singapore as a renaissance city: search for a vision
Post on 02-Jan-2017
213 Views
Preview:
TRANSCRIPT
SINGAPORE AS A RENAISSANCE CITY:
SEARCH FOR A VISION
(PART I)
By
Lee Weng Choy
T Sasitharan
Arun Mahizhnan
Institute of Policy Studies
July 1998
CONTENTS
EXECUTIVE SUMMARY 1
CHAPTER 1: THE IDEA 2
CHAPTER 2: LESSONS OF RENAISSANCE 4
CHAPTER 3: CURRENT CULTURAL LANDSCAPE 9
CHAPTER 4: FUTURE SCENARIOS 13
CHAPTER 5: POLICY PATHWAYS 20
APPENDIX 25
1
EXECUTIVE SUMMARY
The Ministry of Information and the Arts (MITA) commissioned the Institute of Policy
Studies (IPS) to study the concept of a Renaissance City as a metaphor for Singapore’s future
development as a culturally vibrant city. This concept paper begins by examining some key
developments of the European Renaissance and the lessons they hold for Singapore. While
the historic Renaissance cities were not liberal democracies in themselves, it is clear that
those who contributed to and participated in the cultural awakening that the Renaissance
brought about were curious and liberal spirits living in an intellectually open environment.
But they were the elite of the society. In a modern and tiny city-state like Singapore, culture
can neither be confined to the elite nor could it flourish in a conformist and controlled
environment. If Singapore were to truly transform itself into a future Renaissance City, it
needs to shed old assumptions and practices that treated culture as secondary to and separable
from the economy. It needs to replace them with a comprehensive and coherent cultural
policy in much the same way as it approached economic development. It also has to
recognise that culture and economy are interconnected. Given that Singapore itself has
chosen an open economic system and an open communication system as the path to the
future, and given the current world trends, chances are that state dominance will wane, civil
society will rise and information technologies will be liberating. Based on these projections,
two positive cultural development scenarios are probable: i) a syncretic model in which the
end-state will be a unique Singapore culture, developed from the syncretic selection of what
is best from many different cultures; ii) a multicultural model in which the existing
indigenous cultures are strengthened and promoted to exist separately but in symbiotic
relationship with each other. Yet other scenarios are also plausible but they tend to negate
the Singapore spirit. In either of the positive scenarios, the centrality and totality of culture in
society is an imperative. Cultural policy in such an environment should have certain
unalterable core values, should be enabling in spirit and should look to civil society as a
partner in its implementation. The two different scenarios demand specific policy frameworks
which must address key factors such as language, education, media, institutional development
and state support.
2
CHAPTER ONE
THE IDEA
Imaging Singapore
Singapore has been imagined as one kind of city or another over the years. Long before it
became a “modern city,” Singapore has been labelled the “Emporium of the East,” thanks to
its entrepot trade. When Singapore became part of Malaysia in 1963, it was to be the “New
York” of Malaysia, while Kuala Lumpur would continue to play the role of capital
“Washington D.C.” Two years later when Singapore seceded from Malaysia, some hoped
Singapore would become the “New York” not just of Malaysia but of the East as a whole
because of Singapore’s aspirations to become the leading financial centre of the region. Some
others felt Singapore should turn itself into the “Geneva of the East,” hosting many
international organisations like the United Nations, the World Trade Organisation, the World
Health Organisation, the International Red Cross or the Asia Pacific Economic Cooperation
whose Secretariat has in fact been established in Singapore. Yet others have expressed the
hope that Singapore would become the “Boston of the East” by upgrading its tertiary
educational institutions into Harvard- and Massachusetts Institute of Technology-like
universities. Those involved in the information technologies do, of course, want Singapore to
become the “Silicon Valley of the East.” Going beyond a city-oriented vision, and stopping
just short of saying “Switzerland of the East,” the government itself has declared that
Singapore should set its sights on matching the living standards of Switzerland.
It is, perhaps, noteworthy here that some non-Singaporeans not particularly charitable
towards our situation have branded Singapore as the “Third China” (after China and Taiwan)
because of the majority Chinese population, or as the “Israel of the East” because of its
location as a Chinese-dominant island in a Malay-dominant sea.
Thus, Singapore has been, both willingly and unwillingly, a subject of imagined identities,
each reflecting particular aspirations or biases.
Singapore as a Renaissance City
It is in the long line of aspirational imaginations that we now hear of Singapore as a
“Renaissance City” or the “Venice of the East.” But, no one has quite defined what kind of
city that would really be. The term ‘Renaissance,’ of course, has historical connotations and
is generally understood to mean a revival – more literally, rebirth – of a glorious past when
arts and letters and science flourished with the support of an intellectually rich and curious
community. The term “Renaissance man” used to refer to persons who were highly skilled in
several professions; today, in our age of specialisation, it connotes a person who, while being
very good at his/her own profession, is deemed to be culturally sophisticated as well.
Likewise, a modern Renaissance City usually conjures up the image of a city that, while well
functioning, is also culturally vibrant. These meanings, however, are neither an accurate
reflection of the historical process of the Renaissance nor are they instructive guidelines for
cultural development.
3
What is, perhaps, most instructive from the examples of imagined identities above, in the
context of this study, is the realisation that most of those identities are facile, fragile and
ultimately self-limiting. To illustrate: even if our two universities ever became world-class
universities, they will no more make Singapore the “Boston of the East” than our Chinese
majority will make Singapore the “Israel of the East.” Likewise, a collection of well-
equipped theatres and concert halls filled with an itinerant flow of world-class acts from
abroad will not, by themselves, make Singapore a Renaissance City. It is this realisation that
is the starting point of this concept paper.
The Ministry of Information and the Arts (MITA), as the ministry responsible for the cultural
development of Singapore, wanted to acquire a better understanding of the implications of the
term “Renaissance City” and what it would really entail if Singapore were to be transformed
into such a city. It commissioned the Institute of Policy Studies (IPS) in February 1998 to
conduct a study of the idea of Singapore as a Renaissance City. The study has been divided
into two phases: the first, to explore the idea of the Renaissance City and, if possible, to
develop a vision of Singapore as a Renaissance City; and the second, to develop a specific
action agenda if indeed the idea of Singapore as a Renaissance City proved viable. This
division into two phases is based on the understanding that concrete policy initiatives must be
preceded by a clear and thorough conceptual framework. This paper represents the first phase
of the study project.
Research Process
The authors of this report first conducted two focus group discussions in order to gain a better
grasp of the contours of the whole project and to clarify some basic issues relating to the idea
of the Renaissance and how it might apply to Singapore. The members of the two focus
groups comprised some of the leading Singapore thinkers on the subject of culture, and the
authors owe much to their clarifications and contributions. The authors are particularly
indebted to Kwok Kian Woon and Kuo Pao Kun.
This paper is the culmination of the deliberations of the focus groups, a survey of the relevant
literature and the thinking of the three authors.
