rights of the accused case digests

NarrativesConstitutional Law II

Michael Vernon Guerrero Mendiola2005

Shared under Creative Commons Attribution-NonCommercial-ShareAlike 3.0 Philippines license.

Some Rights Reserved.

Table of Contents

People vs. Dramayo [GR L-21325, 29 October 1971] 1Alejandro vs. Pepito [GR L-52090, 21 February 1980] 2

Dumlao vs. Commission on Elections [GR L-52245, 22 January 1980] 3People vs. Mingoa [GR L-5371, 26 March 1953] 4

Feeder International Line PTE, Ltd. vs. Court of Appeals [GR 94262, 31 May 1991] 5People vs. Martos [GR 91847, 24 July 1992] 6

Corpuz vs. People [GR 74259, 14 February 1991] 7Dizon-Pamintuan vs. People [GR 111426, 11 July 1994] 8

People vs. Holgado [GR L-2809, 22 March 1950] 10Delgado vs. Court of Appeals [GR L-46392, 10 November 1986] 11

People vs. Baluyot [GRs L-35752-3, 31 January 1977] 11People vs. Magsi [GR L-32888, 12 August 1983] 13

People vs. Malunsing [GR L-29015, 29 April 1975] 14Moslares vs. Court of Appeals [GR 129744, 26 June 1998] 15

Borja vs. Mendoza [GR L-45667, 20 June 1977] 16People vs. Alcalde [GR 139225-28, 29 May 2002] 17People vs. Dy [GR 115236-37, 29 January 2002] 19People vs. Sadiosa [GR 107084, 15 May 1998] 21

People vs. Perez [GR 122764, 24 September 1998] 22People vs. Lozano [GR 125080, 25 September 1998] 24

People vs. Ladrillo [GR 124342, 8 December 1999] 25People vs. Lumilan [GR 102706, 25 January 2000] 26

Evangelista vs. People [GRs 10813536, 14 August 2000] 29People vs. Valdesancho [GR 137051-52, 30 May 2001] 30

People vs. Alcalde [GR 139225-28, 29 May 2002] 31People vs. Ostia [GR 131804, 26 February 2003] 32

People vs. Flores [GR 128823-24, 27 December 2002] 35Acebedo vs. Sarmiento [GR L-28025, 16 December 1970] 36

People vs. Laya [GR L-53873, 13 May 1988] 37Conde vs. Rivera [GR 21741, 25 January 1924] 39

Dacanay vs. People [GR 101302, 25 January 1995] 39People vs. Rivera [GR 139180, 31 July 2001] 40

Solar Team Entertainment vs. How [GR 140863, 22 August 2000] 42Garcia vs. Domingo [GR L-30104, 25 July 1973] 43

Re: Request Radio-TV Coverage of the Trial of the Plunder Cases against Estrada. Perez vs. Estrada [AM 01-4-03-SC, 29 June 2001] ...45Tumey vs. Ohio [273 US 510, 7 March 1927] 45

Soriano vs. Angeles [GR 109920, 31 August 2000] 46United States vs. Javier [GR L-12990, 21 January 1918] 48United States vs. Garcia [GR L-3951, 14 March 1908] 48People vs. Sandal [GRs 32394-95, 5 September 1930] 49

People vs. de Luna [GR 77969, 22 June 1989] 50People vs. Prieto [GR L-46542, 21 July 1978] 51People vs. Salas [GR L-66469, 29 July 1986] 51

Gimenez vs. Nazareno [GR L-37933, 15 April 1988] 52Aquino vs. Military Commission No.2 [GR L-37364, 9 May 1975] 53

People vs. Salas [GR L-66469, 29 July 1986] 55Carredo vs. People [GR 77542, 19 March 1990] 55

This collection contains forty seven (47) casessummarized in this format by Michael Vernon M. Guerrero (as a senior law student)during the First Semester, school year 2005-2006 in the Political Law Review class

under Dean Mariano Magsalin Jr. at the Arellano University School of Law (AUSL).Compiled as PDF, September 2012.

Berne Guerrero entered AUSL in June 2002 and eventually graduated from AUSL in 2006.He passed the Philippine bar examinations immediately after (April 2007).

berneguerrero.wordpress.com

Narratives (Berne Guerrero)

286 People vs. Dramayo [GR L-21325, 29 October 1971]En Banc, Fernando (J): 8 concur, 1 took no part

Facts: In the morning of 9 January 1964, Pableo Dramayo and Paterno Ecubin, in the company of the deceased Estelito Nogaliza, all of Barrio Magsaysay, of the Municipality of Sapao, Surigao del Norte, saw its chief of police, to shed light on a robbery committed in Nogaliza's house 5 days before. The response was decidedly in the negative as they themselves were prime suspects, having been implicated by at least 2 individuals who had confessed. At about 7:00 p.m. of the same day, while they were in the house of Priolo Billona, Dramayo invited all those present including Francisco Billona, Modesto Ronquilla, Crescencio and Savero Savandal, for a drinking session at a place at the back of the school house. It was on that occasion that Dramayo brought up the idea of killing Estelito Nogaliza so that he could not satisfy in the robbery case. The idea was for Dramayo and Ecubin to ambush Estelito, who was returning from Sapao. The others were to station themselves nearby. Soon Nogaliza was sighted. He was accosted by Dramayo with a request for a cigarette. It was then that Ecubin hit him with a piece of wood on the side of the head near the right ear. Dramayo's participation consisted of repeated stabs with a short pointed bolo as he lay prostrate from the blow of Ecubin. It was the former also, who warned the rest of the group to keep their mouths sealed as to what had just happened. His equanimity appeared undisturbed for early the next morning, he went to the house of the deceased and informed the latter's widow Corazon that he had just seen the cadaver of Estelito. The barrio lieutenant and the chief of police were duly notified. The latter, upon noticing blood stains on the trousers of Dramayo, asked him to explain. The answer was that a skin ailment of his daughter was the cause thereof. Dramayo, et. al. were charged for the murder of Estelito Nogaliza. The lower court found Pableo Dramayo and Paterno Ecubin, guilty beyond reasonable doubt, of the crime of murder, qualified by the circumstance of evident premeditation as aggravated by night time, and imposes upon each of the said accused the penalty of reclusion perpetua. The other accused were not convicted as, two of them, Crescencio Savandal and Severo Savandal being utilized as state witnesses, and the other three, Priolo Billona, Francisco Billona and Modesto Ronquilla acquitted. Dramayo and Ecubin appealed.

Issue: Whether Dramayo and Ecubin should be acquitted inasmuch as the other co-accused have been acquitted due to reasonable doubt.

Held: The starting point is the presumption of innocence, according to the Constitution, which is a right safeguarded both Dramayo and Ecubin. Accusation is not, according to the fundamental law, synonymous with guilt. It is incumbent on the prosecution to demonstrate that culpability lies. Dramayo and Ecubin were not even called upon then to offer evidence on their behalf. Their freedom is forfeit only if the requisite quantum of proof necessary for conviction be in existence. Their guilt must be shown beyond reasonable doubt. To such a standard, this Court has always been committed. There is need, therefore, for the most careful scrutiny of the testimony of the state, both oral and documentary, independently of whatever defense is offered by the accused. Only if the judge below and the appellate tribunal could arrive at a conclusion that the crime had been committed precisely by the person on trial under such an exacting test should the sentence be one of conviction. It is thus required that every circumstance favoring his innocence be duly taken into account. The proof against him must survive the test of reason; the strongest suspicion must not be permitted to sway judgment. The conscience must be satisfied that on the defendant could be laid the responsibility for the offense charged; that not only did he perpetrate the act but that it amounted to a crime. What is required then is moral certainty. It cannot be denied that the credible and competent evidence of record resulted in moral certainty being entertained not only by the trial judge but by the Supreme Court as to the culpability of Dramayo and Ecubin. The force of the controlling doctrines, on the other hand, required that the other three accused be acquitted precisely because, unlike in the case of Dramayo and Ecubin, the requisite quantum of proof to show guilt beyond reasonable doubt was not present. There is no question as to the other two who testified for the state being like-vise no longer subject to any criminal liability. The judgment of conviction should not have occasioned any surprise on the part of Dramayo and Ecubin, as from the evidence deserving of the fullest credence, their guilt had been more than amply demonstrated. The presumption of innocence

Constitutional Law II, 2005 ( 1 )


could not come to their rescue as it was more than sufficiently overcome by the proof that was offered by the prosecution. What would have been a blot on the law is that if, on the facts as established, no reasonable doubt being entertained, Dramayo and Ecubin would have been acquitted likewise just because the other 5 defendants were not similarly sentenced. There had been cases where the Supreme Court, notwithstanding a majority of the defendants being acquitted, the element of conspiracy likewise being allegedly present, did hold the party or parties responsible for the offense guilty of the crime charged, a moral certainly having arisen as to their culpability.

