spl digests

Sanchez vs. PeopleG.R. No. 179090June 5, 2009

Facts:1. Appellant was charged with the crime of Other Acts of Child Abuse in an Information under R.A. 76102. On September 24, 1997, VVV's father, FFF, started leasing a portion of the fishpond owned by Escolastico Ronquillo (Escolastico)3. On September 2, 2000 at around 7:00 in the morning, while VVV was cutting grass in their yard, appellant arrived looking for FFF. She noticed that appellant had asanggot(sickle) tucked in his waist.4. Right then and there, appellant told them to leave the place and started destroying the house with the use of his sickle. As a result, appellant destroyed the roof, the wall and the windows of the house.5. VVV was then sent to fetch abarangaytanod. 6. Upon reaching their house, VVV saw her brother, BBB, get a piece of wood from the back of their house to defend themselves and their house from appellant. However, appellant approached BBB, grabbed the piece of wood from the latter and started beating him with it.7. At the sight, VVV approached appellant and pushed him.Irked by what she did, appellant turned to her and struck her with the piece of wood three (3) times, twice on the left thigh and once below her right buttocks.As a result, the wood broke into several pieces.8. Appellant defended himself saying that he did not intentionally hit VVV, but the RTC ruled against him.9. The RTC sentenced appellant under the indeterminate sentence law of imprisonment of prision correccional as minimum to prision mayor maximum10. The CA affirmed the RTC ruling as to the conviction of appellant, but ruled that the RTC erred in applying the indeterminate sentence law since RA 7610 is a special law.

Issue:1. Whether or not the Court of Appeals correctly modified the penalty imposed by the RTC.

Held:1. NO. The Court of Appeals is wrong in ruling that the RTC was incorrect in applying the indeterminate sentence law, even if the case falls under R.A. 76102. The imposable penalty under Section 10(a), Article VI of Republic Act No. 7610 isprisionmayorin its minimum period.3. Applying the Indeterminate Sentence Law, the RTC imposed upon appellant the penalty of six (6) years ofprision correccional, as minimum, to seven (7) years and four (4) months ofprision mayor, as maximum.4. The CA modified this by imposing upon appellant the indeterminate penalty of six (6) years and one (1) day, as minimum, to eight (8) years, as maximum, ofprision mayor,postulating that since R.A. No. 7610 is a special law, the RTC should have imposed on appellant an indeterminate sentence, "the maximum term of which shall not exceed the maximum fixed by said law and the minimum shall not be less than the minimum term prescribed by the same.5. The OSG contends that the RTC appropriately applied the Indeterminate Sentence Law.6. Sec. 1 of the Indeterminate Sentence law provides that if the offense is punished by any other law, the court shall sentence the accused to an indeterminate sentence, the maximum term of which shall not exceed the maximum fixed by said law and the minimum shall not be less than the minimum term prescribed by the same.7. To repeat, the penalty for Other Acts of Child Abuse isprision mayorin its minimum period. This penalty is derived from, and defined in, the Revised Penal Code.8. Although R.A. No. 7610 is a special law, the rules in the Revised Penal Code for graduating penalties by degrees or determining the proper period should be applied. Thus, where the special law adopted penalties from the Revised Penal Code, the Indeterminate Sentence Law will apply just as it would in felonies.

Ladonga vs. PeopleG.R. No. 141066February 17, 2005

Facts:1. Adronico and Evangeline Ladonga becamse regular customers in Alfredo Oculams pawnshop in Tagbilaran Bohol.2. Sometime in May 1990, the Ladonga spouses obtained aP9,075.55 loan from him, guaranteed by United Coconut Planters Bank (UCPB) Check No. 284743, post dated to dated July 7, 1990 issued by Adronico3. The Ladonga spouses obtained an additional loan ofP12,730.00, guaranteed by UCPB Check No. 284744, post dated to dated July 26, 1990 issued by Adronico4. The Ladonga spouses obtained a third loan in the amount ofP8,496.55, guaranteed by UCPB Check No. 106136, post dated to July 22, 1990 issued by Adronico.5. The three checks bounced upon presentment for the reason "CLOSED ACCOUNT".6. When the Ladonga spouses failed to redeem the check, despite repeated demands, he filed a criminal complaint against them.7. While admitting that the checks issued by Adronico bounced because there was no sufficient deposit or the account was closed, the Ladonga spouses claimed that the checks were issued only to guarantee the obligation, with an agreement that Oculam should not encash the checks when they mature. 8. Since petitioner Evangeline is not a signatory of the checks and had no participation in the issuance thereof.9. The RTC rendered a joint decision finding the Ladonga spouses guilty beyond reasonable doubt of violating B.P. Blg. 22.10. Petitioner brought the case to the Court of Appeals, arguing that the RTC erred in finding her criminally liable for conspiring with her husband as the principle of conspiracy is inapplicable toB.P. Blg. 22which is a special law; moreover, she is not a signatory of the checks and had no participation in the issuance thereof.11. CA Affirmed her conviction. It held that the provisions of the penal code were made applicable to special penal laws. It noted that Article 10 of the Revised Penal Code itself provides that its provisions shall be supplementary to special laws unless the latter provide the contrary.12. The Court of Appeals stressed that sinceB.P. Blg. 22does not prohibit the applicability in a suppletory character of the provisions of the Revised Penal Code (RPC), the principle of conspiracy may be applied to cases involving violations ofB.P. Blg. 22.

