stuart d. blacksell mph, phd, rbp mahidol-oxford tropical medicine research unit (moru), bangkok,...
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Stuart D. Blacksell MPH, PhD, RBP
Mahidol-Oxford Tropical Medicine Research Unit (MORU), Bangkok, Thailand.
Wellcome Trust-Mahosot Hospital-Oxford Tropical Medicine Research Collaboration, Vientiane, Lao PDR.
Centre for Tropical Medicine, University of Oxford, United Kingdom.
Stuart D. Blacksell MPH, PhD, RBP
Mahidol-Oxford Tropical Medicine Research Unit (MORU), Bangkok, Thailand.
Wellcome Trust-Mahosot Hospital-Oxford Tropical Medicine Research Collaboration, Vientiane, Lao PDR.
Centre for Tropical Medicine, University of Oxford, United Kingdom.
International Cooperation in
Strengthening & Mitigating Biothreats
MORU’s strategic position….
Half of the world’s population within 2000 miles….
Major field site / laboratory
Laos project field site
Bangkok Unit
Collaborator’s site
MozambiqueAQUAMAT collaborative sitesSri Lanka
MORU – 2011
Diseases driving the needs?
BSL3 labs in SEA - The MORU experience
“BSL3/4 labs” in South East Asia
5
1
13
7
52
8
1
1
2
Biocontainment facilities in SEA
Biosafety challenges in SE Asia
• Running a Biocontainment facility RESPONSIBLY is a huge investment of time, people, facilities and money.
• Most facilities are not properly prepared – Legislation and Standards
– Financial
– Administrative
– Personnel
– Logistics
– Facilities and Equipment
– Enforcement
National legislation
International Standards
Financial and Administrative Issues • Financial
– Limited budgets
• Maintenance
• Training
– Corruption!
• Administrative
– Institutional Biosafety Committee
– Incomplete documentation
• Biosafety manual
• Emergency Response Plan
• Interaction with First Responders (Police/Fire)
• Standard Operating Procedures
Security/Restricting Access
• Site specific security plan• Staff with access
– USA • FBI clearance - Restricted person criteria (Criminal,
Drugs, Terrorism)• US Dept of Justice registered “entity” personnel
– Thailand • Local Police check using national and international
databases
– Laos • No capability
Logistics – Infectious inventories
• Baseline Inventory established– Agent, source, quantity, use– Audit trail– Checked periodically by RO’s
• Quarterly check of inventory, people, security
• MORU experience– Freezerworks software
– Very labor intensive• 2 people – 24 months – 20,000 samples
Facilities maintenance and testing
Other considerations
• BSL3 Energy costs– Tropical climate – BSL3 single pass air = very expensive and wasteful– Why not recirculation 85% of the air with additional HEPA filtration
• Regional training faculties – Biocontainment engineering/Biosafety Officers/Maintenance– Not for profit– Use facilities and experience that is already available locally
• Assess the risks – Do we really need a BSL3 lab? – Can we use BSL2 lab with BSL3 practices
Conclusions
• Focus areas for biosafety and biocontainment– Regulations and legislation– Biosafety Administration – Assess the risks – do we really need a Rolls Royce?– Training
• Biosafety administration
• Biosafety practices/PPE
• Emergency response
– Facilities maintenance and testing/certification– Forward planning for budgets– Appropriate physical security
Thank you
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