the danish gambling authority's guide on preventive measures
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Version 1.1 – 17 July 2013
The Danish Gambling Authority’s
guideline
on preventive measures against
money laundering and terrorist
financing
in the casino sector
Version 1.1 – 17 July 2013
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Table of content
1. Preamble........................................................................................................................................... 4
1.2 Laws, regulations and guideline ................................................................................................. 4
2 Risk assessment of the casino company ........................................................................................... 7
2.1 Risk management and the use of a risk based approach ............................................................ 7
2.1.1 Risk factors for online casino .............................................................................................. 8
2.1.2 Risk factors for land-based casino ..................................................................................... 10
3 Internal rules ................................................................................................................................... 13
4 Know your customer – online casino .............................................................................................. 14
4.1 Registration of costumers ......................................................................................................... 14
4.2 Verification of the customer’s identity ..................................................................................... 14
4.2.1 Politically exposed persons residing in another country ................................................... 16
4.3 Storage of identity information etc. .......................................................................................... 18
4.4 Updating of information while the customer relationship is ongoing ...................................... 18
5 Know your customer – land-based casino ...................................................................................... 19
5.1 Registration of players.............................................................................................................. 19
5.2 Identification of the player ....................................................................................................... 19
5.3 Identification after arrival ......................................................................................................... 20
6 Awareness duty ............................................................................................................................... 21
6.1 Awareness duty for online casino ............................................................................................ 21
6.1.1 Large transactions .............................................................................................................. 22
6.1.2 Unusual and complex transactions .................................................................................... 22
6.1.3 The FATF-list .................................................................................................................... 23
6.2 Awareness duty for land-based casinos.................................................................................... 23
7 Monitoring of players...................................................................................................................... 25
7.1 Particularly for online casino ................................................................................................... 25
7.2 Monitoring on land-based casinos ............................................................................................ 26
8 Examination and noting duty .......................................................................................................... 27
8.1 Examination duty ..................................................................................................................... 27
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8.2 Noting duty ............................................................................................................................... 28
9 Notification ..................................................................................................................................... 30
9.1 Notification to the State Prosecutor for Serious Economic and International Crime .............. 32
9.2 Suspending online casino transactions ..................................................................................... 33
9.3 Notifying the Danish Gambling Authority ............................................................................... 33
10 Storing of documents and registrations ......................................................................................... 34
11 Internal control .............................................................................................................................. 35
12 Education and instruction programs ............................................................................................. 36
13 Confidentiality .............................................................................................................................. 37
14 Penalty clauses .............................................................................................................................. 39
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1. Preamble The gambling area regulations on preventive measures against money laundering and terrorist
financing shall contribute to the combat of crime by
limiting the possibilities of abusing the casino business for money laundering and terrorist
financing purposes,
easing the police’s crime investigation, and
preventing the remittance of criminal proceeds into the legitimate national economy.
Money laundering includes transactions and activities concerning the proceeds of crime, including
receiving profits and actions carried out in order to hide the funds’ origin, movement, ownership
etc. or in any other way secure the proceeds. Using proceeds of crime in gambling is therefore
among other things covered by the definition of money laundering.
Terrorist financing includes giving direct or indirect financial support to mobilise or collect funds to
- or financial services set at the disposal for persons, groups or organisations that have committed or
intend to commit terrorist acts.
For both online and land-based casinos there are rules concerning the efforts taken against money
laundering and terrorist financing. The money laundering regulations do not cover the revenue-
restricted licences1 to online casino. Moreover, the regulations do not apply when providing other
types of games such as betting or land-based provision of gaming machines.
The guideline includes instructions on how the regulations must be met by the licence holders,
employees and other staff members involved in the casino activity. With regards to the areas in
which it is up to the above-mentioned groups to carry out a risk assessment, the guidelines include
instructions on how the regulation requirements can be met.
The regulations on preventive measures of money laundering and terrorist financing are risk based.
This means that the casino company must arrange internal procedures on the basis of the its
business model and the estimated risk of the company being abused to launder money or finance
terrorism.
A risk based approach requires that the casino has a good understanding of the existing risks and is
capable of executing reasonable judgment. This requires accumulating expertise through e.g.
education, guidance, professional counselling and “learning by doing”.
The casino is obligated to report to the State Prosecutor for Economic and International Crime
(SEIC) on for example customers who have financial funds whose origin cannot be directly
explained, even though the transaction itself will not immediately contribute to money laundering.
1.2 Laws, regulations and guideline The guideline describes the regulations of the:
Act on Gambling no. 848 of July 1 2010
Executive order on online casino – order no. 67 of January 25 2012
1 A licence with a maximum duration of 1 year where the gross gambling revenue does not exceed DKK 1 million.
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Directive 2005/60/EF of the European Parliament and of the Council of October 26 2005
on the prevention of the use of the financial system for the purpose of money laundering
and terrorist financing
Executive order no. 1347 of the Danish Financial Supervisory Authority of December 3
2013 on countries and territories where there is deemed to be a certain risk of money
laundering or terrorist financing (the FATF-list).
The Danish Gambling Authority has prepared legal guidelines on the gambling act and its executive
orders, which gives an overview over the use of the different legal acts in the area of gambling. The
legal guidelines can be found on spillemyndigheden.dk Legislation. Moreover, guidelines on the
registration of players etc. can be found in the Danish Gambling Authority’s “Guideline on betting
and online casino”.
Further guidance concerning money laundering and terrorist financing can be found in the typology
reports that are continuously being prepared and published by FATF2. The reports from FATF
include risk studies of particular areas, businesses, products etc. using the so-called suspicion
indicators. These reports can be found on FATF’s homepage.
Risk-Based Approach Guidance for casinos on how online and land-based casino providers can use
the risk based approach to make an assessment of players, etc. in order to prevent and stop money
laundering and terrorist financing.
Vulnerabilities of Casinos and Gaming Sector identifies the land-based casino providers’ vulnerable
areas where a particular risk of money laundering and terrorist financing is present.
In the section below you will find a list of general examples of how the casino sector can be abused
by criminals. In the FATF-report on the casino sector there are more examples of and more
information about the risk factors of the business.
The use of chips as payment in illegal transactions
Criminals may wish to exchange money into chips which they can afterwards use as payments in
illegal transactions. The chips can contribute to strengthening the alibi of the criminal as they
indicate that the funds originate from casino visits and not from a criminal action.
Purchase of chips
By having credit-card receipts showing that a large amount of money has been spent on a casino,
the criminal can try to hide criminal earnings by making them appear as casino prizes e.g. by
buying chips, but not using them for gambling. Similarly, criminals can be interested in buying
chips from other players in order to have funds appear as prizes.
2 Financial Action Task Force (FATF) is an independent international organization which develops and promotes ways
to protect the global financial system against money laundering and terrorist financing. The FATF-recommendations are
recognized as the global standard for combatting money laundering and combatting terrorist financing.
Recommendations from FATF are built upon a risk based approach to the fight against money laundering and terrorist
financing.
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Transfer of funds to other accounts
The criminal can hide the origin of funds by placing the funds on a gambling account through one
type of payment and afterwards have the amount paid out through another type of payment. This is
especially evident when payments are carried out with prepaid cards.
Platform games
When playing in networks criminals can be interested in losing on purpose to other players in order
to make funds appear as prizes.