Issue:1. Whether or not Evangeline can be held liable as a conspirator under B.P. 22.

Held: 1. NO, B.P. Blg. 22does not expressly proscribe the suppletory application of the provisions of the RPC. Thus, in the absence of contrary provision inB.P. Blg. 22, the general provisions of the RPC which, by their nature, are necessarily applicable, may be applied suppletorily.2. The first clause should be understood to mean only that the special penal laws are controlling with regard to offenses therein specifically punished. Said clause only restates the elemental rule of statutory construction that special legal provisions prevail over general ones.3. The second clause contains the soul of the article. The main idea and purpose of the article is embodied in the provision that the "code shall be supplementary" to special laws, unless the latter should specifically provide the contrary.4. The suppletory application of the principle of conspiracy in this case is analogous to the application of the provision on principals under Article 17 inU.S. vs. Ponte. 5. For once conspiracy or action in concert to achieve a criminal design is shown, the act of one is the act of all the conspirators, and the precise extent or modality of participation of each of them becomes secondary, since all the conspirators are principals.6. But, conviction is set aside since prosecution failed to prove petitioners overt act and active participation, which is an important element of conspiracy.

People vs. BustineraG.R. No. 148233June 8, 2004

Facts:1. Sometime in 1996, Edwin Cipriano (Cipriano), who manages ESC Transport, the taxicab business of his father, hired appellant as a taxi driver and assigned him to drive a Daewoo Racer with plate number PWH-266.2. It was agreed that appellant would drive the taxi from 6:00 a.m. to 11:00 p.m, after which he would return it to ESC Transports garage and remit the boundary fee in the amount ofP780.00 per day3. On December 25, 1996, appellant admittedly reported for work and drove the taxi, but hedid not return it on the same day as he was supposed to.4. Leaving nothing to chance, Cipriano went to the Commonwealth Avenue police station and reported that his taxi was missing.5. Appellants wife went to the garage of ESC Transport and revealed that the taxi had been abandoned in Regalado Street, Lagro, Quezon City6. While appellant does not deny that he did not return the taxi on December 25, 1996 as he was short of the boundary fee, he claims that hedid not abandon the taxi but actually returned it on January 5, 19977. Eventually the RTC found accused guilty of qualified theft and suffer the penalty of Reclusion Perpetua.

Issue:1. Whether it was correct for the RTC to hold accused guilty of the crime of qualified theft.

