tactical lessons learned - the justice clearinghouse · •we are capable of shifting tactical...

Evergreen Mountain, LLC.

TACTICAL LESSONS LEARNED ROBERT TRIVINO

The Organization’s Culture

Surprise

Violence of Action

ASSAULT PHILOSOPHY

ACTUAL EVENTS

OBJECTIVE #7 - 2005

• Helicopter infiltration

• 28 man assault force

• 10 min flight to level 1 trauma

• Night time operation

• Rural, farm area

• Very high threat

• Snipers in over-watch

OBJECTIVE #7 - 2005

DIRT ROAD DIRT ROAD

FARM FIELD

OBJECTIVE #7 - 2005

DIRT ROAD DIRT ROAD

FARM FIELD

OBJECTIVE #7 - 2005

DIRT ROAD DIRT ROAD D

• Consolidated everyone at TGT 1

• Searched and questioned detainees (BAD GUYS!)

• NO JOY on targeted individual

• One detainee talks - leads us to 5 other targets

OBJECTIVE #7 - 2005

• Conducted several targets PID’d by detainee

• Linked up at TGT 1 – commander says

“peek-a-boo” in building to the south.

• I left half the force a at target building #1

• We were covered by the snipers in overwatch

Stairs

TEAM 1

TEAM 2

Door Covered

Carport

Concrete support pillars, no cars

parked in the carport

Bedroom

Kitchen

Cooking area Bedroom Bedroom

Living

First floor of a two story residence

OBJECTIVE #7 - 2005

Stairs

TEAM 1

TEAM 2

Stairs HQ

TEAM 2 TEAM 2

• KIA

OBJECTIVE #7 - 2005

Stairs HQ

TEAM 2 TEAM 2

OBJECTIVE #7 - 2005

Stairs

• KIA

• • •

• •

OBJECTIVE #7 - 2005

Stairs

HQ • • •

• •

• WIA

• KIA

OBJECTIVE #7 - 2005

Stairs

• • •

• •

• WIA

HQ KIA •

OBJECTIVE #7 - 2005

Stairs

• WIA

HQ KIA •

OBJECTIVE #7 - 2005

Stairs

• WIA

HQ KIA •

OBJECTIVE #7 - 2005

Stairs

KIA •

OBJECTIVE #7 - 2005

Stairs

HQ KIA • WW

OBJECTIVE #7 - 2005

OBJECTIVE #7 FACTS

• Hostage rescue tactics conducted

• Attempted to enter the front door

• Immediate casualties at the “FATAL FUNNEL”

• Lost the element of surprise prior to breach (Peek-

a-Boos)

• Never cleared the second floor (2nd Order Effects)

OBJECTIVE #7 FACTS

• Leaders lost accountability for a short period of

• Junior Leaders stayed in the Fight

• Survival Instinct took over

• Not enough litters

• Snipers support helped a lot

• Continual comms with HQ = rapid response and

medical support

OBJECTIVE #7 FACTS

• Engaged through opened and closed doors (direct

fire & hand grenades)

• K9 not taken to objective

• 6 enemy KIA

• 1 friendly KIA

• 6 friendly WIA

• 3 RTD after two weeks

OBJECTIVE #7

WHAT WE LEARNED

• We had to change our tactics – had to evolve

• Surprise was critical to mission success

• Had to incorporate more tools to accomplish the

mission and stay safer

• Speed will NOT always win the fight

• No need to risk men for terrorists

• Started to use the tactical call-out

OBJECTIVE #7

WHAT I LEARNED

• I needed to take more litters

• Will not give up surprise

• I needed to change our tactics

• Doorways are the control points – stay away from

OBJECTIVE #8 - 2005

• Foot Infiltration

• Coordinated Assault

• 10 minute flight to medical

• Night time operation

• Residential area

• Extremely High Threat

Dirt Road C2

Assault

Element 2 Assault

Element 1

6’ Adobe Wall Sec TGT 2

Assault Element 2

Vehicle Gate

Stairwell

Window

Automatic Fire

Stairwell

Window

Stairwell

Window

Stairwell

WIA WIA

6’ Adobo Wall Sec

WIA WIA

Stairwell

concussion

grenade

bangers bangers

Unmanned

Machine

Stairwell Unmanned

Machine

House Clear

WIA WIA

OBJECTIVE #8 FACTS

• Conducted hostage rescue tactics

• Attempted to enter front door

• Casualties at the “Fatal Funnel”

• Lost element of surprise before entry (breach at

the gate)

• No K9

• Team did not bring ladders

• Lethal & non-lethal munitions used to clear

OBJECTIVE #8 FACTS

• The time it took the Teams to reach the front door,

pause for a second, and make entry provided

enough time for the bad guys to man their

weapons

• Good communication with command allowed for

simultaneous assault and CAS-EVAC

• LUCKY!!! We were lucky – machine gun nest was

unmanned

OBJECTIVE #8 FACTS

• Containment was a byproduct of our maneuver

and it worked very well

• 5 enemy KIA

• 2 friendly KIA

OBJECTIVE #8

WHAT WE LEARNED

• We lost/gave up surprise – which is key

• Perimeter team saved helped us accomplish our

mission

• Hostage rescue tactics will NOT work against a

determined enemy when we lose or give up

surprise

• We must look to change our tactics

OBJECTIVE #11 - 2006

• Vehicle infiltration

• Urban area (city)

