solving the skeptical problem contents · 2017. 12. 22. · 2 those who think that hilary putnam...

CHAPTER1:

SOLVINGTHESKEPTICALPROBLEM

CONTENTS1.  ThePuzzleofSkepticalHypotheses.........................................................................................1 

2.  ContextualistSolutions:TheBasicStrategy..........................................................................4 

3.  SomeOldContextualistSolutions:Lewis’s‘RuleofAccommodation’........................8 

4.  SomeOldContextualistSolutions:The‘RelevantAlternatives’ApproachandtheRuleofRelevance..................................................................................................................................14 

5.  TheSubjunctiveConditionalsAccount(SCA)ofthePlausibilityofAI’sFirstPremise......................................................................................................................................................18 

6.  SCA,Grandmothers,andMethods..........................................................................................21 

7.  SCAandSomeSkepticalHypothesesThatDon’tWork.................................................23 

8.  SCAConfirmed................................................................................................................................25 

9.  Nozick’sOwnSolutionandtheAbominableConjunction............................................28 

10.  StrengthofEpistemicPositionandAI’sSecondPremise.........................................31 

11.  StrengthandSensitivity.........................................................................................................35 

12.  TheRuleofSensitivityandtheBeginningsofaNewContextualistSolution...37 

13.  TheRuleofSensitivityandSCA:AComparisonofOurNewSolutionwiththeOtherContextualistSolutionsandwithNozick’sSolution...................................................40 

14.  OurNewContextualistSolutionClarifiedandComparedwiththeStraightforwardSolutions..................................................................................................................41 

15.  BoldSkepticismandtheWarrantedAssertabilityManeuver.................................44 

16.  BoldSkepticismandSystematicFalsehood...................................................................48 

17.  BeggingtheQuestionAgainsttheSkeptic?.....................................................................51 

CHAPTER1:

SOLVINGTHESKEPTICALPROBLEM

1. THEPUZZLEOFSKEPTICALHYPOTHESES

Manyofthemostcelebrated,intriguing,andpowerfulskepticalargumentsproceedbymeansofskepticalhypotheses.Brutallyparedtotheirbarestessentials,theyareroughlyofthefollowingform,where'O'isapropositionabouttheexternalworldonewouldordinarilythinkoneknows(e.g.,Ihavehands1)and‘H’isasuitablychosenskepticalhypothesis(e.g.,IamabodilessbraininavatwhohasbeenelectrochemicallystimulatedtohavepreciselythosesensoryexperiencesI'vehad,hencefortha'BIV'2):

1IchoosethisOpartlyforitshistoricalconnectionstoDescartes'sFirstMeditation,andalsobecauseIthinkitisanexemplarycaseofsomethingweordinarilythinkweknow.ButwhilewewouldordinarilythinkweknowthisO,we'dseldomhaveoccasiontosaythatweknowit,becausecasesinwhichsuchaclaimtoknowledgewouldbeconversationallyinorderarequiterare.(Exception:Ateacherbeginsanepistemologylecturebymatter‐of‐factlylistingvariousthingssheknows,andthatanyplausibletheoryofknowledgeshouldmakehercomeouttoknow.Inthecourseofthislisting,shesays,‘AndIknowthatIhavehands.’)Forthisandvariousrelatedreasons,somemightnotlikemychoiceofO.Suchreadersareinvitedtosupplytheirownfavoriteexemplarycasesofthingsweknowastheskeptic'starget.

2ThosewhothinkthatHilaryPutnammayhavealreadydisarmedBIV‐inspiredskepticismshouldunderstandtheBIVhypothesistobethehypothesisthatone'sbrainhasbeenrecentlyenvattedaftermanyyearsofnormalembodiment.ForevenifPutnamisrightinclaimingthatthecontentofthebeliefsoftheBIVsofhisscenarioissuchthattheseBIVsaren'tmassivelydeceived,itseemsthatrecentlyenvattedBIVsaresodeceived.

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The Argument from Ignorance (AI)3 1. I don’t know that not-H. 2. If I don’t know that not-H, then I don’t know that O. So, C. I don’t know that O.4

Settingasidethedistractingsideissuesthatimmediatelythreatenfromalldirections,andkeepingAIinthisstark,uncomplicatedform,Iwill,inwhatfollows,presentanddefend,atleastinbroadoutline,thecorrectsolutiontothepuzzleAIconfrontsuswith.AndAIdoespresentuswithapuzzle,because,forreasonswe'llinvestigateinlatersections,eachofitspremisesisinitiallyplausible,whenHiswellchosen.ForhoweverimprobableorevenbizarreitmayseemtosupposethatIamaBIV,italsoseemsthatIdon'tknowthatI'mnotone.HowcouldIknowsuchathing?

3AItakesitsnameprimarilyfromitsfirstpremise.ButsinceoneofAl'sbestformulations(towhichIherebyreferreadersseekingagoodversionofAIthathasnotbeensobrutallypared)isinchapter1ofPeterUnger'sbookIgnorance:ACaseforScepticism(1975)itisinmorethanonesensethatitisanargument‘fromignorance.’

4Iactuallyhaven'tparedAItoitsbarestessentials.Itcouldbefurtherparedtoaone‐premiseargument:Idon'tknowthatnot‐H;so,Idon'tknowthatO.Thesecond,‘bridge’premisehasbeenaddedtofacilitatemytreatmentoftheargument,nicelydividingthoseissuesthatimpactontheacceptabilityofthefirstpremisefromthosegermanetothesecond.

AIisthefirstandgreatargumentbyskepticalhypothesis.Andthesecond,likeuntoit,isTheArgumentfromPossibility(AP),which,likeAI,takesitsnamefromitsfirstpremise,andwhichhasthisform:

1.ItispossiblethatHind.2.IfitispossiblethatHind,thenitispossiblethatnot‐Oind.So,3.Itispossiblethatnot‐Oind.4.Ifitispossiblethatnot‐Oind,thenIdon’tknowthatO.So,C.Idon’tknowthatO.

(Thesubscript'ind'indicatesthatwhatoccursinthescopeof'Itispossiblethat'istobekeptintheindicativemood,sothatthepossibilityexpressedwillbeanepistemicone.The‘bridge’premises,2and4,canbeomitted.)InthispaperIaddressonlyAI,butletmequicklyindicatehowAPshouldbehandled.Premise4,whichinitiallystrikesmanyasAP'sweakestlink,isactuallycorrect(DeRose1991,sectionG).Thus,theAPskepticmustbestoppedbeforeshereachesstep3.Fortunately,thetreatmentofAIthatIpresentinthispapercanbegeneralizedtohandletheinitialphase(steps1‐3)ofAPaswell.ThistreatmentofAPislefthereasanexerciseforthereader,butisexplainedinchapter3,especiallysectionK,ofmy(199O).

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Anditalsoseemsthatif,forallIknow,IamaBIV,thenIdon'tknowthatIhavehands.HowcouldIknowthatIhavehandsif,forallIknow,I'mbodiless(andthereforehandless)?But,atthesametime,itinitiallyseemsthatIdoknowthatIhavehands.Sotwoplausiblepremisesyieldaconclusionwhosenegationwealsofindplausible.Sosomethingplausiblehastogo.Butwhat?Andequallyimportantly,how?

Tobesure,thepremisesareonlyplausible,notcompelling.Thus,wewillalwayshaverecoursetotheMooreanreactiontothisargument:Declarethatitismorecertainthatoneknowsthatonehashandsthanitisthateitherofthepremisesoftheargumentistrue(muchlessthattheirconjunctionistrue),andthereforerejectoneofthosepremises,ratherthanaccepttheconclusion.Butalsoavailableistheskepticalreaction,whichistoaccepttheconclusion.

Butweshouldhopeforabettertreatmentoftheargumentthansimplychoosingwhichofthethreeindividuallyplausiblepropositions—thetwopremisesandthenegationoftheconclusion—seemsleastcertainandrejectingitonthegroundsthattheothertwoaretrue.Inseekingasolutiontothispuzzle,weshouldseekanexplanationofhowwefellintothisskepticaltrapinthefirstplace,andnotsettleformakingasimplechoiceamongthreedis‐tastefulwaysoutofthetrap.Wemustexplainhowtwopremisesthattogetheryieldaconclusionwefindsoincrediblecanthemselvesseemsoplausibletous.Onlywithsuchanexplanationinplacecanweproceedwithconfidenceandwithunderstandingtofreeourselvesfromthetrap.

ManyofthoseworkingonAIinrecentyearsseemtohaveunderstoodthis.5AndIhavegoodnewstoreport:Substantialprogresstowardsfinallysolvingthisskepticalpuzzlehasbeenmadealongtwoquitedifferentfronts.Thebadnewsisthat,asIshallargue,neitherapproachhassolvedthepuzzle.Buttheculminatinggoodnewsisthat,asIwillalsoargue,thenewsolutionIpresenthere,whichincorporatesimportantaspectsofeachofthetwoapproaches,canfinallysolvethis

5ThisisespeciallytrueofStewartCohen,towhomI'mindebtedforhisgeneralsetupofthepuzzleasaconflictofintuitions,asatisfactorysolutionofwhichrequiresanexplanationofwhythepuzzlearises.See(Cohen1988:93‐94).

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perenniallythornyphilosophicalproblem.WhilemoredetailsandprecisionwillbecalledforintheresultingsolutionthanIwillprovide,therewillbeenoughmeatonthebonestomakeitplausiblethatthefullyarticulatedsolutionliesinthedirectionIpointtohere.

Insections2‐4ofthispaper,Iexplorethecontextualistapproachtotheproblemofskepticism,andshowwhyithasthusfarfallenshortofsolvingthepuzzle.Insections5‐9,IturntoRobertNozick'sattempttosolveourpuzzle.SincetheshortcomingsofNozick'streatmentofknowledgeandskepticismhavebeen,atleasttomysatisfaction,dulydemonstratedbyothers,itwillnotbemypurposeheretorehearsethoseshortcomings,butrathertoexploreandexpanduponthesubstantialinsightthatremainsintactinNozick'saccount.Insections1O‐17,Ipresentanddefendmyowncontextualistsolution,whichIargueisthebestsolutiontoourpuzzle.Since,asIargueinsections15‐17,theskeptic'sownsolution,accordingtowhichweacceptAl'sconclusion,isamongthesolutionsinferiortotheoneIpresent,AIdoesnotsuccessfullysupportthatconclusion.

2. CONTEXTUALISTSOLUTIONS:THEBASICSTRATEGY

SupposeaspeakerA(for‘attributor’)says,‘SknowsthatP,’ofasubjectS'struebeliefthatP.Accordingtocontextualisttheoriesofknowledgeattributions,howstronganepistemicpositionSmustbeinwithrespecttoPforA'sassertiontobetruecanvaryaccordingtofeaturesofA'sconversationalcontext.6

6Forabitmoreonthenatureofcontextualisttheories,seemy(1992a).Thenotionof(comparative)strengthofepistemicposition,centraltomycharacterizationofcontextualism,willbeexplicatedbelowinsections1Oand11.

Forexemplarycontextualisttreatmentsoftheproblemofskepticism,inadditiontothepaperscitedbelowinsections3and4,seeespecially(Unger1986)and(Cohen1988).

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Contextualisttheoriesofknowledgeattributionshavealmostinvariablybeendevelopedwithaneyetowardprovidingsomekindofanswertophilosophicalskepticism.ForskepticalargumentslikeAlthreatentoshow,notonlythatwefailtomeetveryhighrequirementsforknowledgeofinterestonlytomisguidedphilosophersseekingabsolutecertainty,butthatwedon'tmeeteventhetruthconditionsofordinary,out‐on‐the‐streetknowledgeattributions.Theythusthreatentoestablishthestartlingresultthatwenever,oralmostnever,truthfullyascribeknowledgetoourselvesortoothermeremortals.

But,accordingtocontextualists,theskeptic,inpresentingherargument,manipulatesthesemanticstandardsforknowledge,therebycreatingacontextinwhichshecantruthfullysaythatweknownothingorverylittle.7Oncethestandardshavebeensoraised,wecorrectlysensethatweonlycouldfalselyclaimtoknowsuchthingsasthatwehavehands.Whythenarewepuzzled?Whydon'twesimplyaccepttheskeptic'sconclusionandhenceforthrefrainfromascribingsuchknowledgetoourselvesorothers?Because,thecontextualistcontinues,wealsorealizethis:Assoonaswefindourselvesinmoreordinaryconversationalcontexts,itwillnotonlybetrueforustoclaimtoknowtheverythingsthattheskepticnowdeniesweknow,butitwillalsobewrongforustodenythatweknowthesethings.Butthen,isn'ttheskeptic'spresentdenialequallyfalse?Andwouldn'titbeequallytrueforusnow,intheskeptic'spresence,toclaimtoknow?

Whatwefailtorealize,accordingtothecontextualistsolution,isthattheskeptic'spresentdenialsthatweknowvariousthingsareperfectlycompatiblewithourordinaryclaimstoknowthoseverypropositions.Oncewerealizethis,wecanseehowboththeskeptic'sdenialsofknowledgeandourordinaryattributionsofknowledgecanbecorrect.

Thus,itishoped,ourordinaryclaimstoknowcanbesafeguardedfromtheapparentlypowerfulattackoftheskeptic,while,atthesametime,thepersuasivenessoftheskepticalargumentisexplained.Forthefactthattheskepticcaninvokeveryhighstandardsthatwedon'tliveuptohasnotendencytoshow

7Thisisatleastsoaccordingtoskeptic‐friendlyversionsofcontextualistsolutions,aswillbeexplainedlaterinthissection.

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thatwedon'tsatisfythemorerelaxedstandardsthatareinplaceinmoreordinaryconversationsanddebates.

ThreeimportantpointsaboutcontextualiststrategiesasdescribedaboveshouldbemadebeforeImoveon.First,thistypeofstrategywillleaveuntouchedthetimidskepticwhopurportsbyAImerelytobeestablishingtheweakclaimthatinsome(perhaps‘high’or‘philosophical’)sense(perhapsinducedbythepresentationofAl)wedon'tknowtherelevantO,whilenotevenpurportingtoestablishtheboldthesisthatourordinaryclaimstoknowthatsamepropositionarefalse.Whethersuchatimidskepticalstanceisofanyinterestisatopicforanotherpaper.ThecontextualiststrategyisimportantbecauseAIinitiallyseemstothreatenthetruthofourordinaryclaims—itthreatenstoboldlyshowthatwe'vebeenwrongallalonginthinkingandsayingthatweknowthisandthat.Foritdoesn'tseemasifit'sjustinsome‘high’or‘philosophical’sensethatAl'spremisesaretrue:Theyseemtrueintheordinarysenseof'know'.Infact,oneisinitiallytemptedtosaythatthere'snogoodsenseinwhichIknowthatI'mnotaBIVorinwhichIcanknowIhavehandsifIdon'tknowthatI'mnotaBIV.How(andwhether)toavoidtheboldskepticalresultispuzzleenough.

Second,inpresentingthecontextualiststrategy,Ihaveaboveassumedaskeptic‐friendlyversionofcontextualism—oneaccordingtowhichthephilosophicalskepticcan(fairlyeasily),anddoes,succeedinraisingthestandardsforknowledgeinsuchawayastomakeherdenialsofknowledgetrue.Somecontextualistsmaythinkthatit'snotsoeasytosoraisethestandardsforknowledge,andthatadeterminedopponentoftheskepticcan,bynotlettingtheskepticgetawaywithraisingthem,keepthestandardslow.Buttheimportantpointistoidentifythemechanismbywhichtheskepticatleastthreatenstoraisethestandardsforknowledge.Whethertheskepticactuallysucceedsagainstadeterminedopponentinsoraisingthestandardsisoflittleimportance.Tosafeguardordinaryclaimstoknowwhileatthesametimeexplainingthepersuasivenessoftheskepticalarguments(whichisthegoalofhisstrategy),thecontextualistcanprovisionallyassumeaskeptic‐friendlyversionofcontextualism,leavingitasanopenquestionwhetherandunderwhichconditionstheskepticactuallysucceedsatraisingthestandards.Thecontextualist'sultimatepointwillthenbethis:Totheextentthattheskepticdoessucceed,shedoessoonlybyraisingthestandardsforknowledge,and

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sothesuccessofherargumenthasnotendencytoshowthatourordinaryclaimstoknowareinanywaydefective.

