour'spositionshouldbeseenasaversionofsocialconstructivism.IftheKochbacillusisinseparablefromitsconditionsofproduction,andif,aswesaw,constructionandautonomousreality(p.70) aretobeunderstoodassynonymous,thenisthisnotarguingforthesocialconstructionofreality?ForLatourtheanswertothisquestionisaresounding‘No,’andforaverystraightforwardreason.Socialconstructivismpresupposes,Latourargues,thedualityofthehumanandthenonhuman.Itisthenonhumanworldthatisunderdeterminedandinneedofthehumanworldtocomealongandspeakforit,toprovidethedeterminationsthenonhumanworldcannotprovideitself.Scientificrealismadherestothissameviewofreality.Theentitiesofscience,aswesawabove,arecommonlytakentobeautonomousandindependentofthesocialcontextwithinwhichtheymaybediscussedanddisputed.Inthecaseofscientificrealism,itistheautonomousrealityofascientificentitythatultimatelydetermineswhetherthescientifictheoryweconstructistrueornot;conversely,socialconstructivistsarguethatthetruthofascientifictheoryiscaused,becauseoftheunderdeterminationoffacts,bysocialfactors.Despitetheiropposingpositions,theyeachbasetheirunderstandinguponafundamentaldualism–asubject–object,human–nonhumandualism.‘Theacquiescenceofthetwoarchenemies,socialconstructivistsandrealists,totheverysamemetaphysicsforopposedreasonshas,’Latournotes,‘alwaysbeenformeasourceofsomemerriment’(Latour2000,264).

WhatLatouroffersinordertoavoidtheeither/oroptionsofscientificrealism/socialconstructivism,Whiggish/anti-Whiggish,iswhathecalls‘historicalrealism.’Keytohistoricalrealismisthenotionof‘relativeexistence,’bywhichLatourmeansthatscientificentitiescanbesaidtobe‘existingsomewhat,havingalittlereality,occupyingadefinitiveplaceandtime,havingpredecessorsandsuccessors’(ibid.253);or,asheputsitinPandora'sHope,‘weinsistandinsistagainthatthereisasocialhistoryofthingsanda“thingy”historyofhumans’(Latour1999,18).Whatthismeansisthatrealityissomethingthatcanincreaseanddeclinethroughanincreaseanddeclineofheterogeneousassociations.Itisnotallornothingregardingtheexistenceofentities.‘Anentity,’Latourclaims‘gainsinrealityifitisassociatedwithmanyothersthatareviewedascollaboratingwithit.Itlosesinrealityif,onthecontrary,ithastoshedassociatesorcollaborators(humansandnonhumans)’(Latour2000,257).InthecaseofPouchet'stheoryofspontaneousgeneration,itsrelativeexistencein1864washighsinceitwasassociatedwithanumberofhumanandnonhumanelements.Latourlists‘commonsenseexperience,anti-Darwinism,republicanism,Protestanttheology,naturalhistoryskillsinobservingeggdevelopment,geologicaltheoryofmultiplecreations,Rouennaturalmuseumequipment[thelabwherePouchetworked]’(ibid.257),asamongtheassociationsthatwereinseparablefromtherelativeexistenceofspontaneousgenerationatthetime.By1866,however,Pasteur'stheoryoffermentationdisplacedPouchet'stheorybyhavingincreaseditsownheterogeneousarrayofassociations.These(p.71)

associationshavecontinuedtoincreasetothisdaysuchthatPasteur'stheoryhasbecome‘blackboxed’(touseLatour'sterm)bybeingnotonlyincorporatedintotextbooksasalargelyunquestioned,unproblematic,autonomousfactregardingreality,butalso,andmoreimportantlyforLatour,ithasbecomeblackboxedpreciselybecauseoftheheterogeneousnetworkofhumanandnonhumanassociations.‘Ilive,’admitsLatour,‘insidethePasteuriannetwork,everytimeIeatpasteurizedyogurt,drinkpasteurizedmilk,orswallowantibiotics’(ibid.263).

Latourthusarguesthattherelativeexistenceofentitieswaxesandwanesrelativetothenumberofhumanandnonhumanassociationsithasestablishedwithinanetwork.Thesehumanandnonhumanassociations,moreover,arenotheldtogetherbysociety;rather,asLatourandprimatologistShirleyStrumargue,‘societyisnotwhatholdsustogether,itiswhatisheldtogether’(LatourandStrum1987,276).Anditisheldtogether,theyargue,bymaterial(i.e.,nonhuman,ornon-social)resources.‘Aslongasitissimplysocialskillsthatarebroughtin,’andbroughtintoholdtogetherthesocialgroup,‘onedoesnotgetasocietymorestableandmoretechnicallydevelopedthanthatofthebaboonsorthechimpanzees’(ibid.277).5Furthermore,inholdingsocietytogetheronecannotpredeterminewhatwillorwillnotwork.Consequently,Latourwillunderstandhistoryinamannerthatemphasizesthepossibilityfornovelty.Asheputsit.

