producing crisis/surviving crisis: power, capital, and …
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PRODUCINGCRISIS/SURVIVINGCRISIS:POWER,CAPITAL,ANDTHESOCIALSTRUCTUREOF
ACCUMULATIONINTHEHASHEMITEKINGDOMOFJORDAN
by
ColinPowers
AdissertationsubmittedtoJohnsHopkinsUniversityinconformitywiththerequirements
forthedegreeofDoctorofPhilosophy
Baltimore,Maryland
April2020
©2020ColinPowers
Allrightsreserved
ii
Abstract
Thismonographwillattempttoresolveatwo-partproblematique:(1)whyisitthat
Jordaniancapitalismcontinuouslyengendersdevelopmentalandsocialfailuresand(2)howisit
thatthiscapitalismenduresinspiteofengenderingsuchfailures.
Inansweringthefirstofthesequestions,Iwillemphasizestructuralpropertiesendowed
bybothhistoryandJordan’sglobalperipherality/externaldependencybeforeunwindingthe
moreimmediatecausalandconstitutiveeffectsintroducedbycontemporaryeconomic
governance,theprofitseekingbehaviorofanelitefractionofthecapitalistclass,andprocesses
relatedtoauthoritarianrenewal.Iwillattributetheenduranceofthiscapitalism,meanwhile,toa
constellationofintegratedinstitutionalbulwarksthatIwillrefertoasJordan’ssocialstructureof
accumulation.Consolidatinganelite-dominatedformofaccumulationandcontrol,Iwillshow
howthestabilityrealizedthroughtheseinstitutionalbulwarksbothrequiresandimplieslong-
termunderdevelopmentandhighlevelsofsocialtension.HavingdemonstratedhowthisJanus-
facedphenomenonfunctionstogeneratecrisisconditionswithoutultimatelyprecipitatingeither
thecollapseorevolutionofthewiderpoliticaleconomy,itismyhopethattheparadoxof
Jordaniancapitalism—aformationatonceresilientandontologicallyboundforfailure—willbe
atleastpartiallyresolved.Inthismonograph’sconclusion,Iwillusethethickdescriptionatthe
heartofthiscasestudyinconjunctionwithabductivereasoningsotoderivegeneralizable
theoreticalknowledgeasregardsactuallyexistingneoliberalismalongtheglobalperiphery.
iv
Contents
ChapterOne:Anintroductionto(Jordanian)capitalisminthe21stcentury………………………………………………….pp.1-45
ChapterTwo:Socialstructureofaccumulationtheoryandtheroadhead…………………………………………………….pp.46-68
SectionOne
ChapterThree:Apreamble:JordanbeforetheMandate,JordanduringtheMandate…………………….……………...pp.70-96
ChapterFour:IndependentJordan’sfirstsocialstructureofaccumulation:1946-1973………………………………pp.97-133
ChapterFive:Oil,inducedstaterentierism,andJordan’ssocialstructureofaccumulation:1973-1986……..pp.134-169
SectionTwo
ChapterSix:Politics,policymaking,andtheinstitutionalizationofneoliberalcapitalism.………………………..pp.171-204
ChapterSeven:Themakingandmanagementofthemarket:Thestate/palaceintheeconomy…………………pp.205-255
ChapterEight:Institutionalizingoligarchy:TheJordanianformofmarketcompetition……………………………pp.256-293
ChapterNine:SocialcontrolunderAbdullah…………………………………………………………………………………………..pp.294-318
ChapterTen:Peripherality,dependencyandtheexternalarticulationofJordaniancapitalism…………………pp.319-370
ChapterEleven:Legitimatingneoliberalism:inward/outwardfacingideologyandtheJordanianSSA……….pp.371-398
ChapterTwelve:Conclusions………………………………………………………………………………………………………………….pp.399-417
Index1………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………….pp.418-419
WorksCited…………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………..pp.420-432
v
ListofTablesGrossFixedCapitalFormationbyKindofEconomicActivity(2008-2016):4JobCreation(SectorandActivity):14RegisteredExpatriateWorkersbyEconomicActivity:17MedianandMeanRealWagesinJordan(2010and2016):30CentralGovernmentBudgets(1924-1944):86SourcesofDomesticRevenues(1953-1966):113AllocationofStateExpenditures(1953-1966):113StructureofJordanianImportsandExports(1967-1973):125SourcesofGovernmentRevenues(1953-1966):126Jordan’sForeignPatrons(1964-1973):127SourcesofDomesticRevenues(1974-1989):142StructureofJordanianImportsandExports(1974-1989):156-157SectoralShareofNationalGDP(1974-1989):162ApplicantsandAppointeestotheJordanianCivilService(1990-2017):212KADDBJointVentures(2008):249ForeignPopulationResidinginJordanbyCountryofNationality(2004,2015):314SourcesofJordanianODA(2015-2016):334Jordan’sArrangementswiththeIMF(1989-2016):338AllocationsofBilateralOfficialDevelopmentAssistance(2015-2016):339ExternalTradebyCommodityGroups(2018):352-354Top10ForeignCompaniesInvestinginJordan(2003-2015):355ForeignDirectInvestmentFlowsbyCountry(2005-2017):356ForeignOwnershipofAmmanStockExchange(2017-2019):358InvestorsOwningMorethan1%EquityinJordan’sPubliclyListedFirms(2019):360-364
vi
ListofFigures Gross Fixed Capital Formation (% of GDP): 5 National Savings (% of GDP): 5 Total Factor Productivity (Constant National Prices): 6 Output per Workers (2011 USD): 6 Growth of Labor Productivity per Person Employed: 7 Jordan Trade Performance (1985-2017): 8 Jordan’s Current Account and Trade Balance under King Abdullah: 8 Terms of Trade (1997-2017): 9 Ranking of Jordanian Export Complexity (1964-2017): 9 Manufacturing Value Added Per Capita (1990-2016): 10 Share of Medium and High-Tech Products in Manufactured Exports (1990-2016): 10 Jordan v. Comparator Countries, Share of Medium and High-Tech Products in Manufactured Exports (1990-2016): 11 Resident Patent Applications: 11 Distribution of Work Permits by Sector, Sex, and Nationality: 16 National Unemployment Rate: 19 Education Levels of New Market Entrants (1960-2010): 21 The Unemployment by Education Levels (2000-2010): 21 The Jordanian Employed (2013-2017): 22 Labor Force Participation Rates (1990-2018): 26 Employment to Population Ratio (2000-2018): 26 Employment Structure in Private-Wage Employment by Firm Size (2010): 32 British Subsidy to Mandate Transjordan (1921-1944): 89 Jordan Trade Performance (1954-1966): 125 Domestic and International Borrowing (1974-1989): 143 State Expenditures (1974-1989): 144 Foreign Trade (1974-1989): 158 Sources of Government Receipts (1974-1989): 158 Asset of Licensed Commercial Banks (1976-1990): 161 GDP Per Capita Growth (1982-1991): 165 Share of Public Sector in Total Employment under King Abdullah (2000-2016): 209 Public Sector Jobs Created (2007-2017): 209 Average Annual Household Expenditures on Health Services (2008-2017): 218 Tax Revenues (2005-2017): 219 Treasury Bills and Bond Issues to GDP Ratio (2001-2016): 223 Overall FDI Restrictiveness Index: 235 QIZ Exports (2000-2011): 239 QIZ vs. FTA, Exports (2010-2011): 239 QIZ Job Creation and Export Sophistication: 244 Total Assets of Licensed Commercial Banks (2000-2018): 272 Aggregate Sectoral Income (2017): 273 Share of Aggregate Sector Market Capitalization and Sector Annual Income (2017, 2019): 277-290 Work Permit Holders by Nationalities (2004-2014): 314 Jordan’s Official Development Assistance (1990-2009): 333 Jordan’s Annual Official Development Assistance (2010-2017): 336 US Aid Budget Allocations (2019): 340 Jordanian Trade Performance (1985-2017): 340 Jordan’s Current Account and Trade Balance under King Abdullah (2000-2017): 341 Terms of Trade (1997-2017): 345 Jordan’s Economic Complexity (1964-2017): 346 Jordan’s Export Basket (2017): 346
vii
Jordan’s Export Basket, Product Composition (2017): 347 Value-Add of Domestic Manufactures (1990-2016): 348 ICT Exports as Percentage of Total Exports (Jordan v. Comparator Countries, 2000-2017): 349 Jordan’s Export Complexity Index Score and Rank (1964-2014): 352 Foreign Ownership of Amman Stock Exchange (2017-2019): 359 Education Levels of the Jordanian Workforce: Home v. the Diaspora (2010): 368 Workers’ Remittances under King Abdullah (2000-2017): 370
1
CHAPTERONE
Anintroductionto(Jordanian)capitalisminthe21stcentury
If not sui generis, Jordanian capitalism is undoubtedly peculiar, as is most obviously and
saliently evinced through its relationship with crisis.
On the one hand, it can be shown that crisis, broadly defined, constitutes both a necessary input
and an inevitable output of capital accumulation in Jordan, an odd phenomenon in and of itself. Despite
this being so and despite the economy’s loitering in a state of terminal distress, moreover, it can also be
shown that this formation somehow demonstrates both resilience and immutability as well. An
impossibility of sorts, then, Jordanian capitalism seems to endogenously generate then stubbornly
persist within the very conditions meant to trigger either its demise or its evolution.1
Onecouldbeforgivenforfindingthisallabitdisorienting.Thisisthecountryofaplucky,
reformistKing,afterall,ofamonarchwhoconfidentlytraverseswesterncapitalsincantingtales
ofarisingSiliconWadi.Andyet,theslightestscrutinywouldbesufficienttorevealKing
1 Itisindisputable,ofcourse,thatthevagariesofJordan’sexternalenvironmentintensifythiscapitalism’smany
failures,astheeffectsoftheSyrianrefugeeinfluxwellattests.Nevertheless,asitcanandwillbedemonstratedthatexogenousshocksonlyextenuateandcompoundtendenciesinternaltotheeconomicformation—asfailureandunderdevelopmentarethereforestructural,endogenous,andevenontologicalpropertiesoftheJordanianeconomyitself—,myconceptualizationismeanttoarticulatethatmarketfailuresareofthiscapitalism’sownmakinginboththefirstandfinalinstance.
2
Abdullah’sstoriesofapost-modernprosperity2justbeyondthehorizonaslittlemorethan
delusionandmarketing-speak.Asurveyofcriticalnationalaggregates,forinstance,evidencesan
economymarredbydecliningratesofsavings,investmentandgrossfixedcapitalformation
(GFCF).IfGDPgrowthfiguresinitiallysuggestaslightlyrosieroutlook,aquickpeakunderthat
hoodestablishesthattheseyieldsarebornealmostexclusivelyofdemographicshifts,the
contingentinflowsofIraqicapital,andpetrodollarrecycling(boundforspeculationinthebuilt
environment).Totheextent,then,thateconomicexpansionisnowwhollydisarticulatedfrom
laborproductivityandtotalfactorproductivity—eachofwhichhavestagnatedorrecededacross
thepasttwentyyears3—,oneoughttakelittlesolacefromwhatgainsare,onoccasion,reflected
inmetricslikethegrossdomesticproduct.
Whatismore,thoughtheopeningoftheJordanianeconomywassoldthroughconstant
referencetotheteleologiesofcomparativeadvantagetheory—topromisesofexport-led
development,technologicaltransfers,knowledgeupgrades,efficiencygains,andhealthy
specialization—,itsrealitieshaverevealedthisassomethingofalongcon.Tragicallypredictable
thoughsuchanoutcomemaybe,itneverthelessbearsrepeatinganddetailingthattwentyyears
2 Isay“post-modern”astheKingetalhavepromisedaprosperitywithoutindustrializationoranyofthe
traditionalenginesofeconomiccatch-up.Emphasizingtechandtheserviceeconomy,theyarticulatesomethingresemblingtheDubaimodel(thoughwithouttheabundantcapital).
3 JordanStrategyForum,“OntheimportanceoflaborproductivityinJordan:whereisthechallenge?”,Report
(2018),p.9. ThisdeclineoccurreddespiteAbdullah’stenurehavingcoincidedwiththeintroductionofanumberofgame-
changinggeneralpurposetechnologies,ofwhichdigitalcommunicationsrepresentsbutthemostobviousexample.
Tooffersomesenseofthegravityoftheseproductivitydeclines,Jordanranked116thintheworldinlabor
productivitybetween2010and2018.
3
oftradeliberalizationhave,inactuality,producedanimportbasketgrowinginsizeandvalueand
anexportbasketincreasinglyconcentratedinlowvaluegarmentmanufacturesandhighly
volatile,low-pricedcommoditiessuchaspotashandphosphates.Indicativeofthewider
industrialdecayprecipitatedbytheconfluenceoftrade4,investment,andindustrialpolicy,the
valueaddedthroughJordan’sdomesticmanufactures(MVA)isfallingeverfurtherbehind
relevantcomparatorswitheachpassingyear,andhighandmedium-technologyexportsnow
constituteasmallerpercentageofGDP(andoftotalexports)thantheydidin1990.Lestone
assumethesearebuttemporaryhiccupswithinanotherwisepromisingevolution,gross
expendituresintoresearchanddevelopment(R&D)suggestthatindustrialregressionislikelyto
onlyaccelerateaswemoveforward.Compoundedbydeficientoutlaysoneducation,thedistance
betweenJordanandtheglobaltechnologicalfrontiercanthereforebeexpectedtowidenwith
time,deepeningthemalaisehithertodescribed.5Inviewofeverythingfromthecountry’s
decliningtermsoftradeandsubstandardratesofinnovationtothemanyissuesbegottenofits
prematuredeindustrialization,Jordan’sageofperditioninthelowermiddleincometrapmost
certainlyseemsuponus.
4 Itisworthnotingthattheimpositionofinvasiveintellectualpropertyregulations—animpositionthatispartand
parcelofthesetradepolicies—havealsoundercutthosefewtechnologically-intensive,forward-lookingindustriesthathaddemonstratedpotentialpriortoAbdullah’sascension(suchaspharmaceuticals).TheseregulationswereintroducedfirstfollowingJordan’saccessiontotheWTO,andmoreextensivelyfollowingJordan’ssigningoffree-tradeagreements(FTAs)withtheUnitedStatesandtheEuropeanUnion.
5 PerUNESCO,Jordan’sgrossexpenditureintoR&D(asapercentageofGDP)sitsat.71asof2016.Asapointof
comparison,SouthKorea,thegloballeaderonthismetric,spends4.3%ofGDPonR&D.EconomiesthatJordansurpassedorequaledintermsofdevelopmentasofthe1980s(suchasIreland,Estonia,Hungary,andMalaysia)allspendintheareaof1.5-1.8%.
Asforexpendituresoneducation,WorldBankestimatesputJordanat3.59%GDPasof2017.Bywayofcomparison,theaverageexpenditurepercentageforlowermiddleincomecountriesisapproximately4.3-4.5%GDPasofthetimeofwriting;OECDmembersaveraged5.2%asof2013.
4
GrossFixedCapitalFormationbyKindofEconomicActivity(CurrentPrices)
(Units:MillionJD)
2008 2009 2010 2011 2012 2013 2014 2015 2016 Agr., For., and Fishing
59 50 41 38 45 54 62 61 100
Mining and Quarrying
37 148 325 97 16 85 65 84 205
Manufacturing* 380 329 360 811 328 409 446 412 415 Electricity, Gas, etc.
236 105 298 267 101 264 181 282 178
Water Supply, Sewage, etc.
98 418 880 824 810 147 273 240 203
Construction 98 127 102 120 98 110 116 102 69 Wholesale and Retail Trade
49 45 56 67 86 89 88 147 151
Transportation and storage
401 159 130 72 128 79 92 152 216
Accommodation and Food services
36 36 36 77 48 38 42 35 56
Info and Communications
139 124 79 95 106 145 402 335 286
Financial and Insurance Activities
137 132 128 138 135 159 206 195 154
Real Estate Activities
1914 1987 1885 1850 2336 2400 2157 2177 1905
Prof, Scientific, and Technical Activities
5 3 5 4 2 4 5 7 8
Admin and Support service activities
7 7 4 6 5 1 0 2 20
Public Admin and defense
574 736 627 483 342 548 632 661 722
Education 125 129 104 101 82 93 171 185 141 Human Health and Social Work activities
120 131 113 142 82 135 128 121 112
Arts, entertainment, rec
0 1 5 2 3 1 1 3 2
Other Services 3 2 2 4 8 6 2 11 4 Household activities
0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
Activities of Extraterritorial Organizations
0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
*Manufacturesarewhollydominatedbylowsophisticationgarments. DataprovidedbytheJordanianDepartmentofStatistics(MinistryofPlanningandInternationalCooperation)
7
*ChartsprovidedbyJordanStrategyForum,“OntheimportanceoflaborproductivityinJordan:whereisthechallenge?”,Report(2018),p.8-9
9
DataprovidedbyCentralBankofJordan
RankingofJordanianExportComplexityAcrossTime
DataprovidedbyEconomicComplexityIndex(MITMediaLab/HarvardCenterforInternationalDevelopment)
11
*DataforpreviousthreechartsprovidedbytheUnitedNationsIndustrialDevelopmentOrganization
DataprovidedbyWorldIntellectualPropertyOrganization(WIPO)
12
Harrowingastheviewisfromthemacroperspective,itimproveslittlefromthe
perspectiveofthefirm.Between2015and2017,ofthe189corporationslistedontheAmman
StockExchange(ASE),morethanhalf(96)postedeitherdecliningratesof(pre-tax)profitsor
increasingratesoflosses.Moreworrisome,perhaps,duringthissameperiod,greaterthanathird
(68)ofthesepubliclytradedenterprisespostedatleasttwoyearsoflosses.6
Iftheprevalenceofnon-profitabilitygoessomewaystowardsestablishingthestateof
contemporaryeconomicdistress,theprevalenceofnegativegrowthgoesevenfurther.Forthe
sameperiodjustdiscussed,roughly55%ofthecompaniestradedontheASE(106intotal)
reportednetlossesinaggregatefixedassets.7Shouldoneexcludethebankingandinsurance
6 Onasectorbysectorbasis,eightofthefifteenfirmsinthebankingsectorposteddecliningratesofprofit,
fourteenofthenineteenintheinsurancesectorpostedeitherdecliningratesofprofitorincreasingratesoflosses(twofirmsalsoexperiencedlossesinatleasttwooftheyearsunderexamination),fifteenofthethirtyinthefinancialservicessectorpostedeitherdecliningratesofprofitorincreasingratesoflosses(sixteenexperienceslossesinatleasttwoyears),fifteenofthethirtythreeintherealestatesectorpostedeitherdecliningratesofprofitorincreasingratesoflosses(twentyexperiencesatleasttwoyearsoflosses),threeofthesixintheeducationsectorposteddecliningratesofprofit,sevenoftheeightinthehotelsandtourismsectorpostedeitherdecliningprofitsorincreasinglosses(oneexperiencedlossesintwoormoreyears),sixoftheteninthetransportationsectorpostedeitherdecliningratesofprofitorincreasinglosses(threeexperiencedlossesinmorethantwoyears),theonemediacompanylisted(Al-Rai)postedbothadecliningrateofprofitandtwoyearsormoreofpre-taxlosses,twoofthefourintheutilitiessectorposteddecliningratesofprofit,oneoftheteninthecommercialservicessectorpostedeitherdecliningratesofprofitorincreasinglosses(threeexperiencedlossesintwoormoreyears),twoofthefourinthepharmaceuticalssectorpostedeitherdecliningprofitsorincreasinglosses(oneexperiencedtwoormoreyearsoflosses),twooftheseveninthechemicalssectorpostedeitherdecreasingratesofprofitorincreasinglosses(fourexperiencestwoormoreyearsoflosses),sixofthenineinthefoodandbeveragesectorpostedeitherdecliningprofitsorincreasinglosses(oneexperiencedlossesintwoormoreyears),oneoftwointhetobaccosectorpostedbothincreasingratesoflossandtwoyearsormoreofloss,sevenofeleveninminingandextractionpostedeitherdecliningratesofprofitorincreasingratesofloss(sixexperiencedtwoormoreyearsoflosses),twoofseveninengineeringandconstructionpostedeitherdecliningratesofprofitofincreasingratesoflosses(fourexperiencedtwoormoreyearsoflosses),twoofthreeinelectricalindustriesexperiencedlossesintwoormoreyears,twoofthreeintextilespostedeitherdecliningratesofprofitorincreasingratesoflosses(oneexperiencedtwoormoreyearsoflosses),andthreeoffourinhealthcareservicespostedeitheradecliningrateofprofitoranincreasingrateoflosses(oneexperiencedtwoormoreyearsoflosses).
7 Forthebanking,finance,andinsurancesectors—wherebusinessisnotdirectlyrelatedtofixedcapital
formation—Iaccountedforgrowthbymeasuringtotalassets(ratherthanfixedassets).
13
sectorsfromthesecalculations—sectorsrelativelyunaffectedbynegativegrowthinrecent
times8—,themagnitudeofthisgeneralized,economy-widetrendtowardsdivestmentand
diminutioncomesintoevenstarkerrelief,withafull64.5%ofnon-banking,non-insurancefirms
postingnetlossesinfixedassets.9Itiscertainlyworthaskingwhetherthefirmstradedonthe
ASEareperfectlyrepresentativeoftheprivatesectorwritlarge.Regardless,however,the
torpiditytheyevincenecessarilyreflectsarottingfoundationintheheartofJordaniancapitalism.
Theaccuracyofsuchaninferenceiscorroboratedinthelabormarket.Herein,oneought
beginwithjobcreation,whichhasbeenqualitativelyinsufficientacrossthetenureofKing
Abdullah.From2005to2009—arelativeboomtimefortheJordanianeconomy—,theEconomic
ResearchForum’sJordanLaborMarketPanelSurvey(JLMPS)establishedthattheJordanian
economygenerated35,000to45,000netjobsperannum.10Inadequateasthesenumbersalready
were,theyunsurprisinglymadelittleprogressintheyearsfollowingtheglobalfinancialcrisisof
2008-2009.Despitereceivingamajorbumpfrompublicsectorhiring,between2010and2016,
8 Onlythreebankingfirmsandfourinsurancefirmspostednegativegrowthratesbetween2015and2017.9 Seventeenofthirtyfinancialservicesfirmspostedadeclineinassets;twenty-sevenofthirty-threerealestate
firmspostedadeclineinfixedassets;threeofsixeducationfirmspostedadeclineinfixedassets;fourofeighthotelandtourismfirmspostedadeclineinfixedassets;sixoftentransportationcompaniespostedadeclineinfixedassets;Al-Raipostedadecline;oneofthefourutilitiesandenergyfirmspostedadeclineinfixedassets;fiveofthetenfirmsinthecommercialservicessectorpostedadeclineinfixedassets;twoofthefourpharmaceuticalfirmspostedadeclineinfixedassets;fourofsevenchemicalfirmspostedadeclineinfixedassets;bothfirmsinthepaperandcardboardandprintingandpackagingsectorsposteddeclinesinfixedassets;fiveofninefoodandbeveragefirmsposteddeclinesinfixedassets;oneofthetobaccofirmspostedadeclineinfixedassets;nineofelevenminingandextractionfirmspostedadeclineinfixedassets;fiveofsevenengineeringandconstructionfirmspostedadeclineinfixedassets;allthreeelectricalindustriesfirmspostedadeclineinfixedassets;twoofthreetextilefirmspostedadecline,andtwoofthefourmedicalservicesfirmspostedadecline.
10 RaguiAssaad,“ThestructureandevolutionofEmploymentinJordan”,inRaguiAssaad(ed.)TheJordanianLabor
MarketintheNewMillenium(2014),p.5.
14
netjobcreationaveragedoutatroughly38,000jobsperannum,whichtranslatestoannual
employmentgrowthrateofjust2.1%peryear.11
Whenoneexaminesthekindsofjobsbeingcreatedduringtheselostdecades,itbecomes
apparentthattheJordanianeconomyisalsoproducingdisproportionatelyfewopportunitiesfor
high-skill,high-wageworkers.Thetablebelow,displayingnetjobcreationsince2007according
toeconomicactivityandaccordingtowhetheranindividualisemployedbythepublicorthe
privatesector,givessomeindicationofthisstructuralfact.
JobCreationinNumbers(SectorandActivity)12
2007 2008 2009 2010 2011 2012 2013 2014 2015 2016 2017
PublicSectorjobscreated 22230 26820 26760 18402 18248 16171 11487 17158 21408 15043 19532PrivateSectorjobscreated 47427 40386 46599 43584 33544 30756 35594 31391 26904 35203 32882JordanianPrivatesectorjobs 34849 32227 32715 36360 29375 26568 28236 26111 22290 29714 28883Non-JordanianPrivatesectorjobs 12579 8159 13885 7224 4170 4188 7358 5280 4614 5489 3999Wholesaleandretailjobs 10499 9525 11737 7786 7249 6870 9897 9514 6181 7438 7329Manufacturing 5948 6512 5274 7039 5462 5858 5980 4286 4143 4641 4148AccomodationandFoodservices 1301 1748 2247 3002 1866 2623 2375 3578 2486 5496 3025ICT 1683 1963 1087 641 1252 354 1432 1306MiningandQuarrying 1873 364 545 85 255 119 -113 264 3 -218 187Financialservices 2063 1938 1045 1984 1190 1466 1354 1090 1685 189 1647RealEstate 4176 3912 2628 125 70 173 280 -127 104 -20 44Householdemployment 5019 3437 2917 3410 2479 2532 3327 2682Professionalservices 1860 1734 843 909 1347 1198 2051 2127Humanhealthandsocialwork 3253 5191 5876 5990 4525 3692 3109 2968 3013 3653 4197Construction 3314 3062 723 761 -254 1024 1839 965 738 1527 -634NetJobscreated 70356 69092 76316 62813 52888 48068 48571 49935 48309 50853 53969
11 RaguiAssaadandColetteSalemi,“ThestructureofemploymentandjobcreationinJordan:2010-2016”,Working
Paperno.1259,TheEconomicResearchForum(2018),p.4.12 ThedatainformingthistablehasbeendrawnfromtheJordanianDepartmentofStatistics,adivisionofthe
country’sMinistryofPlanningandInternationalCooperation. Ofnote:theclassificationsystemwasadjustedin2009,atwhichpointrealestaterelatedjobswerealsomade
inclusiveofbusinessactivitiesrelatedjobs.
15
Totheextentthatnewworkexiststoday,then,itisinthesectorsofwholesaleandretail
commerce,accommodationandfood,andhouseholdbusinesses.13Thedominanceofthese
sectorsintermsofjobflowshasalsoimpliedatransformationtotheaggregatejobstocksin
Jordan.Datafrom2016showthatapproximatelytwothirdsofallJordanianwageworkersare
nowemployedinlow-wage,low-skillservicejobs.14
Tomakeableakpicturebleaker,oneneedalsorecognizethatnon-Jordaniansconstitutea
significantpercentageofthoseobtainingworkinthelow-wageservicesector—asectorthat,as
justdetailed,representsthesinglelargestsourceofcontemporaryjobcreation.15Inaggregate
terms,theconfluenceofthesetwofactshasresultedinnon-Jordaniansabsorbingbetween50-
75%ofallthejobscreatedinthepost-2010period.16Byextension,thesefiguresmeanthat
13 Thoughthetableevincessomewhatencouragingfiguresasregardsjobscreationinthemanufacturingsector,
oneshouldbejudiciousinevaluatingthenatureofthesegains.Asnearly40%ofallmanufacturinglaborworksinenterprisesemploying1-4individuals,thegainsshowninthedataarenotareflectionofahealthyexpansionintheindustrializedworkforce;rather,itisareflectionofthestate’spromotionofhouseholdenterprisesandmicroenterprisesoperatinginthefieldofsmallscalefoodprocessingandhandicrafts.
Inaddition,thoughthetablemightleadonetobelievethatthehumanhealthandsocialworkjobmarketshave
experiencedasignificantjumpinlabordemand,itisworthnotingthatthesejumpsarealmostentirelypoweredbygovernmenthiringcampaigns.
14 AssaadandSalemi(2018),p.12.15 Thisnon-Jordaniansubpopulationiscomprisedofroughly54%Egyptians,20%Syrians,20%otherArabs,and
6%SouthandEastAsians.16 See:TheMinistryofLabor,TheNationalLabourMarketIndicators:2013-2017.PublishedbytheLabourMarket
InformationDepartment(Amman,June2018),pp.43-44. Duetoselectivelegalpermittingandelite-benefitingimmigrationpolicies,non-Jordaniansnowrepresent
majoritiesofthelaborforcesacrossthefollowingeconomicactivities:householdemployment,manufacturing,accommodationandfoodservices,andconstruction.Thesesamepopulationsalsorepresentasizablesegmentofthewage-workersinthewholesaleandretailcommercesector.Thisallbeingthecase,non-JordanianshavecolonizedallthegrowthsectorsinthecontemporaryJordanianeconomy.
ThelatestdatareleasedfromtheMinistryofLaborconfirmsthecontinuationofthesetrends.In2017,the
aggregatenumberofpermittednon-nationalworkersintheJordanianlabormarketgrewto390,091.Thenewest
16
duringthesesameyears,Jordanianjobseekershavebeenlefttofightoveratotalof9,000-10,000
newemploymentopportunitiesperannum.17Theimplicationsforthenationalunemployment
rate(andfortheemployment-to-populationratio)shouldbeobviousenough.
Whilethefollowingtablesandchartsexcludenon-registered,illegalforeignlaborersfrom
theirtabulations—therebyexcludingasubpopulationthatitselfnumbersinthehundredsof
thousands—,theyshouldnonethelessgivethereaderasenseforthemagnitudeoftheforeign
presenceintheJordanianlabormarket.
* Graph provided by Francoise de Bel Air, Migration
Profile:Jordan.PolicyBrieffortheRobertSchumanCentre
forAdvancedStudies(November2016),p.7
recipientsofworkpapersprimarilycamefromtheSyrianrefugeepopulation(anadditional7.5thousand),theAfricanmigrantpopulation(4.4thousand),theEgyptianmigrantpopulation(2thousand)andfromnon-ArabAsiancountries(2.1thousand).
17 AssaadandSalemi(2018),pp.4-5.
18
Byvirtueofthefactthatthelaborsupplyhasgrownexponentiallyduringthedecadesof
Abdullah’srule—notonlyinrawnumbersbutinlevelsofeducation—,deficienciesinprivate
sectorlabordemandhaveprovenevenmoreacutelyconsequentialthanwouldotherwisebethe
case.Nowherearetheseconsequencesmoreobviouslymanifestthanintheareaof
unemployment.18Between1999and2009,theunemploymentratefloatedbetween13%and
16%.SpikingevenfurtherupontheeruptionoftheArabUprisings,atthetimeofwriting,itsitsat
18.7%(March2019).19
Thoughunemploymentisauniversal,non-discriminatingafflictioninJordan,itis
incommensuratelysufferedbytheyoung,thehighlyeducated,andthefemale.Regardingits
genderedproperties,femaleunemploymentratestrendconsistentlyandsignificantlyabove
nationalaverages,irrespectiveofeducationoranyothermediatingvariable.Themostrecent
estimatesoftheILO(2018)positafemaleunemploymentrateof25.1%.20Ifonlytofurther
underscoretheprivatesector’sendemicinadequacies,itisworthnotingthatthispercentage
18 ThisdissertationwillarguethatunemploymentinJordanisprimarilyafunctionofdemandsidefailuresinthe
labormarket(i.e.inprivatesectorjobcreation).AsIwilllatercontend,IbelievethesefailurescanbebestexplainedthroughunwindingthecoimbricatedhistoriesofJordanianstateandclassformation.WhiletheHashemiteregimeanditspartnersinWashingtonhavelongtriedtoattributeunemploymentandeconomicnon-participationtoeitheranassortmentofpsychicpathologiesandhumancapitaldeficienciesonthepartofjobseekersortothedistortingeffectsgeneratedbythepublicsector,thesechargesaresuperficial,incomplete,ideological,andself-serving.
Formoreonthis,see:ColinPowers,“Policyconvergence,(under)development,andJordanianeconomicsunder
KingAbdullah”,MiddleEastLawandGovernance(forthcoming).19 ThisfigurewaspublishedtheDepartmentofStatisticsinMarch,2019.20 Datacanbeaccessedat:https://ilostat.ilo.org/
19
wouldactuallybemuchlowerwereitnotforpost-uprisingspublicsectorhiringcampaigns
withinthefieldsofeducation,healthcare,andsocialwork.21
DataprovidedbytheJordanianDepartmentofStatistics
Thattheeducatedjobseekertooexperiencesunemploymentatratesinexcessofthe
nationalaverageissimilarlybeyondcontention.22Taking2010asanexample,wherecollege
21 See:AssaadandSalemi(2018),p.17.Theirsurveyresearchshowsthatwomenactuallydisproportionately
benefitedfromthepublicsector’spost-uprisingsexpansion.Intheaggregate,however,thosepublicsectorjobsarestillrelativelyscarce.
Importantly,itisalsocriticaltonotethatwhenfemalejobseekersareunabletosecureformaljobswithinthepublicsector,theydonotturntotheprivatesector;rather,theydropoutofthelaborforceinshockinglyhighnumbers.
22 Itisalsoworthnotingthattheincrementalreturnsofeducation(onwages)havedeclinedinrecentyears. See:RamiGalalandMonaSaid,“TheevolutionofwageformationandinequalityinJordanin2010-2016”,
WorkingPaperno.1209,EconomicResearchForum(2018),p.4. Thisisinpartafunctionof2013legislationthatputacapongovernmentandcivilservicewages,acapthat
would,bydefinition,affectthewagesofhighskill,higheducatedindividualsnearthetopofthebureaucracy.
20
educatedjobseekerscomprisedonly13%ofthelaborforce,theyneverthelessmadeup30%of
thecountry’sunemployed.23Someofthis,ofcourse,canbeexplainedbythefactthatcollege-
educatedjobseekersarerepresentingagreatershareofthenewentrantscomingintothelabor
marketeachyear(asthechartsonthenextpagesattest).24Asnewentrantsarelikelytospend
sometimesearchingforajob,theirunemploymentnumbers—and,byextension,the
unemploymentnumbersofcollegegraduates—arealwaysgoingtobeinexcessofnational
averages.25Andyet,theexplanatorypowerofthispropositionwillsoonbeshowntobelimited
justastheplightoftheeducatedjobseekerwillbeshowntorunfardeeper.26
23 Assaad(2014),p.9.24 Whilethecollegeeducatedcomprisedjust8%oftheworkingagepopulationatthestartofAbdullah’sreign,by
2010,theywereconstituting30%ofallnewlabormarketentrants(Assaad,2014,p.9).25 Whenoneconsidersthat2010,theyearthesestatisticswererecorded,alsocoincidedwithamoregeneralized
economicdownturn,itisreasonabletoassumethatthejobsearch-to-employmentpipelineforcollegegraduateswouldhavebeenmorecongestedthanusual,andthattheirunemploymentratewouldhavehavebeenfurtherinflatedasaresult.
26 Toforeshadowargumentsthatwilllaterbedevelopedindetail,itwillbedemonstratedthatindustrialand
investmentpolicyoverthepasttwentyyearshavepredominantlyservicedbusinessinterestsoperatinginthefieldsofluxuryrealestate,construction,andlowsophisticationgarmentmanufacturing.Asemploymentopportunitiesinthesesectorsarelow-skillinnatureandastheprofitmarginsachievedineachofthesesectorsdependsuponanumberofimplicitsubsidies—includingtheabilitytoemployunprotected,lowskillforeignlaborers—,thestate-backedboomtheyhaveexperiencedhasdonepreciouslittleforthecollege-educatedjobseeker.ItwillalsobeshownthatAbdullah’spoliticizeduseofpublicsectorhiringinthepost-uprisingsperiodhasdisproportionatelyrewardedloweducation,lowskilljobseekers—meaningthatcollegegraduateshavefoundlittlejoyinthebureaucracyaswell(Assad,EmploymentandJobcreation,p.9).
21
EducationalLevelsofNewMarketEntrants,1960-201027
TheUnemployedbyEducationLevels(2000-2010)28
27 ChartprovidedbyAssaad(2014),p.928 ChartprovidedbyAssaad(2014),p.8
22
TheJordanianEmployed2013-201729
Asforthepervasivenessyouthunemployment—whichhashoveredbetweenthreeand
fourtimesthenationalaverageforthepastdecade30—,noperspicacioussociologicalimagination
isrequiredtodeterminethatittootracesbacktoanemicprivatesectorjobcreation.Asearlier
detailed,theJordanianeconomy(publicsectorincluded)generatesroughly35,000-45,000job
opportunitiesperannum.Thepercentageofthepopulationthatisfifteenyearsorgreater,
meanwhile,isgrowingatapproximately3.8%/year.Innominalterms,thismeansthatwitheach
yearthatpasses,afreshcohortofapproximately158,00015year-oldsiscomingofage.31
29 ChartprovidedbyMinistryofLabor(2018),p.1730 Asanotherwayofconceptualizingthisphenomenon,oneshouldalsoconsiderthattheyouthemploymentrate
hasdroppedfrom48%in2010to37%in2016. See:AlAzzawiandHlasny(2018),p.7.31 Thesefiguresaredrawnfromthe2016JordanianEmploymentandUnemploymentSurvey(EUS2016)
conductedbytheJordanianDepartmentofStatistics.
23
Assumingthatroughlyhalfoftheseindividualsdelaytheirentrytothejobmarketsotocontinue
theirstudies,onecanconservativelyestimatethatsomewhereintheareaof50,000newfifteen
year-oldsarejoiningthelabormarketeachyear.Incombinationwiththefreshhighschooland
collegegraduatesdoingthesame,economistshavetherebyestimatedthatthetotalnumberof
newjobseekerswillfluctuatebetween70,000and90,000perannum.32Subtractingnetjob
opportunitiesfromnewjobseekers,then,onecanseethat35,000to55,000young,first-time
entrantstothelabormarketwillfailtofindworkeachyear.
Beforeclosingontheunemploymentcrisis,IwouldberemisswereItoignorethatit
appearsimpervioustoeconomicgrowth.Indeed,whilecontemporaryunemploymentinJordan
hasdemonstratedapredictableresponsivenesstoeconomicdownturns33,theinverseeffecthas
notbeenevincedduringperiodsofhigheconomicgrowth.DuringthefirstdecadeofAbdullah’s
rule—theaforementioned1999to2009period—,forinstance,despiteGDPgrowthfigures
averagingoutataround6%perannum,theunemploymentratefailedtomakeanysubstantial
gains.34
32 See:ShireenalAzzawiandVladimirHlasny,“YouthVulnerabilityinEgyptandJordan:Dimensionsand
Determinants”,WorkingPaperno.1275,EconomicResearchForum(2018). Forafullstatisticalreview,seethedatabasesofAl-ManarCenterforHumanResourceDevelopment.Accessible
at:http://www.almanar.jo/en/human-resources-information/onlinestatistics 33 Oncegrowthcollapsedfollowingtheonsetoftheglobalfinancialcrisis,thisnegativeresponsivenessofthe
unemploymentwouldbedemonstratedquiteclearly.Thoughsignificantincreasesinpublicsectorhiringhelpedpartiallymitigatelossesinthelabormarket—thepublicsectoremployment’sshareintotalemploymentincreasedfrom39%in2010to42%in2016—,itwasatthisstagethattheunemploymentratetrackedupwardstowards20%.
See:AssaadandSalemi(2018),p.17.34 ThisiswelldocumentedbyAssaad(2014),p.1-5.
24
Importantly,themeagernessofprivatesectorjobcreationisnotonlyimplicatedin
Jordan’sdangerousunemploymentlevels;italsoinformsthecountry’swoefullaborforce
participationrates.Between2015and2017,onlytwoineveryfiveworkingageJordanianswas
activelyparticipatinginthelabormarket.35Whenoneaccountsforthefactthatroughlyoneof
everyfiveeconomicallyactivepeopleisunemployed,thismeansthattheemploymentratein
Jordanaveragedoutaround32%duringtheseyears,afigurelargelyinkeepingwithrecent
historicaltrends.AcrossthedurationofAbdullah’stenure,infact,annualemployment-to-
populationratioshaveneveronceexceeded37%.36Bywayofcomparison,theaverage
employmenttopopulationratiosforbothOECDandlowermiddle-incomecountriesduringthis
sameperiodwereapproximately56%.37
Whileextremelylowlaborforceparticipationratesamongstfemalesgoalongway
towardsexplainingthesedepressedfigures—forthepost-2000period,ILOestimatesshow
35 See:JordanStrategyForum,“OntheimportanceoflaborproductivityinJordan:whereisthechallenge?”,Report
(2018),p.5. AswasalsoestablishedthroughtheJPLMS’slongitudinal,surveybasedanalysis(extendingbetween2010and
2016),themostpersistentlabormarketstateforthirty-fivetosixty-fouryear-olds—meaningthestatefromwhichapersonwasleastlikelytotransitionoutofduringtheinterveningperiod—wastobe“notemployed,notineducation,notintraining”(NEET).Ashocking90.8%oftherespondentsthatindicatedtheywereinaNEETstatein2010wouldremaininsuchastateasof2016.
Formoreonthis,see:AssaadandSalemi(2018),p.14.36 Thispercentageiscalculatedasthenumberofemployedpeopleovertheageof15againstthetotalpopulation. Forthevastmajorityofthisperiod,theemploymenttopopulationratiohasfluctuatedbetween32%and36%
accordingtoILOandWorldBankdata.37 HadJordan’snewentrantsintothejobmarketbeenintegratedatappropriatelevels,demographicsdictatethat
theexpansionofthelaborpoolwouldhavepushedemployment-to-populationratiosupnear65-70%.Sucharatiowouldhavefacilitatedgainsnotonlyintermsofaggregatedemandandgrowthbutalsointermsofgovernmentrevenues.
25
annualfemalelaborforceparticipationrateshoveringbetween11.2-14.9%—,itisimportantto
notethatJordanianmalesarecheckingoutofworkatincreasingratesaswell.Between2010and
2015alone,maleemployment-to-populationratiosdeclinedbyroughly15%,droppingfroma
64%rateatthebeginningoftheperiodtoa55%ratebyperiod’send.38
Justaswasthecasewithunemployment,laborforcenon-participationisalsoparticularly
highamongstJordanianyouth.Worsethanthat,recentdatasuggeststhattheyoung’s
disengagementfromtheeconomydoesnotreflectatemporaryresponsetoatemporarily
distressedlabormarket,butrather,asemi-permanentcondition.39AsAssad’slongitudinallabor
marketanalysisdocuments,47%ofthose15-34year-oldswhowerenotemployed,notin
education,andnotintraining(NEET)in2010remainedinthatsamelabormarketstateasof
2016.40Onthebasisofthesefindings,itisreasonabletoconcludethataninitialfailurein
transitioningtothelabormarketcanresultinlong-termeconomicwithdrawal—andallthat
impliesforboththeindividualandfornationaldevelopment.
38 AssaadandSalemi(2018),p.3.39 Asof2016,44.9%ofallrespondentstotheDepartmentofStatisticsEUSlabormarketsurveyindicatedthatthey
droppedoutofthelaborforceduetotheirbeliefthattherewasnoworkavailablewhile21.4%didsobecausetheycouldnotfind“suitablework.”Whenoneconsidersthatthosepercentagesare41.6%and15.3%,respectively,forthoseaged15-24—withanother14.3%expressingjobsearchfatigueastheprimaryreasonfornon-participation—,onecanseethattheyoungareexperiencingasenseofhopelessnessandapathy,andthattheprospectsofalostgenerationareveryrealindeed.
ThesefindingsarecorroboratedbytheJPLMSof2016aswell.See:AlAzzawiandHlasny(2018),p.4.40 See:AssaadandSalemi(2018),p.43. AsIwilldiscussinthesectionondiscipline,muchofthisimmobilityistheresultofnegativeexternalities
introducedbytheregime’sattemptstoformalizethelabormarket.
26
DataprovidedbyWorldDevelopmentIndicators(WorldBank);ILOestimates
DataprovidedbyWorldDevelopmentIndicators(WorldBank);ILOestimates
27
ForthescarcefewJordanianswhoareabletofindwork,moreover,itiscriticalto
emphasizethatemploymentislikelytoaffordthemlittlebeyondapovertywage.Onthebasisof
datafurnishedbythe2010JPLMSsurvey,forinstance,GalalandSaidconservativelyestimated
that49%ofJordanianworkersearnedawageplacingthemandtheirfamiliesbelowthelow
earningsline.41Thoughthesameauthorscontendthatthepassageofminimumwagelegislation
in201342managedtoreducethispercentageto21%asof2016,theircalculationsarethe
productofhighlydubiousmethodologicalchoices.43Mostsimplyput,GalaandSaid’s
determinationofthe
41 Thelowearningslineiscalculatedbymultiplyingthenationalpovertylineagainstthenationaldependencyratio
(i.e.howmanynon-laborersinahouseholdaredependentonthewagesofthebreadwinner).TotheextentthatthenationalpovertylinedoesnotaccuratelyreflecttherealityofpovertyinJordan,itisexceedinglypossiblethatthislowearningslinewillwindupstructurallyundercuttingtherateofworkingpovertytoday.
42 Their21%figureisreferencedonp.8(GalalandSaid2018). Since2010,thePalacehasfrequentlylegislatedincreasestothenationalminimumwage.Asof2019,the
minimumwagehasbeensetat190JD. Regardingtheeffectsofthesepiecesoflegislation,anumberofpointsneedtoberaised.Firstly,aswillbeargued
onthenextfewpages,Ibelieveitisreasonabletoconcludethatawageof190JDpermonthwouldstillleaveafamilyindefactopoverty.Whileanicestepforward,then,theimplementationofaminimumwagestillleavesalottobedesired.Secondly,Jordan’sMSME’shavealong-demonstratedhistoryofinformalbusinesspractices(i.e.non-compliancewithgovernmentregulations).Thisbeingthecase,itcanbeassumedthatmanysuchbusinessescontinuetopaywageswellbelow190JDpermonth.GiventhatMSMEsemployapluralityofJordanianworkers—aswellasthevastmajorityofthosemostlikelytobeaffectedbysuchlegislation—,thishistoryofnon-compliancesuggeststhatthegovernment’seffortsareunlikelytoreachmanyoftheworkersmostinneedofsuchinterventions.
43 Specifictomyskepticism,oneneedbeginwiththefactthatthemethodologythroughwhichboththeJordanian
governmentandtheaforementionedGalalandSaidcalculatetheirnationalpovertylineishighlydubious.Byconsequenceoftheiruseofinheritedformulaeandoutdatedandinvalidcostoflivingassumptions—issuesalsoplaguinghowwesterncountriesengagewithquestionsofpovertytoday—,eachoperatesfromthepremisethatthatJD80.2permonthissufficientforkeepinganindividualoutofpoverty.Asadailyfigure,thisbreaksdowntoJD2.67,anumberthatIwillshowtobewhollydissonantfromwhathouseholdexpendituredatasuggestsisneededtokeepsomeoneclothed,sheltered,andfedinmodernJordan.
Whatismore,itisworthnotingthatGalalandSaid’sdeterminationofasignificantdropinworkingpoverty
between2010and2016hadalsobeenpoweredinnosmallpartbyasomewhatarbitrarymethodologicalrevision.Specifically,thescholarschangedthedependencyratiointheirformulafrom4.0to3.0(e.g.theyshifted
28
lowearningslinehadbeencalculatedonthebasisofapovertylinesetat2886JDperannumfor
afamilyoffour.AreviewofhouseholdexpendituredatagatheredbytheJordanianDepartment
ofStatistics,however,makesclearthatsuchanincomeisinnowaycommensuratewiththe
moderncostofliving,evenaftercontrollingfortheinflationaryeffectsofAmman’scosmopolitan
exception.44HouseholdexpendituresinJordan’sfourpoorestgovernorates—Ma’an,Tafila,Karak,
andBalqa—,forinstance,averageoutatapproximatelyJD6606.9,JD4727.5,JD6510.3,andJD
7233.7peryear,respectively.Totheextentthatthesegovernorateswitnesspervasiveand
generationalpoverty,thefactthatsuchfiguresaremagnitudesgreaterthantheofficialpoverty
lineusedinGalalandSaid’sanalysissuggeststheauthors’claimsarenecessarilyandunduly
conservative.
Inaddition,evenifoneweretoacceptGalalandSaid’sspuriouspovertyline—andagree,
foramoment,thatthatanincomeofroughlyJD3,000perannum(orJD250permonth)mightbe
stretchedthroughoneformofalchemyoranothersotocoverthebasicneedsofaJordanian
family—,areviewofmedianandmeanwagesissufficienttoestablishthatamajorityof
Jordanianworkersstillremainperilouslyclosetoimpoverishmenttoday.Themedianwagein
theirformulaontheclaimthatanaveragewageearnerin2016neededtoonlysupportthreeotherhouseholdmembers,ratherthanfour,aswasthecaseon2010).WhentakeninconjunctionwiththepovertylinethathasbeenassertedbytheJordaniangovernment,thisdependencyratioyieldsalowearningslineofJD240.5permonthperhousehold.ThisequatestoanannualwageofJD2886.
44 In2017,forexample,theDepartmentofStatistics’surveyfoundthattheaveragefoodexpendituresofa
JordanianhouseholdaloneamountedtoJD4079.7. ThoughonemayassumethatthisfiguretobepartiallyinflatedbythespendingoftheAmmanielite—asmight
alsobethecasewithaverageexpendituresonhousingandutilities,whichamountedtoJD2921thatsameyear—,suchaverages,whichtogetheradduptoafiguremorethanthreetimesthenationalpovertyline,shouldminimallygiveonepauseinacceptingtheclaimsputforthbyGalalandSaid.
29
Jordanin2016wasamereJD370JDpermonth,afterall.45Whenoneexcludescushier(and
muchmaligned)publicsectorjobs,moreover,thismediandropsallthewaytoJD300.46This
beingthecase,simplearithmeticcanestablishthat60JD/monthconstitutesthemarginkeeping
amedianworkingfamilyabovea(structurallydeflated)povertyline.Combinedwiththefactthat
just1.1%ofthosequestionedundertheJLMPSreportedhavinganysavings,thefundamental
(andexistential)precaritythreateningeventhosefamiliesfortunateenoughtohaveanemployed
memberamongsttheirnumber—andfortunatetobeoutsideofficialpoverty—shouldbesimple
enoughtoappreciate.47Towork,especiallyfortheyoungergenerations,istoworkwhilepoor,
barelyabletokeepone’sheadabovewater.
45 Thisdoesrepresentanincreasefrom2010’smedianfigureof319.46 Disaggregatingthedistributionfurther,onewouldseethatthemedianwageforyoungerwageearners(15-29
years-old),inclusiveofpublicsectorworkers,wasjust300JD/month,andthatthemedianwageforuniversitygraduatesisjustJD400/month.
47 Whatismore,giventhatfiscalconsolidationhasresultedinadistinctandqualitativedeclineinpublicservices—
arealityofcontemporaryJordanianlifethathasbeenamplydocumentedbyWorldBankeconomistsinthepost-ArabUprisingsperiod—theamountofexpendableincomethatisneededforahouseholdtosecureeducationforitsyoung,healthcareforitsold,etc.,isonlyincreasingatthetimeofwriting.Byvirtueofthefactthathouseholdsmustthereforedevoteincreasing(andincreasinglyscarce)resourcestochildren’seducation,tooutofpockethealthcosts,totransportation,andtofoodandutilities—tobothsocialreproductionandthemereavoidanceofdownwardmobility—,thepovertywagesjustdetailedaremadeevenmoreincommensuratewiththerealitiesofthepresentday.
31
Beyondbeingforcedtolaborforpovertywages,Jordaniancapitalismalsosubjectsits
workerstohighlevelsofinformality.Thoughrecentgovernmentshaveinvestedconsiderable
energyinattemptstoformalizethelabormarket,2016surveydatashowthatupwardsof37%of
Jordanianworkersarestilllackinginbasicsocialinsurance.Accountingfornon-Jordanians,the
percentageofworkerstoilinginformallyjumpsto45.1%.48
Ifhundredsofthousands(ifnotmillions)remaindeprivedofthebenefitsofsocial
insurance,itisworthpointingoutthatthebenefitsofsocialinsurancearealsoofahighlylimited
nature.Circumscribedtotemporaryunemploymentassistance(cappedatsixmonths)andapay-
as-you-gopensionsystem,492014’sSocialSecurityLawhasleftquestionsofhealthinsurance50,
sickleave,andfamilybenefitsoutsidethepurviewofthestate’sinterventionism.Without
diminishingthegainsthathavebeenrealizedthroughformalization,then,oneneedrecognizethe
parlousconditionsthatpersistforthebeneficiariesofthisinitiativeasmuchastheenduring
plightofthoseleftlanguishingininformalworkarrangements.51
48 See:GalalandSaid(2018),pp.6,12. Whatisworse,whatgainshavebeenmadeinformalizationhavebeenachievedthroughshiftingformerlyfull-
timeworkersintoirregularemployment,asIwilllaterdetail.49 2014’sSocialSecurityLawalsoinstitutedanumberofparametricchangestothepensionsystem,changesthat
functionedsotorestricteligibility,increasecontributionrates,andreducebenefits.Underthetermsofthislaw,employeescontribute10%oftheirsalarytotheSocialSecurityCorporation,whileemployerscontribute7%ofthatindividual’ssalary.
Itisworthnotingthatthislawdidestablishmandatorymaternityleaveasthelawofthelandintheprivate
sector;however,asthereisapaucityoffemaleworkersemployedintheprivatesector,thisachievementissomewhathollowinitsactualsocialeffects.
50 Only30%ofprivatesectorworkersinJordanhaveaccesstoemployerprovidedhealthinsurancearrangements
(See:AssaadandSalemi,2018,p.13)51 GiventheproclivitythatMSMEownershavedemonstratedwhenitcomestostealingemployees’socialsecurity
contributionsandskirtingtheirownobligations,thereareanumberofotherreasonsforbeingsuspiciousofthe2014legislation’sachievementsaswell.
32
*GraphprovidedbyAssaad(2014),p.27
Afullauditingofformalization’ssocialandeconomiceffectswouldalsorequirethatone
addressanumberofthenegativeexternalitiesborneofthepolicyinitiative.Themostsalientof
thesewastopushincreasingpercentagesoflaborersintopart-timeand/ortemporarycontract
Formoreonthehistoryofmachinationswithsocialsecurity,see:HaniHourani,TheJordanianLabourMovement,
Report:FriedrichEbertStiftung(Amman,2002),p.66.
33
workarrangements.52Thisirregularization(ortemporarization)ofworkhasafflictedboth
formalandinformalsectorsofthelabormarketatincreasingratesoverthepasttenyears.
Regardingtheformalsector—inclusiveofthoseworkinginbothapublicandprivatecapacity—,
thepercentageoflaborersworkingunderapermanentcontractdeclinedfrom57%in2010to
52%in2016.Asfortheinformalsector,wherejust6%ofworkershadbeensubjectedto
irregularemploymentarrangementsasof2010,by2016,thatpercentagehadclimbedalltheway
to31%.53Forfartoomany,then,theeffortsofthegovernmentinrecentyears—andthepassage
of2014’sSocialSecurityLawinparticular—didnotprecipitateatransitionfromregular,informal
worktoregular,formalwork.Itdidnotevenprecipitateatransitionintoirregular,formalwork.
52 Theseoutcomesareafunctionofflexibilization’scentralitytothelargerformalizationinitiative.Thebasicidea
wasthatbyaffordingemployersgreaterdiscretionwhenitcomestohiringandfiring,suchemployerswouldinturnprovemorewillingextendpropercontractsandsocialinsurancetotheiremployees.Thereality,however,hasbeenmuchdifferent.Themoderategainsthatwereeventuallymadeinformalizingthelabormarket—particularlyfollowingthepassageof2014’sSocialSecurityLaw—wereprimarilyachievedbysubjectingworkerstoanewformofvulnerability:irregularity.
53 See:AssaadandSalemi(2018),pp.11-12. Increasedirregularityprevailsinthemodernlabormarketregardlessofthesizeofthefirmemployingaworker.
Infact,largefirms(thoseemployingmorethan100people)areembracingthesepart-timingpracticesaseagerlyasanyoneelse.
34
Rather,it pushedincreasingpercentagesofsociety’smostvulnerable54intoeitherirregular,
informalwork55orunemployment.56
Byanyconceivablemetric,then,itwouldseemthatcontemporaryJordaniancapitalismis
expiringbeforeourveryeyes.Profitratesarelacking,capitalaccumulationislargelyparalyzed,
millionslanguishinoraroundpoverty,andmultiplegenerationshavecometoknownothingbut
downwardmobilityandconstantprecarity.Inviewofbothhistoryandsocialtheory,itwould
thereforeseemplausibletosuggestthatthewidersocialformationnowsitsonthemost
combustibleofpowderkegs—oneneedingbuttheslightestofsparksinordertosetoffa
conflagrationthatmightswallowtheKingdomwhole.Andyet,whileJordanhasseenitsfairshare
54 Regardingthepointonsociety’smostvulnerable,individualslocatedwithinthethreequintilesofJordan’swealth
distributionaredisproportionallyrepresentedamongsttheirregular,informalworkforce.55 In2010,19%oftheJordanianworkforcewasworkinginformallythoughwithregular,full-timehours.In2016,
thisnumberofinformalregularsdroppedto13%.Andyet,this6%declinedidnottranslateintoa6%gainintheformalsector(whetherasregularsorirregulars).Rather,itwasabsorbedbygreaterpercentagesofJordanianlaborersfallingintoinformal,irregularwork:thepercentageofworkerslaboringundersuchconditionsincreasedfromamere1%in2010to6%in2016(AssaadandSalemi,2018,p.7).