Third,AIcanbepuzzlingevenwhenoneisnotinthepresenceofaskepticwhoispresentingit.Theargumenthasaboutthesamedegreeofintuitiveappealwhenoneisjustconsideringitbyoneself,withoutanybody'ssayinganything.Butthecontextualistexplanation,asdescribedabove,involvesthestandardsforknowledgebeingchangedbywhat'sbeingsaidinaconversation.8Forthemostpart,Iwillframethecontextualistexplanationintermsofsuchconversationalrules,largelybecausethat'swhatbeendonebymycontextualistpredecessors,withwhomIwanttomakecontact.Butwemustrealizethattheresultingsolutionwillhavetobegeneralizedtoexplainwhytheargumentcanbesoappealingevenwhenoneisconsideringitinsolitude,withnothingbeingsaid.Thebasicideaofthegeneralizationwilltakeeitherorbothofthefollowingtwoforms.First,itcanbemaintainedthatthereisaruleforthechangingofthestandardsforknowledgethatgovernsthetruthconditionsofourthoughtsregardingwhatisandisnotknownthatmirrorstheruleforthetruthconditionsofwhatissaidregardingknowledge.Inthatcase,ananalogueofthecontextualistsolutioncanbegivenforthought,accordingtowhichthepremisesandconclusionofAIaretrulythought,butmytruethoughtthat,say,Idon'tknowthatIhavehands,hadwheninthegripofAI,willbecompatiblewithmythought,madeinanothercontext,thatIdoknowthatverything.Second,ourjudgmentregardingwhethersomethingcanorcannotbetrulyasserted(underappropriateconditions)mightbeheldtoaffectourjudgmentregardingwhetherit'strueorfalse,evenwhenwemakethisjudgmentinsolitude,withnothingbeingsaidatall.ThatthepremisesofAIcouldbetrulyasserted,then,makesthem(atleast)seemtrueevenwhenthey'rejustbeingthought.

Myownsolutionwillemploythebasiccontextualiststrategyexplainedinthissection.But,asshouldbeapparentalready,wehaven'texplainedthepersuasivenessofAl,andthushaven'tsolvedourpuzzle,ifwehaven'tlocatedandexplainedtheconversationalruleormechanismbywhichtheskepticraises(orthreatenstoraise)thestandardsforknowledge.Andherecontextualistshavehad

8ThankstoRichardGrandyandtoPeterUngerforpressingthispoint.

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littletooffer.Thetwomainproposalsthathavebeenputforwardarediscussedinthefollowingtwosections.

3. SOMEOLDCONTEXTUALISTSOLUTIONS:LEWIS’S‘RULEOFACCOMMODATION’

ThoughsubstantialpapershavebeenlargelydevotedtocontextualismanditsabilitytoexplaintheworkingsofskepticalargumentslikeAl,oneofthebestattemptstoexplainhow(bywhatruleorconversationalmechanism)skepticsraisethestandardsforknowledgeistobefoundinDavidLewis's‘ScorekeepinginaLanguageGame’(1979a),apaperthat,whilenotprimarilyaboutknowledgeattributions,doestreattheminpassing.9

AccordingtoLewis,‘rulesofaccommodation’operateinmanyspheresofdiscoursethatcontaincontext‐sensitiveterms.10Suchrulesspecifythatwhenastatementismadecontainingsuchaterm,then—ceterisparibusandwithincertainlimits—the‘conversationalscore’tendstochange,ifneedbe,soastomakethatstatementtrue.Forexample,'flat',accordingtoLewis,isacontext‐sensitiveterm:howflatasurfacemustbeinorderforasentencedescribingitas‘flat’tobetrueisavariablematterthatisdeterminedbyconversationalcontext.Andonewaytochangetheconversationalscorewithrespecttothestandardsinplaceforflatnessistosaysomethingthatwouldrequireforitstruthsuchachangeinstandards.Suppose,forexample,thatinacertainconversationthestandardsforflatnessarerelaxedenoughthatmydesktopcountsasbeingflat.IfIwerethentosay,‘My

9Iamheredistinguishingamongcontextualistsolutionsaccordingtothemechanismorrulethattheyallegeraisesthestandardsforknowledge.AlthoughtherearesuggestionsoftheRelevantAlternatives(RA)approachin‘Scorekeeping,’Lewis'sRuleofAccommodationisquitedifferentfromthemechanismmostRAtheoristsposit—thustheseparatetreatmentofLewis.TotheextentthatLewisisarelevantalternativist,theRAaspectsofhistreatmentareaddressedbelowinsection4.

10Seeespecially346‐47.

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desktopisnotflat,’whatIsaywouldbefalseifitwereevaluatedaccordingtothestandardsforflatnessinplaceimmediatelybeforethisissaid.ButtheRuleofAccommodationspecifiesthatinsuchasituation—atleastundertherightcircumstances,wheretheceterisparibusclauseismet—thestandardsforflatnessareraisedsoastomakemystatementtrue.

Lewissuggeststhatskepticsmanipulateasimilarruletochangethestandardsforwhatistocountasknowledge.AccordingtoLewis'sexplanationoftheplausibilityofskepticism,then,theskeptic'sstatementschangetheconversationalscore—here,raisethestandardsforknowledge11—soastomaketheskeptic'sstatementstrue.Oncethestandardsforknowledgehavebeensoraised,then

the commonsensical epistemologist must concede defeat. And yet he was in no way wrong when he laid claim to infallible knowledge. What he said was true with respect to the score as it then was.12 (355)

HereLewisdisplaysthebasiccontextualiststrategy:Heprotectsthetruthofwhatweordinarilysay,orsaybeforetheskepticgetsaholdofus,fromtheskeptic'sattackbyexplainingthesuccessofthatattackintermsoftheskeptic'schangingwhatcountsasknowledge,or,here,‘infallibleknowledge.’Thus,thepersuasivenessoftheskeptic'sattackisexplainedinsuchawayastomakeitunthreateningtoourordinaryclaimsofknowledge.

Andthisexplanationinitiallyappearstobetailor‐madeforAI,forAl'sfirstpremiseisadenialofknowledge—preciselythetypeofassertionthatariseinthestandardsforknowledgecanhelptomaketrue.Suchadenial,then,isjustthesortofthingthatcanraisethestandardsforknowledgeviaaRuleofAccommodation.Perhapswhentheskepticassertsthisfirstpremise,thestandardsforknowledgeare

11ForLewis,asforRelevantAlternativestheorists(seesection4,below),thisraisingofepistemicstandardsconsistsinexpandingtherangeofrelevantalternativestowhatonebelieves,thatis,therangeofalternativesthatonemustbeinapositiontoeliminateinordertocountasknowing.

12Whycan'tthecommonsensicalepistemologistsimplydeclareagainthatheknows,andrelyonaRuleofAccommodationtolowerthestandardsbackdownsoastomakehisclaimtrue?TothisLewisrespondsthat,forsomeadmittedlyunknownreason,thestandardsaremoreeasilyraisedthanlowered(355).

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raised,viatheRuleofAccommodation,toalevelatwhichwecountasknowingneitherthatwe'renotBIVs,northatwehavehands.13

ButaRuleofAccommodationcannotreallyexplainthepersuasivenessofAI,or,moregenerally,ofanyargumentbyskepticalhypothesis.Tovividlyillustratewhythisisso,letusimagineandcomparetwoskepticswhoaretryingtoconvinceyouthatyoudon'tknowthatyouhavehands.The‘AIskeptic,’truetohername,reliesonAI,which,asInotedinsection1,isprettypowerful.The‘simpleskeptic,’ontheotherhand,simplyinsiststhatyoudon'tknowthatyouhavehands,offeringnoreasoningatallforthisskepticalassertion.

InseekingasolutiontothepuzzlegeneratedbyAI,weshouldhopeforasolutionthat,attheveryleast,explainswhytheAIskepticismoreconvincingthanthesimpleskeptic.Ifourexplanationdoesnotdothismuch,thenwehaven'texplainedhowtheskepticalargumentworksonusinanywaysufficienttodifferentiateitfromabald(anddogmatic!)skepticalassertion.

ButtheRuleofAccommodation,asitstands,appearstobeequallyaccommodatingtobothofourimaginedskeptics.WhenthesimpleskepticclaimsthatIdon'tknowthatIhavehands,thesupposedRuleofAccommodationshouldraisethestandardsforknowledgetosuchapointastomakeherclaimtrue.Ofcourse,theceterisparibusclausemayblockthisresult,dependingonhowitisfleshedout.ButthereisnothingtothisRule,atleastasithassofarbeenarticulated,thatwouldfavortheAIskepticoverthesimpleskeptic.Thus,theexplanationbasedonthisRuledoesnotdifferentiatebetweenthesetwoskeptics.Butifitdoesn'tdothat,itdoesn'tsolveourpuzzle.

Toavoidpossiblemisunderstanding,letmeclearlystatethatmyobjectionisnottotheproposedsolution'slackofprecision—thatwe'renotgivenaveryclearideaofwhentheRuleofAccommodationtakeseffect,thattheRulesaysmerelythat

13Tobefair,Lewis,asI'vepointedout,treatsknowledgeonlyinpassing.Althoughtheskepticheimaginesdoesutilizeaskepticalhypothesis(thatoneisthevictimofadeceivingdemon(355)),suggestingthatthetreatmentLewisoffersshouldbehelpfulinsolvingthepuzzleofskepticalhypotheses,heneverexplicitlyattemptsasolutiontoourpuzzle.Still,sincethesolutionatleastsuggestedbyLewisisoneofthebestonoffer,it'sworthestablishingthatitcan'treallysolvethepuzzle.

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thestandardstendtochangeinacertainwayprovidedthatthe(highlyunarticulated)ceterisparibusclauseismet.Myownsolutionwillbelikewiseimprecise.No,theproblemisn'tthattheRuleisn'tcompletelyfilledin,butratherthat,forthereasonsgivenabove,sincetheexplanatoryworkneededtosolvethepuzzleisn'tdonebytheaspectsoftheRulethathavebeenprovided,itwillhavetobedonebyjustthoseaspectsoftheRulethathaven'tbeenprovided.And,aswe'velittleideawhattheseaspectsare,we'velittleideaofwhatitisthatmaysolvethepuzzle.14

Perhaps,whenit'smorefullyarticulated,theoperativeRuleofAccommodationcanbeseentocontainafeaturethatfavorstheAIskepticoverthesimpleskeptic.Inthatcase,thesolutiontoourpuzzle,whichhassofareludedus,may(atleastinpart)befoundinafullerarticulationofthatRule.

ButIdoubtthatthesolutionevenliesinthatdirection.One(secondary)reasonformydoubtisthatpositiveclaimstoknowthatskepticalhypothesesdon'tobtainseemtoraisethestandardsforknowledgeaswellasdodenialsofsuchknowledge.

ToillustratethisI'lluseFredDretske'sfamiliarexampleofmulescleverlypaintedtolooklikezebras(Dretske197O,1O15‐16).IfIsawwhatlookedtobezebrasinthezebracageatazoo,Iwouldordinarilyclaimtoknowthattheanimalsinthecagearezebras.(Suppose,forinstance,thatmysonaskedme,‘Doyouknowwhatthoseanimalsare?’Iwouldrespondpositively.)AskepticmightchallengethissupposedknowledgewithaninstanceofAlwhereOisThoseanimalsarezebrasand

14NoneofthisistodenythatthereissomeRuleofAccommodationaccordingtowhichthestandardsforknowledgetendtoberaisedto‘accommodate’denialsofknowledge.NorisiteventodenythatsuchRulesofAccommodationhelptheAlskeptic.Infact,Ifinditplausibletosupposethatmanydenialsofknowledge,includingthoseofAlskeptics,oftendoexertanupwardpressureonthestandardsforknowledgeviasomesuchrule.Likewise,certainsettings(inadditiontocourtsoflaw,certainphilosophyclassesaregoodexamples),itseemstome,tendtomilitateinfavorofhighepistemicstandards.Alskepticsmaytakeadvantageofthesefactors,theinfluenceofwhichmayexplainsomeofthepersuasivenessoftheirskepticalperformances.Buttosolveourpuzzle,wewantprimarilytoexplainwhatthenatureoftheskepticalargumentitselfaddstotheeffectivenessoftheskeptic'sperformancethatgoesbeyondwhatiscontributedbytheskeptic'ssettingandthefactthatsheassertsherconclusion.

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HisThoseanimalsaremulescleverlypaintedtolooklikezebras.Theresultingpremisesareindividuallyplausible,sinceIcouldn'ttellacleverlypaintedmulefromazebra.AcontextualisttreatmentofthisinstanceofAlwillclaimthatinassertingthefirstpremise,theskepticraisesthestandardsforknowledgetoalevelatwhichIcountasknowingneitherthattheanimalsarenotcleverlypaintedmulesnorthatthey'rezebras.

Anditindeeddoesseemthatoncethisskepticalhypothesisisbroughtintoplay,IcannothappilyclaimtoknowwhatIsohappilyclaimedtoknowbefore.Tobeinagoodenoughpositiontoclaimtoknowthattheanimalsarezebrasaccordingtothestandardsbroughtintoplaybytheskeptic,onemustbeinagoodenoughpositionthatonecanruleout15thehypothesisthattheyarecleverlypaintedmules.SinceI'mnotinthatkindofepistemicposition,Idon'tcountasknowing,althoughperhapssomeonemorefamiliarwithmulesandzebraswouldstillcountasknowing,evenatthesehigherstandards—someone,forinstance,whowasinapositiontosay,‘No,theycan'tbemules:nomule'sheadisshapedlikethat.’

Butthesesamehigherstandardsseemtobeinducedwhentheskepticalhypothesisisbroughtintoplaybyapositiveclaimtoknowthatitdoesn'tobtain.Suppose,tovaryDretske'sexample,thatIamconfronted,notbyaskeptic,butbyaboastfulzoologist.Hebrags,‘Duetomyvastknowledgeofzebraandmuleanatomy,Iknowthatthoseanimalsarenotmulescleverlypaintedtolooklikezebras;soIknowthatthey'rereallyzebras.’Thiszoologist,asmuchastheskeptic,seemstoinvokehigherstandardsforknowledgeatwhichhe,butnotI,willcountasknowingthattheanimalsarezebras.HecertainlyseemstobeclaimingmorethanthemundaneknowledgethatevenIpossess—andclaimtopossess—inanordinaryzoosetting,wherethere'snosuchzoologisttellingmewhat'swhat.

ButaRuleofAccommodationcannotaccountforthisriseinstandards,forthezoologistdoesn'tdenyanysupposedknowledge.Tothecontrary,whathedoesismakepositiveclaimstoknow,andariseinstandardsforknowledgecanneverhelp

15Forsomecommentsonthisnotionof‘rulingout’seesections4and5,below.

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tomaketrueapositiveclaimtoknow.So,asIsaid,aRuleofAccommodationcan'tdoanythingtoexplainthisnotableriseinepistemicstandards.16

MyprimaryreasonfordoubtingthatoursolutionistobefoundinafullerarticulationoftheRuleofAccommodationisthis:ToexplainthepersuasivenessofAl(and,inparticular,ofitsfirstpremise)insuchawayastodifferentiatetheAlskepticfromthesimpleskeptic,wemustidentifythefeatureofskepticalhypothesesthatmakesitparticularlyhardtoclaimortothinkthatoneknowsthattheyarefalse.FarfrombeingfoundinaRuleofAccommodation,then,asolutiontoourpuzzle,ifit'stobefoundatall,istobefoundinanexplanationofwhatitisaboutskepticalhypothesesthatmakesthesepropositions,asopposedtoeversomanyotherpropositions,sucheffectiveskepticalweapons.So,tosolvethepuzzle,wemustlocateorarticulatethispeculiarlypotentfeatureofjustthesepropositions(theskepticalhypotheses).And,onceweseewhatthisfeatureisandhowitworks,theRuleofAccommodationisdestinedtoplayonlyarathersubsidiaryrole(seenote14)inexplainingtheeffectivenessoftheskeptic'sattack.

MysecondaryreasonfordoubtingthattheRuleofAccommodationmightsolveourpuzzlewasworthbringingupbothbecauseitseemstometohavesomeforce,andbecauseitvividlyillustratesthisimportantfact:Theupwardpressureonthestandardsforknowledgethatbringingskepticalhypothesesintoplayexertsisexertedwhetherthehypothesesareraisedindenialsofknowledgeorinpositiveclaimstoknow.

16It'sbeenproposedtome,onbehalfoftheRuleofAccommodationandthesolutiontoAlthatcanbebasedonit,thattheboastfulzoologist,whilehedoesnotsaythatIdon'tknow,doesstronglysuggestorimplythatIdon't,andtheRuleofAccommodationoperateshereonhissuggestion:thestandardsgoupsoastomakethesuggestiontrue.Iamskepticalofthisattempttosalvagethesolutionfortworeasons.First,Isuspectthattherulebecomesfartoopowerfulifit'sallowedtoworkonwhatwesuggestaswellasonwhatwesay.Second,thestandardsforknowledgeseemlikewiseraisedeveniftheboastfulzoologistthinksIamalsoanexpert,andthinksheisinformingmethathetooknowswhat'swhat.Herehe'snotevensuggestingthatIdon'tknow.