Ifhistoryhasnoothermeaningthantoactivatepotentiality–thatis,toturnintoeffectwhatwasalreadythere,inthecause–thennomatterhowmuchjugglingofassociationstakesplace,nothing,nonewthingatleast,willeverhappen,sincetheeffectwasalreadyhiddeninitscause,asapotential…Causalityfollowstheeventsanddoesnotprecedethem.(Latour1999,152,emphasismine)

Aswithproblematizinghistory,thehistoryLatourseekstodoissimilarlyinterestedinmovingbeyondananalysisoftheactualtotheconditionsthatwillallowforsomethingnewtotakeplace.Iftheeffectisalreadyinthecauseasitshiddenpotential,thentheactualizationofthispotentialmerelycomestorealizewhatwasalreadyactuallythereandhenceitisnottheupsurgeofanythingnew.ThisispreciselyDeleuze'spointandiswhyherepeatedlyarguesthatthevirtualinnowayresemblestheactual,foronlyinthiswaycansomethingtrulynewcometobe.6ForLatour,then,theeffectisnottobeunderstoodasthelogical,pre-determinedresultofthecause;tothecontrary,‘causalityfollowstheevents.’AsthisiselaboratedinLaboratoryLife,‘“reality”cannotbeusedtoexplainwhyastatementbecomesafact,sinceitisonlyafterithasbecomeafactthattheeffectofrealityisobtained’(LatourandWoolgar1986,180).Wecouldcallthisthereality-effectwherebythedrawingofanumberofassociationsandlinksbetweenhumanandnonhumanelementsenablestheactualizationoftheautonomousfactualrealitythatisthentakentobethecauseofthese(p.72) relationships.Onceactualizedasafact,orblackboxedasLatourputsit,thehistoricalprocessesthatdrawtogetheraheterogeneousmultiplicityofassociationscometobeeclipsed(blackboxed)bytheactualizedfact.Itisonlythroughthecounter-actualizationofaproblematizinghistorythatthehiddenrealityofthevirtualcanbecometapped,wherebytheactualbecomesproblematized,allowingforitspossibletransformation.ThesameistrueforLatour'suse

ofhistoryinsciencestudies.Ratherthanpursueatraditionalcausalanalysisofhistoricaleventsandattempttoteaseoutthecausalfactorsintheobservedevents,sciencestudiesseekstoshowhowtheidentificationofacausalfactorisitselfinseparablefromtherelativeexistenceofthisfactor.Latourthusoffersacounter-causalanalysisofscientificentities.InthecaseoftheKochbacillusthat‘caused’thedeathofRamesesII,Latour'scounter-causalanalysisseesthecauseitselfasaneffect(orquasi-effect)ofanactualizationofanumberofassociativerelationships.Becauseoftherelativeexistenceofthepresentnetworkofassociations,wecansaythatRamesesIIdiedoftuberculosis;asthenetworkofassociationsbetweenhumansandnonhumanschangesonetotwohundredyearsfromnow,therelativeexistenceoftheKochbacillusmightnotbewhatitistoday;inotherwords,somethingnewandunforeseenmightcomealongtodisplaceitasPasteur'sfermentationdisplacedPouchet'sspontaneousgeneration.Thesameistrue,ofcourse,forthecounter-causalanalysisLatoursetsforth.Heisnotofferingadeeper,morethoroughcausalanalysis;tothecontrary,hisanalysis,ashereadilyadmits,isofapiecewithscientificanalysistotheextentthateachattemptstodraworderfromdisorder.AsLatourandWoolgarunderstandit,‘disorder[isto]beconsideredtheruleandordertheexception’(LatourandWoolgar1986,251),andwhereastraditionalapproachespresupposeacausalorderbehindeveryeffectthatbecomessubjecttoanalysis,Latourarguesthatdisorderandchaosispresupposedbyeveryanalysisthatidentifiesacausalorder,includinghisownanalysis.7Latour'stheoryofrelativeexistence–aswithHume'sstagingofidentitydiscussedinearlierchapters–thusrecognizestheprovisionalnatureofidentity,theinseparabilityofanhistoricalontologyfromthatwhichisdeterminatelyindividuatedandknown.‘InthemetaphysicsofhistorythatIwanttosubstituteforthetraditionalone,’Latourconcludes,‘weshouldbeabletotalkcalmlyaboutrelativeexistence’(ibid.156).

