robert mcnamara in retrospect chapter 11 discussion questions

Robert McNamaraIn Retrospect

Chapter 11Discussion Questions

1. (320) Did McNamara consider the potential benefits of a victoryin Vietnam worth the risks? What do you think?

2. (321) Using the chart of withdrawal opportunities, identify themost politically feasible opportunity for withdrawal.

3. (321) “It is sometimes said that the post-Cold War world will be sodifferent from the world of the past that the lessons of Vietnam willbe inapplicable or of no relevance to the twenty-first century.” Assess the validity of this statement.

4. (322) Of the first three causes, which one seems to have been the most preventable? What branch/department/position should have been part of the solution?

5. (322) In consideration of the fourth cause, how does our government make sure that a knowledge deficiency never happens again?

6. (322) With reference to the fifth cause, where else have we over-estimated the effectiveness of our technology? Where havewe not been guilty of this ‘sin’? When have we won the ‘heartsand minds’ of the populations we have ‘helped’ since Vietnam?

7. (322) Have we had full and frank public debates since Vietnam?

8. (322) Has our government kept the population informed during conflicts since Vietnam? Does openness guarantee public support?

9. (323) Why is an international coalition deemed so necessary? Juxtapose the American experience in WW II and Vietnam to either prove or disprove this assertion.

10. (323) How do you know if there is no immediate solution to a problem? How quick are you disposed to make this determination in your private life? Should our government work with a higher threshold?

11. (323) To what extent are these mistakes linked?

12. (324) Why are there conflicts based on race, religion, ethnic identity, nationalism, or boundary disputes?

13. (324) “In the postwar years, the United States had the power – and to a considerable degree exercised that power – to shape the world as we chose. In the next century that will not be possible.” Assess the validity of these two statements.

14. (324/5) Who appears to be the ‘players’ in international relations at the moment? Are they ‘new’?

15. (326) Which theory of international relations do you feel will most accurately describe the future – power politics or collective security?

16. (327) Has 9/11 made McNamara’s budgetary analysis irrelevant? If not, what lesson can be transferred to today’s situation? If so, is it possible that we can spend too much on national security?

17. (327) “It [defense expenditures] assumes that in conflicts outside the NATO area – for instance in Iraq, Iran, or the Korean peninsula – we will act unilaterally and without military support from other great powers?” Was McNamara right? “And it assumes that we must be prepared to undertake two such confrontations simultaneously.” Was he right?

18. (327/8) In assessing the five goals of international relations:a. how did Vietnam teach us these lessons?b. which goal seems most important?c. which goal seems most attainable?d. do any two goals seem mutually exclusive? Are they?

19. (328) Just how difficult will it be for the U.S. (leaders and public) to accept collective decision making?

20. (329) has Germany and Japan accepted more risk?

21. (329) Has the U.S. replaced our enemy, and hence our foreign policy of containment? Does this replacement provide more or less clarity of purpose and accomplishment?

22. (329/30) Did one or more of the listed conflicts “cross the line” to one that did or should have required U.S. intervention?

23. (330/1) So what is our rationale in assessing if we should become involved in a military conflict? What are your personal beliefs on the subject?

24. (331) Would McNamara support our use of force in:Afghanistan? Iraq? Iran? Korea? ISIL?

25. (332) Give evidence that supports the notion of the difficulty in controlling extensive military operations. Is this enough evidence to ‘prove’ McNamara is right?

26. (333/4) What was your personal reaction to the last two pages? What do you think was the public reaction to this book in 1995?