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4. SOMEOLDCONTEXTUALISTSOLUTIONS:THE‘RELEVANTALTERNATIVES’APPROACHANDTHERULEOFRELEVANCE17

Perhapsthemostpopularsolutiontoourpuzzlehasbeenputforwardbyadvocatesofthe‘RelevantAlternatives’theoryofknowledge(RA).AgainsupposeaspeakerAsays,‘SknowsthatP.’AccordingtoRA,suchanassertionismadewithinandmustbeevaluatedagainstacertainframeworkofrelevantalternativestoP.ToknowthatPistohaveatruebeliefthatPandtobeabletoruleouttheserelevantalternatives.ButnoteverycontraryoforalternativetoPisarelevantalternative.18Inanordinarycaseofclaimingtoknowthatsomeanimalsinthezooarezebras,toagainuseDretske'sexample,thealternativethatthey'recleverlypaintedmulesisnotrelevant.Thus,Icantruthfullyclaimtoknowthey'rezebrasdespitemyinabilitytoruleoutthisfancifulalternative.

Butinvariousextraordinarycases,thepaintedmuleshypothesisisarelevantalternative.ItmightbemaderelevantbysomeextraordinaryfeatureofS(theputativesubjectofknowledge)orhersurroundings.19ButmostRAtheoristsarecontextualists,andallowthatfeaturesoftheconversationalcontextinwhichA(theascriberofknowledge)findshimself,inadditiontofeaturesofSandhersurroundings,caninfluencewhichalternativesarerelevant.20AlvinGoldman,for

17FredDretske(seehis197O,1971,198la,198lb),althoughhedoesadvocateaRelevantAlternativestheoryofknowledge,proposesatreatmentofAIquitedifferentfromthatdescribedbelow.I'mnotcertainwhetherDretske'sisevenacontextualistversionofRA.(AsInoteinpart2ofmy1992a,onecanbeanRAtheoristwithoutbeingacontextualist.)OnethingisclearaboutDretske'streatmentofAI:Hedeniespremise(2).Giventhis,histreatmentrunsintothesamedifficultiesasdoesNozick's;seeespeciallysection9below.

18See,forexample,Dretske197O,1O22;Goldman1976,772;andStine1976,249.

19Thus,ifSisatazoothatfairlyconsistentlyusespaintedmulesinanattempttofoolthezoo‐goingpublic,thenthepaintedmulehypothesisisrelevant.So,eventhoughSisluckyenoughtobeatthiszooononeoftheraredayswhenactualzebrasarebeingused,Scannottruthfullybesaidtoknowthatthey'rezebrasunlesssheisabletoruleoutthepaintedmulehypothesis,whichshecan'tdounlesssheknowsmorethanIdoaboutzebrasandmules.

20AsIexplaininpart2ofmy1992a,anRAtheoristcanbeaninvariantistifheallowsonlyfactorsabouttheputativesubjectofknowledgeandhersurroundings,andnotconversationalfactorspertainingtothespeaker

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instance,suggeststhat‘ifthespeakerisinaclassinwhichDescartes'sevildemonhasjustbeendiscussed,’thencertainalternativesmayberelevantthatordinarilyarenot(1976:776).

Itisthiscontextualistaspectof(mostversionsof)RAthatfacilitatesthemostcommonlyproposedsolutiontoourpuzzle,theRelevantAlternativesSolution(henceforth,'RAS').Withsomeslightvariationsindetailindifferentpresentationsofit,thebasicideaofRASisthis:TheAlskeptic'smentioningoftheBIVhypothesisinpresentingthefirstpremiseofAlmakesthathypothesisrelevant.Oncetheskepticalhypothesishasbeenmaderelevant,wecorrectlysensethatwecannottruthfullyclaimtoknowanythingcontrarytoitunlesswecanruleitout.Sinceweareunabletoruleitout,andsinceitisanalternativetobothIamnotaBIVandtoIhavehands,wecorrectlysensethatwecouldonlyfalselyclaimtoknowthesethings.Sotheskeptictruthfullyassertsthatwedon'tknowthatthehypothesisdoesn'tobtain,andthentruthfullyconcludesthatwedon'tknowthatwehavehands.21

Whythenarewepuzzled?BecauseweatthesametimerealizethattheBIVhypothesisisnotordinarilyrelevant.Werealizethatinmostoftheconversationalcircumstancesinwhichwefindourselves,ourinabilitytoruleouttheskeptic'sfar‐fetchedhypothesisisnobartoourtruthfullyclaimingtoknowsuchthingsasthatwehavehands.Thus,evenaswefindtheskeptic'sdenialsofknowledgepersuasive,werealizethatwhenweagainfindourselvesinmoreordinarycontexts,itwillnotonlybecorrectforustoclaimtoknowsuchthings,itwouldbewrongtodenythatweknowthemmerelybecausewecan'truleouttheBIVhypothesis.Whatwefailtorealize,accordingtoRAS,isthatourordinaryclaimstoknowsuchthingsasthatwe

(theascriberofknowledge),toaffectwhichalternativesarerelevant.Mattersgettrickywithfirst‐personknowledgeclaims,whereSandAareidentical.Here,inadditiontoallowingfeaturesthataffecthowgoodanepistemicpositionoursubjectactuallyisin,andthattherebyattachtoherquaputativesubjectofknowledge,contextualistRAtheoristswillalsoallowfeaturesofherconversationalcontext,whichaffecthowgoodapositionshemustbeintocountasknowing,andwhichtherebyattachtoherquaattributorofknowledge,toinfluencewhattherangeofrelevantalternativesis.

21Again,hereI'monlygivingtheskeptic‐friendlyversionofthiscontextualistsolution.AnRAtheoristmightbelessfriendlytotheskepticbyholding,forexample,thatmentioninganalternativemakesthatalternativerelevantonlyifone'sconversationalpartnerletsonegetawaywithmakingitrelevant.

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havehandsarecompatiblewiththeskeptic'spresentdenialthatweknowthoseverythings.

RAS,then,isaninstanceofthegeneralcontextualiststrategy—oneaccordingtowhichtheraisingofthestandardsconsistsinenlargingtherangeofalternativesthatarerelevantandthatonemustthereforebeinapositiontoruleoutinordertocountasknowing.TheconversationalruleormechanismthatRASpositsforenlargingthatrange(raisingthestandardsforknowledge),then,isthatmentioningapropositionQ—ceterisparibusandwithincertainlimits,nodoubt—tendstomakeQacontextuallyrelevantalternativetoanyPthatiscontrarytoQ.CallthistheRuleofRelevance.22

NotethatthisRuleofRelevance,asopposedtotheRuleofAccommodation,canhandlecaseslikethatoftheboastfulzoologist,inwhichapositiveclaimtoknowthataskepticalhypothesisdoesn'tobtainseemstohavethesameeffectonthemeaningofsentencescontaining'know'aswouldadenialofsuchknowledge.ThisistobeexpectedonthepresentRuleofRelevance,onwhichboththedenialandtheclaimtoknowwill,byincludingamentionoftheskepticalhypothesis,expandtherangeofrelevantalternativessothatitwillincludethathard‐to‐rule‐outhypothesis.

ButtoexplainthepersuasivenessofAI(particularlyofitsfirstpremise),andtotherebysolveourpuzzle,atreatmentofAImusttelluswhatitisaboutskepticalhypothesesthatmakesitdifficulttoclaimtoknowthattheydon'tobtain.ThekeyfeatureofskepticalhypothesesthatRASseizesonisclearlythis:wecan'trulethemout.

22Ofcourse,itshouldn'tbeheldthatjustanymentionofapropositionmakesthatpropositionarelevantalternative.Inordertobemaderelevant,thepropositionmust,nodoubt,beinsertedintoaconversationintherightway.ButtheadvocateofRAScanplausiblyclaimtohaveexplainedthepersuasivenessofAIevenifhehasn'tgivenanexactspecificationoftheconditionsunderwhichamentioningofapropositionmakesthatpropositionarelevantalternative.PlausiblyholdingthatinpresentingAItheskepticdoesinsertherskepticalhypothesisintotheconversationintherightway,theadvocateofRAScanleaveitasafutureprojecttospecifymoreexactlyjustwhichwaysaretherightways.Althoughthisbyitselfwillbeneithernecessarynorsufficientforthementioningofapropositiontobeoftherightkindtoenlargetherangeofrelevantalternativessoastoincludeit,itnonethelessmayberelevantthatintheskeptic'spresentationofAl'sfirstpremise,thementioningofthehypothesisoccurswithinthescopeofanepistemicoperator—’Sdoesnotknowthat....’

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Andisn'ttheresomethingtothisexplanation?Foritseemsthatweindeedcan'truleout(effective)skepticalhypotheses,anditfurtherseemsthatitispreciselythisfactthatmakesthemsucheffectiveskepticalweapons.

Butthoughitisplausibletosupposewecan'truleoutskepticalhypotheses,andalsoplausibletosaythatwedon'tknowthattheydon'tobtain,itisfutiletotrytoexplaintheplausibilityofthelatterbythatoftheformer.

Indeed,thereareplentyofotherphrasesthatcanbeusedplausiblytodescribeourapparentlylimitedepistemicpositionwithregardtoeffectiveskepticalhypotheses.Allofthefollowingdescriptionsaboutmypositionvis‐a‐vistheBIVhypothesishavesomeinitialplausibility:Icannotruleitout,Idon'tknowthatitdoesn'tobtain(anddon'tknowwhetheritobtains),Ican'ttellthatitdoesn'tobtain(andcan'ttellwhetheritobtains),Ican'tdiscernthatitdoesn'tobtain(andcan'tdiscernwhetheritobtains),andIcan'tdistinguishitsobtainingfromitsnotobtaining,andsoon,andsoforth.Butcitingoneofthesetoexplaintheplausibilityofanotherdoesn'toccasioneventheslightestadvanceinourunderstanding.

WhataccountsfortheplausibilityofsayingthatIdon'tknowthatI'mnotaBIV?ThefactthatIcan'tdiscernthatI'mnotone?Thisisnoexplanation.Itseemsjustasgood(infact,tome,better)toreversethingsandclaimthatthefactthatIdon'tknowthatI'mnotaBIVaccountsfortheplausibilityofsayingthatIcan'tdiscernthatI'mnotone.

Likewiseforrulingout.Itisindeedplausibletosupposethatwecan'truleoutskepticalhypotheses.Andit'splausiblethatwedon'tknowthattheydon'tobtain.Butitdoesn'tseemtoadvanceourunderstandingmuchtoexplaintheplausibilityofeitherbythatoftheother.

(Anexerciseforthereader:Randomlypicktwooftheabovenegativeassessmentsofourepistemicpositionvis‐a‐viseffectiveskepticalhypotheses.Thenconsiderwhethertheplausibilityofthefirstcanbeexplainedbyreferencetothesecond.Thenreversethingsandconsiderwhethertheplausibilityofthesecondcanbeexplainedbyreferencetothefirst.Trythesameprocedureonanotherpairofdescriptions.(Ifyou'rerunninglowonsuchnegativeassessments,you'llfindit'seasy,followingmylead,tocomeupwithmanymoreonyourown.)Thenevaluate

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thesuccessofexplainingtheplausibilityofAl'sfirstpremisebyreferencetothefactthatwecan'truleouteffectiveskepticalhypotheses.)

Toexplainwhywefeelsomepulltowardsdescribingourepistemicpositionwithregardtoskepticalhypothesesinanyoftheabovelessthanflatteringways—aswellasverymanyotherwaysthatIdidn'tbothertomention—weneedanexplanationthatreachesoutsidethiscircleofall‐too‐closelyrelatedtermsofepistemicappraisal.23Indeed,aswillemergeinthefollowingsections(especiallysection8),thebestexplanationfortheplausibilityofAl'sfirstpremisealsoseemstoprovideagoodaccountofwhyitseemsthatwecan'truleoutskepticalhypotheses,aswellasanexplanationoftheplausibilityofthevariousotherpessimisticevaluations.Oncethisexplanationisinplace,itbecomesevenclearerthatnoneofthethingsit'susedtoexplaincanbeproperlyusedtoexplaineachother.

5. THESUBJUNCTIVECONDITIONALSACCOUNT(SCA)OFTHEPLAUSIBILITYOFAI’SFIRSTPREMISE

Themainstumblingblockofthecontextualistsolutionswe'vediscussedhasbeenafailuretoexplainwhatitisaboutskepticalhypothesesthatmakesitsoplausibletosupposethatwedon'tknowthatthey'refalse.ThispointofweaknessinthecontextualistsolutionsistheparticularpointofstrengthofNozick'streatmentofAIinhisPhilosophicalExplanations(1981).InthisandthefollowingthreesectionsI'llpresentanddefendtheSubjunctiveConditionalsAccount(SCA)oftheplausibilityofAl'sfirstpremise,whichI'veabstractedfromNozick'saccountofknowledgeandskepticism.

23Goldman(1976)cashesout‘discriminating’whatonebelievesfromarelevantalternativetoitintermsofwhatonewouldbelieveifthealternativeobtained.This,combinedwiththeRuleofRelevance,couldyieldanapproachtoskepticismclosetotheoneI'llheredefend.Goldmanhimselfdoesnotproposeasolutiontotheskepticalproblem;hestrivestoremainneutralontheissue.ButI'llbeworkinginthegeneraldirectionIthinkGoldmanpointsto.

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AccordingtoSCA,theproblemwithmybeliefthatI'mnotaBIV—andIdohavesuchabelief,asdomostofus—isthatIwouldhavethisbelief(thatI'mnotaBIV)evenifitwerefalse(evenifIwereone).ItisthisthatmakesithardtoclaimtoknowthatI'mnotaBIV.For,accordingtoSCA,wehaveaverystronggeneral,thoughnotexceptionless,inclinationtothinkthatwedon'tknowthatPwhenwethinkthatourbeliefthatPisabeliefwewouldholdevenifPwerefalse.Let'ssaythatS'sbeliefthatPisinsensitiveifSwouldbelievethatPifPwerefalse.SCA'sgeneralizationcanthenberestatedasfollows:WetendtojudgethatSdoesn'tknowthatPwhenwethinkS'sbeliefthatPisinsensitive.

Asiswellworthnoting,thisgeneralinclinationexplainstheoperationofnonphilosophicalskepticalhypothesesthatarefarlessradicalthantheBIVhypothesisoreventhepaintedmulehypothesis.Justso,itservestoexplainwhy,eventhoughIfeelinclinedtosaythatIknowtheBullswontheirgamelastnightbecauseIreadtheresultinasinglenewspaper,Istillfeelstronglypulledtowardadmittingthe(mildly)skepticalclaimthatIdon'tknowthatthepaperisn'tmistakenaboutwhichteamwon:Irealizethatmybeliefthatthepaperisn'tmistakenisabeliefIwouldholdevenifitwerefalse(evenifthepaperweremistaken).

Indeed,afterencounteringacoupleofinstancesofAIwithdifferentskepticalhypothesespluggedintothe'H'slot(forexample,theBIV,thepaintedmules,andthemistakenpaperhypotheses),onedevelopsasenseofwhatmakesforaneffectiveskepticalhypothesisand,thus,anabilitytoconstructconvincinginstancesofAIoneself.TomakeAl'ssecondpremiseconvincing,itisusuallysufficient(thoughnotnecessary)thatHbeincompatiblewithO.Butwhataboutthefirstpremise?Tomakeitconvincing,weinstinctivelylookforahypothesisthatelicitsinthelistenerboththebeliefthatthehypothesisdoesn'tobtainandanacknowledgementthatthisbeliefisoneshewouldholdevenifthehypothesisdidobtain.

Uponhearingthehypothesis,typicallyonecan'thelpbutprojectingoneselfintoit.Howwouldthingsseemtomeifthatsituationobtained?Well,prettymuch(orsometimesexactly)astheyactuallyseemtome.And,so,whatwouldIbelieveifsucha‘strange’situationobtained?Prettymuch(orexactly)whatIactuallybelieve.

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Forexample,andinparticular,ifIwereaBIV,IwouldbelieveeverybitasfirmlyasIactuallydothatIwasn'tone.ButifthisbeliefisoneIwouldholdevenifitwerefalse,howcanIbeinapositiontotellthat,ordiscernthat,orknowthat,it'strue?