287 Alejandro vs. Pepito [GR L-52090, 21 February 1980]First Division, Melencio-Herrera (J): 5 concur

Facts: During Bianito Alejandro's arraignment, he pleaded not guilty to the crime of Homicide before the Court of First Instance of Aklan (Branch III, presided by Judge Gerardo M.S. Pepito). Alejandro, however, admitted in open court that he killed the deceased but that he acted in self-defense. The judge, on 6 July 1979, in an order required the defense counsel, first to prove evidence in self-defense and the prosecution to present its evidence to disprove the same. Alejandro moved for reconsideration, reiterated in an Amended Motion, of the Order contending that the Court action was violative of Section 3 Rule 119 of the Rules of Court, which establishes the sequence in the presentation of evidence by the parties in criminal cases, first by the prosecution and then by the defense, and not vice versa. Additionally, Alejandro claimed that the procedure adopted by the Judge is prejudicial to the substantial rights of the accused in the sense that the same would give rise to the presumption that the prosecution had already established the guilt of the accused beyond reasonable doubt when what is only on record is the accused's admission that he had killed the victim in self defense. The Judge denied reconsideration in an Order dated 9 October 1979. Alejandro filed the petition for certiorari with tthe Supreme Court.

Issue: Whether the trial order should be in reverse order inasmuch as the accused has admitted to the killing but under the claim of self-defense.

Held: Enshrined in our Constitution as a protection to accused persons in criminal cases is the requirement that no person shall be held to answer for a criminal offense without due process of law. That requirement simply requires that the procedure established by law shall be followed. Section 3 of Rule 119 prescribes the order of trial in criminal cases, provides that "the plea of not guilty having been entered, the trial must proceed in the following order: (a) The fiscal, on behalf of the People of the Philippines, must offer evidence in support of the charges. (b) The defendant or his attorney may offer evidence in support of the defense. (c) The parties may then respectively offer rebutting evidence only, unless the court, in furtherance of justice, permit them to offer new additional evidence bearing upon the main issue in question. (d) When the introduction of evidence shall have been concluded, unless the case is submitted to the court without argument, the fiscal must open the argument, the attorney for the defense must follow, and the fiscal may conclude the same. The argument by either attorney may be oral or written, but only the written arguments, or such portions of the same as may be in writing, shall be preserved in the record of the case." Thus, it behooved the Judge to have followed the sequence of trial set forth. That procedure observes the "mandate of reason and the guarantee of fairness with which due process is identified". The procedure outlined safeguards and protects the fundamental right of the accused to be presumed innocent until the contrary is proved. That right is founded on the principle of justice and is intended not to protect the guilty but to prevent as far as human agencies can, the conviction of an innocent person. Indeed, the form of a trial is also a matter of public order and interest; the orderly course of procedure requires that the prosecution shall go forward and present all of its proof in the first instance. As held in People vs. Balicasan (17 SCRA 1119 [1966]), "in view of the assertion of self-defense in the testimony of the accused, the court should have taken anew defendant's plea and then proceeded with the trial of the case, in the order set forth in Section 3 of Rule 119 of the Rules of Court." The Judge's desire to abbreviate the trial and unclog his docket is commendable but it must yield to the paramount objective of safeguarding the rights of an accused at all stages of criminal proceedings, and to



the interest of orderly procedure adopted for the public good.

288 Dumlao vs. Commission on Elections [GR L-52245, 22 January 1980]En Banc, Melencio-Herrera (J): 5 concur, 1 abstained as far as Dumlao is concerned.

Facts: A Petition for Prohibition with Preliminary Injunction and/or Restraining Order was filed by Patricio Dumlao, Romeo B. Igot and Alfredo Salapantan Jr., in their own behalf and all others allegedly similarly situated, seeking to enjoin respondent Commission on Elections (COMELEC) from implementing certain provisions of Batas Pambansa 51, 52, and 53 for being Dumlao specifically questions the constitutionality of section 4 of Batas Pambansa (BP) 52 as discriminatory and contrary to the equal protection and due process guarantees of the Constitution. Said Section 4 provides that "In addition to violation of section 10 of Art. XII-C of the Constitution and disqualification mentioned in existing laws, which are hereby declared as disqualification for any of the elective officials enumerated in section 1 hereof. Any retired elective provincial, city of municipal official who has received payment of the retirement benefits to which he is entitled under the law and who shall have been 65 years of age at the commencement of the term of office to which he seeks to be elected, shall not be qualified to run for the same elective local office from which he has retired." Dumlao alleged that the aforecited provision is directed insidiously against him, and that the classification provided therein is based on "purely arbitrary grounds and, therefore, class legislation." For their part, Igot and Salapantan, Jr. assail the validity of Section 7 of BP 51, which provides that "Unless sooner removed for cause, all local elective officials hereinabove mentioned shall hold office for a term of 6 years. which shall commence on the first Monday of March 1980"; Section 4 of BP 52, which provides that "any person who has committed any act of disloyalty to the State, including acts amounting to subversion, insurrection, rebellion or other similar crimes, shall not be qualified to be a candidate for any of the offices covered by this Act, or to participate in any partisan political activity therein: provided, that a judgment of conviction for any of the aforementioned crimes shall be conclusive evidence of such fact and the filing of charges for the commission of such crimes before a civil court or military tribunal after preliminary investigation shall be prima facie evidence of such fact"; Section 1 and Section 6 of BP 52. In addition to the said provisions, Igot and Salapantan, Jr. also questioned the accreditation of some political parties by the COMELEC, as authorized by BP 53, on the ground that it is contrary to section 9(1), Art. XII(C) of the Constitution, which provides that a "bona fide candidate for any public office shall be free from any form of harassment and discrimination."

Issue: Whether Section 4, BP 52, which disqualifies elective candidates who have been charged in civil and/or military tribunals, is valid.

Held: Explicit is the constitutional provision that, in all criminal prosecutions, the accused shall be presumed innocent until the contrary is proved, and shall enjoy the right to be heard by himself and counsel. An accusation, according to the fundamental law, is not synonymous with guilt. The challenged proviso contravenes the constitutional presumption of innocence, as a candidate is disqualified from running from public office on the ground alone that charges have been filed against him before a civil or military tribunal. It condemns before one is fully heard. In ultimate effect, except as to the degree of proof, no distinction is made between a person convicted of acts of disloyalty and one against whom charges have been filed for such acts, as both of them would be ineligible to run for public office. A person disqualified to run for public office on the ground that charges have been filed against him is virtually placed in the same category as a person already convicted of a crime with the penalty of arresto, which carries with it the accessory penalty of suspension of the right to hold office during the term of the sentence. Although the filing of charges is considered as but prima facie evidence, and therefore, may be rebutted, yet, there is "clear and present danger" that because the proximity of the elections, time constraints will prevent one charged with acts of disloyalty from offering contrary proof to overcome the prima facie evidence against him. Additionally, it is best that evidence pro and con of acts of disloyalty be aired before the Courts rather than before an administrative body such as the COMELEC. A highly possible conflict of finding between two government



bodies, to the extreme detriment of a person charged, will thereby be avoided. Furthermore, a legislative/administrative determination of guilt should not be allowed to be substituted for a judicial determination. Being infected with constitutional infirmity, a partial declaration of nullity of only that objectionable portion is mandated. The first paragrap of Section 4, BP 52, on the other hand, is valid. However, that portion of the second paragraph of section 4 of Batas Pambansa Bilang 52 providing that "the filing of charges for the commission of such crimes before a civil court or military tribunal after preliminary investigation shall be prima facie evidence of such fact", is hereby declared null and void, for being violative of the constitutional presumption of innocence guaranteed to an accused.

289 People vs. Mingoa [GR L-5371, 26 March 1953]En Banc, Reyes (J): 10 concur

Facts: Found short in his accounts as officer-in-charge of the office of the municipal treasurer of Despujols, Romblon, and unable to produce the missing fund amounting to P3,938 upon demand by the provincial auditor, Aquino Mingoa was prosecuted for the crime of malversation of public funds in the Court of First Instance of Romblon. Mingoa explained to the examining officer that some days before he had, by mistake, put the money in a large envelope which he took with him to a show and that he forgot it on his seat and it was not there anymore when he returned. But he did not testify in court and presented no evidence in his favor. Having been found guilty as charged and sentenced to the corresponding penalty, he appealed to the Court of Appeals. But that court certified the case to the Supreme Court on the ground that it involved a constitutional question.

Issue: Whether Article 217 of the Revised Penal Code, which provides that "the failure of a public officer to have duly forthcoming any public funds or property with which he is chargeable, upon demand by any duly authorized officer, shall be prima facie evidence that he has put such missing funds or property to personal use" violates the constitutional right of the accused to be presumed innocent until the contrary is proved cannot be sustained.