ReturningnowtoBadiou,wehaveseenthathedoesawaywiththevirtualinordertoaffirmthe‘theabsoluteontologicalseparationoftheevent,thefactthatitoccursinthesituationwithoutbeinginanywayvirtualizable’(Badiou2000,75).ForBadiou,then,acreativemovewouldnotentailanattempttomovebeyondtheactual,ortovirtualize(thatis,counter-actualize)theactual.BadiouclaimsthatDeleuze,bymakingsuchamove,issimplytakingrefugeintheineffabilityofa‘naturalmysticism’(p.73) (Badiou2004,80),andamysticismthatshort-circuitsanyformofpoliticalengagementwiththeactualbeforeitcanevengetstarted.8Badiou,ashiscriticismsofDeleuzebelie,seeksanactiveengagementwiththeactualitiesofdailylife,andthisengagementisbestserved,heargues,byathoughtthatmaintainsfidelitytotheevent,aneventthatisthevoidofthesituation.Itisinthiswaythatpoliticalresistancecanbecomea‘resistance[that]isarupturewithwhatis’(Badiou2005a,7).Andthepoliticalrealitytoberesistedistheconsensus-driven,popular-opiniondominatedideology‘ofcontemporaryparliamentaryStates’(ibid.,18).WhatsuchStatesdois‘desingularize’theabsoluteseparabilityoftheevent;inshort,Statesrelyuponanhistoricizationthatidentifiestheeventwithasituation(thatis,whatthepublicthinksaboutthis,that,ortheothersituation).Thisinevitablyintroducesnon-egalitarianstatements,policies,andsoon,intothepoliticalrealm,whereasapoliticsthatmaintainsfidelitytotheevent‘works,’Badiouargues,‘towards…theimpossibility,inthesituation,ofeverynon-egalitarianstatementconcerningthissituation’

(ibid.93).Resistance,therefore,isbestservedbythosewhoactuallythinkthetruthofagivenpoliticalsituation,andthusforBadiou‘therealsituationdemands…thatwepitafewrarepoliticalmilitantsagainstthe“democratic”hegemonyoftheparliamentaryState…’(ibid.122).

Acrucialdifferenceappearsatthispoint,forwhileBadioucallsforthe‘fewrarepoliticalmilitants’whosefidelitytothevoidofthesituationwillfacilitatetherupturewithwhatis,Deleuze'sphilosophyhasoftenbeeninterpreted–byNegri,Hardt,andothers–asthebasisforaphilosophyofthemultitude,foraradicaldemocraticpolitics.Atthesametime,andperhapsinconsistently,Deleuzefrequentlyadmitsthattrulycreativeworkisrare,asaretheindividualswhodosuchwork.Deleuzeendshisessay‘LiteratureandLife,’forexample,withthebaldstatementthat‘thereareveryfewwhocancallthemselveswriters’(CC6).Tobegintoaddresstheseissues,wewillturntoDeleuze'sfinalpublishedessay,‘Immanence:alife…,’inordertodetailfurthertherelationshipbetweencreativeeventsandtheactual,historicalsituationswithinwhichtheseeventsoccur.OurguidingexampleforthisdiscussionwillbethelifeandworkofKafka,forKafkawouldindeedbeforDeleuzeoneoftheveryfewwhocouldcallhimselfawriter.

III.Kafka:aLife,anEvent…Onthenightof22September1912,Kafka,ashehaddonesomanytimesbefore,satdownathisdesktowrite.Thisnight,however,Kafkawrotethestory‘TheJudgment’inonesittingfromteno'clockintheeveninguntilsix(p.74) thenextmorning.Thesignificanceofthisnight,ofthisevent,wasimmediatelyapparenttoKafkaandwasfurthervalidatedtwodayslaterwhen,afterreadingthestoryaloudtohisfriends(includingMaxBrod),Kafkawroteinhisdiarythat‘Theindubitabilityofthestorywasconfirmed’(Kafka1982,214).InhisbiographyofKafka,ReinerStachclaimsthattheliteratureweassociatewithKafkawasbornthatnight:

Suddenly–withoutguideorprecedent,itseemed–theKafkacosmoswasathand,fullyequippedwiththe‘Kafkaesque’inventorythatnowgiveshisworkitsdistinctivecharacter:thefatherfigurewhoisbothoverpoweringanddirty,thehollowrationalityofthenarrator,thejuridicalstructuresimposedonlife,thedreamlogicoftheplot,andlastbutnotleast,theflowofthestoryperpetuallyatoddswiththehopesandexpectationsofthehero.(Stach2005,115)

WecanseehowBadiouwouldinterpretthisevent.Onthenightof22September1912,thetruthwename‘Kafkaesque’wasrevealedtoKafka,anditisthistruththatKafkaremainedfaithfultothroughouttherestofhiswritings.AsthefidelitytothetruthofHaydn'smusichascometobehistoricizedandnamedtheclassicalstyle,thetruthrevealedtoKafkathatnighthascometobenamedKafkaesque.Thetruthitself,however,isforBadioutheunnameablevoidthatpromptstheeffortstobefaithfultoitinone'swritings,effortsthatthencometobenamedwithinthesituationswheretheseeffortsoccur.Kafka,forinstance,namedthepointandmeaningofhiseffortswhen,inhis‘LettertoHisFather,’hesaid,‘Mywritingwasaboutyou’;andthenightafterhewrote‘TheJudgment’hehadalreadybeguntoidentifyandattributevariousmeaningstothestory,notingthathehad‘thoughtsofFreud,ofcourse’(Kafka1982,213).

ABadiou-inspiredreadingofwhatmightbecalledthe‘event’ofKafka'slifeasawriter,orofhislifepersimpliciter,certainlydoesseemtobecorroboratedbyKafka'sexample.However,whatwemustnotoverlookisKafka'sexperienceofthiseventaswellastherelationshipofthisexperiencetoKafka'smanyabandonedeffortstowriteanindubitablestory.AccordingtoStach,with‘TheJudgment,’‘Forthefirsttimehe[Kafka]hadlinkedtheme,imagery,andplottoigniteasparkbetweenliteratureandlife.Hecalledthebrightnessofthisspark“indubitability”’(Stach2005,115).Moreover,Kafka'sexperienceoftheindubitabilityofthestoryisnotofanunnameablevoidthatcannotbesaidandthatcirculatesasanabsencewithineverythingthatiswrittenandsaid;tothecontrary,asKafkaexperiencedthewritingofthestory,hediscovered,asheputit,‘Howeverythingcanbesaid,howforeverything,forthestrangestfancies,therewaitsagreatfireinwhichtheyperishandriseupagain’(Kafka1982,213).Kafka'sexperienceismoreakin,then,toaBergsonianintuition,andthustheindubitabilityofthestoryisanexperienceoftheabsolutewithinintuition.‘Byintuition,’asBergsondefinesit,andaswasdiscussedearlier,‘ismeantthe(p.75) kindofintellectualsympathybywhichoneplacesoneselfwithinanobjectinordertocoincidewithwhatisuniqueinitandconsequentlyinexpressible’(Bergson[1903]1999,23–4).ThisinexpressibleabsoluteisnotthevoidforBergson,butratherthepuredurationthatcannotbecapturedbyattemptstodelineateitwithinlanguageandanalysis.Andyetdespiteitsinexpressiblenature,thisabsoluteisnotavoidbutisrathercapableofbeingstudied,situated,andexperiencedbywhatforBergsonwouldbeatrueempiricism:‘atrueempiricismisthatwhichproposestogetasneartotheoriginalitselfaspossible,tosearchdeeplyintoitslife,andso,byakindofintellectualauscultation,tofeelthethrobbingsofitssoul;andthistrueempiricismisthetruemetaphysics(ibid.36–7).

Aswehaveseen,Deleuzereferstothis‘trueempiricism’as‘transcendentalempiricism’,athemethatloomsaslargeinDeleuze'sfinalpublishedpiece,‘Immanence:alife…,’asitdidinhisearlybookonHume.Deleuze'stheoryoftranscendentalempiricismalsolinkstoourdiscussionsofLatour,forjustasLatour'stheoryofrelativeexistenceandhistoricalrealismwaspartofageneralefforttoavoidthesubject–objectmetaphysicshesawasprevalentbothamongscientificrealistsandsocialconstructivists,sotooforDeleuze,‘wewillspeakofatranscendentalempiricismincontrasttoeverythingthatmakesuptheworldofthesubjectandtheobject’(PI25).IncontrasttoBadiou'stheoryofthevoidthatisabsentwithinthegivensofasituation,forDeleuzetherearegivenstoatranscendentalexperience,suchasthe‘purestreamofa-subjectiveconsciousness,apre-reflexiveimpersonalconsciousness,aqualitativedurationofconsciousnesswithoutself’(ibid.).ThesegivensconstitutewhatDeleuzewillcallthetranscendentalfield,whichheproposestodefine‘byapureimmediateconsciousnesswithneitherobjectnorself,asamovementthatneitherbeginsnorends’;andyet,asDeleuzeclarifies,‘wereitnotforconsciousness,thetranscendentalfieldwouldbedefinedasapureplaneofimmanence,becauseiteludesalltranscendenceofthesubjectandoftheobject’(ibid.26).Inotherwords,thetranscendentalfieldisexpressed,inthisinstance,astherelationshipofsubjecttoobject,or,subjectandobjectarethetranscendentstotheimmanenceofthetranscendentalfield.However,ifthesubjectorobjectistakenastheidentitytowhichtheimmanenceofthetranscendentalfieldistobeattributed,thentheimmanenceofthe