AsI'vejusthinted,asimilarexplanation,intermsofsubjunctiveconditionals,canexplaintheplausibilityoftheotherwayswefeelinclinedtodescribeourseeminglylimitedepistemicpositionvis‐a‐viseffectiveskepticalhypotheses.Considerespeciallythedescriptioninvolving'rulingout'.Inanormalzoosetting,mostofuswouldtakeourselvestoknowthattheanimalsinthezebracagearezebras.Fromthis,itseems,weshouldbeabletoinferthatthey'renotcleverlypaintedmules,sincezebrasaren'tmules.Sowhyarewereluctanttocountourseeingthezebrasandperformingthisinferenceasacaseofrulingoutthepaintedmulehypothesis?Because,theexplanationgoes,evenafterperformingtheinference,itstillseemswewouldbelievetheobservedanimalsweren'tpaintedmulesiftheywerepreciselythat.Whydoesitseemwecan'ttellthatthey'renotpaintedmules?Becausewewouldbelievetheyweren'teveniftheywere.Dittoforwhyweseeminglycan'tdiscernthatthey'renotandwhyitseemswecan'tdistinguishtheirbeingcleverlypaintedmulesfromtheirnotbeingsuch,etc.

AlsoworthnotingistheusefulnessofSCAinexplainingourreluctancetoascribeknowledgeincertainlotterysituations.Evenwheretheoddsofyourbeingaloserareastronomicallyhigh(thereare2Omilliontickets,onlyoneofwhichisawinner,andyouhavebutoneticket),itcanseemthatyoudon'tknowthatyou'realoserofafairlotteryifthewinnerhasn'tyetbeenannounced.SCAaccountsforthisseeming:Yourbeliefthatyou'realoserisoneyouwouldholdevenifyouwerethewinner.

SCAisapowerfulexplanation.Butthereareproblems.AsIsuggestedabove,thereareexceptionstothegeneralinclinationtowhichSCAappeals:TherearecasesinwhichitseemstousthatsomeSdoesknowthatPeventhoughwejudgethatSwouldbelievethatPevenifPwerefalse.Someoftheseexceptionswillbequicklydiscussedinsections6and7below.Thefirstandmainpointtomakeregardingsuchexceptions,ofcourse,isthatthisverygeneralinclinationneedn'tbeexceptionlesstoperformtheexplanatoryroleSCAassignsit.Insection8wewillseestronggroundsforendorsingSCAasbeingatleastontherighttrackdespitethe

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exceptionstothegeneralizationtowhichitappeals.Buttheseexceptionsarestillworthexamining,fortheywillindicatecertainimportantdirectionsinwhichSCAcanbeimproved,eventhoughwewon'tbeinapositiontomakeSCAideallyprecisehere.

6. SCA,GRANDMOTHERS,ANDMETHODS

First,then,consideracasediscussedbyNozick:

A grandmother sees her grandson is well when he comes to visit; but if he were sick or dead, others would tell her he was well to spare her upset. Yet this does not mean she doesn't know he is well (or at least ambulatory) when she sees him. (1981, 179)

Here,itseems,thegrandmotherknowshergrandsoniswell,thoughitcanseemthatshedoesn'tsatisfythethirdconditionofapreliminaryformofNozick'sanalysisofSknowsthatP,whichis:

(3) If p weren't true, S wouldn't believe that p.

Nozick'sresponseistorelativizethisthirdconditiontothemethodbywhichShascometobelievethatp,yielding:

(3) If p weren't true and S were to use M to arrive at a belief whether (or not) p, then S wouldn't believe, via M, that p (179),

where'M'isthemethodbywhichShascometobelievethatp.24

UnlikeNozick,I'mnotpresentingananalysisofpropositionalknowledge.ButhisgrandmothercasealsoseemstobeanexceptiontothegeneralinclinationSCAappealsto:Herewe'renotatallinclinedtothinkthegrandmotherdoesn'tknowher

24Precisely,whatNozickdoesisthis:Heanalyzesthetechnicallocution'Sknows,viamethodM,thatp',andtheninturnanalyzestherelationofS'sknowingthatpintermsofthistechnicallocution.TherevisedthirdconditionI'vedisplayedispartofNozick'sattempttoanalyzethetechnicallocution.

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grandsoniswell,eventhoughitcanseemthatifheweren'twell,shewouldstillbelievehewas.ThegeneralizationSCAutilizessaysthatwetendtojudgethatSdoesn'tknowwhereSdoesnotsatisfyNozick'sthirdconditionforknowledge.OnepossibilityhereistofollowNozickverycloselybymodifyingthatgeneralizationsothatitreferstoNozick'smodified,ratherthanhisoriginal,thirdcondition,andthus,likeNozick,explicitlyrelativizingouraccounttothemethodbywhichSbelievesthatP.

Often,though,contexttakescareofthisforus.Eventooneawareofthelikelihoodthatthegrandmother'sfamilywouldhavekeptherinthedarkabouthergrandson'sconditionwerehenotwell,itcanseemthatevenNozick'sinitialformulationofthethirdconditionforknowledgeismetbythegrandmother.Ononewayofevaluatingthatsimpleconditional,itseemsthatifthegrandsonwerenotwell,thegrandmotherwouldnotbelievehewaswell.Afterall,she'slookingrightathim!Thestandardpossible‐worldssemanticsforcounterfactualconditionalscanilluminatewhat'sgoingonhere.Whenonesearchesforthepossibleworldsmostsimilartotheactualworldinwhichthegrandsonisnotwell,therespectsinwhichthepossibleworldsaretoresembletheactualworldisahighlycontext‐sensitivematter.Especiallywherethecontextfocusesone'sattentiononthegrandmotherandhercognitiveandrecognitionalabilities,onecanplaceheavyweightuponsimilaritywithrespecttothemethodsheisusingtoarriveatherbelief,andthenitcanseemthatintheclosestworldinwhichthegrandsonisnotwell,she'slookingrightathimandseeingthathe'snotwell,andsodoesnotbelieveheiswell.Onthiswayofevaluatingtheconditional,thegrandmotherdoessatisfyeventheinitialformulationofNozick'sthirdcondition,andshe'snocounter‐exampletothegeneralizationutilizedbySCA.But,inevaluatingthatsimpleconditional,onecanalsostressothersimilarities,particularlyonesinvolvingthepropensitiesandplansofthevariousfamilymembers(orwhateverfactsgroundthejudgmentthatifhergrandsonweren'twell,thegrandmotherwouldbeeffectivelyliedto),toreachtheverdictthatifhewerenotwell,shewouldbelievethathewaswell.

WecansharpenSCAbyspecifyingthatwetendtojudgethatSdoesn'tknowwhenshefailstosatisfyNozick'sinitialformulationof(3),where(3)isevaluatedinsuchawaythatheavyemphasisisputuponsimilaritywithrespecttothemethodofbeliefformationutilizedbyS,or,followingNozick,wecaninsertaspecificationof

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themethodintotheantecedentof(3).25Butinneithercaseisthistomakeaveryprecisemodification;rather,itmerelyindicatesthedirectioninwhichamorepreciseaccountmightlie,foranysuchuseofthenotionofmethodsofbeliefformationinouraccountinvitesahostofquestions(manyofwhichNozickwrestleswith)involvinghowsuchmethodsaretobespecifiedandindividuated.

7. SCAANDSOMESKEPTICALHYPOTHESESTHATDON’TWORK

CertaininstancesofAIaren'tverypersuasive.ThefirstpremiseoftheargumentcanbequiteunconvincingdespitethefactthatSCApredictsthatwe'dfinditplausible.Suppose,forinstance,thatinanattempttoshowbyAIthatIdon'tknowIhavehands,askepticutilizes,insteadoftheBIVhypothesis,thefollowingsimpleH:IfalselybelievethatIhavehands.TheresultinginstanceofAlseemstopacklittleornomorepunchthanasimpleskeptic'sunsupportedclaimthatIdon'tknowIhavehands.It'satthefirstpremisethatthisill‐fatedinstanceofAlfizzles.ButmybeliefthatIdon'tfalselybelievethatIhavehandsisinsensitive:Ifthisbeliefwerefalse(ifIdidfalselybelievethatIhavehands)Iwouldstillbelieveitwastrue(I'dstillbelievethatIdon'tfalselybelievethatIhavehands).Likewiseinsensitiveismybeliefthatthefollowinghypothesisisfalse:I'manintelligentdogwho'salwaysincorrectlythinkingthatIhavehands.Ifthisbeliefofminewerefalse(ifIweresuchadeludedintelligentdog)I'dstillbelieveitwastrue(I'dstillbelievethatIwasn'tsuchacreature).SoSCA,asithassofarbeenformulated,predictsthatitwillseemtousthattheabovebeliefsdon'tamounttoknowledgeandthatwe'llfindplausiblethefirstpremiseofAlthatresultswhentheabovehypothesesareused.Butinfact

25Thesearenotidenticalmodifications.Onthefirstoption,similaritywithrespecttomethodisweightedheavily,butcanbeoutweighedbyotherfactors.Thus,evensoevaluated,themostsimilarworld(s)inwhichtheantecedentoftheoriginal(3)aretruemaybeworldsthatdivergefromtheactualworldwithrespecttothemethodbywhichScametobelievethatP.Bycontrast,onthesecondoption,sincethemethodbywhichSbelievesthatPbecomespartoftheantecedentoftheconditionalwe'reevaluating(themodified(3)),theclosestpossibleworld(s)inwhichthatantecedentistruecannotbeworldsthatdivergefromtheactualworldwithrespecttomethod.

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theseinstancesofAl'sfirstpremisearefarfromconvincing.AsopposedtotheBIVhypothesis,itseemsthatonedoesknowthatthedeludeddoghypothesisandthesimplefalsebeliefhypothesisarefalse.

Again,themainpointtomakehereisthatSCA'sgeneralizationneedn'tbeexceptionlesstobeexplanatory.WhileamorepreciselyChisholmedrefinementofSCAmightnothavethenegationsoftheseineffectiveH'sasinstancesofthosepropositionsitsayswetendtojudgewedon'tknow,I'llherejustmakeapreliminaryobservationastowhatmightbegoingwrong.Partoftheproblemwiththese‘hypotheses’isthattheydon'tgiveusmuchofanideaofhowIcometohavethefalsebelieftheyassigntome.Hypothesesaresupposedtoexplain;skepticalhypothesesshouldexplainhowwemightcometobelievesomethingdespiteitsbeingfalse.ThefirstofthesehypothesessimplystipulatesthatI'mwrongaboutmyhavinghands,withoutindicatinghowIcametobesosadlymistaken.ThesecondaddstothefirstthatI'madog,whichaddslittletoourunderstandingofhowmymistakeabouthavinghandscameabout.Bycontrast,whenweencountereffectiveskepticalhypotheses,wehavesomeunderstandingofhow(ifHistrue)wehavecometofalselybelievethatO.IfeitherofourineffectivehypothesesisfilledinsoastomakeitcleartoushowIcametofalselybelieveIhavehands,itbecomeseffective.

SCA'sgeneralizationwasthis:WetendtojudgethatSdoesn'tknowthatPwhenwethinkthatS'sbeliefthatPisinsensitive(whenwethinkthatSwouldbelievePevenifPwerefalse).ThelimitationofSCA'sgeneralizationthat'ssuggestedbythesecasesisthis:Wedon'tsojudgeourselvesignorantofPwherenot‐Pimpliessomethingwetakeourselvestoknowtobefalse,withoutprovidinganexplanationofhowwecametofalselybelievethisthingwethinkweknow.Thus,IfalselybelievethatIhavehandsimpliesthatIdon'thavehands.SinceIdotakemyselftoknowthatIhavehands(thisbeliefisn'tinsensitive),andsincetheaboveitalicizedpropositiondoesn'texplainhowIwentwrongwithrespecttomyhavinghands,I'lljudgethatIdoknowthatpropositiontobefalse.Butthisagainisjustapreliminarystatement,andthere'sroomforalotmorerefinementhere.Whatweneednowissomeassurancethatwe'reheadedintherightdirection.

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8. SCACONFIRMED

Suchassuranceistobefoundbyconsideringwhatitwouldtaketomakeitseemtousthatwedoknowskepticalhypothesestobefalse.

Butlet'sfirstreconsiderthelotterycase.Asnotedaboveinsection5,wearepuzzlinglyreluctanttoclaimknowledgeincertainlotterysituations.TheexplanationprovidedbySCAforthisphenomenonisintuitivelyappealing:Itdoesseemthatthefactthatwewouldbelievethatwewerelosersevenifwewerewinnersislargelywhat'sbehindourjudgmentthatwedon'tknowwe'relosers.SCAreceivesfurtherpowerfulsupportwhenweconsiderthegroundsthatdoseemtoussufficientforknowledgeofone'sbeingaloser.Inthelotterysituation,evenaveryminutechanceofbeingwrongseemstodepriveoneofknowledge.Butifwe'regoingtoworryaboutevensuchminutechancesoferror,thenwhydoesitseemthatyoudoknowyou'realoserafterthewinningnumberhasbeenannouncedontheradioandyou'vecomparedthenumbersonyourticketwiththesadlydifferentnumbersannounced?Afterall,radioannouncementscanbeinerror;whatyou'rehearingmaynotbearealradioannouncementbutthevoiceofafriendwho'sriggedupapracticaljoke;youmightbesufferingfromsomeweirdmomentaryvisualillusionandmisreadingthenumbersonyourticket;andsoforth.Allveryremotepossibilities,tobesure.But,sincewe'realreadycountenancingeventhemostminutechancesoferror,whydon'tthesepossibilitiesrobusofknowledgeevenaftertheannouncementhasbeenmadeandheard?

SCA'sexplanationofwhywedon'tthinkweknowbeforetheannouncementismadeisthatweatthattimejudgethatifweweren'tlosers,we'dstillbelievethatwewere.Notethatonceyou'veheardtheannouncementofthewinningnumbersandcomparedthemwiththenumbersonyourticket,itnolongerseemsthatifyouhadbeenthewinner,you'dbelieveyouwerealoser.Rather,wejudgethatinthatcaseyou'dnowbelieveyouwerethewinnerorwouldatleastbesuspendingjudgmentasyoufranticallydouble‐checkedthematch.It'sveryimpressivethattheveryoccurrencethatwouldsufficetomakeitseemtousthatyoudoknowyou'realoser(theradioannouncement)alsoreversesourjudgmentregardingthetruthoftheconditionalappealedtoinSCAtoexplainwhyitseemstousthatyoudon'tknow

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beforetheannouncementismade.TheoccurrencewhichgetsustojudgethatweknowherealsoremoveswhatSCApositsastheblocktoourjudgingthatweknow.ThisisanindicationthatSCAhascorrectlyidentifiedtheblock.

SCAsimilarlyprovidesaveryintuitivelyappealingexplanationforwhyitseemstousthatwedon'tknowthatskepticalhypothesesarefalse,aswasalsonotedinsection5.Itagainreceivespowerfulfurtherconfirmationaswelooktocasesinwhichoneseeminglydoesknowthataskepticalhypothesisdoesn'tobtain(casesinwhichskepticalhypothesesthatareordinarilyeffectivefailtobeeffective).TheboastfulzoologistIintroducedtowardtheendofsection3,itseems,knowsthattheanimalsinthezebracagearenotcleverlypaintedmules,whileI,itseems,donot.Buttheveryanatomicalknowledgethatseeminglyenableshimtoknowthey'renotpaintedmulesalsohastheconsequencethatiftheanimalswerecleverlypaintedmules,thezoologist,unlikeme,wouldnotbelievethattheyweren't.AndalthoughIdon'tseemtoknowthey'renotpaintedmulessimplybylookingatthem,Icould,itseems,gettoknowthisifIundertooksomespecialinvestigation—perhaps,ashasbeensuggestedintheliterature(Stine1976:252),oneinvolvingpaintremover.Whichspecialinvestigationswoulddothetrick(andunderwhichcircumstanceswouldthey)?Asurveyofvariousscenariosyieldsanimpressivecorrelation:Theinvestigationsthatwouldseeminglyallowmetoknowthattheanimalsaren'tpaintedmuleswouldalsoaffectourjudgmentastothetruthvalueofthesubjunctiveconditionalsocriticaltoSCA.OnceIhavecompletedtheinvestigation,itseemsthatI,likethezoologist,wouldnotbelievethattheanimalsweren'tpaintedmulesifinfacttheywere.Likewise,bycheckingappropriatelyindependentsources,IcouldgetmyselfintoapositioninwhichIseeminglywouldknowthatthenewspaperisn'tmistakenaboutwhethertheBullswonlastnight.Butthechecksthatwouldseeminglyallowthisknowledgewouldalsomakeitseemthatifthepaperweremistaken,Iwouldnotbelieveitwasn't.Againandagain,SCApositsacertainblocktoourjudgingthatweknow,andthechangesthatwouldclearthewayforourjudgingthatweknowalsoremovethisblock.ThismakesitdifficultnottobelievethatSCAisatleastroughlycorrect.