Held: The validity of statutes establishing presumptions in criminal cases is now a settled matter, Cooley, in his work on constitutional limitations (8th ed., Vol. I, pp. 639-641), says that "there is no constitutional objection to the passage of a law providing that the presumption of innocence may be overcome by a contrary presumption founded upon the experience of human conduct, and enacting what evidence shall be sufficient to overcome such presumption of innocence." In line with this view, it is generally held in the United States that the legislature may enact that when certain facts have been proved they shall, be prima facie evidence of the existence of the guilt of the accused and shift the burden of proof provided there be a rational connection between the facts proved and the ultimate fact presumed so that the inference of the one from proof of the others is not unreasonable and arbitrary because of lack of connection between the two in common experience. The same view has been adopted here as may be seen from the decisions of the Supreme court in US vs. Tria (17 Phil 303); US vs. Luling (34 Phil 725); and People vs. Merilo (GR L-3489, 28 June 1951). The statute in the present case creates a presumption of guilt once certain facts are proved. It makes the failure of a public officer to have duly forthcoming, upon proper demand, any public funds or property with which he is chargeable prima facie evidence that he has put such missing funds or property to personal use. The ultimate act presumed is that the officer has malversed the funds or property entrusted to his custody, and the presumption is made to arise from proof that he has received them and yet he has failed to have them forthcoming upon proper demand. Clearly, the fact presumed is but a natural inference from the fact proved, so that it cannot be said that there is no rational connection between the two. Furthermore, the statute establishes only a prima facie presumption, thus giving the accused an opportunity to present evidence to rebut it. The presumption is reasonable and will stand the test of validity laid down in the above citations. Herein, Mingoa's explanation is inherently unbelievable and cannot overcome the presumption of guilt arising from his inability to produce the fund which was found missing. If the money was really lost without Mingoa's fault, the most natural thing for him to do would be to so inform his superiors and apply for release



from liability. But this he did not do. Instead, he tried to borrow to cover the shortage. And on the flimsy excuse that he preferred to do his own sleuthing, he even did not report the loss to the police. Considering further, as the prosecution points out in its brief, Mingoa had at first tried to avoid meeting the auditor who wanted to examine his accounts, and that for sometime before the alleged loss many teachers and other employees of the town had not been paid their salaries, there is good ground to believe that Mingoa had really malversed the fund in question and that his story about its loss was pure invention.

290 Feeder International Line PTE, Ltd. vs. Court of Appeals [GR 94262, 31 May 1991]Second Division, Regalado (J): 3 concur, 1 on leave

Facts: The M/T "ULU WAI" a foreign vessel of Honduran registry, owned and operated by Feeder International Shipping Lines of Singapore, left Singapore on 6 May 1986 carrying 1,100 metric tons of gas oil and 1,000 metric tons of fuel oil consigned to Far East Synergy Corporation of Zamboanga, Philippines. On 14 May 1986, the vessel anchored at the vicinity of Guiuanon Island in Iloilo without notifying the Iloilo customs authorities. The presence of the vessel only came to the knowledge of the Iloilo authorities by information of the civilian informer in the area. Acting on said information, the Acting District Collector of Iloilo dispatched a Customs team on 19 May 1986 to verify the report. The Customs team found out that the vessel did not have on board the required ship and shipping documents, except for a clearance from the port authorities of Singapore clearing the vessel for "Zamboan." In view thereof, the vessel and its cargo were held and a Warrant of Seizure and Detention over the same was issued after due investigation. Feeder International Line PTE Ltd, through its agent Feeder International (Phils.) Inc. then filed its Motion to Dismiss and to Quash the Warrants of Seizure and Detention which the District Collector denied in his Order dated 12 December 1986. In the course of the forfeiture proceedings, the parties, through their respective counsel, agreed on a stipulation of facts. On 17 March 1987, the District Collector issued his decision, finding the M/T "ULU WAI" guilty of violating Section 2530 (a) of the Tariff and Customs Code of the Philippines (PD 1464), as amended, while her cargo of 1,100 M/T Gas Oil and 1,000 M/T Fuel Oil are found guilty of violating Section 2530 (a), (f), and (1-1) under the same Code and are hereby forfeited in favor of the Republic of the Philippines. Feeder International appealed to the Commissioner of Customs who rendered a decision dated 13 May 1987, affirming the decisin of the District Collector of Customs of Iloilo in toto. On 25 June 1987, Feeder International filed a petition for review of the decisions of the Collector and the Commissioner of Customs with the Court of Tax Appeals, praying for the issuance of a writ of preliminary injunction and/or a restraining order to enjoin the Commissioner from implementing his decision. On 14 December 1988, the Court of Tax Appeals issued its decision affirmed the decision of the Commissioner of Customs. Feeder International, on 19 January 1990, filed a petition for review of the Court of Tax Appeals' decision with the Supreme Court. On 21 March 1990, the Supreme Court issued a resolution referring the disposition of the case to the Court of Appeals in view of the Court's decision in Development Bank of the Philippines vs. Court of Appeals, et al. holding that final judgments or decrees of the Court of Tax Appeals are within the exclusive appellate jurisdiction of the Court of Appeals. On 8 May 1990, the Court of Appeals rendered its questioned decision affirming the decision of the Court of Tax Appeals. Feeder International's motion for reconsideration having been denied on 4 July 1990, it interposed the present petition.

Issue: Whether a forfeiture proceeding is penal in nature, and whether the corporation can invoke the right to be presumed innocent.

Held: A forfeiture proceeding under tariff and customs laws is not penal in nature, contrary to the argument advanced by Feeder International. In the case of People vs. Court of First Instance of Rizal, etc., et al., the Court made an exhaustive analysis of the nature of forfeiture proceedings, in relation to criminal proceedings, holding therein that "seizure and forfeiture proceedings under the tariff and customs laws are not criminal in nature as they do not result in the conviction of the offender nor in the imposition of the penalty provided for in Section 3601 of the Code. As can be gleaned from Section 2533 of the code, seizure proceedings are purely civil and administrative in character, the main purpose of which is to enforce the administrative fines or



forfeiture incident to unlawful importation of goods or their deliberate possession. The penalty in seizure cases is distinct and separate from the criminal liability that might be imposed against the indicted importer or possessor and both kinds of penalties may be imposed. Considering, therefore, that proceedings for the forfeiture of goods illegally imported are not criminal in nature since they do not result in the conviction of the wrongdoer nor in the imposition upon him of a penalty, proof beyond reasonable doubt is not required in order to justify the forfeiture of the goods. The degree of proof required is merely substantial evidence which means such relevant evidence as a reasonable mind might accept as adequate to support a conclusion. Further, a corporate entity has no personality to invoke the right to be presumed innocent which right is available only to an individual who is an accused in a criminal case. Herein, the Court finds and so hold that the Government has sufficiently established that an illegal importation, or at least an attempt thereof, has been committed with the use of the vessel M/T "ULU WAI," thus warranting the forfeiture of said vessel and its cargo pursuant to the provisions of the Tariff and Customs Code. Feeder International is guilty of illegal importation, there having been an intent to unload, is amply supported by substantial evidence. The findings of fact of the Court of Appeals are in consonance with the findings of both the Collector and the Commissioner of Customs, as affirmed by the Court of Tax Appeals. The Court finds no compelling reason to deviate from the elementary principle that findings of fact of the Court of Appeals, and of the administrative and quasi-judicial bodies for that matter, are entitled to great weight and are conclusive and binding upon this Court absent a showing of a grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack of jurisdiction.

291 People vs. Martos [GR 91847, 24 July 1992]First Division, Nocon (J): 3 concur

Facts: On 1 February 1989, acting on the tip of a confidential informer (C.I.) or asset, a team from the First Narcotics Regional Unit based in Urdaneta, Pangasinan, composed of Sgts. Rogelio Raguine, Peregrino Benito and Ramon Padilla, went to Bgy. Carmen East, Rosales, Pangasinan at about 4:00 p.m., in pursuit of a certain "Lito" who was engaged in selling marijuana to students and adults alike. "Lito", whose full name is Carlito Martos, was washing his feet at the water pump near his house when Sgt. Raguine and the CI approached him. Sgt. Raguine, acting as poseur-buyer, was introduced by the CI to "Lito". The former then inquired if "Lito" had "stuff" for sale, and upon eliciting an affirmative answer, ordered P50.00 worth of stuff. Lito went inside his house and returned after a while to where Sgt. Raguine and the CI were. He handed the stuff contained in a small plastic bag, to Sgt. Raguine while the latter gave Carlito Martos a P50.00 bill, which serial number was earlier recorded by him in a log book. After being convinced that the content of the plastic bag was marijuana, Sgt. Raguine immediately signalled Sgts. Benito and Padilla, who were then positioned in separate places some 10 meters away from the water pump, to close in and effect arrest. After identifying themselves as NARCOM agents, Sgts. Benito and Padilla seized Carlito Martos, but the latter was able to wrench himself free from his captors and escaped. The three agents pursued him, but when Carlito Martos heard a shot, he stopped running, raised his hands and surrendered. It turned out that the shot was fired from the gun of Sgt. Padilla which accidentally hit the CI on the left arm. Thereupon, Carlito Martos was brought to the NARCOM office in Urdaneta, Pangasinan. The stuff was turned over to the PC/INP Crime Laboratory, Camp Crame, for analysis. The report confirmed the fact that the stuff was marijuana. Martos was charged for violation of the Dangerous Drugs Act in an information dated 20 March 1989. The Regional Trial Court, Branch 53 of Rosales, Pangasinan, found Martos guilty beyond reasonable doubt of the offense of selling marijuana, defined and penalized under Article II, Section 4 of Republic Act 6425, as amended, otherwise known as the Dangerous Drugs Act of 1972, and sentenced him to suffer the penalty of reclusion perpetua and a fine of P30,000.00, and to pay the costs. Martos appealed.