transcendentalfieldbecomesdistorted.AsDeleuzeputsit:

Whenthesubjectortheobjectfallingoutsidetheplaneofimmanenceistakenasauniversalsubjectorasanyobjecttowhichimmanenceisattributed,thetranscendentalisentirelydenatured,foritthensimplyredoublestheempirical(aswithKant),andimmanenceisdistorted,foritthenfindsitselfenclosedinthetranscendent.(Ibid.26–7)

Aswasdiscussedearlier,ifthevirtualisunderstoodinthesamesenseastheactual,ifanactualeffectissimplytherealizationofanalreadyactual(p.76) potentialhiddenwithinacause,thenthecreativepowerofthevirtualisdistorted(‘denatured’).ItisforthisreasonthatDeleuzewillemphaticallyarguethat‘itisonlywhenimmanenceisnolongerimmanencetoanythingotherthanitselfthatwecanspeakofaplaneofimmanence’(ibid.).Thetranscendentalfieldisneverthelesstheimmanencetothetranscendentsthatactualizeandexpressit–theconsciousness,objects,self,andsoonthatactualizethepre-individualsingularities,the‘pre-reflexiveimpersonalconsciousness,’theindefinites,andsoon–andthustheimmanenceofthetranscendentalfield,understoodinthisway,isanimmanencerelativetotheactualitiesthatexpressit.‘It,’thetranscendentalfield,‘isexpressedinfact,onlywhenitisreflectedonasubjectthatrefersittoobjects’(ibid.26).Pureimmanence,orabsoluteimmanence,DeleuzedefinesasALIFE:‘WewillsayofpureimmanencethatitisALIFE,andnothingelse.Itisnotimmanencetolife[hencetherelativeimmanenceofthetranscendentalfield],buttheimmanentthatisinnothingisitselfalife.Alifeistheimmanenceofimmanence,absoluteimmanence:itiscompletepower,completebliss’(ibid.27).

Deleuzestatestherelationshipbetweenthetranscendentalfield,planeofimmanence,andalifeasfollows:‘Thetranscendentalfieldisdefinedbyaplaneofimmanence,andtheplaneofimmanencebyalife’(ibid.28).Thepureorabsoluteimmanencethatisimmanenttonothingbutitselfisalife,andthetranscendentalfieldisthatwhichallowsfortheactualizationofthatwhichtranscendstheplaneofimmanence.‘Transcendence,’Deleuzeargues,‘isalwaysaproductofimmanence’(ibid.31).Statingthisinthemannerdiscussedinearlierchapters,alifeisthepureimmanencefromwhichisdrawntheplaneofconsistency,aplaneofimmanence,thatdefinesthetranscendentalfield(firstarticulation),andthistranscendentalfieldthencomestobeactualizedasaconsciousnessthatisaconsciousnessofanobject(secondarticulation).Farfrombeginning,asthephenomenologistsdo,withthegivensofexperiencebeingplacedinrelationshiptoaconsciousness,Deleuzecallsforthegivensofatranscendentalempiricism,andatranscendentalexperience(álaBergson),ofwhichconsciousnessitselfistheactualizedexpression.9

Toclarifywhatismeantbyreferringtopureimmanenceasalife,DeleuzereferstothecharacterfromDickens'story,OurMutualFriend.Inthestory,agenerallydespicableandunlikablecharacterisfoundunconscious,dying.Whileinthisstate,Deleuzenotes,‘everybodybustlesabouttosavehim,’butas‘hecomesbacktolife,hissaviorsturncolder,andhebecomesonceagainmeanandcrude’(PI28).OnDeleuze'sreading,whatDickenscapturesinthisstoryisthatstate‘betweenhis[thecharacter's]lifeandhisdeath