InthecaseoftheBIVhypothesis,it'shardtotestSCAinthisway,forit'sdifficulttoimagineasituationinwhichitseemsasubjectdoesknowthatshe'snotaBIV.ButthisonlyconfirmsSCA:Whileit'sdifficulttoimagineasituationinwhich

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oneseemstoknowthatone'snotaBIV,it'slikewisedifficulttoimaginecircumstancesinwhichtheblockSCApositsisremoved.It'sdifficult,thatis,toimagineasituationinwhichsomeonebelievesthey'renotaBIVbutinwhichtheconditionalIfSwereaBIV,thenSwouldbelieveshewasn'taBIVisn'ttrue.For,astheBIVhypothesisisformulated,one'sbrainiselectrochemicallystimulatedsothatonehaspreciselythosesensoryexperiencesoneactuallyhashad.Butwouldn'tonethenhaveformedpreciselythosebeliefsthatoneactuallyhasformed,includingthebeliefthatone'snotaBIV?

UnlikethatinvolvedintheRelevantAlternativesSolution,thepresentexplanationfortheplausibilityofAl'sfirstpremisecan'tbehappilyreversed:TryingtoaccountfortheplausibilityofthesubjunctiveconditionalIfHweretrue,Iwouldbelieveitwasfalse,byreferencetothe(presumed)factthatIdon'tknowthatHisfalsecertainlyseemstogetthingsbackwards.MuchbettertofollowtheproposedNozickeanrouteinexplainingtheplausibilityofdenyingknowledgebyreferencetotheconditional.

Further,aswasthecasewithnotknowing,theinvestigationsthatwouldreverseourotherpessimisticjudgmentsregardingyourstandingvis‐a‐visaskepticalhypothesiswouldalsoputyouinapositiontosaythatyouwouldn'tbelievethehypothesisisfalseifitweretrue.Thus,forinstance,tomakeitseemthatyoucantellthatthoseanimalsaren'tpaintedmules,youmustputyourselfinsuchapositionthatyouwouldn'tbelievetheyweren'tiftheywere.And,aswasthecasewithnotknowing,noneoftheseexplanationsbysubjunctiveconditionalsseemshappilyreversible.

Itseemsthatthisexplanation,SCA,fortheplausibilityofAl'sfirstpremisemustbe(atleastroughly)correctand,therefore,thatitpointstopartofthesolutiontoourpuzzle.

Indeed,somereaderswillwonderwhyIhaveclaimedonlythatourgeneraltendencynottocountinsensitivebeliefsasinstancesofknowledgeexplainsthatpremise'splausibilityandhavestoppedshortofacceptingsensitivityasanecessary

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conditionforknowledge26andthereforesimplyendorsingthatfirstpremiseastrue.Butwhilewe'vejustseenstronggroundsforsimplyacceptingAl'sfirstpremise,therearealsostronggroundsforacceptingAl'ssecondpremiseandforacceptingthedenialofitsconclusion.Wehavetostopshortsomewhere;wecan'tsimplyacceptallthreemembersofthistriadastrue.Tosolvethispuzzle,I'llclaimthatAl'sfirstpremise,whilenotsimplytrue,istrueaccordingtounusuallyhighstandardsforknowledge.But,I'llargue,mysolutionexplainswhythatpremiseseemstrueand,moregenerally,whysensitivityseemsnecessaryforknowledge.Ifmysolutionprovidesthebestexplanationforhowallthreemembersofourpuzzlingtriadseemtrue,thatwillbegoodreasonforstoppingshortwheremysolutiontellsusto,ratherthanwhereoneofitsinferiorrivals—boldskepticism,forexample—tellsusto.

9. NOZICK’SOWNSOLUTIONANDTHEABOMINABLECONJUNCTION

Nozick'sowntreatmentofAI,fromwhichSCAwasabstracted,fails.ThistreatmentisbasedonNozick'saccountofknowledgeastrue,sensitivebelief,where,veryroughly,one'struebeliefthatpissensitivetothetruthvalueofpifonewouldnothavebelievedthatpifphadbeenfalse.27Thus,Nozick'streatmentofAIinvolvesacceptingtheskeptic'sfirstpremise.But,atthesametime,andmuchmoreunfortunately,italsoinvolvesdenyingthesecond.Youdon'tknowthatyou'renotaBIV,Nozickclaims,becauseanybeliefyoumighthavetothiseffectisinsensitive:

26Or,giventheexceptionstothegeneraltendencythatwe'vediscussedinsections6and7,whyIhaven'tacceptedthatsomeproperlyChisholmedrefinementofthesensitivityrequirement(whichhasasinstancesofitconvincinginstancesofAl'sfirstpremise)isnecessaryforknowledge.

27ThoughthisstatementofNozick'saccountofknowledgeisrough,thatwillnotaffectmytreatment,whichwouldapplyequallywelltoNozick'sfullaccount.I'veskippedentirelyNozick'sfourthconditionforknowledge,butIbelievethisfourthconditiontoberedundant,anyway:Itautomaticallyholdswhenevertruebeliefispresent.Also,asI'vealreadynoted,Nozicktakesaccountofthemethodofbeliefformationinhisfinalversionofthethirdcondition.Thesamethinghappenswiththefourth.

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Youwouldhaveheldthisbeliefevenifitwerefalse(evenifyouwereaBIV).Bycontrast,Nozickclaims,yourbeliefthatyouhavehandsisasensitivebelief:Ifitwerefalse—ifyoudidn'thavehands—youwouldnotholdit.Soyoudoknowyouhavehandseventhoughyoudon'tknowthatyou'renotaBIV.Theskeptic'smistake—thesecondpremise—issupposingthatyoucanknowyouhavehandsonlyifyoualsoknowthatyou'renotaBIV.

OrsoNozickclaims.ThisisnottheplaceforageneralevaluationofNozick'sanalysisofpropositionalknowledge,soletusconfineourselvestotheresultsofthisanalysisasappliedtothebeliefsinquestioninAI.HereNozick'saccountdoesverywellinissuingtheintuitivelycorrectverdictfortherelevantparticularjudgmentsregardingwhatisknownandwhatisnot.Mostofuswouldjudgethatwedoknowsuchthingsasthatwehavehands,andthisisNozick'sverdict.And,whenaskepticalhypothesisiswellchosen,itdoesseemquiteplausibletomostofusthatwedon'tknowthatitdoesn'tobtain.Buttherearethreerelevantissuestoourpuzzle:IsthefirstpremiseofAItrue?Isthesecondpremisetrue?Istheconclusiontrue?Andit'seasytoendorsetheintuitivelycorrectanswertotwooutofthethreequestionsifyou'rewillingtotaketheimplausiblestandontheremainingone.

Nozicktakeshisimplausiblestandontheissueofthesecondpremise,denyingitinthefaceofitsevidentintuitiveappeal.28Acceptinghistreatment

28At2O5‐6Nozickadmitsthisappeal,andlaterhewrites,‘Thus,ifournotionofknowledgewasasstrongaswenaturallytendtothink(namely,closedunderknownlogicalimplication)thentheskepticwouldberight.(Butwhydowenaturallythinkthis?Furtherexplorationandexplanationisneededoftheintuitiverootsofthenaturalassumptionthatknowledgeisclosedunderknownlogicalimplication)’(242).

Nozickisquitehardonanti‐skepticswhochooserathertodenythefirstpremise;hewrites:‘Theskepticassertswedonotknowhispossibilitiesdon'tobtain,andheisright.Attemptstoavoidskepticismbyclaimingwedoknowthesethingsareboundtofail.Theskeptic'spossibilitiesmakeusuneasybecause,aswedeeplyrealize,wedonotknowtheydon'tobtain;itisnotsurprisingthatattemptstoshowwedoknowthesethingsleaveussuspicious,strikeusevenasbadfaith’(2O1).ButsimilarremarkscouldbemadeaboutNozick.AsNozickhimselfadmits,thesecondpremisehasitsownintuitiveappeal.Sowhynotsaythatwhatwe‘deeplyrealize’isthatifyoudon'tknowthatyou'renotaBIV,thenyoudon'tknowyouhavehands,andthattheskepticisrightaboutthis?Nozick'sdenialofthesecondpremiseleavesmeaboutas‘suspicious’asdoesadenialofthefirst,andthoughNozick'sdenialdoesn'tstrikemeasaninstanceofbadfaith,denialsofthefirstpremiseseemnobettercandidatesforthatcharge.

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involvesembracingtheabominableconjunctionthatwhileyoudon'tknowyou'renotabodiless(andhandless!)BIV,still,youknowyouhavehands.Thus,whilehisaccountdoesquitewellontherelevantparticularintuitionsregardingwhatisandisn'tknown,ityieldsanintuitivelybizarreresultonthecomparativejudgmentthesecondpremiseembodies.29

Aspromised,Iwon'thererehearsethepowerfulobjectionstoNozick'sanalysisofpropositionalknowledgethathavebeenputforward,30but,assumingthatthisanalysisisn'tindependentlyconvincingbeforeweturntotheproblemofskepticalhypotheses,31we'releftwithlittlereasontofollowNozickinchoosingtotakeanimplausiblestandpreciselywherehehasratherthansomeplaceelse.

Thisleavesusinabind.For,aswesawinsections5and8above,SCAisquitepowerful.Thatexplanationisthatwerealizethatanybeliefwemighthavetotheeffectthatan(effective)skepticalhypothesisdoesn'tobtainisinsensitive,andwe'reinclinedtothinkthatinsensitivebeliefsdon'tconstituteknowledge.HowcanweappropriatethatexplanationwithoutfollowingNozickinhavingtoimplausiblydenythesecondpremiseofAIandembracetheabominableconjunction?

29WhatareNozick'sgroundsforrejectingthesecondpremise?Nozicknotesthatthepremiseisaninstanceofaverygeneralprincipletotheeffectthatknowledgeisclosedunderknownimplication(seenote33,below).Afteradmittingthattheclosureprincipleseemstrue(2O5‐6),Nozickclaimsthatit'swrong,andhisreasonsforthisclaimaremadeentirelyfromwithinhisanalysisofknowledge:Givenhisanalysis,knowledgewon'tbeclosed(seeespecially2O6‐8).SoNozickisrelyingonhisanalysistoshowusthatthesecondpremiseisfalsedespiteitsintuitiveappeal.Andindeed,Nozickhasdevelopedanddefendedhisanalysisofknowledge(inpart1ofchapter3)beforeheappliesittotheissueofskepticism(inpart2).

30Unfortunately,whatisperhapsthemostpowerfulattackonNozick'stheoryofknowledge,madebySaulKripkeinlectures,circa1985,hasnot,tothebestofmyknowledge,founditswayintoprint.ForthoseinterestedincriticalliteratureonNozick,agoodplacetostartiswithForbes1984andseveraloftheessaysinLuper‐Foy1987.Forstillfurtherreading,Luper‐Foy1987containsanexcellentbibliography.

31Asremarkedinnote29,NozickdependsheavilyontheindependentplausibilityofthisanalysistoprovidethemomentumforhistreatmentofAI.

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10. STRENGTHOFEPISTEMICPOSITIONANDAI’SSECONDPREMISE

Here'show:byincorporatingSCAintoacontextualistsolutiontoourpuzzlethatavoidssuchafumblingofAl'ssecondpremise.Indeed,Iproposeaverystrongendorsementofthatsecondpremise.

Recallthataccordingtocontextualisttheoriesofknowledgeattributions,howstrongasubject'sepistemicpositionmustbetomaketrueaspeaker'sattributionofknowledgetothatsubjectisaflexiblematterthatcanvaryaccordingtofeaturesofthespeaker'sconversationalcontext.Centraltocontextualism,then,isthenotionof(relative)strengthofepistemicposition.Inpresentinganddefendingcontextualism,I'vefoundthatmostlistenersfeelthattheyunderstandprettywellwhat'smeantwhenIclaim,forinstance,thatsometimesthestandardsforknowledgearehigherthanusual,orthatinsomeconversationalsituationsone'sepistemicpositionmustbestrongerthaninotherstocountasknowing.Butitwouldbegoodtoclarifythisimportantnotionofstrengthofepistemicpositionasbestwecanby,forinstance,supplyinganintuitivetestforwhenoneepistemicpositionisstrongerthananother.Thebestsuchdeviceisthatofcomparativeconditionals.OnecanhaveavarietyofgroundsforassentingtoconditionalslikeIfMugsyistall,thenWiltistall,andIfWiltisnottall,thenMugsyisnottall.ButoneverygoodbasisforassentingtotheseconditionalsisthecomparativeknowledgethatWiltisatleastastallasMugsy.Likewise,whereSisaputativesubjectofknowledge,PisatruepropositionthatSbelieves,andAandBaresituationsinwhichSisfound,wecanhavesimilarlycomparativegroundsforassentingtoconditionalsoftheformIfSknowsthatPinA,thenSknowsthatPinB.Insuchacase,thecomparativegroundsforourassentisourrealizationthatSisinatleastasstronganepistemicpositionwithrespecttoPinsituationBasheisinwithrespecttothatsamepropositioninsituationA,andthiscomparativeconditionalservesasagoodintuitivetestforthatcomparativefact:Itbringsthatfacttolight.

So,forinstance,toborrowsomeexamplesfromAlvinGoldman(1976),letHenrybeoursubject,andletWhatHenryisseeingisabarnbethethingHenryputativelyknows.BothinsituationF(for‘fakes’)andinsituationN(‘nofakes’),Henryisdrivingthroughthecountrysideand,havingnoreasontothinkthere's

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anythingunusualgoingon,veryfirmlybelieves,andtakeshimselftoknow,thattheobjecthe'sseeingisabarn.Andindeed,inbothcases,itisabarn.ButinF,unbeknownsttohim,Henryisinanareathatisfilledwithveryconvincingfakebarns—papier‐mâchèbarnfacades.Infact,wemaysupposethatHenryhasjustbeenfooledmorethantwentytimesbysuchfakes,althoughhe'snowlookingattheonlyactualbarnformilesaround,andsothistimetrulybelievesthatwhathe'sseeingisabarn.NisexactlylikeF,exceptthattherearenofakesinthearea—thethingsHenryhastakentobebarnshaveallactuallybeenbarns.Withregardtotheseexamples,theconditionalIfHenryknowsinF,thenheknowsinNseemstogetthecomparisonright,indicatingthatHenry'sinatleastasstronganepistemicpositioninsituationNasheisinsituationF.TheevidentfailureofIfHenryknowsinN,thenheknowsinFtogetthecomparisonrightshowsthatHenry'snotinasstrongapositiontoknowinFasinN.Together,theseresultsindicatethatHenry'sinastrongerepistemicpositioninNthaninF.

AsisimportanttoourdiscussionofAl'ssecondpremise,comparativeconditionalscansimilarlybeusedtotesttherelativestrengthofepistemicpositionofasinglesubjectwithrespecttodifferentpropositionsthatsubjectbelievesinthesamesituation:Thus,theintuitivecorrectnessofIfSknowsthatP,thenSknowsthatQandIfSdoesn'tknowthatQ,thenSdoesn'tknowthatPcanindicatethatSisinatleastasstronganepistemicpositionwithrespecttoQasshe'sinwithrespecttoP.32

Sometimesnoclearverdictresultswhenweattempttoevaluateaconditionalinthiscomparativeway,forthegoodreasonthatit'sunclearhowthetwoepistemicpositionswe'reevaluatingcomparewithoneanother.Thus,ifwecompareasituationinwhichHenryhasagoodlookatthebarnbutinwhichthereareacoupleoffakebarnsseveralmilesawaythatHenryhasn'tencounteredwithasituationinwhichtherearenofakesatallinHenry'svicinitybutinwhichhedoesn'thavequiteasgoodalookatthebarn,therelevantconditionalscanbedifficulttoevaluate.But,

32And,ofcourse,suchconditionalscanbeusedtomakeallmannerofothercomparisons:comparativestrengthoftheepistemicpositionsoftwodifferentsubjectswithrespecttothesamepropositionorwithrespecttodifferentpropositions,thestrengthoftheepistemicpositionofasubjectwithrespecttoonepropositioninonesituationascomparedwiththatsamesubject'sepistemicpositionwithrespecttoadifferentpropositioninadifferentsituation,etc.

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inmanyinstances,someoftherelevantconditionalsareclearlytrueoncomparativegrounds.