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2 Risk assessment of the casino company
It is the responsibility of the casino company’s top management to secure that the company
complies with the money laundering regulations. The management should secure that their
involvement in subjects concerning money laundering and terrorist financing is visible to the board
and all employees and business partners. Management has a personal responsibility to secure that
sufficient control measures and working procedures are in place in the casino.
The casino company must appoint a person from management who must secure that the company
complies with the regulations. Online casinos must have the person responsible approved by the
Danish Gambling Authority. If a new person is appointed, the Danish Gambling Authority must
approve the person in question. If changes are made, use form 29.098 – Changes of the licence to
provide betting and online casino - which you can find on the Danish Gambling Authority’s
homepage www.spillemyndigheden.dk Forms.
2.1 Risk management and the use of a risk based approach The regulations stipulate that a casino must have sufficient internal rules about controls, risk
assessment and communication, also called risk management.
The casino’s risk management in relation to money laundering should be based on the casino’s
business model and the possible risks of the casino being abused for money laundering or terrorist
financing purposes.
The casino should start from “above” by making a qualified analysis of the extent to which its
business model and business activities carry the risk of the casino being exploited in the form of
money laundering or terrorist financing.
The risk assessment should be based on an analysis of e.g.
The company’s customer types.
Products.
Deliverance systems i.e. the way that the company makes its products available to
customers (by physical appearances, the Internet, etc.).
Business and transactional scope.
Geographical risks.
Based on the overall risk assessment the casino must determine a risk management policy that is
approved by the management. Risk assessment and risk management policy should be written down
and reviewed regularly.
Risk management is used to assess whether a transaction might have or has had a connection to
money laundering or terrorist financing after which the licence holder examines the transaction
more closely.
Based on the risk management the casino must adopt different working procedures that are
customized to reduce the risk of money laundering and terrorist financing. The strategies that are
established to handle money laundering and terrorist financing in the casino should be designed in a
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manner that makes it possible to identify or prevent illegal activities. This can be done through a
combination of deterrent measures such as:
Evaluation of customer and transactional risks.
Handling the customer’s account.
Appropriate identification measures for players.
Storing of the registrations that can be useful in criminal investigations.
Disclosures, e.g. surveillance and reporting of suspicious activities and transactions.
2.1.1 Risk factors for online casino
A different range of factors can influence the risk level of the casino. Some of or all of the risk
factors mentioned below can influence the extent of risk in the casino and influence the preventive
measures that are necessary to effectively, but proportionately, manage these risks.
Examples of risk factors could be:
The possibility of temporary player accounts.
The type of players – regardless of whether they are regular players, including VIP-players
or occasional players.
The provision of multilayer games, where you play against other players.
Types of payment methods that are accepted by players, including receiving prepaid cards.
Types of games being offered to players, e.g. card games and roulette.
Type and efficiency of the existing monitoring mechanisms (electronic and/or physical).
If the business model of the casino concerns one of the following options or them both:
- Attracts a large amount of players who play for relatively small amounts, or
- Attracts a smaller amount of players who play for relatively large amounts.
More examples are to be found in the FATF’s typology reports.
In the section below some of the risk factors will be described.
Temporary accounts
Until the costumer’s identify is verified, the person in question is a high-risk customer as the casino
has not yet obtained the necessary information about the customer. Down payments from one
temporary account to another account different from the one which the money was put into,
constitute a risk.
The same is present if the customer has established a temporary account several times.
The use of temporary accounts hereby constitutes a risk factor that must be included in the risk
assessment.
Player categories where activities may indicate an increased risk Different player types that may present an increased risk are listed below.
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Players who are politically exposed persons
See section 4.2.1.
Players who spend large amounts (big players)
Big players are a risk factor since it can be difficult for the casino to estimate the origin of their
funds.
The definition of a big player can vary according to the casino in question. Generally, players can
be regarded as big players on the basis of their total gambling consumption in a given period of
time. Accordingly, every day players who play for a relatively large amount at limited occasions
can be regarded as big players. Big players can also be players who on a single visit spend a very
large amount of money.
The casino must have guidelines regarding big players and have individual assessments of what
constitutes a big player. These guidelines can cover commercial risks or marketing in order to
identify big players. The casino must ensure that the guidelines concerning money laundering and
terrorist financing are used consistently according to all big players.
A casino must have an understanding of the origin of the big players’ income or fortune. The casino
must prepare guidelines on how the casino can obtain knowledge of the players’ financial resources.
These guidelines should be based on a risk based decision made by the casino. Information on
income and fortune can give certain insights into the likely level of available assets at the players’
disposal.
The casino should also be aware of players who engage in big gambling when this does not
correspond with the player’s gambling profile. The casino should also be aware of the sources of
the player’s assets and/or income or the player’s occupation. If and when this information is
obtained, the information can contribute to the assessment of whether a customer’s level of
gambling is reasonable compared to the assets or income level. For example, it might be sensible to
examine a big player with relatively modest assets or income.
Occasional players
Occasional players, including tourists, can present an increased risk of money laundering or terrorist
financing as it can be difficult to determine whether their transactions deviate from their normal
behaviour.
Included in this category are also regular players who might pose a risk if their gambling
consumption changes, e.g. if their consumption increases dramatically or if their gambling pattern
does not match their player profile.
Methods of payment Prepaid cards
The same risks exist when it comes to receiving prepaid cards and receiving cash as casinos do not
have the possibility to exercise the same control when it comes to prepaid cards compared to regular
bank accounts. If prepaid cards are received, it must be included in the risk assessment. Customers
who often use prepaid cars should therefore be categorised as high-risk customers.
Electronic wallets (e-wallets)
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E-wallets that only accept money from bank accounts in the name of the customer would normally
not pose any greater or lesser risk in relation to money laundering or terrorist financing compared to
situations when the funds are received directly from a bank.
Network games Online poker games often take place through different platforms. These platforms can be vital when
monitoring whether patterns and values of a game might indicate potential money laundering
activities e.g. chip dumping. The casino and the platform must have clear rules with regards to their
respective roles, notifications, inquiries and consequent actions concerning money laundering and
terrorist financing.
In games where players play against each other there is an increased risk of funds being transferred
between players, which can lead to the origins of the funds being blurred. These games might
therefore constitute an increased risk.
IT-systems
Online casinos are dependent on IT-systems. These IT-systems should be adjusted in order to
secure accurate supervision of accounts and players and secure that the necessary information is
registered and stored. A risk based approach can however not be entirely dependent upon IT-
systems thus there is also a need for human supervision and staff equalling the risk level in the
casino.
2.1.2 Risk factors for land-based casino
A different range of factors influence the risk level of the casino. Some of or all of the risk factors
mentioned below can influence the extent of risk in the casino and influence the preventive
measures that are necessary to effectively, but proportionately, manage these risks.
Examples of risk factors could be:
• Players residing abroad, including especially players from countries which are not in the
EU/EEA or not included on the FATF-list.
• Payment methods, including cash.
• The player’s total number of transactions and/or transaction sizes which are large when
compared to the casino’s resources, which makes surveillance difficult.
• Players who are reluctant to give out information.
• Occasional players, including tourists.
• The size of the casino rooms.
• The location of the casino.
• VIP-rooms and other facilities reserved for big players.