…[the]momentthatisonlythatofalifeplayingwithdeath.’Theattributesandcharacteristicsthatindividuatethecharacterasthe‘meanandcrude’individualthatheisgiveway,Deleuzeclaims,‘toanimpersonal(p.77) andyetsingularlifethatreleasesapureeventfreedfromtheaccidentsofinternalandexternallife’(ibid.).Howarewetointerpretthisstateofbeing‘freedfromtheaccidentsofinternalandexternallife’?ItmightappearthatDeleuzeisprioritizingarealitythatisoutsidetheworldofourdailyconcerns,theworldthatincludesthedespicablemanandallthathehasdonetodeservetheireandcontemptofothers.AsDeleuzewouldargue,however,followingBergson,whatisrevealedbyDickens'characterisarealitythatisinseparablefromthedyingman,arealitythatcomestobeexpressedandactualizedbythosetraitsthatindividuatethecharacter.ForBergsonthisrealityisthepuredurationthatcanonlybeexperiencedbyintuition,andforDeleuzethisrealityisalife,andmoreimportantlyitistheindefinitebecomingthatcannotbereducedtoadeterminatesequenceofmoments.Itis,inshort,thetimeofourlife;notthetimethatcanbedatedchronologically–thenightof22September1912,forinstance–butthetimethatisthepowerofbecoming,theindefinitepowerandblissofbeingabletosayeverything.Thistimeofourlife,asDeleuzemakesclear,isnotoutofthisworldbutisindeed‘everywhere,inallthemomentsthatagivenlivingsubjectgoesthroughandthataremeasuredbygivenlivedobjects’(ibid.29).‘Theindefinitelife,’however,‘doesnotitselfhavemoments,closeastheymaybetooneanother,butonlybetween-times,betweenmoments…’(ibid.).DeleuzewillfrequentlyusetheGreektermaiontorefertothistimethatisnottobeconfusedwiththeactualitiesofourlife,withthetimeofchronosthatis‘measuredbygivenlivedobjects’;nonetheless,itis,asDeleuzeputsit,atimethatcanbethesubjectofvisions,not,hepointsout,as‘interruptionsoftheprocessbutbreaksthatformpartofit[thatis,between-times],likeaneternitythatcanonlyberevealedinabecoming’(CC5).

ItiscriticaltounderstandtheimportanceoftheindefiniteinDeleuze'sdiscussion.Thereisourlife,thelifeweliveasindividuals;andthenthereisalifeandthepre-individualsingularitiesthatareinseparablefromthelifewelive.AsDeleuzeargues:‘Thesingularitiesandtheeventsthatconstitutealifecoexistwiththeaccidentsofthelifethatcorrespondtoit,buttheyareneithergroupednordividedinthesameway’(PI29–30).Thereis,forinstance,touseDeleuze'sexample,thetranscendentalfieldofpre-individualsingularitiesassociatedwiththechild:‘asmile,agesture,afunnyface’(ibid.30).Thesesingularitiesarenotoutsidethelifeofthechild,thelifeofthechildwhohas,Deleuzeclaims,‘hardlyanyindividuality,’buttheyarethedeterminableconditionsthatallowfortheindividuationofthechildwithcertaindeterminingcharacteristics(forexample,asapersonwhoishappy,energetic,absent-minded,andsoon),characteristicsthatfacilitatethepowertosay‘I’–Iamsuch-and-suchaperson.Farfrombeingoutofthisworld,thetranscendentalfieldofpre-individualsingularitiesisvery(p.78) muchapartofthelifeofachild.‘Theindefinite,’therefore,asDeleuzeargues,‘isthemarknotofanempiricalindeterminationbutofadeterminationbyimmanenceoratranscendentaldeterminability.Theindefinitearticleistheindeterminationofthepersononlybecauseitisdeterminationofthesingular’(ibid.30).Thegestures,smiles,andsoon,ofthechildareempiricallydeterminable,buttheyareatthesametimeindeterminaterelativetotheindividualwhowillcometoactualizethesesingularitiesasconstitutiveelementsoftheiridentity.