SuchisthecasewithinstancesofAl'ssecondpremise,wheretheskepticalhypothesisiswellchosen.Theyseemtrueandaretrue,Isuggest,forjustthiscomparativereason:Aswerealize,weareinatleastasgoodapositiontoknowthatthehypothesisisfalseaswe'reintoknowthetargetedpieceofpresumedordinaryknowledge.33Let'slookbrieflyatsomeinstances.Recallthefollowingepistemologicallyperplexingpairsofpropositions:

33Asiswellknown,instancesofAl'ssecondpremiseareofteninstancesoftheprinciplethatknowledgeisclosedunderknownlogicalimplication:Kp&K(pentailsq)→Kq.(InthenextparagraphIexplainwhythisisnotalwaysthecase,atleastwhentheclosureprincipleisn'tstrengthenedastheredescribed.)Asisalsowellknown,thereareexceptionstotheprinciplesoformulated,anditmighttakealotoftinkeringtogetitexactlyright.But,asNozick,thearchdenierofclosure,putsit,‘Wewouldbeill‐advised,however,toquibbleoverthedetailsofP[theprinciplethatknowledgeisclosedunderknownlogicalimplication].Althoughthesedetailsaredifficulttogetstraight,itwillcontinuetoappearthatsomethinglikePiscorrect’(1981:2O5).Nozickgoesontoclaimthatthisappearanceisdeceiving.IbelievethatsomethinglikePiscorrect,butthatdoesn'tcompetewithmypresentaccountofAl'ssecondpremise:Whenaconditionalisaninstanceoftheproperlyformulatedclosureprinciple,therelevantcomparativefactinvolvingstrengthofepistemicpositionholds.SeeBrueckner1985forargumentsthatthedenialofknowledgeclosureprinciples‘isnotafruitfulanti‐skepticalproject’(112).

Whilerestrictionswillhavetobeputontheclosureprinciplethatwillweakenitincertainrespects,theremaybeotherrespectsinwhichitcanbestrengthened.SomeinstancesofAl'ssecondpremiseareconvincingeventhoughHiscompatiblewithO.Forinstance,theBIVhypothesisseemstounderminemyputativeknowledgeofI'minHoustonaswellasofIhavehands,but,ofcourse,thatI'mabodilessBIViscompatiblewithmybeinginHouston.PerhapsifSistoknowthatP,thenSmustknowthatnot‐QforanyQ(buthererestrictionsmustbeadded)suchthatifQweretrue,SwouldnotknowthatP.Thus,therangeofQsthatmustbeknownnottoobtainmaybebroadenedsoastoincludenotonlypropositionsthatareincompatiblewithP,butalsootherssuchthatiftheywerethecase,thenSwouldn'tknowthatP.ThoseQsthatareincompatiblewithPitselfwillthenbeseenasspecialcasesofthosethatareatoddswithS'sknowingthatP.BarryStrouddiscussesastrongerclosureprinciplesuchasthisinhis1984(25‐30).

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not‐H O

I'mnotaBIV. Ihavehands.

Thoseanimalsaren'tjust Thoseanimalsarezebras.cleverlypaintedmules.

Thepaperisn'tmistakenabout TheBullswonlastnight.whethertheBullswonlastnight.

Givennaturalbackgroundassumptions,wecansensethatthefollowingcomparativefactholdsforeachoftheabovepairs:IaminnobetterapositiontoknowthatOthanIamintoknowthatnot‐H.ThiscomparativefactisrevealedineachcasebythehighlyplausibleconditionalthatisAl'ssecondpremise:IfIdon'tknowthatnot‐H,thenIdon'tknowthatO.Closelytiedtothatcomparativefactineachcaseistherelatedandintuitivelycompellingrealizationthatitwouldbenowisertobetone'simmortalsoulonO'sbeingtruethantobetitonnot‐H'sbeingtrue.

Iproposethentoaccepttherelevantconditionalwithrespecttoeachoftheabovepairs,andtoacceptotherconvincinginstancesofAl'ssecondpremise.Indeed,theseconditionalsaretrueregardlessofhowhighorlowthestandardsforknowledgeareset.JustasthecomparativefactthatWiltisatleastastallasMugsyhastheresultthattheconditionalIfWiltisnottall,thenMugsyisnottallwillbetrueregardlessofhowhighorlowthestandardsfortallnessareset,sothecomparativefactthatI'minatleastasstronganepistemicpositionwithrespecttonot‐HasI'minwithrespecttoOwillresultinIfIdon'tknowthatnot‐H,thenIdon'tknowthatObeingtrueregardlessofhowhighorlowthestandardsforknowledgeareset.Thus,wewillneverhavetofollowNozickinacceptingtheabominableconjunction:thatconjunctionisfalseatanyepistemicstandard.

WiththatringingendorsementofAl'ssecondpremiseanchoredfirmlyinplace,wecanreturntothefirstpremise,hopingtoincorporateSCAintoacontextualistaccountofthatpremise'splausibility.

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11. STRENGTHANDSENSITIVITY

Ashasbecomeveryapparent,twonotionsthatarecentraltomyattempttosolveourpuzzleare,ontheonehand,theNozickeannotionofthesensitivityofbeliefsand,ontheother,thenotionofstrengthofepistemicposition.Whilebothnotionsstandinneedofagooddealofsharpeningandexplanation(onlysomeofwhichthey'llreceivehere),we'vealreadyobtainedinterestingresultsapplyingthemtotheepistemologicallyperplexingpairsofpropositionsdisplayedabove.Ineachcase,one'sbeliefinOissensitive,whileone'sbeliefinnot‐Hisinsensitive.Yet,atthesametime,oneisinatleastasstronganepistemicpositionwithrespecttonot‐HasoneisinwithrespecttoO.

Foreachofthesecondandthirdpairsofpropositions,onecouldgatherfurtherevidence,strengthenone'sepistemicpositionwithrespecttobothnot‐HandO,andmakeevenone'sbeliefthatnot‐Hsensitive.Butevenbeforethisfurtherevidenceisgathered,one'sbeliefthatOisalreadysensitive,despitethefactthatoneisinnostrongeranepistemicpositionwithrespecttothisOthanoneisinwithrespecttonot‐H.(Withrespecttothefirstpairofpropositions,itisdifficulttoimagineasituationinwhichoneisinsuchastrongpositionwithrespecttoone'snotbeingaBIVthatthisbeliefissensitive.)

Thisleadsustoanimportantinsightregardingskepticalhy‐potheses:One'sepistemicpositionwithrespecttopropositionstotheeffectthatskepticalhypothesesdon'tholdmustbestrongerthanitiswithrespecttoother,moreordinarypropositions(e.g.,ouraboveOs)ifbeliefinsuchpropositionsistobesensitive.

Anexplanationofourtwocentralnotionsintermsofpossibleworldswillprovideapartialandquiterough‐and‐ready,butstillsomewhatenlightening,pictureofhowthissituationcanarise.AnimportantcomponentofbeinginastrongepistemicpositionwithrespecttoPistohaveone'sbeliefastowhetherPistruematchthefactofthematterastowhetherPistrue,notonlyintheactualworld,butalsoattheworldssufficientlyclosetotheactualworld.Thatis,one'sbeliefshouldnotonlybetrue,butshouldbenon‐accidentallytrue,wherethisrequiresone's

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beliefastowhetherPistruetomatchthefactofthematteratnearbyworlds.Thefurtherawayonecangetfromtheactualworld,whilestillhavingitbethecasethatone'sbeliefmatchesthefactatworldsthatfarawayandcloser,thestrongerapositiononeisinwithrespecttoP.(Recallingtheresultsofsection6,weshouldremembereithertorestrictourattentionsolelytothoseworldsinwhichthesubjectusesthesamemethodofbelief‐formationsheusesintheactualworld,ortoweighsimilaritywithrespecttothesubject'smethodveryheavilyindeterminingtheclosenessofpossibleworldstotheactualworld.)Ifthetruth‐trackingofone'sbeliefastowhetherPextendsfarenoughfromactualitytoreachtheclosestnot‐Pworlds,thenonedoesn'tbelievethatPinthoseclosestnot‐Pworlds,andone'sbeliefthatPissensitive.Buthowfarfromactualitymusttruth‐trackingreach—howstronganepistemicpositionmustonebein—tomakeone'sbeliefthatPsensitive?That,ofcourse,dependsonhowdistantfromactualitytheclosestnot‐Pworldsare.

ConsidermybeliefthatIhavehands.Ibelievethisattheactualworld,andit'strue.What'smore,intheothernearbyworldsinwhichIhavehands,IbelievethatIdo.Therearealso,atleastinmyowncase,somealarminglycloseworldsinwhichIdon'thavehands.TheseincludeworldsinwhichIlostmyhandsyearsagowhileworkingonmyuncle'sgarbagetruck.Intheclosestofthesenot‐Pworlds,I'mnowfullyawareofthefactthatI'mhandless,andmybeliefastowhetherIhavehandsmatchesthefactofthematter.MybeliefastowhetherIhavehandsdoesn'tmatchthefactinvariousworldsinwhichI'maBIV,ofcourse,buttheseareverydistant.Whiletherearecloserworldsinwhichthematchfails,itseemsthatinafairlywiderangeofworldssurroundingtheactualworld,mybeliefastowhetherIhavehandsdoesagoodjobofmatchingthefactofthematter.Thus,I'minaprettystrongepi‐stemicpositionwithrespecttothatmatter.

NowletPbeI'mnotaBIV.Wherenot‐P(here,IamaBIV)isquiteremote,onecanbeinaquitestrongepistemicpositionwithrespecttoPmerelybybelievingthatPinallthenearbyworlds.AsIdobelievethisPinsuchnearbyworlds,I'minaprettystrongepistemicpositionwithrespecttothisP.Thiscanoccur,andinmycase,doesoccur,eventhoughone'sbeliefastowhetherPdoesn'tmatchthefactofthematterintheclosestnot‐Pworlds:Sinceeventheclosestofthenot‐Pworldsarequitedistant,one'sbeliefastowhetherPneedn'tmatchthefactofthematterthatfarfromtheactualworldforonetobeinaquitestrongpositionwithrespecttoP.

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Butforone'sbeliefthatPtobesensitive,onemustnotbelievethatPintheclosestnot‐Pworlds.Sinceskepticalhypothesestendtofastenonsomewhatremote(andsometimesveryremote)possibilities,then,onecanbeinarelatively(andsometimesavery)strongpositionwithrespecttobeliefstotheeffectthattheydon'tobtain(sinceone'sbeliefastowhethertheyobtainmatchesthefactofthematteroverawiderangeofworldsclosesttotheactualworld),whilethesebeliefsremaininsensitive(sinceonewouldstillbelievethatthehypothesesdidn'tobtainintheclosestworldsinwhichtheydoobtain).Bycontrast,wherePissuchthattherearebothPandnot‐Pworldsveryclosetotheactualworld,one'sbeliefthatPmustbesensitive(onemustnotbelievethatPintheclosestnot‐Pworlds)inorderforonetobeinevenaminimallystrongepistemicpositionwithrespecttoP,and,conversely,oneneedn'tbeinaverystrongpositionforone'sbelieftobesensitive.

12. THERULEOFSENSITIVITYANDTHEBEGINNINGSOFANEW

CONTEXTUALISTSOLUTION

Theimportantinsightregardingskepticalhypotheses—thatone'sepistemicpositionwithrespecttopropositionstotheeffectthatskepticalhypothesesdon'tholdmustbestrongerthanitiswithrespecttootherpropositionsbeforebeliefsinsuchpropositionscanbesensitive—suggestsanewcontextualistaccountofhow,inpresentingAl,theskepticraisesthestandardsforknowledge.Let'scalltheconversationalrulethisnewaccountpositsasthemechanismbywhichtheskepticraisesthestandardsforknowledgethe‘RuleofSensitivity.’Althoughamoregeneralformulationofthisruleisdesirable,Iwillherestateitinsuchawaythatitappliesonlytoattributions(anddenials)ofknowledge,sincesuchapplicationsarewhat'sneededtoaddressthepresentpuzzle.34Solimited,ourruleissimplythis:Whenitis

34Introducingaskepticalhypothesisintoaconversationinanynumberofwaysotherthaninattributionsanddenialsofknowledgecanseemtoraisethestandardsforknowledge.Forinstance,insteadofarguing,‘Youdon'tknowthatthepaperisn'tmistakenabouttheresultoflastnight'sgame;therefore,youdon'tknowthattheBullswon,’askepticmayurge,‘Considerthisproposition:Thenewspaperismistakenaboutwho

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assertedthatsomesubjectSknows(ordoesnotknow)somepropositionP,thestandardsforknowledge(thestandardsforhowgoodanepistemicpositiononemustbeintocountasknowing)tendtoberaised,ifneedbetosuchalevelastorequireS'sbeliefinthatparticularPtobesensitiveforittocountasknowledge.WherethePinvolvedistotheeffectthataskepticalhypothesisdoesnotobtain,thenthisruledictatesthatthestandardswillberaisedtoaquitehighlevel,for,aswe'veseen,onemustbeinastrongerepistemicpositionwithrespecttoapropositionstatingthataskepticalhypothesisisfalse—relativetoother,moreordinary,propositions—beforeabeliefinsuchapropositioncanbesensitive.

Astoryintermsofpossibleworldsagainprovidesarough‐and‐ready,butstillperhapsenlightening,pictureofhowtheRuleofSensitivityoperates.Context,I'vesaid,determineshowstronganepistemicpositiononemustbeintocountasknowing.Picturethisrequirementasacontextuallydeterminedsphereofpossibleworlds,centeredontheactualworld,withinwhichasubject'sbeliefastowhetherPistruemustmatchthefactofthematterinorderforthesubjecttocountasknowing.(Giventheresultsofsection6,wemustagainremembereithertorestrictourattentionsolelytothoseworldsinwhichthesubjectusesthesamemethodofbeliefformationsheusesintheactualworld,ortoweighsimilaritywithrespecttothesubject'smethodveryheavilyindeterminingtheclosenessofpossibleworldstotheactualworld.)Callthisspherethesphereofepistemicallyrelevantworlds.Asthestandardsforknowledgegoup,thesphereofepistemicallyrelevantworldsbecomeslarger—thetruth‐trackingofone'sbeliefmustextendfurtherfromactualityforonetocountasknowing.Giventhispicture,theRuleofSensitivitycanbeformulatedasfollows:Whenit'sassertedthatSknows(ordoesn'tknow)thatP,then,ifnecessary,enlargethesphereofepistemicallyrelevantworldssothatitatleastincludestheclosestworldsinwhichPisfalse.

Apowerfulsolutiontoourpuzzleresultswhenwefollowthebasiccontextualiststrategy(seesection2)andutilizethisRuleofSensitivitytoexplain

wonthegame.Now,keepingthatpropositionclearlyinmind,answermethis:DoyoureallyknowthattheBullswon?’Ofcourse,aswiththeRuleofRelevance(seenote22),notjustanymentionofaskepticalhypothesisseemstotriggerthemechanismforraisingthestandardsofknowledgeI'mabouttoarticulate.

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howthestandardsforknowledgeareraisedbytheskeptic'spresentationofAI.Whilemanynoteworthyfeaturesandvirtuesofthissolutionarebestexplainedbycomparingitwiththeotherproposedsolutionstoourpuzzle,asI'lldoinfollowingsections,thebasicideaofthepresentsolutionisthis.InutilizingAItoattackourputativeknowledgeofO,theskepticinstinctivelychoosesherskepticalhypothesis,H,sothatitwillhavethesetwofeatures:(1)Wewillbeinatleastasstrongapositiontoknowthatnot‐Haswe'reintoknowthatO,but(2)Anybeliefwemighthavetotheeffectthatnot‐Hwillbeaninsensitivebelief(abeliefwewouldholdevenifnot‐Hwerefalse—thatis,evenifHweretrue).Givenfeature(2),theskeptic'sassertionthatwedon'tknowthatnot‐H,bytheRuleofSensitivity,drivesthestandardsforknowledgeuptosuchapointastomakethatassertiontrue.BytheRuleofSensitivity,recall,thestandardsforknowledgeareraisedtosuchalevelastorequireourbeliefthatnot‐Htobesensitivebeforeitcancountasknowledge.Sinceourbeliefthatnot‐Hisn'tsensitive(feature(2)),thestandardsaredrivenuptosuchalevelthatwedon'tcountasknowingthatnot‐H.Andsincewe'reinnostrongeranepistemicpositionwithrespecttoOthanwe'reinwithrespecttonot‐H(feature(1)),then,atthehighstandardsputinplacebytheskeptic'sassertionofAl'sfirstpremise,wealsofailtoknowthatO.Atthesehighstandards,theskeptictruthfullyassertshersecondpremise(which,recall,isalsotrueatlowerstandards),andthentruthfullyassertsAl'sconclusionthatwedon'tknowthatO.35ThisaccountsforthepersuasivenessofAI.Butsince,onthisaccount,theskepticgetstotruthfullystateherconclusiononlybyraisingthestandardsforknowledge,AIdoesn'tthreatenthetruthofourordinaryclaimstoknowtheveryOsourknowledgeofwhichtheskepticattacks.Forthefactthattheskepticcaninstallveryhighstandardsthatwedon'tliveuptohasnotendencytoshowthatwedon'tsatisfythemorerelaxedstandardsthatareinplaceinmoreordinaryconversationsanddebates.

35Again,I'mhereassumingaskeptic‐friendlyversionofcontextualism.Seethesecondimportantpointmadeattheendofsection2.