• If the casino’s business model concerns one of the following possibilities or both:
- Attracts a great number of players who play for relatively small amounts, or
- Attracts a smaller number of players who play for relatively large amounts.
• Types of payment methods accepted by the players.
• Types of games offered to the players e.g. card games and roulette.
• The employees’ level of experience.
• Types and effectiveness of the existing surveillance mechanisms (electronic and/or
physical).
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More examples can be found in the FATF typology reports.
In the section below some of these risk factors will be described.
Player categories where activities may indicate an increased risk
Different player types that might present an increased risk are listed below.
Players who spend large amounts (big players)
Big players are a risk factor since it can be difficult for the casino to estimate the origin of their
funds.
The definition of a big player can vary according to the casino in question. Generally, players can
be regarded as big players on the basis of their total gambling consumption in a given period of
time. Accordingly, every day players who play for a relatively large amount at limited occasions
can also be regarded as big players. Big players can also be players who on a single visit spend a
very large amount of money.
The casino must have guidelines regarding big players and have individual assessments of what
constitutes a big player. These guidelines can cover commercial risks or marketing in order to
identify big players. The casino must ensure that the guidelines concerning money laundering and
terrorist financing are used consistently according to all big players, regardless of whether it is big
players who e.g. have a VIP room or similar.
A casino must have an understanding of the origin of the big players’ income or fortune. The casino
must prepare guidelines on how the casino can obtain knowledge of the players’ financial resources.
These guidelines should be based on a risk-based decision made by the casino. Information on
income and fortune can give certain insights into the likely level of available assets at the players’
disposal.
The casino should also be aware of players who engage in big gambling when this does not
correspond with the player’s gambling profile. The casino should also be aware of the sources of
the player’s assets and/or income or the player’s occupation. If and when this information is
obtained, the information can contribute to the assessment of whether a customer’s level of gaming
is reasonable compared to the assets or income level. For example, it might be sensible to examine a
big player with relatively modest assets or income.
Occasional players
Occasional players, including tourists, can present an increased risk of money laundering or terrorist
financing as it can be difficult to determine whether their transactions deviate from their normal
behaviour.
Included in this category are also regular players who might pose a risk if their gambling
consumption changes, e.g. if their consumption increases dramatically or if their gambling pattern
does not match their gambling profile.
Misuse of a third party Criminals might use a third party, including anonymous persons or agents, in order to avoid
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identification at the entrance. A third party can also be used in games, e.g. to break up large cash
amounts. It might also be the case that a third party is used to buy chips or to play on behalf of
others or for cash pay-outs/ redemptions of chips for a larger cash amount, casino checks etc.
Casinos must therefore have procedures in place that enable employees etc. to be aware of whether
a player only acts on his own behalf and of whether an organised exchange of chips, money etc.
between casino customers is taking place.
Loan sharks
The casino might have a problem with loan sharks, which occasionally includes threats of violence.
Loan sharks lend money to individuals at rates that are above the legal maximum lending rate, and
they might be financed or supported by organised criminal networks. A loan shark often approaches
people who are having financial difficulties or for some reason do not wish to lend money by legal
means.
Cash
At a land-based casino players can exchange large sums of illegal profit into large bills that are
easier to hide or transport. Certain cash deposits from a customer, namely cash deposits, which are
seen to be relatively large in comparison to either 1) a specific casino’s average deposit, or 2) what
is known of the customer’s financial situation, can also provide a risk factor.
Cooperation with others If the casino has for example commercial events, the casino must make sure that business partners,
and the employees of the business partners, are honest and reliable. This would also be an
advantage in relation to the prevention of money laundering or terrorist financing.
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3 Internal rules The casino must prepare adequate written internal rules within the area of money laundering. The
internal rules should be based on the casino’s own settings i.e. a risk assessment of the business
model and game types etc. The internal rules must also contain a description of what is understood
by money laundering and terrorist financing and how one could imagine it taking place within the
casino company in question. In addition, the internal rules must include a description of the
requirements that are in force in relation to the Executive order on online casino and the Executive
order on land-based casinos.
The internal rules can consist of a collection of documents which together form the internal rules. It
is not a requirement that there must be a comprehensive document even though this would be
recommendable.
It is not sufficient to just incorporate a copy of the money laundering directive, acts or already
existing guidelines or suggestions to guidelines which alone do not give the employee sufficient
information on how the rules must be administrated in the casino.
The Danish Money Laundering Secretariat under the State Prosecutor for Serious Economic and
International Crime (SEIC) has worked out an overview of possible indicators in concrete customer
relationships that might give rise to deliberations concerning money laundering or terrorist
financing. These deliberations might result in a notification of the State Prosecutor for Serious
Economic and International Crime (SEIC) if they lead to a suspicion that cannot be denied upon
closer examination. The internal rules of the casino could be based on a list of these indicators, to
the extent that they are relevant, and on other indicators of relevance to the casino.
The updated written rules of the casino must be accessible to the employees.
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4 Know your customer – online casino
4.1 Registration of costumers In order to participate in online casino a player must be registered as a customer. In relation to the
registration, the player must state the following information:
Name
Address
Social Security Number
This information is also referred to as identification information. By this is understood actual
information about a person.
The customer himself must always provide the information. It cannot be completed automatically
when the customer e.g. types a Social Security Number.
If the customer does not have a Social Security Number, similar ID-information must be obtained.
This could be the personal registration number used by public authorities in the country in question,
or, if such a number is not used, information on date of birth combined with place of birth.
By customers without Social Security Number is meant customers who actually do not have a
Social Security Number. Customers without Social Security Numbers are e.g. tourists staying in
Denmark. If the customer does not wish to disclose the Social Security Number or similar
information, the person cannot be established as a player.
The registration of the customer is dependent on the customer acting only on his own behalf.
When the customer has given the required identity information, a temporary account can be set-up
as described in the Executive order on online casino § 6.
Information about the intended extent of gambling
At the time of the registration the licence holder must gather information on the intended extent of
gambling of the player. The information must be gathered from the player himself. The casino can
therefore not on its own estimate the expected gambling extent by looking at the player profile. The
casino can, however, give the player options of choice in the form of e.g. predefined categories. The
player must always specify the extent of gambling.
The information must be used in order to monitor the customer relationship, see below.
4.2 Verification of the customer’s identity It is a basic demand that the casino has knowledge of its customers. The casino must therefore be
convinced that the customer is who he claims to be. There cannot be circumstances that raise doubt
as to whether the customer is who he claims to be.
The minimum standards for securing an identity are verification of name, address and Social
Security Number. All three must be controlled, see below.
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Documentation of the player’s identity
The information given by the customer must be controlled. The player’s name, address and Social
Security Number must therefore be verified by a reliable and independent source, e.g. the Social
Security register. All three pieces of information must be verified. Thus, it is not sufficient that the
Social Security Number and name are verified. All three pieces of information need not be verified
by the same source.
If a customer has a secret address, the address must still be verified.
For customers without Social Security Number the name and address must also be verified, and
documentation that substitutes the Social Security Number must be gathered. When verifying, the
casino must be aware of the fact that e.g. a passport and driver’s licence does not contain the home
address. A copy of these documents will therefore not be sufficient.