Issue: Whether the Court could presume that official duty was regularly performed by the arresting officers to determine the culpability of the accused person.

Held: There is no dispute that the findings of facts of the trial courts deserve great weight and respect for they have the privilege of examining the demeanor of the witnesses while on the witness stand and determine the



veracity of the their testimonies. The rule, however, admits of certain exceptions, such as (1) when the conclusions is a finding based entirely on speculations; (2) when the inference made is manifestly mistaken, absurd or impossible; (3) where there is grave abuse of discretion; (4) when the judgment is based on misapprehension of facts; and (5) when the court, in making its findings, went beyond the issues of the case and the same are contrary to the admissions of both the appellant and the appellee. The present case calls for a careful scrutiny of the records due to the irreconcilable differences in the testimonies of the prosecution witnesses which weakens the case for the People. For instance, the P50.00 bill which was supposed to have been offered to the Martos to purchase the marijuana was not formally offered in evidence. The decision further states that the confidential informer was wounded on the right arm, when all the testimonies of both the prosecution and defense witnesses consistently state that the informer was hit on the left arm. The testimonies of the prosecution witnesses are replete with inconsistencies. Further, there was no evidence presented to prove that the marijuana shown in evidence is the same marijuana allegedly sold by martos to the buy-bust team. In prosecuting a case for violation of Section 4, Article II of Republic Act 6425, the prosecution must be able to establish by clear and convincing evidence that the person charged at a particular time, date and place committed any of such unlawful acts. As it is, the Court is not convinced that the evidence of the prosecution could stand ground sufficient to convict Martos. The Court cannot even presume that official duty was regularly performed by the arresting officers, for it cannot by itself prevail over the constitutional presumption of innocence accorded an accused person. "If the inculpatory facts and circumstances are capable of two or more explanations one of which is consistent with the innocence of the accused and the other consistent with his guilt, then the evidence does not fulfill the test of moral certainty and is not sufficient to support a conviction." The accused is not even called upon to offer evidence on his behalf. His freedom is forfeited only if the requisite quantum of proof necessary for conviction be in existence. An assiduous and thorough analysis of the evidence on record disclosed that Martos' conviction has no basis. The prosecution's evidence in support of its theory is not convincing. If there was any evidence presented, it was so slender and shaky, not presented with care and thoroughness which the gravity of the offense demanded and, taken in its entirety, is utterly insufficient to produce conviction beyond reasonable doubt.

292 Corpuz vs. People [GR 74259, 14 February 1991]En Banc, Cruz (J): 13 concur

Facts: As Supervising Accounting Clerk in the Office of the Provincial Treasurer of Nueva Vizcaya, Generozo Corpuz y Padre was designated Acting Supervising Cashier in the said Office. In this capacity, he received collections, disbursed funds and made bank deposits and withdrawals pertaining to government accounts. On 13 April 1981, his designation as Acting Supervising Cashier was terminated, and on 22 April 1981, a Transfer of Accountabilities was effected between the petitioner and his successor. The Certificate of Turnover revealed a shortage in the amount of P72,823.08. A letter of demand dated 22 April 1981, required Corpuz to produce the missing amount but he was able to pay only P10,159.50. The balance was demanded in another letter dated 12 October 1981. This was subsequently reduced by P12,067.51 through the payment to Corpuz of temporarily disallowed cash items and deductions from his salary before his dismissal from the service. On 27 September 1982, a final letter of demand for the total deficiency of P50,596.07 was sent to Corpuz. The demand not having been met, an information for malversation of the said amount was filed against him with the Sandiganbayan on 11 October 1983. Corpuz insists, however, that he is not guilty of the charge because the shortage imputed to him was malversed by other persons. On 27 February 1986, the court found Corpuz guilty beyond reasonable doubt as principal of the crime of Malversation of Public Funds, and there being no modifying circumstances in attendance, and applying the Indeterminate Sentence Law, the Sandiganbayan sentenced him to suffer imprisonment ranging from 12 Years and 1 Day of reclusion temporal, as minimum, to 20 years of reclusion temporal, as maximum; to restitute to the provincial government of Nueva Vizcaya the sum of P50,596.07 which is the amount misappropriated, and to pay the costs of the suit. Further, the court ordered Corpuz to suffer the penalty of perpetual special disqualification, and to pay a fine equal to the amount embezzled. Hence, the petition.



Issue: Whether the equipose rule applies in the present case.

Held: Except for Check 958525, which was only entered in Corpuz's Cash Book on 31 March 1981, or 3 months after its issuance and encashment, all the other 3 were duly entered. Then Check 956639 which was issued and encashed on the same day as Check 958525, was duly entered in his Cash Book. Non-entry of the latter check on time was a subtle way of camouflaging the embezzlement of its money equivalent. There seems to be no logical reason why Checks 956639 and 958525 could not have been liquidated together by Diosdado Pineda who used the proceeds to pay salary differentials of government officials and employees of the province of Nueva Vizcaya, since these have been issued and encashed on the same day. Corpuz could not have been absent since his Employee's Leave Card, wherein his earned leaves are indicated, shows that during the month of December 1980, he earned 1.25 days vacation leave and 1.25 days sick leave, which is the same number of days vacation and sick leaves that he earned monthly from 7 July 1976 to October 1981. Moreover, even if it were true that he was absent on 23 December 1980, the day when Check 958525 was issued and encashed, yet, the other check which was issued and encashed on the same day was duly liquidated. These findings are mainly factual and are based on substantial evidence. There is no reason to disturb them, absent any of the exceptional circumstances that will justify their review and reversal. On the contrary, the Court is convinced that the facts as established point unmistakably to Corpuz's guilt of the offense charged. This conclusion is bolstered by the Solicitor General's observation that Corpuz's denial of responsibility for the missing P50,000.00 is negated by the following factors: (1) when he entered the said amount in his cash book in March 1981, he did not make any notation that said amount, though entered, was not actually received; (2) At the time he signed the certificate of turn-over, he did not make any certification that the amount of P50,000.00 should not be charged against him; (3) Despite his insistence that Pineda and Martinez misappropriated the money, he did not file any case, whether civil, criminal or otherwise, against either or both. Corpuz's claim that he is the victim of a "sinister design" to hold him responsible for a crime he has not committed is less than convincing. His attempt to throw the blame on others for his failure to account for the missing money only shows it is he who is looking for a scapegoat. The plaintive protest that he is "a small fry" victimized by the "untouchables" during the Marcos regime is a mere emotional appeal that does not impress at all. The suggestion that the supposed injustice on Corpuz would be abetted by the Supreme Court unless his conviction is reversed must be rejected as an arrant presumptuousness. The equipoise rule invoked by Corpuz is applicable only where the evidence of the parties is evenly balanced, in which case the constitutional presumption of innocence should tilt the scales in favor of the accused. There is no such equipoise here. The evidence of the prosecution is overwhelming and has not been overcome by Corpuz with his nebulous claims of persecution and conspiracy. The presumed innocence of the accused must yield to the positive finding that he malversed the sum of P50,310.87 to the prejudice of the public whose confidence he has breached. His conviction must be affirmed.

293 Dizon-Pamintuan vs. People [GR 111426, 11 July 1994]First Division, Davide Jr. (J): 4 concur

Facts: Teodoro Encarnacion, Undersecretary, Department of Public Works and Highways arrived at his residence located at Better Living Subdivision, Paraaque at around 9:45 p.m. of 12 February 1988 coming from the Airport and immediately proceeded inside the house, leaving behind his driver and two housemaids outside to pick-up his personal belongings from his case. 5 unidentified masked armed persons appeared from the grassy portion of the lot beside the house and poked their guns to his driver and two helpers and dragged them inside his house. The men pointed a gun at him and was made to lie face down on the floor. Thereafter, the robbers ransacked the house and took away jewelries and other personal properties including cash. After the intruders left the house he reported the matter immediately to the police. He was then interviewed by the Paraaque police and was informed that an operation group would be assigned to the case. He likewise reported the matter to the Western Police District on 15 February 1988. Two days later, a group of WPD operatives came over to his house and he was asked to prepare a list of items of jewelry and other valuables



that were lost including a sketch of distinctive items. He was later told that some of the lost items were in Chinatown area as tipped by the informer the police had dispatched. That an entrapment would be made with their participation, on 14 February 1988. As such, they went to Camp Crame at around 9:00 a.m. and arrived at the vicinity of 733 Florentino Torres Street, Sta. Cruz, Manila at about 10:00 a.m.; that he is with his wife posed as a buyer and were able to recognize items of the jewelry stolen displayed at the stall being tended by Norma Dizon Pamintuan; the pieces were: 1 earring and ring studded with diamonds worth P75,000 bought from estimator Nancy Bacud, 1 set of earring diamond worth P15,000, and 1 gold chain with crucifix worth P3,000. Dizon-Pamintuan was charged with violation of the Anti-Fencing Law (Criminal Case 88-64954). On the basis of the testimonies of prosecution witnesses Teodoro Encarnacion (one of the offended parties), Cp. Ignacio Jao, Jr., and Pfc. Emmanuel Sanchez, both of the Western Police District, the trial court (Branch 20 of the Regional Trial Court of Manila) promulgated on 16 November 1990 its decision, finding Dizon-Pamintuan guilty for violation of Presidential Decree 1612 beyond reasonable doubt, and sentenced her to suffer an indeterminate penalty of imprisonment from 14 years of prison mayor to 18 years of reclusion temporal. No civil liability was imposed in view of the recovery of the items. Dizon-Pamintuan then appealed her conviction to the Court of Appeals (CA-GR CR 11024) where she raised two issues: (1) that the judgment was based on a mere presumption, and (2) that the prosecution failed to show that the value of the jewelry recovered is P93,000.00. On 29 March 1993, the Court of Appeals held that the guilt of Dizon-Pamintuan was established beyond reasonabe doubt. Nevertheless, the Court of Appeals was of the opinion that there was not enough evidence to prove the value of the pieces of jewelry recovered, which is essential to the imposition of the proper penalty under Section 3 of PD 1612. It opined that the trial court erred in concluding that "the value of the recovered jewelries is P93,000.00 based on the bare testimony of Teodoro Encarnacion and the self-serving list he submitted; and thus remanded the records to the court of origin. Dizon-Pamintuan filed the petition for review.