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13. THERULEOFSENSITIVITYANDSCA:ACOMPARISONOFOURNEW

SOLUTIONWITHTHEOTHERCONTEXTUALISTSOLUTIONSANDWITHNOZICK’SSOLUTION

Recallthattheproblemwiththeothercontextualistsolutionswe'veseenisthattheyfailtoadequatelyexplainwhyAl'sfirstpremisehastheintuitivepullithas(whentheskepticalhypothesisemployediswellchosen).OurnewcontextualistsolutiongainsanimportantadvantageoveritscontextualistrivalsbyincorporatingSCA.WeexplaintheplausibilityofAl'sfirstpremisebyreferencetothefollowingtwofacts.First,anybeliefwemighthavetotheeffectthataskepticalhypothesisdoesn'tobtain(wherethathypothesisiswellchosen)isinsensitive:aswerealize,wewouldholdthisbeliefevenifitwerefalse(evenifthehypothesisdidobtain).And,second,wehaveaverygeneralinclinationtothinkthatwedon'tknowthatPwhenwerealizethatourbeliefthatPisinsensitive—whenwerealizethatwewouldbelievethatPevenifPwerefalse.

WefollowNozickinemployingSCA.ButwedivergefromNozick'streatmentinouraccountofwhythesecondfactaboveholds.OnNozick'saccount,wehavethegeneralinclinationassertedtherebecauseourconceptofknowledgejustis,roughly,thatoftrue,sensitivebelief.Thiswouldaccountforourinclinationtodenythestatusofknowledgetoinsensitivebeliefsalright,butitwouldalsohaveushappilyassertingabominableconjunctions,which,infact,we'reloathetodo.

Ournewsolutionavoidsthisunhappinessbynotbuildingasensitivityrequirementintotheveryconceptofknowledge.Thenotionofsensitivity,rather,findsitshappierhomeinourcontextualistaccountofhowthestandardsforknowledgeareraised,andthesecondfactaboveisaccountedforasfollows.WhereS'sbeliefthatPisnotsensitive,SisnotinagoodenoughepistemicpositiontocountasknowingthatPbythestandardsthat,accordingtotheRuleofSensitivity,wouldbeputinplacebytheveryclaimthatSknows(ordoesn'tknow)thatP.Thus,anassertionthatSdoesn'tknowthatP,whereS'sbeliefthatPisinsensitive,willraisethestandardsforknowledgetoalevelhighenoughtomakethatdenialofknowledgetrue.ApositiveclaimthatSdoesknowsuchaP,ontheotherhand,is

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doomedtofailure:Themakingoftheclaimwillraisethestandardsforknowledgetoalevelhighenoughtomakethatclaimfalse.So,wheneverS'sbeliefthatPisinsensitive,wecantruthfullyassertthatSdoesn'tknowthatP,andcanonlyfalselysaythatSdoesknowthatP.Nowonder,then,thatthesecondfactholds!

Thus,wesuccessfullyincorporateSCA,explainingtheplausibilityofAl'sfirstpremise,withoutfollowingNozickinlicensingabominableconjunctions.

14. OURNEWCONTEXTUALISTSOLUTIONCLARIFIEDANDCOMPAREDWITHTHESTRAIGHTFORWARDSOLUTIONS

Thepuzzleofskepticalhypotheses,recall,concernsthepremisesofAltogetherwiththenegationofitsconclusion:

1. Idon'tknowthatnot‐H.

2. IfIdon'tthatnot‐H,thenIdon'tknowthatO.

not‐C.IdoknowthatO.

Asolutiontothepuzzlemust,ofcourse,issueaverdictastothetruthofeachofthesethree,butitmustalsoexplainwhywefindallofthemplausible.

Let'sbeclearaboutwhatourpresentcontextualistsolutionhastosayabouteachofthese.Ourverdictregarding(2)isthatit'strueregardlessofwhatepistemicstandardit'sevaluatedat,soitsplausibilityiseasilyaccountedfor.Butthis,combinedwithasimilarlyenthusiasticendorsementof(1),wouldlandusinboldskepticism.Weavoidthatfatebyendorsing(1)astrue,notatallstandards,butonlyattheunusuallyinflatedstandardsconducivetoskepticism.Thus,onoursolution,wedoknow,forinstance,thatwe'renotBIVs,accordingtoordinarylowstandardsforknowledge.But,though(1)isfalsewhenevaluatedaccordingtothoseordinarylowstandards,we'reabletoexplainitsplausibility,aswe'veseen,bymeansofthefactthatthehighstandardsatwhich(1)istruearepreciselythestandardsthatanassertionordenialofitputintoplay.Sinceattemptstoassert(1)areboundto

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resultintruth,andattemptstodenyitaredestinedtoproducefalsehood,36it'snosurprisethatwefinditsoplausible.

Butwhatof(not‐C)?Onthepresentsolution,claimstoknowordinarypropositionsaretrueaccordingtoordinarylowstandardsbutfalseaccordingtothehighlyinflatedstandardsthat,bytheRuleofSensitivity,areputinplacebytheassertionof(1).(Not‐C)seemsplausiblebecauseit'struewhenevaluatedatthestandardsmostnormallyappliedtoit.But,itwillbeasked,whydowefindtheseclaimstoknowplausibleevenwhenwe'reinacontextinwhichtheskeptichasraisedthestandardstosuchalevelthattheseclaimsarefalse?Alittlecautionisinorderhere.It'scontroversialjusthowintuitivelycorrect(not‐C)doesseemtousinsuchacontext.Mostofusfeelsomeambivalence.Suchambivalenceistobeexpectedwheneverwe'redealingwithapuzzleconsistingofmutuallyinconsistentpropositions,allofwhichareindividuallyplausible.Forwhenthepropositionsareconsideredtogether,onewillhavethisgoodreasonfordoubtingeachofthem:thattheothersseemtrue.Andit'sdifficulttodistinguishthedoubtof(not‐C)thatarisesfromthisverygeneralsource(thatitsfalsehoodfollowsfromotherthingsonefindsplausible)fromthatwhicharisesfromthefactthatthestandardsarehigh.Atanyrate,theverystrongpullthat(not‐C)continuestoexerton(atleastmostof)usevenwhenthestandardsarehighisexplainedinthemanneroutlinedinsection2:Evenwhilewe'reinacontextgovernedbyhighstandardsatwhichwedon'tcountasknowingthatO,weatthesametimerealizethatassoonaswefindourselvesinmoreordinaryconversationalcontexts,itwillnotonlybetrueforustoclaimtoknowtheseveryOsthattheskepticnowdeniesweknow,butitwillalsobewrong

36Butforcasesinwhichitseemsonecantruthfullysay‘Sknowsthatnot‐H,’despitethefactthatS'sbeliefthatnot‐Hisinsensitive,seechapter3,sectionJ(‘Low‐StrengthClaimstoKnowthatSkepticalHypothesesDoNotObtain’)ofmy199O.Insuchcases,givencertainfeaturesoftheconversationalsituation,theRuleofSensitivitydoesnotoperate.Theseconstituteexceptionstotherulethatonecannottruthfullycallaninsensitivebeliefknowledge.AsIexplainthere,Iwelcometheseexceptions,andwouldactuallybeabitworriedifthereweren'tsuchexceptions.Forit'safeatureofmytreatmentofAIthatwedoknowskepticalhypothesestobefalseaccordingtolowepistemicstandards.Iwouldfinditabitembarrassingifwecouldneverclaimtohavesuchknowledgebymeansofsimpleknowledgeattributions,andI'mreassuredbytheresultthatinspecialconversationalcircumstances,itseemswecantruthfullyclaimtoknowthatnot‐H,despitethefactthatourbeliefthatnot‐Hisinsensitive.

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forustodenythatweknowthesethings.It'seasy,then,tothinkthattheskeptic'spresentdenialmustbeequallyfalseandthatitwouldbeequallytrueforusnow,intheskeptic'spresence,toclaimtoknowthatO.

Theverdictsthepresentsolutionissuesregardingthetruthvaluesofthemembersofthetriadarecomplicatedbythefactthatoursisacontextualistsolution.Only(2)receivesthesameverdictregardlessofwhattheepistemicstandardsare;thetruthvaluesof(1)and(not‐C)varywithcontext.It'sjustthisvariancethatoursolutionsoessentiallyreliesoninexplaininghowwefallintoourpuzzlingconflictofintuitions.Noncontextualist(henceforth,‘straightforward’)solutions,ontheotherhand,mustchooseoneofthemembersofthistriadtodeny,claimingthislosertobefalseaccordingtotheinvariantepistemicstandardsthatgovernallattributionsanddenialsofknowledge:The‘Moorean’solutioninthiswaydenies(1),37the‘Nozickean’(2),andthe‘BoldSkeptial’solutionthusdenies(not‐C),acceptingthatwespeakfalselywhenever,eveninordinary,nonphilosophicaldiscussions,weclaimtoknowtheOinquestion.

Fromtheperspectiveofourpresentcontextualistsolution,eachofthesestraightforwardsolutionsresultsinpart,ofcourse,fromafailuretoseethetruthofcontextualism.ButwhichstraightforwardsolutionaninvariantistconfusedlyadoptswilldependonthestandardsthatdominateherevaluationofourbeliefsinOandinnot‐H.Ifherevaluationisdominatedbytherelativelylowstandardsthatgovernourordinary,out‐on‐the‐streettalkofknowledge,shewillendupaMoorean.Ifsheevaluatesthebeliefsinquestionaccordingtothehighstandardsthatareputintoplacebytheskeptic'spresentationofAl,boldskepticismistheresult.TheNozickeansolutionensuesfromevaluatingeachbeliefaccordingtothestandardsthatwouldmostoftenbeusedinevaluatingthatbelief.Forreasonswe'veseen,aclaimtoknow(oranadmissionthatonedoesn'tknow)thataskepticalhypothesisisfalsewill,bytheRuleofSensitivity,tendtoinviteaveryhighreading,atwhichtheadmissionistrueandtheclaimisfalse.ButaclaimtoknowthatOdoesn'tso

37Thisiscalledthe‘Moorean’solutionbecauseMoorerespondedinthiswaytothedreamargument.It'sfarfromcertainthatMoorewouldhavesorespondedtootherinstancesofAIthatutilizedifferentskepticalhypotheses.

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demandahighreading.Fromthepresentperspective,theNozickeanisreactingtothefactthatonecanusuallytruthfullyclaimthatonedoesknowthatOandcanusuallytruthfullyclaimnottoknowthatnot‐H.WhattheNozickeanmissesishowdifficultitistomakethesetwoclaimstogether:onceyouhaveadmittedthatyoudon'tknowthatnot‐H,itseemsthereverseofintuitivelycorrecttoclaimtoknowthatO,atleastuntiltheconversationalairiscleared.

Tosucceed,astraightforwardsolutionmustexplainwhatleadsourintuitionsastraywithrespecttotheunluckymemberofthetriadwhichthatsolutiondenies.Otherwise,we'llhavelittlereasonfordenyingjustthatmemberofthetriad.Nozickhimselfprovidesnosuchexplanationwithrespectto(2),parentheticallyleavingthisvitaltaskto‘furtherexploration,’38andotherNozickeans,ifanytherebe,havenot,tothebestofmyknowledge,progressedanyfartheralongthisfront.Mooreans,tothebestofmyknowledge,havefarednobetterinexplainingwhywe'resoreluctanttoclaimthestatusofknowledgeforourinsensitivebeliefs.It'sthedefendersofboldskepticismwho'vemadethemostprogresshere.Intheremainingsections,I'llexplainwhyourcontextualistsolutionissuperiortothatoftheboldskeptic.

15. BOLDSKEPTICISMANDTHEWARRANTEDASSERTABILITYMANEUVER

Almostallofthetime,itseemstoalmostallofusthatwedoknowtheOsthattheskepticclaimswedon'tknow.Accordingtotheboldskeptic,wheneverwesayorthinkthatweknowthesethings,wesayorthinksomethingfalse.Theboldskepticthusimplicatesus,speakersofEnglish,insystematicandwidespreadfalsehoodinouruse,inspeechandinthought,ofourverycommonword'know'.Equallyparadoxically,theboldskepticholdsthatwe'respeakingthetruthwheneverwesay

38Seethefirstparagraphofnote28,above.

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thatsomeonedoesn'tknowtheseOs,eventhoughitseemstomostofusthatwe'dthenbesayingsomethingquitefalse.Whatleadsusastray?PeterUngerandBarryStroudhavesuggestedonbehalfofboldskepticismthatalthoughwedon'tknowtheseO's,it'softenusefulforustoclaimthatwedoknowthem,andwearethereforeoftenwarrantedorjustifiedinmakingsuchclaims.Whatthenleadsusastrayisthis:Wemistakethisuseful/justified/warrantedassertabilityofknowledgeascriptionsfortruth.39Ontheothersideofthecoin,presumably,we'remistakingtheuseless/unwarranted/unjustifiedassertabilityofdenialsofknowledgeforfalsehood.

Twoseriousproblemsemergefortheboldskepticatthispoint.Thefirstisthatsuch‘warrantedassertabilitymaneuvers’couldbeattemptedbyadvocatesoftheothersolutionsaswell.Warrantedassertabilityindeedcanbemistakenfortruth,andunwarrantedassertabilityforfalsehood,butthisbyitselfdoesnotfavortheboldskeptic'ssolutionovertheotherstraightforwardapproaches.Eachofthestraightforwardapproachesdeniesamemberofthetriadconstitutingourpuzzle,andeachitseemscouldclaimthatthereasonthisloserthey'vechosenseemstrue,thoughit'sinfactfalse,isthatwe'reoftenwarrantedinassertingit,andwemistakethiswarrantedassertabilityfortruth.Thus,theMoorean,forinstance,couldclaimthatalthoughwedoindeedknowthatHisfalse,we'renotwarrantedinclaimingthatweknowthis(thoughthisclaimwouldbetrue),butareratherwarrantedinsayingthatwedon'tknow(thoughthislatterisfalse).Simplyattributingapparenttruthtowarrantedassertabilityisagamealmostanypartytothisdisputecanfairlyeasilyplay.40Thatthislineofthoughtwouldeventuallyworkoutanybetterfortheboldskepticthanforhisopponentswouldtakesomeshowing.41

39ThisisthebasiclineUngertakesinhisdefenseofboldskepticisminhis1975;seeespeciallypages50‐54.Stroud,thoughnothimselfadvocatingboldskepticism,doesseektodefendtheboldskepticalongtheselinesinchapter2ofhis1984;seeespeciallypages55‐82.

40Bycontrast,ournewcontextualistsolutionattributestheapparenttruthof(1)to(l)'struth(andnotjustitswarrantedassertability)attheverystandardsitsassertioninvokes.

41Formyownpart,forreasonsIcan'tgointohere,IthinktheresultingMooreanpositionwouldbeslightlymoredefensible;thus,ifIhadtorejectcontextualismandadoptastraightforwardsolution,I'dbeaMoorean.

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It'sat(1)thattheskeptichashisbesthopeofgaininganadvantageovermysolution,forthatpremiseindeeddoesseemtrue,and,unliketheskeptic,I'vestoppedshortoffullyendorsingit,makingdowithanexplanationofitsplausibility.Buttheskeptic'sotherproblemlurkshere.Usually,whilesolvingaphilosophicalpuzzleconsistingofasetofindividuallyplausiblebutmutuallyinconsistentclaims,oneonlyhastoexplain(away)theplausibilityofthosemembersofthesetonedenies,andoneisrelievedoftheburdenofexplainingtheplausibilityofthosemembersthatoneendorses,theirtruthandourabilitytorecognizethattruthbeingexplanationenoughoftheirapparenttruth.Buttruthdoesnotsufficetoexplainapparenttruthwhereonemakesusouttobeabsolutelyhorriblejudgesoftruthsofthekindinquestion.Thus,theskeptic'ssecondbigproblemisthat,becauseheholdsthatwe'resubjecttoconstantandradicalerrorastothescopeofourknowledge,consistentlythinkingweknowthingswhenwedon't,theskeptic,althoughhethinks(1)istrue,owesusanexplanationforitsplausibility.Giventhatourhabitofmistakingourignoranceforknowledgeissopervasive,whydoesn'titseemtousherethatweknowwhat,infact,wedon't—thattheseskepticalhypothesesarefalse?Whydoesourlackofknowledge,whichwe'resopervasivelyblindto,shinethroughsoclearlytousjustwheretheissueiswhetherweknowaskepticalhypothesistobefalse?