Supplementary documentation
There are requirements of further supplementary documentation of the customer’s identity as this is
an online relationship, i.e. buyer and seller do not meet physically.
Supplementary documentation could be:
Use of verification information from a digital signature.
Submission of photo-ID.
A requirement that the first payment is conducted through a money transfer from the
customer’s account in a financial institution where the customer has identified himself.
The customer is contacted by phone as the telephone number must be verified by a reliable
reference.
A contract or similar is sent to the customer requesting that he signs and returns it.
Photo-ID must originate from a reliable and independent source and will therefore typically be
issued by the public authorities. Information on the photo-ID must be current.
The requirement of a digital signature when logging in does not apply to customers without a Social
Security Number. When establishing a customer without a Social Security number, the customer’s
identity must always be secured in another way.
Additional requirements by increased risk of money laundering and terrorist financing
The casino is obligated to incorporate stricter procedures when an increased risk of money
laundering and terrorist financing is estimated to exist. In every customer relationship the casino
must prove to the Danish Gambling Authority that the extent of the examinations has been
sufficient. The extent of the identification procedure must therefore be determined on the basis of a
risk assessment in each individual case.
Rejecting the creation of a gambling account
A gambling account cannot be created if it has been revealed that the customer has given false
information3. The information can be corrected if the casino estimates that the customer has not
intentionally given false information, e.g. the customer has not stated whether he lives in the right
or left side of a building.
3 A customer giving false information can be deemed a suspicious activity that must be notified if the suspicion cannot
be denied.
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Setting up player accounts
When the customer’s identity has been sufficiently verified, the customer’s account changes status
from being a temporary account into being a final player account.
Additional guidance
The registration and verification of customers is also described in the Danish Gambling Authority’s
guidelines on betting and online casino chapter 8.2.4.
4.2.1 Politically exposed persons residing in another country4
In connection to the registration of politically exposed persons (peps) there exists an increased risk
of money laundering that is connected to corruption etc.
For customers who fall under the definition of “politically exposed persons” and who are resident in
another country, certain rules apply including the following:
Requirements of particular procedures.
Requirements of information on capital and income sources.
Requirements of enhanced supervision.
What is a politically exposed person?
Politically exposed persons are defined according to the Act on Money Laundering and its
belonging executive orders. This guideline is therefore in accordance with the Danish Financial
Supervisory Authority’s guideline on the Act on preventive measures against money laundering of
profits and terrorist financing.
Definition of a politically exposed person
• Persons who hold or have held a high-ranking public office, their immediate family
members or people known as their close collaborators.
The Danish Financial Supervisory Authority has defined the following examples of politically
exposed persons:
By politically exposed persons, who hold or have held a high-ranking public office, is understood:
Heads of state, heads of government, ministers or vice ministers or deputy ministers
Members of Parliament
Supreme Courts judges, members of the constitutional courts and other high-ranking courts
whose decisions are only subject to further review under extraordinary circumstances
Members of Courts of Auditors and central bank board members
Ambassadors, chargés d’affaires and high-ranking officers in the armed forces
Members of publicly owned companies’ administration, management and controlling
organs.
4 Please notice that one cannot provide gambling outside of Denmark with the same licence that allows one to provide
gambling in Denmark. This section is therefore only relevant when registering people who are temporarily residing in
Denmark.
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If the person has not held a high-ranking office within at least a year, the person will no longer be
regarded as a politically exposed person. The examples do not include officials on a medium level
or lower.
By immediate family members is understood:
Spouses.
Registered partners.
Children.
Parents.
By close collaborators is understood:
People who have ownership over legal entities and legal arrangements or who in some way
have close business connections to one of the above-mentioned persons.
People who have ownership over a legal entity or a legal arrangement that is established to
the advantage of one of the above-mentioned persons.
Requirements of particular procedures
If the customer is residing abroad, the customer must state the following when registering:
Current position.
Whether the customer holds or has held a high-ranking public office or whether the
customer is related to or has a close collaboration with someone who holds or has held a
high-ranking public office.
In relation to politically exposed persons the casino must:
1) have adequate procedures to be able to determine whether a politically exposed person is residing
in another country, and
2) obtain the approval of the daily management when establishing business connections with these
types of customers. By daily management is meant the casino’s management or the head of the
casino company.
If the casino has many customers residing abroad, it might be relevant to subscribe to services from
international information providers that are specialised in preparing and updating lists over
politically exposed persons.
It might also be relevant that the licence holder routinely searches the customer’s name on the
Internet through a search engine in order to retrieve information about the person.
Other information in the casino’s possession can also contribute to determine if further
examinations must be made into whether the customer is a politically exposed person.
The number of customers residing abroad and the character of the countries in which the customers
are residing can increase the likelihood of a situation where customers who are politically exposed
persons are not on the private provider’s lists. From a risk based approach this could lead to the
casino having to cooperate with locals on the spot e.g. lawyers, bank connections etc. in order to
clarify whether the person is a politically exposed person in the country in question.
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Requirements of information on capital and income sources
The casino must install reasonable measures in order to obtain information on politically exposed
persons’ capital and income sources that are covered by the gambling activity. This means that the
customer will be asked to present the required information. This information must hereafter be
assessed on the basis of circumstances, including the customer’s transactions.
Enhanced surveillance
The casino must continuously be aware of the business connection with a politically exposed
person. Enhanced surveillance of the customer connection must be established.
4.3 Storage of identity information etc. The casino must store identity information for at least 5 years after the customer relationship has
ceased. See also section 10 on storing of documents and registrations.
By ”identity information” is meant actual information about a person.
The requirement of storing identity information includes that the casino stores information about
which identification documents are being used. This must be seen in relation to the general premise
that the casino must be able to document to the Danish Gambling Authority that the identification
procedure has been adequate regarding the risk of money laundering and terrorist financing.
If the player has shown his passport, the passport number must be noted and stored. When showing
a foreign passport, information on birth data (date and place of birth) must be noted and stored if the
player does not have a Social Security Number. If a driver’s license has been shown, the driver’s
license number must be noted and stored.
Storage after casino activity has ceased
If the casino ceases to exist, the latest functioning management must make sure that identity
information continues to be stored in accordance with § 5, section 3 of the Executive order on
online casino.
4.4 Updating of information while the customer relationship is ongoing Documents, data and other information regarding the customer must be updated continuously.
The casino must always require that a player identifies himself if suspicion exists as to whether a
transaction is connected to money laundering or terrorist financing.
The casino must always require new identification if there is doubt as to whether previous
information obtained about the player’s identity is correct or adequate.
If the extent of a player’s gambling activity changes substantially, the player must renew the
information about the extent of his gambling5.
5 When changes occur in the extent of gambling compared to the stated information this can cause the changes to be
viewed as extraordinary transactions.
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5 Know your customer – land-based casino
5.1 Registration of players A casino must register the following information about every incoming guest:
- Name
- Address
- Date of birth
- Nationality
- Time of arrival
The casino must at the same time carry out video registration of the guest.
The address must be the player’s permanent address (residence). A PO Box does not fulfil the
requirement. In case the player is homeless, it can be accepted that the guest is registered even
though address information is not available. The player can instead obtain information from the
public authorities confirming that the player is homeless. Alternatively, a person from the public
authorities can accompany the homeless and confirm the identity of the homeless. If address
information is not obtained, the licence holder must be able to explain to the Danish Gambling
Authority why it is not necessary. Similar solutions must be found in other cases of impossibility.