The paper will first focus on the lessons of history, particularly those of the European
Renaissance that is the original inspiration of this idea. Second, it will look at the current
cultural landscape of Singapore that will be the foundation for the future. Third, it will set out
the probable scenarios for future cultural developments. Finally, it will indicate some
pathways to policy formulations.
4
CHAPTER TWO
LESSONS OF RENAISSANCE
Concept of Renaissance
The concept of a medieval period, a “Dark Ages,” which separated the classical period of
Europe from its revival was not prevalent during the Middle Ages itself, but came into
currency only afterwards, in the Renaissance period (14th – 16th centuries). Likewise, the
term “Renaissance” does not come into currency until much later, in the 19th century. The
“Renaissance,” as it is commonly understood today – as marking an historical break from the
Middle Ages, as a period of great cultural and social movements, with an emphasis on the
idea of revival or rebirth and on the philosophies of Naturalism, Humanism, etc. – is very
much a construction of 18th century Rationalism and 19th century Liberalism and
Romanticism.
The history of the concept of the “Renaissance” is illustrative of how the present day writes
or rewrites the past for its purposes. Eighteenth century Rationalism conceived the
Renaissance as a period of individualism and struggle for freedom, and argued for a
connection between cultural advance and socio-political liberty. In the 19th century, Jacob
Burckhardt, in opposition to certain romantic conceptions of the Renaissance, argued that
Naturalism was one of the period’s most crucial features. Naturalism is a philosophy which
privileges the direct observation of nature as the path to knowledge (as opposed to doctrine –
mainly religious – being the basis of truth).
Since the 20th century, historians have tended to seek continuities rather than stress breaks,
and the Renaissance has been discussed as having more in common with the Middle Ages
and as being part of a gradual development rather than as a revolutionary period. Twentieth
century historians argue that the idea of “revival” or “rebirth” was not new to medieval
Europe, but that what was different about the Renaissance was that “revival” or “rebirth”
successfully became a battle-cry for a widespread reform movement. Also, the ideas of
“individualism” and “personality” were not alien to the Middle Ages, and Naturalism was not
entirely the invention of Renaissance art and thought. It is just that these ideas became a more
conscious programme during the Renaissance.
The initial driving force for the cultural flourishing of the European Renaissance was the
passion in Italy for classical books. Combined with the new technology of print, this passion
spurred a widespread if not entirely mass cultural awakening in Italy and the rest of Europe.
But this passion for books was a passion for knowledge: it was about cultural literacy – a
fluency in and understanding of certain ideas – and not just about the development of new
technologies which disseminate information.
Implications for Singapore
The “Renaissance” has often been about re-inventing the past in a constructive way for the
present. The desire for a “Singapore Renaissance” is perhaps no different in this regard. To
5
use contemporary management parlance, such a “Renaissance” is about re-institutionalising
some of the “best practices” of the past.
What is interesting in the case of a “Singapore Renaissance,” is that it is unclear whether
what is being re-invented is only Singapore’s Asian past, or its Western past as well. The
latter process would indeed be a legitimate move, as Singapore could lay claim to the legacy
of Western modernity as much as it claims to be developing a distinctly Asian modernity.
Moreover, it is a particularly Singaporean thing to do – eclectic appropriation from elsewhere
and assimilation into one’s own.
Moreover, for all of Singapore’s ambitions to be an information hub, what has not been
consistently expressed is a desire for Singapore to become highly culturally literate.
Singapore has so far only focused on information, not knowledge. If Singapore is to use the
“Renaissance” as a model, the lesson is that cultural literacy is what makes a society
culturally vibrant, and not just cultural information.
Renaissance and Romanticism
Nineteenth-century Romanticism projected onto the Renaissance an image of society being
dominated by the arts and artists. In reality, the individualism and aestheticism of the
Renaissance was not as prevalent as the Romantics imagined and neither were these
characteristics totally absent from late medieval society. And just as characteristic of the
Renaissance was a business-like, matter-of-fact and unromantic sensibility.
Romanticism itself had both reactionary and progressive dimensions. The development and
spread of Humanism, and the rise of a collective desire for freedom, liberty and individuality
was progressive. What was reactionary was the separation of the “emotional” from “reason”
and the “rational.” In the romantic imagination, the arts became both a privileged activity in
society, but also a separate one. Romanticism privileged an emotional – almost irrational –
idea of the arts, individuality, freedom and idealism.
What is remarkable is that today a similarly romantic notion of the arts prevails: the arts are
seen as a separate and emotional or romantic activity, and not part of the rational business of
society. Indeed, the separation of what constitutes the business of society from the emotional
dimension of life has become so extreme that even Humanism, as well as other forms of
idealism, are often seen as separate from economic and pragmatic realities.
Implications for Singapore
Singapore’s pragmatism can be seen as anti-romantic, in the sense that the emotional aspects
of life are seen as secondary, to be subordinated to practical reason and imperatives.
However, what Singapore’s pragmatism shares with Romanticism is that both presume the
separation of the emotional from the practical and rational. The logic is the same, even if the
agenda is different. A more progressive view would see that the emotional and the humanistic
cannot be categorically separated from the rational and the economic. What is at stake in the
desire for a “Singapore Renaissance” is that the Singapore state should find a way to manage
the idealistic and emotional energies of society on the one hand, and the rational and
economic energies on the other – not as separate categories, but as inextricably connected.
6
Renaissance and Civil Society
Unlike most of Europe which was feudal, Italy was exceptional in that most of the territory
was divided into cities. The socio-economic structure of the city – their open, mobile,
dynamic, diverse and dense society – played a central role in the Renaissance. The words
“civilised” and “political” derive from the Roman and Greek names for “city-state”: civitas
and polis. That these Italians lived in cities rather than in a feudal society, was an enabling
condition for their strong sense of campanilismo, which literally means “patriotism.”
“Patriotism” is perhaps not the best translation, as the practice of campanilismo had more to
do with citizens contributing to their cities in terms of public architecture projects, arts
patronage and the like. Whereas patriotism implies loyalty to one’s country in opposition to
other countries, and has connotations of xenophobia, chauvinism or isolationism. Perhaps a
better translation for campanilismo is “civic consciousness.” These Italian cities certainly had
a very active civil society – albeit one largely confined to the upper classes – and their
citizens had a strong sense of belonging and stake-holding in their cities.
While one should not idealise the Italian cities of the Renaissance as being especially
democratic, republican and humanist, nevertheless, these developments are crucial, and gave
rise to the more mature Liberalism, Republicanism and Humanism of later centuries.
Implications for Singapore
Though Singapore began its post-colonial life with the aspirations of a democratic socialist
nation, its traumatic separation from an ill-fated marriage with Malaysia and its economic and
material objectives seem to have paved the way for a state-dominated society. In such a
society, notions of liberty and individuality have become circumscribed and tempered by
notions of “community over self,” “consensus over contention” and “pragmatism over
idealism.” The challenge now is to find a new equilibrium between a more self-aware and
more demanding civil society and a self-assured and paternalistic state. A modern and vibrant
civil society needs an unencumbered public space that can be both a bridge and a buffer
between the state and the individual.