Theskeptic'sinitialanswerwillcertainlybethatwe'renotwarrantedinclaimingtoknowthatskepticalhypothesesdon'tobtain,andthuscan'tmistakewarrantedassertabilityfortruthhere.Butthen,toseewhyskepticalhypothesesareeffective,wemustbetoldwhywe'renotwarrantedinclaimingtoknowthatskepticalhypothesesarefalse,giventhat,accordingtotheskeptic,wearewarrantedinclaimingtoknowallmannerofotherthingsthatinfactwedon'tknow.Andhereskepticshavelittletooffer.Butiftheresultsofsections5and8abovearecorrect,theanswermustinvolvethelackofsensitivityenjoyedbyourbeliefsthatskepticalhypothesesdon'tobtain.Theskeptic'suseofSCAwilltakethisform:Althoughweknownothing(orverylittle),it'swhenourbeliefsareinsensitivethatwe'renotevenwarrantedinassertingthatweknowandwethereforerecognizeourlackofknowledge.ButtheskepticmustnowalsoaddressAl'ssecondpremise,makingsurehisendorsementofSCAismadeinsuchawayastoaccountforourintuitionshere.Indeed,whetherornothebuysintoSCA,theskepticfacesthis

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question:If,asheclaims,we'reusuallyunderthedelusionthatweknowthatO,butwecustomarilyrecognizethatwedon'tknowthatnot‐H,whyaren'twehappytoconjointhiserrorwiththatinsightandembracetheabominableconjunction?

Thismaylooklikeadifficultquestion,buttheskeptichasareadyanswer.Hisproblemisthatthewarrantedassertabilitymaneuverbyitselfdidn'treallysolveourpuzzle,butratherre‐introduceditinanewform.AndtheonlywayI'veseentoincorporateSCAintoatreatmentofAIthatalsohandlestheotherpiecesofourpuzzleistoemploytheideathatcontextuallysensitiveepistemicstandardsgovernouruseof'know',andtoposittheRuleofSensitivityasthemechanismbywhichtheAIskepticdrivesthosestandardsup,asI'veadvocatedhere.Butwiseinvariantiststypicallyacceptthatcontextuallyvaryingstandardsgovernouruseofascriptionsanddenialsofknowledge.Thesensibleinvariantistwilladmitthat,ofcourse,whatpassesforknowledgeinsomecontextswon'tsopassinothers.Beinganinvariantist,he'lldenythatthetruthconditionsofknowledgeattributionsvaryinthewaythecontextualistclaimstheydo.Butthecleverinvariantistwillmaintainthatthevaryingepistemicstandardsthatthecontextualistsupposesgovernthetruthconditionsofthesesentencesinfactgoverntheirconditionsofwarrantedassertability.42

Thisallowstheboldskeptictomimicanycontextualistsolution,andinparticularthesolutionI'madvocatinghere,bymeansofasimpletwist.Withrespecttomysolution,theboldskepticcanmaintainthattheRuleofSensitivityisarulefortheraisingoftheepistemicstandardsgoverningouruseofsentencesascribingknowledgetosubjects,alright,butinsistthatitgovernsthewarrantedassertabilityconditionsofthesesentences,ratherthantheirtruthconditions,which,he'll

42Stroudthusclaimsthatontheskeptic'sconceptionofourpractices,weoperateundercertain‘practicalconstraints’(1984,75)inoureverydayusesof'know',andassertsthatourstandardsforsayingweknowvaryfromcasetocase(65‐66).Thus,ontheskeptic'sconception,thestandardsforascribingknowledgethatweemployineverydayusedependuponour‘aimsandinterestsatthemoment’(65).Accordingtocontextualism,thesevaryingstandardsreflectacorrespondingvariationinthetruthconditionsforattributionsofknowledge.ButonStroud'sskeptic'sconception,whenweascribeknowledgeineverydaysituations,wearetypicallysayingsomethingliterallyfalse,although‘theexigenciesofaction’justifythesefalseattributions.ThebestexplorationofthistypeofideaisprovidedbyUngerinhis1984.

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maintain,remainconstantatalevelbeyondthereachofmeremortalstosatisfy.Thewarrantedassertabilitymaneuvercanthenbeemployed:Wemistakewarrantedassertabilityfortruth(andunwarrantedassertabilityforfalsehood).Thus,sincewe'reneverwarrantedinclaimingtoknowthatskepticalhypothesesdon'tobtain(duetotheoperationofthetwistedRuleofSensitivity),we'reledtojudge(correctly)thatsuchclaimstoknowledgewouldbefalse.AndsinceAl'ssecondpremiseisalwayswarranted,wejudge(againcorrectly)thatthispremiseistrue.ButsinceaclaimtoknowsomeOisusuallywarranted,duetothelowstandardsforwarrantedassertabilitythatwouldordinarilybeappliedtosuchaclaim,wejudge(incorrectly)thatweknowthisO.Thus,mysolution,likeothercontextualistsolutions,canbeeasilyadaptedtosuitthepurposesoftheboldskeptic.Theresultisatheoryparalleltomyowncontextualistsolution,whichdiffersinitssemanticsof'know':Accordingtothisparallelinvariantisttheory,thecontext‐sensitivevaryingepistemicstandardswe'vediscoveredgovernthewarrantedassertabilityconditionsofattributionsanddenialsofknowledge,ratherthantheirtruthconditions,whichareheldtobeinvariant.43Howshallwerationallydecidebetweenacontextualistsolution,andinparticulartheoneI'mheredefending,andtheboldskeptic'sanalogueofit?44

16. BOLDSKEPTICISMANDSYSTEMATICFALSEHOOD

Likeitscontextualistrelatives,ournewsolutionisdesignedlargelywiththegoalinmindofcreditingmostofourattributionsofknowledgewithtruth.Andnowonder.

43Goingbacktotheboldskeptic'sfirstproblem,notethatallthismaneuveringcanbemimickedbytheMoorean,whocanalsoholdthataRuleofSensitivitygovernsthewarrantedassertabilityconditionsofknowledgeascriptions.Liketheboldskeptic,theMooreancanholdthatthetruthconditionsofsuchattributionsofknowledgeremaininvariant,butintheMoorean'shands,theseconstantepistemicstandardswillbemeetablylow.

44ReadersofUnger's1984willseethestronginfluenceofthatexcellentbookonmyprocedurehere,thoughIcometoverydifferentconclusionsthanhedoesinthatwork.(Butseehismorerecent1986.)

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Weingeneraltakeitasastrikeagainstatheoryofacommontermofanaturallanguagethatitinvolvesthespeakersofthatlanguageinsystematicandwidespreadfalsehoodintheiruseofthatterm.Let'sborrowanexampleandsuppose,forinstance,thatacrazedphilosopherclaimedthattherearenophysicians,because,inadditiontoholdingamedicaldegree,anecessaryconditionforbeingaphysicianisthatonebeabletocureanyconceivableillness.45Onwhatgroundsshouldwerejectthisbizarreconjectureinfavorofamoretraditionalandlessdemandingaccountofwhatitistobeaphysician?OurlanguagecertainlycouldhavebeensuchthatS'shavingtheabilitytocureanyconceivableillnesswasatruthconditionof'Sisaphysician'(althoughtheword'physician'wouldnothavebeenveryusefulinthatcase).Invirtueofwhatisourlanguageinfactsuchthatthestrangetheoryisnottrueofit?I'mofcoursenotinapositiontogiveacompleteanswertothisquestion,butit'seminentlyreasonabletosupposethatsuchfactsasthese,regardingouruse,inthoughtandinspeech,oftheterm'physician'areinvolved:thatwetaketobephysiciansmanylicensedpractitionersofmedicinewhodon'tsatisfythedemandingrequirementalleged;thatweseriouslydescribethesepeopleasbeingphysicians;thatwedon'tdenythatthesepeoplearephysicians;etc.It'snodoubtlargelyinvirtueofsuchfactsasthesethatthetraditionalview,ratherthantheconjectureofourcrazedphilosopher,istrueofourlanguage.(Thecorrectnessofthetraditionalviewlargelyconsistsinsuchfacts.)Andthesefactsalsoprovideuswithourbestreasonsorevidenceforacceptingthetraditional,ratherthanthestrange,hypothesisregardingthesemanticsof'physician'.Inthiscase,thatthepeculiartheoryimplicatesusinsystematicandwidespreadfalsehoodinourspeechandthoughtinvolving'physicians'isa(constitutiveandevidential)strikeagainstthetheorythatprovesquitedecisive.

Ifourcrazedphilosophertriedtoaccountfortheabovefactsregardingouruseoftheterm'physician'viathequickandeasyconjecturethatthelessdemandingrequirementsthataremoretraditionallyassignedto'physician',whiletheydon'taccuratelyspecifythetruthconditionsofsentencesinvolvingthatterm,doarticulatethesesentences'warrantedassertabilityconditions,weshouldnot,onthe

45SeeStroud(1984,4O),whointurnborrowedtheexamplefromelsewhere.

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basisofthismaneuver,suspendourjudgmentagainsthiscontention.Thathistheoryinvolvesusinsystematicfalsehoodcontinuestoconstituteastrikeagainstit,andintheabsenceofquiteweightycounterbalancingconsiderationsthatfavorthestrangetheoryoverthetraditionalone,thisstrikeremainsdecisive.

Ofcourse,theproblemwiththishopelessnonstarterofatheoryisthattheredon'tseemtobeanysuchcounterbalancingconsiderationsinitsfavor.Bycontrast,boldskepticismcanappeartobesupportedbyskepticalargumentslikeAl.Thoughtheboldskeptic'sresolutionofourpuzzleinvolvesusinsystematicfalsehoodbecauseofitsunwaveringacceptanceofAl'sconclusion,itatthesametimecanseemtomakesenseofotherpiecesofthepuzzle(thatwe'reinclinedtosaythatwedon'tknowthatskepticalhypothesesarefalseandtosaythatwedon'tknowvariousordinarythingsifwedon'tknowthesehypothesestobefalse),makingthewarrantedassertabilitymaneuverseemmoremotivatedherethanitisinthehandsofourimaginedcrazedphilosopher.But,aswesawintheprevioussection,thisappearanceisdeceptive.Boldskepticism,byitself,doesnotexplaintheplausibilityofAl'spremises.Tohelptheskepticsolvethepuzzle,I'vehadtoascribetohimananalogueofournewsolution.46Butonceweseethattheskepticalpuzzlecanbesolvedjustaswellwithouttheboldskeptic'ssystematicfalsehood,we'releftwithnoreasonforpayingthathighpriceforasolution.47Indeed,sincetheboldskeptical

46Ofcourse,skepticsarefreetorefusethishelpandproposeothersolutions.Likepracticallyanyclaimtohaveprovidedthebestexplanationofsomething,myclaimhereishostagetothepossiblefuturedevelopmentofabetterexplanationcomingalong.

47Well,littlereason.Inhis1984,aspartofhiscaseforhisrelativistconclusionthatthere'snofactofthematterastowhethercontextualismorskepticalinvariantismiscorrect,Ungertriestobalancethisrelativedisadvantageofskepticalinvariantismagainstcontextualism'srelativedisadvantagethatitdoesnotmakethetruthconditionsofknowledgeattributionsappropriatelyindependentfromthecurrentintentsandinterestsofthosewhohappentobespeakingonagivenoccasion(37).Inpart3ofmy1992,Iarguethatcontextualismcanhandlethemostseriousconsequencesonemightsuspectwouldfollowfromthislackofindependence.Whateverindependenceconcernsmightremainwithcontextualismseemquiteswampedbythecostoftheboldskeptic'ssolution,which,asI'vehereargued,isquitehighindeed.

InhisreviewofUnger1984,Brueckner,relatingtheadvantagesofinvariantism,writes,‘Inparticular,speakers'intuitionsconcerningthecorrectuseof'know'seemtoconformtotheclosureprincipleforknowledgeassertedbytheinvariantistyetdeniedbythecontextualist’(1986a,512).Ifinvariantism,butnotcontextualism,upheldclosure,Iwouldtakethistobeaveryimportantadvantageforinvariantism—

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solutionandournewcontextualistsolutionunderconsiderationcloselyparalleleachother,there'snotmuchdifferenceinhowtheysolvethepuzzle.Thattheboldskepticalresolutioninvolvesusinsystematicfalsehoodisoneofthefewdifferencestobefoundhere,andit'saweightyconsiderationagainstthatresolution.And,withtherebeinglittleroomforweightycompensatingadvantagesforthisresolutionoverthecontextualist's(givenhowsimilartheyareinotherrespects),thisconsiderationprovesdecisive.So,aswiththecrazedphilosopher'stheoryof'physician',theboldskeptic'sresolutionofAIshouldberejectedbecauseitinvolvesusinsystematicandwidespreadfalsehoodinouruseofacommontermofourlanguage.

17. BEGGINGTHEQUESTIONAGAINSTTHESKEPTIC?

IfskepticsareallowedtoplayKingoftheMountain—theystartoffontop(nevermindhowtheygotthere)andit'stheanti‐skeptics'jobtoknockthemoff—displacingthemcanbeaverydifficulttask.Howdifficultdependsonseveralfactors,oneofwhichiswhatpremisestheanti‐skepticisallowedtoappealtoinanargumentdesignedtodethronetheskeptic.Iftheskepticwon'tallowanypremisestobeavailable,then,asThomasReidnoted,‘Itwouldbeimpossiblebyargumenttobeathimoutofthisstronghold;andhemustevenbelefttoenjoyhisscepticism’(1895,447).48If,tomakethegameabitmoreinteresting,aslimrangeofclaimsisallowedtopassinspectionandbeavailableforuseintheanti‐skepticalcampaign,then(asReidagainrecognized)it'softendifficulttosaywhat,ifanything,ofimportancewouldfollowfromthefactthattheskepticcanorcannotbeknockedfromhisperchbyargumentsfrompremisesofthatparticulartype.

perhapsevenweightyenoughtomakethecontestbetweenthetwotheoriesinteresting.But,asI'veargued,contextualismneednot,and,properlydeveloped,doesnot,takeanimplausiblestandontheissueofclosure.(Seesection1Oandespeciallynote33,above.)

48Idiscussthisinsection11.Bofmy1989.

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IhavelittleinterestinplayingKingoftheMountain.ButskepticalargumentslikeAIthreatentoshowthattheskepticneedn'tjustplaythisgame,butcangainthetopofthemountain—thatstartingfromourownbeliefsandintuitions,hecangiveusbetterreasonsforacceptinghisskepticismthanwehaveforrejectingit.I'veherearguedthattheboldskepticcannotwinthisbattle—thatofprovidingthebestresolutionofourpuzzlingconflictofintuitions.AlthoughAl'spremisesareinitiallyplausible,thebestresolutionfortheconflictofintuitionsgeneratedbyAIisnotthatoftheboldskeptic.

Alongtheway,I'vebeenassumingcertainthingsthatwebelievebutthattheskepticclaimswecan'tknow,therebyperhapsraisingtheconcernthatI'mbeggingthequestionagainsttheskeptic.Forinstance,inclaimingthatmybeliefthatIhavehandsissensitive,IbetraymyconvictionthatI'mnotaBIV,eitherintheactualworldorinanynearbyworlds.Indeed,I'mreadytoadmittotheskepticthatifIamaBIV,thenIdon'tknowIhavehands,accordingtoanystandardsforknowledge.But,ofcourse,asIfirmlybelieve,I'mnotaBIV.

Isitlegitimateformetousethisconvictioninadebateagainsttheskeptic?Notifwe'replayingKingoftheMountain.Butiftheskepticismarshallingdeeplyfeltintuitionsofoursinanattempttogiveusgoodreasonsforacceptinghisskepticism,it'slegitimatetopointoutthatotherofourbeliefsmilitateagainsthisposition,andaskwhyweshouldgivecredencetojustthosethatfavorhim.Andifwecanfurthershowthatthosebeliefsthatseemtofavorhissolutioncanbeaccommodatedinoursolutionbetterthanhecanaccommodatethoseofourbeliefsthatarehostiletohim,thebestconclusionwecandrawisthatwe'renotordinarilymistakenwhenweclaimorascribeknowledge,despitetheboldskeptic'sattempttoshowthatweare.Instead,themaininsightstobedrawnfromastudyofAlinvolvethecontext‐sensitivityofattributionsofknowledge,andtherolethattheRuleofSensitivityplaysinchangingtheepistemicstandardsthatgoverntheseattributions.49

49ThispaperisdedicatedtothememoryofKenKonyndyk,myfirstphilosophyteacher.ThankstoAnthonyBrueckner,JohnCarroll,GraemeForbes,RichardGrandy,MarkHeller,EdwardStein,HollyThomas,ananonymousreaderforthePhilosophicalReview,andtoaudiencesatRiceUniversityandattheUniversityofVirginia,Charlottesvilleforhelpfulcommentsonearlierdraftsofthispaper.SpecialthanksareduetoPeter

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Ungerforhisimportantwritingsonthistopic,fromwhichI'velearnedmuch;forthreeyearsofalmostdailyphilosophicaldiscussions,manyofwhichwereonthetopicofknowledgeandskepticismandalmostallofwhichwereenjoyableandenlightening;andforhismanycommentsonvariousdraftsofthispaperanditsancestors.