Givenboththecostsofformalizationandthescarcityofbenefitsithasgeneratedtodate,itcanhardlybesaidto
havebeenaboonforJordanianworkers.56 Theconnectionbetweenformalizationandunemployment(especiallyforJordaniancitizens)isafunctionof
2014’ssocialsecurityreformsnotobligingdomesticemployerstomakesocialsecuritypaymentsforforeignlaborers.Byconsequenceoftheseexemptions,Jordan’spoor,low-skillworkersweremadecomparativelylesscompetitivewithintheinformallabormarket,ashiringthemwouldrequirethatanemployermakecontributionstotheSocialSecurityCorporation.
Followingfromthis,akindofsubstitutioneffectoccurred:MSMEsinparticulardiscardedthenowlegally
protectedJordanianworkersotoreplacehim/herwithanunprotectedindividualfromthecountry’slargestockofsurplus,foreignlabor.Nolongerabletofindregular,informalwork,manyoftheseJordaniansdroppedoutofthelabormarketaltogether.
See:IbrahimAlharawinandIreneSelwaness,“TheEvolutionofSocialSecurityinJordan’sLaborMarket:a
CriticalComparisonBetweenpreandpost-2010SocialSecurityReform”,WorkingPaperno.1185(2018),EconomicResearchForum,p.4
35
ofprotesting,suchaconflagrationappearsawaysoff.Somehow,someway,thiseconomy(andits
autocraticoverseer)managestoconsistentlyendurewithintheconditionsofitsowndemise.
Clearly,thereissomethingconceptuallyandtheoreticallyelusiveabouttheJordanian
politicaleconomy,aboutaJanusfacedformationwhoseverysolidityimpliesafragility,one
whoseresilienceischaracterizednotbyself-correction,creativedestructionorsystemiclearning,
butofstasisincrisis.Simultaneouslyconfoundingthetheoreticalsuppositionsanchoring
Schumpeterian,neoclassical,andMarxistanalysis,itisaperversityatoncebeguiling,
illuminating,particular,andrepresentative.
…….....……..…..……...…….…..…...............…..…..........……......………...….....…………….…....…………....………………….
ThismonographwillattempttoanswerwhyJordaniancapitalismconsistentlygenerates
suchcrisisconditionsaswellashowitmanagestoendurewithinsuchconditions.Insodoing,it
willprobewhathappenswhenstabilityisachievedamidstandthroughmassdeprivation,and
explorewhatJordaniancapitalismmightteachusmoreabouteconomicsandpoliticsonthe
globalperiphery.
Atthelevelofwidestabstraction,myexpositionsonthewhyofJordaniancapitalism’s
terminal,self-reproducingcriseswillcenteruponthedialecticalinterplayoftwoindependent
thoughdeeplyconnectedvariables:(i)theneoliberal/autocraticmodalityofeconomic
governanceanddevelopmentpolicymakingthathasbeenadoptedbytheHashemiteregime(and
itspoliticalelite)overtheprevioustwentyyears;and(ii)theprofitandrentseekingbehaviorsof
anelitefractionofa(transnational)capitalistclass.Additionally,Iwillpositthattheinterplayof
thesevariables—andtheoutcomessuchaninterplayproduces—isitselfstructuredby(a)
36
historicalendowments(social,political,andeconomicincharacter);(b)conditionsand
imperativesbestowedbyglobalperipherality/externaldependency;and(c)processesdirectly
relatedtoauthoritarianrenewal.57
Usingrigorousprocesstracing,statisticalanalysis,andthickdescription,myanalysiswill
morespecificallydisassemblewhythiscoalescenceofpolicy,peripherality,profitseeking
behaviors,andauthoritarianrenewalconsolidatesaneconomybiasedtowardsspeculativenon-
tradables,importconsumption,andthebuiltenvironment,andexplainwhythesesbiases
prefigurethehighvolatility,lowproductivity,lowgrowth,anddeficientjobcreationdetailed
earlier.Indeconstructinghowthiscapitalisminstitutionalizessystemsofpoweranddistribution
thatareelite-dominated,externally-dependent,andacutelypunitiveofthelowerandmiddle
classes,thisanalysiswillalsoelucidatetheprovenanceofJordan’spersistent(ifcontained)social
strife.
Iwillattributethiscapitalism’ssurprisingendurance—aswellastheenduranceofits
Hashemiteminders—,meanwhile,toaconstellationofinstitutionalbulwarksthatIcollectively
57 Beforeproceeding,Ishouldpointoutthatthedistinctionbeingdrawnbetweenproximateandstructural
causalityisofananalyticalratherthansubstantivenature.Nevertheless,itisadistinctionthatmustbeemphasizedfortwoprimaryreasons.First,itisneededtopreservetheagencyofcontemporaryactorsandtoavoidaregressionintoonereductionist-deterministicformulationoranother.Second,itisinneededinviewofthechallengesthatcounterfactualinferencecouldotherwiseposetomyarguments.Specifically,totheextentthattheregime’sreproductionofpowerneednothaverequiredthespecificmodalityofeconomicgovernancewehavewitnessedinJordan,itwouldholdthatthelatteroughttherebybeconceivedasindependentoftheformer.Similarly,totheextentthattheexperienceofperipheralityortheendowmentsofhistorydidnotsingularlyrequirethebehaviorswehavewitnessedonthepartofthecapitalistclass,theappropriatenessofpure,structuralargumentationwouldbeagaininvalidated.Insomuchashistoricalandcomparativeanalysesaresufficienttoestablishtheplausibilityofboththesecounterfactualpropositions—andasIamkeennottoundulydepriveactorsoftheiragency—,thisdistinctionmusttherebyberetained.
37
refertoasitssocialstructureofaccumulation(orSSA).58Detailingtheprecisemechanisms
throughwhichthesebulwarksmanagetosatisfyelite,high-leveragedpatrons(through
facilitatingupwardandoutwardredistributionsofwealth),securethesolvencyofthestate,and
police,degrade,anddissuadethesourcesofresistancethataretherebyengendered,Iwillfurnish
asingleexplanationcapableofunlockingthisJordanianpoliticaleconomy’ssurprising(albeit
indeliblyfragile)stability.Acasestudyinthecontemporarydisembeddingofaperipheral
economy,itismyhopethatbyresolvingthelogicthroughwhichcapital’sprospectsontheEast
Bankaresimultaneouslybolsteredandcompromised,Icanhelpgrowourknowledgeofactually
existingneoliberalismsinthe21stcentury.
Researchis,ofcourse,aplentywhenitcomestotheMiddleEast’srecenteconomichistory,
particularlywhenitcomestotheregion’srelationshipswiththeinternationalfinancial
institutions,liberalization(broadlydefined),underdevelopment,andpopularuprisings.59A
58 AsIwilldetailinthenextchapter,thesebulwarksincludeinstitutionalizedpracticesofgovernance,state
interventionintheeconomy,marketmakingandmarketregulation,normmakingandsubjectification,socialcontrol,andaparticularmodalityofpolitical-economicrelationsvis-a-vistheoutsideworld.
59 See:JaneHarriganandHamedEl-Said."TheeconomicimpactofIMFandWorldBankprogramsintheMiddle
EastandNorthAfrica:AcasestudyofJordan,Egypt,MoroccoandTunisia,1983-2004."ReviewofMiddleEastEconomicsandFinance(6.2),2010:1-25.
JaneHarrigan,andHamedEl-Said.AidandpowerintheArabWorld:IMFandWorldBankpolicy-basedlendingintheMiddleEastandNorthAfrica.Springer,2009.
RayBush,Povertyandneoliberalism:PersistenceandreproductionintheglobalSouth.PlutoPress,2007. RayBush,"PovertyandNeo-LiberalBiasintheMiddleEastandNorthAfrica."DevelopmentandChange35.4
(2004):673-695. AdamHanieh,LineagesofRevolt:IssuesofContemporaryCapitalismintheMiddleEast.HaymarketBooks,2013. GilbertAchcar,ThePeopleWant:ARadicalExplorationoftheArabUprising.UniversityofCaliforniaPress,2013. KoenraadBogaert,“ContextualizingtheArabrevolts:thepoliticsbehindthreedecadesofneoliberalisminthe
Arabworld”,MiddleEastCritique(22:3),pp.213-234. AliKadri,ArabDevelopmentDenied:DynamicsofAccumulationbyWarsofEncroachment.AnthemPress,2014. ClementMooreHenryandRobertSpringborg,GlobalizationandthePoliticsofDevelopmentintheMiddleEast
(Volume1).CambridgeUniversityPress,2010.
38
wonderfulliteratureexaminingtheintersectionofauthoritarianismandArabcapitalismshas
alsoemergedoverthepasttwentyyears.60
AsforthestateofthefieldwhenitcomestocontemporaryJordaniancapitalismin
particular,heretoowillonefindanabundanceofinsightfulwork.61Regardingwidermattersof
politicaleconomy,TimothyPiro’sThePoliticalEconomyofMarketReforminJordan,publishedin
1998,providesawelldetailedifsomewhatsociologicallynaiveoverviewofthestateroleinthe
economyacrossthetenureofKingHussein.Bringingusclosertothepresentday,Oliver
Schlumberger’sdoctoraldissertation(PatrimonialCapitalism:EconomicReformandEconomic
OrderintheArabWorld)deconstructsnotonlyhowsecondaryoilrentsfinancedthefull
floweringofHashemiteneopatrimonialisminthepost-1973period,butalsohowthat
neopatrimonialismevolvedundertheconditionsofeconomicopeningandliberalization.Focused
onasimilarperiod,WarwickKnowles’doctoraldissertation(ChangingPatternsofRent:State,
PrivatesectorandDonorsinJordan,1989-2000)probeshowstate-capitalrelationsshiftedin
JordanundertheexigenciesofeconomicopeningandIFIinterventionism.Positingthatstateand
capitalarebound(almostontologicallyso)byasharedtendencytowardsrent-seeking,Knowles
60 See:StevenHeydemann.NetworksofprivilegeintheMiddleEast:thepoliticsofeconomicreformrevisited.
Springer,2004. StevenJuanKing,TheNewAuthoritarianismintheMiddleEastandNorthAfrica.IndianaUniversityPress,2009. CemalBurakTansel(ed.),StatesofDiscipline:AuthoritarianNeoliberalismandtheContestedReproductionof
CapitalistOrder.Pickering&ChattoPublishers,2017. EberhardKienle,PoliticsfromAbove,PoliticsfromBelow:theMiddleEastintheAgeofEconomicReform.Saqi,
London,2003. AlanRichards,MelaniCammett,JohnWaterbury,andIshacDiwan(ed.).APoliticalEconomyoftheMiddleEast.
WestviewPress,2013. 61 Regardingtheclassicsinthisgenre,oneneedbeginwithMichaelMazur’sEconomicGrowthandDevelopmentin
JordanandAdolfKonikoff ’sTransjordan:anEconomicSurvey.Whileeachworkdealsexclusivelywiththeearlypost-colonialperiod,theyareimmenselyusefulresourcesinwhenitcomestothetracingoflong-termtrends.
39
keysinonhoweachactorsoughttosecureitsrentsasthewiderpoliticaleconomymovedfrom
whatheconceptualizedastheinducedstaterentierismofthepost-1973yearstothemarket
dominatedrentierismwhichwouldbeconsolidatedinthelastdecadeofthetwentiethcentury.
Moore,Greenwood,andBlueCarrollhavealsoproducedinsightfulworksexaminingthe
business-staterelationshipinJordan,thoughtheyapproachtheirsubjectmatterfromamore
classicallyinstitutionalistperspective,andwithanarrower,21stcenturyfocus.62Elsewhere,a
numberofexcellentworkshavespecificallyunwoundtheinternationalpoliticaleconomyof
regimesurvivalandbudgetsecurityaswell.63Ifslightlyafieldfrommattersofcapitalproper,
theseanalysesneverthelessproffercriticalinsightsintooneofthecentralactorsintheJordanian
economy(thestate)and,coextensively,intothenatureofthefiscalsociologythatisproducedby
thatactor.Concernedwiththeconsequencesmorethanprovenanceofmarketreform,
meanwhile,Andoni,Schwedler,andRyanhaveeachprocesstracedhoweconomicreform
precipitatesresistanceandpopulardissent—andgetsreorientedintheprocess.64
62 See:PeteMoore,DoingBusinessintheMiddleEast:PoliticsandEconomicCrisisinJordanandKuwait.Cambridge
UniversityPress,2004. PeteMoore,“Whatmakessuccessfulbusinesslobbies?BusinessassociationsandtherentierstateinJordanand
Kuwait,ComparativePolitics(33:2),2001. ScottGreenwood,BusinessregimeloyaltiesintheArabworld:JordanandMoroccoincomparativeperspective.
Doctoraldissertation(UniversityofMichigan,1998). ScottGreenwood,“Badforbusiness?EntrepreneursanddemocracyintheArabworld”,ComparativePolitical
Studies(41:6),2007. KatherineBlueCarroll,BusinessasUsual?EconomicReforminJordan.LexingtonBooks,2003. 63 CurtisRyan,Inter-ArabAlliances:RegimeSecurityandJordanianForeignPolicy.UniversityofFloridaPress,2009. LaurieBrand,Jordan’sInter-ArabRelations:ThePoliticalEconomyofAllianceMaking.ColumbiaUniversityPress,
1994.64 See:LamisAndoniandJillianSchwedler,“BreadriotsinJordan”,MiddleEastReport(1996). JillianSchwedler,“ThepoliticalgeographyofprotestinneoliberalJordan”,MiddleEastCritique(21:3),2012. CurtisRyan,JordanandtheArabUprisings:RegimeSurvivalandPoliticsbeyondtheState.ColumbiaUniversity
Press,2018. CurtisRyan,“Identitypolitics,reform,andprotestinJordan”,StudiesinEthnicityandNationalism(11:3),2011.
40
Inmorerecentyears,finally,ahandfulofanthropologistsandgeographershavealsocasta
lightonthemicro-complexitiesofJordan’sneoliberalauthoritarianism.Mostrepresentativeand
mostexemplaryamongsttheseworksarethepublicationsofDebruyneandKreitmeyr.65
ForegroundinganumberofAbdullah-eramegarealestatedevelopmentproject,Debruyne’s2014
dissertationunwindshowneoliberalurbanrenewalnotonlyfacilitatescronyistrentseekingbut
reshapesthestructureandorientationofthestateitselfaswell.66Withaprojectcenteredonthe
ideologicallegitimationofstateandcapital,Kreitmeyr’s2016dissertationscrutinizeshowthe
Palace,transnationalallies,anddomesticbusinesselitespromotesocialentrepreneurshipin
ordertoadvancetheneoliberalprojectinJordan,andwithit,theirclassinterests.67This
sociologicallyrigorousaccountofideology,inconjunctionwithPaulEsber’sandMayssoun
Sukarieh’srespectiveexaminationof(localandinternational)effortsaimedattheinterpellation
ofdutifulneoliberalcitizen-subjectsintheHashemiteKingdomofJordan,offerswonderful
insightsintooneofthekeycogsincapitalism’scontemporaryinstitutionalizationinJordan.68
CurtisRyan,“Peace,breadandriots:JordanandtheInternationalMonetaryFund”,MiddleEastPolicy(6:2),1998.65 Inadditiontothesetwo,IshouldalsomentionJoseCiroMartinez.His“LeaveningNeoliberalization’sUneven
Pathways:Bread,Governance,andPoliticalRationalitiesintheHashemiteKingdomofJordan”(MediterraneanPolitics,22:4,2017),certainlybelongstothistrendofscholarship.
66 PascalDebruyne,SpatialRearticulationsofStatehood:Jordan’sGeographiesofPowerUnderGlobalization.
Doctoraldissertation,GhentUniversity(2013).67 NadineKreitmeyr,NeoliberalNetworksandAuthoritarianRenewal:ADiverseCaseStudyofEgypt,Jordan,and
Morocco.Doctoraldissertation,EberhardKarlsUniversitatTubingen(2016).68 See:PaulEsber,WhoaretheJordanians?TheCitizen-SubjectsofAbdullahII.Doctoraldissertation,Universityof
Sydney(2018). MayssounSukarieh,“Thehopecrusades:culturalismandreformintheArabworld”,PoliticalandLegal
AnthropologyReview(35:1),2012.
41
Aswillsoonbecomeclear,eachofthesepublications—aswellasagreatmanyothers—
havemassivelyinfluencedthismonograph.Thisfactnotwithstanding,oneshouldnotimplythat
theseworksarethereforeflawless,orthattheyhavenotleftconsiderablelacunaewithinthe
field.
Tobegin,thoughmanyscholarsofJordanhavebeenkeentoassertthateconomic
liberalizationhasfailed,orthatcontemporarycapitalismissociallycompromised,theyhave
provenlesseageroradeptinexplainingwhythisisthecase.Analyticallyspeaking,manysuch
workscanbeshowntooverstatethemagnitudeofthereformsthathaveactuallybeen
implemented;tooverinflateand/orunderexplaintheagencyandefficacyofinstitutionslikethe
InternationalMonetaryFundandWorldBank;andtomisattributethecausalandconstitutive
effectsofpolicieslikederegulation,privatization,andcurrentaccountliberalization.Insodoing,
theseworkshavewoundupdistortingand/orneglectingmanyofthekeyprocessesand
mechanismsimplicatedinthecountry’slong-running(andwide-ranging)economicmaladies.
Whenitcomestomoreabstracttheorization,moreover,byultimatelyreducingthesourceof
Jordan’seconomicdistresstoanunderspecified,fuzzilyconceptualizedentityfrequentlycalled
neoliberalism,thesesameworksmuddythefieldinobscurities,leavinguswithouttherigorand
specificityneededtotrulyadvanceknowledge.
Oneneedalsoacknowledgethatthepoliticaltendstobeassignedakindofontological
primacyinmanystudiesontheJordanianpoliticaleconomy,andthatthisassignmentnecessarily
introducesahostofanalyticalproblems.Mostsimplyput,byrenderingthedynamicsofthe
economyitself(andtheactorscontainedtherein)assomewhatderivativeifnotepiphenomenal
—asoutcomesultimatelyproducedbyprocessesofauthoritarianrenewalandregimesecurity,
42
principally—,theseanalysesoverlook/oversimplifythecompetingimperatives,layered
complexities,anddialecticalinteractionsthatdefineJordaniancapitalism.Asitcan(andwill)be
demonstratedthatcontemporaryunderdevelopmentandeconomiccrisisdonotreduceto
processesofauthoritarianrenewalalone,thisoverlooking/oversimplificationconstitutesa
significantmisapprehensionofthephenomenaunderexamination.Whatismore,totheextent
thatauthoritarianrenewalinandofitselfneednotengendersuchoutcomes—totheextent,in
otherwords,thatanalternativepresentcanbeconceivedwithinwhichHashemite
authoritarianismnotonlyproducesaprosperouseconomybutconsolidatesitspoliticalpower
throughthedeliveryofprosperity,aseitherareviewofJordan’sownhistoryoranevaluationof
similarlyperipheralauthoritarianregimestodaywouldbesufficienttoestablish—,italso
constitutesafailureoftheorization.
Finally,itneedbepointedoutthatmanystudiesoftheJordanianeconomyand/orpolitical
economyarealsocompromised,atleastinpart,bytheiracceptanceandimpositionoftwo
separations.Thefirstseparationdividesstatefromcapital.Suchamethodologicalandanalytical
divisionfunctionstoassigneachactor/domainaninappropriatedegreeofautonomyand
independence,inmyestimations,anddemonstratesanignoranceofwhatMitchelllongago
determined:thatthelinebetweenstateandcapitalintheMiddleEast(andinJordan)isnota
“perimeterofanintrinsicentity,whichcanbethoughtofasafree-standingobjectoractor”but
rather“alinedrawninternally,withinthenetworkofinstitutionalmechanismsthroughwhicha
certainsocialandpoliticalorderismaintained.”69Evenifananalystdemonstratedanappropriate
69 TimothyMitchell,“Thelimitsofthestate:beyondstatistapproachesandtheircritics”,AmericanPoliticalScience
Review(85:1),1991,p.90.
43
concernofthelayeredcomplexitiesdiscussedonthepreviouspage,then,weretheytomissthe
internalitybindingandco-constitutingstateandcapitalinJordan,theywouldhavemissedoneof
thecentraldynamicsinthesecomplexities.70
Thesecondseparation,meanwhile,dividesthedomesticeconomyfromtheregionaland
internationaleconomiesthatitembedswithin.Imposinganotherborderwhereitdoesnot
functionallyexist,thisformofmethodologicalnationalismforcesanalyststowranglewithhow
externalprocessesandvariablesactuponJordanratherthandealwithhowtheyactwithin
Jordan.Aseverythingfromthecountry’sclassrelationstoitsdevelopmentpolicymakinghave
beentransnationalizedatthisstage,thisbifurcationoftheinternalfromtheexternalis
necessarilyproblematicaswell.
Asfortheexceptionstothesecritiques,whichitshouldbesaid,arenotfewinnumber,it
neverthelessholdsthatnoneamongstthemhasgrappledwiththetotalityoftheproblematique
thatisattheheartofthisdissertation.Indeed,ifmanyscholarshaverightlydepictedand
explainedthecrisisconditionsthathaveprevailedonandoffinJordansince1989,itnevertheless
holdsthatnoneofthesescholarshavearticulatedathesiscapableofexplainedhowthecountry’s
politicalandeconomicsystemcouldhavereproducedandsurvivedsuchconditionsallthese
years.None,moreover,havescrutinizedthiseconomywiththesamecomprehensivenessasthis
workshall,aworktraversingnotonlypoliticalandeconomicprocessesbutsocial,ideological,
external,andhistoricalonesaswell.Asoneofthefirsttousesocialstructureofaccumulation
70 Thisinternalityisitself,ofcourse,afunctionofhistory(andofintersectingprocessesofclassandstate
formation).ItwillbebroughtintothestarkestofreliefsthroughareviewtheclasscompositionofthepoliticaleliteempoweredunderAbdullah,areviewestablishingthattheelitefractionofthecapitalistclasshaslargelycontrolledthepowersofthestateforthepasttwentyyears.
44
theoryforthepurposesofstudyinganArabeconomy,Ibelievethismonographwilltherefore
constituteasignificantanduniquecontributiontothefield.71
Inaddition,thoughIprimarilypennedthisworkwithaviewtowardsfillinggapsinthe
fieldsofJordanstudiesandMiddleEastStudiesmorelooselydefined,thatoughtnotsuggestthat
myanalysisthereforehaslittletoofferbeyondtheseregionalborders.Iammostexcited,infact,
aboutwhatthiscasestudycanaddtothefieldofcomparativecapitalism.Despitetakinga
numberofenormousleapsforwardintheyearsfollowingSoskiceandHall’sseminalVarietiesof
Capitalism:TheInstitutionalFoundationsofComparativeAdvantage,comparativecapitalismasa
fieldremainsplaguedbyitswestern-centrismatthetimeofwriting.Thisbeingthecase,while
therecentintegrationofmoreheterodoxthinkingandanalysismayrepresentprofound
enhancementsupontheconceptual,classificatory,methodological,andtheoreticalfoundations
firstlaiddownbythetwoscholarslistedabove,suchenhancementshavenecessarilybeen
limitedbythefactthattheyhavebeeninducedprimarilyinreferencetodeveloped,mature
economies.
Certainly,afewscholarsofLatinAmericahavebeenabletopushtheselimitsthroughfirst
introducingin-depthcasestudiesfromtheirregionofexpertise,andthenamendingcomparative
capitalism’sanalyticalframeworkonthebasisoftheirfindings.Unfortunately,however,thesame
cannotbesaidforresearchersoftheMiddleEast.Todate,infact,nosingleworkhasbeen
publishedthatanalyzedaregionaleconomyaccordingtothetermsdevelopedinthefieldof
71 TheoneexceptiontothisisKarenPfeifer.Shecontributedawonderfulchapter(acomparativeanalysisofMENA
economies)totheeditedvolumeContemporaryCapitalismanditsCrises:SocialStructureofAccumulationTheoryforthe21stCentury.
45
comparativecapitalism.Byconsequence,itwouldbenoexaggerationtotosaythatArab
capitalismsare,forlackofabetterterm,outsidethepurviewofoneofpoliticaleconomy’smost
thrivingsubfieldsofresearch.
Withthismonograph,Ihopetobringthisexclusiontoanend,usinganalyticaltools
developedbythesecomparativiststogenerateuniqueinsightsintoJordaniancapitalismasmuch
asIusefindingsfromthiscasestudytorefinethosetoolsthemselves.Foregroundingtheeffects
ofperipheralityandhistory,detailinghowprofitseekingpervadespoliticsjustaspolitics
pervadesprofitseeking,anddisassemblinghowstructuralandproximateprocessesinteractin
generating(andstabilizing)Jordan’sunderdevelopment,Ihopethismonographwillhelpreorient
thestudyofArabandsoutherncapitalismsintonewandproductivedirections.Providinga
roadmapforthoseseekingwaystomorethoroughlyexcavatethelogicofactuallyexisting
neoliberalismalongtheglobalperiphery,Ihopeitmayalsoofferasignificantadditiontothefield
ofcriticaldevelopmentstudiestoo.
46
CHAPTERTWO
Socialstructureofaccumulationtheoryandtheroadahead
Inthischapter,Iwillfirstdetailthetheoreticalandmethodologicalprinciplesthatwill
orientmyanalysisofJordaniancapitalism.AsmanyoftheseprinciplesarederivedfromSocial
StructureofAccumulation(SSA)theory,IwillbeginbyprovidingabriefintroductiontoSSA’s
primarytenets,propositions,andthinkers.Henceforth,IwilldelineatehowIwillbeamending
theSSAframework—througheclecticandwide-rangingborrowings—sotobetterfacilitatethe
thickdescription,processtracing,andabductivegeneralizationthatisattheheartofthiscase
study.Next,Iwillproceedtoachapteroverview.Here,Iwillspecifytheparticular
methodologicalchoicesstructuringeachchapter’sanalysisaswellasthebasicthesesthatthe
readercanexpecttobeadvancedtherein.
SocialStructureofAccumulationTheory
Inductivelyconstructedfromobservationsofadvancedpost-warcapitalisms,Social
StructureofAccumulationTheorywasfirstarticulatedinthelate1970sandearly1980s.Itsearly
pioneers(namelyDavidGordon,RichardEdwards,andMichaelReich)primarilysoughttoresolve
whattheydeterminedtobeaconfoundingfactofthesecapitalisms’existence:namely,thatthey
hadmovedtowardsneitherprosperousstasisnorrevolutionaryrupture.72Seekingaformulation
72 See:TerrenceMcDonough,MichaelReich,andDavidM.Kotz,eds.,ContemporaryCapitalismanditsCrises:Social
StructureofAccumulationTheoryforthe21stCentury.CambridgeUniversityPress,2010,p.1.
47
thatmightsimultaneouslycorrectneoclassicaleconomicsanditssaccharineassumptionsof
equilibriaaswellashistoricalmaterialismanditsassumptionsofinevitabletransformation,SSA
ultimatelyremainedwithinthewiderMarxistfold,thoughdidsowhilecarvingoutnew
conceptualandtheoreticalgroundforitself.73
SSA’sMarxistinheritanceswouldbemostapparentinwhatmightbecalleditsontologyof
capitalism.74Indeed,notonlydidSSAascribecrisistendenciestocapitalistaccumulationinthe
finalinstance;italsoexplainedthesetendenciesthroughreferencetomanyofMarx’sclassic
presuppositions.75Nevertheless,ifacceptingcrisisasbothimmanenttoandconstitutiveof
capitalism,SSAtheoristsdidnottakethenextstepsoastoinvestit(orsocialconflict)withany
degreeofimmediacyorcertitude.Havinggraftedanumberofinstitutionalistpremisesontotheir
ontologicalcore,theywouldinsteadassertthatmaturecapitalismscontainedwithinthema
73 Ofcourse,theywerenottheonlyMarxistsmovingagainstdeterministicanalyses.Onlythemosteconomisticand
dogmaticwerestillclingingtopresuppositionsofimmanentproletarianrevolutionbythetimetheywerewriting.
74 AsMcDonoughetalputit,blockagestoaccumulationwillinevitablyariseundercapitalismdueto“intensifying
classconflict,increasingcompetitioninproductandresourcemarkets,thesaturationofmarkets,oranynumberofothercauses,someofwhicharegeneraltendenciesofcapitalism,whileothersarespecifictoindividualSSAs”(ContemporaryCapitalism…,p.3).
Regardingontologicalpropositions,itisworthnotingthatSSAtheoristsalsoborrowedheavilyfromKeynes,
particularlyinexplainingthenatureofinvestmentundercapitalism.AsMcDonough,Reich,andKotzwriteintheir2010editedvolume,investmentundercapitalismis“subjecttolargefluctuationsduetochangingexpectationsandperiodicimbalancesbetweenthefinancialandrealeconomies,andpronetoself-reinforcingperiodsofstagnationanddepression”(p.2).Thesaliencetheyassignto“changingexpectations”--andtheextenttowhichtheyappreciatehowcollectiveexpectations(evenifhysterical)canalterthefutureofaneconomy—hasclearechoesinKeynes’writingsontheanimalspirits.
75 Specifically,Gordon,RichardsandReicheachacceptedthatcapitalnecessaryengenderssocialconflict,
oversupply,decliningratesofprofit,anddestructiveformsofcompetition,andthateachoftheseoutcomeseventuallygeneratesblockagesintheveryprocessesitrequiresforitsownreproduction.
48
constellationofmechanismscapableofmitigatingand/ormanagingthemovementtowardself-
destruction(ifonlytemporarily).WiththeirsyncretismalsointegratingSweezyandBaran’s
appreciationforthelonguedureeofaccumulationandrecession,thesescholarswoundup
furnishingaunifiedtheorywiththecapacitytoexplainhowboomasmuchasbustcometobe
stabilizedundercapitalisteconomies,societies,andpolities.76
ForSSAtheory,thecausalandconstitutivelogicofstabilization(whetherinboomorbust
times)wasfoundinthefunctionalcoherenceofawiderinstitutionalformationcontaining
political,economic,social,ideological,andexternalcomponents.Suchaninstitutionalformation
wastobeconceptualizedasaneconomy’ssocialstructureofaccumulation.77Asrelatestothe
76 SSA’searlytheoristswereinfluencedbyawidearrayofintellectualpeersandforebearers.Theirbiggest
influenceswerePaulBaran,PaulSweezy,ErnestMandel,EmmanuelWallerstein,AntonioGramsci,MichelAglietta,andRobertBoyer.
Ofnote,earlytheoreticalwritingspositionedthelaborprocessinparticularascentraltoallofthis,positioningcapital’slongtermprofitrateandtheviabilityofthewidersocialformationasafunctionofanSSA’ssuccessin(alternatively)regulating,segmenting,disciplining,and/orco-optingdistinctgroupsofworkers.
See:DavidGordon,RichardEdwards,andMichaelReich,SegmentedWork,DividedWorkers:TheHistoricalTransformationofLaborintheUnitedStates.CambridgeUniversityPress(1982).
Forclarity’ssake,itisworthemphasizingthatSSAmostnotablymarkednewterritorynotmerelyinarguingthat
theseself-destructivetendenciescanbecontained,blunted,andattenuated,atleasttemporarily,apropositionthatwasrelativelyuncontroversialamongstallbutthemostdogmaticofhistoricalmaterialistsbythetimetheywroteit.Ratherit,itwasbyproposingthatthisstabilizationwasafunctionofanintegratednetworkofinstitutionalcontrols,inprovidingamethodologicalandanalyticalframeworkcapableoftestingandconceptualizinghowsuchcontrolsworked,andinadoptingtheFrenchRegulationSchool’sconcernwiththelongdureeofaccumulation(andstagnation).
77 Demonstratingthesamekindoftheoretical,analytical,andideologicaldiversityastheVarietiesofCapitalism
schoolofpoliticaleconomydoes,itshouldbesaidthatscholarsofSSAhavedisagreedonthebasicfunctionofanSSA.OperatingfromaGramscianorMarxianperspective,Bowles,Gordon,andWeisskopffpositedthatanysuchinstitutionalembeddingofcapitalismconstitutedanenhancementofcapitalistpower.Theyevenwentontosuggestthattheprofitrateitselfisadirectfunctionoftherelativepowerthatthecapitalistclassholdsoverothereconomicactors.OthersworkingwithintheSSAframeworkhavearguedthatprofitsandprofitabilitycanbesecuredthroughvariousinstitutionalpermutations,someofwhichmightbecorporatistandbalancedinthedistributionofclasspower,othersofwhichmightmighterrtowardstheliberalmarket,classdominantidealtype.Thisbeingthecase,theconsolidationofanintegratedSSAcanbutneednotimplytheenhancementofcapitalistclasspower.
49
boomtimes,scholarspositedthatanSSA’sinstitutionalcoherence—exemplifiedbytheFordist
andpost-warKeynesianmodalitiesofindustrialcapitalism,forinstance—inauguratesand
consolidatesasystemoflaborrelations,intracapitalrelations,andstate-capitalrelationsthat
buoysinvestmentexpectations,and,withthem,capitalaccumulation.Intheearlyyears,
moreover,theycontendedthatthestabilitytherebyconsolidatedintheaccumulationprocess
wouldfacilitaterapidgrowthandhighprofitratesinparticular.78
Flipsideofthissamecoin,thesetheoristsrecognizedthatthestabilizingpropertiesthat
theyjustattributedtoanSSA’sinstitutionalintegrationwouldholdnotonlyinthegoodtimes,but
inthebadtimesaswell.Sequentially(andderivedfromthetheory’sMarxistontology),theyfirst
recognizedthatadisruption,whetherendogenousorexogenousinitsnature,wouldeventually
beintroducedtotheaccumulationprocess,andthatsuchadisruptionwouldnecessarily
precipitateacollapseinprofitrates.Withinthematerialconditionstherebyestablished,they
proposedthateachinstitutionaldomainofanSSAwouldbelikelytocomeinforinquisition
and/orchallenge.ByconsequenceofanSSA’sintegratednature,moreover,theyalsoproposed
See:SamuelBowles,DavidGordon,andThomasWeisskopf,“Powerandprofits:thesocialstructureof
accumulationandtheprofitabilityofthepostwarUSeconomy”,ReviewofRadicalPoliticalEconomics(18:2),1986.
DavidGordon,ThomasWeisskopf,andSamuelBowles,“Power,Accumulation,andCrisis”,RadicalPoliticalEconomy:ExplorationsinAlternativeEconomicAnalysis.
78 Havingcenteredtheirfocusonthedevelopedcapitalismsoftheglobalnorthbetweenthenineteenthandmid-
twentiethcenturies,thisgeneration’sassumptionsofrapidandhighgrowthrates(duringthegoodtimes)wasfullyreasonable.Extendedboomsandextendedbustscharacterizedthehistoricalmovementfromthelaissez-fairecapitalismofthelate19thcenturytothemonopolycapitalismoftheearly20thcenturytothepost-warKeynesianiteration,afterall.Itwasonlywiththeemergentneoliberalcapitalismthatconsolidatedinthewakeofstagflationthatcapitaliststabilitybecamedisjointedfromrapidcapitalaccumulation.
Thatsaid,followingthestagflationcrisesofthelate1970s-early1980s,thisassumptionofrapidgrowthwould
beditched,asIwilldetail.
50
thattheonsetofacrisiswithinanyoneoftheseinstitutionaldomainswouldbeliableto
“reverberateacrosstheentirestructure.”79Thesecascadingreverberationswouldfurther
unsettletheinvestmentenvironment,ofcourse,entrenching,deepening,andelongatingthe
economy’songoingrecessionorcontractionintheprocess.
Oncearecessionorcontractionhasthuslycommenced,SSAtheorypositsthatalongand
slowcontestshouldbeexpectedtofollow.Herein,differentdifferentactors,classes,andsocial
forceswillstruggletoestablishandcontrolanewinstitutionalformationthatmightbreakthe
economyfromitsstagnationsotofacilitateanewperiodofaccumulationandhighprofits.80
Upontheconsolidationofsuchaformation,theentirecycle—long-runningstability/high
growth→disruptionintheaccumulationprocess→longrunning-instability/recession—will
repeatagain.
Operationallyspeaking,SSAtheory-basedcasestudiesofactuallyexistingcapitalisms
proceededbyfirstdisaggregatinganationalformationintofiveinstitutionaldomains:(1)the
political,(2)theeconomic,(3)thesocial,(4)theideological,and(5)theexternal.81Brokendown
inthismanner,theythenevaluatedthecontentofeachsuchdomainaswellasthesystemof
relationshipsthroughwhichonewasboundtotheothers.Methodologically,studyofthefirstof
79 DavidGordon,“Stagesofaccumulationandlongeconomiccycles”,inTerenceHopkinsandImmanuelWallerstein
eds.ProcessesoftheWorldSystem.SagePublishers,p.17.80 McDonough,Reich,andKotz(2010),p.11.81 SSAholdsthateachinstitutionaldomainretainsitsautonomyvis-a-vistheothersandisorientedbyitsown
particularlogic,incentives,andinterests.Inaddition,itpositsthatacoherentintegrationofalltheseinstitutionaldomainsisrequiredtobuoylong-terminvestmentexpectations,establishsocialcontrolthroughthemitigationofclassconflict(orthenormativizationofoneclass’hegemony)andtherebystabilizetheaccumulationprocess(McDonough,Reich,andKotz,p.3).Inotherwords,“success”inanyonedomainoftheSSAwouldbeinsufficientforstabilizingtheeconomy.
51
thesedomains(thepolitical)requiredascholartodeterminetheprevailingnatureofstate-
societyandstate-citizenrelationsinagivencountryaswellasthenatureofeconomic
policymaking/governance.Studyoftheseconddomain(theeconomic)requiredascholarto
establishtherolethatthestateplayedintheaccumulationprocessaswellastodeterminethe
formofmarketcompetition—whichwasitselfafunctionofasystemofintracapitalandstate-
capitalrelations—prevailingwithinagivenformation.Analysisofthelattertypicallyentailed
mappingmarketstructuresandclassifyingthepowerdynamicsgoverningtheinteractions
betweenfirms.82Studyofthethirdinstitutionaldomain(thesocial)requiredascholartosurvey
andclassifywhatSSAtheoristsconceptualizeascapital’s(orthestate’s)prevailingstrategiesof
socialcontrol.Typically,thisentailedexaminingthenatureoflabor-capitalrelations,labor-state
relations,labor-capital-staterelations,andintralaborrelations,amongstotherlinesofinquiry.83
Lessclearlyconceptualizedthantheothers,studyofthefourthdomain(ideology)requireda
scholartoestablishtheideationalformulationsbeingdevelopedanddisseminatedsoto
legitimateanationaliterationofcapitalism.Studyofthefifthdomain(theexternal),finally,
requiredascholartoestablishwhatiscalledtheexternalarticulationofanSSA.Thiswouldbe
determinedthroughevaluatinghowanationaleconomylegally,institutionally,andmaterially
nestswithinlargerregionalandinternationalsystemsofproduction,trade,andfinance.
82 Regardingthelatter,thistraditionallymeantdeterminingwhethercapitalinteractsandorganizesitselfthrough
monopolisticcompetition,oligopolisticcompetition,laissez-faire,deregulatedcutthroatcompetition,ormutedrivalryandrestrainedcompetition.
Combined,then,thissectionofanSSAanalysistherebyestablishesthecharacterofstate-capitalandcapital-
capitalrelationsinagivencountry. 83 TheFrenchRegulationSchool,fromwhomSSATheoryhasborrowedextensively,conceptualizesthis
constellationofrelationsas“thedeterminantsofthewagerelation.”
52
SSAandtheNeoliberalChallenge
Aswasmentioned,thefirstgenerationofSSAtheoristshadassumedthataproperly
integratedSSAwouldgeneratenotonlystabilityinthegoodtimes,butbothrapidgrowthand
highprofitrates.Whiletheseassumptions,derivedfromobservationsofpost-warcapitalisms
withintheglobalnorth,heldtrueforatime,theywereeventuallyempiricallyinvalidatedby
ExplainingtheFunctionalCoherenceofanSSA IfitisthesuccessfulconsolidationofanintegratedSSA—wherethestructuralintegrityofthewholeis“createdandsustainedbytheinterrelationshipsamongstitscomponentparts”—,thatunlockstheriddleofacapitalism’s(temporary)stability,whatcanexplainthatconsolidationinthefirstplace?IsanSSA’sstructuralintegrityitselfablackbox?Doesithaveanidentifiablepointoforigin?Doesithavesingleormultiplecauses? Intruth,thereisnostrongconsensusamongstSSAtheoristswhenitcomestomanyofthesequestions.Some,likeMcDonough,haveattributedanSSA’sstructuralintegritytoa“unifyingprinciple”,aprinciplethatitselfcanbetracedbacktoeitherasinglecentralinstitution(likeNewDealcorporatism)ortoasingleexogenouscatalyst(likeWorldWarII).ForMcDonough,then,itisuponsuchaunifyingfoundationthatanSSA’swiderconstellationofinstitutionscoalesceembed,orient,andlink.Incontrast,GordonhasborrowedfromAlthusser’sconceptofoverdeterminationinexplainingtheprovenanceofinstitutionalcoherence.DefininganySSAasa“compositewhole...whoseintrinsicstructureamountstomorethanthesumoftheindividualinstitutionalrelationships”,GordonconceptualizesanSSA’sstructuralintegrityasanoutcomethatisfunctionalist,contingent,andmulticausalinnature.RatherthaninvestanSSAwithintentionalityorassignitanidentifiablestewardinthefinal(orinthiscase,initial)instance,Gordonsuggestsitisbetterseenasafortuitouscollisionofhistoricalmovementsoperatingacrossdifferent(andindependent)institutionaldomains.Inasense,then,GordondivergesconsiderablyfromMcDonoughbyconceptualizingoneofthefundamentaltenetsofSSAtheory(itsstructuralintegrity)assomethingdevoidofabigbang,self-awareness,internalhierarchy,orpurposefuldesign. Inanother,however,hedivergeslittlefromMcDonoughinthatanydisagreementoveroriginsdoesnotimplyadisagreementoverthefunctiononeseesanSSAserving(namely,tostabilizeinvestmentexpectations,profitrates,and,thereby,capitalaccumulation).WhileperceivingthecontentsoftheSSAblackboxinamannerdifferenttoMcDonough,then,Gordonisinlock-stepwiththeformerwhenitcomestowhatanSSAdoes.
53
epochalchangesintroducedinthelate1970sandearly1980s.Indeed,upontheconsolidationof
theneoliberalturn,itwouldbeestablishedthattherapidgrowthandhighprofitratesofthe
1950sand1960sreflectedlessageneralizablepropertyofcapitalismandsomethingmoreakin
toahistoricalaccident.84
Likepreviousmodalitiesofcapitalism,theneoliberaliteration—ascendantacrossmostof
theworldfornearlyfortyyearsnow—didunambiguouslymanagetostabilizecapital
accumulation,atleastfortheperiodprecedingtheglobalfinancialcrisisof2007-2008.However,
unlikeitspostwarcomparators,itdidsowithoutalsodeliveringsignificantgrowth.Breaking
withrecenttrends,then,thiswasaversionofstabilitythatwasachievednotthroughexpansion
butthroughanupwardredistributionofwealthandincome.85Institutionalizingasystem
wherebytherentsandgainsaccruingtocapitalconstituteagrowingshareoftotalincome—
wheretheprofitratehasbeendisarticulatedfromeconomicexpansion86—,neoliberal
84 NowherewasthisbetterestablishedthaninThomasPiketty’sCapitalinthe21stCentury(HarvardUniversity
Press,2013).85 GerardDumenilandDominiqueLevy,CapitalResurgent:RootsoftheNeoliberalRevolution.HarvardUniversity
Press(2004),p.2486 MartinWolfsonandDavidKotz,“AreconceptualizationofSocialStructureofAccumulationTheory”in
McDonough,Reich,andKotzeds.ContemporaryCapitalismanditsCrises:SocialStructureofAccumulationTheoryfor21stCentury(2010),p.79.
Asforhowstabilitycouldbeachievedwithoutgrowth,itshouldbenotedthatoverthecourseofthe1990sand
theearly2000s,thereallocationofwealthinstitutionalizedunderneoliberalSSA’sdideventuallyfacilitatearisingrateofprofitincertaincapitalisteconomiesandincertainsectionsoftheeconomy(financeandthebuiltenvironmentinparticular).Thewealthandincometherebyaccruingtothecapitalistclassthroughtheseprofitrateswouldbemorethansufficientforsecuringtheirbuy-in(andinvestment)intothelargerconstellationofsocial,political,economic,andideologicalinstitutionsmakingthisaccrualpossible.Withthisbuy-inconsummatedandthencontinuouslyreaffirmedthroughthisclass’steadyaccretionofprofits,thisglobalSSAmanagedtostabilizecapitalaccumulationandthewiderinternationaleconomywithoutevergeneratinghighgrowth.
54
capitalismshavemarkedareturn,inmanyways,topremodernformsofsocialandeconomic
organization.
Inviewofthesechangesinhistory,WolfsonandKotzintroducedconsiderable,structural
revisionstoSSAtheory.ThemostsalientoftheseconcernedSSAtheory’spositiononeconomic
growth,asissuccinctlyexpressedinthefollowingpassage:
WeunderstandanSSAtobeacoherentinstitutionalstructurethatsupportscapitalist profit-makingandalsoprovidesaframeworkfortheaccumulationofcapital,butitdoes notnecessarilypromotea“rapid”rateofcapitalaccumulation.Thehistoricallinkbetween theSSAtheoryandthetheoryoflongswingsshouldbesevered.87Whereithadbeenassumedthattheconsolidationofacoherentinstitutionalinfrastructure
wouldnecessarilyfacilitatetherealizationofbothhighprofitratesandrapideconomic
expansion,SSAtheoristswouldhenceforthproceedfromthepremisethatrobustgrowthwasbut
oneofthepossibleoutcomesthatmightbegeneratedupontheconsolidationofsuchan
infrastructure.
Beyondnecessitatingthismajortheoreticalreformulation,theemergenceofneoliberal
capitalismsalsoforcedSSAtheorytoundertakeanumberofslightlylessseismicshifts,bethey
analytical,conceptualandmethodologicalinnature.88Tobegin,themodalityofglobaleconomic
integrationusheredinduringthepastfortyyears—onedefinedbytheremovalofcapital
controls,extensivetradeliberalization,andtheinternationalizationofregulatory(andlegislative)
87 WolfsonandKotz(2010),p.7988 ItisworthnotingthatSSAtheoristsofthisgenerationalsodiscernedthetransformativeimpactthat
financialization—andthesegmentationofthecapitalistclass—washavingonaccumulation(WolfsonandKotz,p.84).Moreover,they,likemanyotherobserversoftheneoliberalera,alsorecognizedthiskindofsegmentationtobeespeciallyparticularlypronouncedinthoseeconomicsresemblingtheliberalmarketarchetype.
55
powers89—madeSSAtheory’spreviousdistinctionbetweenaneconomy’sinternalandexternal
articulationsincreasinglyproblematic.Totheextentthattheglobalandthenationalwerenow
co-constitutivedomains,scholarsofpoliticaleconomy(whetheraffiliatedwithSSAornot)would
thereforeneedtorethinkwhatanationalcasestudyoughttolooklike.
LeadingSSA’srethinkingherewereWilliamRobinson,MichaelWallace,andDavidBrady.
Sotoaccountfortheeffectsborneofeconomicopeningandthetransnationalizationofcapitalist
classesthatitfacilitated,Robinson’srevisionsprovidedSSAwiththeconceptualandanalytical
spaceneededtobetterreflecttheshifting(andtransnational)natureofstate-capitalandcapital-
capitalrelationsinthecontemporaryperiod.90WithtracesofRobertCoxandKeesvanderPijl
pervadingandenrichinghisanalysis,Robinson’sinterventionswereasimportantasanyone
else’sinretrofittingSSAforthe21stcentury.WallaceandBrady,meanwhile,introducedanumber
ofrevisionssotobetterequipSSAtheoryformakingsenseoftheevolvingnatureofsocialcontrol
intheeraofneoliberalglobalization.Cognizantinparticularofthedisciplinaryeffectsthat
liberalizedcapitalmovements,footlooseinvestment,andthefragmentationofproductionchains
nowexertedonlabor,theirconceptualinnovationsprovidedtoolsessentialforunlockingthe
dynamicsofcontemporaryindustrialrelations.Withspatialization,forexample,they
conceptualizedhowthethreatoffirmrelocationnowconstitutesapremiummechanismof
powerandleverage,onerenderinglabor’snecessarilylocalizedformsofresistanceincreasingly
89 Bythis,IrefertotheWTO’sgrowinginfluenceovertheregulatorypoliciesofitsmembership—influence
extendingwellbeyondmattersoftariffs,etc.90 WilliamRobinson,TransnationalConflicts:CentralAmerica,SocialChange,andGlobalization.Verso(2003). WilliamRobinson,LatinAmericaandGlobalCapitalism:ACriticalGlobalizationPerspective.JohnsHopkins
UniversityPress(2008).
56
inefficacious.91Forcinglaborbothtocompeteforcapitalandtooperateundertherulesandlogic
ofsuchacompetition,spatializationhelpscapturehowthespecterofcapitalflightcansecurea
highlyhierarchicalformofsocialpeace/domination.
RevisingSSAfortheJordanianContext
Notwithstandingthesescholars’wonderfulcontributions,asmentioned,Iwillbeaddinga
numberofmyownrevisionstotheanalyticalframeworksthathavebeendevelopedaroundSSA’s
theoreticalpresuppositions.ThoughIamconfidentintheexplanatorypowerofsocialstructure
ofaccumulationtheorymoregenerallyandintheconceptualizationsonoffertherein,Ibelieve
thatafewtweakstoanotherwiseSSA-groundedanalysiswillbetterequipmetogenerateunique,
robust,andconvincinginsightsasregardstheenduranceofJordan’scapitalismofcrisis.
Hearkeningbacktoapointtouchedonintheintroduction,myrevisionsareprimarily
informedbythefactthatinJordan(asinmuchofthedevelopingworld),thereexistsno“sharp
antinomy”betweeneitherstateandcapitalorthenationalandtheinternational.92Specifictothe
state-capitalrelationship,theabsenceofsuchanantinomyisafunctionofhistoryandof
91 MichaelWallaceandDavidBrady,“Spatialization,foreigndirectinvestment,andlaboroutcomesintheAmerican
states,1978-1996,SocialForces(79:1),2000,pp.67-105. MichaelWallaceandDavidBrady,“GlobalizationorSpatialization?TheWorldwideSpatialRestructuringofthe
LaborProcess”inMcDonough,Reich,andKotzeds.ContemporaryCapitalismanditsCrises:SocialStructuresofAccumulationTheoryforthe21stCentury(2010),pp.121-144.
92 Formoreonthispoint,see:AdamHanieh,CapitalismandClassintheGulfArabStates.Springer(2016),p.25. InJordan’scase,theabsenceofsuchanantinomyislargelyafunctionofbothsocial/politicalhistory(i.e.
processesofclassandstateformation)andofglobalperipherality.
57
interpenetratedprocessesofclassandstateformationinparticular.Aswillbedemonstrated,the
Hashemitestatewaspartiallyconstitutedasatoolof(capitalist)classpoweratthetimeofits
inception.Inversely,theJordaniancapitalistclassasmuchasthehierarchicallinesof
segmentationthatempoweritselitefractionwerealsolargelyconsolidatedthroughthe
patternedinterventionsofthestate.Byconsequenceofthisco-constitutiverelationship,thereis
nowayofmakingsenseofstateinterventioninthecontemporaryJordanianeconomywithout
dealingwithquestionsofclassjustasthereisnowayofdealingwithtoday’scorruptedmarket
competitionwithoutdealingwiththeinterestsandprerogativesofthestate(andthepalacein
particular).Similarly,onecannotgrapplewiththeelitefraction’sacutepredispositiontowards
rent-seeking—oneofthemostsalientandinfluentialpropertiesofthecountry’scontemporary
capitalism—withoutfullyinvestigatingthecoimbricationofclassandstateformationinJordan,
bothhistoricallyandinthepresentday.
Specifictothenational-internationalrelationship,theabsenceofsuchanantinomyisa
functionofthestateandtheeconomy’sexternaldependency.Eachofthesepropertiesthemselves
derivefromtheintersectionofpolicymakingandglobalperipherality.Regardlessofprovenance,
thistwo-folddependencyhasshiftedandinternationalizedeverythingfromthenationalclass
structuretothecompositionofthestatetothenatureofthedomesticmarketinJordan.93Asthe
international’sinternalityvis-a-visthenationalnecessarilycollapsesthepartition(analyticalor
otherwise)betweentheexternalandinternalarticulationsofJordan’ssocialstructureof
93 IndicatorsofthisdependencyareapparentinthestructureofJordan’straderelations,intheshareofthecapital
stockthatisownedbynon-nationals,andinthestate’sstructuralrelianceupondevelopmentassistance,budgetaryassistance,foreignaid,andhumanitarianstateswithinthestate.
58
accumulation,dependencyrendersSSA’sunderstatedmethodologicalnationalism—implicitin
theassumptionofaseparationbetweenthosetwoarticulations—non-viableforthepurposesof
thiscasestudy.Justasonecannotappraiseeliterent-seekinginJordanwithoutconsideringthe
state,then,onecannotevaluatethiscapitalism’sfiscalsociology,regimeofsocialcontrol,political
institutionalizationortradeperformancewithoutconsideringtheinternational/transnational.
Operationally,IwillamendSSA’sanalyticalframeworksotoaccountforthesenon-
antinomiesinanumberofways.Regardingstate-capitalrelations,Ihaveincludedafargreater
emphasisthanistypicalonhistoricalprocesstracingsotoestablishthefullempiricalvalidityof
theclaimsputforthonthepreviouspage.Insubsequentlyanalyzingeachindividualdomainof
thecountry’scontemporarySSA,Ihavealsomadespacetountanglethewebofpersonnel,policy,
andinstitutionsthroughwhichcapitalactsviathestate(andviceversa).Thisspacewillbe
evincedinmyanalysisofAbdullah’spoliticalknightingofthebusinesseliteintheearly2000sas
muchasinmyanalysisoftheideologicalcampaignsthathavebeenlaunchedinhopesof
legitimatingneoliberalcapitalism,andthedialecticalunionofstateandcapitalwillbeshownto
constituteoneofthemostsalientpropertiesofJordan’ssocialstructureofaccumulation
throughout.
Iwillincorporatedependencyandperipheralityinasimilarlycomprehensivefashion.In
interrogatingthepoliticalinstitutionalizationofJordaniancapitalism,forinstance,Iwillnotonly
appraisehowbudgetaryimperativesandcreditorrelationsinfluencegovernanceandeconomic
policymaking;Iwillalsodocumenthowexternalorganizationsandforeignconsultantsmore
directlypervadeJordan’slegislativeandregulatoryprocesses.Iwillaccountforperipheralityand
dependencyinmyanalysesofbothmarketcompetitionandofthestate’scontemporary
59
modalitiesofeconomicintervention,meanwhile,bydemonstratinghoweachinstitutional
domainiseffected(ifnotconstituted)bythehegemonyofGulfcapital.Indiscussinghistorical
andcontemporarysocialcontrolstrategies,Iwillconnectperipheralitytoimmigration
patterns—patternsthatwillinturnbeshowntoexertasubstantivedisciplinaryeffecton
domesticlabor.Evenindiscussingideology,Iwillshowhowperipheralityanddependency
reorientdescriptiveandnormativeclaimmakingtowardsexternalaudiences.
IbelievetheserevisionswillnotonlyenhancethequalityofthiscaseJordaniancasestudy,
butalsoprovideatemplateofsortsforothersaimingtobetterunderstandeconomiclifeinthe
globalsouthmoregenerally.
ResearchMethodsandTheoryGeneration
Atthemostmetaoflevels,thissinglesubjectcasestudyusesthickdescriptionin
conjunctionwiththeabductivetheoryofmethodtodevelopgeneralizableclaimsasrelatesto
southerncapitalisms,actuallyexistingneoliberalism,andcontemporaryeconomicdevelopment.
Lessabstractlyspeaking,thisentailsfirstdetectinganddocumentingasurprisingempirical
phenomenon—namely,Jordan’scapitalismofcrisis.Henceforth,abductivereasoningispracticed
toinferthebestexplanationforsuchthisparticularphenomenon.94Then,throughconversation
94 “Best”isappraisedbaseduponlogicalcoherenceandempiricalvalidity. Formoreontheabductivetheoryofmethod,see:JoReichertz,Abduction:TheLogicofDiscoveryofGrounded
Theory.Sage(2007). JaniceMorse,PhyllisStern,JulietCorbin,BarbaraBowers,KathyCharmaz,andAdeleClarke,Developing
GroundedTheory:TheSecondGeneration.Routledge(2016). BrianHaig,“Anabductivetheoryofscientificmethod”,PsychologicalMethods(10:4),2005,pp.371-388
60
withaseriesoftheoreticalpresuppositionsdrawnfromreadingsofheterodoxeconomics
(including,ofcourse,socialstructureofaccumulationtheory),Ideriveaseriesofpropositions
aimedatrefiningand/oraugmentingknowledgeonthetopicslistedabove.Thesepropositions
willbediscussedatlengthinmyconclusion.