It is also useful to note here the distinctions between a city that is part of a state, such as
Venice of old, and a city that is in itself a state, such as present-day Singapore. The dynamics
of the two kinds of cities are so very different that it would be unwise to draw ready lessons
from one for the other. Frequent comparisons have been made between Singapore on the one
hand and New York, London, Paris or some such city on the other, differentiating their
cultural richness and dynamism. Such comparisons are sometimes ill-conceived and
unhelpful. The circumstances of the tiny island city-state of Singapore demand a “national”
effort in almost every major undertaking in the country – be it in education, employment, arts
development, water rationing, traffic control. The lack of an urban-rural divide, the absence
of an internal hinterland, and the small population base also make it exceedingly difficult for
Singapore to embrace the examples of the above mentioned cities. However, this is not to
suggest that we are in a no-hope situation. Some of the seeming adversities may indeed turn
out to be our virtues. For example, the absence of our own hinterland propelled us to look
well beyond our borders to the region and the world for economic resources. Similarly, our
own lack of cultural resources could make us more open to and more welcoming of external
riches without the prejudices of a more endowed and more entrenched society.
7
Renaissance and Liberalisation
Too much has been made of Renaissance citizens living in liberty and equality – these ideals
were retroactively projected on the Renaissance by the 18th and 19th century Enlightenment
and liberal imaginations. The revival of the Greek discourse of democracy during the
Renaissance, while taken on in earnestness, did not revolutionise society, and the revival of
these discourses should also be seen in terms of propaganda and political rhetoric.
The Renaissance was not as widespread and influential a social movement as it has been
imagined by those in the 19th and 20th centuries. The cultural flourishing was largely
confined to social upper-classes. What had a deeper and wider impact on society was the
Protestant Reformation, for instance, which changed the structure of religion and state. The
political shape of Europe was more affected by the Reformation, and yet in the 20th century
lay imagination, it is the “Renaissance” which is more remembered. Both the Renaissance
and the Reformation raised the social status of commerce, though again the former takes the
credit in the thought of the 19th and 20th centuries.
Implications for Singapore
Liberals who wish to argue that in order for Singapore to experience its own cultural
flourishing, then like the Renaissance, it must experience a liberalisation of politics and
society. But it will find that history – as opposed to the romantic conception of that period –
is no ally to their argument. One would be hard-pressed to argue that the essential condition
of the Renaissance’s cultural awakening was the liberal governments of the Italian cities, and
that liberty and equality were experienced by most individuals. History is full of examples of
how a libertine, and even liberal, cultural elite thrived amidst a less than democratic political
regime. The Renaissance was a situation where basically only an elite (which includes the
notion of an elite-centred civil society) was relatively open and supportive of artistic
development and experimentation rather than the society as a whole.
But the central liberal premises cannot be dismissed either: that a culturally vibrant society is
also a liberal one, and that the idea of the individual is essential to a liberal society. If one
were to look at Europe from the Renaissance to the present, then these liberal premises find
considerable support from history.
What is critically important to realise is that the social function of art and entertainment has
changed since the Renaissance; they are no longer the privileged province of the elite, but a
shared domain of both the elite and the mass audience. Thus, for the masses to participate in
culture production and consumption, the same degree of individual autonomy that the elite
enjoyed must now be extended to the masses. If the conception of a Renaissance City were to
be realised, especially in a small city-state like Singapore, it is essential that citizens are
empowered to exercise individual autonomy. For in this autonomy lies the kernel of cultural
creation. So if one cannot argue that the Renaissance proves that a liberal state is a necessary
condition for a culturally vibrant society, using the Renaissance to argue that a less than open
state can have a culturally vibrant society, will also be unsustainable. What is instructive to
recognise is that in thinking about the Renaissance as a model or metaphor for cultural
development in Singapore, one cannot ignore all the other developments that have changed
modern society since then.
8
Summary
In drawing lessons from the Renaissance for contemporary Singapore, we believe that the
point is not to focus on drawing detailed comparisons between modern-day Singapore and the
city-states of Renaissance Italy. That, we feel, would be an inappropriate “use” of history.
Rather, we have sought to identify certain features of how subsequent periods have
conceptualised the Renaissance as well as to identify certain features of the Renaissance
itself, and to explore how these features have relevance for Singapore today.
The concept of the “Renaissance” came about in hindsight, and therefore, the “Renaissance”
has been, since the beginning, used as a model of sorts for later periods. In this regard,
Singapore is acting like 19th century Europe. Also like 19th century Europe, Singapore has
inherited the romantic idea that the arts and culture are a separate domain from the rational
and economic. However, we would recommend against perpetuating this separation, and
argue instead that Singapore must envision a society where creative and emotional energies
are synergistically connected with rational and pragmatic imperatives. One lesson of the
Renaissance which we feel is strongly relevant to Singapore is that an active civil society
makes for a culturally vibrant city. And while Liberalism may not exactly have been the
prevailing ethos of the Renaissance, but more a projection of the 19th century European
imagination, we believe that the Renaissance cannot, on the other hand, be used as a model of
a culturally vibrant society that is not liberal. The liberal premises still hold true: that a
culturally vibrant society is a liberal one, and that the cornerstone of a liberal society is its
fundamental respect for the individual.
9
CHAPTER THREE
CURRENT CULTURAL LANDSCAPE
The purview of the Ministry of Information and the Arts’ (MITA) covers, officially, only the
cultural and information aspects of public life. Thus its approach to the “Singapore as a
Renaissance City” project could be confined, understandably, to just the cultural dimensions
of the city life. However, in exploring the vision for a future city that is both a city and a
state, we need to look at a much broader canvass that includes politics, economics and the
society as a whole. Thus our visioning exercise includes aspects that may not officially come
under MITA, but could nevertheless have an impact on the future Singapore. However, we
have tried to anchor ourselves to the cultural dimension in this exercise, as much as possible.
Old Assumptions
First, we would like to examine some of the assumptions that have governed the official
approach to cultural development in Singapore.
The dire circumstances of the birth of Singapore as an independent nation – being one of the
rare states upon which independence was thrust – have long conditioned the way we look at
life in Singapore. The government, for its part, made no secret of its belief that economics
dominated all else – politics, personal freedoms, culture. The right to work, the right to feed
and the right to material well-being subordinated most other rights of the citizenry. In such a
conception of life and living, it was possible to compartmentalise culture, politics and
economics, to detach each from the other, and to try to contain them in discreet spheres of
public policy and administration. Even more importantly, the official approach tried not only
to separate but also to sequence them – economics first, then culture and then politics. It was
explained that people without jobs and income will not be able to enjoy the music and the
dance, much less make music or do dance. And even when people finally got their share of
economics and their dose of culture, it was felt that they were not mature enough for politics.
A young nation with a fragile society would not be strong enough, it was argued, for the
thrust and parry of contentious politics. Then there was the matter of us being Asians.