• Day mission

• Very high threat

• Potential improvised explosive devices (IEDs) on

target

Vehicle Gate Ped Gate

Sec OBJECTIVE #11 - 2006

• Took control

• Gave instructions

• Took control

• Gave instructions

• Took control

• Moved to safe area

• Continued tactical callout

• Escalation of force

• Dog is committed

• No one came out

• Teams move to breach

• No one came out

• Teams move to breach

• Teams move through house and find a closed door

• Did not use hostage rescue tactics – we cleared

slow and deliberate using the dog and cameras

• Tactical callout worked

• The dog saved lives (my opinion)

• Q&A determined armed bad guys were in the

• Rehearsed escalation of force was critical to

success

OBJECTIVE #11 FACTS

• Use of K9 proved to be the key to success during

clearing operations and detaining the bad guys

• Containment was key to keeping the bad guys in

the house

• Snipers on the adjacent roof was key to our

containment

OBJECTIVE #11 FACTS

• We are capable of shifting tactical gears, stay

aggressive and accomplish our mission

• Slow aggressive clearing is a viable option

• The tactical call-out works and is a viable option

for direct action missions

• Our speed to the target contained the bad guys

• We slowed down once we had containment

OBJECTIVE #11

WHAT WE LEARNED

WHAT WE LEARNED: PLANNING

• Our planning format changed slightly but our planning

process improved considerably

• We established SOPs at all phases of the operation

• SOPs streamlined information flow and decreased

reaction time = we deployed very fast

WHAT WE LEARNED: PLANNING

Planning Infiltration On Target Exfiltration Post Assault

Team 1

Team 2

Team 3

Routes

Veh Prep

Det Exploit

EOD Coor

Intel Coor

Helo Prep

Alt Routes

Intel Coor

Tgt ID

Alt Veh/Helo

1st OOM

2nd OOM

3rd OOM

Initial Ext Security Follow Asslt Pri Callout Det Q&A

Climb Tm

Second Flr

Breach

Pri Secuirty

Pri Security

Alt Callout

Pri SSE

1st OOM

Det Trans

2nd OOM

Pri Aid/Litter

Alt SSE/Det

3rd OOM

SSE Trans

Alt Aid/Litter

Det Exploit AAR Mission Debrief Veh Fix

Mission

Debrief

Intel Coor

Mission

Debrief

Intel Coor

WHAT WE LEARNED: TACTICS

The driving force behind the change in

tactics was due to loss of life

• We could not maintain status quo, we were losing too

many people

• Our tactics needed to evolve just like the enemy’s

tactics evolved.

• Most of our casualties were sustained at the primary

entry to residences and in hallways

• Point of domination CQB works very well

• My opinion: luck and an extremely well trained force

gave us success in most of our earlier engagements

The vast majority of our fatalities resulted

when we lost or gave up the element of

surprise

• Speed, surprise and violence of action doesn’t always

work, especially when combating a determined enemy

• We had to change how we viewed the assault process

• Needed to incorporate more tactical tools

• We needed to keep the element of surprise on our

side as long as possible – all the way to the

decisive point if able

• We needed to create and train on an escalation of

force SOP

• We needed to train at shifting tactical gears during

mid assault

WHAT WE CHANGED

• Incorporated the tactical callout and it a viable

option for direct action missions

• We added this to our training

• Trained to shift tactical gears in mid assault:

dynamic to slow & methodical & retrograde out

of the structure

• SOPs were created – used to streamline our

tactical actions during the conduct of a mission

WHAT WE CHANGED

• Leaders now have options; do NOT default to

hostage rescue tactics

• Make decisions based on target indicators. Shift

tactical gears if we observed indicators telling us

that bad guys are on target

• Extremely well thought through, preplanned

contingencies for most are dangerous courses of

action

WHAT WE CHANGED

The most significant change was in our unit’s

culture as it relates to direct action missions

and our overall assault philosophy

LEADER CHANGES

• Acceptable risk and the mission

• Leaders now had options other than dynamic entry

which were culturally acceptable solutions for

accomplishing the mission

• Using target indicators to make smart decisions

• Are your leaders risk averse?

IMPORTANT FACTS

We didn’t train at the tactical call-out prior to 2006

We didn’t walk to targets a lot until 2005

Tactics changed a lot, up to the point that the one man

got the squeeze to enter a room. Room combat DID NOT

change for me since 1992

RECOMMENDATIONS

• Think about combating a hardened enemy and ask

yourself if your tactics are viable

• Practice clearing a structure slowly and methodical,

incorporating tactical tools in the process

RECOMMENDATIONS

• Assign K9 team(s) to the SWAT team or train together

– A LOT!

• Use robots

• Use non-lethal to help when you’ve lost surprise

RECOMMENDATIONS

• Use ballistic shields when it makes sense – you must

train with them

• Gas em!!!

• Take terrorist threats serious. Do not use hostage

rescue tactics when up against potential terrorists

RECOMMENDATIONS

• Leaders must arm their officers with the best training

available to ensure their officers go home safely

• Use scenario based training to train your people on

judgment, this is most important

• Train to solve problems

RECOMMENDATIONS

• CQB is not your mission!

• Your mission is to save the life of, arrest, apprehend,

someone or group of people.

• CQB is a single means to an end

E V E R G R E E N M O U N T A I N , L L C

Available on Amazon

email me at :

rob@evergreenmountainusa.co

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