Operationally,mydetectionanddocumentationofthesurprisingempiricalphenomenon
attheheartofthisanalysishasrelieduponamixed-methodsapproach.Borrowingeclectically
andwidely,thesequantitativeandqualitativetoolsprovidedthedexterityanddiscernmentthat
wasrequiredtoensurethatIcouldgatherandprocessthediversityofdatainputsneededin
ordertoanalyzeeachoftheinstitutionaldomainsconstitutingJordan’ssocialstructureof
accumulation.Dependingonthechapterandtheparticularproblematiquetowhicheachchapter
isanchored,Ihavespecificallycalleduponthefollowingresearchmethods—oftenincombination
withoneanother—drawnfromacrossthefieldsofpoliticalscience,sociology,economics,and
history:(a)comprehensiveliteraturereviewforthepurposeofhistoricalprocesstracing;(b)
longitudinalstatisticalanalysisforthepurposeofevaluatingnationaleconomicperformanceand
attributingcausaleffectstospecificpolicies;(c)contentanalysisforthepurposeofevaluating
legislation,policyinitiatives,andtradeagreements;(d)classanalysisforthepurposesof
evaluatingthesocialcompositionofeconomicandpoliticalpower;(e)criticaldiscourseforthe
purposesofevaluatingpoliticalspeechandideologicaltexts;(f)analysisofpublicopinionsurvey
dataforthepurposesofevaluatingideology’seffects;(g)longitudinalstatisticalanalysisderived
fromfirm-leveldataforthepurposesofevaluatingbookvaluesandmarketcompetitionacross
time;(h)assetvaluationandassetdeterminationtoevaluatetheeconomicpowerofselectfamily
owned-conglomerates(forthepurposesofevaluatingmarketcompetition);(i)quantitative
61
mappingofsectoralstructures(forthepurposesofevaluatingmarketcompetition);and(j)
statisticalanalysisofinvestorequityamongstpubliclytradedfirms(forthepurposesof
evaluatingmarketcompetition).
Together,Ibelievethesemethodshaveprovensufficientwhenitcomestobothdata
extractionanddataappraisal.Byextension,Ibelievetheirselectionwasappropriateforand
conduciveofcausalandconstitutiveinferencegenerationaswell.
ChapterOutlines
Thisdissertationwillbedividedintotwosections.Thefirstsectionismeanttoprovidethe
readerwithanhistoricaloverviewofJordan’ssocialorganizationandpoliticaleconomy.
Informedbyacomprehensivereviewofthescholarlyliterature,thethreechapterscomprising
thissectionwillmapoutthegeneralcontoursofthecountry’ssocial,political,andeconomic
developmentfromthemiddleofthe19thcenturythroughthedeathofKingHusseinin1999.
Proceedingsequentially,thefirstchapterinthissection(Chapter3:APreamble:Jordan
beforetheMandate,JordanduringtheMandate)willsketchprocessesrelatedtoclassandstate
formationandcoveraperiodroughlystretchingfrom1850through1945.Chapterfour
(IndependentJordan’sFirstSocialStructureofAccumulation:1946-1973)willtakeupwiththe
post-independenceyearsandprovideadetailedexaminationofthesocialstructureof
accumulationthatprevailedbetween1946and1973.Chapterfive(Oil,InducedStateRentierism,
andaNewSocialStructureofAccumulation:1973-1986)willaddressthesocialstructureof
accumulationthatemergedinJordanfollowingtheruptureoftheOPECoilembargo,a
petrodollar-fueledformationthatlargelyheldfirmupandthrough1989.Thischapterwillalso
62
detailthecollapseofthisSSAaswellastheresultingcontractionturnedrecession.Indelineating
theinheritancethathistorybestoweduponKingAbdullah,ayoungmonarchwhorather
unexpectedlycametopowerattheturnofthemillenium,itismyhopethatsectiononewillequip
thereaderwiththecontextneededtomakesenseofthedynamicscoveredinsectiontwo.
SectiontwoofthisdissertationwillfocusonthecontemporaryJordaniansocialstructure
ofaccumulation(1999-2019).Chaptersix—Politics,PolicyMaking,andtheInstitutionalizationof
NeoliberalCapitalism—willtracecontemporarycapitalism’slegislativeandjuridicaloriginstoa
seriesofautocratic-technocraticinitiativesinauguratedbyKingAbdullahovertheprevious
twentyyears.Proceedingsequentially,thisgenealogyofthepresentwillbeginwiththeEconomic
ConsultativeCouncil.Itwillbeshownthatthispalaceappointeddefactoparliament—stewarded
byacoterieofeconomizedelitescollectivelyidentifiedasGenerationAbdullah95—unilaterally
rewrotethemajorityofJordan’sindustrial,investment,trade,laborandregulatorypolicies,
authoringanewformofcapitalismintheprocess.96Next,IwillturntotheAqabaSpecial
EconomicZoneAuthority(ASEZA),anotherorganizationallyautonomousandintentionally
insulatedpolicymakingbodythatwillbedemonstratedtohavehadasimilareffectwithinthe
95 UnlikethepoliticalelitesempoweredduringHussein’stenure,anetworkofmenwho,nomattertheirfaults,
couldatleastbesaidtohaveretainedcommitmentsandconnectionstoawidersocialbase,IwilldemonstratethatAbdullah’skingsmen—drawnalmostexclusivelyfromatransnationallyorientedfractionoftheJordanianbourgeoisie—havenosuchtethering.Incontrasttotheirpredecessors,IwillalsodemonstratethattheyhavesoughttoadvanceanagendathatisexplicitlyantagonistictotheinterestsofJordan’svastmajority(includingitsbureaucrats).Byconsequenceofthesetwofactsandofthefactthatthesebusinessmenturnedpolicyeliteswerenotcreaturesofthestatethemselves,itwillbecomeclearwhytheimplementationoftheiragendarequiredtheestablishmentofahostofnewparallelpolicymakinginstitutions—i.e.theautocratic-technocraticinitiativesjustdiscussed.
96 AsIwillalsoshow,manyoftheindividualsempoweredintheseroyally-alignedinstitutionswouldlaterbe
appointedtoministerialpositionsingovernmentsotoinsurethepoliciestheyhaddrawnupwereimposedinasuitablemanner.
63
localcontextofsouthwestJordan.Finally,IwillclosewithananalysisoftheMunicipal
GovernmentofAmmanunderOmarMa’ani’sleadership,documentinghowhisautocratic-
technocraticgovernance—aidedandabettedbyforeignconsultants—furtherconsolidateda
capitalismbiasedtowardslowgrowth,elite-domination,andspeculationinthebuilt
environment.97Evincinghowthepalacehasbeendisembeddedfromthestateasmuchasthe
markethasbeendisembeddedfromsociety,thischapterwillrevealhowthepoliticalverymuch
investscontemporaryJordaniancapitalismwiththecrisistendenciesthatweredescribedinthe
introductiontothismonograph.
Ifchaptersixcoversthelegislativeandpolicyprocessesrelevanttotheestablishmentof
neoliberalcapitalism,chapterseven—TheMakingandManagementoftheEconomy:The
State/PalaceintheEconomy—willturnthelensontothedirectinterventionsthatthestateand
palacehavetakenintheeconomyoverthepasttwentyyears,demonstratinghowthese
interventionstoofunctionsotoinstitutionalizeandstabilizeanelite-oriented,socially
disembeddedmodalityofcapitalism.Iwillbreakthisanalysisintotwosubsections.Thefirstwill
focusinonwhatIwillconceptualizeasthestate’smass-orientedinterventions.Herein,Iwill
foregroundtherolethat(retreating)welfarismhasplayedinstabilizingcapitalaccumulation
(andindestabilizingmiddleandworkingclasslife)duringthetenureofAbdullah.98Withinthis
97 Investedwithtotaldiscretion,Iwillshowthatthistechnocraticpolicymakingoperatesoutsidethetraditional
apparatusesofthestateandthereforeoutsidethepatronagesystems,distributiverationalities,andwelfaristcommitmentsthatthestatehastraditionallybeenhostto.
98 Specifically,Iwillconsiderthesocialandeconomiceffectsgeneratedthroughpublichealthexpenditures,the
cancelationofuniversalsubsidies,andthestate’sprivilegingoftargetedtransfersinitspovertyalleviationoperations.Inaddition,Iwillexaminehowamoregeneralizabledeclineinthequalityofpublicserviceprovisionshasstressedmiddleandlowerclassfamilies—forcingthemtoborrowandspendgreatersumsonhealthandeducation—,andhowthesestressorsrelatetosocialinstability.
64
widerlineofwelfaristinquiry,Iwillalsotakeheedtoemphasizethegenerationaleffectsthat
relativedeclinesinpublicsectorhiringhavehadoverthelasttwentyyears—anddocumentthe
extenttowhichthesocialimpactofdirectstateemploymenthasdeclinedunderthecurrent
King.99
ThesecondsubsectionwillnarrowinonwhatIwillconceptualizeasthestate’selite-
orientedinterventions.Herein,Iwillbeginwithananalysisofthefiscalsociologythathasbeen
consolidatedunderAbdullah’swatch.Attheaggregatelevel,Iwillshowthatthissociologyisnot
onlyregressive,punitive,andeconomicallyinefficient,butthatitisalsoconduciveofupwardand
outwardredistributionsofwealth.100Henceforth,Iwillproceedtoconsidersixadditional
mechanismsofelite-orientedintervention:(1)privatization;(2)themanipulationofcurrent
accountliberalization;(3)theinstrumentalizationofpubliccreditinstitutionsforthepurposesof
boostingelite-ownedenterprises;(4)real-estateorientedindustrial/investmentpolicies;(5)
laissez-faireindustrialpolicies[asimplementedacrossJordan’sQualifyingIndustrialZones(QIZ),
SpecialEconomicZones(SEZ),andSpecialDevelopmentZones(SDZ)];and(6)militaryindustrial
policies.
Chaptereight—InstitutionalizingOligarchy:TheJordanianFormofMarketCompetition—
willaddressthenatureofcapital-capitalrelationsandmarketcompetitioninJordantoday.This
99 Inaddition,Iwillalsoshowthatpublicsectorhiringtodayremainsdetachedfromconsiderationsofmerit;this
beingthecase,IwillalsodocumenttheextenttowhichthisareaofpublicexpendituresiscompromisedbymuchthesameissuesaswereseenduringHussein’spost-1973years.
100 Morespecifically,IwilladdresstheemphasishehasputontheVAT,hisregime’sdefactoneglectofcorporateand
incometax,thetaxbreaksprovidedacrossJordan’smanyspecialeconomicanddevelopmentzones,thepervasivenessoftaxevasion,andtheeffectsthatissuingdomesticbondstolicensedbanksalonehavehadonthestate’sfiscalsociology.
65
analysiswillalsobebrokenintofoursubsections.Inthefirst,Iwillreviewthemodalityofstate-
capitalrelationsestablishedunderAbdullahanddiscusshowthisrelatestotheconsolidationof
Jordan’soligarchicmarkets.Insectiontwo,Iwilllinkclasshistorytotoday’smarketcompetition,
foregroundinghowthefracturingandhierarchizingofthecapitalistclassalsoinformssub-
optimalmarketperformance.Insectionthree,Iwillbrieflydiscussthefinancializationofthe
economyandhowthehegemonyoffinancialcapitalcontributestoanti-competitivedynamics.In
subsectionfour,finally,Iwilldisaggregatetheeconomyonasectorbysectorbasis,usinga
quantitativeanalysistomaptheoligopolisticmarketstructuresorganizingcontemporary
competition.
Chapternine—SocialControlUnderAbdullah—willexplorethelogicthroughwhichthis
deeplyinefficientandcorruptiterationofcapitalismmanagestostaveoffpopularrevolt.This
analysiswillbebrokenintofoursubsections.Inthefirst,Iwilldetailthelegal-coerciveaspectsof
contemporarysocialcontrol.Inthesecond,Iwillfocusinonthe(domesticandtransnational)
segmentationofthelaborforceandconnectthistothestabilizationofelite-oriented
accumulation.Inthethird,Iwillturntotheproliferationofmicro,small,andmedium-sized
enterprisesanddiscusshowtheyhaveproblematizedthemobilizationofworkersolidarity.
Finally,inthefourthsubsection,Iwilladdresshowthegeneralizedprecarityofthepopulation
mayalsocontributetosocialcontrolinthecontemporaryperiod.
Chapterten—Peripherality,Dependency,andtheExternalArticulationofJordanian
Capitalism—willconsidertheregionalandinternationalintegrationofJordaniancapitalism.This
analysiswillbebrokenintotwosubsections.Inthefirst,Iwillconsiderthejuridical
institutionalizationofeconomicopening.AsIwillhavealreadycoveredsomeaspectsofthis
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institutionalizationinpreviouschapters—principally,thecountry’simmigration,investment,and
industrialpolicies—,thisanalysiswillprimarilyemphasizetheparticulareffectsborneoftrade
andbudgetpolicy.Herein,Iwillprocesstracetheeconomicconsequencesyieldedbythe
country’saccessiontotheWTO,itssigningofhighlyinfluentialbilateraltradeagreements,andby
thestate’senduringdependenceonexternalbudgetarysources.101
Insubsectiontwo,IwillconsidertheconsequencesproducedbyJordan’sveryparticular
modalityofeconomicopening.Herein,Iwillhighlightandexplainfoureconomicoutcomesthat
arespecificallyrelevanttocontemporaryunderdevelopment.Thefirstconcernsthecountry’s
decliningtermsoftrade.Narrowinginontheexportsideoftheledger,thesecondconcernsthe
decliningsophisticationofJordan’sexportbasket.Directlyrelatedtoinvestmentpolicydecisions,
thethirdconcernstheeffectsoftheGulf’scolonizationofJordan’sdomesticcapitalstock,andwill
emphasizehowGulf-originatingFDItendstowardsnon-productivesectors,therebyundermining
industrialdevelopmentandtechnologicalconvergencealike.Bringingimmigrationpolicytothe
fore,thefourthwillexplainhowbraindrainhasbeeninstitutionalizedthroughthecollaborations
ofstateandcapitalistclassinJordan.
Chaptereleven—LegitimatingNeoliberalism:Inward/OutwardFacingIdeologyandthe
JordanianSSA—willcoverthematerialanddiscursivepracticesdesignedtonormativelyembed
contemporarycapitalism(anditsHashemitesponsors).Herein,Iwilldetailfourmasterscripts
101 Specifically,IwillbeexaminingtheJordan-UnitedStatesFreeTradeAgreement(JUSFTA)andtheEUAssociation
AgreementonJordaninconsiderabledetail.ThoughIwillalsotouchonahandfulofregionaltradeinitiativessuchastheGreaterArabFreeTradeAgreement(GAFTA),asthesehavebeenmuchlessimpactfulinpractice,theywillnotbegivenprideofplace.RegardingGAFTAforexample,thoughitwasmeanttoeliminateallimpedimentstotradeasof2005,extensivenon-tarifftradebarriersremaininplaceacrosstheregion,andintraregionaltraderemainsquitelowasaresult.
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mostcentraltothisideologicalprojectaswellastheinstitutionsandactorsthatareinvolvedin
theirarticulation:(1)TheFetishizationofGlobalization;(2)Thedepoliticizationofthe
governance102;(3)Thelionizationoftheentrepreneur;and(4)TheInterpellationofthe(social)
EntrepreneurastheIdealCitizen-Subject.
Finally,inthedissertation’sconcludingchapter,Iwillreviewthecentralthesesanchoring
thiswork,discussmattersofgeneralizationandthecontributionsthiscasestudycanmaketothe
fieldofcomparativecapitalism,andprobeavenuesforfutureresearch.
102 IntracinghowthePalacehasdefineditsself-styledtechnocracythroughnegation—throughfirstascribing
ontologicalcorruptiontothestate,etatisme,politicalpartiesandthepoliticalandthencastingtheKing,hisinsulatedpolicymakers,andthebusinessclassastheirantithesis—,IwilldemonstratehowtheideologicalcomponentoftheSSAinfusesandreinforcescapitalism’ssocial,political,andeconomicinstitutionalization.
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CHAPTERTHREE
APreamble:JordanbeforetheMandate,JordanduringtheMandate
ManystudiesoftheJordanianpoliticaleconomydepicttheperiodpriortotheBritish
arrivalasapremodernkindofether.103ThisconstructionofaBedawiterranulliusisproblematic
foranumberofreasons,firstamongstthemthatitnecessarilyattributesacreationisttypeof
historicalagencytothesubsequentadventoftheboththeBritishandtheHashemites.Itisalso
problematicforthefactthatitobscurestheprovenanceofJordan’scontemporaryclasssystem.
Giventhattheproto-consolidationofthebourgeoisieinthelate19thandearly20thcentury
precededandtherebyshapedtheformationofthestate,thisobscurationisevenmore
consequentialthanmightfirstappear.104
Sotoavoidmakingthesameerror,thispreamblewillintroducethereadertoanumberof
keysocial,political,andeconomicdevelopmentstranspiringwithinTransjordanduringthelate
Ottomanperiod.Henceforth,itwillbrieflysurveyboththeprocessesthroughwhichtheBritish
MandateoverTransjordanwasestablishedandtheprocessesthroughwhichtheHashemite
familyeventuallystakeditsclaimastheMandateauthority’sindigenouspartner.Ofnote,the
analysisinthischapterwilldifferfromtheanalysesfeaturedinthisdissertation’sotherhistorical
103 Notonlydothesestudiesinflatetheroleofthestateinconstructingtheeconomy;bysubsumingtheHashemite
Kingswithinthestate—inmakingtheMonarchyandtheemergentbureaucracyaunifiedactor—,theseanalysesalsoobscurehowthePalacehas,inpursuingitsowninterests,consistentlyunderminedthatbureaucracyandtheformationofarationalizedstate,asIwilldetail.
104 NowhereisthisahistoricismmoreapparentthaninPiro’s1998bookThePoliticalEconomyofMarketReformin
Jordan.Intheintroductiontothiswork,PiroassertsthatinJordan,thestatepreceded(andbyimplication,created)thenationaleconomy(p.6).Thisself-sufficientfactishighlyproblematic,asthefollowingpageswilldetail.
70
chaptersinthatitwillnotbearrangedaccordingtotheframeworksofsocialstructureof
accumulationtheory.DesignedsotoacclimatethoseunfamiliarwithJordanianhistorytothe
basiclayofthelandratherthansotoprovideacomprehensiveanalysisofcapitalism’ssocial,
political,andideologicalinstitutionalizationinthelate19thandearly20thcenturies,Ihopethe
readerwillnotfindthistoodisorienting.
…...…………..……..……..………..........……...........................……..….........….…….…...…………...…….….....………...…………
Inthemid-1800s,thelandsthatwouldlaterconstitutetheBritishMandateofTransjordan
hostedformsofsocialandeconomicorganizationthatinmanywaysresembledwhatwasseen
elsewhereintheArabMashreq.AswasthecaseinSyria,Palestine,andLebanon,the
Transjordanianeconomywasitselflargelydependentuponlongdistancetrade,derivativesofthe
annualhajj(i.e.caravanraiding),camelpastoralism,andsubsistenceagriculture.105Ifsharingin
suchgeneralizedproperties,however,TransjordandivergedfromitsLevantinepeersintwo
(intersecting)regards.First,duetotheintensityoftheclimate’saridity106,thecontingent
historiesofregionalempires,theacutepervasivenessoflocalBedouinraiding,andtheabsenceof
105 ThisarchetypewasdevelopedbySamirAmininUnequalDevelopment. Thoughcorrespondingimperfectlywithanyanalyticalarchetype,Transjordancouldbesaidtoapproximatea
poortributesocialformationintheseyears,onewherethe“centerofgravitywasthetownratherthanthecountryside.”
See:Mohammaedal-Masri,TheJordanianBourgeoisieCompositionandStructure1967-1989.Doctoraldissertation,DurhamUniversity(2005),p.85.
106 Regardingthepointonaridity,withtheexceptionoftheGhorregionandtheeasternhighlands—thelands
betweentheYarmoukRiverandtheSyrianbordersinthenorthandWadiMusainthesouth—,approximately91%oftheTransjordanianlandmasswasunsuitableforagriculture.Receivingunder200millimetersofrainfallperyear,TransjordanwouldthereforeseelittleofthegrainproductionpoweringmuchofSyria’s19thcenturycapitalaccumulation.
See:Masri,p.85andOddvarAresvik(1976),TheAgriculturalDevelopmentofJordan,p.58-60
71
aMediterraneancoastline,thearea’surbancenterswererelativelyunderdevelopedascompared
tothoseseenelsewhereintheMashreq.107Second—andagainduetoboththeclimate’saridity
andthepervasivenessoftheraidingeconomy—,Transjordan’sagriculturalbasewas
comparativelyunderdevelopedaswell.108Ifstillprovidingthematerialconditionsneededforthe
reproductionofsettled,nomadic,andsemi-nomadicwaysoflife,Transjordan’sprecariousfood
suppliesandlimitedeconomicsurplusallowedforneithersubstantialpopulationgrowthnor
capitalaccumulation.
Asregardsthepoliticalrealitiesoftheday,whilenominallyunderOttomancontrol
throughoutthe19thcentury,thelandsofTransjordansawlittleinterferencefromtheirimperial
overlordspriorto1850.OperatingoutofanadministrativecapitalinDamascusatmid-century,
logisticalchallengesandalackoffinancialincentivessawtheOttomansdevotelittleeffortor
resourcestoextendingtheirpresencebeyondtherelativelyfertileAjlunregionofnorth
Transjordan.Thisnegligenceanddisinterestdideventuallygiveway,however,onceamore
interventionistadministrationinIstanbultookaninterestinextractingpredictabletaxreceipts
fromitsMashreqiansubjects.Adoptingavarietyofmeansinserviceoftheseends—thebuilding
andstaffingmilitarygarrisons,theimplementationoflandregistrationthrough1858’sOttoman
107 Transjordan’scitiesandtownsweresignificantlylessprosperousthaneitherinteriortradingdepotslike
DamascusandAleppoorsea-trading,western-orientedportslikeHaifa,Jaffa,andBeirut.108 Forcedtonavigatethewhimsicalityofecologicalconditionsandbedouinpredations/impositionsoftributealike,
throughoutmuchofthe19thcentury,Transjordan’speasantrytendedtoconsistentlyrelocateandtorelyonmoreprimitivetoolsofcultivation(lesttheircapitalbeseizedbytheBedouin).
Formore,see:NormanLewis,“TheFrontierofSettlementinSyria,1800-1950”inCharlesIssawi(ed.)TheEconomicHistoryoftheMiddleEast1800-1914.UniversityofChicagoPress(1955),pp.259-264
MustafaHamarneh,SocialandEconomicTransformationofTrans-Jordan1921-1946.Doctoraldissertation,GeorgetownUniversity(1985),pp.79-80.
72
LandLaw109,theencouragementofsemi-sedentarizationamongsttheBedouin,the(forced)
settlementofCircassianmigrantsinAmman,Jerash,andZarqa,the(forced)resettlementofArab
ChristiansinKarakandMadaba110—,therevenue-drivenextensionoftheOttoman
administrativestatewouldconstituteacriticaljunctureinTransjordanianhistory,catalyzing
processesofeconomicdevelopmentandcapitalistclassformationthatprovedtobeofgreat
subsequentimportance.111
Tobegin,theextensionoftheOttomanstateandtherelativesecuritythisextension
oversawfacilitatedTransjordan’sintegrationintonetworksoftradeandcommercebasedinthe
Syrianinterior—networkswhichTransjordanianresidentshadpreviouslylackedaccessto.112
Thisproto-regionalintegrationaloneprecipitatedatransitionfromsubsistenceagricultureto
export-orientedagricultureinTransjordan,withmassiveincreasesintheexportofwheat,
cereals,barleyandfruitsachievedhenceforth.113Perhapsevenmoreimportantly,thebuildingof
OttomangarrisonsalsofacilitatedtherelocationofSyrianandPalestinianmerchantsinto
Transjordan’semergenttrading(andsmuggling)centers.Nolongerasvulnerabletothecaravan
109 ThenatureandsocialeffectsoftheimpositionoftheOttomanLandLaw(asitinteractedwithpre-existing
systemofmasha’a,miri,andprivateproperty)aresubjecttosomescholarlydebate.Forareview,see:MichaelFischbach,State,SocietyandLandinJordan.Brill(2000)
110 RegardingOttomansettlementpolicy,see:EugeneRogan,IncorporatingthePeriphery:theExtensionofDirect-Rule
overSouth-EasternSyria(Transjordan).Doctoraldissertation,HarvardUniversity(1991).111 RegardingthisstageofJordanianhistorymoregenerally,see:TariqTell,TheSocialandEconomicOriginsof
MonarchyinJordan.Springer(2013),pp.42-43.112 See:Masri(2005),pp.87-114.113 Togetherthoseproductscomprised75-90%ofTransjordan’stotalexportsatthisstage.See:Knowles(2001),
p.86.
73
raidingoftheBedouin,thisarrivalofNablusi,Jerusalemite,andDamascenecapitalfurther
expeditedandacceleratedtheagriculture-drivengrowthalreadyunderway.
Introducinglevelsofinvestment,accumulation,anddispossessionhithertounseenin
theseterritories,thesenon-indigenousarrivalswoundupprofoundlyreshapingtheclass
structureofTransjordan.Totheextent,moreover,thatitwastheextensionofOttomansecurity
whichhadhastenedthearrivalofnon-indigenousmerchantcapitalinthefirstplace,onecanalso
seehowclassandstatewereboundbyaco-constitutiverelationsincetheveryinceptionof
modernTransjordan.114
Therelationbetweenmoneyandpoweronlydeepenedintheyearsaheadas
Transjordan’squicklymetastasizingbourgeoisiesetaboutestablishingcommercialempires
throughouttheterritory’semergingmarkets.AstheexamplesofWafaal-DajaniandSabriTaba’a
makeclear,memberofthisnon-indigenousmerchantclasswereconsistentlyaffordeda
privilegedstatusbytheOttomanBankacrosstheclosingdecadesofthe19thcenturyandearly
decadesofthe20thcentury.115Extendedbothcollateral-lesslettersofcreditandexclusiveimport
permits,suchactorswereabletoexploitsuchprivilegessotoamasssignificantfortunes.116Once
114 WithdemandforagriculturalproductsgreatlyexpandingduetotheMashriq’smoregeneralincorporationinto
theglobalcapitalistsystemandwiththebuildingoftheHijazrailwayfurtherfacilitatingboththeexpansionofthestateandthemovementofgoods,thesemerchantcapitalistssawtheirwealthsteadilygrowoverthecourseofthelate19thandearly20thcenturies.
115 ThesemerchantswonthefavoroftheBank’sDirectorHaydarShukri,whoprovidedthemwithaccesstowide
linesofcreditwithoutrequiringmuchinthewayofcollateral. Formoreonthisperiod,see:AblaAmawi,StateandClassinTransjordan.Doctoraldissertation,Georgetown
University(1993),p.481.116 Certainly,thecapitalstockofthismerchantclasspaledincomparisontothatwhichhadbeenaccumulatedalong
thecitiesofthemoredeeplyintegrated,significantlymoretraffickedMediterraneancoast. See:PhilipRobins,TheConsolidationofHashemitePowerinJordan1921-1946.Doctoraldissertation,Universityof
Exeter(1988),p.324
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thosefortuneswereestablished—fortunesderivedofpoliticalinterventionasmuchas
entrepreneurialspirit—,moreover,thisproto-capitalistclasssubsequentlyproveadeptat
leveragingtheirwealthtoextractassetsandrentsfromtheTransjordanianpeasantry.117
Thisphenomenawasmostobviouslymanifestuponthiseconomicelite’sembraceoftax
farmingandwhatmighttodayberecognizedaspredatorypaydaylending.118Withthevolatility
oftheweatherrenderingtheharvestinmanyareasofTransJordanhighlyunpredictable,cash-
strappedfarmers,forcedtoreckonwiththeimminentarrivaloftheOttomantaxman,were
somethingofaperfectmarkforthesetypesofoperations.119TheAbuJaberfamily,oneofthe
scionsofthecontemporaryJordanianeconomy,standsoutasoneofthemostnotorious
beneficiariesofthisparticularaccumulationthroughdispossessionracket,whichtheyusedto
acquiremassivelandholdingsintheareassurroundingAmmanbytheearly1900s.120Amongst
thedispossessed,thefarmersofBalqa,Karak,andMa’ansufferedmostacutely.121Ofgreat
117 Amawi(1993),p.469-470.118 OftenworkinginconjunctionwithOttomanbureaucrats,thesemerchantsturnedmoneymenwouldsetup
predatoryfinancialarrangementswherebytheyagreedtocoverafarmer’staxobligationsinexchangefortheultimatetransferofcollateral(i.e.property)orusuriousrepaymentrates.See:Masri(2005),p.121,andHamarneh(1985),p.183-184forgreaterdetails.
119 ItisworthnotingthatpeasantpopulationsinnorthernTransjordanprovedmoredeftinmanagingtheOttoman’s
taxadministration.120 Tell(2013),p.43121 Regardingthisrelationshipbetweenaccumulationanddispossession,see:Tell(2013),p.41-45 Inadditiontoaccumulationthroughdispossession,itisworthmentioningthatbycentury’sendandastradeand
commercegrew,smallscale,agriculture-basedindustryalsogainedafootholdintheTransjordanianeconomy.ThoughscarcitiesofcapitalandthedeficienciesinelectricityproductionanddistributionmeantJordanexperiencednothingevenapproximatingindustrializationproper,theestablishmentofflourmills,distilleries,andcigarettefactoriesnonethelessgavesomeindicationofthelargereconomictransformationthenunderway
75
importance,onemustalsonotethatitwasinthesesamepre-MandateyearsthatTransjordan’s
non-indigenousbourgeoisiebothacquiredaclassconsciousnessandbegantoinstitutionalize
itselfasaclassforitself.Theseparticulartransformationswerebothreflectedandconsummated
intheestablishmentoftheAmmanChamberofCommerce(ACC)in1910.122
AsIhopethisbriefhistoricalreviewhasbeensufficienttodemonstrate,then,thedecades
precedingtheBritishMandatewereindeedofunambiguousconsequencetothesocial,economic,
andpoliticaltrajectorieslatertakeninTransjordan.Firstly,asthegenealogyofthecountry’s
foreignbourgeoisieattests,theseyearsendowedapolarizedandelite-dominatedclassstructure.
Evincingaswelltheextenttowhichpoliticalprivilegehelpedmidwifethebourgeoisieinthefirst
place,thissamegenealogycanalsohelpunwindthehistoricallogicinformingJordaniancapital’s
contemporaryproclivitytowardsrentandfavorseeking.Finally,havingdemonstratedhow
capitalinstitutionalizeditselfthroughtheACCpriortothefoundationoftheMandate,thishistory
Formoreonearlyindustrialization,see:MichaelMazur,EconomicGrowthandDevelopmentinJordan.Croom
Helm(1979).122 OntheformationoftheACC,see:Masri(2005),p.124-125. AsIwilldiscuss,theinfluencethemerchantswereabletoexertonearlystate-buildingwasadirectfunctionof
thefirstHashemiteEmir’senduringfinancialprecarity.Constantlyshortonthecashneededtosustainhispatrimonialistgriponpower,theEmirwasforeverinneedoffriendswhomighttidehimoverintheleanearlyyearsofhisMeccanexile.Cognizantofthis,themerchantcapitalistsorganizedattheACCwouldprovemorethankeeninextendingthisdesperateEmiraconstellationofloansandgrants.Holdinghisfateintheirdeeppockets,theywouldthenleveragetheEmir’sindebtednesssotoacquiredefactovetopowerovertheproto-legislativeprocess—particularlyintheareaoffiscalpolicy.UltimatelyabletocajoletheEmirintothedirectionstheypreferredasconcernedmattersoftaxationandrevenuegeneration,thesemerchantswoundupdefiningthefoundationsoftheHashemite’sfiscalsociology—foundationsthathaveprovedremarkablyresilient.Indeed,inthepagestocome,Iwillshowhowcapital’smoldingoftheHashemiteproto-state—aswellasthestate’sgrowinginfluenceovertheprospectsofcapital—coalescedsotoconstituteaverypeculiarpoliticaleconomy.InconjunctionwiththesociopoliticaleffectsderivedfromBritish-ledinitiativesinlandreformandinbuildinganationalmilitary,theseco-extensiveandseminalprocessesofclassandstateformationwouldbecomebasictotheinstitutionalizationofmoderncapitalisminJordan,andarethereforeofcriticalimporttotheproblematiqueattheheartofthisdissertation.
76
alsoaffordscluesintohowthisrelativelysmallgroupofactorswouldlatermanagetoshapethe
structuresofthemodernstateinamannerdetrimentaltolong-termdevelopmentaswell.
TheBritishMandate
In1918,thediplomatichorsetradingthathadprecededtheeventualpost-wardissolution
oftheOttomanEmpireultimatelyresultedintheUnitedKingdom,oneoftheprinciplevictorsof
WorldWarI,beingrewardedwithanumberofMandatesacrosstheMiddleEast.Thisfullhistory
isbeyondthescopeofthisdissertation,thoughtithasbeenaptlycoveredinanumberof
foundationaltexts.123AmongsttheterritoriestobeincludedwithintheUK’snewimperial
possessionswere,ofcourse,Transjordan’s.124IfBritishoriginsinTransjordancanbethereforebe
tracedbacktothebargainingandmapmakingofEnglishandFrenchcolonialofficials,thestoryof
theHashemite’sroadtoAmman(bywayofSalt)isslightlymoreconvoluted.
WithalineagetracingbacktothefoundinggenerationofIslam,theHashemitefamilyhad
longrepresentedoneoftheparamountreligio-politicalforcesinallofArabia.AsWorldWarI
commenced,infact,thefamily’spatriarch,Hussein,heldthetitleofSherifofMecca,apositionof
123 ForafullhistoriesontheSykes-PicotnegotiationsthatwouldcarvetheMiddleEastintoFrenchandEnglish
mandatesfollowingthisdismemberment,see: EugeneRogan,TheFalloftheOttomans:TheGreatWarintheMiddleEast M.E.McMillan,FromtheFirstWorldWartotheArabSpring:What’sReallyGoingonintheMiddleEast JamesBarr,ALineintheSand:Britain,FranceandtheStrugglethatShapedtheMiddleEast.124 ItisworthnotingthattheactualbordersoftheMandateofTransjordanwouldnotbesolidifieduntilthelate
1920s.
77
significant(ifslightlyoverstated)symbolicandmaterialimportanceacrosswhatmightbe
(problematically)identifiedastheMuslimworld.
AsinfluentialashisauthoritiesinMeccahadalreadymadehim,theSherif(andhissons)
harboredfargreaterambitionsfortheirfamily.Havingobservedthepoliticalwindsoftheearly
20thcentury—andhavinganticipatedthecollapseoftheOttomanEmpire—,theseHashemites
daredtoimaginethatanindependentpan-Arabkingdommightsooncomeintofruition,andthat
suchakingdomwouldinevitablycomeundertheirfamily’sdynasticcontrol.Inanattemptto
speaktheserathergrandiosevisionsintoexistence,thefamilycultivatedtieswithBritish
intelligenceanddiplomaticstaffsotoexplorewhetherawartimepartnershipmightyielda
commensuratepeacetimedividend.SweptupinBritishduplicityanddouble-dealing,the
Hashemiteswereultimatelypersuadedtolaunchtheirmuch-ballyhooedGreatArabRevoltin
1916.
However,atthesametimeastheHashemiteswererevoltingandallowingthemselvesto
dreamofanexpansiveKingdomstretchingacrosstheGulf,Iraq,andtheLevant,theyfound
themselvesrenderedsuddenlyprecariousbackontheirtraditionalhomefront.Byvirtueofthe
Saudi-WahabiyyaaxisthenrampagingitswayacrosstheeastoftheArabianpeninsula,the
longtimestewardsoftheHejazwereacutallyseeingtheirgriponanancestralbirthrightslipat
theverymomentwhentheirpan-Arabistprojectseemedclosesttofulfillment.125Asthe
HashemitesweresoontobebetrayedbytheseparateagreementsthattheBritishhadalready
125 See:Tell(2013),pp.55-60 ThoughtheSherifheldontoMeccauntil1924(andMedinauntil1925),theHashemite’spowerinArabiawas
highlyprecariousfromthelatteryearsofWWIonward.
78
signedwiththeZionistleadershipaswell,theSherifandhissonswerethereforeinahighly
dubiouspositiononcethegreatwarfinallycametoitsclose.
Unfortunately,thereisnotspacewithinthistexttoappropriatelycoverthelongand
complexhistorythatsubsequentlyproceededaslocalandforeignactorsjostledforpowerand
controlacrosstheregion.126SpecifictotheHashemitesinTransjordan,however,andforthesake
ofparsimony,wemayreducethishistoryasfollows:thoughAbdullahibnHussein,theeldestson
oftheformerSharifofMecca,hadinitiallybeenofferedtheIraqithronebytheIraqiNational
Congress(athronelatertakenupbyhisbrother,Faisal,thoughonlyafterhewasbanishedfrom
DamascusbytheFrenchArmy),aconstellationofvariables—includingtheimperial
gamesmanshipofthegreatwar’sEuropeanvictors,theparticularcolonialarithmeticofthe
Hashemite’schiefguarantors(theBritish)127,andAbdullah’sunilateralclaimingof
126 Formoreonthishistory(andmythology),see: TimothyParis,Britain,theHashemitesandArabRule:TheSherifianSolution(2004); EfraimKarshandInariKarsh,“Mythinthedesert,ornottheGreatArabRevolt”,MiddleEasternStudies(1997)
RashidKhalidi,TheOriginsofArabNationalism(1991) MCWilson,TheHashemites,theArabRevolt,andArabNationalism(1991) JosephMassad,ColonialIdentity(2001).127 Regardingthatcolonialarithmetic,anumberofpointsareworthmaking.First,Whitehallhad,ofcourse,issued
conflictingwartimepromisestoAbdullah’sfather(thentheSherifofMecca)andtheZionistleadershipthenconsolidatingtheirsettlercolonialprojectinthelandsofPalestine.OncetheBalfourDeclarationconsolidatedthelatter’s(partial)claimonPalestine,theGreaterArabiathathadbeenpledgedtotheHashemiteswasnolongerviable.
Simultaneously,WhitehallwasalsobecomingincreasinglyunnervedbythebrazenaggressivenessoftheSaud-
WahabiyyaaxisinArabia,which,asmentioned,displacedtheSheriffromMeccaandMedinain1924-1925.AstheWahabiyya’sraidingwasbecomingagrowingmenacetothelandsthatwouldbecometheBritishMandateofIraq—andasthismilitantBrotherhood’sambitionsextendedasfarwestasPalestine—,Abdullah’sunilateralmoveonTransjordansuddenlypresentedsomevaluefortheBritish.AHashemite-ledbufferstateinthesebackwaterlands,afterall,mightbeabletokilltwobirdswithasinglestone—honoring(inpart)thepromisestheBritishhadmadetotheSherifasregardedanArabKingdomwhilealsohelpingtosecureBaghdadandJerusalemagainstWahabiyyaencroachment.
SeeTell(2013),pp.60-70formoredetails.
79
Transjordan128—sawtoitthatheeventuallywoundupontheeastbankoftheriverJordan.While
thebordersofthisBritishMandate—whichwastoeventuallybecomeAbdullahKingdom—would
notbefirmlysetatthetimeAbdullahwasnamedEmir(1921),andwhiletheraidingWahabiyya
wouldconsistentlytestTransjordan’ssouthernborderacrosstheearlyyearsofthe1920s,this
emergentpolityacquiredsomedegreeoflegalandgeographicsolidityby1923.129Ofnote,the
tribesofTransjordan,manyofwhomhadsupportedtheOttomansduringthewarandforwhom
thesonofaMeccanSherifwasacompleteunknown,werenotevennominallyconsultedonthese
matters.
ThePoliticalInstitutionalizationofaForeignKing
Asonemayhaveanticipatedfromwhatwasintimatedabove,Abdullah’sself-coronation
didnotgodowneasywiththelocalpopulationsthatweretobemadesubjectstosuchanon-
nativeandanonymoussovereign.Manylocaltribes,infact,forcefullycontestedtheEmir’sself-
aggrandizingpresumptivenessbyorganizingaproto-nationalistresistanceandrebellion
throughoutthefirsttwoyearsoftheMandate’sexistence.130
Duetohisevidentlackofcredibilityamongstdomesticactorsandhisdistancefromlocal
socialforces,itwouldbeunsurprising,then,whenAbdullahbuilthisinitialpoliticalcoalition
128 Ibid,pp.60-62. 129 Forthishistory,see:NaseerAruri,Jordan:AStudyinPoliticalDevelopment(1921-1965).Springer(1972),pp..4-5130 TheAdwantribewasquitefamouslytheleaderoftheserebellions.Formoreonthistopic,seeBettyAnderson,
NationalistVoicesinJordan:TheStreetandtheState.UniversityofTexasPress(2005),pp.43-52.
80
throughpartnershipswithethnicnon-Transjordaniansalone.Evidenceofthis,hisearly
governmentswerestaffedalmostentirelybytheexiledmembersofHizbal-Istiqlal,themajority
ofwhomhailedfromLebanonandSyria.Theseemigres,manyofwhomwerecentralfiguresin
thearticulationandmobilizationofearlyArabnationalism,hadpreviouslyservedAbdullah’s
youngerbrotherFaisalduringhisbriefreigninDamascus.MakingtheirwayintoTransjordan
onlyaftertheFrenchmilitarycampaignhadbroughtFaisal’sreigntoanunillustriousend,they
werementhatultimatelysawtheirJordaniansojournasasteppingstonetosomethingbigger.131
Byvirtueofthefacttheirlong-terminterestslyingbackinDamascusandinthepan-Arabentity
theyhopedthatcitywouldbecapitalto,theIstiqlalistsgovernedTransjordanaccordingto
cynicalandinstrumentalistrationalities.Seekingnothingbeyondtherevenuesneededtoraisean
armysotoretakeDamascusandwhollylackinginbothknowledgeandconcernforpeopleof
Transjordan,Abdullah’spartnershipwiththeIstiqlalists,lastingthroughthemid-1920s,wouldbe
mostrememberedforthebrutaltaxregimeitimposeduponTransjordan’sagriculturalists.132
Duetothevagariesofimperialpolitics133andthesocialdislocationborneofthe
Istiqlalist’spunitivetaxregime,Abdullah’sfavoredSyrian-Lebaneseallieseventuallylostfavor
withtheEmir(andhisBritishminders).TheirsubsequentexpulsionfromJordanin1924
affordedtheKingtheopportunitytoJordanizehispoliticalelite.Hedidnot,however,avail
131 FormoreontheIstiqlalistsinJordan,see:Tell(2013),pp.62-64;Anderson(2005),pp.36-37.132 AsTell(2013)hasdetailed,thisresultedintheTransjordanianpeasantrybeingsqueezedfornineandhalfyears
worthoftaxationoverthecourseofthreeyears(p.63).133 Specifically,theFrenchrequestedthattheBritishcrackdownontheIstiqlalists,whocontinuedtoorganize
agitationagainsttheformer’sMandateinSyria.
81
himselfofsuchanopportunity.Rather,hereplacedhisIstiqlalistswithsecondedMandateofficials
reassignedtoTransjordanfrompreviouspostingsinPalestine.Thissubstitutionofforeignlike
forlikemeantthatindigenouspoliticalrepresentativesremainedlockedoutoftheemergentstate
apparatus—wheretheywouldstayforthemajorityoftheMandateperiod.134Givingsome
indicationofthisnativediscrimination,oftheforty-eightgovernmentministersappointedor
electedduringtheMandateperiod,onlyeightwerenativeTransjordanians.135
Ofcourse,asimportantasAbdullah’sforeignconsiglieresweretothepoliticsandpolicyof
theearlyMandateperiod,theirinfluenceultimatelypaledincomparisontothatoftheBritish
authorities.Itwas,afterall,theBritishRoyalAirForceanditsarmoredcarsthatputdownthe
tribalandproto-nationalistuprisingsinal-Kura(1921)andAmman(1923).136Ifalwaysleaving
himabitshort(anddependentondomesticmerchantcapital,asIwilldiscuss),itwastheBritish
subsidyandannualgrant-in-aidthatunderwrotewhatindigenouslegitimationAbdullahwasable
topurchasethroughrathercrass,transactionalarrangementswithselecttribalchiefs—
principallythoseoftheBaniSakhr.137Lastly,itwasalsotheBritishResidency(andtheHigh
134 FormoreonearlyMandateeragovernance,see:PhilipRobins(1998)andAnderson(2005),p.53.135 Tell(2013),p.75 PriortoJohnGlubb’sestablishmentoftheDesertPatrol—anoutfitthatwouldrecruitfromandmakeofficersof
theHuwaytat,BankSakhr,andSirhantribes(Tell,76)—thesameregimeoflocaldiscriminationandanti-Transjordaniannesswouldalsoreignwithinthesecurityforces.
136 Anderson(2005),p.44.137 PerRobins(1988),p.298,theBritishprovidedtheEmirwithapersonalstipendof36,000£forthemajorityof
the1920s.Thisfiguregrewto100,000£bytheendofthedecade.SuchafigurewasmeanttocovertheEmir’spersonalexpensesandthecostsofmaintaininghisgovernment.Independentofthis,forthemajorityofthe1920s,theBritishstatealsoprovidedtheMandate’smilitaryforceswithannualgrants-in-aidrangingfrom66,000-180,000£.Thesegrantsfinancedsalaries,expenses,buildings,etc.
FormoreontheEmir’sselectivepatronageofthetribes,see:Tell(2013),pp.74-77.
82
Commissionerinparticular)thatdroppedallpretensesregardingTransjordan’sapprencticeship
inself-rulesotogovernunilaterallyfrom1924onward.138
Proceedingonanadhocbasisinitially,Britain’sunilateralseizureoffiscal,administrative,
legislative,andmartialpowerswaseventuallyformalizedin1928uponthesigningofthe
AgreementBetweenHisMajestyandtheEmirofTrans-Jordan.139Sotoaddalegalist-moralist
sheenandadegreeofindigenouslegitimacytothiscoupofthecolonialoffice,theBritishalso
establishedaquasiconstitutioncalledtheOrganicLawthatsameyear.Nominallyspeaking,the
OrganicLawcontainedsomeprogressivemeasures.Forexample,itprovidedforthe
establishmentofanationalLegislativeCounciltobefilled,inpart,byelectedrepresentatives.
Despitetheadjectiveinitstitle,howeverthisCouncilwasonlyconsultativeinnature.Whatis
more,theEmir,whosehereditaryrightsastheheadofstatewerealsojuridicallyestablishedin
theOrganicLaw,wasalsotoretainthepowertodissolvetheCouncilwheneverhedeemed
necessary—ashewouldontheoccasionforthefirstLegislativeCouncilin1929—andwide
discretionaryauthoritieswhenitcametotheappointmentanddisqualificationof
representatives.140GiventhatthepopularrepresentativeschosentotheCouncilwerefiltered
throughanelectoralsystemcombiningindirectballoting(inheritedfromOttomanLaw)anda
138 Inkeepingwiththetimes,thisquietcoupwaslegitimatedthroughtheassertionthatneithertheEmirnorthe
Transjordanianpeoplehad“yetprovedtheircompetenceinlearninghowtoadminister[thecountry].” Massad(2001),p.31139 Aruri(1972),p.76140 Ibidp.4 Onthepositivesideoftheledger,itshouldbeacknowledgedthatAbdullahdidusetheLegislativeCouncilsto
integratethesonsofdociletribalnotablesintothemiddleandlowerranksoftheadministrativestate(Tell,2013,pp.73-75).
83
muddledsystemofminority-orientedquotas—thetoothlessnessofthedemocraticinstitutions
bequeathedbytheBritishwerematchedbytheirnon-representativenessaswell.141The
institutionalizationofsuchapoliticalsystemprovedunsurprisinglyalienatingforthevast
majorityoftheMandate’ssubject-citizens.142
TheStateintheEconomy:LaissezFairetoGrowingWelfarism
Upuntilthelate1920s,theMandateAuthority’sinvestments/interventionsinthe
Transjordanianeconomywerebothnegligibleandsociallynon-impactful.Arelativebackwater
withintheBritishconstellationofArabMandates,TransjordanalsoreceivedlittlefromWhitehall
whenitcametoadministrativeresourcesandpersonnel.TotheextentthatTransjordan’s
Mandateofficerswereengagingwithquestionsofeconomicdevelopmentatallintheyears
precedingthegreatdepression,moreover,itwasthroughthe“prevailingorthodoxyofeconomic
liberalism.”143Withdevelopmentpolicytherebystructuredbythetenetsofbalancedbudgets,
141 The3%participationrateinthefirstelectionconductedunderthissystem(1929)demonstratestheextentto
whichtheTransjordanianpeoplerightlyperceivedthehollownessofthisinstitution. Formoreonthisperiodofpolitical/constitutionalhistory,see:TariqTell,“Bedouin,FallahandState”inEugene
RoganandTariqTell(eds.)Village,SteppeandState:SocialOriginsofModernJordan.BritishAcademicPress(1994),p.179;Also,seeAruri(1972),p.78.
142 Thealienationproducedbythesehollowedinstitutionsmanifestedinthegrowing(andconsistentlypro-
democracy)agitationbeingorganizedbyanemergentJordanianNationalMovement(JNM)throughoutthe1920sand1930s(Tell,2013,p.80).AtthesametimeastheKingwassigningawayJordan’ssovereigntytoBritaininexchangeforhisfamily’sdynasticclaims,theJNM’sGeneralNationalCongressofJuly1928wasissuingtheJordanianNationalCharter.Init,theyassertedthatJordanwas“anindependentsovereignArabcountry”,thatitwastobegovernedconstitutionallyanddemocratically,andthatanylegislation“thatisnotbasedontheprincipleofjusticeandthegeneralwelfareandtherealneedsofthepeople”wouldbeconsideredvoid(Massad,2001,p.30).
143 Knowles(2001),p.86
84
freetrade,andmarket-ledinvestment,Transjordan’speripheraleconomymadelittleheadway
beyondwhatwasgeneratedthroughthecommercialarbitrageofitsmerchantcapitalists.
Threehistoricallycontingentevents,theeffectsofwhichwerecompounding—theglobal
economicdepressionofthelate1920sandearly1930s,thepersistentdrought-likeclimactic
conditionsthatwerecontemporaneoustothedepression,andtheGreatArabRevoltattempted
byPalestiniannationalistsbetween1936-1939—precipitatedsignificantchangesintheBritish
approachtoTransjordan’seconomy.TheAuthority’ssubsequentadoptionofanactivistmodality
ofinterventionismwouldbebifurcatedaccordingtowhatIhaveconceptualizedasmass-oriented
policiesandelite-orientedpolicies.IntegratingdiversesegmentsoftheJordanianbodypolitic
intowhatTellhascalledthemoraleconomyoftheHashemiteregime,themassorientedpolicies
oftheMandateauthoritieswerelargelyinkeepingwiththeKeynesianconsensusthateventually
rosetoprominenceinthewestfollowingtheonsetofthedepression.144Apublicworksprogram
wasestablishedin1931,forinstance,whichfunctionedsotobuildcriticalinfrastructureatthe
sametimeasitprovidedsustenanceandwagesforvulnerablepopulations.Havingbeenmade
acutelyprecariousduetothedroughtsofthe1920sandthebrashraidingcampaignslaunchedby
theArabianWahabiyya,thisinitiativeprovedalifesaverforthesouthernBedouininparticular.145
Beyondprovidingacriticalsourceofwages,theroadsandtrainlinesthatwerelaiddownduring
theseyearsofcoursefunctionedsotofacilitatethemovementofgoods(andthemovementofthe
144 ForacompletereviewofthisKeynesianturn,seeTell(2013),pp.77-80,83-108.145 Ibid,pp.85-93.
85
Mandate’ssecurityforces146)aswell.Suchindirectbutequallypositiveexternalitiesweretobeof
criticalimportforlong-termcapitalaccumulation.147
Intermsofnumbersemployedandlong-termsocioeconomicimpact,however,theeffects
ofthepublicworksprogramstillpaledincomparisontothosethatwouldbeachieveduponthe
MandateAuthority’sexpansionofitsmilitaryfootprint.Financedbyasharpincreaseinthe
Britishsubsidy148andledbyasingularlyinfamousfigureinJordan’smodernhistory—PashaJohn
Glubb—,thestaffingoftheMobileForce,ArabLegion,TransjordanianFrontierForce,andDesert
PatrolForceprovidedthousandsofsteadyjobsfortribesmenotherwisestrugglingtofindaplace
inthemodernizingeconomy.Coupledwiththesejobcreationefforts,moreover,wasanemerging
systemofmilitarywelfarismthatincludedhealth(aswasbestrepresentedbyGlubb’sDesert
MobileMedicalUnit)andeducationalinitiatives.149
146 ThisinfrastructureprovedessentialduringthePalestinianUprisingof1936-1939.Duringtheearlyyearsofthis
conflict,PalestinianforceshadevadedBritishmilitaryforcesthroughseekingandreceivingsanctuaryfromtribesinTransjordan.Oncetheseroadswerebuilt(andoncemanyofthesoutherntribeswerebroughtintotheemployoftheMandateAuthoritiesinTransjordan),thesesanctuarieswereclosed,andtherepressionoftheuprisingwasmadefareasier.
147 Mostimmediatelyhelpful—especiallyforTransjordan’simpoverishedagriculturalists—werethetaxexemptions
andsubsidiesonseedsthatwereprovidedacrossthe1930s.Whileaidingalotofdesperatepeople,thetribesmenoftheHuwaytatandBaniSakrcouldbesaidtohavebeentheprinciplebeneficiariesoftheseparticularinterventions.SeeTell(2013),pp.96-101.
148 Bytheearly1940s,Britishaidhadbeendividedintothreecategories:(1)budgetarysupportfortheMandate
government(2)apersonalstipendof100,000£totheEmirand(3)grants-in-aidforthevariousmilitaryforcesorganizedbyGlubb.
149 ThoughtheMandateadministrationwaslargelycontenttoleaveeducationinthehandsofreligious
organizationsandactors,theestablishmentofasmallHighSchoolinal-Saltinthe1930swouldendupeducatingmanyofthefiguresthatwouldgoontoleadtheJordaniannationalmovementandtostaffthehighestlevelsofthepost-independencebureaucracy.Amongsttheschool’smostfamousgraduateswereSulaymanal-Nabulsi,thePrimeMinisterwhowouldbeoustedbytheyoungKingHusseinin1957;Wasfial-Tall,oneofthecentralactorsintheattempttobuildadevelopmentaliststateinJordan;andHamedalFarhan,oneofthemostinfluentialeconomicplannersofthe1950s.See:Anderson(2005),pp.54,63,68-71.
86
CentralGovernmentBudgets,1924-1944(Britishpounds)
Years Total Revenue Annual Average Total Expenditures Annual Average 1924/25-1937/38 4864236 347445.4 4859644 347117.4 1938/39-1943/44 8375516 1395919.3 8615645 1439940.8 Total 13239752 661987.6 13475289 673764.5
DataprovidedbyKnowles(2001),p.87
Inmanyways,Glubb’seffortsinthesespacesbotharticulatedthesocialcharacterofwhat
wouldbecomethemodernstateandlaidablueprintforhowtoembedtheeconomyinamanner
conducivetostabilityandclasscompromise.150Slightlylessglamorousifnolessimpactfulin
theseregardswerethepassageoftheLandSettlementLaw(1933)andtheenormousland
registrationeffortssubsequentlyundertakenbyErnestDowson’sDepartmentofLandsand
Surveys.InthenorthoftheMandate’sterritories151—regionsthathadbeenmoreextensively
administeredbytheOttomanbureaucracyandwheretheprecedentofpropertyrightshad
alreadybeenintroducedundertheOttomanLandLawof1858—,thelandregistrationprocess
wasunambiguouslysociallypositive.There,thedeedingandtitlingofpropertiesresultedinthe
consolidationofsmallfamilyfarms,ensuringadegreeofsocialequityatthesametimeasit
150 Politicallyspeaking,thismilitarizedwelfarefunctionedsotoremakepreviouslyrebellioussouthernBedouin
tribesintoessentialalliesoftheHashemitemonarchy.Complementedbyanumberofothereffortsintargetedco-optation—specifically,theappointmentofobedienttribalSheikhsandthesonsoftribalsheikhstogovernorships,judgeships,cabinetpositionsinpost-1930Mandategovernments,aswouldbebestexemplifiedduringthetenureofTawfiqAbual-Huda—,militarizedstatebuildingundergirdedmuchofthe(fragile)architectureuponwhichthepost-colonialstatewouldbebuilt.
SeeJoabEilonandYoavAlon,TheMakingofJordan:Tribes,Colonialism,andtheModernState.IBTauris(2007),pp.118-124.
151 ThesocialeffectsoflandregistrationinotherareasoftheMandatewereconsiderablydifferent,however,asIwill
detail.
87
embeddedandlegitimatedtheMandatebureaucracyamongstthepeopleoftheregion.
Subsequentinterventionstosecuresmallfarmersagainsttheusuryanddispossessionthatwere
endemictothedroughteconomy—beitthroughdebtforgiveness,taxexemptionsorajudicial
systemthattendedtobefavorabletotheinterestofsmalllandholders—onlyfurtherensconced
thenorthintheMandate’smoraleconomy.152
Iflandregistrationhadcontributedtotheestablishmentoffamilyfarmsandhealthyclass
relationsinTransjordan’snorth,however,oneneedrecognizethatitsimplementation
engendereddislocationanddispossessioninthecenterandsouthofthecountryaswell.Ashas
beenamplydocumentedbyAlon,landtitlinginthoseareasoftenallowedinfluentialchiefs—
chiefswhowerealsoalliestothePalaceandtheMandateauthorities—tostokefearsofthatthe
titlingofpropertywouldimplyburdensometaxobligationsuponthetitlebearer.Cynically
manipulatingtheverysameandpartitioningandregistrationprocessesthathadprovedso
successfulinAjloun,suchchiefsfrequentlyappropriatedtheentiretyofwhatwereonce
commonlyheldtriballandsfortheirpersonaluse.Inthismanner,Mithqalal-FayizoftheBani
Sakramassedhugelandholdingsaswellasconsiderableinfluencewithinthestillmetastasizing
state.153Lateraffordedsubsidiesand(free)machineryinanefforttoeasetheirtransitioninto
landcultivation,theconsolidationofthechiefs’megalandholdingsinthesedecadesprefigures
theinefficient,water-depleting,elite-dominatedcommercialagriculturethathasprovedso
destructivetoJordanoverthepasttwentyyears.