Issue: Whether the prosecution proved the existence of the third element in the crime of fencing, i.e. the accused know or should have known that the items recovered from here were the proceeds of the crime of robbery of theft.

Held: Fencing, as defined in Section 2 of PD 1612 (Anti-Fencing Law), is "the act of any person who, with intent to gain for himself or for another, shall buy, receive, possess, keep, acquire, conceal, sell or dispose of, or shall buy and sell, or in any manner deal in any article, item, object or anything of value which he knows, or should be known to him, to have been derived from the proceeds of the crime of robbery or theft." Herein, there is no doubt that the first, second, and fourth elements were duly established. A robbery was committed on 12 February 1988 in the house of Encarnacion who afterwards reported the incident to the Paraaque Police, the Western Police District, the NBI, and the CIS, and submitted a list of the lost items and sketches of the jewelry taken from them. Three of these items stolen, viz., (a) a pair of earrings and ring studded with diamonds worth P75,000.00; (b) one set of earrings worth P15,000.00; and (c) a chain with crucifix worth P3,000.00, were displayed for sale at a stall tended to by Dizon-Pamintuan in Florentino Torres Street, Sta. Cruz, Manila. The public display of the articles for sale clearly manifested an intent to gain on the part of Dizon-Pamintuan. As to the thrid element, one is deemed to know a particular fact if he has the cognizance, consciousness or awareness thereof, of is aware of the existence of something, or has the acquaintance with facts, or if he has something within the mind's grasp with certitude and clarity. When knowledge of the existence of a particular fact is an element of an offense, such knowledge is established if a person is aware of a high probability of its existence unless he actually believes that it does not exist. On the other hand, the words "should know" denote the fact that a person of reasonable prudence and intelligence would ascertain the fact in performance of his duty to another or would govern his conduct upon assumption that such fact exists. Knowledge refers to a mental state of awareness about a fact. Since the court cannot penetrate the mind of an accused and state with certainty what is contained therein, it must determine such knowledge with care from the overt acts of that person. And given two equally plausible states of cognition or mental awareness, the court should choose the one which sustains the constitutional presumption of innocence. Since Section 5 of PD 1612 expressly provides that "mere possession of any good, article, item, object, or anything of value



which has been the subject of robbery or thievery shall be prima facie evidence of fencing," it follows that Dizon-Pamintuan is presumed to have knowledge of the fact that the items found in her possession were the proceeds of robbery or theft. The presumption is reasonable for no other natural or logical inference can arise from the established fact of her possession of the proceeds of the crime of robbery or theft. This presumption does not offend the presumption of innocence enshrined in the fundamental law. Dizon-Pamintuan was unable to rebut the presumption under PD 1612. She relied solely on the testimony of her brother which was insufficient to overcome the presumption, and, on the contrary, even disclosed that Dizon-Pamintuan was engaged in the purchase and sale of jewelry and that she used to buy from a certain Fredo.

294 People vs. Holgado [GR L-2809, 22 March 1950]Second Division, Moran (CJ): 7 concur

Facts: Frisco Holgado was charged in the Court of First Instance of Romblon with slight illegal detention because according to the information, being a private person, he did "feloniously and without justifiable motive, kidnap and detain one Artemia Fabreag in the house of Antero Holgado for about eight hours thereby depriving said Artemia Fabreag of her personal liberty." On 8 May 1948, the day set for the trial, Holgado pleaded guilty without the benefit of a lawyer. Two days later, or on 10 May 1948, the trial court rendered judgment, finding Holgado guilty and sentencing him the penalty of prision mayor in its maximum degree to reclusion temporal in the medium degree, as minimum, or 10 years and 1 day of prision mayor to 20 years, with the accessory penalties provided for by law, with costs. Holgado appealed.

Issue: Whether the duties required of the trial court when the accused has no counsel were complied with.

Held: Under the circumstances, particularly the qualified plea given by the accused, who was unaided by counsel, it was not prudent, to say the least, for the trial court to render such a serious judgment finding the accused guilty of a capital offense, and imposing upon him such a heavy penalty as ten years and one day of prision mayor to twenty years, without absolutely any evidence to determine and clarify the true facts of the case. Under Section 3, Rule 112 of the the Rules of Court, when a defendant appears without attorney, the court has four important duties to comply with: (1) It must inform the defendant that it is his right to have attorney before being arraigned; (2) After giving him such information the court must ask him if he desires the aid of an attorney; (3) If he desires and is unable to employ attorney, the court must assign attorney de oficio to defend him; and (4) If the accused desires to procure an attorney of his own the court must grant him a reasonable time therefor. Not one of these duties had been complied with by the trial court. The record discloses that said court did not inform the accused of his right to have an attorney nor did it ask him if he desired the aid of one. The trial court failed to inquire whether or not the accused was to employ an attorney, to grant him reasonable time to procure one or to assign an attorney de oficio. One of the great principles of justice guaranteed by our Constitution is that "no person shall be held to answer for a criminal offense without due process of law", and that all accused "shall enjoy the right to be heard by himself and counsel." In criminal cases there can be no fair hearing unless the accused be given an opportunity to be heard by counsel. The right to be heard would be of little avail if it does not include the right to be heard by counsel. Even the most intelligent or educated man may have no skill in the science of the law, particularly in the rules of procedure, and, without counsel, he may be convicted not because he is guilty but because he does not know how to establish his innocence. And this can happen more easily to persons who are ignorant or uneducated. It is for this reason that the right to be assisted by counsel is deemed so important that it has become a constitutional right and it is so implemented that under our rules of procedure it is not enough for the Court to apprise an accused of his right to have an attorney, it is not enough to ask him whether he desires the aid of an attorney, but it is essential that the court should assign one de oficio for him if he so desires and he is poor or grant him a reasonable time to procure an attorney of his own. Hence, the judgment appealed from is reversed and the case is remanded to the Court below for a new arraignment and a new trial after the accused is apprised of his right to have and to be assisted by counsel.



295 Delgado vs. Court of Appeals [GR L-46392, 10 November 1986]Second Division, Paras (J): 4 concur

Facts: Emma R. Delgado -- together with Gloria C. Tortona, Celia Capistrano and Catalino Bautista alias Atty. Paulino Bautista (at large) -- was charged with estafa thru falsification of public and/or official documents resulting in deceiving one Erlinda Rueda, a Medical Technologist, in arranging her travel to the United States. All the accused (except Catalino Bautista) pleaded not guilty upon arraignment and trial on the merits ensued. Delgado was assisted and represented by her counsel de parte, Atty. Lamberto G. Yco. On 13 December 1973, the date set for the continuation of the defense evidence, said Atty. Yco failed to appear despite proper and previous notice. Instead, he sent a telegram requesting for postponement on the ground allegedly that he was sick. No medical certificate was however submitted. The trial fiscal objected, believing that the motion was dilatory because there had been numerous postponements in the past at Delgado's behest. The trial Court sustained the fiscal's objection thereto, considered Emma Delgado to have waived presentation of her evidence, and considered the case submitted for decision. Thereafter, a judgment of conviction was rendered by the trial court, dated 20 March 1974, finding Gloria C. Tortona, Emma R. Delgado and Celia Capistrano guilty beyond reasonable doubt of the complex crime of Estafa thru Falsification of Public and/or Official Documents, and sentencing each to an indeterminate penalty ranging from 2 years and 4 months of prision correccional, as minimum to 6 years, also of prision correccional, as maximum, to pay a fine of P5,000.00, without subsidiary imprisonment in case of insolvency and to indemnify the offended party Erlinda Ruedas in the amount of P7,431.00. Each was further ordered to pay, jointly and severally, the complainant moral damages in the amount of P5,000.00, and one fourth of the costs of the proceedings. Tortona did not appeal from the decision. Capistrano and Delgado appealed to the Court of Appeals raising the issue of "whether or not on the basis of the evidence and the law the judgment appealed from should be maintained." On 6 December 1976, the Court of Appeals rendered judgment affirming the decision of the trial court as to Delgado and reversing the judgment as to Capistrano. On 27 December 1976, an entry of final judgment was issued and on 1 February 1977, the records of the case were remanded to the lower court for execution of judgment. Believing that there was irregularity in the sending of notices and copy of the decision as Delgado was not informed or notified of said decision by her counsel on record, Atty. Lamberto G. Yco, Delgado filed on 17 February 1977 with the Court of Appeals an "Urgent Motion to Set Aside Entry of Judgment, to Recall the Records and Allow the Movant to Personally Receive Copy of the Decision." The motion was denied by the Court of Appeals in its Resolution dated 20 April 1977. On 11 May 1977 an Order was issued by the Court of First Instance of Manila directing the arrest of Delgado and the confiscation of her bond for failure to appear at the execution of judgment on 11 May 1977. On 27 May 1977, Delgado filed a Motion for the Reconsideration of the Order denying her Motion to Set Aside Entry of Judgments, etc.. and prayed that she be granted a new trial on the ground that she was deprived of her right to be defended by competent counsel (Yco not being a member of the Philippine Bar). On 3 June 1977, the Court of Appeals denied Delgado's motion. Delgado filed a petition for "Certiorari and Mandamus with prayer for a Writ of preliminary injunction" with the Supreme Court.