Whether in economics, politics or culture, we are thought to be different from the West, and
that the ways of Asian Capitalism, Asian Democracy and Asian Values do not – and should
not – parallel the ways of the West.
It is not the intention of this paper to judge the rightness or otherwise of the past assumptions
but to recognise the underlying philosophy that conditioned official thinking and approaches
to culture in Singapore.
The upshot of this philosophy was that culture came to be viewed by people as well as the
government as a secondary activity – almost hobbyist in nature – and not as part of the core
of their being. A corollary of this development is that attributes such as creativity, innovation,
passion, and aesthetic sense have all become disenfranchised from ordinary life and
ensconced in the extraordinary life of the artist, the entertainer or the eccentric. But, new
trends around the world, many of which have entrenched or will come to entrench themselves
10
in Singapore, are challenging these old assumptions.
New Trends
Since the 1980s, four major trends have begun to manifest themselves in Singapore.
First, the internationalisation of the economy. The world economy is becoming increasingly
globalised and Singapore has become part of that process. The Singapore government had in
fact embraced this trend with vigour and alacrity long before it became commonplace. Of
course, Singapore had little other choice, but still it was a thoughtful and conscientious
decision. Both our domestic and external economies are dominated by foreign companies, but
by invitation. Our own companies are spreading beyond Singapore because we need to
expand our markets and production bases. We now have one of the most open economies of
the world and we are one of the most vocal advocates of the virtues of the open economy.
Second, the adoption of information technology (IT) as part of our national DNA. IT is both
shrinking and opening up the world. Country after country is adopting IT as the basic
infrastructure of business, government and community life. In plugging into the IT world and
taking advantage of its numerous benefits, Singapore is even more advanced than most
advanced nations. The government’s own vision is to make Singapore an “Intelligent Island.”
By 2000, it would be among the most wired and most connected cities or states in the world.
Again, the Singapore government has embraced IT with a religious zeal, as with
globalisation, because we have little choice in the matter. An open economic system demands
an open communication system.
Third, the shift to the information economy. A trend that can be observed in Singapore as
well as elsewhere is the inexorable shift to the third wave economy – the information
economy. The information economy will thrive more on brain than on brawn, more on
information networks than on assembly lines, more on judgements than on certitudes. What
this trend foretells is the emphasis that will shift from motor skills and cognitive skills to
analytical and creative skills. Just as technical skills were a core competency in the industrial
economy, creative skills will become a core competency in the information economy.
Fourth, the tension that is arising between two contradictory currents of culture. The
globalisation of the economy and of the information networks has made the global village a
virtual reality. And the global village is acquiring a common culture or at least commonalties
shared by cultures across the globe. But at the same time, there is a resurgence of local
cultures or at least singularities that distinguish one culture from another. There is even
speculation that with the rise of China as a superpower and India as a major power, with
Japan remaining a major power, and the rest of Asia gaining in economic wealth (despite the
current downturn), it is not inconceivable that Asia could offer a dominant ideology or value
system that is different from those of the West. It is not clear at present whether cultures will
fuse or clash or maintain a dynamic equilibrium among themselves. But it is clear that
Singapore will not be a determinant of any trend, only a follower – because of our extremely
small size.
In addition to the above four trends which have a global context, there are other trends that
are more specific to Singapore.
First, in the area of political management, there is a marked transformation in the needs of the
11
citizenry and the way the government is trying to cope with it. In the simpler times of widely
shared poverty and hardship, it was easier for the state to define what the national needs were
and respond accordingly. Since the majority of the population shared those same sentiments,
there was a large collectivity and uniformity of support for the government programmes. But
that has changed now. Increasingly, “national needs” are becoming differentiated and more
narrowly defined. Both the hierarchy of needs as well as the disparity of needs pose a strong
challenge to existing conceptions and programmes to meet those needs. A good example can
be found in the housing needs of Singaporeans. The template of the housing programmes of
the 1960s no longer suffices. The government has been under constant pressure to meet much
more differentiated demands and the public response to its solutions has not been as
consensual as in the past. The same trend is observable in demands for, say, freedoms in the
media, the arts and in politics. Such differentiated demands of the citizenry are likely to lead
to more privatisation of interests and less government control over choices and preferences.
Second, one of the key components of any democratic system – the civil society – has largely
been dormant in Singapore in the past several decades. But there are strong stirrings in this
area now. In the Singapore context, an active and constructive civil society is likely to
emerge in the future, but with expectations of greater participation in governance as well as a
willingness to contribute to community life. A vibrant civil society usually leads to a less
predictable environment and a more contested public discourse. Though the outcomes need
not necessarily be negative or destructive, the competing interests of civil society actors will
necessarily create tensions and conflicts which will make for a more complex environment
than that of the past.
Third, foreign capital has played the dominant role in Singapore’s economic development
through the presence of multinational corporations (MNCs). As an open economy and as an
international business hub, this trend is most likely to continue. The foreign capital brings
with it foreigners at very high levels of management and decision-making. Their presence
and their intellectual and “leisure” demands will have an influence on how the “quality of
life” in Singapore is shaped.
In addition to the presence of the foreign, high-level managerial class, there is also the
presence of a very large number of low-level foreign workers in Singapore. Today, almost
one in three working adults is a foreigner. In total, they make up nearly 15% of the
population. On an island of just 650 square kilometres, such a dense presence will affect the
way we conceive of and practise “local” culture.
New Assumptions
The foregoing observation of new trends leads us to make some new assumptions in order to
develop a set of possible scenarios for the future. These assumptions are, of course, moot but,
in the main, they flow naturally from the above mentioned trends.
First, the state’s power over its citizens will weaken because of the open economy, the open
communication system and the growth of civil society.
Second, the state will become more of a facilitator and less of a controller, more of a
supporter and less of an initiator in many aspects of public life, especially in the cultural
arena. Where it cannot control, the state may prefer civic initiatives and self-support, for few
will enjoy responsibility without power.
12
Third, Singapore’s civil society will become much more dynamic and plural than it is today
by virtue of the openness of the society to external influences and because of the education
and affluence that economic success has brought about. As civic interests cannot be
reconciled except through dialogue, consultation and consensus, public discourses will be
varied and contested.
Fourth, culture will become an integrated element rather than a separate dimension of life in
Singapore. Because of the economic need for self-thinking and creativity in a large
proportion of the population, artistic development and activities (which are the manifestation
of culture) will gain wide acceptance and support.
Fifth, cultural development will be more organic. Unlike industrialisation and technological
skills, culture and the arts cannot be imported or borrowed. Also, unlike the economy, culture
cannot be globalised. Like politics, culture is local and needs to be indigenously rooted and
nurtured.
Sixth, cultural development will be multifaceted though uneven. Because the state will retreat
from its dominant position, the initiatives and support for growth will emanate from a variety
of sources, leading to more natural but variegated developments. Communities that are well
endowed and inclined towards cultural development will allocate more resources to that
development, while others will lag behind. Another major force in the cultural scene will be
the private sector. Thus, culture will be commercialised and the market will have a major
impact on what kinds of cultural activities flourish or flounder.