152 See:Fischbach(2000)forthemostcomprehensiveanalysisofBritish-eralandreformefforts.153 Formoredetailsonal-Fayiz,see:YoavAlon,TheShaykhofShaykhs:Mithqalal-FayizandTribalLeadershipin
ModernJordan.StanfordUniversityPress(2016).
88
Ofcourse,theseagriculturalpoliciesdidnotrepresenttheonlypraxisofMandate-era
elite-orientedeconomicinterventionism.Ifproceedingaccordingtolong-termsocialand
developmentalimpact,oneoughtactuallybeginwithmattersoftaxpolicy.Herein,oneneed
recognizethattheEmirwasconstantlyshortoncashthroughoutthe1920sand1930s,regardless
ofthestarkincreasethattheBritishinstitutedtotheroyalsubsidyfromthe1930sonward.By
Social Control and the Mandate SSA Social control during the Mandate period was less concerned about the shop floor and more about generalized order. The British High Commissioner’s decreeing of the Crime Prevention Law of 1927 went a long way in these regards by allowing Mandate Authorities to use warrantless arrests and indefinite detention for anyone deemed a security threat. The cause of social peace was similarly served by the Law of Collective Punishment and the Exile and Deportation Laws of 1928, which allowed the authorities to harass and expel not only dissidents within the nationalist opposition but also the tribes, communities, families, and parties to which they were member (Massad, 31). The violence of a British-imposed social peace was most acutely felt than amongst the Bedouin tribes of Transjordan’s southern territories. Institutionalized through 1924’s Law of Tribal Courts (amended in 1936) and 1929’s Bedouin Control Law (also amended in 1936), the Mandate Authority’s juridical interventions legally exceptionalized the Bedouin by placing those categorized as such outside the remit of prevailing citizenship rights. More specifically, the aforementioned laws established a kind of tiered legal system internal to the Mandate, a tiering that removed the Bedouin from the jurisdiction of civil law so to subject them to the intersecting remit of traditional customs and military law (Tell, 85). While each piece of legislation was introduced as a temporary measure nominally designed to ease the transition of the Bedouin into modernity, they stayed on the books until 1976. The formalization of the bedouin exception would prove highly conducive for social control. On the one hand, by inventing and institutionalizing tribal law, John Bagot Glubb—the British military officer then organizing and reinstitutionalization Jordanian security—also created the need for official tribal judges. The manufacturing of this need, in turn, created an opportunity for the distribution of patronage, which Glubb would seize by rewarding the docile amongst the tribal leaders with appointed judgeships. If that was the carrot side of this wider social control operation, the Bedouin Control Law provided the stick. Bringing southern Jordan under Glubb’s personal, autocratic jurisdiction while subjecting its peoples to the austere rationalities of military law, discipline could always be enforced should good behavior not be induced through the granting of favors. The specter of direct repression—as was suffered by the Adwan between 1921 and 1923—, made clear how far this disciplining could go. Upon the establishment of a tentative agreement between Ibn Saud and the Mandate government in 1925 as regarded the southern border—an agreement functioning so to fix the Bedouin in space through subjecting their movements to the logic and regulations of borders—, the lives of these communities would also be more tightly monitored by agents of the state (Massad 52).
89
virtueofthisfact,hehadoneoftwooptionsinfinancinghisexpenditures.Ontheonehand,he
couldattempttoraiserevenuethroughtaxation.Sucheffortshad,ofcourse,failedquite
ignominiouslyundertheIstiqlalists.154Ontheother,theEmircouldturntolessformalmeansby
callinguponthemerchantsthathadaccumulatedsizablefortunesacrossthepreviousthreeor
fourdecadesinhopesofsecuringloans,grants,orsomecombinationofthetwosotomeetthe
Palace’sfiscalneeds.
BritishSubsidytoMandateTransjordan,1921-1944
*GraphprovidedbyKnowles(2001),p.57
154 History,ofcourse,hasmadeclearthatajustandrationallyadministeredtaxsystemisfundamentaltoany
country’spolitical,social,andeconomicfutures.Theimpositionofsomekindofincometaxsystem—regardlessofitsinitialprogressiveness—,afterall,investssocialequityandeconomicefficiencyintotheinstitutionalontologyofthestate-societyrelationship.Notonlydoesthisprovidethematerialconditionsneededforaneventualtransitiontowardsdemocraticgovernment;whatismore,thechallengesincumbenttotheadministrationofanincometaxsystemalsorequiresthatahighlycapableandrationalizedstatebeinstitutionalized.Astheestablishmentofaskilledbureaucracylaterallowsforhighlevelsofindustrialanddevelopmentplanning,theimpositionofanincometaxhasanumberofaddedknock-oneffectsaswell.
90
Fortheirpart,saidmerchantsrecognizedthattheinstitutionalizationofanincometaxsystem
promisedtocutintotheirprofitrates.Unwillingtocountenancesuchaninterventionintowhat
theydeemedtobetheirprivateaffairs,theyorganizedobstructionisteffortsthroughtheAmman
ChamberofCommerceanditsChairman,Sabrial-Taba’a,andultimatelymanagedtopersuadethe
Emirtoavoidsuchacostlyendeavorbypromisinghimthattheywouldpassthehatamongst
theirownsotomakesurehewasalwayslookedafter.155Investingwhimsicality,informality,and
inequityintothefiscalsociologyofanemergentstatewhoserevenuestrategyhadalreadybeen
compromisedbyitsexternaldependence,thehalflifeofthesepersonalistlendingarrangements
wouldprovelongindeed.
ThefinancialbeholdennessoftheEmirnotonlyaffordedTransjordan’smerchanteliteof
TransjordandefactovetopowerwithintheMandate-eralegislativeprocess.Italsoallowedthem
toextractfavors,privileges,andbusinessopportunitiesduringtheyearsofWorldWarII—a
constellationofbenefitsthatwouldinturnallowforunprecedentedlevelsof(highly
concentrated)capitalaccumulation.Thebusinessopportunitiesofofthewaryearswerelargely
introduceduponBritain’sestablishmentofaMiddleEastSupplyCenterin1941.Designedto
handlepotentialconflict-relateddisruptionstothemovementofgoodsandsupplies,theMESC
155 Acrossthe1920sand1930s,saidmerchantswoundupextendingthisEmiraseriesofdiscretionaryloans
whenevertheywereneededsotomakeupshortfallsinthePalacebudget.Thoughmanyoftheseloanswentunrepaid,thiswasasmalllosstotakeinexchangeforkillingoffthepossibilityofanincometax.AstheEmir’sprivatecreditors/benefactorsalsoreceivedappointmentstohigh-levelbureaucraticappointmentsandcabinetpositionsaswellasrightstopurchasepublicly-heldlandsintheJordanValleyatpriceswellbelowmarketvalueinexchangefortheirhelp,thepainofhaircutwasmadeevenlesssignificant(Fischbach,2000,pp.73-75).
FormoreontheunrepaidloanstheACCprovidedtheEmir,see:AnneMarielZimmerman,USAssistance,
Development,andHierarchyintheMiddleEast.PalgraveMacmillan(2017),pp.107-108.
91
hadbeeninauguratedfortheexplicitpurposeof“overcomingthelimitationandshortagein
suppliesaswellastoensureeconomicstability”forthewiderMiddleEastthroughthe
institutionalizationofasystemofimportdistribution.156BytreatingallofBritain’scolonial
possessionsasasingle,integratedeconomicunit—adecisionthatwasitselftakenwithaneye
towardsreducingshippingcosts—,theestablishmentofsuchacentralizedbodymeantthatthe
movementofgoodsintheMiddleEastwouldhenceforthberegulatedbyandchanneledthrough
asingleadministrativenode.Inaddition,whilethelargersystemwasoverseenbyBritishand,
later,Americanofficials,localMandategovernmentsandtheirrespectivecustomsdepartments
weretobeassignedconsiderablediscretionarypowerinmanagingMESCoperationsonthe
ground.InTransjordan’scase,suchadministrativedecentralizationempoweredDirectorof
CustomsP.Livingstone,hisassistantR.T.Ledger,andtheaforementionedDirectoroftheOttoman
BankHaydarShukritounilaterallydecidemattersrelatedtotheissuanceofmonopolyimport
licenses,quotas,andshippingspaceregulation.157
Inbothexpeditingregionalcommerceandsuppressingcompetitionthroughthelicensing
system,theMESCpromisedtomakefortunesforthoseabletopositionthemselvesfavorably
withintheimporteconomy.Assuchpositioningwasinevitablypolitical—andastheallocationof
favorswasundeniablydeterminedbyanindividual’sproximitytotherelevantBritishcustoms
officialsaswellasbytheirstandingwithinthenetworksofprivilegeuponwhichthePalacehad
156 FormoreonthefoundationoftheMESC,see:Masri(2005),p.126.157 SeeAmawi(1993),pp.422-430,461-465.
92
consolidateditspowerandpatrimonialismoverthepreviousten-oddyears158—,itshouldnot
strikethereaderasshockingthattheprimarybeneficiariesoftheMESC’swar-timemarket
controlswoundupbeingthesamemerchantelitethathadpreviouslyfinancedthePalace’s
budgetdeficits.
ThemagnitudeofaccumulationfacilitatedthroughtheworkingsoftheMESC—andthe
impactthishadonJordanianclassformation—arehardtooverstate.Specifictoaccumulation,the
aggregategainsachievedthroughthecombinationofamerchant’smonopolycontrolofgrain
markets,hoardingpractices,andsmugglingofcontrabandwereofascalequalitativelylarger
thananythingpreviouslywitnessedinTransjordan.159Asthisrelatestoprocessesofclass
formation,byexcludingallbuttheeliteofelitefromparticipatingintheselicensingrackets,the
MESCfurthercleavedanalreadyrupturedandsegmentedcapitalistclass.Concentrating
unprecedentedlevelsofwealthinthoseAblaAmawiwouldidentifyasthequotacoteriewhile
subjectingtherestofTransjordan’ssmallbusinessmentoincreasinglevelsofprecarityand
deprivation,thegapthatopenedupbetweenahandfulofpoliticallyconnected,commerce-centric
elitesandeveryoneelseduringtheprecariouswartimeyearswouldproveunbridgeableoverthe
158 PerAmawi(directlyreferencingMESCreports),theMESCgavepreferentialtreatmentto“establishedtraders”
andthose“whowerereliableandcouldfinanceoperations”inawardingimportlicenses.Byconsequence,pre-existingwealth/influence/prestigewouldoperateasthedefactocriteriathroughwhichmonopolyimportrightsweredetermined.Seepp.484-485.
159 Masri(2005),p.128 Thoughmuchoftheirprofitswereachievedthroughexploitingimportmarketsforluxurygoods,itisworth
notingthatsomeinstancesofaccumulationunambiguouslyrequiredthedispossessionanddeprivationofthelessfortunate.Ofthoseinstances,thehoardingofgrainsisbutthemostobviousexample.Forhoweachofthesemerchantsenrichedthemselves,see:Amawi(1993),pp.483-488.
93
decadestocome.160Asmembersofthequotacoteriesubsequentlyintermarried161and
institutionalizedtheircollectiveinfluencethroughcontroloftheAmmanChamberofCommerce,
thedisjunctureofaninsulatedelitefromtherestofthebusinessclasswasonlydeepened
throughsocialandorganizationalpartitionsaswell.162
Bybothbestowingparticulartendenciesandinterestsuponthebusinesseliteand
impartingconflictual,antagonisticpropertiesintodomesticcapitalasawhole,theMESC’seffects
onJordan’seconomicfutureprovedprofoundlysignificant.Whenitcametoeither
industrializationortheprospectsofmarketcompetitionmoregenerally,forinstance,the
consolidationofsuchahegemonicclassfractionwas,inandofitself,ahighlyadverseoutcome.
Afterall,asthemembersofAmawi’squotacoterieallretainedanendogenousmaterialinterestin
traderelatedarbitrageandadependenceonimportconsumption,theywouldnecessarilyimpede
theprotectionismandindustrialinvestmentthatwouldbeneededforlong-termeconomic
development.Whatisworse,byrewardingstatus,proximity,andpoliticalinfluencewith
monopolizedimportrightsamongstotherprivileges,theMESCalsomanagedtodeepenthisclass
fraction’stendencytowardsrent-seekingratherthanprofit-seekingactivities.Completingthe
circularlogicinherenttothisformofstate-capitalrelations,themassiveratesofcapital
accumulationrealizedthroughrent-seekingatthistimealsobolsteredthepoliticalinfluenceof
thissmallhandfulofactorsasMandateTransjordaninchedcloserandclosertoindependent
160 Amawi(1993),p.502.161 Specifically,theSafadiandal-Bitar,NuriandTabaa,Ma’albakiandTabaa,BudeirandMalhas,HaffarandBudeir,
andMuasherandal-Bakhitwereallboundbymarriages.162 Foradetailedhistoryofthisconsolidationofpower,see:Amawi(1993),pp.509-529.
94
Jordan.InlockingboththePalaceanditsbourgeoiseliteintoasub-optimalcodependency
consummatedthroughrentsandfavoritism,then,themodalityofstate-capitalrelations
institutionalizedduringWorldWarIIwouldnotonlyprefiguremuchofthecronyism,investment
conservatism,andcommercialbiasthathaveunderminedJordaniancapitalismacrossits
existence.ByconsolidatingadirectlineofcommunicationbetweenPalaceandelitecapital,italso
insuredthattheparticularinterestsofthisclassfractionwouldcometobepoliticallyarticulated
andprivilegedinthepost-colonialperiod,therebyunderminingthedevelopmentofarationalist
stateaswell.163
TheQuotaCoterie
Itisworthpausingheretotakestockoftheparticularfamiliesthatcomprisedthequotacoterie(andthewidereconomiceliteoftheearly1940s)assodoingwillallowthereadertobetterappreciatetheremarkablecontinuitiesbridgingpastandpresentwhenitcomestoJordan’seconomicelite.164 Regardingthequotacoterieitself,Amawiidentifiesthirty-oneindividualsofmixedethnicbackgrounds,anumberofwhomwereeitherboundbymarriageofhailingfromthesamenuclearfamily.AswasmeticulouslydetailedinAmawi’sdissertation,thisslimmestofclassfractionswaslargelycomprisedofthefollowingmen(ethnicbackgroundislistedwithintheparentheses):HamdiMango(Palestinian),IbrahimMango(Palestinian),Sabrial-Taba’a(Syrian),Hashimal-Taba’a(Syrian),theHatahitfamily(Syrian),Umaral-Ma’albaki(Syrian),ShawkatAsfur(Palestinian),MuhammedKhayrAbuIrsheid(Syrian),RushdiQatramiz(Syria),Abdelal-HamidAjami(Syrian),ZakiIdlibi(syrian),Abdal-RahmanMadi(Transjordanian),KhalilMalas(Syrian),Wajihal-Aqil(Palestinian),RashidDarwaza(Palestinian),Salimal-Bakhit(Transjordanian),Najib 163 ThepoweroftheseeconomicelitesintroducedtensionsattheveryheartofJordan’spoliticalandsocialsystems.
Whilethesetensionscould(andwould)bepartiallyassuagedthroughtheeconomicelite’sfinancingofpublicemployment,therehasalwaysbeenabasicdisjuncturebetweentheinterestsofthePalace-bourgeoisaxisandtheinterestsofpeasant,Bedouin,andproto-proletarianpopulations.Whenitcametopolicyquestions,therewouldalsobeafundamentalantagonismbetweenamerchantelitebiasedtowardsanimport-dependentaneconomyandanemergentcoreofnationalist,developmentalistbureaucratsseekingtobuilddomesticindustry.
164 Assectiontwoofthisdissertationwilldealwithextensively,thecontemporaryJordanianbourgeoisieremains
dominatedinnosmallpartbythedescendantsofthisquotacoterie,heirsandlegacychildrenwhohaveevolvedwiththeirco-dependentsponsorsinthestatesotoadapt,reconstitute,andappropriatetheopportunitiesandrentsprovidedbychanginginstitutionalcontextsandevolvinginternationaleconomicsystems.
95
(Continued)al-Bakhit(Transjordanian),Subhial-Halabi(Syrian),YasinTalhuni(Transjordanian),Wafaal-Dajani(Palestinian),Isma’ilal-Bilbaisi(Palestinian),Ramzial-Haffar,MuhammedAliB’deir(Syrian),Khalilal-Shuqayr(Syrian),AhmadMalhas(Palestinian),TawfiqQattan(Palestinian),Jamilal-Safadi(Syrian),HusniBahlawan(Syrian),YasinDiyab(Syrian)andAbdal-HamidDiyab(Syrian).165 Thoughnotamongstthisquotacoterie,anumberofotherprominenteconomicfamiliesalsoestablishedtheirfootholdamongstthebourgeoiseliteduringthelateMandateperiod.IhavealreadydiscussedtheAbuJaber’s(Transjordanian)massivelandholdingsandexploitativecreditbusinesses,bothofwhichwereaugmentedacrossthe1930sand1940s.Alsonotableamongstthetheirwar-timeopportunistswerebothMunirShuqayr—aformercivilservantwhosuccessfullymanagedtostakeoutaclaiminclothimportation—andJawdatSha’sha’a.FortunateenoughtoinvolvehimselfwithbothBilbaisi’sShellOildistributionmonopolyandSpirHaddad’sluxuryimportbusinesses166,Sha’sha’awouldbeoneofthefewthatmanagedtojumpthegapsotojointhemembershipofthequotacoterie,drivinghisfamilytotheverytopoftheJordanianclass structureintheprocess.167ItwasintheseyearsthatthewealthoftheMu’asher(Transjordanian)andAbual-Raghib(Syrian)familieswereaccumulatedaswell.168 Finally,IneedalsoacknowledgethatuponJordan’sacquisitionoftheWestBankin1948-1949,theMESC-derivedcapitalistfractionwouldalsowelcomeanumberoffinancialandmerchantcapitalistsbasedoutofJerusalem,Nablus,andHebronintotheranksoftheirelite.169MostrelevantamongstthenewadditionsweretheShoman,Touqan,Kawar,al-Sakhtiyaan,Nuql,Jardeneh,andMasrifamilies.Merchants,bankers,andproto-industrialiststhemselves,thepatriarchsofeachfamilyswiftlyascendedtheranksoftheTransjordanianeconomicelite.Particulartothissubgroup,itisworthnotingthatwithJordan’spoliticalintegrationofthetwoBanks,AbdelMajidShoman—whohadfoundedArabBankinJerusalemin1935—instantaneouslybecamethemostinfluentialrepresentativeoffinancialcapitalinindependentJordan.170
165 AslocalagentoftheShellOilCompanyandthroughhisexclusivecontroloverthedistributionfuel,Ismai’ilal-
Bilbaisiacquiredhisfortune.ThroughduopolisticcontroloftheimportationofPersiantobacco,monopolisticcontroloverPersianrugs,Englishtextiles,andagrainextractionscheme,IbrahimMangobuilthis(Ibid,486).HewasjoinedinPersiantobaccoimportationbyMithqalAsfur,andbyAjamiandMa’albakiinhistextileandgrain-basedaccumulation(Ibid,486-488).
Forthefulllist,seep.480.166 HaddadcontrolledthemarketforvelvetacrossMandateTransjordanandMandatePalestine.167 Amawi(1993),pp.499-505.168 See:Masri(2005),Appendix10.169 Forthishistory,seeIbid,p..131.170 OnShoman,seeIbid,p.295.
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Conclusion
Inthischapter,Ihaveattemptedtoexcavatethesocial,political,andeconomicfoundations
ofbothJordaniancapitalismandtheHashemitestate.Havingrevealedhow,where,andwhythese
foundationsintersect,itismyhopethatthisexcavationhasallowedthereadertobetter
appreciatethepathdependenciesanddeep-runninghistoricallogicsunderpinningnotonly
today’spoliticaleconomybuttheunderdevelopmentitengenders.Havingrevealedhow
fundamentallyco-imbricatedprocessesofclassandstateformationhavebeeninJordan,itisalso
myhopethatthereaderwillbebetterabletodiscernthebehavioralpropertieshistoryhas
conferreduponcontemporarypoliticalandeconomicelites,andhowthistoocontributesto
Jordan’scapitalismofcrisis.
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CHAPTERFOUR
IndependentJordan’sfirstsocialstructureofaccumulation:1946-1973
Asindicatedinitstitle,thischapterwillreviewindependentJordan’sfirstsocialstructure
ofaccumulation.Afterfirstappraisingthepoliticaldomain,thisreviewwillproceedtoanalysesof
the(i)particularformofeconomicinterventionismadoptedbythestateduringthisperiod;(ii)
theparticularformofstate-capitalrelationsconsolidatedduringthisperiod;(iii)theformof
marketcompetitionconsolidatedduringthisperiod;(iv)thesocialcontrolregimeconsolidated
duringthisperiod;(v)theexternalarticulationoftheeconomyduringthisperiod;and(vi)the
ideologicalinstitutionalizationofpower/capitalevincedduringthisperiod.Thechapterwill
close,finally,bydetailinghowthiswidersocialstructureofaccumulationcameundonebeginning
inthelate1960s.
…………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………
ThePoliticalInstitutionalizationofthepost-independencesocialstructureofaccumulation
TheBritishMandateinTransjordancametoaclosein1946.Notwithstandingthe
pageantrythatmarkedtheterminationofthiscolonialarrangement,theindependenceand
sovereigntyofthefreshlydeclaredHashemiteKingdomofJordanwastobehighlylimitedforthe
firstdecadeofthecountry’sexistence.TheselimitswereafunctionofthenewTreatyofAlliance
thattheEmirhadsignedwiththeBritishamonthpriortotheMandate’stermination.Amongst
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otherthings,thistreatystipulatedthatBritishofficers(principally,PashaJohnGlubb)retained
controlandleadershipoftheArabLegion.Havingabsorbedandintegratedthevariousentities
previouslyconstitutingtheJordanianarmedforcesoverthepreviousfive-oddyears,this
stipulationmeantthattheentiretyofthestate’ssecurityapparatuswouldtherebyremainunder
thedirectionofnon-nationals.171Supplementingthisabdicationofthesovereign’smonopolyon
violence,thenowKingAbdullahalsoagreedtocontinuestationingBritishtroopsonJordanian
territoryforthedurationoftheTreaty.Withthefiscalcapacityoftheyoungstatestillwholly
dependentonBritishbudgetsupportaswell,continuitiesinthebasicontologicalcharacterofthe
statewouldhavemadeitdifficulttoparseexactlywheretheMandateendedandwhere
independencebegan.
Notwithstandingtheenduringsamenessoftheearlypost-colonialstate,theseyearsdid,
ofcourse,introduceanumberofratherprofoundchangestolifeintheHashemiteKingdomas
well.WindfalloftheKing’sbackroomdoubledealingwithGoldaMeirintheyearsimmediately
precedingthePalestiniannakba172,itwasatthistime,afterall,thatboththephysicalgeography
andthepopulationofJordaneffectivelydoubledthroughthecountry’sacquisitionoftheWest
BankandJerusalem.
Thetransformationsimpliedandprecipitatedviatheswiftandunilateralannexationof
theseterritorieswereimmediate,irreversible,andwide-ranging.Nowstewardtooneofhistory’s
mostcontestedovercities—andnowpositionedattheverycenterofwhatwouldbecomeoneof
171 Aruri(1972),p.87172 ThisdoubledealingwasformalizedduringnegotiationsatAl-Shunahin1949-1950,andiscoveredinIlan
Pappe’sBritainandtheArab-IsraeliConflict1948-1951(Springer,1988).
99
theworld’slongestrunningconflicts—,Abdullah’sbackwaterKingdomovernightacquiredthe
kindofinternationalrelevancethatitsHashemitemonarchhadsolongaspiredfor.Uponthe
passageofanaddendumtoJordan’sCitizenshipLawin1949,thecitizenryoverwhomthis
monarchwastorulealsoacquiredadiversity(andmagnitude)wellbeyondwhathehadgrown
toknowduringtheMandateperiod.173Andthentherewasthemostdirecttransformationofall,
theoneborneofthefactthattheKing’sannexationalsobroughtabouthispersonaldemise.
AssassinatedinAl-AqsaMosquebyanethnicPalestinianunwillingtocountenancetheKing’s
complicityintheerasureofthePalestiniannation,Abdullah’sdeathsetinmotionasuccession
transitionattheverymomentthatregionaldebatesoverpost-colonialrepublicanism,socialism,
anddevelopmentwerereachingacrescendo,atransitionthatwouldprovehighlyconsequential
tothesocialstructureofaccumulationthateventuallyconsolidatedinindependentJordan.
ThistransitiondideventuallyconcludewiththeascensionofKingHussein.Priortothat,
however,therewasabriefthoughinfluentialinterregnumduringwhichAbdullah’seldestson,
Talal,heldexecutivepower.EventuallydeposedthoughTalalwas174,theshortnessofhistenure
173 OnthetemporalandgeographicacrobaticsthatwouldinformJordaniancitizenshipfromthestart,seeMassad
(2001),pp.22-92. InternaltothedemographicchangesintroducedviatheabsorptionoftheWestBankandthehundredsof
thousandsofPalestinianrefugeesthatcametosettleontheeastbankintheaftermathof1947-1948,moreover,wereaseriesofvariablespoisedtoreorderthepolitical,economic,andsocialfoundationsoftheKingdomaswell.Thoughtheeffectsofthesevariableshavebeenoccasionallyoverstatedbyscholarsofthisperiod,theintegrationofamoreindustrializedandmorecosmopolitanWestBankunambiguouslyprecipitatedsignificantchangesinthekindsofpoliticalideasthatwerebeingarticulated,intheformsofpoliticalorganizationbeingmobilized,inthenatureofcapitalaccumulation,andintheextenttowhichclasscametoinsinuateitselfintoallofthis.
174 TheofficialreasonforTalal’sremovalwasmentalunfitness.Mostscholarsacceptthegeneralveracityofthis
claim.TotheextentthatthisclaimwasaggressivelypushedbyAmericanandBritishofficerswhowereconcernedwiththeJordanianleft’sinfluenceoverTalal,however,therearesomereasonsforbeingskepticalofthesehistoricalaccounts.SeeMassad(2001),pp.166-171forsomedetailsonthevariousintriguesatplay.
100
didnotpreventhimfromoverseeingthedraftingofJordan’ssecondpost-independence
constitution(thefirstwascodifiedin1947).
PromulgatedinJanuaryof1952,Talal’sconstitutionwasasprogressiveasaconstitution
enshriningadynasticparliamentarymonarchycanbe.175Ofitspositiveattributes,beyond
articulatingawiderangeofsocial,political,andcivilrights,the1952constitutionalsodelineated
adivisionofpowersandestablishedabicamerallegislaturecomprisedofanelectedLowerHouse
alongsideaSenatedirectlyappointedbytheKing.Totheextentthatitsimultaneouslymanaged
thehermeneuticalacrobaticsneededtolegallyreimaginethenation(anditscitizensubjects)in
thecontextofmassiveterritorialaggrandizement,itwasadocumentnotbereftofmerits.Of
course,onewouldberemisstoignoretheshortcomingsthatwerealsofundamentaltothe1952
constitution.BeyondmakingtheKingCommanderinChief,italsorenderedtheMonarch
somethingofaSchmittiansovereignthroughassigninghisperson(ratherthantheelectedLower
House)thepowertoappointanddismissboththePrimeMinisterandthegovernmentwritlarge.
Inalsoprovidingthemonarchwithpowersofthepursue,withthepowertocallforelections,and
withdiscretionarykindsoflegislativeauthority—theconstitutionstipulatedthattheKingcould
decreelegislationbyroyalordinanceintheabsenceofparliamentandthathecouldevoke
emergencypowersmoregenerallyshouldlegallyunderspecifiedcrisisconditionsmakeit
necessary—,theconstitution’sdivisionofpowerswerenominalinmorethanoneway.176When
onealsoconsidershowtheconstitutionquietlyretainedsweepingDefenseRegulationsinitially
175 RussellLucas,InstitutionsandthePoliticsofSurvivalinJordan:DomesticResponsestoExternalChallenges,1988-
2001.SUNYPress(2005),p.17.176 Formoreonthepoliticalimplicationsofthisconstitution,seeLucas(2005),pp.22-23.
101
legislatedbycolonialofficersin1939—regulationswrittenwiththegoalofaidingtheMandate
Authority’seffortsinquellingthePalestinianuprisingsofthelate1930s—,therather
pronouncedlimitationsofthedocumentcomeintoevenstarkerrelief.177
TheselimitationsandthedangerstheycreatedforJordan’sfledglingdemocracywere
quicklymaderealuponTalal’sdisplacementin1953.Usheredintopowerattheripeageof
eighteen,Talal’sheir,KingHusseinwouldinitiallyflirtwithmanyofthesameprogressive
nationalistandpan-Arabistforcesashadhispredecessorbeforeultimatelyyielding—withapush
fromtheCentralIntelligenceAgency—totheseductionsofanautocraticpowergrab.178Takingan
allegedcoupattemptin1957asthecasusbellineededtobringJordan’sexperimentwithpopular
governmenttoanunfortunate(andsemi-permanent)close,hisconsolidationofpowerwouldbe
swift.179DeclaringMartialLawonApril24thofthatyear,Husseindismissedthegovernmentof
Sulaymanal-Nabulsiandmovedshortlythereaftertounwindandrepressalltheinstitutional
foundationsofJordan’sdemocracy.Hewasaidedintheseeffortsbyacoterieofrehabilitated
Mandateeraconservatives.180
177 UrielDann,KingHusseinandtheChallengeofArabRadicalism:Jordan1955-1967.OxfordUniversityPress(1989),
p.5.178 Thehistoryoftheseflirtationsandthecontingentdevelopmentsthatsawhimeventuallyabandonprogressivism
isbeyondthescopeofthisdissertation,thoughithasbeensubjectedtoprocesstracingandthickdescriptionbyanumberofoutstandingscholarsshoulditbeofinteresttothereader
See:Massad(2001),p.165-189. AsherSusser’sOnBothBanksoftheJordan:aPoliticalBiographyofWasfial-Tall(Routledge,1994)containsa
numberofinterestingdetailsaswell.179 ItisalsoworthnotingthatHusseinhadabrogatedhiscountry’streatywithBritainanddismissedJohnGlubb
fromhisperchatoptheArabLegionin1956inanattemptatbrandishinghispan-Arabistcredentials.180 Forhistoriesontheseyearsofpoliticalstruggle,seeMassad(2001),pp.165-194;Dann(1989),pp.21-52
102
Amongstthejuridicalmaneuversmostessentialbothtothisparticularcrackdownandthe
subsequentasphyxiationofJordaniandemocracy,oneneedbeginwiththesuspensionof
parliament,thegerrymanderingoflaterelections181,andtheillegalizationofpoliticalparties.182
Herein,therescindmentofthefreedomofassociationwasperhapsthemostimpactfulvis-a-vis
thelong-termhealthofthepolity.Bycancelingpoliticalparties,afterall,Husseineffectively
emptiedthepublicsphereoftheoneinstitutioncapableofstabilizingJordan’sfragilepolitics
duringthosecriticalmomentswhenthecountrywasfeelingitswaythroughthedisorienting
initialexperienceofindependence.Leavingthedemoswithoutanylegal-formalmechanismfor
mobilizingandarticulatingcollectivegrievanceandaspiration;withoutanymechanismfor
conductingthemasseducationcampaignssodesperatelyneededbyapost-colonialpolity;
withoutanyinstitutionabletorepresentsocietyinthestateasmuchasrepresentingthestatein
society;andwithoutanymeansofintegratingbourgeoisie,workingclass,andlumpenproletariat
alikeintoparticipatorygovernanceandapluralistnationalproject,thisdissolutionofthe
partisansundercutJordan’sdemocracyattheverymomentitwasgatheringitsfeet.183
181 Dann(1989),p.120182 Ofcourse,oneshouldnotromanticizetheelectoralsystemthathadbroughtNabulsi’sgovernmenttopowerin
thefirstplace.Structurallybourgeoisified,theelectoralsystemthatvotedintheChamberofDeputiesin1956hadonlyextendedthefranchisetotaxpayers(thereforepropertyowners)andneitherrefugee,thebankrupt,normilitaryservicemanwereentitledtothevote.Notwithstandingtheseobviousissues,theElectionsLawof1960,writtenintheaftermathofthecoup,wouldmakethisexclusivistsystemappearasanexemplarofrepresentativenessandpopularagency.
SeeDann(1989),p.6;andIlanPappe,“JordanbetweenHashemiteandPalestinianIdentity,inJordanintheMiddleEast,1948-1998:TheMakingofaPivotalState(eds.JosephNevoandIlanPappe),1994,p.70-71formoredetails.
183 Whatismore,inexemptingtheMuslimBrotherhood’sIslamicCenterCharitySocietyfromthisotherwise
comprehensivecrackdownonassociation,healsoassuredthattheywouldbetheonlyentitywiththeorganizationalinfrastructurenecessarytothriveinelectoralpoliticswhenthetimecameforpoliticalliberalization.
103
ComplementedasthismaneuverwasbyrepressivePressLawsandthereimpositionof
censorshipacrossthe1950sand1960s,onecanseehowthereproductionofthemonarch’s
hegemonycametobeinseparablefromthe(coerced)politicalimmaturityofhisdemos—and
howthepoweroftheformerrequiredthenon-realizationofthecitizen.184
EquallyfundamentaltothepoliticalinstitutionalizationofJordaniancapitalisminthis
periodwasawidersecuritizationofpolitics.Withmartiallawineffectthroughoutthe
tumultuoussixteenyearsthatfollowed1957,thissecuritizationcollapsedthetraditionaldivision
separatingtheinternalfromtheexternalsphereofpolitics.Institutionally,thiscollapsewasfirst
operationalizedthroughtheArmy’sabsorptionofpolicinganddomesticsecurityresponsibilities
intheaftermathof1957.185Fromthisfoundation,amorecomprehensivesecuritizationof
Jordan’spoliticswouldfollow—aswellasamoretotaldissolutionofJordandemocratic
institutions—upontheoutbreakoftwonewpoliticalcrisesin1967and1970-1971,respectively.
ThefirstofthesecrisescostJordantheWestBankandresultedfromtheKing’sjoiningof
theArabwareffortagainstIsrael.Thelossofterritoryinturnprovidedtherationalefor
continuingthesuspensionofelectionsasitwasdeemedinappropriateandunfeasiblethatthe
citizenrygotothepollswhilehalfthecountrywasunderIsraelimilitaryoccupation.Thoughthis
suspensionwasintroducedasareluctantandtemporarymeasure,itwoundupextendingfor
twenty-twoyears.186Ifthepoliticalsystemwastherebyincreasinglydisarticulatedfromthe
184 Aruri(1972),p.150185 Intermsofpersonnel,regimestalwartHabisal-MajaliwouldbeassignedcontroloftheArmedForceswhile
Muhammadal-Kilanirosetoprominenceandbuiltabaseofpowerasahighlyinfluentialheadofdomesticintelligence(Massad,2001,p.202).
186 Ibid,p.97
104
demosasthe1960scametoaclose,thesecondoftheaforementionedcrises—thecivilwar
pittingtheprimarilyPalestinianFedayeenagainsttheMonarchyin1970-1971—cementedthe
breakbyintroducingentirelynewlevelsofrepressiveness,violence,anddiscriminationintothe
polity.187Havingalreadysuspendedelectionsandcrackeddownonpoliticalexpressionin1967,
Husseinnowproceededtosuspendtheoperationsofthe(gerrymandered)parliamentitself.188
From1974through1984,thePalaceactuallygovernedinthetotalabsenceofalegislative
counterweight.189NotwithstandingtheextenttowhichtheLowerHousehadalreadybeen
renderedarubberstampinstitution,thesuspensionofparliamentwasstillsignificantinthatit
allowedtheexecutiveandanemergentsetofPalaceappointedpolicyinstitutionstorulethrough
187 Jordan’sethnicPalestinianssufferedanumberofacutediscriminatoryeffectsuponthedefeatandevictionofthe
Fedayeen.ThiswassodespitethefactthatthePalestinianfedayeencountedmanyethnicTransjordanianamongsttheirnumber—anddespitethefactthattheregime’ssupporterscountedmanyethnicPalestiniansamongsttheirnumber.WhilefacileaccountsofBlackSeptembertendtopresentthisasaconflictpittingPalestiniannationalistsagainsttheirJordaniancounterparts,therealitywasfarmorecomplex.
Formoreaccuratedepictionsofevents,seeMassad,p.236-248;YezidSayigh,ArmedStruggleandtheSearchfor
State:ThePalestinianNationalMovement1949-1993;HelenaCobban,ThePalestinianLiberationOrganisation:People,Power,andPolitics;p.;.IrisFruchter-Ronen,“BlackSeptember:the1970-1971eventsandtheirimpactontheformationofJordaniannationalidentity”,CivilWars.
Regardingthesediscriminatoryeffects,inadditiontoinauguratingadePalestinizationofthestate—apolicy
severelydiminishingthebureaucracy’scapabilities—,post-1971,Hussein’slieutenantswouldalsouprootPalestiniannationalistsfromthetradeassociations,professionalassociations,laborunions,andculturalgroupswheretheyhadpreviouslymobilized.In1986,hewouldalsoelectorallyredistrictthosePalestinianrefugeecampsthatwerelocatedeastoftheriverJordantotheWestBank,anactofremarkablecartographicimaginationthatwouldtreathundredsofthousandsofvotersinthevicinityofAmmanasiftheywereresidentsofRamallah.Atoncesimplifyingtheregime’sgerrymanderingeffortsandeffectivelydenationalizing/deterritorializingEastBank-basedcitizen-subjects,itwasameasureforeshadowingthekindsoflegalotheringofcampPalestiniansthatwouldbesoeagerlyadoptedbyHussein’sson.
Formoreonthesehistoricalprocesses,see:AdnanAbuOdeh,Jordanians,Palestinians&theHashmiteKingdomin
theMiddleEastPeaceProcess(1999);Massad(2001),p.259.188 See:Susser(1994),p.157-159.189 LaurieBrand,Jordan’sInter-ArabRelations:ThePoliticalEconomyofAllianceMaking(1994),p.71.
105
royaldecreeandtheunilateralissuanceofprovisionallaw.Thesubsequententrenchingofsuch
governingpraxes—apermanentizationoftheExecutive’stemporarylegislativepowers—would
becomedeeplyconsequentialforJordaniancapitalisminthepost-1973context.
Ifitwasnotalreadythecase,then,thepoliticalcrisesof1967and1970-1971wouldsee
toitthatregimesurvivalcametoconstitutethesingularlogicandmodusoperandiorienting
Hashemitegovernance.Withthemaintenanceofroyalpowernownotonlysupersedingbutalso
subsumingthedevelopmentalistdutiesofthenation-state,theprioritiesofthePalacewould
becomeincreasinglydissociatedfromthoseofstateandsociety.TheeffectsofthePalace’s
divergencefromthestatewerequicklyevincedinthedomainofeconomicpolicymaking.Not
withstandingHussein’seffacementofdemocracy,tohiscredit,itisworthnotingthatpriorto
1973,theKinghadnotovertlyimpededtheworkoftheambitious,nationalistbureaucratsthat
hadcomeintoinfluenceacrossthepost-independencedecades.Theseetatistes,fromMustafa
Wahbahal-TalandhissonWasfial-TaltoHazzaMajali,HazimNuseibeh,Hamadal-Farhan,Munif
al-Razzaz,KamalalSha’ir,andIbrahimHabashnah,allsoughttobuildthekindofmeritocratic-
rationaliststatetheyknewtobenecessaryforJordan’slong-termdevelopment.Manyofthese
individualshadbeeneducatedfirstinJordan’sfirstsecondaryschoolinSaltandlaterunderthe
guidanceofConstantinZuraykwhileattendingtheAmericanUniversityofBeirut.190Staffingthe
MinistryofEconomy,thesemendirectednotablesuccessesinlandreform,electrification,
190 Zuraykwasoneofthepre-eminentintellectualsdrivingthepan-Arabisttrendandchampioningthevictimsofthe
Palestiniannakbaduringthepost-colonialperiod.
106
irrigation,andinestablishingindustrially-focusedcreditinstitutions,especiallyduringtheyears
followingal-Tal’sappointmentasPrimeMinisterin1962.191
Alas,justlikeJordan’sdemocracy,thestate-buildingprojectenvisionedbythese
bureaucratswouldcomeundoneunderthepressuresandchangesintroducedunderthecrucible
ofthelate1960sandearly1970s.AsthemanmostdirectlyresponsibleforthePalace’swaron
theFedayeenin1970-1971,al-TalwounduptargetedandkilledbyaFatehdissidentgroup(Black
September)ashemadehiswaytoanArabLeaguemeetinginCairo(1971).Withhisdeath,the
rationalist-developmentalistmovementinJordanwasdealtablowfromwhichitneverrecovered.
Boundforirrelevanceasitalreadywas,thismovement’sfatewasonlyfurthersealedoncethe
Palace’scofferscametobefilledwithsecondaryoilrentspost-1973’sOPECcrisis.Inthe
immediatesense,theserentsdiminishedtheKing’sneedforarationalistbureaucracycapableof
collectingtaxesorplanningdevelopmentprojects.Inconjunctionwithal-Tal’sdemise,thisledto
thedisplacementofthenationalistbureaucratsandtheriseofacrewofcorrupt,reactionary,and
largelyincompetentregimeloyalistsattheheartoftheadministrativestate.Thisnewpolicy
elite—principallycomprisedofIbrahimHashem,Samiral-Rifa’i,Akefal-Fayez,NuriShafiq,Kamil
AbuJabir,MudarBadran,SuleimanTouqan,SharifbinNasir(theKing’suncle),andBahjatal-
191 Formoreonthisgenerationofpolicymakers,see:Tell(2013),pp.127-129 CyrusSchayegh,“1958Reconsidered:StateFormationandtheColdWarintheEarlyPostColonialArabMiddle
East”,InternationalJournalofMiddleEastStudies(45),2013;p.429-430. PaulKingston“RationalizingPatrimonialism:Wasfial-TallandEconomicReforminJordan,1962-1967”,inTariq
Tell(ed.)TheResilienceoftheHashemiteRule:PoliticsandStateinJordan. Kingston,Paul."Breakingthepatternsofmandate:economicnationalismandstateformationinJordan,1951–
57."Village,steppe,andstate:thesocialoriginsofmodernJordan.London:BritishAcademic(1994):187-216. Susser,Asher.OnbothbanksoftheJordan:apoliticalbiographyofWasfial-Tall.Routledge,1994..
107
Talhuni—largelydominatedgovernmentministriesandtheRoyalCourtacrossthenexttwenty-
oddyears.192
TheStateintheEconomy:ParallelInstitutionsandMilitarizedRooseveltianism
Tounderstandthestate’sroleintheeconomyduringthepost-independenceperiod,one
needbeginwiththeforeignfinanced(andforeignmanaged)parallelinstitutionsthatbuoyedit
throughout.ThoughnotoftheJordanianstateitself,theseinstitutionsoughtbeincludedinthis
sectionbyvirtueofthefactthattheyfulfilledmanyofthatstate’ssocial,developmental,andfiscal
responsibilities.FunctioningsotostabilizeHussein’sruleasmuchasthesocialformationaround
him,theseparallelinstitutions—inclusiveoftheUnitedNation’sReliefandWorksAgencyfor
PalestineRefugeesintheNearEast(UNRWA)aswellasthevariousaidandsupportinitiatives
overseenbyboththeforeignofficesofbothBritishandAmericangovernments—constitutedone
ofthecriticalfirewallswithinthepost-warsocialstructureofaccumulation.
192 AsIwillshowinthediscussionofthenextJordanianSSA,orientedbytherationalitiesofregimesurvivalalone,
KingHusseinwouldnotonlyunderminehismostcapablebureaucratsoutoffeartheymightbuildanindependentpowerbasewithinthestate;hewouldalsochannelpolicymakingpowersintoanumberofautonomous,politicallyinsulatedinstitutionsappointedby(anddirectlyaccountableto)thePalace.SealingthedivorceofPalacefromstate,theseinstitutionsandtheaforementionedpolicyelitewouldmakeanumberofdisastrousdecisionsthatarebasictothe(under)developmentofthecontemporaryeconomy.
Formoreonthiselite,see:TimothyPiro,ThePoliticalEconomyofMarketReform,pp.79-90.
108
Proceedingsequentially,UNRWAwasfoundedin1949.Asitsnamesuggests,thiswasan
entitywhoseinstitutionalraisond’etrewastoprovideforthematerialneedsandhuman
developmentofthe700,000Palestinianrefugeesethnicallycleanseduponthefoundationofthe
Israelistatein1947-1948andsubsequentlydispersedacrossGaza(thenunderthecontrolof
Egypt),theWestBank(underthecontrolofJordan),EastBankJordan,Syria,andLebanon.193
193 ItisworthnotingthatUNRWAwaswidelycriticizedintheArabpublicsphereduringitsearlyyearsof
operations.Thetypicalchargewasthattheinstitutionanditsbackersamongstwesterngovernmentswereattemptingtonormalizetherefugeecrisis(andtheIsraelistate)througheconomicdevelopmentprojectsdesignedtoembedthePalestiniandiasporawithintheirhostcountries.
Foreign Aid: State Building/State Degrading While helping stave off a humanitarian disaster in the wake of the Palestinian nakba, it is important to note that each of these interventions also functioned so to undermine the long-term development of a rationalist/developmentalist bureaucracy. This undermining effect was partially a function of the parallel, largely autonomous, foreign-staffed institutions that were established by UNRWA, the British, and Point Four during the early post-independence period. Adopting, out of necessity, many of the basic roles incumbent upon a sovereign state—from irrigation, water systems, infrastructure, and development policymaking to the entirety of the refugee portfolio—, the many successes these institutions realized in Jordan always implied a tacit though commensurate decline in local capacity building. What is more, given that many of these institutions also poached the Jordanian state’s most high skilled labor, their consolidation did more than preclude the Jordanian state from doing (or learning to do) many of the jobs required of a sovereign government. It also led to a quiet asset stripping of the Jordanian bureaucracy. To the extent that these autonomous institutions’ management of critical public policy areas allowed the Palace to devote its energies towards patronage-related activities as well, they also indirectly contributed to the non-efficient patrimonialism that would come to bedevil Jordanian governance throughout the next sixty years. In many ways, then, the cost of stabilizing the Jordanian polity, economy, and social body, was the undermining of the sovereign state, the deepening of that state’s external dependence, and the embedding of corruption. Though these effects were mitigated during those years when al-Tal et al retained influence at the Palace, they have been prevalent across Jordan’s post-colonial period (up and through the present day).
109
InJordan,thismandatewasoperationalizedthroughtheswiftconstructionofwhatbecame
knownastheUNRWAbluestate,asprawlinginfrastructuredesignedtogovernandcareforthe
country’snumerouscamp-basedrefugeepopulations.Togivesomeperspectiveonthescopeof
UNRWA’sremit,thoughrepresentingonlyafractionofthetotalPalestinianrefugeepopulationin
Jordan,camp-based,UNRWA-registeredPalestiniansstillconstitutedupwardsof35-40%ofthe
nationalpopulationatthetime.
ThepurviewofUNRWA’swelfaristresponsibilitiesextendedfrommattersofshelterand
educationtonutritionandhealth.Inacontroversialsynthesisofwelfare,internationalpolitics,
anddevelopment,thebluestatealsopushedaworksprograminitsearlyyearsmeanttoembed
theformerpeasantryofPalestineintotheeconomyofJordan—therebyeasing(ornormalizing)
thepermanentizationoftheirexile.Regardless,economicallyspeaking,thetotalityofUNRWA’s
effortsclearlyfunctionedtopropupaggregatedemandandtocontainthedisruptionsandsocial
antagonismsthatmighthaveotherwisebeenintroduced.194Notwithstandingthebluestate’s
otherdevelopmentaldemerits195,then,itmostcertainlybolsteredpost-independencecapital
accumulation.
OnUNRWA’sroleinthepost-colonialhistoryoftheLevant,see:RiccardoBocco."UNRWAandthePalestinian
refugees:ahistorywithinhistory."RefugeeSurveyQuarterly28.2-3(2009):229-252. MichaelKagan."TheUNSurrogateStateandtheFoundationofRefugeePolicyintheMiddleEast."UCDavisJ.Int'l
L.&Pol'y18(2011):307.194 ForasummaryofUNRWA’seconomicandsocialinterventions,see:AnneMarielPetersandPeteMoore,“Beyond
BoomandBust:Externalrents,DurableAuthoritarianism,andInstitutionalAdaptationintheHashemiteKingdomofJordan”,StudiesinComparativeInternationalDevelopment(44:3),2009.pp.269-274.
195 Thesedemeritsarediscussedinthetextboxonthepreviouspage.TothepointsmadethereIwouldonlyadd
thatcompletelynecessaryandeffectiveasUNRWA’scaregivingwaswhenitcametodealingwitharatherprofoundhumanitariancrisisforwhichnoneofthepost-colonialArabstates(Jordanincluded)waspreparedto
110
Thesamemultisidedeffectscouldbeattributedtothematerialsupports,expertise,and
personnelthattheBritishandtheAmericangovernmentsprovidedtheJordanianstateinthese
years.TheinfluenceoftheBritishwasmostapparentbetween1946and1956,andnowhere
moresothaninthedomainsofsecurityanddefense,eachofwhichremainedthepersonal
preserveofthenowsecondedBritishmilitaryofficerJohnGlubb.196BeyondGlubb,British
representativesoftheMiddleEastOfficealsocontinueddictatingdevelopmentpolicymaking
acrossthemid-1950sthroughtheirstewardship(andfinancing)oftheJordanianDevelopment
Board.Handlingtheallocationof(British-issued)developmentloansandmilitaryaidand
determiningtheprioritiesoftheKingdom’spubicinvestments,theseofficersorientedthe
trajectoryandstructureofJordanianeconomicdevelopmentduringthefirstdecadeofthe
country’sindependenceasmuchasanyoneelse.197OncetheBritishfinallystartedbeatingtheir
moregeneralizedretreatfromtheregion—awithdrawalfurtherhastenedbythedisasterof
1956’sSuezCrisis—,theAmericansquicklysteppedintothevoidbytakingoverthedirectorship
oftheJordanianDevelopmentBoard,increasingdirectbudgetsupport,andinitiating
programmaticoperationsthroughtheUnitedStatesOperatingMissionanditsTechnical
CooperationAgency(colloquiallyreferredtoasPointFour).Specifictobudgetsupport,US
externalassistancetoJordanbetween1956and1967constitutedroughly20%ofannualGross
NationalIncome.198Equalinpercentagetotherevenuesthenbeingcollectedbythestateand
handleontheirown,itneverthelessholdsthatthesheermagnitudeoftheiroperationscouldnothelpbutconstituteachallengetoHashemitesovereigntyovertime.
196 PetersandMoore(2009)coverthisperiodofJordanianhistorywell.See:pp.266-267.197 Formoreontheirinfluence,seeKnowles(2001),pp.59-62.198 AscitedinZimmerman(2017),p.152.
111
financingnearlyallofJordan’scapitalspending,thissupportunderwrotethesolvencyofthe
post-colonialstatetonosmallextent,andwithit,theprospectsofcapitalaccumulation.199
Movingbeyondtheserathercrudeanddirect(ifalsoessential)interventions,PointFour’s
collaborationswiththeFordFoundationalsosawtoitthatthetermsofJordan’slong-term
economicplanning—asdelineatedinaseriesoffiveandsevenyeardevelopmentplans—were
moresubtlydictatedbyAmericanhandsaswell.GroundingJordan’spolicyapproachinthe
teleologiesofmodernizationtheory,theplanningassistancethatwasprovidedbytheseforeign
institutions(aswellasbytheWorldBank)anchoredJordan’sdevelopmentstrategiestothe
tenetsofstaticcomparativeadvantageandtheagriculturalinvestmentsthosetenetsrequired.200
Thoughhelpingsecuresomedegreeofcapitalaccumulation,byleavinglittleinvestmentfor
industrialization,AmericanplanningalsohelpednudgeJordantowardsaparticularmodalityof
exportorientation—onethatwouldtendtowardsvolatilityanddecliningtermsoftradeover
time.Nordidthenegative(ifunintended)consequencesofAmericaninterventioninJordanend
attheplanningprocess.Byofferingsalarieswellinexcessofwhatwasonofferinthe
bureaucracy—andbyoperatinginisolationfromthatbureaucracyaswell—,PointFour(like
contemporaryUSAidandINGOprojects)alsocontributedtothestuntingoftheJordanianstate.201
199 OnPointFour’simpact,Schayegh(2013)andKingston(2001).200 AlongwiththeIBRD,PointFourandtheFordFoundationwouldlargelydelineatethecontentsofthe1962-1967
5YearPlanforEconomicDevelopmentandthe1963-19707YearPlanforEconomicDevelopment. FormoreontheinfluencethatforeignexpertshadonJordanianpolicymaking,see:Masri(2005),p.133201 AsdetailedbyKingston(1994,p.208),PointFouremployedover1500individualsatsalarieswellbeyondwhat
thePalace-deprivedstatecouldafford.Insodoing,itssomewhatwell-intendedoperationsreducedthetalentavailabletothestate,andtherebyreducedthechancesofJordandevelopingthemeritocraticbureaucracyitsodeeplyneeded.
112
Inaddition,byallowingthePalacetomanipulateaspectsofitsdevelopmentprojectssotofunnel
rentsintothepocketsoftheirnetworksofprivilege,Americanparallelinstitutionsalsohelped
entrenchtheelite-orientedpatrimonialismthatwouldcompromiseHashemitedevelopment
effortsacrossthenextseventyyears.202Forallthesereasons,auditingtheultimatelegacyofthis
eraofAmericaninterventionismishighlycomplicated,astheeffectsbornofbudgetaidand
infrastructuredevelopmentcametobepartiallyoffsetbythosederivedfromPointFour’s
contributionstobothHashemitecorruptionandtotheenduringimmaturityoftheJordanian
state.203
AsfortheeconomicinterventionsundertakenbytheHashemiteregimeitselfinthis
period,oneshouldbeginwithmattersoffiscalsociology.Asthetablesonthenextpageevince,
indirecttaxesandfeesdominatedtherevenuesideofthestateledgerduringtheperiodunder
question.Unwillingorunabletoinstitutionalizeprogressiveincomeand/orcorporatetax
measures,thisrevenuestrategyensuredthatthefiscalsociologyofindependentJordanwas
groundedinthesameclass-biased,upwardlyorientedfoundationsaswasthefiscalsociologyof
MandateJordan.
202 Zimmerman(2017,pp.110,149)andPetersandMoore(2009,p.271)havebothdevelopedthispoint.While
certainlyhelpingagreatmanysmallfarmers,thePointFour-ledEastGhorCanalProject,forexample,alsoprovidedamassivepublicsubsidyforthosemegafarmsandpropertiesthathadbeenconjuredandawardedtopoliticalallies,whetherbyKingHusseinorhispredecessor.In1955,Husseindistributed2000acresofJordanValleyLandtoloyaltribesmenservingintheOfficerCorps.Similarly,asubstantial,$166millionPointFourfinancedfoodaidproject—thetermsofwhichwerelaidoutinPublicLaw480—intendedforthebenefitofJordan’ssmallfarmersalsowoundupfinancingtheestatesandluxuryimportsoftheKing’sfriends.
203 Forinstance,theplanning,construction,andmanagementofhydraulicandirrigationinfrastructureaswellas
transportationnetworkswereundertakenbyinstitutionsautonomousanddisconnectedfromthestate.Indeed,USmoneyandpersonnelthatundertookthemassiveEastGhorCanalproject,themostambitiouseffortofthe1950sandaprojectthatwouldeventuallydeliveredwaterto750,000peopleintheJordanValley(PetersandMoore,269).
