terrorism and counter-terrorism pols4985 summer 2011 gregory c. dixon lectures 6 - 10

Terrorism and Counter-terrorism

POLS4985Summer 2011

Gregory C. Dixon

Lectures 6 - 10

WOULD TERRORISTS USE WMD?Low probability, high impact events and thinking the unthinkable

Weapons of Mass Destruction

• Weapons that do not allow discrimination of the target

• Chemical• Biological• Nuclear• Radiological

The WMD Taboo

• WMD have mass effects• WMD target everything in the target area• No ability to distinguish civilian and soldier• Can have lasting impact– Personal (lasting impact on people affected)– Environmental (lasting damage to environment)

Definitions and Characteristics

• It helps to know what these weapons are• It helps to understand how hard they are to

acquire• It helps to understand how hard they are to

use– Transportation– Deployment

Chemical Weapons

• First battlefield use: WWI– Tear gas used by French in 1914– Chlorine gas used by Germans in 1915

• Types– Vesicants• Burn soft tissue

– Nerve agents• Disrupt nervous system

Chemical Weapons Convention

• Chemical weapons are banned under international law– CWC signed 1993, in force 1997

• All major powers developed these weapons– CWC banned possession, development, and use– CWC includes provisions for destruction of

stockpiles

Potential of CW for Terrorism

• CW can cause mass casualties– Significant impact if properly delivered

• CW cause fear• CW are cheap and easy to make– Basic chemistry

• CW are hard to deliver with improvised means– Handling and transport are tricky– Delivery is harder than it sounds

Potential for CW Terrorism

• Aum Shinrikyo– Religious cult– Goal: bring about end of the world– Used CW in terrorist acts• Sarin attack in Matsumoto – 1994 (8 dead 200 injured) • Sarin attack on Tokyo Subway – March 1995 (12 dead

over 1,000 injured)• Hydrogen Cyanide attempt on Tokyo subway (failed) –

May 1995

CW Terrorism Prospects

• Controls improved after Aum attacks– Harder to acquire precursor chemicals– Tracking increases likelihood of detection

• Relatively easy to make• Harder to transport and deploy effectively– May not matter

Biological Weapons

• First battlefield use: unknown– References in classical literature (500BC)– Major powers developed programs, but no

confirmed use• Types:– Toxins– Diseases

Biological Weapons Convention

• Biological weapons are banned under international law– BWC signed 1972, in force 1975

• All major powers developed these weapons– BWC banned development, possession, and use of

offensive BW– Defensive research is permitted

Potential of BW for Terrorism

• BW can cause mass casualties• BW cause fear• BW are a mixed bag– Some, but not all are easy to culture

• BW are hard to deliver with improvised means– Handling and transport are tricky– Effective delivery is hard

Potential for BW Terrorism

• Rhodesian Civil War: – Government used cholera to debilitate supporters

of guerilla movement• Larry Harris: – US militia group purchased bubonic plague

• Rajneesh Puram Cult: – Salmonella attack in Oregon

• Post 9/11 Anthrax attacks

BW Terrorism Prospects

• Controls improved after 9/11 Anthrax attacks• Requires greater skill and facilities than CW• Relatively easy to acquire low lethality

diseases• Hard to transport and deploy• May have value even if attacks fail

Nuclear Weapons

• First battlefield use: WWII– Hiroshima and Nagasaki

• Types:– Fission– Fusion– “salty” bombs

Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty

• New acquisition of NW is banned– NPT signed 1968, in effect 1970

• Possessors were allowed to keep weapons– Promise of long-term disarmament– Recognized need of major powers to have

weapons• Goal was to allow civilian use while controlling

weapons programs

Potential of NW for Terrorism

• NW can cause mass casualties• NW cause fear• NW are difficult to acquire• NW have a special taboo– Works for and against groups

Potential for Nuclear Terrorism

• No known use by terror groups• No known possession by terror groups• Weapons are tightly controlled• Fissile material is tightly controlled• Fissile material is effectively impossible to

improvise

Radiological Weapons

• First battlefield use: none– Japanese had tinkered with it for final battle for

home islands• Use radioactive materials to contaminate an

area– No nuclear reaction– Significant toxic effects

No International Treaties

• Radiological weapons are considered militarily useless

• No major power moved beyond theory• No need to ban what no nation wanted

Potential of RW for Terrorism

• RW cause fear• RW cause mass casualties• RW can render areas uninhabitable• RW are simpler than NW• RW do not require fissile material• RW isotopes are found in less secure locations

Potential for RW Terrorism

• No known use by terror groups• Several attempts have been made to acquire

isotopes– All failed

Radiological Terrorism Prospects

• Improvised weapons are possible, and have high payoff

• Technical skill required is low• Materials are difficult to acquire• Handling and transport is difficult

Would Terrorists Use WMD?

