raising the bar: creating adaptive leaders to deal with the changing face of war major donald e....
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Raising the Bar:Raising the Bar:Creating Adaptive Leaders to Deal With Creating Adaptive Leaders to Deal With
The Changing Face of WarThe Changing Face of War
Raising the Bar:Raising the Bar:Creating Adaptive Leaders to Deal With Creating Adaptive Leaders to Deal With
The Changing Face of WarThe Changing Face of War
Major Donald E. VandergriffAssistant Professor of Military Science
Georgetown University
DRAFTSeventh Edition
March 2005
© 2005 Donald E. Vandergriff2
Agenda (for entire briefing)This is a 5 part briefing
To present the case for reforming not only U.S. Army accessions process (officers), but the entire approach to changing an organization. This will set the conditions for success: “Part 1 Parallel Evolution,” set conditions with 3-parts to define
a strategic model along people-technology-culture “Part 2 Historical Traditions” Are we trapped by out of date
assumptions? This part says yes! “Part 3 Why is change hard?” We are also trapped, ironically,
by the U.S. society’s success as well as its isolation. “Part 4 New POI” parts 1-3 taken together point to a
revolutionary way to create officers. “Part 5 Need some help?” To do this, we are going to need the
U.S. Congress and the Army to do some things—at least address them and understand that it needs a new leader development paradigm.
© 2005 Donald E. Vandergriff3
• Prepared for delivery, as supplement to “Minority Report,” January 2005 as well as to senior leaders, at all levels, with new ideas
• This briefing is a detailed summary of the forthcoming book, Raising the Bar: Creating Adaptive Leaders to deal with the Changing Face of War
• This study reflects the observations and opinions of the author.
• This study in no way reflect the official policy or opinion of the United States Army Cadet Command, the United States Army, Department of Defense, of the United States Government.
DRAFT – the final version may be different.
AdministrativeNotes
Please do not cite this draft version without permission of the author.
Please do not cite this draft version without permission of the author.
© 2005 Donald E. Vandergriff4
Background: Why I Took This On
For seven years now, I have been asking myself these questions, Can we do it better? Frustrated by saying, briefing and publishing, but do we do it? Can we still afford to change parts of the Army in isolation? Are we preparing our future leaders to deal beyond the conventional, yet out
of date, view of war?: The evolution of war to Fourth Generation Warfare? Globalization? The “revolution in technology”? The Army as it evolves to an Expeditionary Army?
New ways to create Leaders must evolve parallel to the culture-to succeed-to nurture them as they develop and grow
“Centralized command and control systems produce methodical (i.e., predictable) Warfighting doctrines premised on the assumption that subordinates should not be free (i.e., can not be trusted) to make their own decisions while staying within the broad guidance of a commander's intent.”
Colonel John Boyd, USAF"Organic Design for Command and Control“
© 2005 Donald E. Vandergriff5
A Strategic ModelPurpose
Provide decision makers and their staffs a model of strategic problems with A holistic view
WhatWhyHow
In context of where we want to go shaped by the current and future environments
Ideas may be revolutionary, but change is evolutionary, examples do exist
Goal: An Expeditionary Army“People-Ideas-Hardware”
© 2005 Donald E. Vandergriff6
Strategic Model“What” must occur first?
Problem: The Army will fail if it tries to change its parts (institutions) in isolation without changing the culture, particularly in regards to providing the climate to nurture adaptive leaders and innovators.
Solution: “Parallel evolution” defines organizational evolution as a holistic problem in terms of:
What—Expeditionary Army through a Strategic “how-to”
Why—Army to 3rd Generation in order to deal with 4th Generation
How—Strategic leaders must have plan and execute to change culture
Defined as: A culture must evolve as the Army moves to change the way it creates and sustains adaptive leaders,
So before I go on to parts 2-5 that deal with leadership, “Parallel Evolution” (parts 1, 1-1, 1-2 & 1-3) sets the conditions through an evolved culture as war changes
WHY?What?
Change the culture
Adaptive Leader
Occurs atthe same
time
© 2005 Donald E. Vandergriff7
States & non-states wage war
States & non-states wage war
1600 1700 1800 1900 2000
Nuclear Weapons
ProliferateFall of USSR
Strategic Model“Why” the culture as War Evolves
New commo & trans networks
3 GW
4 GW
Precursor activities – going back to Alexander & Sun Tzu
(and before)
maneuver concepts
2 GW
1GW
Highly irregular / partisan /guerrilla warfare; terrorism; criminal organizations, etc.
(all technically illegal)
Peace of Westphalia
State-vs-state— only “legal” form
of war
© Dr. Chet Richardswww.jaddams.com
“What” type of Army& Leaders?