113
SourcesofDomesticRevenues,1953-1966
Unit:Percentage
Direct Taxes Indirect Taxes Fees Other Receipts Total 1953/54 13.49 50.01 11.08 25.42 100 1954/55 11.92 50.48 10.03 27.57 100 1955/56 11.75 47.91 12.4 27.93 100 1956/57 13.53 45.64 11.4 29.43 100 1957/58 12.33 46.5 10.21 30.96 100 1958/59 10.36 44.73 10.62 34.28 100 1959/60 9.84 46.25 12.15 31.76 100 1960/61 10.18 46.08 12.1 31.64 100 1961/62 9.11 36.95 8.81 45.13 100 1962/63 11.22 45.08 10.23 33.48 100 1963/64 9.13 42.59 9.02 39.26 100 1964/65 10.02 47.17 11.45 31.36 100 1965/66 10.1 52.88 9.96 27.06 100
AllocationofStateExpenditures(1953-1966)
Unit:Millions(JD)
Civilian Services
Defense Public Security
Current Expenditures
Development Total
1953/54 13.27 2.12 15.39 1954/55 13.87 2.69 16.56 1955/56 4.34 9.35 1.28 14.97 2.76 17.73 1956/57 4.77 12.13 1.36 18.26 3.06 21.32 1957/58 6.59 11.33 1.64 19.56 4.3 23.86 1958/59 6.79 14.66 2.07 23.52 5.82 29.34 1959/60 7.85 15.81 2.34 26 4.8 30.8 1960/61 8.44 16.15 2.27 26.86 5.98 32.84 1961/62 9.34 16.42 2.29 28.05 4.94 32.99 1962/63 10.82 16.8 2.31 29.31 7.6 37.53 1963/64 12.18 18.57 2.45 33.2 6.15 39.35 1964/65 13.43 18.57 2.46 34.46 9.17 43.63 1965/66 14.12 18.76 2.84 35.72 11.27 46.99 DataoriginallyprovidedbyMinistryofFinance.204
204 IspecificallygatheredthedatainthesetablesfromMasri(2005),Appendix4,Tables1and4.
114
Partiallyeveningoutthesocialeffectsofthisrevenuestrategy,however,wastheallocation
ofstateexpenditures.Thisisbecausethemillionsthatwerespentonthecivilianservice,defense,
andpublicsecurity(andthatweredocumentedinthetableabove)largelyfunctionedasa
mechanismforpublicsectorjobcreation.205Helpingmanagethedisruptivepotentialofthe
country’ssurpluspopulationsandstabilizethelargerpoliticaleconomyintheprocess,thepublic
ledgerfinancedatriplingofmilitaryemployment206andaneartriplingoftheCivilService.207
Thoughrelativelysmallinscaleinviewofwhatwastocome,thisinstitutionalizationofaquasi-
(andmilitarized)statejobguaranteegeneratedenormoussocialdividends,particularlyforthe
mostvulnerable.Inviewoftheeconomy’slackofanindustrialbaseandthelowlevelsoflabor
marketdemandthatthisimpliedforlowandsemi-skilledworkers,theeffectsofthese
expenditureswereevenmorepronounced.Complementingthecontributionstheaforementioned
parallelinstitutionshadmadeinsecuringthewelfareofcamp-dwellingPalestinians(ifonlyata
basiclevelofsubsistence),Hussein’spublicemploymenteffortstooprovidedabulwarkupon
whichthecountry’slowgrowth,peripheralcapitalismcouldstand,howeverprecariously.208
205 See:PeteMoore,DoingbusinessintheMiddleEast:PoliticsandeconomiccrisisinJordanandKuwait.Cambridge
UniversityPress,2004.p.8 Between1955and1960alone,annualdefenseexpendituresincreasedby74%.Withthevastmajorityofthese
expendituresbeingallocatedforthepurposesofexpandingtheconstellationofforcesinitiallyestablishedbyJohnGlubb(ratherthanforupgradingequipment),militaryspendingincreasesallowedforasubstantialincreaseinpublicsectoremployment.
206 Thistriplingofmilitaryemploymentoccurredbetween1960and1975.ItisdocumentedbyLawrenceTal,
Politics,theMilitary,andNationalSecurityinJordan:1955-1967.PalgraveMacmillan(2002),p.75.207 Piro,p.66:Civilserviceemploymentnearlytripledbetween1960and1985.208 Representingoneofthestate’stimeinvariantpraxesofmass-orientedactionhenceforth,thesocialefficacyofthe
Hashemite’spreferredformofpublicemploymentcontinuestobecompromisedbyitseconomicinefficiency.
115
State-Capital Relations
Astouchedonintheprevioussection,parallelinstitutionsandforeignaidwentalongway
towardssecuringthewelfareofJordan’slowerclassesinthepost-independenceperiod.Oneof
theexternalitiesborneofthiswasthatthePalace,nothavingtosecurethoselowerclasses
themselves,wasfreetoengagewiththebusinessclasseswithoutconcernforeithereconomic
efficiencyorsocialpeace.Consolidatingahighlyconciliatoryformofstate-capitalrelations,the
cronyistpartnershipthatresultedwouldgeneratehighprofitratesforadiscretegroupof
politicallyconnectedeconomicelites.Atthesametime,however,thiscronyismalsoprefigured
theeconomy’slong-termunderdevelopmentbydeepeningtheimport/consumption
dependence209ofboththecapitalaccumulationprocessandthepublicrevenuesystem.The
consolidationofaneconomybiasedagainstproductiveactivitieswouldalsoengendersignificant
andmultiformpoliticalconsequencesaswell.210
209 Incontinuingtoindulgeinnon-productiveactivities,moreover,itisimportanttonotethatJordan’smerchants
metlittlepoliticalresistance.Duetothefactthatthestate’srevenuestrategyatthisstagewasduallypremisedonexternalaidanditscapacitytolevydutiesongoodscomingintothecountry,thisimportdependencywasactuallysanctioned(ifnotexplicitlyencouraged)bypolicychoices.Theinstitutionalizationofsuchasub-optimalquidproquo,onewherethebusinesseliteandthestatebothbecameincreasinglyinvestedinaconsumption-based,import-heavygrowthmodel,was,ofcourse,developmentallydisadvantageous.Whilethereareagreatmanyissueswithimportsubstitutionindustrializationandnon-marketorientedprotectionistindustrialpoliciesmoregenerally—andwhileJordan’ssmallness,bothinpopulationandincapitalstock,wasalwaysboundtolimitthecountry’sindustrialgrowth—,itneverthelessholdsthatJordan’slong-termprospectsatthisstagestillunavoidablyhingeduponpolicymakersandbusinesselitesfindingawaytobuildanindustrialbase.Indeed,likewasthecaseforanyotherlatedevelopingeconomyatmid-century(particularlyonewithoutanysignificantnaturalresources),industrializationprovidedthemostviablepathtotechnologicalcatch-up,toincreasingthecomplexityofthecountry’sexportbasket,andtoimprovingthecountry’stermsoftrade.Byforegoingrequisitelevelsofindustrialinvestment,theimport-basedaccordbondingthisfractionofthedomesticcapitalistclasstothestateprefiguredthecountry’senduringunderdevelopment.
210 Concentratedworkforces,shopfloorpoliticaleducation,andtheestablishmentoflaborpartiesareallconducive
tothedemocraticprocessbecausetheyallhelptointegrateandsocializetheworkingclassesinamannerbefittingthestabilityofthewiderpoliticalsystem.Theabsenceofconcentratedworkforces,shopfloorpolitical
116
State-capitalrelationsofthissortwereconsolidatedandinstitutionalizedacrossanumber
ofdifferentspaces.Atthelevelofpolicyplanning,merchantsofquotacoteriestockwere
appointedtotheboardsoftheIndustrialDevelopmentBank(aPublic-PrivatePartnership
foundedin1965),theNationalPlanningCouncil(whichhadreplacedtheJordanDevelopment
Boardasof1971),andtheHousingandUrbanDevelopmentCorporation(1966).Thissame
cliquealsofilledtheleadershipoftheCentralBankofJordan,whichwasfoundedin1964upon
Jordan’sdeparturefromtheSterlingArea.211Leveragingtheinfluencetheseperchesprovided,
Jordan’smerchantcapitalwereabletoinfluencetradepolicyinparticularsotoensurethatthe
Palacemaintainedtheopennessandthesystemof(monopolized)importlicensesthathadserved
themsowellduringthewaryears.212Theseactorswerealsoabletoinsertthemselvesintothe
industrial(commodity-based)investmentsthattheJordanianstateanditsinternationalpartners
inauguratedintheseyears.Offeredequitysharesinconsiderableexcessoftheactualcapitalthey
investedinenterprisesliketheJordanCementFactory,thisprivilegedfractionofthecapitalist
classwereabletosecuresignificant(state-backed)annualdividendswhiletakingonlimited
personalrisk.Asthedividendsearnedonsaidinvestmentswerealsotax-free—andaseachof
Jordan’sbigfive(commodity-based)industrialassetswasawardedadomesticmonopolyon
extractionrights—,theseearmarkedequityholdingscamewithanumberofsecondaryadded
education,andlaborparties—allofwhichwerepartiallyderivedthroughJordan’slackadaisicalindustrialization—,leftthepoliticalprocesswithoutanymeansforintegratingandsocializingtheworkingclassesinamannerbefittingdemocracy.
211 Formoreonalltheseinstitutions,seeKnowles(2001),pp.89-99.212 Saidlicenseswouldnowextendintonew,modernproductslikeautomobiles.
117
benefitsaswell.213Whenonealsoconsiderstheeffectofa1964reformtothetaxcodethat
providedexemptionsonincomederivedfromlandsalesandpropertyrentals—areform
positioningthesesamemerchantstocapitalizeontheremittance-derivedrealestatespeculation
thatwouldtakeholdduringthe1970s214—,onecanbegintounderstandwhyaBritishdiplomat,
observingtheJordanianeconomiceliteofthe1960s,cametodescribethemasa“commercial
junta.”215
FormofMarketCompetition
Asonemayhavesurmisedfromthepreviousreviewofstate-capitalrelations,market
competitioninJordanstrayedratherfarfromtheJeffersonianideal.Giventhattheeconomywas
dominatedbycommerce216,thefactthatpoliticalinfluence(andone’ssocialproximitytothe
Palaceinparticular)wassufficientforsecuringanindividualexclusiveimportordistribution
licensesmeantthatahandfulofactorswereabletoestablishhegemonicpositionsacrossmost
retail,wholesale,andtrade-basedsectorsoftheeconomy.217Leveragingthecapitalaccumulated
213 Formoreontheseelite-orientedindustrialpolicies,see:OliverWils,“CompetitionorOligarchy?TheJordanian
BusinessEliteinHistoricalPerspective”,inManagementandInternationalBusinessIssuesinJordan(2001),p.126. Also,seePiro(1998)pp.37-54.214 Zimmerman(2017),p.111.215 Wils(2001),p.135.216 Masri’sstudyshowsthatasof1973,over2/3ofallprivateenterpriseswithequitiesover20,000JDoperatedin
commerce,and40.9%oftotalprivatecapitalwasinvestedincommerce(245).217 Leveragingpoliticalinfluenceintoexclusivelicensingarrangementsinmuchthesamemannerastheydidduring
thedaysoftheMiddleEastSupplyCentre,thepost-independenceperiodwouldseethecountry’soldmoney
118
throughtheircommercialsuccesses,moreover,thesesameactorsweresubsequentlyableto
securedominanceoverthecountry’semergentbanking,insurance,andconstructionsectorsas
well.218Byconsequence,themarketstructuresthatprevailedinmostareasoftheeconomy
duringthe1946-1973periodarebestclassifiedasoligopolisticormonopolisticinnature.Asthe
capitalrequirementsforindustrialventureswerebeyondthemeansofmostprivatesector
enterprises—andasthestatehadawardedmonopolyextractionrightstothelargelypublicly
ownedphosphate,potash,cement,andoilandgascompaniesestablishedinthisperiod—,
marketsinthesesectorsgavehosttopreciouslittlecompetitionaswell.Theaggregateeffectsof
thislargersystem,then,weretodisarticulateprofitsfrommattersofriskandinnovation,to
deepentheeconomy’sconsumptiondependence,andtorendermarketcompetitionasimple
competitionforrents.Andwhilethepost-independenceformofmarketcompetition—
underpinnedbyconciliatorystate-capitalrelationsandintracapitalrelationswhollydominated
byanelitefraction—wassufficienttogreasetheaccumulationprocessforatime,itdidsoby
deprivingtheeconomyoftheactualproductiveandcreativeenergiesitneededforlong-term
development.
maintainitscontroloftraditionalretailandwholesalemarketsandcolonizemanyoftheemergingimportmarketswroughtbyJordan’smodernization(Masri,p.283).Themostlucrativeofthesenewmarketswasthatofautomobiles,wheretheMango,Mu’asher,Taba’a,andDajanifamiliesexploitedlocalmonopoliestoextractsizablerents(Debruyne,2012,p.132).
218 Thoughnotoperatingthroughthesamecorporatestructureasthemultisectorfamilyownedcorporationsthat
emergedinSouthAmericaintheseyears,thecross-sectorbusinessholdingsandinvestmentsofthisfractionofthecapitalistclasswerenonethelesssignificant.Havingtakenupprimepositioninconstructionandfinanceaswell,themerchants’migrationfromanexclusivefocusoncommercialactivitieswouldstandthemreadytothriveduringthemassiverealestateboomthatcommencedfollowingtheinjectionofGulfcapitalinthepost-1973period.
119
Asfortheoligopolistsandmonopoliststhemselves,onewouldbeunsurprisedtolearn
thattheelite-dominatedformofstate-capitalrelationspreviouslydetailedwoundupworkingto
thebenefitoftheMandateeraquotacoterie.219AsdemonstratedinMasri’smagisterialstudyof
theJordanianbourgeoisie,bythemiddleofthe1960s,thisnarroweliteofroughlyforty-odd
familiesstillcollectivelycontrolledover54%oftheaggregatecapitalintheeconomy.220Herein,
theAsfur,Sha’sha’a,Mu’asher,AbuHassan,AbuJaber,Malhas,Haddad,Hattahit,Shuman,Ali
Bdeir,Bilbeisi,Mangu,MasriandAbual-Raghibfamiliesremainedespeciallyprominent.221This
continuedconcentrationofimmensewealthinthehandsofaselectelitetherebywidenedthe
internalfracturesthathadopenedwithinthedomesticcapitalistclassbackinthe1940s.
SocialControl
Asmentioned,theconstitutionpromulgatedduringTalal’sbriefreignin1952wasa
relativelyprogressiveone.Specifictoworkers,Article23assertedthat“Workisarightforall
219 Asmallnumberofindividualsdidmanagetobreakintothehigherreachesofthebourgeoiseliteinthisperiod.
Generallyspeaking,theydidsothroughsuccessesintheconstruction,manufacturing,and/ortransportationsectors(Masri,p.295).
220 Masri’sfiguresarecalculatedthroughmeasuringtheaggregateequitysharethatthesefamiliesheldinallextant
privateandpublicenterprisesaboveabaselinecapitalizationof20,000JD(pp.245,292).221 See:Masri(2005),p.275-277. Disaggregatingthesefiguresdowntothelevelofindividuals,Masri’scomprehensivesurveyofarchivedataatthe
MinistryofTradewouldshowthatamere179individualsheld57.2%ofallprivatesectorequityinthisperiod.Wideningthelensjustabitfurther,thesameanalysiswouldrevealthat768individualscollectivelypossessedafull80%oftotalprivatesectorequity.
RegardingMasri’smethodology,itisworthnotingthathiscalculationsexcludedtheequityholdingsofsmall
firmswithcapitalization’sofunder20,000JD.
120
Jordaniancitizens,thestatehastosecureitbysteeringthenationaleconomyandsupportingits
growth.”Italsocontainedanumberofprovisionsestablishingbasicrightsvis-a-visworking
hours,paidannualleave,unionization,childlabor,andsocialprotectionsintheeventof
termination,sickness,orinjury.Byconsequence,therewasajuridicalfoundationinplaceatthe
verystartofthepost-independenceperioduponwhichemergentworkingclassescouldadvance
theircollectiveinterestsanduponwhichalargersocialpeacemightbeconsummated.222
FollowingthepassageoftheLaborTradeUnionsLawNo.35in1953,apieceoflegislation
establishingthatanygroupofsevenormore(whetherunitedbyprofessionorplaceofwork)had
therighttounionizeandtostrike,aratherrobusttradeunionmovementdid,infact,riseand
consolidateconsiderableinfluenceinthehopefulanddemocraticenvironsofpre-1957Jordan.By
1954,sixoftheearliesttradeunionscoalescedsotoformtheGeneralFederationofJordanTrade
Unions(GFJTU),andworkingclassorganizationallifereallybegantoflower.Withinayearofthe
GFJTU’sfoundation,thetotalnumberofstate-recognizedlaborunionshadgrowntothirty-six,
twenty-fiveofwhichweremembertotheGeneralFederation.Adoptinganactivepoliticalroleas
well,Jordan’searlylaborandtradeunionsweremajoralliesofthenationalist,pan-Arabist,and
leftistpartiesthenthrivingduringJordan’sbriefdemocraticopening.Alliestothegovernmentof
Suleimanal-Nabulsiinparticular,thelaborunionmovementbackedthePrimeMinisteras
tensionsescalatedwiththePalace—andasthePalaceoptedtoexecuteitscoupagainsthimin
Aprilof1957.223
222 HaniHourani,TheJordanianLabourMovement,FriedrichEbertStiftung(2002),p.12.223 Hourani(2002),pp.12-15.
121
Giventheseallegiances,itwouldbeunsurprisingwhentheKing’sgeneralizedpost-1957
counterrevolution,impositionofmartiallaw,andcancelationofdemocracybroughtJordanian
laborintothecrosshairsofJordan’sreactionaryturn.Duringthecrackdownofthelate1950sand
early1960s,manylaborleaderswereforcedintoinvoluntaryexilesinSyriaandEgypt.Having
ascribedcommunistagitationnotonlytotheleadershipcadrebutalsototheunionasan
institution,thePalacewouldnextlaunchedamorewholesalecampaignagainsttheGFJTUandits
membership.Byconsequenceofthesemachinations,asof1961,thenumberofactiveunionsin
Jordanwasreducedfromthe1956highofthirty-ninetoameresixteen.Throughsuchaculling,
thenumberofworkersrepresentedbyunionswasreducedtoatotalof9,000.
Thepoliticalthawingthatbeganlaterthatsameyear(1961)didbrieflyreverselabor’s
fortunes,especiallyfollowingthepromulgationLaborLawno.21.Withinfiveyears,thenumberof
unionsrecognizedbythegovernmenthadrecoveredtoahealthyfigureofforty.Withinnine
years,unionmembershiprollsquadrupledfromthelowsof1961aswell.224Alas,whatpolitical
momentsgivethpoliticalmomentstaketh,thistimeupontheoutbreakof1970-1971’scivilwar.
HavingalignedthemselveswiththeFedayeen—anunsurprisingoutcomegiventhattheunions
representedmanyofthesameleftistforces,TransjordanianandPalestinian,asdidthe
paramilitarygroups—,theregimehadthejustificationitneededtomoveagainstthelabor
movementwithunprecedentedlevelsofforceandcomprehensiveness.
Thepost-1970repressionofthetradeunions—andthepost-1970institutionalizationof
socialcontrolinJordan—wascarriedoutinanumberofsteps.Tobegin,followingBlack
224 Ibid,pp.13-14
122
September,laborissueswouldsubsequentlycomeunderthejurisdictionandauthorityofa
specialdepartmentattheGeneralIntelligenceDirectory(GID).Thisadministrative
reorganizationmeantthattheworkers’portfoliocametobedealtwithundertherationalitiesof
domesticsecurity.SubjectedtothetactileandcoerciveprerogativesoftheJordanianmukhabarat,
theactivitiesofworkingclassinstitutionswouldswiftlygroundtoahalt.225Complementingthe
physicalityofthisfirstdimensionofpost-1970socialcontrolwereahostofmoresubtle
interventionsaswell.In1971,theMinistryofSocialAffairsandLabordissolvedthe
democraticallyelectedExecutiveCommitteeoftheGFJTUandreplaceditwithacommitteeof
comprisedofgovernmentselectedappointees.Buildinguponthismoveagainstlabor’sleadership
class,throughaseriesofsubsequenttemporarylaws(specifically,TemporaryLaborLaw67and
Decree14/K1/1971),theMinistrynextgranteditselftheauthoritybothtointerfereinthe
internalaffairsofthetradeunionsandtodisestablishthoseunionsdeemedpoliticalactiveor
involvedinthe“propagationofdestructiveideologies.”226Inthismanner,thelessdocileamongst
Jordan’stradeunionswereeitherdisbandedormergedwithamoreobedientoutfit;withina
year,thetotalnumberofunionsoperatinginthecountrywasreducedtoseventeen.Whatis
more,asatroikacomprisedoftheMinistryofLabor,theGFJTU,andtheChambersofCommerce
andIndustryweresimultaneouslyempoweredtoadjudicatetherecognitionofanysubsequent
unionizationefforts,thatstate’sinterventionismalsoallowedforatightregulationofthefreedom
ofassociationgoingforward.Wieldingtheseregulatorypowerswithanironfist,since1971,the
225 Ibid,p.69226 Ibid,p.15
123
statehasrefusedtorecognizeasinglenewunionbeyondtheco-optedseventeenunderits
thumb.227Inadditiontoinvestingitselfwiththeauthoritytoissueinjunctionsagainststrikesand
thepowertolevyfinesandcriminalchargesagainststrikeorganizersandparticipants,the
Ministrywouldalsoillegalizestrikesinvitalindustriesatthistime.228
Throughanumberofadministrativeandlegalmaneuvers,theindependence,
representativeness,andpoliticalefficacyoftheJordaniantradeunionmovementwasbroughtto
adecisive,unambiguousend.229Withadocile,co-optedeliteplacedinpositionsofleadership
withintheindividualunionsandwithintheGFJTU,socialcontrolwouldhenceforthbepreserved
throughtheMinistry’smaintenanceofthisdisarticulationbetweenJordan’slaborinstitutions
andthecountry’sworkingclasslife.230
ExternalArticulation:Engagingwiththeregionalandinternationaleconomies
TheexternalarticulationoftheJordanianeconomyduringthisperiodwasdefinedbytwo
principalattributes:(1)Amodalityofregionalandglobalintegrationthatwasgenerativeof
structuraltradedeficitsand(2)Abudgetstrategythatrenderedthestatefiscallydependenton
externalsources.231Regardingthefirstoftheseattributes,whileanumberoftariff-related
227 AhmadAwad,“Jordan’sParadoxicalApproachtoTradeUnions”,PhenixCenterReport(2017),p.4228 Aruri,p.108;Hourani,p.70.229 Ibid,pp.15-21230 Awad(2017),p.2.231 Itisalsoworthnotinghowthestate’sbudgetarydependence(andthemoregeneraldependenceofthestate)
manifestedinthesecuritysector.ThemartialdependenceofthestatewasofcoursebestpersonifiedbyPasha
124
restrictionsontradewereimposedthroughouttheperiodunderexamination,suchmeasures
wereprimarilyimplementedforthepurposeofrevenuegeneration(ratherthanforthepurpose
ofnurturingdomesticindustry).Stayingwellawayfromtheimportsubstitutionindustrialization
(ISI)modelsthenenvoguethroughoutthethirdworld,Jordanlargelyacceptedtheconventional,
US-backedwisdomofcomparativeadvantagewhenitcametotradepolicy.Theadoptionofthis
tradestrategyresultedinunprecedentedinflowsofconsumeritems232(aswellasincreased
inflowsofcapitalgoods)andtheconsolidationofanexportbasketcomprisedprimarilyof
agriculturalgoodsaswellasvolatile,relativelylow-pricedcommoditiessuchaspotashand
phosphates.233Thecontentandmagnitudeoftheserespectiveinflowsandoutflowsyielded
consistentandconsiderabletradedeficits.By1964,theannualdeficitonthetradebalancehad
reachedJD40.7million.Twoshortyearslater,ithadjumpedallthewaytoJD56.8million.Asof
1973,itclimbedwithinafewwhiskersofJD100million.
JohnGlubb,whoretainedauthorityovertheJordanianArmedForcesupandthrough1956.Itwouldcontinue,moreover,evenafterGlubb’sdismissalandtheabrogationoftheJordan’smilitarytreatywithBritain.ItwastheAmericansandDulles’StateDepartmentthatmateriallysecuredtheKingwhenhemadehismoveagainsttheNabulsigovernmentin1957.ItwasBritishparatroopersthatlandedinJordanin1958followingthecoupagainsttheIraqiKing,moreover,furthercontinuingtheexternalizationofHussein’spraetorianguardianship(Dann,89-90).Finally,itwastheAmericansand,covertly,theIsraelisthatagainsecuredtheregimeagainstthePalestinianFedayeenandtheirinternationalsupportersin1970-1971.
232 Importsincreasedby36%between1964and1966alone.Duringthisperiod,therateofgrowthseeninthe
aggregatevalueofimportedconsumeritemsoutpacedpopulationgrowthrates(Masri,142).233 Between1964and1966,agriculturalgoods(fruits,vegetables,andoliveoil,primarily)constituted58%ofall
commodityexports.Subsequenttothat,phosphates(anditsderivativeproducts)cametodominatetheexportledger.
Masri,p.141
125
DataoriginallyprovidedbyJordanianDepartmentofStatistics.234
DataoriginallyprovidedbyJordanianDepartmentofStatistics235
234 IspecificallygatheredthedataforthesechartsfromMasri(2005),Appendix4,Table8.235 IspecificallygatheredthisdatafromMasri(2005),Appendix4,Tables21-25.
126
Asforthegovernment’sbalancesheet,externalbudgetarydependencenotonlyleftthe
stateinapositionwhereitsdevelopmentambitions(andcapitalspendingmorespecifically)
wereatthewhimsofforeigndonors236;italsogreatlyaffectedtheforeignpolicychoicesavailable
toJordan’spolicymakers.Theregime’srelianceonGulfbudgetaryaid,forinstance,pushedthe
KingintoabindwherehewasforcedtodispatchJordanianmilitarytoSaudiArabiaandKuwait
forthepurposesoftrainingthosecountries’respectivemilitaries—andforthepurposeofstaffing
thepersonalsecurityofthetworoyalfamilies.237ThoughBrandandRyanhaveshowedhowdeft
theKingprovedinmanagingtheIsraeliquestionandthedifferentplayersinArabregional
conflictsinthepost-1973period,thestate’sincapacitieswhenitcametoraisingdomestic
revenuesneverthelessmeantforeignpolicydecisionswouldalwaysneededtobeevaluated
throughconsiderationoftheinterestsofJordan’sforeignsponsors.
SourcesofGovernmentRevenues,1953-1966238 Unit:%ofTotal
Domestic Revenue
External Budget Support
Development Grants
Foreign Loans
1953/54 36.19 63.81 0 0
1954/55 42.44 57.56 0 0 1955/56 42.31 47.51 1.75 8.43
1956/57 41.14 43.89 7.58 7.39
236 BritainprovidedthemainsourceofbudgetsupporttoJordanpriorto1957,atwhichpointtheUnitedStatestook
onthebruntoftheresponsibility.ThoughessentialtothemaintenanceofHussein’sruleintheaftermathofhiscoupagainsttheNabulsigovernment,onceconfidentthatleftistforceswerenolongercapableofthreateningthemonarchy,Americanassistanceeventuallybegandeclining(andsharplyso).Thisleftpost-1962Jordaniangovernmentswithashortfallinrevenue,ashortfalltheywouldonlybeabletomakeupfollowing1967(andtheinfluxofGulfsupport)and1970’sBlackSeptember(andthere-influxofAmericansupport).
237 Brand(1994),pp.87-93;124-134.238 DataoriginallyprovidedbyMinistryofFinance.IspecificallygatheredthisdatafromMasri(2005),Appendix4,
Table3.
127
1957/58 38.95 55.85 3.86 1.33
1958/59 35.57 53.58 7.16 3.69 1959/60 42.03 48.58 1.51 7.87
1960/61 44.01 52.27 3.56 0.16 1961/62 44.05 48.61 5.86 1.48
1962/63 54.31 37.81 2.63 5.25 1963/64 53.3 38.5 4.62 3.58
1964/65 51.57 29.6 3.72 15.1 1965/66 59.95 28.8 5.45 5.81
Jordan’sForeignPatrons(1964-1973)
Units:ThousandsofJD
Tablesprovided
byBrand
(1994),pp.44-
45
128
Ideology
InlegitimatingboththeJordanianmodalityofcapitalismandtheHashemite’sstewardship
oftheeconomyandnationduringthisperiod,KingHusseinetaladoptedanumberofdifferent
ideologicalscripts.Regardingpoliticallegitimacy,heandhisPalaceinitiallyplayeduptheKing’s
pan-Arabistcredentials—primarilysotofendofftheNasseristchallenge.Between1948and
1969,theregimealsopositionedtheKingastheunifyingpersonageembodyingandguidingthe
Palestinian-Jordanianunion.239Intheaftermathof1970-1971,politicallegitimationpivoted
towardsTransjordanianchauvinism,tribalism,andtraditionalismwithatouchofreligiosity.240
Unsurprisinggivenhisregionalalignmentwitharoyalist,conservativeaxisandgiven
Jordan’spositioningontheAmericansideoftheColdWar,Husseinetal.’sideologicalpositionson
theeconomypartiallydrewuponliberaltropesregardingmarketsandbusinessmen.Thiswas
mostobviouslyevincedintheeffortsheandhischiefpolicymakerstooktointerpellatethe
domesticbourgeoisieasthesingularagentofdevelopmentandprogress—,aswasevincedinthe
fawningtreatmenttheprivatesectorwasgivenineachofthethree,five,andsevenyeareconomic
planspublishedbetween1962and1986.241Alongwitharticulatingthesemoreliberalpositions,
239 MohammedAliOudatandAymanAlshboul,“’JordanFirst’:Tribalism,Nationalism,andLegitimacyofPowerin
Jordan”,IntellectualDiscourse(18:1),2010,p.73.240 RobertSatloff,FromAbdullahtoHussein,p.49-50.Seealso:Massad(2001),pp.207-263,241 Eachoneofthesedocumentsinvariablypronouncedthattheprivatesectorwouldbethekeytodevelopmentand
thattheprivatesectorwouldtaketheleadintermsofproductiveinvestment. Thiswasso,ofcourse,despitetheJordanianbourgeoisiehavingabnegatedthehistoricalroletraditionally
incumbentuponitsclass,anabnegationmanifestinboththeJordanianbusinessclass’rentseeking,itsdisinterestinindustrialinvestment,anditsdisinterestindemocraticgovernance.
129
Husseinetalwerewasalsoconsistentinmakingideologicalappealsgroundedinthepost-
colonialliturgyofwelfarismanddevelopmentalism.Speechesanddevelopmentplanspublished
bytheregimeconsistentlyexpressedthesentimentthateconomicgrowthnottobeconceivedof
asanendintoitself—butasameanstowardsadvancingthecollectivewelfare.Pairedwiththis
claim,moreover,wasasecondonemoredirectlyhedgingagainsthispreviouslyarticulated
liberalism,onesuggestingthatmarketswereonlydesirabletotheextentthattheyimproved
collectivesocialwelfare,andonechargingthatthestateneededtotakeanactiveroleininsuring
thatsuchimprovementswererealized.242ArticulatingthesameRooseveltianbalanceaswas
evincedinhispublicsectorhiringpolicies—andintheconstitution’senshringofagovernment
jobs’guarantee—,theseaddendatohiscoreideologicalpositionstherebyelevatedthestate
alongsidethebourgeoisie,positingthatneitheronenortheothercouldbefullysufficientin
drivingthecountry’smodernization.Takeninconjunction,itcouldthereforebeargued(asMazur
has)thatHussein’sideologicallegitimationoftheeconomyemphasizedasynthesiswherethe
“fundamentallyfree-enterprisephilosophy(oftheKing)wasfusedwitha‘benevolent
paternalism’involvingahighdegreeofadministrativediscretion.”243
CrisisandCollapse:Theendofthepost-independenceSSA
Notwithstandingthemanyissueswiththepost-independencesocialstructureof
accumulation—includingtherelativelylowlevelsofcapitalaccumulationthatit
242 Scheyagh,p.430.243 Mazur(1979),p.235.
130
institutionalized—,itheldrelativelysteadyforthefirsttwentyyearsofJordan’spost-colonial
existence.Asintimatedthroughoutthischapter,however,thisSSAdidindeedcomeundoneunder
thepressureoftwoseparatepoliticaleconomiccrises.
Asmentioned,thefirstofthesecrisesoccurredin1967,whenJordan’sparticipationinthe
ArabwareffortagainstIsraelcostittheWestBankandJerusalem.Theeconomiceffectsofthis
losswereenormous.Priorto1967,theWestBankhadcontributedroughly33-38%ofJordan’s
annualgrossdomesticproduct.Havingcomprised55%ofJordan’sservicesector,43%ofitsretail
andwholesaletradesectors,41%ofitsrealestatesector—andhavingcontributedbetween10-
18%ofindustrialoutputandmorethan33%ofthecountry’selectricityandagricultural
output—,thiscontractionhitvirtuallyeveryareaoftheeconomy.244Whatismore,giventhatthe
WestBankhadalsoconstitutedmorethan40%oftheeconomy’sdomesticconsumermarket,its
losswouldalsogreatlyreducedemandforJordaniangoodsgoingforward,whethertheybe
producedbypublicorprivatefirms.Industrialfirms—particularlytheJordanianPetroleum
RefineryCompanyandtheJordanianCementFactory—sufferedmostacutelyduetothelossof
thisconsumerbase,onlyfurthersettingbackthecountry’sdelinquentindustrialization.245
Tomakemattersevenworseforanalreadyflailingeconomy,theIsraelioccupationofthe
WestBankalsoprecipitatedasecondwaveofrefugeemigrationintoJordan.Intotal,anestimated
300-400,000PalestinianswoundupcrossingtotheeasternsideoftheriverJordanfollowingthe
(illegal)Israeliconquestof1967.Thoughmanyoftheserefugeeswereabsorbedintothe
244 Masri(2005),p.194245 Mazur(1979),p.212
131
infrastructureoftheUNRWA’srelativelyautonomouspoliticaleconomy—andwhileothersfound
materialsecuritythroughjoiningtheranksofthePalestinianfedayeen—,thismassiveinfluxof
populationstillputanenormousamountofstrainonsocial,political,economic,andecological
fabricsthatwerethreadbaretobeginwith.Ontheeconomicfront,thisstrainwasmostdirectly
feltinthelabormarket,whereaprolongedunemploymentcrisiswouldstubbornlypersistupand
throughthemid-1970s.WiththeUnitedStatesalsoadoptingpunitivemeasuresinresponseto
Jordan’sparticipationinthepan-Arabwareffort—measuresprincipallymanifestinthefreezing
ofitsbudgetsupportandtheceasingoftechnicalassistance—,theprecarityofbothregimeand
societywasonlydeepened.
Alreadyflatliningduetotheshocksandupheavalsof1967,theeventsof1970-1971only
acceleratedthedeathspiralthattheJordanianeconomyhadalreadyfalleninto.Thoughthe
regimeultimatelyprovedvictoriousinthecivilwaritwagedinthoseyearsagainstaloose,
disorganizedcoalitionofPalestinianparamilitarymovements,victorywassomewhatPyrrhicin
thatitalsoresultedinJordan’sbanishmentfromthewiderregionaleconomy.AstheFedayeen
wereexiledtoLebanon,SyriaandIraqwouldrespondbyclosingtheirborderstoJordanian
exports,SaudiArabia’sbyshuttingofftheTAPline—whosepassagethroughJordanianterritories
hadprovidedthegovernmentwithakeysourceofrevenues—,andLibyaandKuwaitby
curtailingtheirannualaidpayments.Noteventherecommencement(andsizableincrease)of
Americanexternalsupportcouldstoptheresultingdriftintocontractionanddepression.246
Foreignreservesshortages,fiscalinsolvency,andthebankingsystem’scollapseredoundedoff
246 Forthishistory,seeKnowles(2001),p.91
132
oneanothersotoproducedepressionlikeconditions,andtheviabilityofboththenational
economyanditsHashemitemindersappearedtenuousatbest.247
Alas,thewhimsicalityofinternationalpoliticswouldeventuallyturninthePalace’sfavor
andinsodoingoffertheJordanianeconomyalifelineinitsmomentofdesperateneed.Critical
herewastheArabwareffortagainstIsraelin1973.AsthememoryofBlackSeptemberfadedand
Jordanwasrevalorizedasafrontlinestatewithinthisrenewedregionalconflict,thePalacefound
itselfratherauspiciouslypositionedwithinaregionaleconomypoisedtoexpandmanytimes
overfollowingtheexplosionofoilpricesinthepost-1973period.
Henceforththerecipientofunprecedentedlevelsofofficialexternalassistance,
remittances,andlowinterestloans,capitalaccumulationrateswouldtickupwardacrossthe
1970s.Theydidso,however,throughaformofcapitalismthatwassubstantiallydifferentthan
thepre-1973iteration.Flushwithcash,thePalace—nottheelitefractionofthecapitalistclass—
wastobecomethelargestandmostinfluentialactorintheeconomy.Consolidatingasystemof
whatKnowleshascalledinducedstaterentierism,theHashemitepoliticaleconomywould
therebyevolveintoaderivative,poorman’sversionofthecapitalismstakingrootintheGulfat
thesametime.248Facilitatedintheseeffortsbyanextremelyfavorableexternalenvironment—
247 WhilethecrateringoftheeconomyinevitablyaffectedJordan’spoortoagreaterextentthananyoneelse,the
effectsofthismultilevelquagmirewerealsoacutelyfeltbytheelitefractionofJordan’scapitalistclass.Inastateoftorpidityifnotexistentialdespair,theyearsbetween1967and1973wouldseetheirinvestmentscease,theirbusinessactivitiespause,andtheircontributionstogrossfixedcapitalformationdriftintonegligbility.AsArabBank—byfarthebiggestfinancialinstitutioninJordan—wasownedbyAbdelMajidShoman,anethnicallyPalestinianindividualknowntohavemaintainedacloserelationshipwiththePLO,theregime’swarontheFedayeenwouldgenerateuncertaintyinhighleverageplaces,uncertaintythatinturnprecipitatedthiscollapseininvestment.Withthedomesticcapitalistclassshortonconfidenceandcapital,itwouldlargelycedealleconomicagencytothePalaceoverthecourseofthenextfifteenyears,asIwilldetailinthenextchapter.
SeeMasri(2005),p.212andPiro(1998),p.62,formoredetails.248 Knowles(2001),p.110.
133
oneprovidingbothaninfluxofcapitalandalabormarkettoabsorbthehighandlow-skilled
ethnicPalestiniansthatwereabouttobemadeincreasinglyprecariousthroughthepost-Black
Septemberpracticesofthestate—,arevitalized,reintegratedstructureofsocial,political,
economic,andideologicalinstitutionswassoontobeestablished,astructurethatwouldstabilize
JordaniancapitalismasmuchasitdiditsHashemitecustodian.
AsIwillshow,itwasalsoatthistimethatHussein’sembeddedneopatrimonialismmaturedintoitsfinalform.
Driveninnosmallpartbyabrieflymobilizedmilitarycoupin1974—onethatsawtheverysameactorsthathadjustsecuredtheKing’sthronethreeyearspriornowthreatentochallengehisrule—,theKingwouldincreasepublicsectorhiring,increasepublicsectorwages,andestablishauniversalsystemofsubsidiesandpricecontrolssotosecurethematerialwelfareofhundredsofthousands,withspecialbenefitsgiventohisethnicallyTransjordanianallies.
134
CHAPTERFIVE
Oil,inducedstaterentierism,andJordan’ssocialstructureofaccumulation:1973-1986
Aswasdetailedatthecloseofthepreviouschapter,despiteholdingrelatively(and
surprisingly)steadyfortwenty-oneyears,thepost-independenceSSAultimatelycollapsedunder
theweightofthepolitical-economiccrisesof1967and1970-1971.Thoughtheprovenanceof
thesecriseswereexogenoustoJordan(atleastinpart),theyneverthelesscatalyzedarather
profoundtransformationinthecountry’sendogenouseconomicorganization.Thepost-1973SSA
thateventuallyemergedconsolidatedandstabilizedanentirelynewmodalityofcapitalisminthe
HashemiteKingdomofJordan.
Aswillbedetailed,thestabilizationandgrowthofJordan’snewcapitalismwerelargely
achievedthroughexternallyfinancedcurrentexpendituresandhighratesofprivate
consumption.249Byvirtueofthesespikesinstateandhouseholdspending,aggregatefinal
consumptioncametoaverageapproximately111%ofGDPbetween1973and1986—andthe
economy’sexpansioncametobewhollydisarticulatedfromdomestictotalfactorproductivity,
whichwasstagnantacrosstheperiodunderexamination.250Thedivergenceofprofitratesand
capitalaccumulationfromTFPwouldofcourseprovedeeplyproblematicforlong-term
development.
249 TotheextentthatconsumptionwasitselfunderwrittenbythereceiptofGulf-originatingremittances,moreover,
ittooshouldbeconceptualizedasaderivativeoftheexternalenvironment.250 Masri(2005),p.342 ThisstagnationinTFPoccurredinspiteofpublicexpendituresprovidingforrelativelyhealthyratesofgross
fixedcapitalformation.
135
Boththenon-realizationofTFPgainsandJordan’smoregeneralsquanderingofitspetro-
derivedinflowscanbeexplainedbythenearsightednessoftheregime’spoliticalsurvival
strategy.Thisstrategyinstitutionalizedasystemwherebythecapitalthatwasmadeavailable
throughexternalaidandremittanceswasfunneledintoallocativeandpatronage-related
activitiesratherthanproductiveones;italsotradedlong-terminvestment,planning,anddelayed
gratificationforthesocialopiateofimmediateconsumptionandeliterent-seeking.Similarly
problematic,italsorefastenedthedependencythatboththePalaceandthecapitalistclasshad
developedvis-a-vistheimportmarket.Asprivateprofitrates,thedomesticrevenuesofthe
Palace,andtherent-seekingstrategiesofaninstitutionallyweakenedbureaucracyeachcameto
(directlyorindirectly)requirethereproductionofmassivetradedeficits,theinstitutional
interestsofeachsuchactor/organizationalsocametorequiretheenduringunderdevelopmentof
theeconomy.Byconsequence,muchoftheboomthatwasinherenttopost-1973capitalinflows
evaporatedintohouseholdconsumption,governmentspending,andinflation(especiallyinthe
realestatesector251).
ThestabilizationofcapitalaccumulationprovidedbythisSSAcouldonlybutbebrief,
then,aswellasbeingfundamentallyvulnerabletoexogenousshocks.Oncesuchshockscame
throughthecollapseofoilpricesintheearly1980s,Jordaniancapitalism(anditsauthoritarian
251 AsdetailedinapublicationofthePrimeMinster(atthetimeofwriting)OmarRazzaz,landpricesroseby500%
between1970and1976,andthenbyanother500%between1975and1985(OmarRazzaz,“ContestedSpace:UrbanSettlementaroundAmman”,MiddleEastReport1993).
SeeKnowles(2001),p.106onthebuiltenvironment’sshareoffixedcapitalformationduringthisperiod.
136
overseer)wouldenterintoanotherlongperiodofcrisis,onethathasbeenstabilizedthough
neverentirelyescaped.
Organizationally,thischapterwillcloselyfollowthestructurelaiddownduringmyreview
ofJordan’spost-independencesocialstructureofaccumulation.Afteragainbeginningwitha
reviewofthepoliticaldomain,Iwillproceedtoanalysesof(I)theparticularformofeconomic
interventionismadoptedbythestateduringthisperiod;(ii)theparticularformofstate-capital
relationsconsolidatedduringthisperiod;(iii)theformofmarketcompetitionconsolidated
duringthisperiod;(iv)thesocialcontrolregimeconsolidatedduringthisperiod;and(v)the
externalarticulationoftheeconomyduringthisperiod.Aswaspreviouslythecase,Iwillalso
concludethischaptermydeconstructinghowthissocialstructureofaccumulationeventually
gaveway,thetimeinthelate1980s.Theonlysubstantiveanalyticaldifferencebetweenthetwo
chapters,then,isthatthisonewillomittheideologicalinstitiutionalizationofcapital/powerfrom
consideration.Thischoicewasmadeonthebasisofthefactthatideologicalinstitutionalization
waslargelyinvariantacrossthetwoperiodsunderexamination.252
………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………..
ThePoliticalInstitutionalizationofJordan’sNewCapitalism:InsulatingPolicymaking,the
HegemonyofthePalace,andtheDeclineoftheRationalistState
252 Despitebeingpublishedinthemidstofaneconomiccrisisgatheringspeedwitheachpassingday,the1986Five
YearPlannotonlyarticulatedtheverysameoptimismashadpreviousplanningdocuments,butalsoreinflatedthisimaginaryofprogressandmodernizationachievedthroughthehealthyandefficientbondofbusinessclassandstate.
137
Politicsproperinthepost-1973periodremainedorderedbythelogicofemergencyand
executivesupremacy.Theillegalizationofpoliticalassociationstayedineffectthroughthemid-
1980s,andparliamentarylifecontinuedoninitsstateofpermanentabeyance.Having
reproducedsuchinstitutionalandorganizationalvacuums,theKingandhisallieswerefreeto
rulethroughroyaldecreeandtheissuanceofprovisionallegislation.Keentopreventany
alternativepowercenterfromemerging,thoseallieswouldthemselvesbemanagedthroughelite
circulationandco-optation.253
Theinstitutionalizationofsuchanaristocraticallystyledsystemofhousepoliticssawtoit
thatindividualssuchasZaydal-Rifa’i254,MuhammadShafiq255,MudarBadran256,WalidAsfur257,
253 Thoughsomeoftheoldmerchantelitewereincludedinthissystemofelitecirculation,theseactorsfound
themselvessomewhatpoliticallyrelegatedduringthisperiod.Whichisnottosaythatsuchelitesdidnotbenefitfromthepoliciesimplementedatthisstage,asIwilldetail.
254 Rifa’iwasappointedPrimeMinisterin1973atthetenderageof36.255 ShafiqservedanumberoftermsasMinisterofFinanceandwiththeNationalPlanningCouncil(abodylater
reorganizedastheMinistryofPlanning).256 BadraninitiallyservedasMinisterofEducationinRifa’i’sgovernment.HetoowouldserveasPrimeMinister
between1976-1979and1980-1984.257 AsfurservedasChairmanoftheJordanFertilizersIndustriesCompany,MinsterofIndustryandTrade,andasa
boardmemberontheJordanCementFactoryCompany,amongsthisotherposts.
138
Alial-Nusr258,Umaral-Nabulsi259,Mahiral-Shukri260,ZiadFariz261,HanaAwda262,andAhmad
Ubaydat263wereshuffledinandoutofpositionsofprominence,whetheringovernment,atthe
RoyalCourt,oramongstJordan’sgrowingnumberofstateownedenterprises(SOEs).264Though
theconstantshufflingwassuccessfulinachievingitsprimaryobjective—preventingthe
emergenceofsecondarypowercenters—,suchanachievementcameattheexpenseofpolicy
coherence,organizationalcompetence,andlong-termplanning.Asthisrelatestoeconomic
policymakinginparticular,inconjunctionwiththedeepeningdisjunctureofgovernmentfrom
thedemos,thedegradationofthebureaucracythatwasbroughtaboutthroughtheKing’selite
shuffling265createdthespaceforanumberofnewautonomous,Palace-alignedpolicymaking
bodiestoemergeandaccrueconsiderableinfluenceovertheplanningprocess.
258 Al-NusrsatontheboardsoftheJordanCementFactoryCompanyandtheJordanFertilizersIndustriesCompany
aswellasservingasMinisterofPlanning.259 Al-NabulsiservedasMinisterofAgricultureinRifai’sfirstgovernmentinadditiontosittingontheboardofthe
ArabPotashCompany.260 Al-ShukrisatontheboardsoftheJordanCementFactoryCompany,theArabPotashCompany,andtheJordan
FertilizersIndustriesCompanywhilealsoservingasDeputyDirectoroftheCentralBankofJordan.261 FarizsatontheboardoftheArabPotashCompanybeforetakingupseniorpositionsintheMinistryofFinance
andattheCentralBankofJordan.262 AwdaservedasSecretaryGeneraloftheNationalPlanningCouncil,asMinisterofFinance,andasChairmanof
theJordanFertilizersIndustriesCompaniesamongsthisotherposts.263 UbaydatwasPrimeMinisterbetween1984-1985.264 Foremoreonthisnewgenerationofpollicymakers,seePiro(1998),p.63.265 Thisdisarraywascompoundedbythefactthattheearliergenerationofrationalistpolicyplanners—best
representedbyWasfial-Tal—hadfallenoutoffavorwitharegimenowflushwithcash(andthereforelessconcernedwithwhatameritocratic,efficientstateapparatuscouldoffer).
139
FirstamongstthesePalace-alignedinstitutionswastheEconomicSecurityCommittee
(ESC).StewardedbyCrownPrinceHassan,theESCwasestablishedatthebehestofCentralBank
GovernorDr.Khalilal-SalimfollowingthelossoftheWestBankandbroughtintoofficialexistence
withthepassageofa1971PlanningLaw.WithaboardofdirectorscomprisedoftheMinisterof
Finance,theMinisterofTradeandIndustry,theMinisterofTransport,andtheaforementioned
GovernoroftheCentralBank,theinstitution’sofficialmandatewasaconsultativeone.Though
investedonlywiththeauthoritytoaidthegovernmentasitnavigatedthechallengesbornofthe
naksa,theESCquicklyoutgrewanysuchlimitedbailiwick.266By1974andwithafullRoyal
blessing,theESCwasoperatingasbothanunelectedlegislatureandactivistappendageofthe
executivebranch.Henceforth,theESCoverturneddisagreeableexistinglegislation,decreednew
lawatitsowndiscretionandwithoutpublishingthecontentsofsaidlawsinthestate’sOfficial
Gazette,dissolvedandreappointedtheboardsofpublicshareholdingcompanies,anddictatedthe
borrowingandlendingbehavioroftheCentralBank.Insodoing,theESCmorethananyother
policybodycametodefinethejuridicalfoundationsforthecountry’snewcapitalism.267
SupportingitintheseeffortswasasecondPalace-alignedpolicybodymidwifedinto
existencebythesameCrownPrinceHassan.FoundedpriortotheESC(in1970),theRoyal
ScientificSociety(RSS)wasinvestedwithamandateexplicitlycenteredonlong-term
266 OntheoriginsoftheESC,see:Brand(1994),p.67;Knowles(2001),p.97;Masri(2005),p.211.267 ItisworthnotingthattheESCalsooversawthebusinessoftheJordan-IraqCommitteeforEconomicCo-
ordination.AsIwillshow,thiscommitteefunctionedasoneofthecriticalmechanismsinthePalace’selite-orientedpatronagestrategy(Brand,1994,p.68).
140
developmentplanning.268AstheRSS’sseniorstaffwascomprisedofprominentindividuals
simultaneouslyservingontheboardsofthecountry’sindustrialSOEs269,however,conflictsof
interestandadegreeofmyopiawerebakedintotheinstitution’spolicyprocess.
Notwithstandingtheseissues,therewereanumberofhighlycompetentpeopleemployed
attheRSSduringtheseyears.270BassamAsfur,headoftheRSSin1978,forinstance,evincedsuch
competencebyadvisingtheKingtomovetheeconomyawayfromitsdependenceon
consumptionandtheservicesector.Bassamal-Sakat,headofitsEconomicsDepartment,
moreover,evincedhisbycautioningCrownPrinceHassanagainstcontinuingaloosecredit
systemthatwasmerelyfeedinganinflationary,speculativebubbleinrealestate.271Regardlessof
themeritsofitspersonnel,however,totheextentthattheRSStoowasdesignedtobeboth
institutionallyautonomousanddirectlyaccountabletothePalace,ittoocontributedtothe
witheringofJordan’sdevelopmentalistbureaucracy.
TheStateintheeconomy
Inordertobettersociallyembed(andtherebystabilize)themarketinthepost-1973
period—andinordertoensurethatprofitsflowedintotherightpocketsandatsufficient
268 ItwouldbetheRSS,then,ratherthantheappropriategovernmentministry,thatauthoredthetwoseminal
strategicdocumentsofthisera—1976and1981’srespectivefive-yearplans.269 Bassamal-Sakat,forexample,servedasChairmanoftheJordanCementFactoryCompanyatthesametimethat
heheadedtheEconomicsDepartmentattheRSS.270 AshasbeenthecaseacrossJordanianhistory,itshouldalsobenotedthattheRSS’developmentplanswerenever
faithfullyimplemented,atleastinfull.271 Piro(1998),p.71
141
levels—,thestatescaledupbothitsmass-orientedandelite-orientedinterventionsinthe
economyconsiderably.Italsodiversifiedtheinstitutionsthroughwhichtheseinterventionswere
implemented.
ConsolidatingwhatKnowlesclassifiedasaformofinducedstaterentierism,thisnew
modalityofinterventionprovedbothsociallyeffectiveandeconomicallymisguided,ensconcing
allocativestatepracticesratherthanproductiveandfurtheringthedisjunctureofconsumption
fromproduction.Throughentrenchingarevenuestrategyduallypremisedonexternalaidand
thedirectandindirectleviesthatcouldbeimposedonimport-basedconsumption,thisinduced
staterentieirismalsolockedboththestateandthebourgeoiseliteintoanincreasingdependence
oncommercialarbitrage.272Bymoregenerallyconsummatingthedivorcebetween
interventionismandeconomicrationalities—aswillbecomeclearasIreviewthestate’sfiscal
policies,socialwelfarepolicies(inclusiveofpublicemployment),creditpolicies,andindustrial
policies—,finally,thoughthisrentierismmayhavecontributedtostability,itdidsoatthe
expenseoflong-termdevelopment.273
Regardingtherevenueaspectofstatefiscalpolicy,thepost-1973Jordanianstateretained
andscaledupapre-existingdependenceonexternalassistance,importduties,indirecttaxes,
domesticandinternationalborrowing,andnon-taxformsofextraction(suchasthefeesleviedon
postandtelephoneservices).Theshareoftotaldomesticrevenuesattributedtoimportduties
272 Thoughthisfiscalsociologyimpliedandrealizedthroughsuchanarrangementwasnotparticularlyinequitable,
itwasatonceunsustainableandpoliticallydestructive.273 Iwillalsoconnecttheseinterventionstotheregime’sevolvingauthoritariansurvivalstrategy.Asthisstrategy
remainsstructurallyunchangedtoday,thissubsectionwillgivethereaderapreviewofmuchofthematerialthatwillbecoveredinsectiontwoofthisdissertation.
142
duringthisperiodfluctuatedbetweenahighof44.98%in1977toalowof18.37%in1989,while
theaforementionednon-taxrevenuestreamsconsistentlycontributedbetween25-40%formost
theyearsunderquestion.
SourcesofDomesticRevenues,1974-1989(%)274
Income tax
Others Total Direct Tax
Import Duties
Taxes on consumption
Licenses Fees Total Indirect Taxes
Post, Telephone
Interests and Profits
Others Total non-tax revenues
Total
1974 8.19 4.96 13.16 25.63 13.67 7.57 6.27 53.13 2.38 12.88 18.45 33.71 100 1975 11.22 4.51 15.73 25.28 12.89 7.15 9.27 54.59 2.7 13.17 13.81 29.68 100 1976 8.68 6.86 15.54 37.17 8.46 9.86 11.77 67.25 2.11 9.39 5.71 17.21 100 1977 9.28 6.47 15.74 44.98 6.96 9.21 5.9 67.04 2.46 8.71 6.04 17.22 100 1978 11.71 6.1 17.81 38.71 4.42 8.39 8.46 59.97 4.79 9.06 8.36 22.21 100 1979 11.91 7.15 19.06 38.85 5.62 8.3 9.08 61.35 4.72 8.35 6.52 19.59 100 1980 11.84 8.05 19.89 34.5 5.84 8.36 8.64 57.35 5.3 9.36 8.11 22.75 100 1981 12.93 6.57 19.5 30.42 5.46 8.14 11.82 55.85 4.1 14.56 6 24.65 100 1982 12.06 6.29 18.35 30.3 6.66 6.85 10.49 54.3 5.72 14.68 6.95 27.35 100 1983 11.49 5.97 17.46 30.1 8.81 6.43 10.5 55.84 5.84 14.85 6.02 26.7 100 1984 11.73 6.81 18.55 28.44 8.96 6.92 10.73 55.05 8.03 8.76 9.61 26.4 100 1985 12.34 6.44 18.79 26.76 10.39 6.42 9.62 53.19 8.68 9.97 9.37 28.02 100 1986 9.32 5.14 14.46 21.77 10.03 5.83 8.02 45.66 8.86 7.72 23.3 39.88 100 1987 8.53 5.69 14.22 20.42 10.97 6.2 9.42 47.01 7.86 6.96 23.94 38.77 100 1988 7.94 6.23 14.17 21.51 11.21 6.61 9.29 48.63 9.29 5.06 22.85 37.2 100 1989 9.09 7.29 16.37 18.37 13.7 5.71 11.02 48.81 11.09 7.9 15.83 34.82 100
Specifictothestate’sdomesticborrowing,thiswasoperationalizedthroughtheissuance
oftreasurybillsandtreasurybondsaswellasthroughthereceiptofdirectloansfromlocal
commercialbanks.Excludingthedirectloansprofferedbycommercialbanks,domesticand
internationalborrowingcontributed15-25%ofgovernmentfinancingacrossthetenureofthis
SSA.275AshadbeenthecasesincetheACCfirstwontheearofEmirAbdullahinthe1920s,direct
274 DataprovidedbyMasri(2005),Index14,Table5.275 AsIwillshow,excessiveinternationalborrowinginthemid-1980swouldultimatelytriggeradebtcrisisin
Jordanthatsubsequentlysenttheeconomyintoatailspinfromwhichithasneverproperlyrecovered.
143
taxesonincomeandbusinessweretoremainmarginaltothestate’srevenuestrategyacrossthe
yearsunderexaminationremained.276
DataprovidedbyMasri(2005),Index14,Table4
Withtheexceptionoftheeffectsgeneratedbydomesticborrowing—borrowingthat
functionedsotoredirectwealthupwardandintothepocketsoffinancialcapitalinparticular—,
thefiscalsociologyendowedbythisrevenuestrategywasverymuchinkeepingwithprecedent.
Themarginalityoftheincometaxmadecertainthatsocialinequityandeconomicinefficiency
enduredattheontologicalcoreofthestateproject.Problematicasthisalreadywas,theabsence
276 Between1967and1973,forinstance,incometaxesreceiptsaveragedouttoapproximately25%ofthereceipts
providedbyimportduties.Acrossthefollowingfifteenyears,moreover,directtaxes’aggregateshareofannualstaterevenuesaveragedoutatonly16.8%(Masri,330).