Storage duty
The licence holder must store the registered information for 5 years from the time of the customer’s
visit after which the information must be deleted. See section 10 on storing of documents and
registrations.
Video tapings must be stored for 2 months after the customer’s visit after which the recording must
be deleted.
Storage after casino activity has ceased
If the casino ceases to exist, the latest functioning management must make sure that the identity
information etc. continues to be stored for 5 years.
5.2 Identification of the player When registering, the visitor must show identification that confirms the registered information.
By “identification” is understood documentation proving that the identity information is correct.
This can be e.g. a pass port or a driver’s licence.
That a customer identifies him-self means that the customer gives the required identity information
and shows identification.
The casino must be certain that the player is who he claims to be. There must not be circumstances
that cause doubt as to whether the player is the person presented in the identification documents.
The casino should deny the visitor entrance if there is false or insufficient identification.
The casino must in every customer relationship be able to document to the Danish Gambling
Authority that the extent of the examination (the identification procedure) has been sufficient
compared to the risk of money laundering and terrorist financing.
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The casino must on the basis of a risk based approach pose further requirements regarding
identification of the player in situations that in themselves carry an increased risk of money
laundering or terrorist financing.
5.3 Identification after arrival The casino must always require that a player identifies himself if there is suspicion of a transaction
having connections to money laundering or terrorist financing.
The casino must also require new identification material if there is doubt as to whether the already
obtained information on the player’s identity is correct or sufficient.
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6 Awareness duty The overall aim with the awareness duty is to detect possible activities related to money laundering
and terrorism. The awareness duty, which is assumed on the basis of objective requirements,
supplements the on-going monitoring performed on the basis of the casino’s knowledge of the
player. When a player’s activity, due to its particular character, might be related to money
laundering and terrorist financing, the casino’s knowledge of the player can be important in relation
to whether a suspicion arises in the actual case.
The awareness duty is a behavioural norm that the casino and its employees must assume in their
daily work with players and player transactions, regardless of whether an actual suspicion exists or
not.
As a rule of thumb, if it looks suspicious based on existing information and reasonable judgment
then there is a need to examine the matter more closely.
Situations that could objectively indicate money laundering or terrorist financing demand that the
casino company either actually concludes that it is not the case or notifies the State Prosecutor for
Serious Economic and International Crime (SEIC).
A suspicion will normally arise on the basis of an evaluation of the character of the player activities
and any differences compared to normal player activities, concealments and other atypical player
circumstances that altogether bring awareness to an eventual attempt of veiling a profit or a terrorist
financing purpose.
The awareness duty applies regardless whether an actual suspicion of money laundering or terrorist
financing exist.
The duty applies to all types of players, which is why an actual assessment must always be made.
The Money Laundering Secretariat’s ”Indications of eventual money laundering of profit or terrorist
financing” provides information that can help to identify the elements that can be included in the
awareness duty.
6.1 Awareness duty for online casino According to the Executive order on online casino § 29, the casino company is bound by a general
awareness duty.
Management and employees must according to the rules be aware of player activities that, due to
their character, might be related to money laundering or terrorist financing. This especially applies
to cases of:
complex transactions.
unusually large transactions.
all transaction that are extraordinary compared to the player.
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Transactions that are related to countries or territories where there, according to a FATF
declaration, exists a particular risk of money laundering or terrorist financing (the FATF-
list).
6.1.1 Large transactions
A transaction consists of both insertions on a player account, deposits on games, transmissions
between the player’s own accounts and down payments.
The casino itself assesses, according to a risk based approach, if a transaction is deemed large. The
casino’s general knowledge of the Danish players, their consumption etc. can be used as an
assessment element. FATF has set the amount limits at USD/EUR 3,000, but since the limits are
not implemented in the Act on Gambling, each casino must set a limit on its own. The limit should
be set according to an assessment of what constitutes normal transaction sizes on the account in
question. The limits can therefore vary according to different game types.
Moreover, the limit should also be set based on a risk assessment of how vulnerable the casino is
with regards to money laundering and terrorist financing.
The procedures of the casino concerning large transactions should include:
• Identification of and control with every customer
• Gathering of appropriate additional information to understand the customer’s situation and
business.
Requirements of the gaming system
According to the Danish Gambling Authority’s technical standards, the casino’s gaming system
must give notice or establish a report if a player makes a payment or transaction of for example
DKK 20,000 or more (or the equivalent amount in another currency or currencies).
The gaming system must also be able to analyse suspicious transactions and from that establish
reports to be used in the prevention of money laundering and terrorist financing.
Afterwards the reports must be checked in order to examine whether the transactions are suspicious
and whether the suspicion cannot be denied.
It does not follow from the limit of DKK 20,000 in the technical standards that the individual
casino, based on an assessment of the risk elements, cannot or should not have a lower limit.
Several transactions that sum up to a large transaction
The limit for transactions must be set per customer. This means that if a customer during a
day/period altogether exceeds the limit set by the casino, these transactions must be examined.
An online casino with several websites should use amount limits per customer and not per website.
6.1.2 Unusual and complex transactions
Unusual transactions can be an unusual degree of movement on the player’s account or that an
unusually large amount, compared to the player’s regular use of the accounts, is deposited.
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Other examples might be:
Changing the player-account
Players often use their private bank accounts when they play online. The players can have different
bank accounts, and they can wish to change which of these account they will use in the casino.
The casino should, when changing the bank accounts, consider updating the costumer ID.
Identity theft
Information on bank accounts can be stolen and unrightfully used on websites. Identity theft can
also be used in relation to opening bank accounts which are subsequently used on websites. It is
useful for the casino to go through IP-numbers in order to prevent that criminal people on the same
computer open several bank accounts based on stolen identities. The casino will be able to see these
risks in the data history (charge back system).
The player’s behaviour
Suspicious behaviour can for example be in the form of players who:
• often play against each other,
• use different payment methods,
• do not wish their prizes to be put on the same card used for deposits,
• carry out huge transactions within a short period of time,
• deposit funds without playing, or
• often use prepaid cards.
Inquiries
Suspicious inquiries from players can concern e.g. questions regarding:
• down payment of funds to other accounts, especially accounts in countries that appear on the
FATF list.
• down payment to accounts belonging to others.
6.1.3 The FATF-list
Awareness duty (and examination duty cf. chapter 8) in relation to other countries and territories
mentioned on the FATF-list means that the casino must be aware of transactions that are connected
to these countries. Regarding countries and territories mentioned on the FATF-list, there is seen to
be a particular risk of money laundering and terrorist financing.
6.2 Awareness duty for land-based casinos According to the Executive order on land-based casinos § 33, the casino management, security
personnel and other employees must be aware of the transactions and exchanges which can be
related to money laundering and terrorist financing.
The awareness duty includes complex or unusually large transactions and all unusual transaction
patterns.
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A suspicion will normally arise on the basis of an evaluation of the character of the player activities
and the differences that exist compared to normal player activities, concealment and other atypical
player circumstances that altogether bring awareness to a possible attempt of veiling a profit or a
terrorist financing purpose.