Summary
It is most unlikely that the current cultural landscape of Singapore will remain unchanged.
Both internal and external forces are already affecting the economic, political and social
arrangements and institutions that have lasted for more than three decades. Culture cannot
remain impervious to those changes. Some of the salient trends of the future will see the
diminution of state power and control, the rise of civil society and the emergence of a more
variegated but integrated cultural environment. However, these trends do not foretell
precisely what the future will really be. We can only speculate on probable future scenarios,
some of which are set out in the next chapter.
13
CHAPTER FOUR
FUTURE SCENARIOS
The Scenarios
We can perhaps imagine Singapore as a “Renaissance City” 50 or even 25 years in the future.
The actualisation of such an imagined city would be the result of policies and directives that
are put in place today. The implementation of these policies is conceivable within several
contexts in which different cultural paradigms, with distinctly different parameters and
markers, may hold sway.
The cultural contexts, scenarios or “end-states” that will ultimately emerge in Singapore
would be the function of a historical process of cultural and social development unfolding
along five broad trajectories:
The Fundamentalist
The Laissez-faire
The Cosmopolitan
The Multicultural
* Strong Multiculturalism
* Weak Multiculturalism
The Syncretic
The five trajectories are distinguishable in at least two ways. First, and somewhat
simplistically, they are distinguishable to the extent to which distinct and different cultural
end-states are realisable from each. In this respect, the Syncretic, the Multicultural and the
Cosmopolitan scenarios are one set of trajectories with end-states sharing several common
features; while the Laissez-Faire and the Fundamentalist scenarios are another set of
trajectories. Second, the scenarios are distinguishable to the extent to which each is disposed
to permit intervention, modulation and management of the processes and transformations
involved in the realisation of their respective end-states.
This of course presumes that both the state and the people (as individuals or as part of the
civil society), would have specific and different roles within each trajectory in the realisation
of the end-states. It goes without saying that no authority on earth can force cultural change
down the people’s throat. Cultural change against the people’s will is not just impracticable,
it is, given our understanding of the term “culture,” logically impossible.
The Fundamentalist
This trajectory of cultural development assumes that the state is the sole actor driving the
process in a specific, predetermined direction, with or without the co-operation of the people
or the civil society. For example, the state’s objective could be to develop a Chinese country,
with a Chinese dominant culture and with Mandarin as the main language. To this end, the
state provides the vision, the policies, the funding and formalises a structure. This form of
14
cultural development would be a non-starter in many parts of the world. But Singapore is
small enough and has a population compliant enough for such a project to be at least
contemplated. However, even if the end-state of a Chinese country with a Chinese dominant
culture is achieved, it is highly improbable that such an entity would survive very long in the
geo-political circumstances in which Singapore is ineluctably located.
The Fundamentalist trajectory will have to cope with a maximally open economic and
communications system, while concurrently maintaining a closed, highly controlled and
tightly regulated political system. This too would be untenable over the long term.
The Laissez-Faire
The Laissez-faire trajectory is unique by virtue of the fact that its end-state is indeterminate
or ambiguous. This is a trajectory of cultural development where the state provides nothing –
no funding, no vision, no policy and no formalised structures for development. It leaves
cultural development entirely in the hands of the people or the civil society. Therefore the
end-state which is finally developed is essentially in the hands of the people. The state merely
plays the role of a referee, enforcing law and order, sustaining economic development and
ensuring defence and security. It has no stake at all in cultural development.
Given the general lack of cultural awareness among Singaporeans and the evident lack of
critical and constructive public discourse, the prognosis for this trajectory of development is
not good. However, considering the rate and complexity of cultural change today, and the
significance of cultural development for the well-being of society at large, it would be
irrational to persist in the Laissez-faire approach. The risks are too high and it is a gamble
Singapore can ill-afford.
The Cosmopolitan
The term “Cosmopolitan” is being used here in a manner quite different from its common
usage. The Cosmopolitan trajectory will neither develop a variety of “world culture” nor a
culture displaying attributes that transcend any single national boundary and belongs instead
to the world as a whole.
As it is envisaged here Cosmopolitanism is a tack of cultural development that may also arise
from Singapore persisting with its current practice of multiracialism i.e. without a coherent or
rational vision of cultural development. But with two other important variables coming into
the equation, namely:
i) that the state will continue to attract an increasing number of foreign
professionals and workers to work here;
ii) that there will be an increasing number of highly qualified, professional
Singaporeans who will leave Singapore to work and live elsewhere.
Given these social and demographic conditions, a particular kind of weak multiculturalism
could emerge wherein the idea of a “native” Singaporean would simply be redundant. The
Singapore population would consist of a large number of people in perpetual transit –
everyone would be on their way somewhere else. This is of course the spectre of “Hotel
Singapore,” a career pit-stop for the highly-trained, highly-paid, highly-mobile, trans-national
15
employee of the future, and the low wage coolie who is willing to do the tough, dirty, menial
labour that the people in “Hotel Singapore” are no longer willing to do. There is no place in
this equation for sentiments like a “sense of belonging”, an idea of “home” or for putting
down “roots.”
The more skilled, educated and productive the person, the more likely he or she will be
imbued with a clinical pragmatism driven by the engine of the market. This will be the age of
the Singaporean Diaspora, people mobile enough to heed the call of the highest international
bidder. Communal peace and harmony will prevail; it must, in order to continuously attract
international investments and facilitate business. But, as with a weak form of
multiculturalism, social and cultural integration will be shallow and superficial. There will of
course be sufficient cultural understanding and interaction to facilitate business and daily
living, but there will be no need for a deeper understanding of cultural differences and
certainly no need to forge a cultural identity.
Singaporean Cosmopolitanism may be maintained indefinitely, so long as the state is able to
sustain a sufficient level of economic growth and wealth distribution. Indeed, it would be fair
to say that this variety of cosmopolitanism is actually fair-weather cultural garnishing,
sprinkled upon a viable economic vision.
The Multicultural
Another highly probable trajectory of cultural development in Singapore could result in the
Multicultural end-state. The processes of cultural development and socialisation involved in
the realisation of multiculturalism or syncretism are very similar. What sets them apart in fact
is the vision that is actually adopted at the beginning of the process. The vision driving the
Syncretic model would be to arrive specifically at a viable cultural paradigm which consists
of heterogeneous elements but is nonetheless fused in a manner in which its very coming
together, its internal consistency and its sustainability over the long term is unmistakably and
uniquely Singaporean. The Multicultural vision has no ambitions of finally arriving at a new
and unique Singaporean culture. The aim in this case is to arrive at an end-state where
different ethnic communities will preserve and practise distinct ethnic cultures but live in
peace and harmony, mutually recognising and respecting their differences.