WecanclarifythesepointsfurtherifwereturntoKafka.Inliterature,Deleuzeargues,‘writingisaquestionofbecoming…itisaprocess,thatis,apassageofLifethattraversesboththelivableandthelived’(CC1).Andthemannerinwhichwritingbecomes‘aquestionofbecoming,’accordingtoDeleuze,istostripthepowerofthe‘the’andinjecttheindefinite‘aoran’:‘thepoweroftheindefinitearticleiseffectedonlyiftheterminbecomingisstrippedoftheformalcharacteristicsthatmakeitsaythe’(CC2).Whereaswemayhaveatendencytorelatetheindefinitetoanactualindividual–suchasisexemplifiedbythetendencytorelateKafka'swritingtobeingabouthisfather,asevenKafkahimselfdid–literatureproper,forDeleuze,‘takestheoppositepathandexistsonlywhenitdiscoversbeneathapparentpersonsthepowerofanimpersonal–whichisnotageneralitybutasingularityatthehighestpoint:aman,awoman,abeast,astomach,achild’(CC3).Aswithproblematizinghistory,awriterwritesnotinordertoactualizethoughts,memories,andsoon,ortoshowhowtheactualbecameactual,butratherinordertomovebeyondtheactualitiesofwhatiswritten–thefatherin‘TheJudgment’–totheimpersonal,indefinitepowerofthevirtualthatmadethisandindefiniteotheractualizationspossible.AsKafkahimselfexperiencedthepowerofthevirtual,itentailedthepowertosayeverything,butheimmediatelyaddedthat‘therewaitsagreatfireinwhichthey[thefanciesthatareactualized]perishandriseupagain’(Kafka1982,213).This,forDeleuze,isthepowerofliterature.

Thispower,moreover,isinseparablefromthestyleinwhichKafkawrites.TorecallStach'scharacterizationoftheKafkaesquecosmosthatwasgivenbirthtothatSeptembernight(ametaphorKafkahimselfuses10),theindubitablestoryhewroteincludedallthemotifsthatwouldcontinuetocirculatethroughoutallhiswritingsfromthatpointforward–thefatherfigure,the‘hollowrationalityofthenarrator,’andsoon.Thesemotifs,however,hadbeenapparentinKafka'searlierworkaswell.Thedifferenceinthiscase,asStachdiagnosesthesituation,isthathehadlinkedthethemesofhispreviouseffortsinsuchawaythatitignited‘asparkbetweenliteratureandlife’(Stach2005,115).StatedinDeleuzianterms,Kafka'smanypreviousefforts–whatStachreferstoas‘theinterminablesequenceofabortiveattempts’(Stach2005,114)–constitutethetranscendentalfield(p.79) thatisdrawnonthepureplaneofimmanence(firstarticulation);thistranscendentalfieldthenconstitutesaplaneofconsistencythatisthenactualizedwithin‘TheJudgment.’TheindubitabilityofthisstorythatKafkaexperiencedis,onourreading,simplytheexperienceoftheinseparabilityoftheplaneofimmanence,thetranscendentalfieldofsingularities(motifs,themes,andsoon),fromwhatisactuallywrittenandthensubsequentlyreadaloudtohisfriends.Whatisexperiencedhere,forDeleuze(andagainfollowingBergson),isthepowerofbecoming,theintuitionofpuredurationorthe‘eternitythatcanonlyberevealedinabecoming’;inshort,itistheexperienceofthetimeofourlifethatisthetranscendentalconditionforthecreationofsomethingnew,andtheconditionthatisinseparablefromthatwhichiscreated.WithBergsonunderstandablyinmind,Deleuzethusclaims:‘Thereisnoliteraturewithoutfabulation,but,asBergsonwasabletosee,fabulation–thefabulatingfunction–doesnotconsistinimaginingorprojectinganego.Rather,itattainsthesevisions,itraisesitselftothesebecomingsandpowers’(CC3).