Examples of transactions that might be connected to money laundering or terrorist financing are:
Large transactions
On the basis of a risk based approach the casino itself assesses whether a transaction is deemed
large. The casino’s general knowledge of the Danish players, their consumption etc. can be used as
an assessment element.
FATF has set the amount limits at USD/EUR 3,000, but since the limits are not implemented in the
Act on gambling, each casino must set a limit on its own. The limit should also be set based on a
risk-assessment of how vulnerable the casino is with regards to money laundering and terrorist
financing.
The procedures of the casino concerning large transactions should include:
• Identification of and control with every customer
• Gathering of appropriate additional information to understand the customer’s situation and
business.
The player’s behaviour
Suspicious behaviour can for example be in the form of players who:
• place huge amounts in gaming machines, but play for small amounts or not at all,
• have no intention of playing
• safeguard by e.g. playing on both black and white on the roulette,
• often play against each other,
• have a lot of cash
• buy chips without playing
• use different payment methods,
• carry out huge transactions within a short period of time, or
• cash in prizes that do not correspond with the actual prizes.
Video surveillance
In every casino an apparatus must be installed which makes it possible to video monitor all the
transactions of the change box and of all transactions made in relation to games played at tables.
Casinos that have surveillance departments use videotaping media or similar to maintain
registrations of the players’ activities. These surveillance departments should also include
surveillance of potential suspicious transaction reports. For example, the casino can use its
surveillance system for the supervision of players who execute transactions that are unusual or
suspicious.
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7 Monitoring of players For the casino to be able to estimate whether the transactions or activities are suspicious, the players
must be monitored.
Obtain knowledge of players
By monitoring the casino must obtain knowledge of the individual player and the extent of
gambling, including, if necessary, the origin of the player’s funds.
The monitoring of players and their games are crucial in order to secure an effective use of
guidelines, procedures, internal controls and automatic procedures for the fight against money
laundering and terrorist financing.
All monitoring must be in accordance with the Act on Processing of Personal Data.
Usage of the obtained knowledge
On the basis of the customer knowledge the casino has obtained, the customer relationship and the
player’s transactions must continuously be monitored in order for the casino to keep track of
whether the player acts unusually.
Based on the casino’s own criteria the casino should estimate whether a player constitutes a risk and
estimate the risk factors connected to the individual player.
7.1 Particularly for online casino An online casino has good possibilities to monitor players and obtain knowledge of the player’s
normal behavioural patterns.
Information about the player’s intended extent of gambling
Information about the extent of gambling, stated by the player, must be included in the casino’s on-
going supervision of whether there is a customer relationship or transaction where there is a risk of
money laundering or terrorist financing, including whether the transactions are unusual compared to
the casino’s information about the player.
Changes in the extent of gambling might be suspicious transactions.
Customers with several player accounts
A licence holder can provide games on several websites, and one single website can offer a range of
different types of games. The licence holder must monitor the players’ actions with regards to the
whole casino activity, that means across websites, games etc.
Players may wish to distinguish between the different types of games offered by the same licence
holder. The reason for the distinction may be that the player wishes to monitor performances within
different gambling areas. The casino should implement procedures and systems that can identify the
opening of several accounts and wallets when there is the suspicion that it is taking place for
dishonest reasons. Dishonest reasons include a player trying to hide expenses or trying to avoid
reaching the transaction limit in the casino.
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7.2 Monitoring on land-based casinos On a land-based casino it is more difficult to monitor a player’s accumulated transactions and
transactional patterns. This places certain demands on the communication between employees etc.
when it comes to obtaining a comprehensive picture of the single player and his movements in the
casino.
For the same reasons the monitoring of land-based casinos should also include:
customer-/staff relationships, especially during busy periods, and
the internal communication in the casino.
The monitoring must moreover be especially focused on whether the employees follow the internal
guidelines.
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8 Examination and noting duty The casino is obligated to examine the purpose of the activities and transactions that are described
under the section “Examination duty”, and the results hereof must be noted and stored in
accordance with § 29, chapter 2 of the Executive order on online casino and § 33 of the Executive
order on land-based casino.
8.1 Examination duty The aim of the examination duty is to determine whether what looks suspicious will become an
actual suspicion of money laundering or terrorist financing that cannot be denied, or whether a
possible suspicion can be denied. An examination should therefore only take place when there is a
suspicion present. This could be e.g. a case where a transaction does not match the customer’s
normal behavioural pattern.
It is not the intension that the casino should engage in a closer assessment of criminal justice, but
the casino must always try to have the suspicion denied by examining the circumstances more
closely. All suspicious transactions should therefore not automatically be reported.
The starting point of the examination of a suspicion would be to compare the information that the
company has about the customer (information about the purpose with the business and the scope
hereof) and that which looks suspicious.
The casino can contact the customer in order to obtain information about the purpose of the
transaction/activity. A player’s statement can however not be taken for granted, and the player’s
information must therefore be verified by an independent source. This can be done through e.g.
searching in various search engines, reference books or by asking the player to document the
information.
The customer’s explanation will in many circumstances not be enough to be able to deny a
suspicion. It might therefore be relevant to ask the customer to document his explanation.
If the casino estimates that an inquiry will give the customer a clue about the casino being
suspicious and in the midst of doing an investigation, or if the casino does not wish to contact the
customer about the case, the casino must file a report to SEIC if the suspicion cannot be denied in
any other way. For both online and land-based casinos it will often be difficult to execute the
examination duty, why one should notify SEIC.
The casino’s player knowledge can also contribute to having a suspicion denied, e.g. a suspicion
will often be denied if the player is a known poker player who has just won a large amount of
money in a poker tournament. A suspicion can also be denied by obtaining information about the
player. For example, the player’s employment status might indicate how many assets the player has
at his disposal.
Only very seldom will the person who is responsible for notifying be able to identify the actual type
of crime. The general knowledge about customer behaviour and the actual knowledge about the
given customer is therefore normally an indicator of whether the relationship must be examined
more closely.
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If the suspicion cannot be denied by a closer examination, the casino and management, security
personnel and other employees engaged in the actual casino activity are obligated to notify the State
Prosecutor for Serious Economic and International Crime (SEIC) immediately.
Examination of the origin of funds
By suspicious transactions it can in some cases be necessary that the casino obtains knowledge
about the origin of funds. It can be difficult to find this information as they are not publicly
accessible, and the customer might become aware of the fact that the transaction can be notified to
SEIC. If it is not possible to obtain the information, the transaction should result in SEIC being
notified as the suspicion cannot be denied.
8.2 Noting duty If the transaction is complex or unusually large (compared to the customer), or if the transaction
pattern is unusual (compared to the customer), the casino employee must take note of the incident.
The noting duty includes factual information about the player and the transaction and a conclusion.
The note must be sufficient in order to refresh one’s memory. The starting point will often be the
player’s own explanation of the purpose of the transaction, possibly compared to statements
gathered from colleagues who are in contact with or have tasks related to the player.
The noting can for example include the following:
a) The purpose of the transaction.
b) Correspondence with the player.
c) Account registrations.
d) Information on identification documents.
e) Signed documents of a contracted nature (account creation etc.).
The storage duty also applies even though the examination concludes that the suspicion is denied,
and the State Prosecutor for Serious Economic and International Crime (SEIC) should not be
notified.