Issue: Whether Delgado is entitled to a new trial, inasmuch as Atty. Lamberto G. Yco, Delgados counsel, is not a member of the Philippine bar.

Held: A accused person is entitled to be represented by a member of the bar in a criminal case filed against her before the Regional Trial Court. Unless she is represented by a lawyer, there is great danger that any defense presented in her behalf will be inadequate considering the legal perquisites and skills needed in the court proceedings. This would certainly be a denial of due process. Herein, since Delgados "lawyer," Atty. Lamberto G. Yco, is not a real lawyer, the Court remanded the case to the trial court for new trial.

296 People vs. Baluyot [GRs L-35752-3, 31 January 1977]First Division, Makasiar (J): 4 concur



Facts: On 6 August 1970, in the Municipality of Malolos, Province of Bulacan, Miguel Baluyot y Dulay, Pablo Pinca y Narca and Antonio Balinjari y Naval, alias Tony Baluyot robbed money from Gerry Sureta alias Marcelino Carceles y Abasola, then driving a taxi marked AIRLANE with plate 14-97, 40-TX 870 (TX-9345 s/69), to the damage and prejudice of Sureta. They stabbed Sureta, hitting him n the neck, thereby inflicting serious wounds (stab wounds), which directly caused the death of Sureta. Baluyot, Pinca and Balinjari were charged with the crime of robbery with homicide before the Circuit Criminal Court of the Fifth Judicial District holding sessions in Malolos, Bulacan (Judge Abelardo M. Dayrit, presiding). Upon arraignment on 28 September 1970, all the accused, assisted by attorney de oficio, Atty. Oscar Torres, pleaded not guilty to the information. The following day September 29 when the case was called for trial, the prosecution started presenting its evidence. The accused were assisted by the same attorney de oficio, Atty. Oscar Torres, who manifested that he was appearing as counsel for the accused in that day's trial only. Trial was continued the following day, 30 September 1970. The accused were this time assisted by another counsel de oficio, Atty. Godofredo Linsangan. Thereafter, the continuation of the trial was reset for 7 October 1970. At this hearing, the accused were assisted by another counsel de oficio, Atty. Eduardo Villafuerte, who was appointed by the trial court after the accused informed it that they had no lawyer. Then the trial court asked the new counsel de oficio what his pleasure was, and the latter requested that he be given a few minutes within which to confer with the accused. The trial court gave him 20 minutes within which to "consummate" his conference. Accordingly, when the session was resumed, Atty. Villafuerte manifested that "after conferring with the accused, they intimated their desire to withdraw their former plea of not guilty and to substitute in lieu thereof the plea of guilty to the offense charged." Without inquiring from the prosecution what its stand was on the motion of counsel for the accused, the trial court, addressing itself to all the accused said "You have heard the manifestations of counsel. Do you now affirm the truthfulness and correctness of the manifestation of counsel to the effect that you now desire to withdraw your former plea of not guilty and to substitute the same with that of guilty to the offense charged?" All of the accused replied in the affirmative. When asked whether the accused were ready to hear their sentence, the latter replied in the affimative. Then and there, and without much ado, the trial court dictated in open court its decision convicting Baluyot, Pinca and Balinjari of the crime of robbery with homicide and sentencing each and all of them to death, "with the other accessories of the law; to proportionately indemnify the heirs of the victim in the amount of P12,000.00; to correspondingly pay the said heirs by way of moral and exemplary damages in the amount of P20,000.00, proportionately; and similarly, to proportionately pay the costs of these proceedings." Hence, the automatic review.

Issue: Whether it is sufficient for the trial court to ask the accused whether they were ready to receive their sentence after they had affirmed the "truthfulness and correctness" of their counsel's manifestation on their change of plea.

Held: Similar to the identical case of People vs. Ricalde (L-34673, January 30, 1973), it is held that previous decisions have repeatedly warned against the danger of the plea of guilty being improvidently entered in capital cases. The Court has uniformly stressed the importance of the trial court's receiving evidence notwithstanding the plea of guilty in order that no reasonable doubt may remain as to the guilt and the degree of culpability of the accused. The Court has time and time again reminded judges that they are duty bound to be extra solicitous in seeing to it that when an accused pleads guilty he understands fully the meaning of his plea and the import of inevitable conviction. Herein, the trial court did not even ascertain for itself whether the accused completely understood the precise nature of the charge and the meaning of the aggravating circumstances of nighttime, craft and abuse of superior strength as having attended the commission of the crime, so as to obviate any doubt as to the possibility that they have misunderstood the nature and gravity of the charge to which they were pleading guilty. The trial court did not conduct a dialogue with the accused on their educational attainment, especially considering that a cursory perusal of their signatures on the statements they gave to the Malolos Police Force tends to show that they have very little or scanty education. Moreover, after the arraignment, trial was held on three dates and on each day the accused were assisted by 3 different counsel de oficio. In the hearing of 7 October 1970 the day the decision under review was rendered the counsel de oficio who assisted the accused was designated by the trial court only after the case was called for



trial, i.e., after the accused had informed the trial court that they did not have a lawyer. Under these circumstances, it is not unreasonable to assume that said counsel de oficio proceeded to trial without first fully investigating the facts of the case and that his interview with the accused, even if it lasted for 20 minutes as the record insinuates, was not, and could not have been sufficient to enable him to acquire a fairly good grasp, much less a comprehensive knowledge, of the relevant facts of the case. Incidentally, under the Rules of Court, whenever an attorney de oficio is employed or assigned by the court to defend the accused at the trial, he shall be given a reasonable time to consult with the accused and prepare his defense before proceeding further in the case, which shall not be less than 2 days in case of trial. The record, incidentally, does not show the existence of a "good cause" to justify the trial court in shortening the trial fixed by the Rules. The trial court cannot plead ignorance of the prevailing injunction directed towards trial judges to exercise patience and circumspection in explaining to the accused not only the nature and meaning of the accusation and the full import of their plea of guilty but also the meaning in layman's language of the aggravating circumstances that attended the commission of the crime. Furthermore, the trial court did not even consult the testimonies of the 3 State witnesses namely, the doctor and the police officers who took down the statements of the accused who testified during the first and second hearings, at least with the end in view of ascertaining the degree of the penalty that should be imposed after accepting the plea of guilty of the accused. What the trial court did was only to ask the accused whether they were ready to receive their sentence after they had affirmed the "truthfulness and correctness" of their counsel's manifestation on their change of plea. In short, the trial court did not even inform the accused that their plea of guilty might mean death for all of them.