The spirit and tenor of the Multicultural paradigm will not be significantly different from the
ethnically determined, inherited cultures that each of the communities brings to the equation
at the start. Apart from the differences in the visions which drive them, the Multicultural and
the Syncretic models share structural and constitutional similarities. Indeed it is quite possible
that they may inter-penetrate. Each may be analogously compared to different styles and
techniques of painting: Abstraction and Collage. If the Syncretic paradigm could be likened
to a complex, studied abstract composition, then the Multicultural paradigm is best seen as a
kind of collage – “The coupling of two [or more] realities, irreconcilable in appearance, upon
a plane which apparently does not suit them … .”i
The Multicultural paradigm is a mosaic of elements; a pastiche of distinct and separable
ethnic and communal identities interacting and living together. It is very likely that a
spectrum of multicultural end-states may emerge as a result of this trajectory of cultural
development. How well the multicultural mosaic coheres and how strong the integrated
whole is, would vary according to whether the end-state achieved is Multiculturalism of the
“strong” or “weak” variety.
16
Strong Multiculturalism
If the process of cultural development in Singapore is managed and modulated in accordance
to principles derived in part, for example, from those of the avowed multicultural policies of
Australia and Canada, and if the state enables the people to be an equal partner in the process
of cultural development, then it is very likely that a variety of strong multiculturalism will
eventually emerge here. Singapore, however, should take cognisance of only the principles of
the Australian and Canadian models of multiculturalism and not their practice and
implementation. Singapore must determine and evolve its own multicultural praxis.
Multiculturalism should be conceived as a systematic and comprehensive response to cultural
and ethnic diversity, with educational, linguistic, economic and social components and
specific institutional mechanisms.ii
The principles of the Australian, and Canadian models of multiculturalism [constitute]…
“an extensive effort to cope democratically with diversity, developed in the
very short time-span of two decades… this policy is founded on a civic and
contractual definition of citizenship, rather than on ethnic and cultural
communitarianism, a feature which is crucial for avoiding conflicts and
reconciling diversity with societal cohesion. This means that while ethnic and
cultural specificities are respected (our emphasis), they are to be subsumed
under the Constitution, the democratic system, the use of a national language
(two in the case of Canada) and certain norms, such as individual rights, social
equity and gender equality, which prevail in the country.”iii
The coherence and integrity of the end-state that might arise from this process of cultural
development is attributable principally to the strong bonding or “enmeshment” of the distinct
and different parts within the texture of the whole.
“The claim that a single historical story can do justice to the histories which
diverse persons residing in a place have lived has given way to a vision of
history as a tapestry of interrelated stories, stories to be told from a variety of
perspectives. What makes any given story a story of a place [of Singapore, the
United States or South Africa] is precisely its integration (our emphasis) into
the fabric of all of the other stories.”iv
One difference between strong multiculturalism and weak multiculturalism is the difference
in the level or the extent of “enmeshment” achieved in a society. Ultimately though, strong
multiculturalism is only possible in societies which are able to accord equal rights, liberties
and opportunities to all people and communities, while at the same time recognising and
respecting their particular and different cultural demands and needs.
“Multicultural societies and communities that stand for the freedom and
equality of all people rest upon mutual respect for reasonable intellectual,
political, and cultural differences. Mutual respect requires a widespread
willingness and ability to articulate our disagreements, to defend them before
people with whom we disagree, to discern the difference between respectable
and disrespectable disagreement, and to be open to changing our own minds
when faced with well-reasoned criticism. The moral promise of multiracialism
depends on the exercise of these deliberative virtues.”v
17
The role of the state and the people in realising strong multiculturalism is fundamentally no
different than in the realisation of syncretism; i.e. it must be based on a strong mutually
supportive partnership between the state and civil society.
Weak Multiculturalism
This is the end-state which would arise if the multicultural programme is implemented
without sufficient thought and a cohesive and rational vision. Weak multiculturalism could
well be the result, for instance, of Singapore persisting with its current practice of
multiracialism; or it may be the outcome of the state adopting a laissez-faire attitude in the
development of multiculturalism here, either by not intervening to direct the process or by
doing so minimally.
Presently, Singapore’s cultural policy is neither sufficiently coherent nor comprehensive.
Indeed, because the state still perceives culture as a discreet and separate dimension of human
activity, one which is decidedly less important than economics or politics, its approach to
cultural planning and management has tended to be ad-hoc and unsustainable over the long
term. In a nutshell, there is no organising principle, no over-arching vision which could tie
together disparate aspects of Singapore’s cultural scene, such as arts education, development
of local artistic talent, censorship regulation and licensing guidelines, and drive it forward in
an efficient and co-ordinated way.
This variety of multiculturalism will also consist of discreet and different ethnically
determined cultures mirroring the current ethnic composition of the population. But unlike
strong multiculturalism, it would be characterised by attenuated social cohesion and
integration. Cultural formations would be superficial and, ultimately, transient and
ephemeral. The social mores that will prevail would be more or less an extension of the
multiracial practices that are already in place now. While there may well be mutual toleration
among the different communities, there will also be no real understanding or respect of the
particular cultural differences of each. Critical discussion and cross-communication between
different communities will be non-existent and inter-cultural understanding and exchange
would be manifested at the most superficial levels. This is because there would be no
pressing social or cultural need for deep dialogue and communication; significant
disagreements would be swept under the carpet in the interests of maintaining harmony. As a
result people from different ethnic groups will live together without overt conflict, but their
interactions with and understanding of each other will be shallow. Expressions of racial and
communal integration and cohesion will be little more than tokenisms, more rhetoric than
substance.
The Syncretic
Given the political, social and cultural conditions that are already in place today, and the
vectors of global change that are discernible, perhaps the most likely trajectory of cultural
development in Singapore would result in an end-state characterised by a syncretic culture.
Of the five trajectories being considered, the Syncretic is the only one which holds out the
promise of an end-state from which a unique and cohesive Singapore culture may develop. In
the fullness of time, this new Singapore culture will derive but be distinguishable from the
four inherited, ethnically determined cultures that are already present here.
Syncretism is a particular kind of blending – it is the blending of both harmonious and
18
inharmonious elements. One possible variety of syncretism in Singapore, for instance, could
produce a blending of the elements that presently fall on either side of the so-called “Asian
and Western Values” divide. The syncretic is a complex, multifarious and highly fluid
cultural paradigm, one which is not adequately described by the casual glibness associated
with the notion “East-West fusion.” It is certainly neither as logical nor as systematic as the
Hegelian notion of a “synthesis” – i.e. a third state in the dialectic process, arising from two
opposites, within which the irrational is eliminated and the rational preserved.