144
ofanincometaxbasealsorenderedthestate’srevenuestrategyendemicallyvolatileand
externallydependent—attributesthateventuallyopenedthedoorforfurthersocialinequity
courtesyoftheIMF’sstructuralreforms.277Asforthespendingsideoftheledger,despitethe
hugeincreaseinstaterevenuesthatwereultimatelyrealizedthroughafavorableexternal
environment,stateexpendituresinthepost-1973periodwereneverthelessofsuchamagnitude
astoimplyconsistentannualdeficitsandagrowingnationaldebt.278Publicspendinggrewata
shockingannualrateof15.6%peryearbetween1973and1986—agrowthratethatyieldeda
nominaljumpfrom146.6millionJDingovernmentspendingin1974to1.1billionJDin1989.279
277 Onceexternalinflowswerenolongersufficientinfightingofffiscalcrisis,thisabsenceofincomeandcorporation
tax-basedreceiptsforcedthestatetolookelsewhere—therebyallowingfortherealizationofafarmoreregressivetaxfuture.Asthisactuallyplayedout,thelossofexternallygeneratedrevenueswouldprecipitatethestate’sinevitableturntoeasytoadminister,IFI-backedGeneralSalesandValue-Addedtaxesasitattemptedtofillthegaps.Duetothefactthatthegeneralavailabilityofthesepolicyleverscannotbeunderstoodapartfromthefailuretoinstitutionalizedirecttaxationinthisperiod—andduetothefactthattheseconsumptiontaxesinvesteddecidelypunitive,sociallydislocating,andclasstargetingpropertiesintothefiscalsociologyofAbdullah’sHashemiteregime—,then,oneneedaccountforthedistalconsequencesofthestate’srevenuestrategybetween1973-1986asmuchastheimmediateonesifoneistohaveacomprehensiveunderstandingofthisaspectoftheSSA.
278 EvenpriortothereceiptofGulf-generatedwindfalls,governmentexpendituresgrew19.8%peryearacrossthe
1967-1973period(Masri,201). Ontheconsistentdeficitsrunbetween1973and1989,seeKnowles(2001),p.103,114.279 DatagatheredfromMasri(2005),Index13,Table4.
145
Disaggregatinghowthisspendingwasallocated,approximately70%ofthetotalwasdevotedto
annualcurrentexpenditures.Primarilyfinancingaqualitativeexpansionofthepublicsector
laborforce,suchexpenditurespoweredatriplingofthecivilservicebetween1970and1984.280
Incombinationwithsignificantexpansionsinmilitaryemployment281,thepublicsector’sshareof
aggregateemploymentwouldtherebyreachfullparitywiththeprivatesectorasofthemid-
1980s.282
Byprovidingsteadywages(andconsistentwageincreases),substantialbenefits,and
healthservices,publicsectoremploymentsecuredwhatamountedtomiddleclasslifestylesof
hundredsofthousands(ethnicallyTransjordanianpeople283).Governmentjobholderswereeven
shieldedfromtheinflationarypressuresrunningrampantatthetime.284Mostrelevantinthese
280 Innominalterms,theranksofthecivilservicegrewfrom27,000in1970to74,000in1984(Piro,66).281 Defenseexpendituresabsorbedbetween28-40%oftheofficialannualbudget(Masri,205,334),though
Kanovsky,drawingonUSArmsControlDisarmamentAgencydata,hasestimatedthatmilitaryspendingwaslikelythreetofourtimesgreaterthanwhatwasreportedinthosebudgets(Jordan’sEconomyfromProsperitytoCrisis).Whilesomeofthisspendingwasdirectedtowardsweaponsprocurement,muchofitwenttowardshiring,wagesandthemilitary’spensionandhealthcaresystems.
282 Functioningalmostexclusivelyasamechanismforpatronagedistribution—onethatcouldwidenthesocialbase
oftheregimethroughfurtherembeddingTransjordanianfamiliesandcommunitiesinthelargesseofthestate—,however,itshouldalsobenotedthatthishiringcampaignwasnon-meritocraticinnature.Withthevastmajorityofthestate’snewchargesbeingofthelow-skillvariety,thesocialbenefitsderivedfrompublichiringwerepartiallyoffsetbyboththeeconomicinefficienciestherebyproducedandthenegativeeffectsthattheabandonmentofmeritocracyexertedonstatecapacity.
Aswillbediscussedinthesocialcontrolsection,duetotheGulf ’sopeningofitslabormarkettoJordanasof
1974—amovethatprecipitatedamassmigrationofprimarilyeducatedPalestinians–thesocialimpactofthisnon-meritocratichiringpolicy,onedesignedlyfavoringethnicTransjordanians,wasnotquiteaspronouncedasitotherwisewouldhavebeen.
283 Withpreferentialadmissionstandardsandquotasputinplaceatpublicuniversitiessotoinsurethatthechildren
ofHussein’sethnicallyTransjordanianalliesgotalegupinhighereducationaswell(Satloff1986,AbuOdeh,2000).
284 Thisinflationwaslargelydrivenbytheinflowsofaidandremittances(aswellasbytheallocative,consumption-
orientedpracticesofthePalace).
146
regardswastheestablishmentoftheCivilConsumerCorporation(CCC)in1975.Operatingunder
theMinistryofSupply,theCCCprovidedcivilservantsandmilitarypersonnelwith“durableand
non-durableconsumergoodsatcostprice,dutyfreeinrespectofimporteditems.”285Laterthat
decade,specialsupermarketswerealsointroducedwhilerentcontrolpoliciesandthe
subsidizationofhousingwereimplementedtocontroltherealestatemarket’sanimalspirits.
Bytheearly1980s,thePalacemovedbeyondthispublicsectorwelfarismsotoestablisha
moreuniversalsystemofpricecontrolsandsubsidies.Operatingoutoftheaforementioned
MinistryofSupplyaswell,thissubsidyregimewasoneofthefeweconomicinterventionsofthe
timethatmanagedtodelivermass-orientedandelite-orientedbenefitsatoneandthesametime.
Regardingitsmass-orientednature,thestate’ssubsidizationofwheat,flour,sugar,rice,meat,
poultry,oliveoil,andmilkhelpedsecureabasiclevelofwelfareandhouseholdconsumption,
regardlessofemploymentstatus.286Asforitselitebenefits,thosesubsidiesalsosecuredsteady
profitsforanewquotacoteriepredominantlycomprisedofethnicallyTransjordaninanmerchant
capitalists.Specifically—andfollowingmuchthesamelogicastheMiddleEastSupplyCentre—,
thesubsidyprogramprivilegedpoliticallyconnectedmerchantsthroughawardingsaid
individualswithexclusiveimportlicensesforthoseproductsincludedundertheMinistryof
Supply’sconsumersubsidizationprogram.287Therebyaffordedaguaranteedbuyeranddefacto
285 Knowles(2001,p.110286 Ibid287 PetersandMoore(2009),p.273
147
monopolycontrolofsubstantialwholesalemarkets,subsidiesfunctionedsotofunnelhealthy
profitsintothesemerchants’pocketsacrossthe1980sandbeyond.
Forthe30%oftotalpublicexpendituresthatweredevotedtocapitalinvestment,whilea
greatdealofthisbudgetwasallocatedfordebtrepayments,overhalfofitwasdevotedtoland
purchasesandtheconstructionofgovernmentbuildings.288Thoughtheyieldofthisinvestment
providedsomethinginthewayofpublicgoods,suchexpendituresalsoprovidedaprivateboon
forthosedevelopersandconstructioncompaniesfortunateenoughtoprocurethecontractsthat
weretenderedtherein,therebyevincingthesamemass-elitedualismashadthegovernment’s
foodsubsidizationefforts.289
Asmentionedattheoutsetofthissection,thestatealsointervenedintheeconomyviaa
constellationofcreditinstitutions.Thisseriesofnominallyautonomous,specializedlendingand
investmentfacilities—themostprominentofwhichwerethePensionFund(whichwouldbe
renamedtheJordanInvestmentCorporation),theIndustrialDevelopmentBank,theSocial
SecurityCompany,andtheHousingBank—,wastypicallyusedbythePalacesotofinancea
numberofpoliticallyimportantthougheconomicallydubiousenterprisesanddevelopment
projects.ThisoftenmeantbridgingthefinancialgapsneededtokeepanumberofthePalace’s
misguidedindustrialventuresturningoverinspiteoftheirgrowinglosses.Criticalastheymay
thereforehavebeeninstavingoffthecollapseofcommodityextraction(aswellasthejobsthat
sectorcreated),thepoliticizedinvestmentstrategiesfollowedbythesecreditfacilitieseventually
288 Masri,p.335289 Unsurprisingly,theprincipalbeneficiariesoftheseprocurementprocessesweremanyofthesameindividuals
thathadpreviouslybenefitedfromthestate’sindustrialpoliciesand/orissuanceofimportlicenses.
148
engenderedenormousanddiversifiedportfoliosloadedwithtoxicassets.Offeringsome
indicationofhowthescopeofthiscreditbackstopgrewovertime,Knowleshasshownthatthe
aggregateassetsofthefourinstitutionsmentionedabovequadrupledbetween1973and1983.In
nominalterms,by1989,theirtotalloanportfolioreached542.7JDmillion.290
Whatismore,theseautonomouscreditinstitutionsonlyeverconstitutedasinglepartof
thestate’sinvestmentoperations,asmoredirectformsofinvestmentandownershipwerealso
practicedinthisperiod.Takenincombination,theaggregateresultsofthisaspectofstate
interventionismareratherstaggering.Asof1989,itwasestimatedthatthestate(loosely
defined)held58%equityintheminingsector291,23.2%equityinthemanufacturingsector,and
20.8%equityintheservicessector.Moregenerallyspeaking,AnaniandKhalafcalculatedthatthe
stateheld32.2%oftheaggregatecapitalsubscribedacrossthecountry’sthirty-onelargest
firms.292
Beforeclosingonstateinterventionisminthepost-1973period,ahandfulofspecialpolicy
initiativesmeanttorevitalizetheelitefractionofthecapitalistclass—agroupofactorswholly
disorientedbythecrisesof1967and1970-1971—arealsoworthmakingnoteof.Inthedomain
oftradepolicy,preferentialimportlicensingarrangementsallowedtheseactorstoretainthe
monopolisticandoligopolisticmarketpositionstheyhadearlieracquiredthroughpreviousstate
290 Knowles(2001),p.116291 ThestateheldmajoritysharesinallthebigfiveindustrialassetsapartfromtheJordanianPetroleumRefinery
Corporation,whereit’sequitystakewas24%.292 JawadAnaniandR.Khalaf,“PrivatisationinJordan”,inEl-Nagger,S.,(ed.)AdjustmentPoliciesandDevelopment
StrategiesintheArabWorld,pp.210-233.
149
interventionsinthewholesaleandretailsectors.293Throughitsrefusaltodevaluethecurrency—
arefusalthatcamedespitetheobviousutilitythatdevaluationwouldhaveinreducingthetrade
deficit294—,moreover,thePalacealsoensuredthatthedemandforimportswouldnotbestifled
intheleast.Havingprivilegedimportdutieswithinthestate’srevenuestrategy,thestatewould,
infact,directlyalignitsinstitutionalinterestwiththeparticularistinterestsofthemerchantas
well.
Withpolicytherebystructuredacrossanumberoffrontsinsuchamannerastoinsure
thatimportconsumptionwounduppoweringahugeproportionofGDPgrowthinthisperiod,
policyalsoprovedverygoodforthoseactorspositionedsotocontrolJordan’simportmarkets.In
addition,thesesameeliteactorsbenefitedthroughtheinterventionsoftheJordan-Iraq
CommitteeforEconomicCoordination(JICEC),whichwasdesignatedresponsibilityforawarding
speciallicensesforexportingtotheIraqimarket.Thoughthisfraud-ladenprocessthatwould
latercomeundoneinspectacularfashion,initsearlydays,theJICECdeliveredwonderfulprofits
293 Indiscussingimportsandtradepolicy,IwouldberemisswereInottoacknowledgehowthesedomainsalso
cametobenefitanumberofgovernmentministries(andtheirrespectiveworkforces).Specifically,by(purposefullyorunpurposefully)establishingasystemofoverlappingauthorities—asystemreferredtoasal-izdiwajiyya—bureaucraticredundanciesallowedtheMinistriesofPlanning,Finance,andIndustryandTradetoeachclaimresponsibilityforsimilarlywideandintersectingdomainsofoperations.Insodoing—andinalsobringeachMinistryintotherent-ladenorbitofimportpolicy—al-izdiwajiyyasawtoitthateachMinistrywasabletolegitimategrowingbudgetrequests,requeststhatinturnallowedeachinstitutiontogrowtheirowninternalclientelesofmiddlemanagers(Piro,84).Intotal,tenofthetwenty-twoministriesoperatingasof1984managedtoimplicatethemselvesinthemanagementoftheeconomytoonedegreeoranother.Thoughtheinstitutionalizationofal-izdiwajiyyaundeniablyweakenedtheinstitutionalcapacityandrationalityofthebureaucracy,itsimultaneouslyfunctionedsotomakeeachministryorganizationallyrobustthroughprovidingthemhealthybudgetoutlaysandaccesstoimport-basedrentextraction.
294 Thedecisionnottodevaluewasalsomadeoutofthefearthatitwoulddriveawayremittances(Piro,71).Though
desperatelyneededinordertoalleviatethetradedeficit(andinordertohelpdomesticindustrialcapital),thenearsightednessofthePalace’seconomicsmeantitwasneverconsideredpriortotheIMF’sarrivalin1988-1989.
150
foraprivilegedfewfirmsinthecement,pharmaceutical,andbankingindustries.295Finally,tothe
extentthatonlylicensedcommercialbankswereallowedtoparticipateinthedomesticbond
market—andtotheextentthatthesecommercialbanksweredisproportionatelyownedby
membersoftheoldquotacoterie—,itcouldalsobearguedthatthestate’sdebtissuancesalso
functioned,atleastinpart,asanelite-orientedinterventionintheeconomy.296
SocialControl
Asdiscussedinthepreviouschapter,theregime’scrackdownonpoliticalassociationin
theaftermathofBlackSeptemberalsoextendedintothenon-partisandomainoftradeandlabor
unions.Usingavarietyofjuridicalmeans,theGeneralIntelligenceDirectory(workingin
partnershipwiththeMinistryofLabor)laidsiegetothemajorinstitutionsofworkingclasslife,
culminatinginthedefactoconquestoftheGeneralFederationofJordanianTradeUnions
(GFJTU).297Consolidatingadisjuncturebetweenlabororganizationsandthesocialforcesthey
295 FormoreonthisseePiro(1998),p.67296 Itwouldbedisingenuous,ofcourse,tosuggestthatthisarrangementworkedpurelytothebenefitofthe
commercialbanks.Thebankswere,afterall,verymuchatthebeckandcallofthePalace.Forinstance,between1984and1986,theCentralBankwoulddemandthatcommercialbanksinvestbetween4-9%oftheirdinardenominateddepositsintreasurybillsanddevelopmentbonds.In1986,theCentralBankwouldalsorequirethatcommercialbanksinvestatleast15%oftheircapitalintheshareholdingcompaniestradedontheAmmanStockExchange(thatfigurewoulddropto9%asof1987).Andyet,asexploitativeandeconomicallydestructiveasthesepolicieswereinthelongterm,theinterestratesattachedtothegovernment’sbondsmadeitworththetroubleforJordan’scommercialbanks,atleastforatime.Priortothedebt,currency,andbankingcrisesof1988-1989,moreover,returnsoninvestmentintostateownedenterpriseswerealsopoliticallyguaranteed.
See:Masri(2005),p.343297 Havingbothdivestedthisbodyofitsinternaldemocracyandhavingco-optedthoseindividualsatthetopofthe
GFJTU’sleadershipstructure,Jordan’sFedayeen-aligned,politicallyantagonisticunionswerelargelybroughttoheel.
151
weremeanttorepresent,thissystematicdiscipliningofthetradeunionmovementanchoredthe
entiretyofthepost-1973socialcontrolstrategyandistherebydeservesprideofplaceinany
analysisofthisperiod.
Complementingthesecoerciveformsofintervention—andperhapsevenmoreeffectivein
theestablishmentofsocialcontrol—however,wasthemigrationsystemputinplacebytheArab
statesfollowingtheoilboomof1973.ForJordan,theoutflowingendofthissystemsawhundreds
ofthousandsofJordanianworkerssecurelivelihoodsinthecash-flushedGulf.298Togivesome
senseofthemagnitudeoftheseoutflows,atanygiventimebetween1975and1985,onewould
havefoundroughly40%oftheJordanianlaborforceworkingand(permanently/semi-
permanently)residingintheGulf.299
Foraneconomyandsocietyshellshockedbythecrisesof1967and1970-1971,theGulf’s
acceptanceofJordan’shighandlow-skillsurpluslaborprovedanessentialpreconditionfor
subsequenteffortstoreconstituteanewmodalityofdomesticsocialpeace.Helpingclosethe
structuraldisarticulationoflabormarketsupplyfromlabormarketdemand,theyfirstand
foremostalleviatedathendeepeningemploymentcrisis.Morethanthat,theGulflabormarket
298 YannLeTroquerandRozennHommeryal-Outdat,“FromKuwaittoJordan:ThePalestinians’ThirdExodus”,
JournalofPalestineStudies(28:3),p.38. WhiletheGulfhadlongprovidedacriticalreleasevalvefornakba-dislocatedPalestinianlaborersinparticular—
evenbefore1970,Kuwaitgavehosttoover140,000Palestinians,manyofwhomhadarrivedduetorelaxedmigrationcodesoftheearly1950sandsubsequentlycometofilltheKuwaitibureaucracyandconstructionsector—,thepost-1973yearswitnessedaqualitativejumpinGulf-boundemigration.
299 Innominalterms,asof1986,thisdistributiontranslatedto592,000Jordaniansworkingathomeand325,000
Jordanians(oftenaccompaniedbytheirfamilies)laboringacrossKuwait,SaudiArabia,theUnitedArabEmirates,andQatar.
See:Oroubal-Abed,“Thediscourseofguesthood:ForcedMigrantsinJordan”,inA.HFabiosandR.Isotalo(eds.)ManagingMuslimMobilities.PalgraveMacmillan(2014).
152
alsoactedasareleasevalveforthePalestinianquestionbyprovidinglucrativework
opportunitiesfortheethnicPalestinians,theGulf’simmigrationpoliciestookmuchofthesting
outoftheJordanianstate’songoingdePalestinianizationcampaigns.300
Complementingthesocialcontrol-relatedeffectsderivedfromGulf-bounddepartures
werethoseborneofthelowskill(primarilyEgyptian)arrivalsthatflowedintoJordanduring
thesesameyears.Forsomebackground,priorto1984,outsideArabshadbeenallowedtolegally
resideandworkinJordanwithoutneedforalaborpermit.301Whilealackofeconomic
opportunitymeantthatrelativelyfewforeignworkersavailedthemselvesofthispan-Arabistrelic
duringthe1950sand1960s,onceexternalaidandremittancesbeganrushingintopost-1973
Jordan,sotoodidlowskill(primarilyEgyptian)laborseekingtheirownsmallpieceof
300 Ititworthnotingtheextenttowhichtheregime’ssocialcontrolstrategyhadadistinctlyethniccomponentand
howthesubjectingofPalestinianpopulationstoaparticularregimeofsurveillance,discrimination,andprecarityalsocontributedtogeneralizedquietude.Havingneverpromulgateddomesticlegislationconcerningrefugeesandforcedmigrants—adecisionpartlyinformedbythePalace’sunderstandablereluctancetonormalizethePalestinianexodus—andhavingneversignedthe1951UNConventionRelatingtotheStatusofRefugees,thePalacewasabletorespondtoBlackSeptemberbyassigningitsMinistryofInterioranditsdomesticintelligenceforcesprimarylegalresponsibilityfordealingwithcamp-basedPalestinianpopulations(Al-Abed,83).Inaddition,inalsotieringthelegalstatusesofdifferentfractionsofPalestinianrefugees—GazanmigrantsintoJordanhaveneverbeengrantedcitizenship—theregimehasalsobeenabletoconstructandexploitjuridicalambiguitysotorendercitizenshipandthelegalexistencethatimpliesinherentlyprecariousforlargesegmentsofthesecommunities.InadditiontothedePalestinianizationofthepublicsector(see:AbuOdeh,190),from1976onwards,aquotasystemwouldalsobeestablishedatJordanianuniversitiessotoaffordpreferentialadmissionstoethnicTransjordanians(Massad,258).
OntheGulf-boundoutflows,IshouldalsoaddthatwhiletheirPalestinianandprivatesectorcompositionis
typicallyemphasized,itisimportanttonotethattheopeningofGulflabormarketsalsoimpliedthetransferoflargenumbersof(ethnicallyTransjordanian)publicsectorworkers.ComprisingtheJordanianbureaucracy’stravelingactweretypicallyeducators,healthcareworkers,andsecondedmilitaryofficers.Whilenothavingquitethesamesocialcontrolimpactastheprivatesectormovement’sdescribedabove,byhelpingmitigatesomeofthefiscalstrainandbureaucraticredundanciesthathadbeengeneratedthroughthestate’suncheckedexpansioninthe1970s,oneshouldnotdiscounthowtheseregionalreassignmentstoocontributedtothestabilizationofthewiderHashemitepoliticaleconomy.
301 GeraldineChatelard,“Jordan:ARefugeeHaven”.MigrationPolicyInstituteOnlineJournal(2010),p.7
153
petrodollarrecycling.Regardingnumbers,bythemiddleofthe1980s,itwasestimatedthat
roughly450,000EgyptianswereactiveintheJordanianlabormarket,that153,519ofthesehad
beenregisteredthroughtheproperlegalchannels,andthattheEgyptianproportionofthe
aggregateforeignlaborstockwasroughly80%.302Importantly,theseinflowsoflow-skillforeign
laborwereencouraged,activelyrecruited,andlobbiedforbyJordaniancapital,particularlythose
actorsandenterprisesholdingstakesintheagricultural,construction,andrealestatesectors.As
theseforeignworkersrepresentedasignificantreductioninthecostoflaborinputs—andas
profitmarginsandbusinessmodelsintheaforementionedsectorscametobesolelypremised
uponafirm’scapacitytoaccesstosuchinputs—,thisclassfraction’sinterestinthenon-citizen’s
righttoworkinJordanwas,ofcourse,deeplycynicalandnon-altruistic.
Whenitcametosocialcontrol,theeffectsofthemass-employmentofcheapEgyptian
laborwouldbethree-foldwhenitcametosocialcontrolinthepost-1973period.Firstandas
hintedatintheparagraphabove,cheapEgyptianwages(andthedepressiveeffectstheir
presencehadonthewiderwagestructure)stabilizedtheprofitsofthecapitalelite.303Tying
profitsandaccumulationtoaccesstoforeignlaborwouldofcourseprovedisastrous(andpath
dependent)inthelong-term—whetherdevelopmentallyorsociallyspeaking.Totheextentthatit
buoyedthebusinessclassesintheshort-termandwiththemthelargereconomicsystem,
302 Ibid303 AsthatlattergroupofactorswasnowincreasinglyenmeshedintheeconomicsofJordan’surbanizingbuilt
environment—whetherthroughcontractingwork,realestatespeculation,orfinance—,accesstocheapforeignlaborwastobecomefundamentaltotheirprofitmargins.
154
however,itunambiguouslybenefitedthesocialcontrolstrategyofthisperiodaswell.304Second,
theinjectionofEgyptianlaboralsoallowedtheregimetointegrateportionsoftheethnically
Transjordanianpeasantryintotheexpandingstatebureaucracywithoutdeprivingthefarming
industryofthelaborinputsneededforitsoperations.Byindirectlyfacilitatingtheupward
mobilityandsocialreproductionforJordan’slowerandmiddleclasses,305then,thiseffectof
Egyptianlabor—whichconstituted87%thelaborforceintheJordanValleyasof1986—too
contributedtosocialcontrolacrossthedecadesunderquestion.306Third,theEgyptianizationof
thelaborforcealsocontributedtocapitalistsocialcontrolbycomplicatingthemobilizationof
workersolidarity.Asforeignlaborerswerebothculturallyapartandeternallyprecariousdueto
theirexceptionallegalstatus—non-Jordanianworkerswerebarredfromforming,joining,or
participatinginunionactivitiesandatalltimessubjecttodiscretionarydeportation—,theywere
alsoactorsforwhomantagonisticlaboractionwouldintrinsicallyholdlittleappeal.Representing
roughly50%ofthetotallaborforceastheydid,theirnecessaryquietismthereforemeantthat
nativeworkers’movementsheldpreciouslittleleverageinanyconflictwithcapitalorthestate.
304 Theseworkersrepresentedadefactosubsidyinthesensethattheywerewillingtoacceptwagesbelowthe
marketrateinJordanandinthesensethattheywereexcludedfromtheprotectionsandprivilegesprovidedbythelaw.
305 OneshouldalsonotehowcentraltheKafalasystem—bywhichIrefertoamigratoryandlegalregimecentered
ondomesticworkers—wastomaintainingahighqualityoflifeformuchoftheJordanianmiddleclass.Asthesewomenwerefunctionallydevoidofrights,theirlowwagesandlonghoursfunctionallysubsidizedthesocialreproductionofthousandsofmiddleclassJordanianfamilies.
306 Chatelard(2010),p.6 Certainly,thestate’sabsorptionoflowskilledTransjordanianworkerswaseverybitasdevelopmentally
problematicastheimportationofcheapEgyptianlaborwas.Nevertheless,itwasextremelyeffectiveasamatterofsocialpolicy.
155
Incombinationwiththerepressionandsurveillanceofdomesticorganizedlaborandthe
lowemploymentratethatwassecuredthroughexportationoflargesegmentsofthelaborforce
totheGulf,onecansee,then,howtheinflowsideofJordan’smigrationpolicyfunctionedsoto
preemptunrestandsotoinflatetheprofitsofdomesticcapital.
ExternalArticulation
Jordan’smodalityofinteractingwithregionalandinternationaleconomicsystems
between1973and1986operatedaccordingtothesamelogicashadpreviousversions.Tobegin,
thestateandmerchant’selitecontinuedrelianceupontheimportmarketensuredthatJordan’s
developmentallydestructiveaddictiontoforeignconsumergoodspersistedonunabated.With
littleheadwaymadeinupgradingthesophisticationofthecountry’smanufacturingoperations307
(andwiththecountry’sexportbaskettherebystilloverwhelminglyconcentratedinhighlyvolatile
commoditymarkets),thisaddictionengenderedeverwideningcurrentaccountdeficits
throughouttheperiodunderquestion.Thatsameconcentration,moreover,alsoleftJordan’s
economystructurallyvulnerabletoshiftsinitsexogenousenvironment.Whentakenin
combinationwiththefactthatthestate’sbudgetarystrategywasitselfalsoalmostentirely
dependentuponequallyvolatile(andexternal)sourcesofincome,thisvulnerabilityleftthe
accumulationprocesswithoutanykindoffirewalltoprotectitformexternally-introduced
307 ThislackofsuccesswaspartiallyafunctionofaderivativeformofDutchdisease.Thedeepeningintegrationof
Jordan’seconomywiththelargerpetroeconomiesoftheGulfledtocurrencyovervaluation.Inconjunctionwiththeeffectsofthestate’semboldeningcronyism,thisovervaluationwouldcontributetothedecliningcompetitivenessofJordan’smanufacturedgoods.
156
shocks.Worsethanthat,theeconomy’sreavowalofitsdependenceonpotashandphosphate
exports—occurringduringthesameyearsthatEastAsianeconomieswereusingthetransition
intohigh-technologyproductiontopowertheireconomicconvergencevis-a-visthewest—also
prefiguredthecountry’smorestructural,long-termdriftintolowcomplexity,low-valueadd
stagnation.
StructureofJordanianImports,1974-1989308
*Unit:Thousands(JD)
Total Consumer Goods
Crude Materials and Other Goods
Capital Goods Miscellaneous Goods
Total Imports
1974 69627 29998 40913 15969 156507 1975 90513 57222 82877 3401 234013 1976 133335 90003 114628 1573 339539 1977 147185 121187 184099 1946 454417 1978 175669 117252 161232 4673 458826 1979 215211 179462 193575 1275 589523 1980 240154 227087 246743 1993 715977 1981 3252132 305518 414962 1811 1047504 1982 368303 380280 391396 2514 1142493 1983 365058 377787 310552 49913 1103310 1984 417124 453746 170533 29937 1071340 1985 384762 464695 201331 23660 1074448 1986 358230 309541 141483 40945 850199 1987 362011 371011 162813 19710 915545 1988 371616 393744 219451 37658 1022469 1989 414360 532793 262066 19791 1230010
308 DataprovidedbyMasri(2005),Index13,Table11
157
StructureofJordanianExports,1974-1989309
*Unit:Thousands(JD)
Total Consumer Goods
Crude Materials and Other Goods
Capital Goods Miscellaneous Goods
Total Exports
1974 13865 24931 634 7 39437 1975 15999 23469 603 4 40075 1976 25407 23277 862 4 49552 1977 32167 26955 1128 3 60253 1978 32630 30670 828 1 64129 1979 41994 39444 1111 7 82556 1980 54233 64216 1658 0 120107 1981 76717 86719 5508 82 169026 1982 88152 92298 5100 31 185581 1983 94244 62437 3404 0 160085 1984 108758 148683 3614 0 261055 1985 99012 153260 3074 0 255346 1986 78075 145584 1956 0 225615 1987 84102 160817 3854 0 248773 1988 79885 239262 5631 10 324788 1989 132325 388185 13586 10 534106
309 DataprovidedbyMasri(2005),Index13,Table11
158
DataprovidedbyCentralBankofJordan
Institutionalizingaderivative(oil-dependent)rentieristeconomywithanoverdependence
onimportconsumption,theexternalarticulationoftheJordaniansocialstructureof
accumulationinthisperiodprovedtemporarilystabilizing(inthatitdeliveredprofitsto
merchantcapital+
159
indirect,tariff-basedtaxreceiptsforthestate)aswellasfundamentallydestructiveinthe
mediumtolong-term.
FormsofMarketCompetition:EnduringClassFractures,EnduringEliteHegemony
IfthesocialcontrolstrategyofcapitalanditsHashemitemindersshiftedconsiderably
after1973,thesamecannotbesaidofthemodalityofcapital-capitalrelations—andtheformof
marketcompetitionsuchrelationsendow.Asprivatesectorcompetitionwasmostlylimitedto
contestsforpoliticalfavor,marketscontinuedtolackwhateverdynamicenergiestheycan,on
occasion,givehostto.Asthistranslatedtomarketstructures,oligopolsiticormonopolistic
formationsprevailedacrossmostsectorsoftheeconomythroughouttheperiodunder
question.310
Notwithstandingthesecontinuities,thecapitalistclassitselfdidundergosomenon-
insignificantchangesintheseyears.Tobegin,whilemuchoftheoldquotacoterieeliteeventually
managedtoretainandgrowtheirwealthfollowinganumberofyearsofpost-1970paralysis,the
hegemonyoftheirclassfractionwasnolongerbeastotalasitoncewas.Henceforth,theywere
joinedattheheightsoftheeconomybytwodiscretegroupsofnouveauxriches.Thefirsthad
beenmintedthrougheithersuccessesintheGulforopportunisticplaysinAmman’sfeveredreal
estatespeculation.Thesecondwascomprisedofanumberofactorswhomanagedtoleverage
310 SeeMasri(2005),Appendix16,Tables1-37forafullbreakdownofmarketstructuresduringthisperiod.
160
theirpowerinthebureaucracyintobusinessacquisitions.Prominentamongstthislattergroup
wereahandfulofformersenioremployeesoftheCentralBankofJordan.311
Asregardsthefateofthequotacoterieitself,inadditiontoretainingtheirpositionsof
dominancewithinthecommercialsector,manywithinthisfractionpivotedintoconstruction,
governmentcontracting,realestate,andGulf-entangledinvestmentduringthe1970sand
1980s.312Thetableonthefollowingpage—demonstratinganeconomywhollydominatedby
retailtrade,finance,governmentservices,andtransportation(itselfanappendageoftheimport
game)—evincethesectoralimbalancethatresulted.313Otherswithinthisclassfractionused
thesedecadestoshoreuptheirdominanceofJordan’srapidlyexpandingbankingandfinance
sectors.314ThemostobviousinstanceshereinweretheShumanandMu’asharfamilies.315Asthe
financializationoftheglobaleconomyintroducedincreasingreturns(ifalsovolatility)tothe
311 SeeMasri,p.410ontheCentralBankEmployees.Also,seeMasri(2005),Appendix11forthedistributionof
powerandcapitalwithinthiswiderclassfraction.312 Withouteverabandoningtheirimportandretailempires,theNuqul,Masri,andAliBdeirfamiliesmanagedthis
transitionintonewgrowthareasespeciallysuccessfully(Masri,408).313 Notethatgovernmentaccountingmetricscodeagreatdealofcommercialbusinessunderthelabelof
“transportation”(alabelthatincludesbusinessesinvolvedinthemovementofgoods).314 ThoughbrieflychallengedbyahandfulofnewGulf-madecompetitors—Ahmadal-Galabi’sPetraBankand
HassanAbdulAziz’sJordan-GulfBankinparticular—thishegemonywouldeventuallybereaffirmedwheneachofthesechallengerswentbustduringthebankingofcrisisofthemid-late1980s.
315 TheShumanfamilyrepurchasedconsiderablesharesofArabBankintheseyears,whiletheMuasherfamily
repurchasedmuchoftheequityintheJordanNationalBank.ThoughArabBankalsoreceivedconsiderableGulf-basedinvestmentinthesesameyearsyears—withtheHaririfamiliyinparticulartakingonasignificantequityshare—,suchrepurchasesweresufficientsoastoretaintheShoman’sleadershipoverthislionofJordanianbanking.
Similarly,theoldguardal-Sakar,Tash,Abdal-Rahman,andTouqanfamiliesmanagedtoretaintheircontroloverAmman-Cairobankduringthissameperiod.
161
bankingindustryacrosstheperiodunderquestion,thequotacoterie’shegemonyoverthissector
provedextremelyprofitableforatime.316
DataProvidedbyCentralBankofJordan
316 Thoughslightlylater,itishereworthnotingthatquotacoteriefamiliesalsoacquiredmajorequitystakesinthe
ExportandFinanceBank(laterrenamedAhliBank).EFPwasfoundedin1995byShakerbinZaidandAlial-Husri,theformerofwhichwasacousinofHussein’s.TheFinanceMinisterandtheGovernoroftheCentralBanksatonitsboard,andtheNuqul,Darwazah,AbuJaber,andKawarfamiliesprovidedmuchoftheearlycapital(Schlumberger,149).
162
SectoralShareofNationalGDP,1974-1989
Unit:Percentage317
Collapse:Crisis,Stabilization,andthePreludetoAbdullah
WhileOPEC’sembargofacilitatedoneofthegreatestredistributionsofwealthinmodern
globalhistory,thegoodtimesdidnotlastforever.Bytheearly1980s,thepriceofcrudeoilon
internationalmarketswastrackingconsistentlydownward,precipitatingacommensurate
declineinthepetro-derivedrentsannuallyaccruingtothegovernmentsofSaudiArabia,Kuwait,
Libya,andIraq.318Inthisclimate,theregionalpartnersuponwhomJordanhadgrown
increasinglydependentoverthecourseofthe1970sthemselvesgrewincreasinglyconservative
317 DataprovidedbyMasri(2005),Index13,Table2318 TheIraqieconomywasalsodealingwiththestressintroducedbythecountry’sendlesswarwithIran.
163
whenitcametotheextensionofbudgetarysupport,developmentgrants,foreignlending,and
energyconcessions.
Aswasearliermentioned,inattemptingtofillthegapsleftbythereducedavailabilityof
externalassistance,Jordan’seconomicpolicymakersfirstturnedtodomesticandinternational
bondmarkets.ThiskindofdebtfinancingacceleratedunderthegovernmentofZaydal-Rifa’iin
particular.Foreign-helddebtswiftlyspikedtounsustainablelevels,growingfrom1.6$billionin
1981to8$billionasof1989.319
Ifalreadystressedbytheprospectsofasovereigndebtcrisis,thetroublesfacingthe
JordanianeconomyonlyworsenedonceIraqiimporters,underthestressofwar,provedunableto
honoranumberofcontractspreviouslyagreeduponwithJordanianenterprises.Firmsinthe
banking,pharmaceutical,andindustrialsectorswereespeciallyexposedtothelossesthereby
rendered,precipitatingawaveofnationalbankruptcies.Nordidthebadtimesendthere.Upon
theKing’sannouncementthatJordanwouldunilaterallyrescinditsclaimontheWestBank—a
decisiontriggeringcapitalflightasanxiousethnicPalestiniansgrewconcernedabouttheirlegal
standingintheHashemiteKingdom—,theeconomynextgavehosttoafullscalebankingcrisisas
well.Withthesituationmadeevenmoredesperatebyinternationalcreditors’refusaltoextend
thegovernmentnewloans,come1989,KingHusseinwaseventuallyforcedtoturntotheIMF.Far
fromplayingtheroleofsavior,however,neithertheinjectionoftheFund’semergencycapitalnor
thepolicyadvicetheyadministeredweresufficientinstemmingthebleeding.Quitetothe
319 JawadAnani,“ThepoliticalsociologyofJordan:ananalysisofthemapofgainsandpains”,inManagementand
InternationalBusinessIssuesinJordan(2001),p.176.
164
contrary,infact,theIMF’ssuccessesinconvincingtheKingoftheneedtoliberalizetheJordanian
Dinarquicklybroughtaboutrapiddevaluation,therebyintroducingacurrencycrisisontothelist
ofeconomictraumasalreadyinflictingtheeconomy.320
Finally,amidstallofthiseconomicchaos,oneofHussein’srelativelyrareforeignpolicy
miscalculationsalsoprecipitatedtheundoingofthePalace’spreviouslystable(ifexternally
dependent)socialcontrolstrategy.DuetohisdecisiontomaintainJordan’sneutralityduringthe
firstGulfWar(1991-1992),HusseinhadincurredthewrathofboththeconservativeGulf
monarchiesandtheUnitedStates.Thiswrathexpresseditselfnotonlythroughthecessationof
budgetassistance.Whatwasworse,Hussein’sneutrality—inconjunctionwithYasirArafat’sopen
supportfortheIraqiwarproject—enragedtheal-SabahofKuwaittotheextentthattheydecided
toexpelthecountry’shugeethnicallyPalestinian,legallyJordanianexpatriatelaborforce.By
consequence,200,000Jordaniannationalswereforcedtomakeaninvoluntaryreverse
pilgrimagein1990-1991,returningtoanEastBanktheyhardlyknewinhopestheymightrebuild
theirlivesinthenationoftheircitizenship.321Foraneconomyalreadysufferingunderalong
recession,thearrivalofthesenativeimmigrantspushedafullysaturatedlabormarket(andthe
socialfabricitundergirded)tothepointofbreaking.322
320 Shortlythereafter,Jordanianpolicymakersunilaterallyoptedtore-establishthecurrencypeg.321 Whilethesereturneesbroughtconsiderablesavingswiththem,muchofthisendeduponlyfurtherinflatingthe
realestatespeculationthathadbeenlargelyrunningwildsincethemid-1970s.See:AdnanAbuOdeh,Jordanians,Palestinians&theHashemiteKingdomintheMiddleEastPeaceProcess(1999),p.233.
322 Theinjectionofthese70,000jobseekers,infact,woundupdeepeningafundamentaldisjuncturebetweenlabor
supplyandlabordemand(especiallyintheprivatesector),renderingunemploymentandlaborforcenon-participationastructuralcomponentoftheeconomygoingforward.
See:LeTroquerandal-Oudat(1999),p.41
165
DataprovidedbyWorldDevelopmentIndicatorsDatabase(WorldBank)
Bottomwaseventuallyhitandtheworstofwhatwasaratherstaggeringrecessioncame
toacloseby1991.Intheaftermath,anewlowgrowth,lowaccumulationformofcapitalism—
oneshapedbyHussein’spartial,highlyunevenimplementationoftheIMF’sliberalization
agenda323—woundupconsolidating.Inbroadstrokes,thiscapitalismallowedthepalace’s
323 See:JaneHarrigan,Hamedel-Said,andChengangWang,“TheIMFandtheWorldBankinJordan:acaseofover
optimismandelusivegrowth”,ReviewofInternationalOrganizations(2006),pp.263-292,formoreonthiseraoftheIMF’sinterventionisminJordan.
Inanutshell,astheaforementionedauthorsestablish,theIMFwasneverquiteasaustere(oreffective)a
disciplinarianinJordanasistypicallyassumed,andthattheHashemiteregimewasneverquiteasdutifulastudentasissometimesremembered.Byconsequence,Jordan’seconomicliberalizationinthe1990swouldbehighlypartial,selective,uneven,andincoherent.
166
neopatrimonialismtoendure,thestate’sveryparticularinterventionsintheeconomyto
continue,andmarketcompetitiontoremainascompromisedasever.324
Withafewnotableexceptions,thestate’smass-orientedeconomicinterventionswereto
remainanchoredtothemodalityofwelfarismthathadbeeninstitutionalizedinthemid-
1970s.325Regardingtheconsumption-facingaspectofthatwelfarism,thoughstatesubsidieson
gasandoil(in1989)andwheat(in1996)werebrieflylifted326,andthoughtheregimewasforced
byitsDC-basedcreditorsintobrieflyflirtingwithmeans-testingsocialprotectionmoregenerally,
theIMFetal.wereultimatelyunsuccessfulindismantlinganyofthemajor(anduniversalist)
mechanismsthroughwhichpriceswerecontrolled.327Similarly,thoughpublichiringdiddecrease
324 Knowleshasarguedthatthenew,post-crisispoliticaleconomywasdifferentfromthepreviousiterationtothe
extentthatJordanianrentierismslowlymorphedfromthepetrodollar-financed,inducedstaterentierismofthe1970sand1980stoasomewhatnovel,marketorientedsystemofrentierism.
Bethatasitmay,thestatewouldhardlyberetreatingintotheroleofthenight’swatchman.Aquicksurveyofthe
JordanInvestmentCorporation’sholdingsduringthe1990scangivesomeindicationofthisnon-retreat.Asof1998,thisnominallyautonomouspubliccreditinstitutionstillheldanestimated40%oftheAmmanFinancialMarket’saggregatecapitalstockwhich.Thoughthe40%figureactuallyrepresentsaconsiderabledeclineascomparestoeventhreeyearsearlier(theJIC’sholdingswereupwardsof60%asof1995),itisstillanextremelylargelarger.WhenonealsoconsidersthatmuchofJICdivestmentfunctionedasaccountingmisdirection—specifically,manyoftheJIC’ssharesinstateownedandprivateownedenterprisesweresoldtotheSocialSecurityCorporationandothernominallyautonomous,governmentruncreditinstitutions—theregime’sdirectandindirectstakeintheeconomywaslikelytobemuchlargerthanthatalreadyenormousfigure.
325 See:PetersandMoore(2009),p.275;Knowles(2001),p.119326 Eachinstanceprecipitatedmassiveprotestandaswiftreversalinpolicyfromthegovernment.Ontheseprotests,
see: LamisAndoniandJillianSchwedler,“BreadRiotsinJordan”,MiddleEastReport(1996),pp.40-42. CurtisRyan,“Peace,breadandriots:JordanandtheInternationalMonetaryFund”,MiddleEastPolicy(6:2),1998,
pp.54-66. 327 Onthisultimatelynon-consummatedflirtation,seeKnowles(2001),p.251. Thatsaid,itshouldbeacknowledgedthattheMinistryofSupply—theinstitutionpreviouslyresponsiblefor
administeringthestate’ssubsidizationofgoods—wasdisbandedin1998.
167
duringthis period—andthoughcapsonnewemploymentdidimpartgenerationaltensionsinto
thelabormarket328—,thePalace/stateneverrenounceditsroleasemployeroflastresort.
Ifmassorientedinterventionsweremarkedbycontinuitiesmorethanchanges,thesame
couldnotbesaidofthestate’selite-orientedinterventions.329Here,thePalaceusednewmeansto
protectoldincumbentswhilesimultaneouslyintroducingnovelpolicymeasuressotoblooda
freshgenerationofprivatesectorelites.Specifictotheincumbents,theKingandhisallies
intervenedsotoshelterthisoldguardfromthevariousthreatsinherenttotheIMF’sreform
agenda.Whenitcametomacrostabilization,forinstance,andthevarioustax-relatedchanges
beingrequiredofhisregime,Husseinetalfirstmanagedtoprotectimport-dependentmerchants
throughinsertingahostofexemptionsintotheGeneralSalesTaxregime.330Acrosstheseyears,
theyalsoconsistentlyfilibusteredtheestablishmentofincomeandcorporatetaxcollection
systems.WhenitcametotheIMF’spushforcurrentandcapitalaccountliberalization,
meanwhile,theregimealsoarrangedthattheInvestmentPromotionLawof1995containeda
seriesofsector-specificlimitsonforeignownership.Inthismanner,suchrentier’sprotectionism
insulatedconstructionandcontracting,landandairtransport,tradingandtradeservices,
bankingandinsurance,telecommunications,mining,andagriculturalproductionfromsignificant
328 Thistensionmanifestedinpublicemployment’sprivilegingofincumbent,olderworkers(andtheirbenefits)and
thegulfthatsubsequentlyopenedupbetweenthosegrandfatheredintotheoldwelfarismandthethousandofyoungaspirantswhofoundthepathsthattheirfathershadwalkedinsecuringamiddleclasslifenowclosed(PetersandMoore,2009,p.277).
329 Thoughithasrightlybeenarguedthattherewasamovetore-formalizebusiness-staterelationsduringthis
period—amovenecessitatedbytheIFI’sinterventionsandnotinfrequentlyfundedandinstitutionalizedthroughtheUSAidmanagedEMIRproject—formalizationdidlittletomitigatetheenduringrentieristrelationshipbetweenaprivilegedeliteandtheregime.
330 Anani(2001),p.180.
168
foreigncompetitioninparticular—sectorsunitedbythefactthattheywereeachapreserveofthe
oldbourgeoiselite.331WhenthePalacedideventuallyacquiesce(inpart)totheIMF’swishes
regardingprivatization,finally,itwouldmediatetheprocessofpublicdivestmentsotosteera
numberofvaluableandprofitablestate-ownedenterprisesintothehandsofthesesame
clients/allies.SabihMasri’sacquisitionoftheJordanHotelsandTourismcompanyprovidesbut
themostfamousexampleofthiskindofcurated,non-competitive(anddiscounted)sale.332
Turningtothenewblood,itshouldbeacknowledgedthatHussein’shalf-hearted
privatizationcampaignalsoservedastheprincipalmechanismthroughwhichtheregime
integratedpoliticallyconnectedethnicTransjordaniansintotheelitefractionofthecapitalist
class.333Onoccasion,bothnouveauricheandoldelitecouldbeservedinthesametransaction.
Thesell-offoftheJordanTelecommunication’sCompany(JTC)in1995,oneoftheday’smost
profitableoftheSOEs,providedonesuchexample.334
331 See:Knowles,p.288.332 Onthissale,seeKnowles,p.248.333 Onthisaspectsofprivatization,see:YitzhakReiter,“ThePalestinian-TransjordanianRift:EconomicMightand
PoliticalPowerinJordan,MiddleEastJournal(58:1),2004,pp.72-92.Also,see:Wils,p.134;PetersandMoore,p.277;Schlumberger(2004),pp.150-158.
AsPetersandMooredocument,theRifaifamily’smigrationintotheeconomicelitewouldbemostillustrativeof
thisphenomenon.LeveraginghispositionasCEOofJordanDubaiCapitalalongsidehisfamily’sinviolablestandingwithinthepoliticalelite,SamirRifa’imanagedtoasserthimself(andtoextracthealthyreturns)duringthedisaggregationandselloftheJordanElectricityCompany.
334 1994legislationallowingforprivateinvestmentin“peripheralservices”--servicesincludingmobile
telecommunicationstechnologies—providedthejuridicalfoundationforthisprivatizationandtheriseofanumberofforeignowned,megacommunicationscompaniesintheearly2000s.
TheJTCtransactionwasoverseenbyShakerbinZaid,whojustsohappenedtoalsobethecousinofKingHussein
andthesonofthesittingPrimeMinisteratthetime.WorkingwithAliHusriandJamalSarayrah,binZaid’sstewardingofthebiddingprocesswasamasterclassineliterentdistribution,onethatsecuredtheinterestofhe
169
This,then,wouldbethewidereconomiccontextintowhichAbdullahibnHussein,aman
whowaselevatedtotheroleofCrownPrinceonlymonthspriortohiscoronation,walkedin
1999.Inthenextsectionofthisdissertation,Iwillexaminethecapitalismhehashelped
institutionalizeoverthecourseofthenexttwentyyears—andthesocialstructureof
accumulationthatholdsittogether.
andhiscolleaguesaswellastheinterestsofforeigninvestors,savvybureaucrats,andahandfulofoldscionsinonefoulswoop(Schlumberger,152).
FranceTelecomultimatelycameawaywith35%equity,theSocialSecurityCorporation(oneofthestate’s
autonomouscreditinstitutions)with8%,andArabBankwith5%(Knowles,243).WithDajaniAssociatesoverseeingthelegalpaperwork,thesametransactionalsofunneledheavyfeesintothecoffersofthatoldguardfamily.
171
CHAPTERSIX
Politics,policymaking,andtheinstitutionalizationofneoliberalcapitalism
Inthischapter,Iwilldiscussthepoliticalinstitutionalizationofcontemporaryneoliberal
capitalisminJordan.Atthelevelofwidestabstraction,thisdiscussionwilldemonstratethatthe
insulated,Palace-directedmodalityofeconomicpolicymakingpreviouslyinstitutionalizedby
Husseininthepost-1973periodhasbeenretainedbyhisson.Inaddition,itwillrevealthat
JordanianpoliticsunderAbdullahremainmoregenerallyorientedbythesupremacyand
prerogativesoftheunitary(monarchical)executive.ThoughthenewKing’sfluencyin
internationalnormsandvalues—andhisregime’snominalcommitmenttowards
democratization—mightpartiallyobscurethisfact,aspowerisstillwieldedautocraticallyandas
authoritariansurvivalisstillretainedastheorganizingprincipleofHashemitepolitics,this
analysiswillshowthattheweightofhistoryissignificant(ifnotconstitutive)whenitcomesto
thepoliticalaspectofthecontemporarySSA.
Allofwhichisnottosaythatcapitalism’spoliticalinstitutionalizationtodayiswhollyin
keepingwiththepast.Quitetothecontrary,thisanalysiswillalsodetailanumberof
transformationsthathavebeensuigeneristoandfacilitativeofAbdullah’sneoliberalturn.First
andforemostintheseregards,IwillshowthatAbdullah’sempowermentofpalaceappointed,
quasiautonomouspolicymakingbodieshasconsolidatedahistoricallyuniqueformofautocratic-
technocraticgovernance.Operatinginexplicitoppositiontothetraditionalapparatusesofthe
stateandincollaborationwithacoterieofforeignalliesasAbdullah’snocturnalcouncilshave,I
172
willdevelophowthisautocratic-technocraticgovernanceimbricatestwodecadesworthoffailed
developmentpoliciesaswellasthepoliticalandsocialtensionsthatarefundamentalto
Abdullah’srule.
ThischapterwillalsoforegroundhowthenewKinghaseconomizedhispoliticalclass335
andhowthistoohascontributedtothesocialdisembeddingofJordanian(crisis)capitalismin
the21stcentury.Wherethepreviouspoliticalclasshadusedtheircontrolofthestatenotonlyto
extractrentsbutalsotodistributethoserentstoawiderconstituency(howevercorruptlyor
inefficiently),itwillbedemonstratedthatAbdullah’seconomizedleaders—divorcedfromany
domesticsocialforceastheyare—seetoitthatrentsarenotonlyreallocatedupward,butthat
theyarefunneledalmostexclusivelyintothehandsofatransnationalcapitalistclasstowhich
theyaremember.Byconsequence,Iwillmakethecasethatcapital’scolonizationofgovernment
underAbdullahandthedisplacementsithasimplied(bothfortheoldpoliticalguardandforthe
traditionalstewardsofthebureaucracy)arebothfundamentaltoamodalityofaccumulation
characterizedbyhighinequality,highinefficiency,andelitebias.
Asregardschapterorganization,Iwillbreakmyanalysisintothreesubsections,eachof
whichwilldetailaseparateinstanceoftechnocratic-autocraticgovernanceinthecontemporary
period.ThefirstsubsectionwilladdressthecompositionandlegacyoftheEconomicConsultative
Council(ECC).ThesecondwillconsidertheAqabaSpecialEconomicZoneAuthority(ASEZA).
Thethird,finally,willkeyinonOmarMaa’ni’stenureasMayoroftheMunicipalityofGreater
335 Byeconomized,Irefertothemovementofprivatesectorelitesintopositionsofgoverningandpolicymaking
authority.
173
Amman(GAM).Collectively,theseinstancesoftechnocratic-autocraticgovernancewillbeshown
tohavearticulatedthelegislativeandjuridicalfoundationsoftoday’scapitalismofcrisis.Their
recordwillalsobesufficientsotoestablishhowthepoliticalmoregenerallypervadesthe
contoursofthecontemporarysocialstructureofaccumulation.
Importantly,Iwanttoemphasizeattheoutsetthattheorganizationandperformanceof
thethreeautocratic-technocraticpolicymakingbodiesreviewedinthischapterareindeed
representativeofmoregeneraltrendsincontemporaryeconomicgovernance/policymaking—
andarethereforewhollyunexceptionalwithinthecontextofAbdullah’sJordan.Atthelevelof
nationalpolicyplanning,forinstance,thistrendtowardstransferringofpowerawayfromthe
parliamentand/orstatebureaucratsandtowardspalace-aligned,technocraticbodieshasbeen
evincedmanytimesover.TaketheJordanianInvestmentBoard(laterrenamedtheJordanian
InvestmentCommission,orJIC)asanexample.NotunliketheECC,theJIC’smembershipis
royallyappointed,inclusiveofsomegovernmentofficials,anddominatedbyindividualsrecruited
fromJordan’svariousChambersofCommerceandIndustry.LiketheECCaswell,itsofficesare
linkeddirectlytothePrimeMinister’s,anofficefilled,ofcourse,byanotherappointeeoftheKing.
Grantedawidemandatewhenitcomestodevelopingandevaluatinginvestmentpolicy,theJIC’s
royalestablishmentthereforeepitomizesthesameinsulated,autocratic-technocraticgovernance
thatIwillbescrutinizingthroughtheexamplesoftheECC,ASEZA,andMa’ani’sGAM.Thesame
couldalsobesaidofEconomicPolicyCouncil.Foundedin2016,thisAbdullah-appointed
consultativebodyhasbeenempoweredtochartmajordevelopmentstrategies.Ittoois
comprisedofprivatesectorrepresentatives,representativesoftheRoyalCourt,andahandfulof
174
ideologicallyalignedgovernmentministers,andittooiswhollyunaccountabletoanypopular
institutions.336
Whiletheconstraintsofspaceandtheoreticalsaturationdictatethatthischaptershallnot
diveanyfurtherintothebusinessoftheJICorEPC,Ibrieflyreferencetheirexampleshere—andI
couldreferencemanyothers—inordertoreassurethereaderthatIhavenotcherrypickedthe
policymakingbodiesfeaturedhereinordertodistortormisrepresentthenatureofcapitalism’s
politicalinstitutionalization.Putsimply,mycaseshavebeenselectedbecausetheyarethemost
impactfulandemblematicexamplesofageneralizedphenomenon—andbecausetheyare
thereforethemostempiricallyrelevantandtheoreticallyilluminatinginstancesthatcanbe
studiedonthissubjectmatter.
(1)TheEconomicConsultativeCouncil(ECC)
InDecemberof1999,thefreshlyanointedKingappointedanEconomicConsultative
Council(ECC).LiketheESCbeforeit,thisCouncilwasestablishedunderthepretensethatit
provideanadvisoryfunction—thatithousethekindsofexpertisethatthecountry’spolitical
leadershipwouldneedastheydevelopedtheir(IMF-mandated)economicreformagenda.
Pretensenotwithstanding,theECCswiftlyacquiredlegislativeandadministrative
mandatesofwideremitandnegligibleoversight.Specifictotheformer,theECCwasenlistedto
supplythepolicycontentoftheroyaldecreesandprovisionallegislationthatAbdullahusedasa
336 ColinPowers,“Policyconvergence,(under)development,andJordanianeconomicsunderKingAbdullah”,Middle
EastLawandGovernance(forthcoming).
175
workaroundforhavingtodealwitheithertheSenateortheLowerHouseduringtheearlyyears
ofhistenure.337TheCouncil’slegislativepowers—whichwererathertotalbetween1999and
2003338—,wouldthenbematchedbyadministrativeprerogativesaftertheKingexploitedthe
upheavalandchaosborneofthesecondIntifadaandtheAmericaninvasionofIraqsotomove
membersofthisECCintohighleveraged,Ministerial-levelpositionswithinthebureaucracy.339
Operatingasadefactoprivateparliamentasmuchasanautonomous,royally-blessedcabal
withinthestateapparatus,theECCwastherebymadestewardofanewJordanianeconomy.