The amount of information that should be noted and stored in the individual case depends on the
complexity of the circumstances. Often, it will be enough to store information about the purpose of
the transaction.
In more complex situations the stored information may contain internal deliberations and
assessments. This could be e.g. information about the transaction being deemed legal and not giving
raise to further examinations, or that the transaction on the current basis is not suspicious, but that
enhanced supervision of the transactions that follow must be made. It could also be noted that the
transaction must be examined further, or that the SEIC must be notified.
Notes taken in relation to examinations of suspicious transactions belong to the casino’s internal
work documents, which the player does not have access to.
Since there can be information that is sensitive according to the Act on Processing of Personal Data,
it is recommended that the noted information is only accessible to relevant employees.
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Documents and registrations concerning transactions must be stored so they can be found
collectively for at least 5 years after the execution of the transaction. See also section 10 on storing
of documentation and registrations.
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9 Notification When one suspects that a player’s transaction or inquiry has or has had a connection to money
laundering or terrorist financing, the casino must firstly examine the transaction or the activity more
closely.
When a suspicion has first been established, the Danish Money Laundering Secretariat must
immediately be notified unless the casino through its examination seems to be able to reach the
conclusion that the suspicion is no longer present. In other words, the suspicion must be denied, not
only weakened.
A piece of information from a customer that is not supported by documentation or by information
that the casino is otherwise in hold of will typically not be suitable in order to remove a suspicion
when it has arisen.
The requirements of a rebuttal do however not include:
that the casino must set up extensive examinations, engage in investigations or the likes, or
that the casino must always gather documentation from a customer when a suspicion
concerning money laundering has arisen.
This means that the casino should notify the Money Laundering Secretariat when it believes that it
cannot come any further with its investigation within reasonable limits.
When in doubt, you must always notify.
There exists a notification duty even though the transaction will not immediately result in the
proceeds being laundered (also when the transaction has been executed). It is important to note that
the money laundering regulations must contribute to the prevention of crime, including terrorism,
by
limiting the possibility for abusing the casino business for money laundering and terrorist
financing purposes, and
easing the police’s crime investigation.
In order to fulfil the requirement the casino must have internal procedures in place that secure that
the needed notifications are made. On the basis of a risk assessment, the casino must focus on those
areas deemed vulnerable to money laundering and terrorist financing. An effective risk assessment
securing examination of all suspicious acts will make the casino able to report to the State
Prosecutor for Serious Economic and International Crime (SEIC).
It is obligatory to notify the State Prosecutor for Serious Economic and International Crimes
(SEIC). It is not a police reporting.
The notifications will be received by a special unit within SEIC called the Money Laundering
Secretariat. The Money Laundering Secretariat is established with the aim of receiving, analysing
and communicating notifications on possible money laundering of proceeds obtained through
criminal activity or financing of terrorism by the companies and people who are covered by the
Money Laundering Act and the Act on Gambling.
The Money Laundering Secretariat communicates the notifications to e.g. the Danish Tax Authority
(SKAT) and the police.
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Documents and registrations concerning transactions must be stored, so they can be found
collectively at least 5 years after the execution of the transactions. See also chapter 10 on storing of
documents and registrations.
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9.1 Notification to the State Prosecutor for Serious Economic and International
Crime Notifications can be sent by e-mail to fiu@politi.dk. The e-mail address can receive encrypted mails
that are sent from a PC with a security certificate.
In order to send encrypted e-mails to the State Prosecutor for Serious Economic and International
Crime (SEIC), it is necessary to download the secretariat’s certificate, which can be done on the
following internet addresses:
– http://www.certifikat.dk
– http://www.rigsadvokaten.dk/?id=215
– http://www.politi.dk/da/kontakt/mailadresser_sikre.htm
In urgent cases notification to SEIC can always be made by telephone (+45) 45 15 47 10.
Formal requirements
There are no particular formal requirements regarding the notification. The notification must
include as much information as possible, making it possible for the authorities (police, the Danish
Tax Authority etc.) to continue the case. This means that involved persons and companies must be
identified by name, address and Social Security Number, if possible. Furthermore, the suspicion
must be described, which will normally mean that relevant transactions and eventual account
conditions must be mentioned and relevant annexes must be attached. Hereby it is possible for the
State Prosecutor for Serious Economic and International Crime (SEIC) to see whether there in the
police register or in other public registers is information of relevance to the case. There must also be
enough information on the actual background of the notification in order for SEIC to be able to
decide on the further process.
A notification can be made in both Danish and English.
Who must notify?
The notification does not need to include the name of the employees involved in the examination,
including the person who became suspicious. If there is an actual need to know this, the information
can be obtained afterwards.
It is not always the employee in contact with the player who notifies the State Prosecutor for
Serious Economic and International Crime (SEIC). This function is often carried out by the money
laundering responsible. According to the casino’s business procedures the employee must typically
report the suspicion to the money laundering responsible who afterwards carries out the necessary
examinations of the suspicion and eventual reporting to the State Prosecutor for Serious Economic
and International Crime (SEIC).
If the money laundering responsible does not take part in the examination of the suspicious
transaction, it would be appropriate that the person in question is notified in every single case since
it is the same person who must control that examinations of suspicious transactions are made, that
the results of these examinations are stored and that the State Prosecutor for Serious Economic and
International Crime (SEIC) is notified if the suspicion cannot be denied based on the examination.
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Confidential information
Passing on player information to the police is not seen as an unjustified transfer of confidential
information. Therefore, information given to the police in good faith will not impose any liability
onto the casino or its employees.
In cases where the purpose of the intervention might be wasted, the police can demand that the
information is handed over immediately and afterwards have their decision tried in court. Therefore,
the obtaining of further information, which due to the rules of confidentiality in other acts cannot be
transferred (e.g. because they contain information on customer relations) or which the casino does
not wish to transfer without a warrant, is done according to the rules of edition or search in the
Danish Administration of Justice Act.
The Danish Gambling Authority’s obligation to notify
The Danish Gambling Authority is obligated to notify the State Prosecutor for Serious Economic
and International Crime (SEIC) if the Danish Gambling Authority becomes aware of circumstances
which can be assumed to have a connection to money laundering or terrorist financing.
9.2 Suspending online casino transactions If one suspect that a player’s transactions or activities have or have had a connection to money
laundering or terrorist financing, an online casino licence holder must set the given transaction on
hold until the State Prosecutor for Serious Economic and International Crime (SEIC) has been
notified. After the notification, the transaction can be completed.
As an exception to the above mentioned, a transaction does not need to be suspended before the
notification of SEIC:
if the completion of the transaction cannot be omitted, or
if the completion of the transaction might hurt the investigation of the case.
The State Prosecutor for Serious Economic and International Crime (SEIC) must in these cases
receive notification immediately after the transaction has been completed.
9.3 Notifying the Danish Gambling Authority Quarterly the casino must send in the following information to the Danish Gambling Authority:
• the number of notifications sent to the State Prosecutor for Serious Economic Crime (SEC),
and
• the number of employees who has received education and instruction programs.
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10 Storing of documents and registrations Casinos should store all information and documents that might be connected to money laundering
or terrorist financing.
It could for example be the following:
a) The purpose of the transaction.
b) Correspondence with the player.
c) Information on the identification documents.
d) Signed documents of a contracted nature (account creation etc.).