• This is a rational utility question– Does the use of WMD further the cause?

Deterrence

• States use deterrence to prevent WMD use by potential enemies– Raise the cost of using WMD past the point where

it is rational• Deterrence depends on the ability to retaliate– MAD during the Cold War– Deterrence of rogue states today

Are Terrorists Deterrable?

• Some are– Wars of national liberation• Need recognition• Want to eventually claim to be a member of

international society• Place limits on what can be done

– Political groups• Political ends require acceptance in the process

Are Terrorists Deterrable?

• Some are– State sponsored groups• Sponsor can be held accountable

Are Terrorists Deterrable?

• Some are not– Maximalist groups• If you want to completely reorder the world, you may

not care about legitimacy

– Non-state groups• If you cannot retaliate, you cannot deter

Terrorist Use of WMD

• Some groups actively are seeking WMD• Some groups would clearly use them– Al Qaeda

• Other groups have incentive not to acquire or use them

Prospects for Use

• Nuclear weapons are not likely to be used– Very hard to acquire– Significant risks to acquisition and use

• Biological weapons would be hard to use– Requires technical skill to make usable– Hard to acquire high-lethality versions

Prospects for Use

• Radiological weapons would be hard to use– Hard to acquire– Hard to handle before deployment

• Chemical weapons are the easiest– Dangerous to make, transport, and deploy– Low cost– Easiest of the weapons to make and use

Is This Risk Real?

• There is no clear agreement on the likelihood of these attacks

• No one thinks the likelihood is zero

LLHI Events

• Low-likelihood, high impact events– Not likely to happen– But if they do, the consequences are severe

• These require preparation and planning– Must be included in counter-terrorism strategy– WMD terrorism is not likely, but vigilance is part of

what keeps it that way

FROM TERRORISM TO COUNTER-TERRORISM

Know thy self, know thy enemy. A thousand battles, a thousand victories. – Sun Tzu

Know Your Enemy

• Terrorism is a tactic• Groups select terrorism for rational reasons– Terrorists have goals– Terrorists have strategies to achieve them

• The enemy is the group, not the tactic

Counter-Terrorism

• 2 ways to think of counter-terrorism– Destroy or defeat the group– Stop the use of terrorism by the group

• In both cases you must know your enemy

Understanding the Enemy

• Counter-terrorism is largely the purview of states

• States identify which groups are engaged in activities that target them or their interests

• This can range widely from no threat to many threats

Identifying Target Groups

• Internal threats– “Home-grown” terrorism– Domestic cells of international groups

• External threats– Threats to interests abroad– Threats from groups based outside the US

Know Thy Enemy

• Group motivation– Stated motivation– Unstated underlying conditions

• Group Goals– Strategic goals– Tactical goals

Know Thy Enemy

• Group Capabilities– Resource constraints– Political constraints– Operational constraints

Know Thy Enemy

• Contextual factors– International system elements• Colonial history• Regional conflict• Globalization effects

– Local factors• Socio-economic factors• Local politics• Local cultural elements

The Complex Web of Enemies

• A state may have multiple groups targeting it• You must understand the range of threats– How they function on their own– Potential for joint action

Devising Strategies

• A state may need multiple strategies for the same organization

• A state may need multiple strategies for a range of organizations– Some strategies may mutually reinforce– Some may work at cross-purposes

Effective Counter-Terrorism

• Know your enemy– Who are they?– What do they want?

• Know yourself– Who are you?– What tools do you have?– How hard are you willing to fight?

COUNTERTERRORISM STRATEGIESBuilding the toolkit

Counter-Terrorism as Toolkit

• Counter-terrorism is a constellation of policies– Diplomacy– Intelligence– Law Enforcement– Media Relations– Military Force– Incident Response– Global Governance

Hard and Soft Power

• Hard power– Military – Economic

• Soft power– Moral– Ideological– Diplomatic

Terrorism and Hard Power

• Terrorists are weak– You don’t adopt terrorism if you are strong

• States vary widely in hard power• Terrorism is not readily deterred by hard

power– Retaliation is limited– Retaliation may be the goal of the terrorists

Terrorism and Soft Power

• Terrorists may be weak or strong– The goal of the organization may have support– The tactic of terrorism historically undermined

broad soft power– Soft power among the target groups may be

stronger– Terrorists may build soft power if response by

target state is overzealous

Terrorism and Soft Power

• States may be weak or strong– States can have more or less legitimacy in the

global community– States have variable power to persuade– States may increase or decrease soft power based

on response to terrorism– Soft power is hard to measure

Developing a Strategy

• Counter-terror is a rational response to terrorism

• It is calculated based on the assumptions of the state and its leaders– It is a political process– It is formulated through a policy structure– It reflects the structure of the state