Held:1. NO. Accused is guilty of Carnapping2. Appellant was convicted ofqualified theft under Article 310 of the Revised Penal Code, as amended for the unlawful taking of a motor vehicle.However,Article 310 has been modified, with respect to certain vehicles,]by Republic Act No. 6539, as amended, otherwise known as "AN ACT PREVENTING AND PENALIZING CARNAPPING.3. When statutes are inpari materiaor when they relate to the same person or thing, or to the same class of persons or things, or cover the same specific or particular subject matter,or have the same purpose or object,the rule dictates that they should be construed together4. The elements of the crime of theft as provided for in Article 308 of the Revised Penal Code are:(1) that there be taking of personal property; (2) that said property belongs to another; (3) that the taking be done with intent to gain; (4) that the taking be done without the consent of the owner; and (5) that the taking be accomplished without the use of violence against or intimidation of persons or force upon things.5. Theft is qualified when any of the following circumstances is present:(1) the theft is committed by a domestic servant; (2) the theft is committed with grave abuse of confidence; (3) the property stolen is either amotor vehicle, mail matter or large cattle; (4) the property stolen consists of coconuts taken from the premises of a plantation; (5) the property stolen is fish taken from a fishpond or fishery; and (6) the property was taken on the occasion of fire, earthquake, typhoon, volcanic eruption, or any other calamity, vehicular accident or civil disturbance.6. On the other hand, Section 2 of Republic Act No. 6539, as amended defines carnapping as the taking, with intent to gain, of a motor vehicle belonging to another without the latter's consent, or by means of violence against or intimidation of persons, or by using force upon things. The elements of carnapping are thus: (1) the taking of a motor vehicle which belongs to another; (2) the taking is without the consent of the owner or by means of violence against or intimidation of persons or by using force upon things; and (3) the taking is done with intent to gain.7. There is no arguing that the anti-carnapping law is a special law, different from the crime of robbery and theft included in the Revised Penal Code.It particularly addresses the taking, with intent to gain, of a motor vehicle belonging to another without the latter's consent, or by means of violence against or intimidation of persons, or by using force upon things.8. However, the anti-carnapping law particularly deals with the theft and robbery of motor vehicles.Hence a motor vehicle is said to have been carnapped when it has been taken, with intent to gain, without the owner's consent, whether the taking was done with or without the use of force upon things.Without the anti-carnapping law, such unlawful taking of a motor vehicle would fall within the purview of either theft or robbery which was certainly the case before the enactment of said statute.9. From the foregoing, since appellant is being accused of the unlawful taking of a Daewoo sedan, it is the anti-carnapping law and not the provisions of qualified theft which would apply as the said motor vehicle does not fall within the exceptions mentioned in the anti-carnapping law.Go-Tan vs. TanG.R. No. 168852September 30, 2008

Facts:1. OnApril 18, 1999,SharicaMari L. Go-Tan (petitioner) and Steven L. Tan (Steven) were married. Out of this union, two female children were born,KyraDanielle[4]and Kristen Denise.2. OnJanuary 12, 2005, barely six years into the marriage, petitioner filed a Petition with Prayer for the Issuance of a Temporary Protective Order against Steven and her parents-in-law, Spouses Perfecto C. Tan and Juanita L. Tan (respondents) before the RTC.3. She alleged that Steven, in conspiracy with respondents, were causing verbal, psychological and economic abuses upon her in violation ofR.A. 9262 otherwise known as the Anti-Violence Against Women and Their Children Act of 2004.4. OnJanuary 25, 2005, the RTC issued an Order/Notice granting petitioner's prayer for a TPO.5. Respondents filed a Motion to Dismiss with Opposition to the Issuance of Permanent Protection OrderAdCautelamand Comment on the Petition,contending that the RTC lacked jurisdiction over their persons since, as parents-in-law of the petitioner, they were not covered by R.A. No. 9262.6. OnMarch 7, 2005, the RTC issued a Resolutiondismissing the case as to respondents on the ground that, being the parents-in-law of the petitioner, they were not included/covered as respondents under R.A. No. 9262 under the well-known rule of law expressiouniusestexclusioalterius.7. Petitioner contends that R.A. No. 9262 must be understood in the light of the provisions of Section 47 of R.A. No. 9262 which explicitly provides for thesuppletoryapplication of the Revised Penal Code (RPC) and, accordingly, the provision on conspiracy under Article 8 of the RPC can besuppletorilyapplied to R.A. No. 9262.8. That Steven and respondents had community of design and purpose in tormenting her by giving her insufficient financial support; harassing and pressuring her to be ejected from the family home; and in repeatedly abusing her verbally, emotionally, mentally and physically; that respondents should be included as indispensable or necessary parties for complete resolution of the case.9. On the other hand, respondents submit that they are not covered by R.A. No. 9262 since Section 3 thereof explicitly provides that the offender should be related to the victim only by marriage, a former marriage, or a dating or sexual relationship10.

Issue:1. Whether or not the Parents in Law can be included in the ambit of R.A. 9262.

Held:1. YES. While the said law provides that the offender be related or connected to the victim by marriage, former marriage, or a sexual or dating relationship, it does not preclude the application of the principle of conspiracy under the RPC.2. Indeed, Section 47 of R.A. No. 9262 expressly provides for thesuppletory application of the RPC. For purposes of this Act, theRevised Penal Codeand other applicablelaws,shall havesuppletoryapplication.3. Hence, legal principles developed from the Penal Code may be applied in a supplementary capacity to crimes punished under special laws, such as R.A. No.9262, in which the special law is silent on a particular matter.4. It must be further noted that Section 5 of R.A. No. 9262 expressly recognizes that the acts of violence against women and their children may be committed by an offender through another5. Thus, contrary to theRTC'spronouncement, the maxim"expressiouniosestexclusioalterius finds no application here.It must be remembered that this maxim is only an ancillary rule of statutory construction.It is not of universal application.