297 People vs. Magsi [GR L-32888, 12 August 1983]En Banc, Makasiar (J): 9 concur, 2 took no part, 1 on official leave, 1 on sick leave

Facts: On 14 January 1968 in the Municipality of San Fernando, La Union, Philippines, Eloi Magsi, Juan Ponce y Billon (@ Johnny), Perfecto Arce (@ Peping), along with Gerardo Flores (@ Gerry), Opring Olazo, Doro Doe and Peter Doe, conspired in the killing of one Jesus Gallardo outside the latter's house through the use of carbine, pistols and revolvers. Magsi, et. al. were charged before the Court of First Instance of La Union, Second Judicial District on 10 January 1968 for murder, with aggravating circumstances attendant in the commission of the offense, i.e. (1) abuse of superior strength; (2) use of a motor vehicle; (3) the offense was committed in the dwelling place of the offended party; and (4) that the offense was committed by a band. "Doro Doe," subsequently identified as Teodoro del Rosario. Altogether, the case was actually set and rescheduled for 6 times: (1) On 1 August 1970, where despite appointment by the court of Atty. Mario Rivera as de officio counsel for the accused, hearing was re-set to 8 September 1970 on motion of Atty. Rivera, who was prompted to ask for it because of accused's desire to be represented by a de parte counsel. Prior to the next hearing, Atty. Rivera moved to withdraw as de officio counsel and it was favorably acted on by the court on 7 September 1970. (2) On 8 September 1970, for failure of the de officio and de parte counsels to appear, despite a second call of the case, the hearing was re-set for the next day and the court appointed Atty. Dominador Cariaso de officio counsel for the accused. (3) On 9 September 1970, neither the de parte nor the de officio counsel was in Court, so Atty. Rivera was reappointed that day as de officio counsel for arraignment purposes only. Del Rosario entered a plea of guilty but qualified it with the allegation that he committed the crime out of fear of his co-accused Eloy Magsi and the other co-accused. Accused's allegation of duress prompted Atty. Rivera to move for the re-setting of the case for the study and presentation of possible mitigating circumstances. The case was accordingly re-set for 14 September 1970. (4) On 14 September 1970, the presentation of mitigating circumstances was not held as scheduled, but de officio counsel Atty. Cariaso's explanation regarding his close ties with the deceased and his family was heard, and his motion to be relieved as counsel by reason thereof, and be replaced by one who can attend to the defense of the accused with candor, was denied by the court. However, per the note presented to the Court by Atty. Cariaso presumably from Atty. Baterina, de parte counsel for the accused, the contents of which sought the re-setting of the case for the first week of October, the case was again re-set for 6 October 1970. The Court motu proprio changed accused's plea of guilty to not guilty. (5) On 6 October 1970, Atty. Cariaso, who appeared in court only after a



warrant for his arrest was issued, informed the Court that those interested in the conviction of the accused opposed his appearance as de officio counsel, and at the same time, also turned over another note, the contents of which asked for another resetting. The Court denied the motion of Atty. Cariaso to withdraw as counsel, but re-set the case for 19 October 1970. (6) On 19 October 1970, Atty. Cariaso outrightly informed the Court that the accused was ready to enter an unqualified plea of guilty. Based on accused's plea of guilty without any evidence for the prosecution on any of the alleged aggravating circumstances nor accused's evidence on duress, the Court rendered its decision the next day, 20 October 1970, finding del Rosario guilty beyond reasonable doubt of the crime of murder and sentenced him to suffer the penalty of death. Hence, the mandatory review.

Issue: Whether the court had been remiss in its duties to the accused, who was convicted on an improvident plea of guilty.

Held: Of the six hearing dates held relative to the case, accused at two instances entered a qualified plea of guilty. De officio counsel Atty, Rivera and accused were hardly afforded by the Court any opportunity to discuss the case together, and the qualified plea of guilty resulted from the Court's proddings rather than from accused's spontaneous volition. The Court knew that accused's prior plea of guilty was qualified by alleged duress employed on him by the other accused. It behooved the Court to allow the accused an opportunity to present evidence on the alleged duress, as well as discover for itself the reasons for accused's change of mind regarding his plea. But more importantly, the Court could have complied, as it failed to do so the first time, with its bounden duty to apprise and advise the accused of the seriousness of the charges, the meaning of the qualifying and modifying circumstances, and gravity of the penalty that may be imposed on him despite the plea of guilty, as well as received prosecution's evidence on the alleged aggravating circumstances attendant to the commission of the offense charged. But these considerations notwithstanding, sans any evidence whatsoever from the prosecution nor from the defense, after Atty. Cariaso's manifestation, and its trite queries addressed to the accused whether he confirmed the same or not, the Court proceeded to decide the case. The Court has consistently enjoined strict and substantial adherence to its rulings in cases where defendants are charged with capital offenses. Mere pro-forma appointment of de officio counsel, who fails to genuinely protect the interests of the accused, resetting of hearing by the court for alleged reception of evidence when in fact none was conducted, perfunctory queries addressed to the accused whether he understands the charges and the gravity of the penalty, are not sufficient compliance with the Court's injunctions. The conduct of the trial court clearly established the fact that it had been remiss in its duties to the accused, who was convicted on an improvident plea of guilty.

298 People vs. Malunsing [GR L-29015, 29 April 1975]Second Division, Fernando (J): 4 concur

Facts: In the original complaint, Manuel Villegas was charged along with other accused Geremias Pajarito and Samuel Pajarito. After the preliminary investigation, no doubt due to the efforts of Atty. Geronimo Pajarito (same surname as Geremias and Samuel), possibly a kinsman, Geremias and Samuel "were both discharged for lack of probable cause." Atty. Pajarito explicitly manifested in the opening of the trial Manuel Villegas intimated to him that he had his own lawyer. There was an admission that he did appear for him in the preliminary investigation but only because there was no other counsel. Villegas was informed that "the Court will give you a lawyer. Atty. Pajarito is appointed as counsel de oficio for you. We will proceed with the trial"; nothwithstanding Atty. Pajaritos reservations about the matter, stating that as Villegas had manifested that he had dispensed with his services, his representation might later on be questioned. After marking it of record that Atty. Pajarito was appointed as such counsel de oficio, the attorney was asked whether he wanted to confer with Villegas. This was the answer: "I think I know the case." The Court then immediately proceeded with the hearing, having the first witness called. The prosecution during the trial presented its witnesses, and likewise all the defendants, except Manuel Villegas, took the witness stand and testified for and in their defense. Villegas is a very old man, ignorant and unlettered; during the entire proceedings in the



case, Villegas while present did not know what was going on. The trial court never apprised Villegas of his fundamental right to be assisted by a lawyer. The trial court did not bother inquiring why Villegas did not take the witness stand, something out of the ordinary as all defendants, except Villegas, had testified. The trial court went on throughout the proceedings of the case without knowing why Villegas did not testify, that if Villegas testified what would his testimony be like, what would be his demeanor during his testimony. The trial court rendered decision, admitting that "No evidence was presented for and in behalf of Manuel Villegas," but convicting Villegas for murder.

Issue: Whether a counsel de oficios appointment as counsel for the accused is sufficient to satisfy the Constitutional guarantee of the accuseds right to counsel.

Held: It is not enough that a counsel de oficio was appointed, especially so as here, where the accused had indicated that he wanted a lawyer of his choice, a decision prompted moreover by the fact that he had lost confidence in the member of the bar thus designated. Nor is it to manifest respect for this right if the counsel de oficio thus named, instead of conferring with the accused, would just blithely inform the judge that he was already fully prepared for his exacting responsibility. It was unintended, of course, but the result could not rightly be distinguished from pure travesty. Villegas could then rightfully invoke this constitutional guarantee. Inasmuch as it is intended to assure a just and fair proceeding, he is entitled at the most to a new trial where he can be duly represented either by a counsel of his choice or by one appointed de oficio, one who would discharge his task in a much more diligent and conscientious manner and would not readily assume that he need not bother himself unduly with familiarizing himself further with all aspects of the case. For only in such a way may there be an intelligent defense. If the matter be viewed thus, there is no unfairness to the state either. It can still see to it that a person against whom a probable cause had been found would have to stand trial, but, to repeat, with all the constitutional safeguards.

299 Moslares vs. Court of Appeals [GR 129744, 26 June 1998]Second Division, Melo (J): 4 concur

Facts: On 19 February 1991, Honor P. Moslares purchased three units of Toyota Corolla 1600 from Toyota Bel-Air, Inc. which were thereupon registered under his name, under the name of Manila Construction Development Corporation of the Philippines, and under the name of Austra-Phil Homes Inc. In payment thereof, Moslares issued Philippine Bank of Communications Check 841644 dated 24 May 1991 in the amount of P1,425,780.00. When presented for payment, said check was dishonored for having been drawn against insufficient funds. Thus, Moslares was charged for violation of Batas Pambansa 22 and for Estafa. The hearings of the case were postponed several times either at the instance of Moslares or the prosecution, or motu proprio by the court. On 13 September 1995, the scheduled date of the presentation of evidence by Moslares, he failed to appear, but was represented by a newly retained lawyer, Atty. Dionisio Landero, who claimed that he was not ready to proceed with the trial as he was not yet familiar with the case. As a result, the trial court set the promulgation of the decision on 30 October 1995. On 9 October 1995, Moslares filed a Motion for Reconsideration/Re-Trial. However, on 26 October 1995 the trial court issued its decision, stating that "Moslares did not attend during the presentation of evidence for the prosecution nor for the defense. The Court set the presentation of evidence for the defense 19 times, 4 of which were cancelled on the ground that there was a typhoon and the public prosecutor was 'indisposed'. But the accused did not even testify and presented only one witness, a certain Sixto Avila. Subject cases were submitted for decision 4 times for failure of the accused to present evidence but was lifted in the interest of justice upon motion of the accused. He changed his lawyer four times everytime the Court ordered the case submitted for decision for failure of the accused to present his evidence in order to gain a delay." The court therein found Moslares guilty beyond reasonable doubt of violation of BP 22 (Criminal Case 92-0099 and Criminal Case 92-0100), and sentenced him to suffer an imprisonment of 1 year for each criminal case. On 30 October 1995, the trial court proceeded to promulgate in absentia the 26 October 1996 decision. On 14 November 1995, Moslares filed a notice of appeal which was denied due course by the lower court in its assailed order dated 1 February 1996. The lower



court, relying on the case of People vs. Mapalao (197 SCRA 79 [1991]), considered Moslares to have waived his right to appeal. On 14 February 1996, Moslares filed a petition for relief from judgment which was likewise denied by the trial court. On 14 March 1996, Moslares filed a petition for review with the Court of Appeals which treated the petition as one for certiorari. Moslares also filed on 3 October 1996, a petition to post bail, later supplemented. On 29 November 1996, the Court of Appeals rendered a decision dismissing the petition for review and denying the petition to post bail. Motions for reconsideration subsequently filed by Moslares were denied. Moslares filed the petition for certiorari with the Supreme Court.