Developing a Strategy

• Foreign policy formulation is different in different states– Regime type matters– Governance capacity matters– International position matters– Global integration matters

Cost/Benefit Analysis

• Political leaders weigh the cost/benefit logic– What is the cost of terrorism?• Political• Monetary

– What is the cost of fighting?• Containment• Defeat

Context of Terrorism

• Counter-terrorism is a policy choice• It must be balanced and weighed against

other policies– C/B analysis frames value of policy choices– What do we trade off to fight terrorism?– Can we afford to fight?

Shock Events

• Significant terror attacks impact the C/B logic– Shock event is seen as “new normal”– Shock event spawns series of worst case analyses– The C/B logic changes

• Shock events open a window– Policy can change significantly– Political leaders feel strong pressure to act quickly

Unintended Consequences

• Both terrorists and their adversaries make decisions in uncertainty– They can have it wrong– The results of an action or reaction can lead to

unexpected consequences– One or both sides can miscalculate the outcome of

an act

Context

• Policy is often made in a fluid context• It settles out over time• Policy logic is constantly shifting– Both sides are constantly calculating based on

their own logic

Foundations

• Who are the terrorists?– What are their goals?– What motivates them?– What sort of support to they have• Domestic• International

– How big a threat do they pose?• Actual• Symbolic

How To Fight?

• We assess the threat and determine a response

• Mix of strategies to achieve the goal– Diplomacy– Military power– Law enforcement

International Context

• States develop policy in international context– International Law• A general set of rules

– Inter-Governmental Organizations• International tools for cooperation

Complex Policy Choices

• Leaders must navigate this complex process to design policies– Professional bureaucracy helps– Having resources helps

• Leaders must balance difficult choices– No simple solution– It may be years before you know if it was the right

call

TERRORISM IN INTERNATIONAL LAW

The incomplete legal framework of a war on terror

International Law and Armed Force

• There are extensive and well-established laws regarding the use of force

• Terrorism does not clearly fit these• Adaptations to international law have taken

place– Additions to international law targeted at terrorist

acts

Laws of Armed Conflict

• Military forces are bound by rules of war• States are expected to fight within the rules• Individual soldiers have responsibility

LOAC and States

• UN Charter– Sets rules for the use of force– Emphasis is on system stability• Self-defense• Proportionality• “protection of international peace and security”

– Focus is on nation-state conflict• War in the Clausewitzian sense

LOAC and States

• Regional treaties may include further limits on state action

• Additional Conventions limit state options– CBRN weapons are banned or strictly limited

LOAC and Criminal Law

• Individuals are subject to international criminal law– National leaders– Individual soldiers

• States are responsible for enforcement• If states fail, ICC can pick up the issue– Limited jurisdiction– Limited range of crimes

LOAC: Nutshell Version

• Firm and mandatory distinction between soldiers and non-combatants– Non-combatants must be protected

• Surrendered enemies cannot be killed or injured• Wounded and sick must be cared for• Prisoners of war must be well treated• Torture is explicitly banned• Ban on inflicting “unnecessary suffering”

Fuzzy Application

• LOAC originally applied only to international conflict

• Changes post WWII have changed this– Genocide Convention (1948)– Additional Protocol to Article 3 of Geneva

Conventions (1977)– International Criminal Court (1998)

Terrorism in International Law

• Terrorism blurs the lines of the LOAC– Terrorists seldom respect the rules– Terrorists do not fit the definitions of soldier and

non-combatant– Terrorist acts are not conventional armed conflict– Terrorists may operate as “stateless” persons– Non-state actors are not signatories to

Conventions or treaties

Legal Responses to Terrorism

• International law explicitly makes terrorism a crime– Convention on the Unlawful Seizure of Aircraft

(1970)– Convention on the Suppression of Terrorist

Bombing (1997)– Convention for the Suppression of the Financing of

Terrorism (1999)

Who Enforces the Rules?