OfthetwentypeopleappointedtotheCouncil,fourteenhailedfromtheJordanianprivate
sector.340ContemporariesandpersonalassociatesoftheKing,themajorityofthisfourteenwere,
infact,legacychildrenofthequotacoterie—thegrandchildrenandgreatgrandchildrenofthose
familiesthathadrosetosuchprominenceinthe1940sduetotheEmir’smanipulationofwar-
timeimportlicensing.Complementingthepoliticallyknightedagentsofoldmoneywithin
337 Givenitsadvisoryremitanditslocationoutsidethestatebureaucracy,theECC’spathtolegislativeinfluencewas
notimmediatelyapparent.UpontheoutbreakoftheSecondIntifada(and,later,theIraqWar),however,eachofwhichprovidedcasusbelliforAbdullah’smoveagainsttheparliamentanddemocratization,thisinfluenceswiftlycametobefelt.Bycynicallyconjuringapoliticalemergency—andbydismissingtheparliament—,afterall,theconstitutionalgroundswereclearedforthemonarchicalexecutivetogovernthroughprovisionallaw.Nolongerneedingtocontendwithunrulyelectedrepresentatives,emergencyalsoprovidedforacontextwithinwhichtheECCcouldbeelevatedtoapositionofroyallyendorsedprominencewithouthavingtofaceunduepoliticalscrutiny.
338 Atleastasrelatestotheeconomy,ofcourse.339 AliAbuRaghebwasevenappointedPrimeMinisterin2001,withhiscabinetlargelyfilledbyECCmembersas
well.340 AsfurtherregardsthegenealogyofAbdullah’sneweconomizedelite,itisalsoworthnotingthatmanyamongst
theECC’snumberhadbeenenlistedinaUSAidLeadershipandTeamEffectivenesstrainingprogramatYaleUniversityduringthe1990s(DeBruyne,2013,p.157).NotonlywasJordan’semergentpolicyclassdominatedbytherepresentativesofdomesticcapital;itwasalsoacoteriefilledbysubjectstrainedandsocializedintheAmericanparadigmofliberaldevelopment.
176
Abdullah’seconomizedelite—KarimKa’war341,FawwazZu’bi342,GhassanNuqul343,Sabih
Masri344,KhalidTouqan345,MuhammedAbuGhazeleh346,NadimMu’asher347,Sahelal-Majali348,
RaghabedKurdi349,SuhairAliDabbas350,principally—wereasecondcliquerepresentativeof
Jordan’snew,tech-facingcapitalistclass.ProminentamongstthislattergroupwereFadi
Ghandour351,Salahal-
341 Ka’warwasandisoneofthebiggestplayersinJordaniantechnology,presidentoftheIdealGroupandInt@jat
thetimeofhisappointment342 Zu’biwasowneroftheAdritecGroup,anindustrialagriculturalequipmentfirm,atthetimeofappointment343 NuqulhadinheritedtheNuqulGroup,amassivefamilyownedconglomerateoperatingacrossanumberof
differentsectors344 Theoneelderstatesmanwithinthesebusinesselites,Masri,thecurrentChairmanofArabBank,wasrunning
ZaraInvestmentsandanumberofotherfinancialandrealestateenterprisesatthetimeofhisappointment.345 TouqanhadbeenPresidentofBalqaUniversitypriortohisappointment.346 Ghazeleh,thesonofTalalAbuGhazelehandhismassivelegalempire,alsoheldseniorpostsatDelMonteand
JordanianPoultry.347 Mua’sherwasDirectorofAhliBankandChairmanofArabInternationalHotelsCompanyandalDawliyafor
HotelsandMallsatthetimeofhisappointment.HewouldlaterbecomechairmanofElzayReadyWearManufacturingCompany,agarmentsmanufacturerawardedthestatusofaspecialeconomiczone.
348 MajaliwasfounderofMidContractingJordan,afirmthatwouldbeoneoftheprinciplebeneficiariesofthe
constructionboomoverseenbytheECCandthePalaceacrossthe2000s.MajaliandKurdiwereassignedtheECCportolioresponsibleforforeigninvestmentsandinvestmentclimate.Majaliwouldlaterbeimmersedinamassivecorruptionscandalcenteringonapublichousingcontract.
349 KurdiwasCEOofHayatPharmaceuticals,thelargestenterpriseinoneofthefewsectorsexperiencingsignificant
growthinthe1980sand1990s(growththatwouldcollapsefollowingthesigningoftheJordan-USFTA).350 SuhairwasworkingforCitybankatthetimeofherappointmenttotheECC.351 GhandourfoundedAramex,aninternationalshippingcompanyemployingmorethan2,000worldwide.
177
Dinal-Bashir352,MuhammedHalaqa,AliAbuRagheb353andBaseemAwadallah.354Headofthe
RoyalCourt’seconomicsdepartment,AwadallahservedastheKing’spointmanwithintheECC
andasthechiefarchitectofhisneoliberalredesign.355
Asregardsthatredesign,theECCusedthepoliticalhegemonyitacquiredbetween1999
and2002topasswhattheInternationalCrisisGroupdescribedasa“massacreoflegislation”,one
thatreorderedthebasicorientationoftheeconomy—andthatarticulatedanewformof
capitalismintheprocess.356Thenewnessofthiscapitalismwouldbeprimarilyarticulated
throughfiveinnovations:(1)expeditedandintensifiedeconomicopening;(2)atransferofpublic
assetsinto(particular)privatehands;(3)theinstitutionalizationofaclass-biasedfiscal
sociology;(4)apartialmonetaristturnattheCentralBankofJordan;and(5)bythedemarcation
352 Bashirisalawyer;hehasservedonmanysubsequentlyestablished“consultativebodies”suchastheEconomic
PolicyCouncil353 AbuRaghebhadbeenmanagingdirectorofNationalEngineeringandContractingCompanybetween1971and
1991,afterwhichhebeganhispoliticalcareer.HewouldalsobeoneofthemostinfamouscharactersfingeredinthePanamaPapersscandal.
354 TheinclusionofAl-Bashir—whowasmarriedtoReemBadran,daughterofthemany-timePrimeMinisterMudar
Badran—meanwhile,allowedtheKingtoincorporatesomeofthosefamiliesthathadbeensocentraltohisfather’shousepoliticsandstrategyofelitecirculationon-sideaswellasheshiftedpoliticalpowerdistinctlyinthedirectionofprivatesectorcapital(Schlumberger,139-140).Thoughnotoftheelitefractionofdomesticcapitalthemselves,finally,AbuRaghebandHalaqa—thelatterofwhichwouldserveasbothHeadoftheECCandDeputyPrimeMinisterintheformer’sgovernment—werethepoliticalclass’truebelieverswhenitcametoAbdullah’sneoliberalproject(DeBruyne,2013,p.157).Steadfastideologicalallies,eachwouldservethisprojectinanumberofdifferentcapacitiesacrossthecomingdecades.
355 Awadallahwouldlaterbeonthewrong-endofanendemicallypoliticizedanti-corruptionstruggle,anoutcome
thatforcedhimoutofgovernmentandmoreorlessintoaLondon-basedexile.356 TheInternationalCrisisGroup,“TheChallengeofPoliticalReform:JordanianDemocratisationandRegional
Instability”,Report(October,2013).
178
ofaneweconomicgeography—legallyachievedthroughtheestablishmentofaconstellationof
specialeconomiczonesandexportprocessingzones.
PoliticsinGeneralintheAgeofAbdullah:ALiberalKing,PerformancesofReform,andAnti-Democracy ThoughAbdullahcametoofficekeentostylehimselfintheaestheticofreformism,hisrevanchistauthoritarianismapparentfromtheveryinceptionofhisreign.SotoexpeditetherollbackofJordan’sdemocratization—arollbackthatwasongoingsincehisfather’ssigningofapeacedealwithIsraelatWadiArabahin1994—,theyoungKingfirstadoptedanumberofjuridicalmeasuresdesignedtoguaranteetheenduringinconsequentialityoftheparliament.Foremostamongstthesemeasures,upontakingpower,Abdullahimmediatelyensuredthatthemonarchicalexecutive’sdiscretionaryandexclusiveauthoritieswhenitcametopowersofthepurse,foreignanddefensepolicy,monetarypolicy357,thelegislativeprocess358,theappointmentofthePrimeMinisterandhis/hergovernment,andthedismissaland/orsuspensionofparliamentwereallretained.LeavingtheupperhouseofJordan’sparliament(theSenate)aroyallyappointedbody—andimpedinganyreformtothegerrymanderingandsinglenon-transferablevote(SNTV)methodthatfunctionedtocompromisetheelectoralsystemdeterminingthecompositionoftheparliament’slowerhouse—,heassuredthatthosedemocraticinstitutionsthatwereallowedtoexistwerehollowedoutandcompromisedaswell.359 Furthermore,thoughAbdullahwasforcedtoaccommodatethedemocratizingwhimsyofhisAmericansponsorsduringthefreedomagendaperiodoftheBushpresidency,eventhen,hewouldsoinamannerthatguaranteedhisautocraticinfrastructure—aninfrastructurecenteredonhisperson,theRoyalCourt,andtheGeneralIntelligenceDirectorate(GID)—neveractuallycameupfordebate.360AstheparametersoftheAbdullah’sdemocratichermeneuticswerealwaystobestructuredbytheontologicalpriorityassignedtoregimesurvival(first)and 357 Aswouldbecomeapparentduringthefinancialcrisisof2008,theindependenceoftheCentralBankofJordanis
nominalatbest.WhensubjectedtothepressuresoftheKing,itdoesasrequested,regardlessofthecountry’slong-termeconomichealth.
358 NotonlydidtheRoyalCourtretainsoleauthoritywhenitcametotheintroductionofbills,italsoretainedthe
righttolegislatethroughdecreeandtheissuanceofprovisionallaw.359 Formoreonthisdemocratichollowing,see:SeanYom,“ThenewlandscapeofJordanianpolitics:social
opposition,fiscalcrisis,andtheArabSpring”,BritishJournalofMiddleEasternStudies(42:3),2015. WhiletheauthoritariannatureofAbdullah’searlygovernancewasfarfromsubtle,itwouldgrowevenmore
explicitbytheearly2000s.WhenprotestsfilledthestreetsfollowingtheoutbreakofthesecondIntifadaand,slightlylater,thesecondAmericaninvasionofIraq,theKingwouldsuspendparliamentandrulealmostexclusivelythroughprovisionaldecreeupandthroughroughly2005.
360 See:ColinPowers,“Policyconvergence...”,MiddleEastLawandGovernance(forthcoming).
179
Thefirstoftheseinnovationswasoperationalizedthroughtariffratereductions,through
thefast-trackingofJordan’saccessiontotheWTO,andthethroughestablishmentofhighly
PoliticsinGeneral(continued)economicliberalization(second),agovernmentbyandofthepeoplewouldneveractuallybeonthetable.
Furthermore,thoughAbdullahwasforcedtoaccommodatethedemocratizingwhimsyofhisAmericansponsorsduringthefreedomagendaperiodoftheBushpresidency,eventhen,hewouldsoinamannerthatguaranteedhisautocraticinfrastructure—aninfrastructurecenteredonhisperson,theRoyalCourt,andtheGeneralIntelligenceDirectorate(GID)—neveractuallycameupfordebate.1AstheparametersoftheAbdullah’sdemocratichermeneuticswerealwaystobestructuredbytheontologicalpriorityassignedtoregimesurvival(first)andeconomicliberalization(second),agovernmentbyandofthepeoplewouldneveractuallybeonthetable. AsimilarperformanceofpoliticalreformtotheoneseenduringtheBushyearswouldcommencefollowingtheshockoftheArabUprisings.AsMariaJosuahascapablydetailed,2011-2012’sNationalDialogueCommittee(NDC),anotherbodymeanttoplotthecourseforsubsequentdemocraticreform,actuallyfunctionedandoperatedjustaspreviouslyaborteddemocratizationinitiativeshad.Tobegin,participantsinthisCommitteewerehandselectedbythePalace,whichallowedtheKingandhisRoyalCourttoscreenandexcludethemoreambitiousoftheregime’sdemocraticchallengers.Havingalreadycuratedthecommitteeinthismanner,thePalacewouldalsoinsurethataloyalistfactionwithintheinstitutionacquiredakindofproceduralistcontrolsotodictatewhatkindofreformswerebeingbroughtupfordiscussion. IfthemorepolitecontingentsofthedemocracymomentwerestifledthroughmachinationsattheNDC,othersweremanagedthroughadeftstrategyofselectiveco-optation.ForthefrustratedMilitaryVeteransthathademergedasasignificantoppositionforceduringtheseyears,co-optationwouldbeinstrumentalizedthroughmakrama1,wageincreases,andincreasedpublicsectorhiring.Havingtherebytakenawaysomeofthegrievancesmobilizingthemovements,theregimenextworkedtopickoffmanyofthisopposition’smostcapableleaders—includingKhalidKalaldehoftheSocialLeft,whowasappointedMinisterofParliamentaryAffairsin2015andwholaterservedasElectionCommissionPresident—byintegratingsaidactorsintotheseniorranksofthestate.RenderedsomewhatrudderlessanddisorientedbythePalace’sinterventions,theearlypromiseofthismilitarizedrevolteventuallydissolvedintoineffectuality.Asforthemoreantagonisticoftheactorspushingfordemocracyatthisstage—actorssuchasAl-HirakandtheSouthernMovement—,theregimewoulduseahostofmorekinetic-coercivemeanstobreaktheirmomentum.
180
invasivefreetradeagreements(FTAs)withtheUnitedStatesandEuropeanUnion.361Morethan
openingtheJordanianeconomytotheworld,themodalityofglobalintegrationthereby
institutionalizedbytheECC/PalacewouldalsoimplywholesalechangestoJordan’sregulatory362,
tax,investment,andindustrialpolicies,asIwilllaterdetail.
TheECC/Palace’sselectiveoffloadingofpublicassets—policies,itshouldbesaid,that
werelegitimatedthroughappealtothesamepromisesandnecessitarianargumentsaswere
typicallyarticulatedbyeconomistsattheIMFandWorldBank363—,meanwhile,waslargely
achievedthroughPrivatizationLawno.25of2000.PriortothepassageofLawno.25,
privatizationhadproceededinapiecemealfashion.Foreachentitythatthestatewastodivest
from(inpartorinwhole),specificlegislationneededtobewritten,debated,andapprovedbythe
parliament.Thediscreteproceduralismbakedintosuchaprocessallowedactorsbothwithin
parliament364andthelargerapparatusofthestatetointerjectthemselvesandtheir
constituenciesintonegotiationswithprospectivebuyersandinvestors.Whileoccasionally
361 35%inthemid-1980s,theratewasbroughtdownto13.5%asofearly2000.362 FerrisNesheiwat,‘TheadoptionofintellectualpropertystandardsbeyondTRIPS-isitamisguidedlegaland
economicobsessionbydevelopingcountries’,LoyolaLAInternationalandComparativeLawReview,32,2010,pp.361-394.
363 Jordanianpolicyplanners,likeBankeconomists,madethecaseforprivatizationbysuggestingthatthereceipts
fromsalescouldbeusedtofinancepublicinvestmentininfrastructuralupgradesandhumanresourcedevelopment.ThePrivatizationLawof2000hadstipulatedthatupto15%ofthereceiptsgainedthroughprivatizationwouldbereinvestedininfrastructureandretrainingprograms.Whethermadeinbadfaithornot,suchanarrangementnevercametopass,assubsequentlendingagreementswiththeIMFwouldearmarknearlyalltheproceedsfromprivatizationforexternaldebtbuybacks.
FortheBank’sdiscourseonprivatization,see:TheWorldBank,ClaimingtheFuture:ChoosingProsperityinthe
MiddleEastandNorthAfrica,(Washington,DC:WorldBank,1995)364 Inparticular,PrimeMinisterMajaliandtheEconomicandFinanceCommitteeoftheLowerHousewouldplaya
criticalroleinpumpingthebrakesonmanyofthesetransactions(Knowles,2001,p.240)
181
successfulinstonewallingaprivatizationinitiativealltogether—aswasthecasein1998during
theattemptedprivatizationoftheAqabaRailwayCorporation365—,thepoliticizationofthese
processesalsoallowedstaterepresentativestomoregenerallyexerttheirleveragesotooffer
somemodicumofprotectiontotheworkersthatmightbeaffectedbyasale.Amongstother
examples,itwasthroughthesekindsofpoliticizedinterventionsthatthegovernmentretained
ultimateboardcontroloftheJordanianCementFactorydespiteLaFarge’sacquisitionof36%
equityin1998.366
ThepassageofLawno.25andthestreamliningofprivatizationthatitallowed,then,not
onlyexpeditedthemassoffloadingofpublicassets;italsoremovedwhatlimitedprotection
parliamentarymediationhadpreviouslyprovidedtothosemostlikelytobeaffected.367Withina
matterofmonths—assoonasOctoberof2000tobespecific—,andunderthedirectsupervision
oftheECC,thirty-fourofthefortycompaniestargetedforstatedivestmentundera1997strategic
planhadbeenfullyorpartiallyprivatized.368Thisincludedanumberofthecountry’slargestand
mostvaluable(ifunprofitable)assets,includingRoyalJordanianAirlines,theJordanian
TelecommunicationsCompany,theJordanPhosphatesMiningCompany,andtheArabPotash
Company.
365 Knowles(2001),p.244366 ThesekindsofinterventionsalsoimposedconditionsofpurchaseonLafargethatrestricted,atleasttemporarily,
anypost-factodismissalofworkers(Knowles,241)367 SufyanAlissa,“RethinkingeconomicreforminJordan:confrontingsocioeconomicrealities”,Report:Carnegie
MiddleEastCenter(2007),p.12.368 Knowles(2001),p.245
182
Unlikethesecondinnovation,theECC’sinstitutionalizationofaclass-biasedfiscal
sociologyrequiredanumberofsynchronizedsteps.Ontherevenuessideoftheledger,thisbegan
withtheimpositionofaregressive,downwardlypunitiveValued-Addedtax.369Thedislocating,
polarizingeffectsthatwereintroducedthroughtheVATwerethencompoundedbyboththenon-
establishmentofprogressiveincomeorcorporatetaxregimesandbytheextensivetax
exemptionsthatthestateoptedtoofferforeigninvestorsinparticular.Ontheexpendituresside,
reductionsinsocialandcapitaloutlays—institutionalizedinthenameoffiscalconsolidation—
onlyfurtherconsolidatedthedistributivelogicattheheartofthiscapitalism’snewfiscal
sociology.370
AsforthePalace-ECC’smonetaristinnovations,theirinstillingofpricestabilityasthe
singularmandateoftheCentralBankwouldmakeitnearlyimpossibleforfuturegovernmentsto
upholdmanyoftheirconstitutionallyinscribedsocialobligations,furtheracceleratingthe
disembeddingoftheeconomy.371TheECC’sdemarcationofaneweconomicgeography,finally,
was,asmentioned,operationalizedthroughtheestablishmentofanetworkofspecialeconomic
zones(SEZs)andexportprocessingzones(EPZs).Juridicallyconstructedsoastobeoutsidethe
laws,rules,andregulationsofJordanproper,thesezones—someofwhichareprivatelyowned
andmanaged—alsoprovidedfirmsoperatingwithintheirjurisdictionwithanextensivelistof
369 ItshouldbeacknowledgedthattheVATwasonlyimplementedin2001;priortothat,Abdullah’srevenuestrategy
relieduponanequallypunitiveGeneralSalesTaxregime,however.370 Reductionsincapitalspendingofcoursealsounderminedlong-termgrowthprospectsaswell.371 TheJordanianconstitutioncontainsprovisionsregardingajobsguaranteeaswellasothersdefiningthestate’s
remitasbasedonthemaximizationofemploymentandthedeliveryof“higherandmoreequitabledistributionofincome.”
183
non-conditionalsubsidies,taxbreaks,andinvestmentincentives.Thisinnovationwouldcometo
beimplicatedinmanydimensionsofthecontemporarysocialstructureofaccumulation,
informingeverythingfromthesocialcontrolregimethatstabilizesaccumulationtodaytothe
formsofmarketcompetitionandprofitseekingnowprevailingtothiscapitalism’s
developmentallydisastrousexternalarticulation.
TheECC’sdemarcationofaneweconomicgeographyalsoseguesratherperfectlyintothe
nextpolicymakingbodytobediscussedinthischapter.Thestoryherebeginswiththe
aforementionedmassacreoflegislationandwithLawno.32of2000inparticular.Writtenin
consultationwithSeniorLegalAdvisorsfromDeloitteConsulting372(namely,Jean-PaulGauthier)
andsteeredthroughintenseCabinet-leveldebatesbyAliAbuRagheb373,thislaw,partandparcel
oftheefforttolegallydefineanewgeographyinJordan,conjuredintoexistencearatherbizarre,
quasi-extranationalspaceitcalledtheAqabaSpecialEconomicZone.374
372 Unsurprising,perhaps,tostudentsofcontemporaryglobaldevelopment,thegenealogyofASEZAultimately
tracesbacktotheboardroomsofprivatemanagementconsultancies.TheprincipalactorsinvolvedindevelopingtheideaofanexportprocessingzoneinAqabawereGenslerArchitects,ECO-Consult,andAECOMInternational,eachofwhomhadbeencommissionedforthisworkbytheWorldBankand/orUSAid(DeBruyne,169).BorrowingheavilyfrommodelsandrationalitiesinitiallydevelopedthroughUSAid’sexperimentationwithexportprocessingzonesinthePhilippines,theplanstheconsultanciesultimatelycameupwitharerepresentativeoftheperversesouth-to-southlearningthathasbecomesocommonincontemporarydevelopment.
373 Onthesecabinetdebates(wherethevastmajorityofthegovernment’sministersexpressedresistanceto
Abdullah’sdesiredspecialeconomiczone-policies,andwhereAbdullaheventuallyhadtosidestepthatcabinetandthetraditionallegislativeprocessasaresult),see:MarwanKardoosh,“TheAqabaSpecialEconomicZone,Jordan.”Paper:WorldBankGovernanceKnowledgeSharingProgram,PolicyInitiativesandReformsintheMENARegionWorkshop(2004),pp.15-18.
374 OnGauthier’sinvolvement,see:LocusEconomica,“AdvisingonJordan’sSpecialDevelopmentAreasLaw”
(availableat:http://www.locuseconomica.com/blog/2016/9/2/assisting-jordans-special-development-areas-law).
184
TheAqabaSpecialEconomicZonewasbizarrebecauseunlikeJordan’sotherspecial
economiczones—whichweretypicallyestablishedonnon-residential,relativelymarginal
industrialestates—,thisonewastoincludeoneofthecountry’slargestcities(Aqaba)withinits
borders.Ratherthanextractingsomeperipheral,peoplelesslandscapefromthelegaljurisdiction
ofthenationalgovernment,then,Lawno.32wastounilaterallyrelocateanentiregovernorate
(constituting7.4%ofJordan’stotalterritoryandpopulatedbymorethan111,000)intosome
strangeetheroutsidethedirectpurviewofthestate,electedrepresentatives,and,inmany
instances,thelawitself.375Theresidentsofthiszoneweretohenceforthbegovernedbyan
unelectedbodycalledtheAqabaSpecialEconomicZoneAuthority(ASEZA),anAuthoritywhose
state-chargedremitcenteredonattractingforeigninvestmentanddrivingexportsbeforeallelse.
Tothisbodywenowturn.
(2)TheAqabaSpecialEconomicZoneAuthority(ASEZA)
FollowingthepassageofLawno.32,Aqaba’sfullreconstitutionasaspecialeconomiczone
governedbythediscretionaryauthorityofanunelectedrulingbody(ASEZA)alonewasnotyet
375 See:Debruyne(2013),p.172. ThiswasfinalizedandmadematerialinMayof2001whentheAqabaMunicipalgovernmentwasdissolvedand
theAqabaSpecialEconomicZoneAuthority(ASEZA)beganitsrule.ThoughtheresidentsoftheAqabaSpecialEconomicZone(atleasttheJordaniannationalsamongstthem)retainedtheirconstitutionalstatusasJordaniancitizensandthoughthelandsthemselvesweretoremainthesovereignpossessionoftheHashemiteKingdom,thislegislationnonethelessremovedAqabaanditspeoplefromJordanproperinaverysubstantiveway,asIwilldetail.
185
complete.Indeed,agreatdealinthewayofjuridicalacrobaticswouldstillberequiredof
Abdullah’spolicyelite.376
Morespecifically,suchacrobaticswereneededinordertocarrythroughwhatwerelegally
complextransfersofpowers,transfersthatwouldtakeauthoritiespreviouslyinvestedin
governmentministriesorelectedofficialsandreassignthemtoASEZA.Inimplementingthese
transfers,Abdullah’spolicyeliteultimatelyandprimarilyreliedupontheissuanceof
MemorandumofUnderstanding.Eighteensuchmemoranda,infact,weresignedoverthecourse
oftheearly2000s—memorandathatwerenot,ofcourse,subjecttopublicoversightandthat
containednomechanismsforpopularparticipation.
Collectively,theseMoU’sascribedASEZAlegaljurisdictionforareasofgovernancefar
beyondthedevelopmentinitiativesthathadinitiallydefineditsremitandraisond’etre.Granted
“financial,fiscal,andadministrativeindependence”,operatingitsownvisaandworkpermit
system,managingtheeducationalsystemforhundredsofthousands,andhandlingportfoliosas
diverseassecurity,povertyalleviation,roadbuilding,andsocialdevelopment,ASEZAwasmadea
sovereignandindependentstateinallbutname.AsonecommunicationsofficerforASEZAlater
remarked,“thereisbutonegovernmentinAqaba(and)thatisASEZA.Wearesurroundedbyfour
countries,includingJordan.”377
Theaggregateeffectsofthesetransfersthroughmemorandawerenotonlytorender
ASEZAadefactostatewithinthestate,however;theywerealsotoempowerasmallcabalof
376 InadditiontothecityofAqaba(andthecity’sport),WadiRumandWadiAraba,theformerofwhichstandsas
oneofJordan’sbiggesttourismassets,werebothredistrictedtoASEZAaswell.377 See:Debruyne(2013),p.174-175.
186
formerECCstaffers378withinASEZA’sdefactostatewithtotalizingandautocraticpowersof
governance.379ByvirtueofASEZA’sorganizationalstructure—astructurethatseparatedthe
Authority’soperationsintosixdiscretedomains,eachofwhichwastobepresidedoverbya
Commissionerinvestedwithsubtantialdiscretionarypower380—,ameresixindividuals,infact,
colloquiallyreferredtoasal-Mufawwadiyya,wereabletobuildandrulewhatamountedto
localizedfiefdomsinAqabathroughpersonaldiktat.Theydidso,moreover,whileworkingin
collaborationwithBechtelCorporation,therathernefariousAmericanconstructiongiantwho
managedtoprocureaninterimcontract(afteralargelynon-competitiveprocess)forthe
managementanddevelopmentofthespecialeconomiczonein2002.381
378 AsregardsthoseformerECCstaffers,acrossthe2000s,ASEZA’srotatingal-Mufawwadiyyafilleditsrankswith
personneleitherdirectlytransferredfromtheAmman-basedconsultativecouncilorenlistedfromthewidercohortofinternationally-oriented,privatesectorbourgeoiselites(fromwhichtheECChaditselfrecruited).
Thatsaid,onecaveatshouldbenoted:thefirstChiefCommissioner,MohammedKalaldeh,hadgenuinelysought
toembedtheAuthorityinthesocialfabricofAqabaandtoanchordevelopmenttotheneedsoflocalpeoples.ItwasnotuntilAqelBiltaji’sappointmentasChiefCommissionerthattheneoliberalkingsmenfullytookover.
379 Interestingly(andIwilldetailinchaptereleven),policymakersattemptedtolegitimatetheanti-democraticcoup
internaltothistechnocratic-autocraticformofgovernancebyevokingmanyofthepublicchoicetheory-basedscriptsthataresocentraltothewiderneoliberalturn.Positedastheantithesisofthepolitical—aconceptthatwasitselfontologicallyinvestedwithshortsightedness,irrationality,localparticularism,andthecorruptionsofspecialinterests—,ASEZAwasconjuredandsoldasanecessarynegation,asamodalityofergonomic,rationalizedanti-politicsconcernedorientedpurelywiththeuniversalinterest.Inanactofdiscursiveinversion,theobviousproblemsintrinsictoASEZA’sautonomy,insularity,andmoregeneralfreedomfromoversightarethereforereframedasasolutiontotherent-seekingsystemofwastathatwastoblameforJordan’senduringunderdevelopment.AsImadFakhouriwouldputit,unlikethepoliticians,ASEZAgovernedin“thecommonandpublicinterestinsteadofprivateandsmallerscaleinterests”(DeBruyne,180).ASEZAwasheretogetthingsdone—whichmoreimmediatelytranslatedintoattractingforeigninvestorsintotheeconomiczone,atwhichpointgrowthandwelfaregainscouldbeassumed—,andthatwasallthepeopleofAqabaanditsenvironswantedanyway,asBilalal-Bashir,aformercommissionerwiththeAuthorityasserted(DeBruyne,168-180).
380 AtopthisorganizationalstructuresataChiefCommissioner.Whileultimatelyaccountabletotheofficeofthe
PrimeMinister,theAmman-basedgovernment’soversightofASEZAwasnominalatbest.SeeDeBruyne,174,formoredetails.
381 OnBechtel,see:Kardoosh(2004),p.26-27.
187
ProblematicasASEZA’sorganizationalstructurealreadywas,matterswouldonlyget
worsefollowingarestructuringofoperationsin2004.Thisrestructuringwasinformedbythe
Palace’sfrustrationswiththelevelsofforeigninvestmentthatwerebeingattractedintothe
specialeconomiczone,anoutcomethattheKingetalbelievedtobecausedbytheundue
influencethatstubbornlocalinterestswereexertingonASEZA’s(alreadyremarkablyinsulated)
governingapparatus.382OnthebasisoftheRoyalCourt’speculiaranalysis,itwasdeterminedthat
ASEZA’sday-to-dayoperationsinthefieldofeconomicdevelopmentneededtobeoutsourcedtoa
freshlyfoundedshareholdingcompanycalledtheAqabaDevelopmentCorporation(ADC).
Importantly,thoughthisentitywasjointlyownedbyASEZAandtheJordaniangovernment,its
seniorstaffwastobecomprisedalmostentirelyofnon-nativemanagementconsultants.Gerry
Post—amanwhowouldpopupagainduringAmman’surbanrenewal—andtheaforementioned
Jean-PaulGauthier(whowasnowrunningafirmcalledTheServiceGroupinadditiontoretaining
hisongoingaffiliationwithDeloitte383)tooktheleadamongsttheseconsultants.384
DuetothefactthattheADCwaschargedwithhandlinganumberofdiverseandimpactful
portfolios385,thedecisiontostafftheorganizationwithforeignmanagementconsultants,likethe
decisiontobringBechtelinasapartnerin2002,wouldprovedeeplyconsequentialinshaping
382 GiventheAuthority’salmosttotalinsulation(legallyorotherwise)fromlocalpolitics,thiscausalexplanation
seemsdubious.383 Gauthierwouldgoontofound(andserveasCEO)forLocusEconomica,aninternationalconsultancyexplicitly
workingonspecialeconomiczonepolicy.384 PostetalfirstworkedunderthebannerofafirmcalledBearingPointIncorporated.Thatfirmwasacquiredby
DeloitteduringtheADCcontract,however.385 AsIwilldetail,theADCwascentraltothesaleofAqaba’sportandtotheestablishmentofmassiverealestateand
industrialdevelopmentprojects
188
notonlythedevelopmentplansthatwouldphysicallyreshapeAqaba,butalsothelocalformof
capitalismthatwouldultimatelycometoprevailinJordan’swest(east).AsUSAidhadalsobeen
heavilyinvolvedinASEZA’sworkfromtheverystart,moreover,theforeignpenetrationofthe
economicpolicyprocessinAqabaextendedwellbeyondthemanagementconsultantsalone.386
Withinal-Mufawwadiyya’srotatingcastofneoliberalKingsmenitself,themanwho
ultimatelyinfluencedthefateofAqaba’ssocial,political,economic,andphysicalfuturesmore
thananyotherwasImadFakhouri.ThoughanacolyteofGenerationAbdullah,Fakhouri’spathto
prominencewasslightlydifferentthantheotherselfstyledtechnocratswhohadbeenso
privilegedinpolicycirclesfollowing1999’sroyalsuccession.WhileFakhourihadbrieflyserved
histimeintheprivatesectorasChiefOperatingOfficerforCenturyInvestmentGroup(2000-
2002),theHarvardandNorthwestern-educatedmanhadspentthemajorityofhispre-ASEZA
professionalcareershuttlingbetweenthestatebureaucracyandjobswiththeUnitedNations
DevelopmentProgramme.IftheseprofessionalexperiencesmadeFakhouridifferentthanthe
businessmentypicallyfavoredbytheyoungKing,hewouldbesimilartohiscolleaguesinthathe
toolackedanysubstantivelinkagetoadomesticsocialbase.387Equallyamatchforanyof
Abdullah’sboyswhenitcametohisneoliberalfidelities,Fakhouriwouldproveasfaithful,
386 AidcollaboratedwithASEZAviaitsAqabaTechnicalAssistanceSupportProgram,theAqabaZoneforEconomic
MobilityProgram,andtheAqabaCommunityandEconomicDevelopmentProgram. Formoreontheseforeignentanglements,see:Debruyne,p.177-179.387 See:Alissa(2007),pp.13-15. Inafittinglyneoliberalfashion,thisGenerationAbdullahofcoursepresentedtheirdivorcefromdomesticsocial
constituenciesasasignoftheirstrengthandcredibility—asaself-sufficientdemonstrationthattheywerebeyondwastaandparochialcorruption.
189
tireless,andeffectiveaservantasanyoneelseduringtheinitialyearsofASEZA’stransformational
project.
Fromanumberofdifferentposts—FakhouriwasnamedCommissionerforInvestment
andEconomicdevelopmentupontheformationofthespecialeconomiczonebeforebeinglater
appointedasCEOoftheaforementionedAqabaDevelopmentCorporation(ADC)—Fakhouri
woundupsteeringmanyofal-Mufawwadiyya’smostcriticalpolicydecisions.388Joininghim
duringtheseseminalmomentswasDr.Bilalal-Bashir.SecondonlytoFakhouriwhenitcameto
influenceoverthespecialeconomiczone’slong-termdevelopment,Dr.Al-Bashir,whoisthe
brotherofECCmemberSalahal-Bashir,initiallyoperatedfromtheperchofCommissionerof
EnvironmentandTourism.Later,hetookonthepostsofCommissionerofInvestment,Deputy
ChiefCommissioner,andDirectoroftheDevelopmentZonesCommission,respectively,acrossthe
midtolate2000s.FlankinghimandFakhouriforthemajorityoftheseyears,moreover,wereDr.
Saleemal-Moghrabi,Dr.KamelMahadin,andMohammedBalqar.389
MarryingembourgeoisedautocracywithDeloittehackeryandUSAid-authorednotionsof
development,ASEZA’sgovernanceunsurprisinglyyieldedanumberofdeeplyproblematic
economic,social,andpoliticaloutcomes.Amongsttheseoutcomes,oneneedbeginwithASEZA’s
388 OnFakhouri,see:Schlumberger(2004),p.142;andKardoosh(2004),pp.33-34.389 Carefulnottofullyupsetthepoliticalapplecart,itisworthnotingthatthePalacealsosawtoitthatanumberof
ideologicallyagreeabletraditionaleliteswereappointedtopositionsofpowerwithASEZAacrosstheyears.TheAuthority’sfirstCommissionerforcustomsandrevenues,forexample,wasoftheRifa’ifamily,oneoftheoldstalwartsofAbdullah’sfather’sautocraticsystem.SalehKilani,ascionoftheoldelitehimself,moreover,wasalsobroughtin,firstasCommissionerforFiscalRegulationandDevelopmentandlaterastheChiefCommissioneroftheDevelopmentZonesCommission(Debruyne,p.175).Theeconomiczone’sfirstinvestor,meanwhile,wastheJordanianIndustrialEstatesCorporation(JIEC),apubliclymanagedentitythenrunbyAmeral-Majali,himselfthesonofoneofthecountry’sseniormilitaryfamilies(Ibid)
190
facilitation(andsubsidization)ofluxuryrealestatedevelopments.Thesedevelopmentstypically
proceededasfollows:advisedbythemanagementconsultantsrunningtheADC,relevant
CommissionersatASEZAuseddiscretionaryauthoritytoevokeimmanentdomainovercritical,
legallyambiguousterritories.Havingseizedtheselands(inthenameofthepublicinterest)—and
havingdisplacedthethousandslivingthere—,ASEZAthensellstheemptiedspacestoprivate
developers(atdiscountedprices).390ASEZAsubsequentlyfinancestheinfrastructuraloutlays
thatwillberequiredbysuchdeveloperswhilealsoaffordingallfirmsoperatingwithinthe
territoryofthespecialeconomiczonewithaconstellationoftaxbreaks,investmentincentives,
andlaxlaborregulations.391
Whilethesearrangementswerenominallyconditioneduponthedeveloper’swillingness
todevotepartofthelandacquiredforindustrialinvestment392,anysuchconditionswereto
provewhollynon-bindinginpractice.Byconsequence,apartfromtheexpectationthattheyoffer
afewsalutaryremarksasregardssustainabledevelopment,jobcreation,andtechnological
transfers,developerswerefreetoallocatetheentiretyoftheir(subsidized)investmentinto
390 Formoreonthesetransactions,seeDebruyne(2013),p.185391 SeeDebruyne,179-181,fordetailsonASEZA’sleadership. Iwilldetailthenumeroussubsidiesprovideddevelopers—fromdiscountedlandsalestotaxbreakstoASEZA’s
coveringofkeyinfrastructuretothestockofcheapforeignlaborASEZAprovisionedthroughitsworkpermitpoliciestotheinvestmentcapitalprovidedbypubliccreditinstitutionsliketheSocialSecurityInvestmentFund—inthenextchapter.Asboardmembersfromsomeoftheseprojects—suchasSahlDudinofAylaOasis—actuallysitontheboardoftheSocialSecurityInvestmentFund(andasMuhammedalZu’bi,anotherkeyallyfromGenerationAbdullahactuallysitsaschairmanoftheprivatizedSocialSecurityCorporation,Iwillalsodetailhowinjectionsofpublicmoneyscometobeprovidedanytimeoneoftheseprivateprojectswascomingupshortintermsoffinancingaswell.
392 Typically,thePRroll-outfortheselandsalesemphasizednon-bindingcommitmentscallingfor15%oflanduse
tobedevotedtoindustrialprojects.
191
hotels,highrises,andluxuryamenities.Functionallyspeaking,then,theautocratic-technocratic
governanceofASEZAreducedtothepublicsubsidizationofrealestate-basedspeculation.
Moreover,iftheinvolvementofforeignconsultantsandtechnocratsintheautocratic
governancejustdescribedmayhavealreadyhelpedverifythetransnationaldimensionsof
Jordan’ssocialstructureofaccumulation,sotoowouldareviewofthosebenefitingfromthis
governance.Indeed,ifonesurveysthemegaprojectsconsolidatedthroughprocessesliketheone
hithertodetailed—projectsincludingAylaOasis393,TalaBayResortComplex394,MarsaZayed395,
andSarayaAqaba396—,onewillseethatineachinstance,therosterofmajorequityholders
countsasmanyGulf-basedcapitalistsasitdoesJordanianones.397Inmanyways,theseAbdullah-
erajointinvestmentsinthebuiltenvironmentactuallyfunctionedtocrystallizethiscoming
together,ortransnationalization,ofthecapitalistclassinJordan.FacilitatingtheGulf’seconomic
colonizationofthecountryatthesametimeasitsecuresnon-productionbasedprofitsfor
privilegeddomesticelites,thisisatransnationalizationthatisinmanywaysconstitutiveofthe
393 SabihMasriwasthefounderoftheAylaOasisDevelopmentCompany.TheBoardconsistsofKhaledMasri
(Chairman),KamilSadeddin(BoardmemberofanotherMasriowned,SaudibasedcompanycalledtheAstraIndustrialGroup),FouadTuffaha(alsoadirectorattheAstraGroup),SahlDudin(whoisalsoaboardmemberfortheSocialSecurityInvestmentFund,anappendageoftheSSC),andShirinMasri.
394 TalaBayisownedbyJordanProjectsforTourismDevelopment,acompanyinitiallyfundedbyUSAid.Thelargest
shareholderisAbujaberBrothersCompany;theotherprimaryinvestorsareOhrInvestmentHoldingCompanyLtd(basedintheBritishVirginIslands),MadarFinanceandInvestments(basedinDubai),theSSC,Orascom,andFaiqalSayegh.
395 TheprimaryinvestorinMarsaZayedwasAbuDhabibasedal-MaabarJordanRealEstate,andtheprojectwas
moredirectlyimplementedbyEagleHillsJordan,anAbuDhabibaseddevelopmentcompany.396 ArabBankandSaudiOgerremainthemajorinvestorsinSaraya.ThoughMasriisChairmanofArabBank,the
SaudiSovereignWealthFundandtheHaririfamilyeachholdmassivestakesintheBank.397 Inthenextchapter,IwillalsoaddresshowASEZAfacilitatedthere-exportationofgarmentsintotheAmerican
market,andtherebyhowithasalsoservedtobenefitcapitalfromsouthandeastAsia.
192
economy’stendenciestowardscrisis,aswillbecomeclearerandclearerthroughouttherestof
thistext.398
Importantly,itisworthnotingthattheeconomiccolonizationthathastherebybeen
encouragedthroughASEZA’sautocratic-technocraticgovernanceextendswellbeyondtheGulf’s
acquisitionofequitysharesinAqaba-basedgolfcoursesandvacationresorts.Thisisa
398 Onthedomesticfront,Jordan’soldmoneyaswellasahandfulofnewactorsmadeoutsimilarlywellfromthese
developmentprojects.Amongstthatfirstgroup,theMasriandAbuJaberfamiliesreceivedthebiggestbumpfromthelandspeculationfacilitated(andsubsidized)byASEZAduringtheseyears.ForSabihMasriinparticular,hisArabBankandZaraInvestmentHoldingCompanyhadeachacquiredvastequityholdingsinAylaOasisandSarayaAqaba;asAylaOasisaloneconsistsofaHyattRegency,agolfcoursefurnishedwithitsownseparateaccommodations,279apartments,andaretailvillagecontainingsixty-eightboutiques,thisequitysecuressubstantialanddiversesourcesofrent.WithasignificantstakeinTalaBay,meanwhile,AbujaberInvestmentsandAbujaberBrothersCompany’spullthesametrickjustafewkilometersdowntheroad.
AsforthenewactorsgrabbingthemselvesapieceofthepieinAqaba,twomilitaryentities—MawaredandAl
Haqq—and,allegedly,membersoftheroyalfamilyarethemostdeservingofdiscussion.Iwilldiscusstheformerinfargreaterdetailinthechapterthatfollowsthisone.Bywayofintroduction,fornowIwillonlysaytwothings:first,thattheseinstitutionsarerepresentativeofanentrepreneurialturnintheJordanianArmedForces—aturnthathasgeneratedandcontinuestogenerateagreatdealofconsternationwithinwhatwaspreviouslyasteadfastbulwarkofHashemitepower.Andsecond,thatMawared,havingbeengrantedlegalcustodianshipoverallthemilitary’spropertiesandland,hasfoundthekindsofmegarealestatedevelopmentprojectsdescribedonthepreviouspageparticularlyconducivetoitsinterests,asitisgenerallyabletoleverageitsofficialownershipofpubliclands(anditscontroloverpermitting)intoequityintheprivatehotels,etc.,thataresubsequentlybuiltonthoselands.Inthismanner,MAWAREDacquiredastakeinZaraInvestmentHoldingCompany,forinstance,whichisitselftheprimaryinvestorinAylaOasis.
Connectingthistotheroyals,thereiswidespreadspeculationthattheKinghimselfownsaspieceofMawared’s
growinginvestmentempire,andthatheandhiswifearealsopartnertoahandfulofotherobscurefinancialinstitutions—suchasRubiconGroupHoldings—thataresimilarlysubscribedtoRedSea-centeredrealestatespeculation(Debruyne,p.184).
RegardingtheGulf-basedparticipantsinthispalace-sponsoredgrift,AbuDhabi’sAl-MaabarJordanRealEstate,
Dubai’sEagleHillsJordan,Dubai’sMadarFinanceandInvestments,andSaadHariri’sSaudiOgerhaveallsecuredhealthyprofitsinAqaba,beitthroughtheequitytheyheldinthearea’svariouspropertiesandprojectsorthroughtheirwinningoflucrative,publiclysubsidizedconstructioncontracts.
WhilenotGulf-based,itisworthmentioningthattheEgyptiandevelopmentfirmOrascomProjectsforTouristic
Developmentalsogotinontheaction.
193
colonization,infact,thatextendsintothedomainofcriticalinfrastructureaswell.Nowherewas
thismoreobviouslyevincedthanintheredevelopmentofAqaba’sPort.
TrulyoneofthemoresordidaffairsinASEZA’sratherignominioushistory399,thecontract
forthismassiveprojectwoundupbeingawardedtoAbuDhabi’sstate-ownedAl-Maabar
InternationalInvestments400onthebasisofaBuild-Operate-Transfercontract.Havingwonthis
contractthrougharatheropaqueandnon-competitiveprocess—andhavingpaidtheADCamere
$500millionfortheportaswellas3200dunamofsurroundingland,afeegrosslybelow
estimatedmarketvalue401—,theBOTcontractsignedbytheADCandal-Maabarmeantthatfor
alleffectsandpurposes,aprivatelymanagedfirmcloselyalignedtothealNahyanfamilywasto
beownerhenceforthofoneofJordan’smostessentialpiecesofinfrastructure.Problematicasthis
alreadywas,inadditiontosellingthispublicassettoal-Maabaratasteepdiscount,ASEZA/ADC
alsoagreedtosubsidizetheredevelopmentprojectinanumberofdifferentways.Beyond
investing$200millionofpublicfundingintotheredevelopmentprojectwithoutsecuringa
commensurateequityshareintheport,subsidizationalsosawthelocalauthoritiesagreeto
compensateal-Maabarfordelaysandworkinterruptionstothetuneof$548,000aday.402Given
theextentoftowhichtheredevelopmentwasultimatelydelayed—muchofwhichfollowedafter
399 Asofyear2013,fiftydifferentaccusationsand/orlegalchargesofcorruptionhadbeenfiledagainstASEZA.See:
PascalDebruyneandChristopherParker,“Reassemblingthepolitical:placingcontentiouspoliticsinJordan”inContentiousPoliticsintheMiddleEast.PalgraveMacmillan(2015),p.450.
400 Al-MaabarhassincebeenboughtoutbytheDubai-basedEagleHillsLLC.401 ThesalewasjustifiedbyreferencetoJordan’sneedtomakepaymentsonitsdebtstotheParisClub,whichwere
comingduein2009.402 DebruyneandParker(2015),p.450.
194
dockworkerslaunchedaprotestinresponsetoal-Maabarevictingthemfromtheirhomesnear
thePort403—,thesecompensatorypaymentsentailedanothersignificanttransferofpublic
wealthintoprivate(andforeign)hands.404
TransformingtheinfrastructureandbuiltenvironmentofAqabaasmuchasitdidthelogic
ofcapitalaccumulationinthecountrywritlarge,ASEZA’sgovernance,liketheECC’sbeforeit,
endowscontemporaryJordaniancapitalismwithmanyofitsmostenduringfeatures.
(3)TheMunicipalityofGreaterAmman,theAmmanInstitute,andtheUrbanRenewaloftheJordanianCapital
Beforeclosingonthepoliticalinstitutionalizationofneoliberalcapitalismin
contemporaryJordan,IwillturntoexaminehowMayorOmarMa’ani—workinginpartnership
withanothermanagementconsultant-staffedinstitutioncalledtheAmmanInstitute(Ai)—co-
optedandtransformedthegovernmentoftheMunicipalityofGreaterAmman(GAM)soto
restructurenotonlyAmman’sphysicalspacebutalsothemodalityofcapitalaccumulationthat
definedandsustainedit.Furtherdeepeningthenationaleconomy’sdependenceupon
investmentsinspeculativenon-tradables(especiallyrealestate)andprecipitatinganupward
(andoutward)redistributionofwealthaswell,Ma’ani’stenureasMayorwouldrepresentan
extensionofthesameautocratic-technocraticgovernancethathaspervadedallpolicymaking
403 Underal-Maabar’sdirection,theredevelopmentoftheAqabaportwouldrequirethemassdisplacementofport
workersandthewidererasureoftworesidentialneighborhoods:ShalahlahandShmisani(DeBruyne,191,196).Thesedisplacements,whichhadalreadypartiallybegununderalMaabar’sMarsaZayedproject,eventuallyprecipitatedoneofthelargestpre-ArabUprisingsprotestmovements.DespitetheimpacttheseprotestswouldhaveontheJordanianspring,however,theywerenotsuccessfulinreversingthedisplacements.
404 Inadditiontoal-Maabar,aSwedishfirmlaterwonthecontractforthemanagementoftheport(DeBruyne,185).
195
acrossthereignofKingAbdullah.YetagainexhibitingtherotatthecoreofJordanianpolitics,this
thirdcasestudycanhelpvalidatemanyofmyearlierclaimsonthepoliticalinstitutionalizationof
thecontemporarySSAwhilealsofurtherunveilingthepoliticaloriginsoflowgrowth,crisis-
orientedcapitalismontheeastbanktoo.405
OmarMa’aniwasappointedtohispostasMayorfollowingtheaforementionedJordan
Gatedisasterof2006.406Evincingthecontinuitiesandcommonalitiesbindingeachinstancein
thewiderpoliticalinstitutionalizationofcontemporaryJordaniancapitalism,Ma’aniwould
subsequentlyusemanyofthesameautocratic-technocraticmaneuversaswerepracticedbythe
405 Aswillbecomeclear,Ma’ani’sgovernanceyieldedmajorsocialdislocationatthesametimeasitfurther
consolidatedthedevelopmentallyspuriousinvestmentstrategiesfirstintroducedbytheECCandASEZA,therebycontributingtotheentrenchmentofcrisisconditionsandstagnation.
406 JordanGatewasa“twintower”developmentprojectprimarilyfinancedbyKuwaiticapital.ImplementedasaPPP
calledtheUrbanDevelopmentProject,thetowerswerebuiltonpubliclandpreviouslydesignatedasarecreationalpark.Followingamassivefirein2006,thewiderurbanrenewalprojectthenunderwaycameinforinquisition,andmuchoftheleadershipoftheMunicipalityofGreaterAmman,includingtheMayorNidalHadid,weredismissed.
Formoreonthisdebacle,see:ElianaAbu-Hamdi,“TheJordanGateTowersofAmman:SurrenderingPublicSpace
toBuildaNeoliberalRuin”,InternationalJournalofIslamicArchitecture(5:1),2016,pp.73-101.
UrbanRenewalinAmman Thetopicofurbanrevitalizationwasahotoneinmanydevelopmentcirclesduringthefirstdecadeofthe2000s.ThiswasallthemoresoinAmman,wheretheJordanGatedisasterof2006hadinvestedrenewalwithawholenewkindofpoliticalsalience.GentrificationcumurbanrenewalhadkeyroyalsponsorsinthepersonsofQueenRaniaandKingAbdullah,thebackingofthedevelopmentcommunity(fromUSAidtoJapan’sInternationalCooperationAgency),andsignificantappealtoGulfinvestorsstillflushwithearningsfromthepre-financialcrisisoilboom.InthepersonofOmarMa’ani—whoserisetothemayorshiphadbeensecuredthroughRania’sinterventions—italsohaditspolicydirector.
196
ECCandASEZA—andemploymanyofthesamepersonnel—asheswiftlymovedtocarryouthis
desiredtransformationoftheAmmanicityscape/socialecology.
InkeepingwiththeautocratictendenciesthathavebeenbasictoAbdullah-era
governance,theearlydaysofMaani’smayoralcareergavewitnesstoanumberofefforts
designedtoinstitutionallyinsulatetheMayor’sofficefromboththewidermunicipalbureaucracy
andfromthepublic.Simultaneoustothis,thisinitialperiodalsosawtheMayorandhisclose
alliesattempttoretrofitAmman’smunicipalgovernmentforthemoderneraaswell.This
retrofittingmostlyconsistedofeffortstocullanallegedlybloatedbureaucracysotomakeit
appropriatelylean,efficient,andadaptable.407
LesttherewasanyambiguityonthenewMayor’sideologicalmoresincarryingoutthis
culling,itsaccompanimentbyceaselessideologicalattacksmeanttoinvestthebureaucracywith
ontologicalcorruptionaswellastribalistandtraditionalisttendencieswouldbringMa’anietal.’s
neoliberalaffinitiesintoratherstarkrelief.408HavingmadeenemiesofhisJordanianemployees
throughtheseactions,Ma’ani,likehiscounterpartsatASEZA,wouldinturncometorelyupon
407 Thiscullingcontainedanumberofabsurdities,themostobviousofwhichwasthatitwashighlypaidforeign
consultantslikeGerryPostandtheWatsonandWhiteCompanywhowerefrequentlyenlistedinmakingtheseaccusationsofbloatedness.GiventhatPostwaspersonallyacceptingamonthlyfeeofJD20,000forhisservicesandthattheWatsonandWhiteCompanycommandedasimilarlysignificantretainer,theirarticulationofnecessitarianargumentsinfavoroffiscalconsolidationandmasslay-offswasmorethanabitrich.
FormoreonMa’ani’sreorganizationofGAM,seeDeBruyne(2013),pp.239-241. OnMa’ani’smoregeneraltransformation(andprivatization)ofgovernance,see:ChristopherParker,“Tunnel-
bypassesandminaretsofcapitalism:Ammanasneoliberalassemblage”,PoliticalGeography(28),2009,p.116-117.
408 Ontheseideologicalattacksontribes(andontheparticularutilityoftheanti-tribalism/traditionalismcharge),
see:ElianaAbu-Hamdi,“BureaucraticizingtheCity:ModeratedTribalism,RegimeSecurity,andUrbanTransformationinAmman,Jordan”,TraditionalDwellingsandSettlementsReview(27:2),2016,pp.23-37.
197
uponabraintrustcomprisedofUSAidtechnocrats409andtrustedforeignmanagement
consultantsacrosshistenureasMayor.410
Theseforeignalliesweretypicallyhousedatanewlyformed“thinkanddotank”calledthe
AmmanInstitute(Ai).FunctioninginamannersimilartotheAqabaDevelopmentCorporation,Ai
wasenlistedbyMa’aniasadefactoplanningbody—anautonomous,unelected,foreign-staffed
organizationunilaterallyempoweredbytheMayorsotodesignthemassiveurbanrenewal
projectsthatwouldsubsequentlythesocialandeconomicfoundationsofJordan’scapitalcity.
PersonallystewardedbyGerryPost411—whocollectedamonthlysalaryofJD20,000forhis
troubles—,Ai’splanningwouldquicklyevincethesameclass-biasandrecklessnessaswasseen
withtheADCinAqaba.IncombinationwithMa’ani’sautocraticgovernance,thiswouldbe
sufficienttoensurethatAmman’surbanrenewalgeneratedprofoundlevelsofsocialdislocation,
gentrification,andcapitalistrentseeking.412
409 TheWatsonandWhiteCompany,oneoftheconsultanciesbroughtintotoadviseMa’anionthisculling,madethe
caseformasslay-offsbyassertingthatGAM’sbureaucracyneededto“goonadiet”(ParkerandDeBruyne,2015,p.442).
410 USAid’sSABEQprogram—SustainableAchievementofBusinessExpansionandQuality—,footedthebillfor
manyoftheseforeignconsultants,allowingMa’anitobringinGerryPost’sBearingPointInc.aswellastheWatsonandWhiteCompany.
411 Post’sAihadafewJordanianstaffamongstitsnumber,includingTamamMango.Heirtoaquotacoteriemyself,
Mango,wholaterreceivedhisPhDatUNI,representsthekindofcompradorconsultantthatisnotuncommoninJordan’sdevelopmentspaces.AfterservingasoneofPost’schieflieutenants,MangowouldmoveovertotheCrownPrinceFoundation,whereheiscurrentlyemployedasCEO.
412 Foranexcellentreviewofthisgeneralphenomenon,see:NajibHourani,“NeoliberalurbanismandtheArab
uprisings:aviewfromAmman”,JournalofUrbanAffairs(36:S2),2014,pp.650-662.
198
Proceedingsequentially,byconsequenceoftheMayor’sweaponizationoftakseemrelated
provisionswithintheMunicipalityofGreaterAmman’sLawofExpropriation413—aswellashis
unilateralrewritingofzoninglawsandapolicyofevictinglong-termthoughnon-permitted
housingcommunities414—,renewalexpelledthousandsoflowerclasspeoplefromthehomesand
neighborhoodsthathadanchoredtheirfamiliesacrossgenerations.Throughthesemeans,the
SanaayaAmman415developmentprojectalonedisplacedroughly5,000peoplelowerincome
peoplefromtheQaisiyyaneighborhood.416Inmakingspaceforthecity’smassivenewAbdali
constructionproject,thepeopleoftheneighboringalZa’amtaneighborhoodweresimilarly
removedbytheunilateraldecreesofMa’ani’smayoraloffice.417
413 ThisTakseemsystemwasusedininstancesofmulti-ownershipproperties(i.e.propertiesinheritedbymorethan
onefamilymember).Facilitatingnewdevelopments,iteffectivelyallowedforthedissolutionofexistingpropertyclaimsundertheauspicesthattheGAM’swouldsubsequentlyprovideanequivalentpropertyinadifferentarea(Debruyne2013,p.312)
414 Inotherwords,thesewerecommunitiesthathadbuiltpermanenthomesinthe1960sand1970swithout
establishingproperlegaltenureovertheland.SeeDebruyne(2013),p.260,fordetails.415 TheSanaayaAmmanproject—aluxurytowerconstructionprojectfinancedbyLimitless,aDubai-basedfirm—
wasactuallypostponedpost-thedisplacementofthesepeopleafterfinancesdriedupin2009.ItisbasedintheAbdunneighborhoodofAmman.