Social attributes, customs, values and other cultural markers could be so mixed and
amalgamated in the syncretic that the result is an interlaced, heterogeneous, polyphonic
matrix in which Singaporean communities could be located. Despite the lack of uniformity
or homogeneity, syncretism is an end-state which is consistent and viable by itself. Ethnically
determined cultural distinctiveness, as it exists now, will mutate, and the individual’s cultural
identity will increasingly be formed via dialogues between the Self and “the Other” which is
constituted of many faces and voices. Social cohesion or integration will be constructed or
invented, and it would be a dynamic and fluid state based upon the common understandings
of cultural differences and shared experiences of a lived past. In this malleable and
amorphous state the privilege attributable to “natural culture,” “natural language,” “roots,”
“traditional culture” and “authentic heritage” would wither away into either insignificance or
meaninglessness.
“In a world with too many voices speaking all at once, a world where
syncretism and parodic invention are becoming the rule not exception, an
urban multinational world of institutional transience – where American clothes
made in Korea are worn by young people in Russia, where everyone’s “roots”
are to some degree cut – in such a world it becomes increasingly difficult to
attach human identity and meaning to a coherent “culture” or “language.”vi
Both the state and the people, either as individuals or as part of a civil society, have a vital
role to play in the achievement of the syncretic. Only a strong, mutually supportive,
partnership between the state and the civil society would result in syncretism. This
partnership must be an equal and dialogical relationship in which the state formalises the
structures, the policies and the funding for the realisation of syncretism; namely, it provides
the vision and the rules of engagement, while the civil society works through the actual
process of establishing and legitimising the cultural paradigm. The programme to realise
syncretism would almost certainly fail if the state attempts to direct and determine the process
of cultural development through an autocratic and top-down manner of management.
Summary
Clearly, taking into consideration the need for sustainable national growth in the future, the
available options for cultural development in Singapore are limited. The Laissez-faire and
Fundamentalist scenarios, for instance, are merely limits for conceptualisations. Even if they
were realisable, they would be untenable in practice over the long term.
Weak Multiculturalism and Cosmopolitanism are certainly realisable scenarios which could
be sustained over the long term. And, whether we like it or not, they would be the scenarios
most likely to be realised if cultural policy planning continues on its current tack. It is our
opinion, however, that both Weak Multiculturalism and Cosmopolitanism are far from the
ideal cultural end-states we should be aspiring for as a nation. It is no exaggeration to say that
19
both scenarios undersell the aspirations of Singaporeans for themselves and their nation.
Therefore the only viable options available, in terms of sustainability and desirability, are the
Syncretic and Strong Multiculturalism scenarios. The structure and constitution of these
scenarios would enable the people of Singapore to develop strong emotional moorings to the
nation and foster identities that would nurture the potential of the individual to his or her
fullest capacity. These scenarios would also permit the state to engage the power of the
imagination inherent in the depth and diversity of our inherited cultures.
Singapore’s national development in the next century, conceived socially, economically or
politically, would be incomplete without factoring in culture. Cultural development planning
can no longer be ignored and both Syncretism and Strong Multiculturalism would give it the
focus and centrality it deserves in national policy making.
Both scenarios would materialise if and only if the state and the people, work in tandem as
partners; and if there is a clear, coherent and comprehensive cultural policy in place.
The substance of this policy will be the subject of the next chapter.
20
CHAPTER FIVE
POLICY PATHWAYS
Need for Comprehensive and Coherent Cultural Policy
After considering the scenarios, it is clear that a “vision” is crucial and central if Singapore is
to become a culturally vibrant society. The corollary of the centrality of vision is that it must
find articulation in a comprehensive and coherent cultural policy.
As we have been arguing throughout the paper, Singapore must re-conceptualise the
relationship between what it has termed “culture” and the “economy.” We believe that the
world today puts a much higher premium on creative- and knowledge-intensive societies, and
in such societies, “culture” and the “economy” cannot be treated as mutually exclusive
categories, or as minimally related but must be seen as interconnected at many levels. If
Singapore is to effectively re-conceptualise this relationship between “culture” and the
“economy” and if Singapore is to become a leading creative- and knowledge-intensive
society, then a comprehensive and coherent cultural policy is as essential as the
comprehensive and coherent economic policy that we have had for decades.
Projecting the status quo in Singapore today into the future, the most likely outcomes are the
Cosmopolitan scenario or a weak variant of the Multiculturalism scenario. Such outcomes are
surely less desirable than the Syncretic scenario or a strong variant of the Multiculturalism
scenario. We anticipate this result because at present there does not exist a comprehensive
and coherent cultural policy that can support the evolution of the latter set of scenarios.
A comparison between the existing cultural policy with the economic policy clearly shows
that in the latter case, the reach and depth of thinking and planning concerning the economy
is of a different order altogether. And the results of the country’s economic policy are plain to
see.
Elements of Comprehensive and Coherent Cultural Policy
A comprehensive and coherent cultural policy should be:
i) National in scope. It cannot just be aimed at certain segments of society, but must
include the entire nation. Just as the country’s economic or educational policy are national
in scope, so should be its cultural policy. A crucial indicator that a policy is national in
scope is that it involves:
ii) Inter-ministerial planning and action. Again to use existing economic policy as a
paradigm, one can see how economic policy demands the coordination of the ministries
of Trade and Industry, Finance, Foreign Affairs, Education, Environment, Information
and the Arts, and so on. This inter-ministerial planning and action is necessary in the case
of culture as it is with the economy, because of its:
21
iii) Totality and centrality. Economic policy rightly conceives of the economy as affecting
not just a limited area of social life, but as playing a central role in and as affecting the
totality of society. As has been explained earlier, in the knowledge economy of the future
wherein creativity and innovation will enjoy a high premium, the majority of the small
population base of Singapore would have to be culturally adept and creative. This is in
addition to the fact that culture is no longer the privileged province of the elite but the
common domain of the masses. Given such centrality of purpose, cultural policies should
have some:
iv) Core values. Core values are the anchors of the policy-making process. While policy
may be modified from time to time to respond to environmental changes, the fundamental
objective of the policy and the values integral to that objective should remain unaltered
over time. Thus, in the 1960s, the government declared that the ultimate objective of
Singapore’s cultural policy was the creation of a Singapore culture and a unique and
common Singaporean identity for all citizens. Extraordinarily, the government changed
course in the mid-1980s, now aiming for hyphenated identities in an ill-defined multi-
cultural environment. This change of course raised questions about Singapore’s
commitment to both multiculturalism and a Singaporean culture. The anxiety now is
whether the government will stay the course this time around.
However, in cultural development as in economic development, the government is not the
sole executor of policy – it is the people who ultimately put policy into practice. As such, the
government should bear in mind two specific modes of operation in cultural policy
implementation:
v) Enabling mode. State intervention into the areas of “culture” – defined in the broadest
sense – cannot be simply top-down, because one cannot import or impose a culture, it
must grow from the ground. The state must put into place systems that guide and
empower various individuals and sectors of society so that these agents can generate
“culture” locally. What should ideally happen is a retreat of state control of local
knowledge but at the same time an extension of state support for it. Too often cultural
development in Singapore turns to foreign expertise or talent; but in the case of cultural
development – unlike in economic development – the priority should be local
practitioner, expertise and talent.
vi) Partnership mode. There are three constituents in cultural partnership: the state, civil
society (which includes the individual) and the market. The role of the state and the
market are well understood in Singapore. Cultural policy must now recognise and respect
the agency of individuals and civil society in terms of how they articulate social ideals
and values. Moreover, a sound conceptual framework of cultural policy alone is not
enough to make this partnership work. If a system offers support without adequate
sensitivity to the needs and interests as articulated by civil society, then the system
becomes effectively impotent. Again, it is instructive to recall how the government is
highly responsive to the market with regard to economic policy development.