Afinalcreativefunctionofliterature,andafunctionwithpoliticalimplicationsthatwillbethesubjectofthenextchapter,istheabilityofliterature,andinparticularminorliterature,toinventapeopleandalanguagewithinandamidst(thatis,inseparablyfrom)thedominantformsofsocietyandlanguage.AsDeleuzearguesinmanyplaces,thoughmostnotablyinthebookheandGuattariwroteonKafka,awritersuchasKafkaisable,through‘thecreationofsyntax[tobringabout]theinventionofanewlanguagewithinlanguage[thematernalordominantlanguage],’andindoingsoexemplifyhow‘languageasawholecanrevealitsoutside,beyondallsyntax’(CC6).Thisoutside,asshouldbeclearbynow,is‘not,’asDeleuzeagainstresses,‘outsidelanguage,buttheoutsideoflanguage’(CC5).Thisoutside,asBlanchotandothershavecorrectlynoted,isinseparablefromtheworkofliterature,oritistheoutsidethatproblematizestheactualpreciselybecauseitistheoutsideoftheactualthatisinseparablefromit.Inthusproblematizingtheactual,thehistorian,aswiththewriter,attemptstounleashtheindubitabilityoftheoutsideoflanguagethroughlanguageitself,andintheprocessallowforthecreationofsomethingnew.Putdifferently,thepoweroftheoutsideforliterature‘consistsininventingapeoplewhoaremissing’(CC4).Thispower,asLatourrecognized,isneitherasubjectivenoranobjectivepower,neitherthepowerofhumansnorthepowerofnature;itisthepoweroflifeandthetimeofourlifetocreatetheveryoppositionsandactualitiesthataretheactualfocusofourdailylives.Problematizinghistory,asweunderstandithere,istheattempttocounter-actualizetheunquestionedgivensandactualitiesofdailylifeinordertorevealthetransformativepowers,thehistoricalontology,thatisinseparablefromtheseactualities.Deleuzewillrefertothiseffort,especiallyinhis(p.80) laterworks,asgeo-philosophy:‘Ifthequestionofgeo-philosophyisimportant,itisbecausethinkingdoesnotoccurinthecategoriesofsubjectandobject,butisavariablerelationtoterritoryandtotheearth’(2RM379).Thepoliticalimplicationsofgeo-philosophyhavebeenrecognized,butweshallnowturntoexaminetheroleproblematizinghistorymayplayinfacilitatingthecounter-actualizationofpoliticalrealities,andwhatsuchacounter-actualizationmightlooklikeorentail.11Hume'sworkwillalsoreturntotheforefront,forthehistoricalandpoliticalwritingsofHumeare,onourreading,inseparablefromthepositionssetforthintheTreatiseandtheEnquiries.TotheextentthatDeleuzeextendsHume'sworkbydevelopingatranscendentalempiricism,wewillthennotsurprisinglybegintoseetheimportanceofthehistoricalforDeleuze,ortheimportanceofwhatwehavecalledhistoricalontology.

Notes:

(1.)ThereisvoluminousliteratureonFoucault,butforanexcellentplacetobegin,seeDreyfusandRabinow1982,andMay2006.

(2.)SeeBadiou2005a,179.

(3.)AsGeiringersaysinhisbiographyofHaydn,‘itisindeeddoubtfulthatHaydn'sgeniuswouldeverhaveunfoldedsobrilliantlywithoutthestimulusofhisEnglishadventures’(Geiringer1968,116).

(4.)ThefoundationaltextinthisgenreisTheSocialConstructionofRealitybyPeterL.BergerandThomasLuckman(BergerandLuckman,1967).Foracriticaloverview,seeHacking'sTheSocialConstructionofWhat?(Hacking1999).

(5.)LatourhasrecentlyfocusedontheseimplicationsofhisworkinReassemblingtheSocial(Latour2007).Formore,seeJohnLaw,whohasmadesimilarargumentsinhisbookOrganizingModernity,applyingitinthiscaseto,amongotherthings,personalidentity.Asheputsit,‘Wearecomposedof,orconstitutedby,ourprops,visibleandinvisible…Eachoneofusisanarrangement…apersonisaneffect,afragileprocessofnetworkingassociatedelements.ItisanunusualtheoryofagencyonlytotheextentthatIwanttofoldtheprops–andtheinteractionswiththeprops–intotheperson’(Law1993,33).

(6.)InBergsonism,forinstance,Deleuzeclaimsstatesquitebluntlythattheactual‘doesnotresemblethevirtualfromwhichitarose’(B97).

(7.)InLaboratoryLifethispointismadeexplicitly:‘Isthereanyessentialdistinctionbetweenthenatureofourownconstructionandthatusedbyoursubjects?Emphatically,theanswermustbeno.Onlybyrejectingthepossibilityofthislastdistinctioncantheargumentsofthischaptercohere.Thenotionofcreatingorderfromdisorderappliesasmuchtotheconstructionofourownaccountastothatofthelaboratoryscientist’(LatourandWoolgar1986,254).

(8.)ThisisultimatelyHallward'scritiqueofDeleuze(Hallward2006).

(9.)FormoreonthecontrastbetweenDeleuze'sthoughtandthephenomenologicaltradition,seemybook,TheProblemofDifference:PhenomenologyandPoststructuralism(Bell1998).

(10.)‘Thestorycameoutofmelikearealbirth,coveredwithfilthandslime,andonlyIhavethehandthatcanreachtothebodyitselfandthestrengthanddesiretodoso’(Kafka1982,214).

(11.)ForworkonDeleuze'sgeo-philosophy,seeProteviandBonta2004.

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