The amount of information that should be noted and stored in the individual case depends on the
complexity of the circumstances. Often it will be enough to store information about the purpose of
the transaction.
In more complex situations the stored information might contain internal deliberations and
evaluations. This could be e.g. information about the transaction being deemed legal and not giving
raise to further examinations or that the transaction on the current basis is not suspicious, but that
enhanced supervision of the following transactions must still be made. It might also be noted that
the transaction must be investigated further or that the State Prosecutor for Serious Economic and
International Crime (SEIC) must be notified.
Notes taken in connection to examinations of suspicious transactions belong to the casino’s internal
work documents which the player does not have access to.
It is not always the employee in contact with the player who notifies the State Prosecutor for
Serious Economic and International Crime (SEIC). This function is often carried out by the money
laundering responsible or a responsible employee. According to the casino’s business procedures
the employee must typically report the suspicion to the money laundering responsible who
afterwards carries out the necessary examinations of the suspicion and the eventual reporting to the
State Prosecutor for Serious Economic and International Crime (SEIC).
If the money laundering responsible does not take part in the examination of the suspicious
transaction, it would be appropriate that the person in question is notified in every single case since
it is the same person who must control that examinations of suspicious transactions are made, that
the results of these examinations are stored and that the State Prosecutor for Serious Economic and
International Crime (SEIC) is notified if the suspicion cannot be denied upon the examination.
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11 Internal control The casino must develop and implement a framework for internal controls (e.g. guidelines,
procedures and processes) for all the operational divisions and departments which will be using the
internal controls. The internal controls must include all relevant activities and programs such as e.g.
reporting of suspicious activity, reporting of transactions (where it is required), customer
identification and accounting. Internal controls should also include the establishing of accounts,
documentation procedures and supervision which together must be sufficient in order to discover
and report suspicious activity to the State Prosecutor for Serious Economic Crime (SEC).
The control measures, which must be based on a risk assessment, should be described, and the
individual controls should be documented as a starting point.
The casino’s internal controls must be carried out according to:
complexity, organisation and size of the casino,
the risk attached to the different types of games and financial services that are offered, and
the risk attached to the different customer types.
Controls can include:
• Measures that can manage risk players, their transactions, accounts and secure sufficient
supervision and education of personnel.
• Use of appropriate automatized systems and programs.
• Establishing supervisory measures.
• Regular revision and update of the risk assessment.
The casino should carry out independent internal and/or external controls of procedures concerning
money laundering and terrorist financing that take into account the risks facing the casino. The
casino should act if the casino becomes aware of those weaknesses and flaws in their risk-based
money laundering and terrorist financing programs or parts of it that might result in lacking
fulfilment of requirements, reports and accounting.
Control should be carried out with appropriate frequency. The casino should continuously consider
whether the internal control procedures are satisfactory.
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12 Education and instruction programs The casino must prepare education and instruction programs for its employees. These education and
instruction programs must among other things secure that the employees are informed of the rules
concerning the awareness-, examination -and notification duty in relation to activities which due to
their character can be associated with money laundering or terrorist financing.
The casino must secure that sufficient education and instruction programs for management and
employees are carried out. These programs must be connected to the casino’s written internal rules.
Education and instruction programs must secure that the employees have an adequate knowledge of
the duties that relate to money laundering, including the casino’s procedures for the area, and of the
importance that the requirements have for the individual employee’s work.
The employees must be educated and instructed in accordance with the responsibility that each
casino employee has.
Examples of staff that must be trained is
• the accounting staff,
• the staff in the financial department,
• the staff in the fraud department,
• the staff in the IT department,
• the staff taking care of the big player contact,
• the customer staff,
• the supervisory staff and
• the surveillance staff.
The staff having the responsibility to supervise or approve transactions in connection to gambling
should be included in a more comprehensive training program.
Using a risk based approach in relation to the different methods available for training gives the
casino flexibility when it comes to frequency, implementation mechanisms and education. The
casino should revise its own work force and accessible resources and implement educational
programs that give adequate information on money laundering and terrorist financing, customised
to the employees.
The casino must place demands and secure that employees actually have participated in the program
classes.
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13 Confidentiality The casino, management and employees must conceal when the State Prosecutor for Serious
Economic and International Crime (SEÌC) has been notified. This is also the case when notification
is considered, or when there is or will be conducted an examination of whether money laundering or
terrorist financing exists.
People who are bound by confidentiality
The following people are bound by the demand of confidentiality:
Licence holders
Employees, including management and other employees engaged with the actual casino
activity
Licence holders and their management and employees and accountants and others, who carry out or
have certain occupations, must keep the following confidential:
• possible notifications of the State Prosecutor for Serious Economic and International Crime
(SEIC) concerning suspicion of money laundering or terrorist financing,
• deliberations on notification, as mentioned above, and
• examination of whether money laundering or terrorist financing is actually taking place.
It is however permitted to forward information to the Danish Gambling Authority concerning:
• eventual notifications to the State Prosecutor for Serious Economic and International Crime
(SEIC) concerning suspicions of money laundering or terrorist financing,
• deliberations on notification, as mentioned above, and
• examination of whether money laundering or terrorist financing is actually taking place.
The information can be forwarded in order for the Danish Gambling Authority to use it in relation
to the monitoring of licence holders. The Danish Gambling Authority cannot assess whether one, in
the given case, must notify the State Prosecutor for Serious Economic and International Crime
(SEIC).
Information covered by confidentiality
Confidentiality covers information about
• the notifications being made,
• deliberations on whether to notify, and/or
• the existence or establishment of examinations of whether money laundering or terrorist
financing is taking place.
Confidentiality only covers this type of information. If a licence holder or an employee suspects that
an employee in another casino launders moneys from e.g. embezzlement, the regulations do not
prevent the licence holder from informing the casino of the suspicion. The licence holder will
however not be able to inform the casino that the State Prosecutor for Serious Economic and
International Crime (SEIC) has been notified. In connection to the notification the licence holder
must however observe the confidentiality regulations that apply according to other legislations.
Confidentiality deadline
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Confidentiality is not covered by any deadline and therefore also applies after a person’s connection
to a casino has ceased.
Protection of employees
The licence holder must take appropriate action in order to protect employees who notify or are
involved in the notification of suspicious transactions internally or to the State Prosecutor for
Serious Economic and International Crime (SEIC) in order to protect them from threats or reprisals.
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14 Penalty clauses Intentional or grossly negligent breach of regulations of the Executive order on online casino and
Executive order on land-based casinos can be punished by fines.
Intentional or grossly negligent breach of unjustified transfer of information received from the State
Prosecutor for Serious Economic and International Crime (SEIC) will be punished by fines, unless a
more severe punishment is prescribed by the regulations of the Criminal Code.
If it can be concluded that a licence holder or employees have intentionally contributed to money
laundering, the person in question can be punished for handling according to the Criminal Code §
290. If the person in question has assisted the financing of terrorism, he can be punished according
to the Criminal Code § 114 b, section. 1, nr. 3 on assisting terrorist financing.
It is possible to sentence someone to jail in up to 6 months when particularly gross or extensive
breaches of the regulations of notification duty, identification or storage of identification - or
transaction information have taken place.
In relation to the above-mentioned, see § 60 in Act on Gambling and § 37 in the Executive order on
online casino.
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