Cultural Policy Frameworks
As discussed earlier, there are two viable cultural development scenario options available to
Singapore: Syncretism, which aims at the end-state of a Singaporean culture, and Strong
Multiculturalism, which continues with and strengthens plurality. Both scenarios require a
22
state and civil society much more informed of and sensitive to cultural production and
consumption. Cultural policy frameworks to foster such developments would impact on many
aspects of Singapore society. While the second part of the study is intended to go into the
details of a policy blueprint or action agenda, we sketch out here some policy frameworks for
the two scenarios. Some of the recommendations below would apply exclusively to just one
scenario while others could well apply to both.
(Note: In using the terms “national language” or “official language” below, we do not
necessarily mean Malay or English respectively. It is deliberately silent on that point.)
Policy Framework for a Syncretic Singapore
i) Language Use
Establish and promote one national and official language in Singapore.
There should be no mandatory second language education and people should be free
to choose any language for study.
ii) National Translation Facility
Establish a state-funded national translation agency.
Ensure translation of all culturally significant Singaporean texts into the
national/official language.
iii) National Education
Primary to Secondary Level:
Establish and promote a national education canon derived from the four main
Singapore cultures, with exposure to other major cultures of the world.
National education should emphasise the need to evolve a unique and common
Singaporean culture in addition to social cohesion and national unity.
Incorporate such education as part of the core curricula in schools.
Tertiary Level:
Establish a Singapore Studies Department in the University.
Make a national education programme compulsory for all undergraduate levels.
iv) Media
Engage the media as a partner in cultural development and cultural discourse.
Establish terrestrial and cable television channels, radio stations and websites to
promote cultural and artistic programmes in the national language.
Establish journals, publications and websites for the dissemination of critical,
intellectual and cultural discourse.
v) National and Non-denominational Institutions
Foster the development of national and non-denominational institutions that cut across
barriers of ethnicity, language and culture.
vi) State Support
Support and develop only national initiatives.
Encourage greater institutional autonomy both in principle and practice.
23
vii) Artist Development
Make artist development a priority, as much as infrastructure development.
Promote local and original artistic productions as a priority.
Select individuals and institutions for special developmental support (à la Singapore
MNCs).
Establish an on-going review of artistic censorship policy and practice.
Encourage diversity in media, presentation, content and form of artistic expression.
Policy Framework for a Strong Multicultural Singapore
i) Language Use
Encourage use of one language as lingua franca.
Establish the mother tongue or a “local” language as a mandatory second language.
Encourage both official and private use of these languages.
ii) National Translation Facility
Establish a state-funded national translation agency.
Ensure translation of all culturally significant Singaporean texts into all four official
languages.
iii) National Education
Primary to Secondary Level:
Establish and promote a national education canon derived from the four main
Singapore cultures.
Make available ethnic-, language- and culture-specific curricula choices in schools.
Establish multicultural arts education as part of the core curricula in schools.
Tertiary Level:
Encourage research on ethnic-, language- and culture-specific basis.
Make a core multicultural programme compulsory for all undergraduate levels.
iv) Media
Engage the media as a partner in cultural development and cultural discourse.
Establish terrestrial and cable television channels, radio stations and websites to
promote cultural and artistic programmes in the four official languages.
Establish journals, publications and websites in the four official languages for the
dissemination of critical, intellectual and cultural discourse.
v) National and Denominational Institutions
Foster the development of national and denominational institutions that encourage
both pluralism and national cohesion.
Establish institutions and mechanism for cross-cultural communication.
vi) State Support
Support diverse ethnic, communal and cultural initiatives as well as national efforts.
Encourage greater institutional autonomy both in principle and practice.
vii) Artist Development
Make artist development a priority, as much as infrastructure development.
24
Promote local and original artistic productions in all four official languages.
Select individuals and institutions for special developmental support (à la Singapore
MNCs).
Establish an on-going review of artistic censorship policy and practice.
Encourage diversity in media, presentation, content and form of artistic expression.
The recommendations above are indicative of the policy requirements to realise either the
Syncretic or Strong Multiculturalism scenarios. Part II of this project will provide the action
agenda, a fuller exposition of the policy initiatives to be undertaken according to the final
cultural “vision” for Singapore.
Before we close, we wish to address one specific question that has been asked of us: should
the government itself use the label “Singapore, a Renaissance City?” Our recommendation is
not to do so. Let others call Singapore a Renaissance City if it ever comes to that. Third party
endorsement is much more credible than self-praise.
25
APPENDIX
PARTICIPANTS IN FOCUS GROUP DISCUSSIONS
1. Mr S CHANDRAMOHAN
Broadcaster
2. Ms CHANG Li Lin
Doctoral student
3. Mr K C CHEW
Publisher
4. Mr Francis CHONG
Doctoral student
5. Dr Derek da CUNHA
Writer & Research Scholar
6. Mr Cherian GEORGE
Journalist
7. Prof S GOPINATHAN
Educationist
8. Prof KOH Tai Ann
Scholar in language and culture
9. Prof KWA Chong Guan
Scholar in history and heritage
10. Dr LAI Ah Eng
Scholar in ethnic relations
11. Mr LAI Chee Kien
Architect
12. Mr KUO Pao Kun
Playwright
13. Prof KWOK Kian Woon
Scholar in sociology and culture
14. Prof K P MOHANAN
Scholar in language and literature
26
15. Dr OOI Giok Ling
Scholar in cities and urban studies
16. Ms Julie SABARATNAM
Expert in Information Technology
17. Dr Sharon SIDDIQUE
Scholar in sociology
18. Dr YACCOB Ibrahim
Scholar in systems engineering
19. Dr YAP Mui Teng
Scholar in demography
i Ernst, Max. What Is The Mechanism Of Collage?
ii Multiculturalism: A Policy Response to Diversity, Paper prepared on the occasion of the
1995 Global Cultural Diversity Conference, ( 26-28 April 1995) and MOST (Management Of Social
Transformations) Pacific Sub-Regional Consultation, (28-29 April 1995), both in Sydney, Australia.
iii Ibid.
iv Herwitz, Daniel. Modern Indian Art, Modern Philosophy, Modern Cultural Identity. International
Symposium 1996. Internet.
v Gutman, Amy. 1994. Multiculturalism. Charles Taylor ed. By Amy Gutman; Princeton University Press. p.
24.
vi Clifford, James. 1988. The Predicament of Culture. Harvard, Harvard University Press. p. 95.
top related