• International Criminal Law is enforced by states in most cases– National parties enforce criminal law– Cooperation within international institutions for

arrest and extradition– National courts hear the cases

Terrorism, CAH, and the ICC

• Terrorism is not consider a crime against humanity– Terrorism is not covered by the ICC statutes– The ICC has no jurisdiction– No international court has authority over terrorist

cases

Issues for Counter-Terrorism

• LOAC apply to soldiers on the battlefield– Terrorists are technically civilians taking up arms– This puts them in a grey area• Non-uniformed combatants are one of two things:

– Spies– Mercenaries

• Both can be summarily executed on the battlefield• Neither has the rights of soldiers

Issues for Counter-Terrorism

• Interrogation– Torture is illegal - Convention Against Torture

(1984)• Individual war crime (isolated acts)• Crime against humanity (systemic abuse)• “Discrete crime” (isolated act outside of war)

– The line between “enhanced interrogation” and “torture” is blurry• Specific acts are not listed

Issues for Counter-Terrorism

• Application of the LOAC are not clear in a War on Terror– Individual soldiers are open to future charges– Policy-makers are also open to future charges

• Lines of domestic and international laws blur– National courts must implement most laws– Venues can be unclear

An Incomplete Framework

• The international and domestic legal frameworks are incomplete

• Lines of jurisdiction remain unclear– Not all countries apply the same rules the same

way• Current policy exists in a realm of uncertainty

MULTILATERAL INSTITUTIONS AND THEIR ROLE

Global governance of the terrorist threat

Multilateral Institutions

• Multilateral Institutions are organizations that operate beyond the nation-state

• We normally consider them to be formal organizations– Inter-Governmental Organizations– More than two nations as members

• Many different types

Multilateral Counter-Terrorism

• There are organizations that aid in counter-terrorism

• Most efforts are ad hoc– Added to pre-existing organizations– Integrated with other functions

Multilateral Counter-Terrorism

• Multilateral efforts vary widely– Issue area within counter-terrorism– Some tools fit better than others in a multilateral

context– Agreement is more widespread in some areas– The efforts change over time– Who you cooperate with matters

Why Go Multilateral?

• Part of overall analysis of terrorism and counter-terrorism– Lower costs: share the cost with others– Increased effectiveness– Necessity

• This decision will be balanced like other counter-terrorism decisions

CBA for Multilateral Approach

• Can you do it along at a cost you are willing to pay?

• What are the costs of cooperation?– More states raise costs of cooperation– Coordination problems also arise– A series of bilateral agreements may be better

than a multilateral one

Multilateral Strategies

• What form of cooperation to take?– Policing– Intelligence– Nation-building– Military operations

Changing Context

• Overall security environment– Cold War world was different– Post-Cold war is more complex– Terrorism cooperation in the context of broader

security• Local context– Knowing where your partner is coming from

A Brief Digression

• How you see cooperation is influenced by how you think about the world– Realist theories

• Hegemonic stability forces cooperation

– Liberals• Cooperation lowers costs through efficiency gains

– Constructivists• Political leaders share normative framework in policy

responses• Professionals share a framework of how to tackle the

problem across borders

Taking the Plunge

• In some cases the multilateral approach will be attractive

• States will elect to act together– The form will vary widely– The degree of cooperation will also vary– The tools used will vary

Costs of Cooperation

• Reduced freedom of action• Loss of “proprietary” information• Potential need to share broader information• Potential need to defer to other states• Costs of exit if strategy fails

The UN System

• UN is weakened by lack of consensus– Division over “illegitimate” and “legitimate” goals

of terrorist tactics– Concern over terrorism as an excuse for

colonialism• Security Council and General Assembly both

experience divisions

1990’s UN Discussions

• The 1970’s and 80’s saw little clear progress• 1990’s saw serious, concerted negotiation

after end of Cold War– 2 major conventions agreed upon• Convention on the Suppression of Terrorist Bombing

(1997)• Convention for the Suppression of the Financing of

Terrorism (1999)

UN Post 9/11

• Creation of Counter-Terrorism Committee (CTC) in Security Council (2001)– 9/11 breaks deadlock

• Global Counter-Terrorism Strategy (2006)– General Assembly response– Counter-Terrorism Implementation Task Force

• Global cooperation justified under the “international peace and security” standard

UN Post 9/11

• Increased cooperation in counter-terrorism• Standards for establishing best practices and

sharing information• Established a Monitoring Group to collect and

share global terrorism information• Established a Sanctions Committee to evaluate

necessity of sanctions for violators

Other Multilateral Approaches

• European Union• Organization of American States• African Union

• All have counter-terror activity within their organizations

How Effective Has This Been?

• Still relatively new• Evidence is mixed• Backlash against UN for “interference” in

sovereign affairs• UN agencies compete for a “piece” of counter-

terrorism– High Commissioner for Human Rights wants to

appoint a human rights advisor

Can Multilateralism Help?

• Yes, under the right conditions• The jury is still out on the best mechanisms