© 2005 Donald E. Vandergriff8
1600 1700 1800 1900 2000
Peace of Westphalia
Nuclear Weapons
Proliferate
Fall of USSR
Strategic Model“Why” the culture as War Evolves
States & non-states wage war
New commo & trans networks
Highly irregular / partisan /guerrilla warfare; terrorism; criminal organizations, etc.
(all technically illegal)
1GW
2 GW
3 GW
4 GW
maneuver concepts
©Dr. Chet RichardsJaddams.com
“What” type of Army& Leaders?
© 2005 Donald E. Vandergriff9
Strategic Model “What”: Negative Leadership Model
What the Army is sayingit wants the ExpeditionaryArmy to do, led byAdaptive leaders,cannot exist with this type ofLeadergroomed bytoday’s culture
Lack of Trust
Method driven orders
Underdevelopedprofessionalism
No initiativeWhat if the culture does not change?
Can the ExpeditionaryArmy do it with these?
How else will today’s culture
impactthe future?
© 2005 Donald E. Vandergriff10
“Increased centralization generates friction between the levels of command. Without well-established mutual trust, the temptation to micromanage overtakes commanders and slows decision cycles at all levels. Increased legislation works to create a rigid, mechanistic structure. All of these factors combine to create a rigid inefficient, and sluggish organization that is slow to adapt and ultimately combat ineffective!!.”
Colonel John Boyd
Strategic Model Negative Leadership negates Adaptability & Innovation
Then “What” ?
© 2005 Donald E. Vandergriff11
Strategic Model To a Positive Leadership Model
The Army knows what it wantsfrom leaders in the future.The culture mustexist to nurturethe traitsof theseleaders.
Trust
“Objective driven”or “Mission”
orders
Evolutionary Tactics
Adaptive Leaders
“How-to” Create and
nurture them?
Okay, good answer,then “What” ?
“What” for the Future?
© 2005 Donald E. Vandergriff12
“Increased decentralization throughout the organization harmonizes the rhythm of the slower strategic decision cycle with those of the faster tactical decision cycles. An efficient, highly adaptive and pro-active, organic whole emerges to become a Superior War-fighting Organization!”
Colonel John Boyd
Why? Negative Leadership negates Adaptability & Innovation
Then “What” ?The hard part now!
The Strategic “How-to”
© 2005 Donald E. Vandergriff13
A Strategic ModelAchieve “Parallel Evolution”
What? Cold War Army Expeditionary Army Why? Fight 2GW well opponents adapt global conditions WMD 4GW How? Strategic leaders lead change adjust policies/laws/beliefs
award/protect innovators/risk-takers educate outside influences-Congress
Institutional changes simultaneously evolve toward goal
The CulturePresent-StrategicInfluences all others
Evolve officer educationand training=New ROTC
Goal: Expeditionary
Army
To assist the people in between, those who planand execute, this must occur simultaneously
Requires evolved culture
Adaptive leaders to lead this Army
Cannot have One withoutThe otherDifficult part:
strategyfor getting
there (“how”)
doctrine
personnel
Force structure
Leadership
The critical part
Change cultureAdaptive leader
© 2005 Donald E. Vandergriff14
Strategic Model-Parallel EvolutionWhat must occur simultaneously
Information
Capital (IC)
Organizational
Culture
People
CD + ED
Potential Value
Strategy (Map)
Strategic Leaders
The ‘hidden’ dimension of soldiers (CD + ED) determines how potential value materializes, the realism of the strategy, and the
nature of internal strategic processes
The ‘hidden’ dimension of soldiers (CD + ED) determines how potential value materializes, the realism of the strategy, and the
nature of internal strategic processes
The Three Components of Learning &Growth are NOT ‘Born Equal’
CD = Cognitive Development
ED = Social-Emotional Development
Min
ority
Re
po
rt A
nn
ex
Ao
f rep
ort
© 2005 Donald E. Vandergriff15
A Strategic ModelA historical model-incomplete
What? From Tactical to Operational Maneuver continue leader evolution new force structures new technology
Why? Could not move beyond tactical zone technology resource competition How? von Seeckt critical AAR (1919) strenuous leadership selection
evolutionary experiments new technology stabilization feedback loops Institutional changes simultaneously evolve toward goal
The CultureStrategic
Encouraged/protect those who experiment &
take risks
Goal: Army that
moved fromtactical to
operational maneuver
(still neglected)strategy?)
Doctrine existed as principlesor guidelines- Truppenfuhrercould be evolved/expanded
Feed back loop: AAR (1919) critical of every aspectof Army performance in WWI
Force structure-Panzer Division Sturm battalions
Sc
ha
rnh
ors
tre
form
s(1
80
9)
Strenuous leader
selection
Sturm tactics
Encouraged to seek
responsibility
Airplane, tank and radio Machineguns, automobile
No strategic thinkers?