Issue: Whether Moslareshas waived his right to present evidence

Held: While it is true that the right to present evidence may be waived expressly or impliedly, it cannot be said that Moslares had waived said right in the present case. The postponements sought by Moslares and counsel appear to be justified and were not vexatious and oppressive. The intention and the willingness of Moslares to present evidence can be gleaned from the fact that he had already presented one witness and has other witnesses ready for presentation, although this was delayed, but for meritorious reasons, such as illness of Moslares and his counsel, Moslares' confinement at a hospital, ongoing negotiations between the parties, and substitution of counsel. The rights of an accused during trial are given paramount importance in our laws and rules on criminal procedure. Among the fundamental rights of the accused is the right to be heard by himself and counsel. Verily, this right is even guaranteed by the Constitution itself. This right has been recognized and established in order to make sure that justice is done to the accused. Further, the constitutional right of the accused to be heard in his defense is inviolate. No court of justice under our system of government has the power to deprive him of that right. It would have thus been more befitting and seemly of the Court of Appeals had it ordered the trial court to reopen the case for the reception of Moslares' evidence. Granting that Moslares had sought a number of postponements, the requirements of substantial justice mandate that he should have been given his day in court. The grant of a reasonable continuance would have been sounder judicial discretion to ferret out the truth, than to have a speedy disposition of the case but at the expense of a fundamental right. Hence, it was error for the trial court to have proceeded with the promulgation of decision on the premise that Moslares had waived his right to appear in court to present his evidence. Likewise, the Court of Appeals, in affirming said decision, gravely abused its discretion as it sustained a decision of the lower court rendered in violation of Moslares' right to due process.

300 Borja vs. Mendoza [GR L-45667, 20 June 1977]Second Division, Fernando (J): 4 concur, 1 on leave

Facts: Manuel Borja was accused of slight physical injuries before the City Court of Cebu. No arraignment was made. Notwithstanding this, Judge Romulo R. Senining proceeded with the trial in absentia and thereafter, in a decision promulgated on 18 August 1976, found Borja guilty of such offense and sentenced him to suffer imprisonment for a period of 20 days of arresto menor. Thereafter, an appeal was duly elevated to the Court of First Instance of Cebu presided by Judge Rafael T. Mendoza. Without any notice to Borja and without requiring him to submit his memorandum, a decision on the appealed case was rendered on 16 November 1976 affirming the judgment of the City Court. Borja filed the petition for certiorari with the Supreme Court.

Issue: Whether Borja should be arraigned first before the trial can commence.

Held: The plea to nullify the proceedings in the criminal case finds support in the procedural due process mandate of the Constitution. It requires that the accused be arraigned so that he may be informed as to why he was indicted and what penal offense he has to face, to be convicted only on a showing that his guilt is shown beyond reasonable doubt with full opportunity to disprove the evidence against him. Moreover, the sentence to be imposed in such a case is to be in accordance with a valid law. Due process is where the accused is "heard in a court of competent jurisdiction, and proceeded against under the orderly processes of law, and



only punished after inquiry and investigation, upon notice to him, with an opportunity to be heard, and a judgment awarded with the authority of a constitutional law." An arraignment thus becomes indispensable as the means "for bringing the accused into court and notifying him of the cause he is required to meet." Upon the accused being arraigned, "there is a duty laid by the Code [now the Rules of Court] upon the court to inform [him] of certain rights and to extend to him, on his demand, certain others. This duty is an affirmative one which the court, on its own motion, must perform, unless waived." No such duty, however, is laid on the court with regard to the rights of the accused which he may be entitled to exercise during the trial. Those are rights which he must assert himself and the benefits of which he himself must demand. In other words, in the arraignment the court must act of its own volition, as arraignment is an indispensable requirement in any criminal prosecution." Procedural due process demands no less. Nor is it only the due process guarantee that calls for the accused being duly arraigned. As noted, it is at that stage where in the mode and manner required by the Rules, an accused, for the first time, is granted the opportunity to know the precise charge that confronts him. It is imperative that he is thus made fully aware of possible loss of freedom, even of his life, depending on the nature of the crime imputed to him. At the very least then, he must be fully informed of why the prosecuting arm of the state is mobilized against him. An arraignment serves that purpose. It is true, the complaint or information may not be worded with sufficient clarity. He would be in a much worse position though if he does not even have such an opportunity to plead to the charge. With his counsel by his side, he is thus in a position to enter his plea with full knowledge of the consequences. He is not even required to do so immediately. He may move to quash. What is thus evident is that an arraignment assures that he be fully acquainted with the nature of the crime imputed to him and the circumstances under which it is allegedly committed. It is thus a vital aspect of the constitutional rights guaranteed him. It is not useless formality, much less an idle ceremony.

301 People vs. Alcalde [GR 139225-28, 29 May 2002]En Banc, Davide Jr. (CJ): 14 concur

Facts: At 1:00 p.m. of 29 August 1997, SPO2 Nicanor Avendao, arriving at the house of Arnel Alcalde y Pascasio in Barangay Bubukal, Santa Cruz, Laguna,found the house in disarray. He saw a naked woman lying dead on a wooden bed with both hands and feet tied from behind, as well as a dead child on a crib. The dead woman was Wendy Alcalde, and the dead child was Arwin Alcalde. Some clothes and a puppy were also burned. Avendao and his team recovered a piece of steel near Wendys face and empty bottles of gin and Royal Tru-Orange on top of the cabinet. They took pictures of the dead bodies and caused the entry of the incident in the police blotter. He learned later that Arnel's two daughters, Bernalyn and Erica, had been rushed to the provincial hospital for treatment before he and his team arrived at the crime scene. On 24 September 1997, the Office of the Provincial Prosecutor of Laguna filed before the trial court two informations against Arnel for parricide, committed against his wife Wendy and his 11-month old son Arwin, and two informations for frustrated parricide, committed against his two daughters Bernalyn and Erica the before the Regional Trial Court, Branch 28, Santa Cruz, Laguna. Upon his arraignment on 22 October 1997, Arnel, who was assisted by a counsel de parte, refused to speak. Pursuant to Section 1(c) of Rule 116 of the Rules of Court, the trial court entered for him a plea of not guilty in each of the cases. On the same occasion, the defense waived pre-trial. The cases were then consolidated and jointly tried. The witnesses initially presented by the prosecution were SPO2 Nicanor Avendao, Dr. Nilo Pempengco, Dr. June Mendoza, and Salud Suillan. After the prosecution rested its case and formally offered its exhibits, the defense filed a motion for leave of court to file a demurrer to evidence, which was granted. On 27 April 1998, the defense, through counsel de parte Atty. Renato B. Vasquez, Sr., filed a demurrer to evidence based on the grounds that (a) The accused has not been adequately informed of the nature and cause of accusation against him during the arraignment; (b) Not an iota of incriminatory evidence, direct or circumstantial, has been adduced and presented by the prosecution during the trial; and (c) The constitutional presumption of innocence of the accused has not been overcome by any evidence or contrary presumption. In its Order of 22 May 1998, the trial court denied the demurrer to evidence and set the dates for the presentation of the evidence for the defense. However, in a Manifestation dated 4 June 1998, Atty. Vasquez informed the court that the defense



opted not to present evidence for Arnels defense, as the prosecution failed to prove his guilt beyond reasonable doubt. On 16 July 1998, the prosecution filed its Comment on the manifestation and prayed for the re-opening of the presentation of prosecutions evidence for the purpose of proving that Arnel was at the scene of the crime. In its Order of 21 August 1998, the trial court allowed the prosecution to present additional evidence. The defense questioned the propriety of the said order before the Court of Appeals in a petition for certiorari. In its resolution of 17 December 1998, the Court of Appeals dismissed the petition for non-compliance with Section 1, Rule 65, Rules of Court, and for the further reason that the order soug

rights of the accused case digests

Documents

dumaug: rights of the accused

compiled online digests - rights of the accused.docx

article iii - bill of rights digests part 1

rights of the accused: punishment “old sparky” w

rights of the accused civil liberties: protecting individual...

the rights of accused person in malaysia

annotation constitutional rights of the accused

human rights of an accused

rights accused

crim pro cases -bail and rights of accused

miranda & rights of the accused

rights of the accused

rights of persons accused of crimes

rights of the accused: punishment

rights of shareholders case digests

poli. rights of the accused cases

criminal procedure constitutional rights of the accused

rights of false accused

rem digest crimpro (rule111-rights of the accused)

case digests bill of rights 5-9