Not beyond operations?
Majority foot-driven
Too isolated from politics
No standard-too complex Germans understoodthe value of rapid decision-making throughstrength of character
© 2005 Donald E. Vandergriff16
A Strategic ModelWhat happens when only parts change?
What? AirLand Battle doctrine Agility-Initiative-Decisive-Synchronization Division 86 “The Big Five” M1, Apache, Patriot, MLRS, Hummet
Why? Beat Soviets quickly Low casualties short wars fragile & complicated tail How? DuPuy/Starry/Meyers/Ulmer volunteer Army quality of life but did not
evolve the foundation of demise in Vietnam (the culture of management science) Institutions did not change simultaneously toward goal
The CultureStrategic
First major reform of ROTC (Wagner), training Revolution (NTC), attempted
COHORT (unit vice individual) Goal: Move U.S. Army from
attrition doctrine to
maneuver doctrineto win first battle ofnext war decisively
Achieved goal whenfighting another 2GWenemy that was/iseven more centralized
First time in history went toManeuver doctrine-FM 100-5 (82);“Synchronization” conflicted with it
Feed back loop: Veterans of Vietnam did not want torepeat experience of Vietnam; infusion of Reagan build-up
Force structure-Division 86, but retained top down hierarchy
ROAD
Mo
bil
iza
tio
n d
oc
trin
e(E
lih
u R
oo
t &
Ge
org
e M
ars
ha
ll) Never ending
make or break professionalism
Attrition Warfare
1970 War College Report
on Army culture
Precision weapons, improvedProtection, mobility, communication
Changes called for by1970 report did not occur
Policy adjustments helpedClimates but not culturei.e., longer cmd tours, COHORT
etc…
Mass-productionstandardization
© 2005 Donald E. Vandergriff17
A Strategic Model3GW to cope with 4GW?
The CultureStrategic
Contribution & seeking responsibility
Goal: Networked
Army that worksseamlessly withother services
governmentagencies in order
to perform array ofmissions
Feed back loop: Bottom up encouraged by verticalCulture, i.e., companycommand.com
Hierarchal force structure flattenedTo four areas: tactical, operational,Strategic and technical-Command (control
taken out).
10 la
yers
C&
CM
od
ula
rity
UA
/UE
Arm
yT
ran
sfo
rma
tio
n(2
00
5-?
)
Neo
-Tay
lori
sm
care
er m
od
el
rep
lace
d b
y
Dem
min
g
Act
ion
beg
ins
to
rep
lace
rh
eto
ric
Tan
k, p
reci
sio
nS
trik
e, je
t/h
elo
Success=professionalism
Decisiveness at right time
Service oriented leaders
Leaders have ability tomulti-task, understand merging levels of war in a flat, matrix, networking force structure; Education & Training extensive
Culture Strategic leader(s) publicly awarding/praising members
4GW School/train/cross-fertilize with Government agencies networked teams
3GW Continue to evolve policies free-play/force-on-force cyclic units
Ear
ly r
igo
r=
com
mo
n la
ng
uag
e
Rank structure flattened to four areas: tactical, operational,strategic and technical, “perform orout” replaces “up or out”
Future combat system fielded/non-lethal, hand-held computers, time now information,
Qu
alit
y o
ver
qu
anti
ty
On
ce-
un
tou
chab
le
law
s, p
olic
ies
&
bel
iefs
are
fin
ally
add
ress
ed
Doctrine is in terms of principles to enhance evolution based on feedback loopobjective type orders
Culture rigorous education & hard training=bond
4GW understanding of culture/language
3GW leads to cognitive excellence-networking
Has abilityTo understand& deal with it
What? Expeditionary Army Networked Army(?)
Why? 4GW 5GW(?) 2GW(state)
What? Executes“how-to”
change culture
FM
1-0
FM
3-0
FM
7-0
“Ad
apti
ve L
ead
er”
© 2005 Donald E. Vandergriff18
Part I AgendaExplained in three parts
Setting conditions for success
Part 11- “What”Part 12- “Why”Part 13- “How”
Goal: An Expeditionary Army
3GW culture to understandAnd deal with 4GW.Leadership is key.
Culture is evolved and shaped toenhance people-centric warfare.
© 2005 Donald E. Vandergriff19
Part I Conclusion
The Army is
Part 11- Good at defining “What” Part 12- At realizing “Why” Part 13- but does not know “How”
To make a Strategic plan toEvolve the culture in order toSet the strategic setting, so
Other institutions can evolve, Parallel to one another, Adjusting to 2nd and 3rd order effects
Goal: An Expeditionary Army
Goal: A Culture thatsupports the
leadership of an Expeditionary Army
Goal: Tocombine
institutionsat goal
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