416 ThemajorityoftheevictedwereHebroniterefugees(orthedescendantsofrefugees)ofalnaksa.Lacking
appropriatelandandpropertytitles,fewamongstthiscommunityhasreceivedanycompensationfromGAM;forthosethatdid,moreover,theratewassetbasedonlandvaluationsfromthe1960s.Throughthesecynicallegalmanipulations,Ma’ani’sgovernmentwasabletoseizetheirlandatone-sixthtoone-eighthitsmarketprice(Debruyne,2013,p.312).
417 AlsocontributingtothismakingofspacewastheMayor’soffice’sredrawingofAmman’spublictransportation
infrastructure.Routesandhubs(includingtheAbdalistation)weresimplyrelocatedwithoutanyregardforthosetobeeffected.
PriortotheNewAbdaliproject,Abdalihadbeenhometooneofthelargestlow-incomemarketsandthecentralbusingnodeofWestAmman.Havingratherfarcicallychargedthatthemarketwasthedistributionalnexusfordrugtraffickers,Ma’anietalunilaterallycloseditwhilerelocatingthebusterminaltoTarbarbour,aneighborhoodintheremotenorth-eastofthecity.
Formoreonthis,see:DorisSummer,“Theneoliberalizationofurbanspace”,VillesetTerrirtoiresduMoyen-Orient(2006)
NajibHourani,“UrbanismandNeoliberalorder:thedevelopmentandredevelopmentofAmman,”JournalofUrbanAffairs(26:S2),pp.634-649
199
Ifexpulsionsofthesesortsexpeditedgentrificationeffortsthroughclearingtheland,the
renewalinitiativessubsequentlyimplemented(includingtheaforementionedSanaayaAmman
andnewAbdaliprojects)finishedthejob.Constructingmonumentstoluxuryconsumerismatop
thegraveyardsoflowerclasscommunities,chicapartments,hotels,officebuildings,shopping
malls,andhigh-endrestaurantshavebeenerectedwhereintergenerationalcommunitiesonce
madetheirhomes.LikewasseeninthetransformationofAqaba’sbuiltenvironment,then,each
ofthedevelopmentprojectsintroducedinAmmanimpliedanexplicitservicingoftherichas
muchasanerasureofthepoor;eachproject,inotherwords,evincedtheabidinglogicof
accumulationthroughdispossession.418Thiswassoevenwheninitialprojectplansmayhave
includedsomeprovisionsfordevelopmentally-oriented,publicly-mindedinvestment.For
instance,theoriginalproposalfortheaforementionedredevelopmentofnewAbdalihad
envisionedamultiuseurbandistrictcontainingmedicalfacilities,ITfirms,aKingHussein
MemorialLibrary,andacampusforanewAmericanUniversityofJordan.Astheyearspassedand
thescaffoldingwentup,however,whatendedupbeingconstructedwasashinynewfinancial
sectormoonlightingasahubforbourgeoisrecreation.
Asfortheparticularsofthecapitalistrent/profitseekingthatisattheheartofthisall,to
theextentthatMa’ani’surbanrenewalwasguidedbythesameforeignmanagementconsultants
ashadpresidedoverFakhouri’seffortsinAqaba,itshouldbenoshocktothereaderthatthe
418 ItisworthnotingthatoneofMa’anietal.’sgentrificationplansdidfail.Specifically,aspartofplanstorenewthe
olddowntownofAmman,theMayor’sofficeattemptedtoabolishrentcontrolssotopriceouttheoldsouqmerchantsthathadpopulatedthestorefrontsoftheareaforgenerationsUltimately,theresistanceofoldsouqmerchantsandtheremarkable,cross-classmobilizationthatroseuparoundthemwaspartiallysuccessfulinreversingMa’aniandAi’srent-controlpolicies.See:ParkerandDebruyne(2015),pp.442-445.
200
samemixof(transnational)regimeclientsandpatronswhowereprivilegedonJordan’ssouthern
coastwerealsoprivilegedduringAmman’sreconstruction.IntheNewAbdaliredevelopment,for
instance,theMayoretalmadecertainthatGulfcapital,domesticfinancialcapital,andthe
emergentinstitutionsofmilitaryentrepreneurialism—institutionsthatalsoenrichedthemselves
inAqaba—eachsecuredahealthyreturnoninvestment.419Inorganizingapublic-private
partnershipchargedwithbuilding“affordablehousing”onthecapital’speriphery,Ma’aniandAi
laterallowedaDubai-basedJordanianbusinessmanwithclosetiestotheroyalfamily(Khalidal-
Wazani)toembezzlemillionsofdinarfromthepubliccoffersaswell.420Andinmoregenerally
419 Firstlyandofgreatimportance,NewAbdaliwastobe(largely)builtonaformermilitarybarracks.Byvirtueof
thisfact,thesameMawaredthathadmanagedtoinsinuateitselfintomanyofAqaba’srealestatedealingsfounditselfperfectlypositionedtoextractrentsfromAmman’sreconstructionaswell.LeveragingitsnominalownershipofthesepubliclandsanditsfiftypercentshareinanewlyestablishedAbdaliInvestmentandDevelopmentCorporation—aprivatesharingholdingcompanycreatedbyMawaredsotodirecttheconstructioneffort—,thisentrepreneurialwingofthemilitary,onwhoseboardMayorOmarMa’aniandKingAbdullahjustsohappenedtosit,mayhaveevenmadeoutbetterinAmmanthanitdidinAqaba(ParkerandDeBruyne,444).Whatismore,justasSaudiOgerhadbeenoneofMawared’schiefpartnersintheconstructionracketdownsouth,heretooweretheyjoinedbyalocalsubsidiaryofthatfirm,OgerJordan.WithArabBankagainintow(securingashareforJordanianfinance)aswellandwiththeUnitedRealEstateCompany,aninvestmentarmoftheKuwaitProjectsCompany,alsoacquiringaminoritystakeintheAbdaliInvestmentandDevelopmentCorporation,onemightsaythewholebandwasbacktogether.WhenitcametoGulfpetrodollarrecyclingandeliterentdistribution,then,AbdaliwaseverybitthematchforAqaba.
Seewww.abdali.joformoreinformationontheAbdaliInvestmentandDevelopmentCorporation.420 Specifically,thispublic-privatepartnershipwascontractedtoconstruct15,000unitsofaffordablehousinginal-
Jiza,anemergent“ruralghetto”locatedneartheQueenAliaAirport.PPPpublichousingprojectsmoregenerallybeganfollowingthelaunchoftheRoyalInitiativeforDecentHousingin2011.Withinthisparticularpartnership,Khalidal-Wazani’sTaamerJordanHoldingshadbeenpairedwiththeHousingUrbanDevelopmentCompany,anentitycreatedin1992andhenceforthassignedprimaryresponsibilityforhandlingandfinancingthegovernment’ssocialhousingpolicies.ThelongandshortofthePPPwasthatKhalidal-Wazaniillicitlypocketedsuchmassiveamountsofthepublicmoneythathadbeenallottedfortheconstructionofhousesthatstateprosecutorswereforcedtoopenacaseagainsthim(Debruyne,p.293).
Asal-Wazaniwasalong-timeadvisertotheRoyalCourt,amanwithcloserelationstotheUAE’sroyals—heis
currentlythe“StrategyandKnowledgeAdvisor”atheMohammadbinRashidalMaktoumKnowledgeFoundation—,theformerCEOoftheSarayaAqabaRealEstateCompany,andthecurrentChairmanofArabBank-Syria,hispersonencapsulatesthenatureandconsequenceofGenerationAbdullah’stechnocraticautocracybetterthananyother.
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ensuringtheopacityofprocurementprocesses,providingpublicsubsidiesfortheconstruction
firmsbuildingthecity’snewskyline421,andguaranteeingcapital’swideraccesstocheapforeign
labor,thisleadershipmadecertainthatthewiderrealestate-facingbusinessclimatewasas
conducivetoeliteprofitseekingaspossible.
…….………..……........…………….…………….………..….……………………………………………………………………………
Therampantcorruption(andtheformofcapitalaccumulation)thatwasoverseenby
Ma’aniandAidideventuallycometoaratherignominiousend.ThespotlightoftheArab
uprisingsilluminatedmanyofthispolicyteam’smoregratuitousdepravities;byconsequence,
OmarMa’aniwoundupbrieflyarrestedandGerryPostwaseventuallysentpacking.
ItshouldneverthelesscomeaslittlesurprisethatMa’ani’sfallfromgraceasMayorwould
notimplyasubstantivechangetothelargerprocessesofpowerandaccumulationthathehad
previouslystewarded—whetherinAmmanornationally.ReplacinghimasMayor,afterall,was
anotherdutifulsubjectofGenerationAbdullah,AqelBiltaji,whowasservingasChief
CommissionerofASEZAatthetimeofhisnewappointment.UnderBiltaji,collaborative
predationinspeculativenon-tradableswastoremainthemodusoperandiofgovernance,andthe
Insomeways,thisaffordablehousinginitiativerepresentedtheback-endofagentrificationprojectthathad
begunwiththekindsofdisplacementsIdescribedinQaisiyyaandZa’amta.Havingalreadyprofitedoffthedevelopmentsthatwerebuiltwherethosecommunitiesoncelived,thesameconstructionfirmswouldthenprofitagainthroughbuildingthenewaffordablehousingunitsthatthosedispossessedcommunitieswouldnowbeforcedtoliveinoutontheperipheryofthecapital
421 Profitswerestate-subsidizedthroughextensivetaxbreaks,throughtheGAMfinancingmuchofthe
infrastructure(androadconstructioninparticular)thatwouldlinknewAbdalitotherestofAmmanandthroughtheSocialSecurityCorporationconsistentlyprovidingtheAbdaliInvestmentandDevelopmentCorporationwithcriticalinjectionsofcapitalwhenevertherewereshortfallsinliquidity.SeeDeBruynepp.246-256,321.
202
publicwastocontinuetosubsidizeeliteprofitsthroughanumberofdifferentmechanisms,asI
willdiscussatlengthinthenextchapter.
EvenforMa’ani,thedarkdaysprovedgratefullyfleeting.Afterbutafewyearsonthe
backfoot,hewouldexperienceLazarus-stylerebirth,arebirthconsummatedupontheformer
Mayor’sappointmenttotheSenateandtotheboardoftheCrownPrinceFoundationin2016.His
politicalrehabilitationsuggeststhehalflifeoftheneoliberalpolicymakerinJordanmayprove
longindeed—regardlessofthewreckagetheyleavebehind.AndshouldthegriftofAbdullah’s
economizedpoliticaleliteneedanyfurtherevidence,itisworthnotingthattheMa’anihasbeen
allowedtoretainhispostasCEOofMaaniVenturesthroughouthistenureasSenator—andthat
Ma’aniVentureshasmanagedtoconsistentlyprocurelucrativepublicinfrastructurecontracts.422
Conclusion
Operatingthroughaseriesofinsulatedandautonomouspolicymakinginstitutions—
institutionsthatallowedAbdullahetaltobypassthedemos,theparliament,andthetraditional
machineryofthestate—,theKing’seconomizedpoliticalelitewereabletorestructureeachand
everypillarofthenationaleconomy,fromtradeandinvestmentpolicytotaxandindustrial
policy.AstheexamplesofASEZAandMa’ani’sGAMevince,thiselitewasalsoableto
embourgeoiseJordan’sphysicalspacesthroughgentrifyingurbanrenewalprojects.Inthusly
rewiringthecircuitsofcapitalaccumulation,transnationalizingthecapitalistclass,and
422 Formoreonhisbusinessdealings,see:www.maani.com
203
deepeningtheJordanianeconomy’sdependenceonthebuiltenvironment,theautocratic-
technocraticgovernancedetailedinthischapterverymuchinstitutedthearchitectureofthe
country’scontemporarycapitalism.
Ifmyanalysiswassuccessfulinestablishingtheveracityoftheclaimsarticulatedabove,I
hopeithasbeensuccessfulinconveyingtwofurtherpointstothereaderaswell.First,by
deconstructingthepropertiesandoutputsofthecountry’sautocratic-technocraticmodalityof
governance,itismyhopethatmyanalysishasalsoaffordedinsightsintothedualisticnatureofa
socialstructureofaccumulationthatisatoncecrisisproducingandcrisisstabilizing.Ontheone
hand,Ihaveshownthatthismodalityofgovernance—aswellastheinsulationofaneconomized
politicalelite—functionstoexpediteandstreamlineaveryparticularrestructuringofthe
economy.Asthisrestructuringdeliversprofitsandrentstoaconstellationofinfluential
transnationalallies,itsimultaneouslystakessuchhighleverageindividualsandinstitutionsinthe
survivaloftheJordanianpoliticaleconomy.Inviewofthematerialresources(financiallyor
otherwise)thatareatthedisposaloftheseindividualsandinstitutions,Iwouldcontendthatthe
distributiveeffectsyieldedbythisgovernancecannothelpbuttostabilizeJordaniancapitalism.
Andyet,Ihaveshownthatthesamedistributiveeffectsinevitablyexertacountervailing
effectaswell.Thecostsofgeneratingandallocatingprofitsinthismanner—ofstabillizing
capitalisminthismanner—,are,afterall,significant.Tobegin,theelite-accruingsystemof
accumulationthroughdispossessionthatisinstitutionalizedthroughthismodalityofgovernance
implieslowaggregategrowth,exploitation,andconsistentsocialdislocation.Byarticulatingthe
preconditionsofunresttothisextent,suchgovernancenecessarilyincreasestheprobabilityof
disruptionandanti-systemmobilization.Theseprobabilitiesareonlyincreased,moreover,bythe
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processeffectsofthismodalityofgovernance.Whileautocratic-technocraticdecision-makingmay
beconducivetofastpolicychange,itisprofoundlyalienatingaswell.Byempoweringnon-
nationalswhilemarginalizinganddeactivatingthedemosandthestatebureaucracyalike,infact,
thisisaprocessboundtoengendersubstantivelevelsofdisaffectionandangeramongsta
numberofcriticalsocialforces.Asthesameinput—autocratic-technocraticgovernance—can
therebybedemonstratedtobedrivingandcontainingcrisis,Ihopethischaptermayhave
renderedtheparadoxofJordan’scapitalismalittlelessparadoxical.
Second,bytracinghowthepoliticalpervadeseverythingfromintracapitalrelationsand
theformofmarketcompetitiontosocialcontrolandtheexternalarticulationoftheJordanian
economy,itismyhopethattheco-constitutive,interpenetrating,andintegratednatureof
Jordan’sneoliberalsocialstructureofaccumulationhasalsocomebetterintofocus.AsIturnto
chaptersevenandanexaminationofthestate/palaceroleinthecontemporaryeconomy,Iintend
todrivethispointhomeevenfurther.
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CHAPTERSEVEN
Themakingandmanagementofthemarket:Thestate/palaceintheeconomy
Thischapterwilltracehowthestate’sroleintheeconomyhasshiftedsincethepassingof
KingHussein.Inthepagesthatfollow,IwilldemonstratethatAbdullah’sneoliberalguidancehas
notorchestratedthewithdrawalofthestatefromtheeconomy,butrather,aseriesofchangesto
howthebenefitsgeneratedbystateinterventionaredistributed.Havingdetailedhowsaid
benefitsnowaccrueintofewer(andoftennon-Jordanian)handsthanwaspreviouslythecase—
andhavingexplainedhowthestate’smixofmarketmakingandmarketmeddlingexpedites
short-term,developmentallyspuriousformsofprofitseeking—,therelationbetween
contemporarystateinterventionismandJordan’scapitalismofcrisiswillbeeasilydiscerned.
Iwillbreakthisanalysisintotwosubsections.ThefirstwillfocusinonwhatIpreviously
conceptualizedasthestate’smass-orientedinterventions.Herein,Iwillforegroundtherolethat
(retreating)welfarismhaveplayedinstabilizingcapitalaccumulation(andindestabilizing
middleandworkingclasslife)duringthetenureofAbdullah.423Withinthiswiderlineofwelfarist
inquiry,Iwillalsotakeheedtoemphasizethegenerationaleffectsthatrelativedeclinesinpublic
423 Specifically,Iwillconsiderthesocialandeconomiceffectsgeneratedthroughpublichealthexpenditures,the
cancelationofuniversalsubsidies,andthestate’sprivilegingoftargetedtransfersinitspovertyalleviationoperations.Inaddition,Iwillexaminehowamoregeneralizabledeclineinthequalityofpublicserviceprovisionshasstressedmiddleandlowerclassfamilies—forcingthemtoborrowandspendgreatersumsonhealthandeducation—,andhowthesestressorsrelatetosocialinstability.
206
sectorhiringhavehadoverthelasttwentyyears—evincingtheextenttowhichthesocialimpact
ofdirectstateemploymenthasdeclinedunderthecurrentKing.424
ThesecondsubsectionwillnarrowinonwhatIpreviouslyconceptualizedasthestate’s
elite-orientedinterventions.Herein,Iwillbeginwithananalysisofthefiscalsociologythathas
beenconsolidatedunderAbdullah’swatch.Attheaggregatelevel,Iwillshowthissociologytobe
class-biasedandhighlypolarized.425Henceforth,Iwillproceedtoconsidersixadditional
mechanismsofelite-orientedintervention:(1)privatization;(2)themanipulationofcurrent
accountliberalization;(3)theinstrumentalizationofpubliccreditinstitutionsforthepurposesof
boostingelite-ownedenterprises;(4)real-estateorientedindustrial/investmentpolicies426;(5)
laissez-faireindustrialpolicies[asimplementedacrossJordan’sQualifyingIndustrialZones(QIZ),
SpecialEconomicZones(SEZ),andSpecialDevelopmentZones(SDZ)];and(6)militaryindustrial
policies.427
424 Inaddition,Iwillalsoshowthatpublicsectorhiringtodayremainsdetachedfromconsiderationsofmerit;this
beingthecase,IwillalsodocumenttheextenttowhichthisareaofpublicexpendituresiscompromisedbymuchthesameissuesaswereseenduringHussein’spost-1973years.
425 Bypolarizing,Iprimarilymeanthatthisfiscalsociologyfunctionstodeliverupwardandoutwardredistributionsofwealthatthesametimeasitpunisheslowerandmiddleclassfamilies.IwillestablishthisclaimthroughexaminingthedistributiveeffectsintroducedbytheVAT,theregime’sdefactoneglectofcorporateandincometax,thetaxbreaksprovidedacrossJordan’smanyspecialeconomicanddevelopmentzones,thepervasivenessoftaxevasion,andtheissuingofdomesticbondstolicensedcommercialbanksalone.
426 LikethosethatwereintroducedinAqabaandAmman(aswasdiscussedinthepreviouschapter).427 Herein,IwillscrutinizeMawared—theorganizationintroducedinmydiscussionsofASEZAandtheGAM—as
wellastheKingAbdullahIIDesignandDevelopmentBureau(KADDB).
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Mass-OrientedStateInterventions:Employment,Health,SocialWelfare
AswasthecaseunderKingHussein,KingAbdullah’smass-orientedinterventionsinthe
economystartswithpublicemployment.Fromcivilserviceandmilitaryhiringatthenational
leveltothestaffingofmunicipalgovernmentsatthelocallevel,thestate’sdirectjobcreation
continuestosecurealevelofbasicwelfareforhundredsofthousandsofJordanianfamiliesifno
longeraffordingsuchfamilieswiththemiddleclasscomfortsthatitoncedid.428Throughsuch
means,Abdullahhaskeptthepercentageofpublicemploymenttototalemploymentrelatively
steady(andrelativelyhigh).Inmomentsofpoliticalcrisis,moreover,Abdullah,likehisfather
beforehim,hastendedtoincreasethispercentageinhopesofamelioratingpublicgrievance.
Spikesinthepercentageofpublicemploymenttototalemploymentcoincidingwiththeglobal
financialcrisisof2007-2009andtheArabUprisingsof2011givetestamenttosuchcontinuities.
428 Publicemploymentcanalsobeusedtoserviceeliteclients.Forinstance,thePalaceusesappointmentstothe
Senate/seniorministerialpositions,jobsattheRoyalCourtorwiththeRoyalNGOs;andpositionswithnominallyautonomous,palace-alignedinstitutionssuchasMawared,theKADDB,ASEZA,theSocialSecurityCorporation,andtheJordanianInvestmentCommissiontolookafterthepoliticallyconnectedelite.
208
Hussein’sNeopatrimonialism Aswasdetailedinchapterthree,theembeddedneopatrimonialismestablishedbyHusseinhadrequiredandexpandedtheapparatusofthestatesotoassureawidedistributionofrentsandservices.Particularlyinthepost-1973context,Idelineatedthatdespiteunderminingthelong-termdevelopmentoftheeconomythroughtheinefficienciesandconsumption-orientedbiasofhisinterventions,Hussein’spoliciesweresociallysuccessfulinthattheyinsuredawidedistributionofpatronage.ThrougharegimeofuniversalconsumersubsidiesandpricefixingoverseenbytheMinistryofSupply,throughthesubsidizationofindustrialinputs,throughacivilserviceandmilitarythatsecuredthewelfareofhundredsofthousandsofTransjordanians,throughtheinstrumentalizationofnominallyindependent,state-ownedcreditinstitutionsandpensioninvestmentfunds,andthroughaseriesoflabormigrationarrangementsthatsecuredlivelihoodsandprosperityforhundredsofthousandsofethnicPalestinianswhohadtoalargeextentbeenlockedoutofthebureaucracy,Hussein’sneopatrimonialismconsolidatedarobustifdependentmiddleclass. Thisneopatrimonialismwouldeventuallycomeundonebythetotaldisarticulationofconsumptionfromproductivity—anoutcomethatwasitselfafunctionofanemergentformofrentierismthatsawthestate-businesspartnershipbiastheeconomytowardsimports,consumption,services,andcommerce-basedarbitrage—,butitsdistributivestrategywasnonethelesseffectiveinstabilizingthelargerpoliticaleconomyforaperiodofapproximatelytentofifteenyears.
209
ShareofPublicSectorinTotalEmploymentUnderKingAbdullah(Ages15+)
DataprovidedbytheDepartmentofStatistics.
GraphprovidedbyRaguiAssadandColetteSalemi,TheStructureofEmploymentandJobCreationinJordan:2010-2016,p.25
DataprovidedJordan’sDepartmentofStatistics
Acouplepointsareworthnotingasregardsthegraphsonthepreviouspage,however.
First,whilealongitudinalcomparisonofpublicemploymenttototalemploymentratiossuggests
anequivalencebetweentheera’sofAdullahandHussein,suchasuggestionwouldbemisleading.
210
ThisisbecauseAbdullah-eraratiosareinflatedbyrelativelysmallerdenominators(i.e.bythe
modernperiod’scomparativelysmallertotalemploymenttoworkingagepopulationratios).In
otherwords,Abdullah-eraratiosofpublicemploymenttototalemploymentarejuicedbya
generalizeddeclineinemploymentwritlarge(andinlaborforceparticipationmoregenerally).If
oneweretoaccountforthisandtakeamorereflectivemeasureasthebasisforalongitudinal
comparison—say,publicemploymenttototalpopulationratios,orannualpublicsectorjobs
createdv.jobseekers—,itwouldbecomeclearthattherelativesocialweightofpublic
employmenthasactuallyrecededconsiderablyundertheruleofthecurrentmonarch.Tothe
extentthatpublicemploymentisnowsecuringalesserproportionofJordanianfamiliesagainst
thewhimsofthe(failing)labormarket,then,onewouldneedtoacknowledgethatthe
effectivenessofthisaspectofthestate’smass-orientedeconomicinterventionshas
depreciated.429
Thisdepreciationisperhapsmoreeasilydiscernedthroughanexaminationofthe
Jordaniancivilservice’srecruitmentandhiringnumbersduringAbdullah’stenure.430Between
429 Ifthesocialrelevanceofpublicemploymenthasclearlybeendiminishedunderthecurrentregime,itisworth
notingthatthedevelopmentalimpactofpublicemploymenthasalsobeenfairlymarginal.ThismarginalityisafunctionofthefactthatAbdullah’spublicsectorhiringhasalwaysbeenconductedwithoutconsiderationofmerit(ascollegegraduates’hiringratesmayhavesuggested).Bloated,inefficient,andcontributingverylittleintermsofdevelopmentplanning,industrialplanning,andadministration,thepublicsector’seconomicutilitythereforecontinuestoreducetothecontributionsthatitmakestolowerandmiddleclassconsumption.Thisallbeingthecase,oneshouldbecarefulnottooverstatetheeffectthatthisaspectofthestate’sinterventionismhashadonthestabilizationofcontemporarycapitalaccumulation.
See:BenedicteCoestier,“JordanandtheMiddle-IncomeGrowthTrap:ArabSpringsandInstitutionalChanges”,
WorkingPaper:UniversiteParisOuest,NanterreLaDefense(2015),p.12.430 Thenumberofpeopleapplyingforjobswiththecivilservicefirstspikedwiththefirstreturnmigrationof
JordaniansfromtheGulfin1990-1991.Thatsaid,theapplicantpoolhastrulyexplodedduringAbdullah’stenure.
211
2014and2018,thecivilserviceneveroncereceivedlessthan300,000annualapplications.
Acrossthosesameyears,thecivilserviceneveroncehiredmorethan10,332applicantsina
singleyear.431Ifjobprospectsforanyapplicanttothecivilservicearethereforehighlydubious,it
isworthnotingthattheoddsfacingacollegegraduateareevenlonger.Whiletheaggregate
appointmentperapplicantratehoversbetween2-3%dependingontheyear,theappointment
perapplicantrateforcollegegraduatesrestsbetween1.3-2.2%forthe2014-2018period.432
431 Duringoneoftheyearsunderquestion,ithiredamere7,772.432 ThisisinstarkcontrasttothetrendsthatprevailedunderHussein.Inthoseyears,collegegraduateswere
virtuallyguaranteedapermanent,wellcompensatedjobinthepublicsector. See:KarenPfeifer,“SocialStructureofAccumulationTheoryfortheArabWorld:TheEconomiesofEgypt,Jordan,
andKuwaitintheRegionalSystem”inTerrenceMcDonough,MichaelReich,andDavidKotz(eds.)ContemporaryCapitalismanditsCrises:SocialStructureofAccumulationTheoryforthe21stCentury,pp.309-353).
212
ApplicantsandAppointeestotheJordanianCivilService(1990-2017)433
433 DataprovidedtheBureauoftheJordanianCivilService
213
SocialWelfare
Socialwelfareoperationsconstitutethesecondpillarofthestate’smassoriented
interventionsintheeconomy.Forclarity’ssake,Ihavegroupedpovertyalleviationprograms,
publiceducationprograms,andhealthcareprogramsunderthiscategoryofstateintervention.
Atthemacrolevel,onemustbeginherebyacknowledgingthattheuniversalism
previouslyanchoringwelfareinJordanhasbeenlargelydiscardedunderAbdullah.434Hastening
thestate’sgeneralizedretreatfromthesocialdomain,welfareisnowprimarilyoriented
accordingtothelogicofmeans-testing,Evidenceofthisisthereplacementofthestate’s
subsidizationofconsumergoods435—aswellastheMinistryofSupplythatoncemanagedits
administration—withapovertyalleviationprogrampremisedontargetedcashtransfers.436
CashtransfersareadministeredbytheNationalAidFund(NAF),whichisabranchofthe
MinistryofSocialDevelopment.Unsurprising,perhaps,forthoseacquaintedwiththeglobal
reputationoftransfer-basedpovertyalleviationprograms,theNAF’seffortshaveprovenwoefully
inadequateonanumberofdifferentlevels.First,thecriteriadeterminingwhetheranapplicantis
eligibletoreceivesuchaidareundulydiscriminatoryandaustere.Sotofulfillamandatedictating
434 Aswascoveredinpreviouschapters,thewelfarismofAbdullah’spredecessorhadbeengroundedinuniversalist
principles.Onemanifestationoftheseprincipleswasthestate’ssubsidizationofbasichouseholdgoods,whichhadservedasoneoftheprimarymechanismthroughwhichthestatecouldbothsupportmiddleclassconsumption,ensurethebasicneedsofimpoverishedcommunities,andfacilitateprofit-seekingamongstpoliticallyconnectedmerchantelites.
435 Thefinalrelicoftheoldsystem,thebreadsubsidy,waswithdrawnin2018.436 Thestatehasalsoworkedtoteachthepoortofishthroughsupportingtheirhouseholdbusinesses.Therein,
governmentshaverelieduponmicrofinancestyledoperations,MSME-relatedinitiatives,andvocationaltrainingprojects.
214
thatonlythetrulyneedyreceivestatesupport,allbuttheelderly,thephysicaldisabled(i.e.those
physicallyunabletowork),thefamiliesoforphans,andsingleparent,female-ledhouseholdsare
excludedfromtheNAF’sremit.Whatisworse,theFundalsostipulatesunemploymentasan
eligibilityrequirement.437GiventhatamajorityoftheJordanianlaborforceearnswagesator
barelyabovethepovertyline,theunemployment-basedconditionalityoftheNAF’sassistanceis
highlyconsequential.WhenonealsoconsidershowpaltrythesumsarethattheNAFactually
doesdoleout438andthefactthatbureaucraticfailures—i.e.theabilitytolocateandregister
householdsandindividualsacrossJordan’surbanandruralgeographies—inevitablyleadsto
hundredsofthousandsofeligiblecandidatesslippingthroughtheadministrativecracks,the
shortcomingsoftargetingbecomeevenmorepronounced.
Anempiricaldemonstrationmaybetterilluminatetheinadequaciesofthestate’scurrent
povertyalleviationefforts(andevinceyetanotherdepreciationinthestate’smass-oriented
interventionism).Acceptingextremelyconservativenationalpovertylinecalculations—and,for
themoment,ignoringhowtheformulabehindthesecalculationsstructurallydeflatepoverty
figures439—,itcanbeestimatedthatsomewherebetween14-15%oftheJordanianpopulation
437 Eveninthecaseofunemployment,moreover,italsomakesaccesstoaidconditionalonanindividual’s
enrollmentinvariousvocationaltrainingprograms.438 AccordingtotheNAF’sinternaldocumentsandannualreports,totalcashdispensedin2018totaled80,052,833
JD.Thatworksouttoroughly1094JDofincomesupportperfamily,orroughly91JDinstateassistancepermonth.TheseamountsarenowherenearsufficientforhelpingafamilycopewithJordan’severacceleratingcostsofliving.AsthetemporarycashaiddistributedbytheNAFreachedonly17millionJDduringthatsameyear,moreover,theutterinadequacyofthatpartofthesocialsafetynetthatismeanttohelpthoseattheverybottomcomesintostarkerrelief.
439 In Jordan’s case, such methods led the Department of Statistics to posit a national poverty line of 813 JD per individual
as of their most recent calculations (2010).
215
livesinwhatwouldbedeemedpermanentpoverty.Thispercentagetranslatesintoroughly1.5
millionpeople.Whenoneaddsthetransientlypoortothisfigure440,thenumberofaggregate
impoverishedJordaniansjumpscloserto3.5millionpeople,orroughly33%ofthetotal
population.441Byconsequenceoftargeting’sfastidiousrationalities,however,only73,162
families(afiguretranslatingto243,054individuals)receivedcashaidfromtheNAFin2018.442A
simplesubtractionoperationrevealsthattargetingtherebyleavesroughly3.2millionpoor
peopleoutsidetheremitofstatesupport.EvenaccountingfortheSyrianrefugeepopulation,itis
clearthattheNAF’stargetedpovertyalleviationmechanismsare,therefore,quiteliterallyleaving
millionsofJordan’spoorwithoutaccesstoanycashassistance.
Ifwelfaristeffortsinpovertyalleviationhaveunderwhelmed,sotoohaveeffortsinpublic
education.AcrossAbdullah’stenure,thegovernmenthasspentroughly3.5-3.8%ofGDPon
publiceducation.443Thatlevelofexpendituresisquitelowrelativetotheexpendituresofother
lower-middleincomecountries444,andgoesalongwaytowardsexplainingJordanianstudents’
well-documenteddeclinesintestingperformanceduringthepost-2000period.445Whatismore,
440 Bytransientlypoor,Imeanthoseindividualslivingbeneaththepovertylineforatleastonequarteroftheyear.441 OmarObeidat,“ThirdofJordan’spopulationlivesbelowpovertylineatsomepointofoneyear—study”,Jordan
Times(July2,2014).442 Thisdatacanbeaccessedat:http://www.naf.gov.jo/naf_sum_years443 DataprovidedbyWorldBank.444 OECDcountriesaveraged12.6%GDPbetween2014-2017. See:JordanStrategyForum,JordanontheGlobalTalentCompetitivenessIndex2018445 Foreducationaldecline,see:KhaledAbuTayeh,MohammadAl-Rsa’i,andMohammadal-Shugairat,“Thereasons
forthedeclineoftheresultsofJordanianstudentsin‘TIMSS’2015”,InternationalJournalofInstruction(11:2),2017,pp.325-338
216
thedecliningqualityofpubliceducationisalsoforcingmiddleandlowerclassfamiliestospend
increasingpercentagesoftheirhouseholdbudgetonprivatetutoring/educationalservices.446
Evidenceofthis,surveydatafrom2017showedthatmeanhouseholdspendingoneducationhad
reached578.8JDperyear,upmorethan140JD(orroughly25%)fromjustfouryearsprior.
Relativetothemedianwage447,theseoutlaysconstituteasizableportionofahousehold’s
expendableincome.Thestate’stacitdivestmentfrompubliceducation,then,beliesadeclinein
qualityoflifeformillionsofJordanians,andiscritical—bothintheshortandlong-term—tothe
country’sstrangecapitalismofcrisis.
Beforeclosingonwelfareandmass-orientedinterventionsmoregenerally,Ishould
acknowledgedthatthestate’seffortsinthedomainofhealthcarehaveprovensomewhatmore
earnest.Attheaggregatelevel,thegovernment’sshareoftotalhealthcareexpendituresreached
ashighas67%in2009beforedecliningbackto57%asof2015.Evenaccountingforthismore
recentebbing,that57%stillrepresentsanincreaseofroughly25%ascomparestoabaselineof
theyear2000.448Whileexactnumbersontheallocationofthesepublicexpendituresaredifficult
tocomeby,significantportionsaredevotedtowardsprovidingfreehealthservicesatpublic
Itshouldbeacknowledgedthatthisdeclinehasbeenpartiallycatalyzedbythemassivepopulationexpansion
Jordanhasexperiencedovertheprevioustwentyyears.446 EconomistsattheWorldBankhavedocumentedthisphenomenon.See:ElenaIanchovichina,Eruptionsof
PopularAnger:TheEconomicsoftheArabSpringanditsAftermath,WorldBank(2018).447 Asof2016,themedianwageinJordanwas370JD.Themedianwageintheprivatesector,however,wasonly300
JDthatsameyear.448 Thepublicshareofhealthexpendituresin2000wasjust44.9%(WorldBankHelathNutrition,Population
statistics).
217
facilitiesforthosecitizensbelowtheageofsixorabovetheageofsixty.449Inaddition,forthose
citizensthatareagedoutofthoseprivilegedcategories,itisalsopossibletopetitioneitherthe
MinistryofHealthortheRoyalCourtshouldoneneedhelpcoveringthecostsofaprocedureor
treatment.Thoughtherearemanyproblemswithsuchadiscretionary,charitableformof
intervention450,theimpactofthispetitioningsystemisstillsignificant:in2013,theRoyalCourt
alonedistributed800$millionthroughthesechannels.451
Themanymeritsofthestate’shealthrelatedinterventionsnotwithstanding,theyarenot
withouttheirshortcomings.Tobegin,duetotheunderdevelopmentoftheprivateinsurance
market,outofpockethealthexpendituresasapercentageoftotalhealthexpendituresremains
significant(28%asof2016).452Despitethestate’ssignificantinvestmentsinthissectorofthe
economy,then,householdsarestillhavingtodevoteasizableportionofexpendableincome
towardspayingforhealthservices.Furthermore,byvirtueofthefactthatthepriceofhealth
servicesincreasefasterthanwagesdo,therelativeamountofhouseholdincomebeingallocated
tohealthservicesisgrowingovertime.SurveydatagatheredbytheDepartmentofStatistics,for
instance,showsthataveragehouseholdexpendituresonmedicalcarehasactuallymorethan
doubledbetween2013and2017alone.453
449 YazanDoughan,“CorruptionintheMiddleEastandtheLimitsofConventionalApproaches,GIGAFocusMiddle
East(5),2017,p.7450 Beyondinevitablyexcludingmanyoftheneedy,thissystemalsorathercynicallyallowsthePalacetoplaytherole
ofbenign,magnanimoussaviorinprovidingaservicethatshouldhavebeenprovidedwithoutanyneedforsuchapersonalistintervention.
451 Doughan(2017),p.8452 DataprovidedbytheWorldHealthOrganization’sGlobalHealthExpenditureDatabase.453 DepartmentofStatisticsHouseholdExpenditureandIncomeSurvey2008,p.137
218
Intotal,then,whilethestate’smass-orientedinterventionsdocontributetothesocial
embeddingofJordaniancapitalism,theyarenotofthescalenecessarytotrulysecurethe
livelihoodsandwelfareofJordan’smiddleandlowerclasses.Thoughtheseinterventionsmay
helppartiallystabilizetheaccumulationprocess,then,theydosowhilealsoreproducingthe
kindsofsocialprecaritythatinvestJordaniancapitalismwithitsunderlyingfragilityandcrisis-
orientednature.Thesamecanbesaidofthestate’selite-orientedinterventions.Thoughsecuring
profitsforacertainfractionofthecapitalistclass,theywillbeshowntohaveincentivizedand
facilitatedbehaviorsthataredevelopmentallydestructiveinthelong-term,furtherconsolidating
thecrisistendenciesoftheeconomy.
Elite-OrientedInterventionsintheEconomy
(1)HashemiteFiscalSociology:RevenueGenerationandPublicExpendituresunderAbdullah
DepartmentofStatisticsHouseholdExpendituresandIncomeSurvey2013,Table4.24 DepartmentofStatisticsHouseholdExpendituresandIncomeSurvey2017,Table4.6 In2013,theaveragewas214.6JD;asof2017,itwas486JD.
219
Jordan’sfiscalsociologyhasshiftedconsiderablyunderthedirectionofKingAbdullah.The
starkclassbiasesitnowevincesderivefrommanysources,chiefamongstthemtherevenue
strategyadoptedunderthecurrentregime’swatch.Tobegin,thisstrategyleansheavilyupon
regressive,downwardlypunitivetaxesonconsumption.454Suchtaxeshaveconstitutedroughly
65-75%oftotalannualtaxrevenueandmadeup36-48%ofthegovernment’stotalannual
revenuesthroughoutthetenureofthecurrentKing.455
454 Taxrevenueshaveconstitutedbetween55-66%totalgovernmentrevenuesbetween2005and2017.The
government’sothermajorrevenuestreamsincludeforeigngrants,propertyincomerevenue,revenuefromsalesofgoodsandservices,revenuefromfinesandpenalties,andrevenuesfrommiscellaneoustransfers.
455 DataforgraphsprovidedbytheInternationalMonetaryFund.
Red:Taxes on International Trade and Transactions Orange: General Taxes on goods and services Purple:Taxes on corporate income, profits, and capital gains Green:Taxes on individual income, profits, and capital gains
220
Compoundingthedistributiveeffectsgeneratedbythistaxstructure456havebeenthe
upwardlyredistributiveeffectsofdomesticborrowing.Thismodalityofborrowingwasinitially
discussedinthecontextofthe1973-1986SSA.Functionallyspeaking,thestate’sbond
issuances—inconjunctionwiththelackofanysignificantprogresswhenitcomestoincomeand
corporatetax457—areupwardlyredistributivetotheextentthattheyimplyafuturetransferof
456 OneshouldacknowledgethatthesetaxesonconsumptionwereinitiallyintroducedasaGeneralSalesTax.
Shortlythereafter,however,thesystemtransitionintothegeneralizedValue-AddedTaxthatitnowoperatesaccordingto.
457 Aswellasthepervasivenessoftaxevasion,asIwilldiscuss.
TheValue-AddedTax(VAT)inAbdullah’sJordan RegardingthedetailsofAbdullah-erataxesonconsumption,itshouldfirstbeacknowledgedthattheGeneralSalesTaxsystemwasinitiallyintroducedonlyafterexemptinganumberofgoodsfromitspurview,andthatthoseexemptions(ongoodslikebread,tea,rice,andmilk)hadbeendesignedsotoinsulatethecountry’spooraswellassignificantportionsofitsmiddleclassfromtheworstofthetax’spotentialeffects.Overtime,however,Abdullah’spolicyplannershavemethodicallyremovedmanyoftheseexemptions.Thoughexemptionsstillremaininplaceforsugar,riceflour,cookingoil,lamb,beef,chicken,fish,freshmilk,andtea,beginningin2018,a10%taxwasimposedonpackageddairyproducts,eggs,essentialvegetablesliketomatoes,potatoes,andcucumbers,frozenmeat,freshfish,andfruits(JeremySharp,“Jordan:BackgroundandU.S.Relations,Report:CongressionalResearchService(2018),p.2).Withtheexceptionofthissmallnumberofspecialgoods,moreover,theVATsystemnowimposesaunifiedtaxrateof16%onnearlyeverythingelsesoldinthedomesticeconomywiththeexceptionofthosetransactionsoccurringwithinJordan’sconstellationofspecialeconomiczones. 2015to2018alsosawthetaxrateplacedongasoline,petrol,kerosene,andfuelderivativesjumptounprecedentedlevels.Asof2018,taxesimposedonalitreof95octaneunleadedgasolinerepresentedapproximately57.2%thetotalpriceofthatlitre,taxesonalitreofkeroseneconstituted26%ofitstotalprice,andtaxesondieselconstituted26.2%ofitstotalprice(JordanTimesEditorialStaff,“’Reallyhigh’taxesonfuelpartofKingdom’spolicytosupportTreasury—Zawati”,JordanTimes(July29,2018).Byconsequence,workingclassfamilieshavealsobeenforcedtoreckonwithsubstantialincreasesinthecostoftransportationandcooking.Whilethefueltaxesinparticularhavebeensoldthroughegaltiarian-coatedenvironmentalistappeals,moreover,thismystifiestheclass-biasthatisbasictoanysuchflattax—especiallythosethatarenotsupplementedbystateinvestment/subsidizationofpublictransportationintheseinstances.WithJanuary2018alsoseeingthegovernmentfinallyliftitsdecadelongsubsidyonbread—amovethatincreasedthepriceofbreadbybetween60-100%,andthatwaspartneredwithasystemofconditionalcashtransfersmeanttooffsetthepriceincreasesforthosefamiliesdeemedsufficientlypoor—,theregressiverevenuestrategyhithertodescribedhascometobepairedwithpunitivereductionsinexpendituresaswell.
221
incomefromtaxpayertothehandfulofcommercialbanks(andtheireliteowners)thatare
licensedtoparticipateinthesovereigndebtmarket.458Atthesametime,then,ashousehold
budgetsarebeingsqueezedbytheVATandthegrowingcostofbasicnecessities,thosesame
householdsarealsobeingplacedonthehookfortheinterestpaymentstheJordanian
governmentincreasinglyowestothecountry’sfinancecapital.Theaggregateresult—where
householdstransfersubstantialportionsoftheirincometothestatewhiledomesticfinance
enjoyshealthyrateofreturnsontheconstellationofdebtinstrumentsthatitaloneisfreeto
acquire—isahighlypolarized,developmentallycompromised459,capital-dominatedfiscal
sociology.
Togivethesepolarizingeffectssomekindoforientingcontext,considerthatinterest
paymentsonlocally-helddebtaloneconsumed8.74%oftotalstateexpendituresin2017aswell
as68.5%of2017’stotalcapitalexpenditures.460Asthesepercentagesdwarfwhatthestateis
spendingonsociallyanddevelopmentallyessentialdomainssuchaseducation,researchand
458 Thisredistributiveeffectisfurtherenhancedbythefactthatinterestratesongovernmentissueddebtexceed
averageprivatesectorprofitratesbyaconsiderablemargin.Notonly,then,arethesefinancialinstitutionsultimatelytakingmoneyoutofthepocketoftaxpayers.Asonlylicensedfinancialinstitutionshaveaccesstothesebondmarkets,theirreturnsarealsoartificiallyjuicedvis-a-vistheircapitalistcompetitors.
Withgovernmentsecuritiesnowcomprisingapproximately22%oftheaggregateassetsheldbythedomesticbankingsector,saidfinancialinstitutionshavebeenquitekeenintakingadvantageoftheirprivilegedposition.Almostbydefinition,then,thedesignedexclusivismofthedomesticbondmarkethasnecessarilyimpliedarelativetransferofwealthtoJordanianfinancialcapital.
See:JordanStrategyForum,AmmanStockExchange:TheWayForward,Report(Amman,2017),p.14459 Developmentally,oneofthemoredirect(andnegative)consequencesofthegovernment’sbondissuances
concernsitscrowdingouteffect.Morespecifically,byabsorbingsignificantpercentagesofthefinancialsector’sinvestmentcapital,thegovernment’sdebtstrategywindsupreducingtheamountsofcapitalthatareavailableforproductiveinvestmentelsewhereintheeconomy.Toacertainextent,then,thisrevenuestrategyallowsbankstoavoidrisk-seekingandprofit-seekinginvestments,therebystiflinggrowthandinnovation.
460 JordanStrategyForum,Ontheimportance…(2018),p.6.
222
development,targetedcashtransfers,andwelfaristinterventionsmoregenerally,theyquitetidily
representtheextenttowhichtheinflowsandoutflowsofAbdullah’sfiscalpolicyprivilegecertain
eliteactorsattheexpenseofdevelopmentandsocialequity.461
461 Asthesebondissuanceshelptofinancecurrentexpenditures(andthewagesoftheKing’slowskilledpublic
sectorworkforce),ofcourse,theyareactasacriticalmechanismwithintheKing’sauthoritarianrenewalstrategy.
Capital’sReturnsontheDomesticBondMarket Asofthetimeofwriting,domesticallyissueddebtinstruments—acollectionofbondsandtreasurybillswithtenorsrangingfromonetotenyears—constitute60.5%ofthegovernment’stotaldebtportfolio(MoFdocument).Relativelyshort-termbondsandbillsoftwo,three,andfiveyeardurations,moreover,compriseroughly60%ofthistotal.ThoughtheMinistryofFinance’sdistinguishesbetweendomesticandexternaldebtonthebasisofcurrencydenomination(nottheresidenceoftheinvestor)andtherebypotentiallyoverstatesthemagnitudeoflocallyhelddebt,Saif’s2017researchestimatesthat54%ofgovernmentdebtisinthehandsofdomesticinvestors(JordanStrategyForum,Ontheimportance…(2018),p.6). Disaggregatingthedebtinstrumentsissuedin2018and2019alonebymaturitydate,theaverageinterestrateonasixmonthtreasurybillwasapproximately4.1%;theaverageinterestonaoneyeartreasurybillwasapproximately4-4.2%;theaverageinterestrateonatwo-yeartreasurybillwasapproximately4.15%;theaverageinterestrateonabondofthreeyearswasapproximately4.5%;theaverageinterestrateonabondoffiveyearswasapproximately5.45%;theaverageinterestrateonabondofsevenyearswas6.3%;theaverageinterestrateonabondoftenyearswasapproximately6.8-7%;andtheaverageinterestrateonabondoffifteenyearswas7.9%(dataprovidedbyAmmanStockExchange).AsofFebruary2019,themainrateonJordaniangovernmentbondswas4.75%.Theweightedaverageinterestrateonthestate’sgrossdomesticdebtasof2017,meanwhile,was4.1%.Importantly,thisisafigurethatisnearlydoubletheequivalentratewhenitcomestothecountry’sexternallyhelddebt(2.4%).
223
GraphprovidedbyJordanStrategyForum,AmmanStockExchange:TheWayForward(2017),p.14
BeforeclosingontheconstructionofJordan’scontemporaryfiscalsociology,Ineedalso
makenoteofthedistributiveeffectsyieldedbythestate’sfacilitationoframpanttaxevasion.
Withanissueasmurkyastaxevasion,itisdifficult,ofcourse,toestimatemagnitudeswithany
degreeofprecision.AgeneralsenseforJordan’sstrugglesinthisarea,however,canbegained
throughabriefreviewofaggregatecorporateincometaxreceipts.Suchareviewwasprovidedby
theIncomeandSalesTaxDepartment,whichissuedareportin2017indicatingthatitcollected
lessthanJD60millionintotalfromthe132,000registeredandactivecompaniesthatfiledtaxes
thepreviousyear.462Perfirm,thisfiguretranslatestoanaveragecontributionof455JD.Given
thatcorporatetaxrateoutsideJordan’sspecialeconomiczonessitsat20%,suchcontribution
ratesimplyeithersystematicevasionoraneconomicdepression.Whenonealsoconsidersthe
morepulpyfindingsrevealedfollowingthereleaseofthePanamaPapers—findingsimplicating
manyofJordan’spoliticalandeconomicelite,includingtheroyalfamily,intheMossackFonseca
overseenscheme—,itisalsopossibletoseehowthiskindofbehaviorreachesto(ifitisnot
462 JordanTimesEditorialStaff,“132,000companiesinvolvedintaxevasion”,JordanTimes(April28,2018).
224
directlyencouragedby)theverytop.463Inviewofthesetwodatapoints,onecanassumethattax
evasionislikelycostingthestatehundredsofmillionsofJDinannualrevenuesatthesameasitis
facilitatingupwardandoutwardredistributionsofwealth.
Tosummarize,thefiscalsociologyinstitutionalizedunderAbdullah’sleadershiphasledto
bothasignificantupwardtransferofwealthandtheintense,persistentsqueezingofJordan’s
distressedmiddleandlowerclasses.TheextremitiesofJordan’ssocialpolarizationinthe
contemporaryperiodandthestructuralizedinstability,inefficiency,andinequalityconstituting
itscontemporarymodalityofneoliberalcapitalismareinnosmallpartafunctionofthe
institutionalizationofthisperiod’selite-orientedtaxpolicy.
(2)Privatization464
Operationally,Abdullah-eraprivatizationhasbeencarriedoutthroughthreedifferent
kindsoftransactions.PerKnowles,thefirstoftheseseesthegovernmentitselfsellequityit
463 TheoriginalArabiclanguagepublicationonthePanamaPapersscandal(asitrelatestoJordan)hasbeenpulled
fromAmmannet.net’sserver. Forinformationontheinvestigationandpeopleimplicated,see:DaoudKuttab,“PublishingthePanamaPapersin
Jordan”,ZenithMagazine(2016). Dataavailableat:InternationalConsortiumofInvestigativeJournalists,ThePanamaPapers:ExposingtheRogue
OffshoreFinanceIndustry(https://offshoreleaks.icij.org/). 464 SchlumbergerhasarguedthatAbdullah’sprivatizationinitiativesservedtwoprincipalfunctions.Ontheone
hand,itallowedKingAbdullahtoperformtheroleofearnestneoliberalreformer.Byprivatizingkeyassets,hecouldpartiallysatisfythewantsofhisforeigncreditors(andhisbackersinthewest)whilenotyetriskingthekindofsocialupheavalthatwereimmanenttootherareasofthestructuralreformpackagesuchassubsidyremovalormasslayoffsinthepublicsector.Ontheotherhand,privatizationandtheunderpricedtransfersofvaluablestateownedassetsthatitenactedalsoallowedhimtoconsummateanewpartnershipwithanowtransnationalizedcoalitionofcapitalistallies.
225
directlyholdsinvariousSOEstoanemergentconstellationofstrategicforeignpartners.465In
practice,theseexternally-orienteddirectequitysalesservedasthechiefmechanismthrough
whichthestateoffloaded(atleastpartially)anumberofkeyindustrialassetsintheearly
2000s.466Itwasthroughthismeans,forinstance,thatFrance’sLafargeacquiredwhatwould
becomea50.2%equityshareintheJordanCementFactoryCompany.467Similarly,thiswasthe
meansthroughwhichCanada’sNutrienLtdbecamethesinglelargestshareholderintheArab
PotashCompany(28%ofequity),afamouslyproud,formerlypan-Arabist(andpubliclyowned)
465 TheoneexceptiontothisruleistheJordanianPetroleumRefineryCompany(JPRC),whichremainsorganizedas
anSOEasofthetimeofwriting.ManyofAbdullah’seconomizedelite—includingAlaaBataineh,Omaral-Kurdi,andWalidAsfour—sitonitsBoard.
See:Knowles(2001),pp.236-247.466 ThiswasalsothemechanismthroughwhichthestatedivestedfromthehighlyprofitableJordanian
TelecommunicationsCompany.Theinternalpolitics—andtheaggressivecontestsforrentsthatpittedtwomembersofGenerationAbdullah,JamalSarayrahandAliShukri,againstoneanother—involvedinthispartialsalehavebeenwelldocumented.Asiteventuallyplayedout,40%oftheJTCwoundupsoldaconsortiumcomprisedofFrenchTelecom(35.2%)andArabBank(4.8%).
467 ItwasactuallyHamdiTaba’a,oneofthetrueelderstatesmenofJordaniancapital,whowasChairmanoftheJCFC
atthetimeofthistransaction. AfterLaFarge’sacquisitionofamajorityequityshare,theSocialSecurityCorporationstillretaineda21.8%stake
inJCFC,therebyinsuringacontinuationofstateinfluence.TheestateofChaabiMiloudholds10.3%equityandisthethirdlargestshareholderatthetimeofwriting.
226
entity.468DirectequitysaleswerealsousedinthecaseoftheJordanianPhosphateMines
Company(JPMC)469andtheJordanianFertilizerCompany(JFC).470
Internally-orienteddivestmentscarriedoutbyJordan’snominallyautonomouspublic
creditinstitutionsconstitutethesecondkindofprivatizationtransaction.Generallyspeaking,it
hasbeenthepublicsector’spensionfund,theJordanInvestmentCorporation(JIC,laterrenamed
theSocialSecurityCorporation,orSSC)),thatorchestratesthesetransactions,andgenerally
speaking,theJIC/SSChasoffloadedminorityshareholdingstolocalstrategicinvestors.Ifthefirst
kindofprivatizationtransactionhadfunctionedsotoselloffJordan’sindustrialbasetoforeign
actors,thesecondkindfunctionedsotransferagreatdealofpublicwealth(andhealthySOEs)
intotheprivatehandsofthepoliticallyconnectedbusinesselite.Sociallypolarizingasthese
divestmentoperationswerealwaysboundtobe,theireffectendedupbeingdoublysoduetothe
factthatinpractice,thepubliccreditinstitutionswoundupsellingtheirsharesinmoreprofitable
assetsandbusinesses(atdiscountedprices)whileretainingmoretoxicassetsontheirbalance
468 JamalSarayrah,amanwhowouldalsofindhimselfatthecenteroftheJordanTelecommunicationsCompany’s
privatization,sitsasChairmanoftheBoardattheArabPotashCompanyatthetimeofwriting.469 TheoriginalbuyersoftheJPMCwerethegovernmentofBrunei(37%)andtwosubsidiariesoftheIndian
FarmersFertilizersCooperative(9.62%).UpontherevelationsofcorruptiononthepartofJPMCCEOWalidKurdiin2012—whoistheuncleofKingAbdullahandwhohaslivedintheUKsincethesecorruptionscametolight—,thegovernmentofBruneidivesteditssharestotheaforementionedIndiancooperative.Thistransactionwascompletedin2018.
470 TheJordanFertilizerCompany(JFC)wasitselfa(toxic)subsidiaryoftheJPMC.Duringtheearly2000s,itwas
effectivelysplitintotwoseparateentities,eachofwhichwouldbereformedasajointventurecompanythroughpartnershipswithtworespectiveforeigninvestors.TheJFC’sone-timesouthernoperationscametobeoperatedbyalimitedliabilityjointventurecompanycalledNipponJordanFertilizerCompany,whileitsnorthernoperationswouldbesteeredbythesimilarlyorganizedJordanIndianFertilizerCompany.
227
sheets.471Byconsequence,thisformofdivestmentwas,functionallyspeaking,enrichingwell-
connectedspeculatorsthroughdegradingthevalueandhealthoftheJIC’sportfolio—aportfolio
uponwhichthepensionsofpublicsectorworkersdepended.Indirectly,then,theseprivatization
transactionsimpliedaprocessofaccumulationthroughdispossession.
Thethirdkindofprivatizationtransactionseesthestatefirstleaseandthensubsequently
transferpublicassetstoeitherforeignordomesticconsortia.472Policyplannerstypicallyoptfor
thismechanismindealingwithcapital-intensiveinfrastructureorcriticalutilitieslikewater
servicesandelectricitydistribution.Specifictotheformer—andinadditiontotheprivatization
ofAqabaPortthatwasdiscussedinchaptersix—,notableprivatizationsofthistypeinclude
QueenAliaAirport,theAmmanCityBussystem,andtheAqabaRailroadCorporation.473Asfor
theprivatizationofutilities,oneneedbeginwithwaterservices—andwiththeWorldBank.Asis
detailedinBasilMahayni’s2015dissertation,theBankhadactuallybeenpushingforthe
privatizationofwatermanagementsincethe1990s;itevenfinancedthemanagementcontract
throughwhichtheWaterAuthorityofJordanfirstintroducedcorporategovernancetoitsAmman-
471 ThiswouldbeseenintheJIC’sretentionoftheJordanTobaccoandCigarettesCompany,forexample.472 Ofthemechanismthreestyledprivatizations,IshouldnotethatAbdullah’spolicyplannersalsousedalease-
transferagreementtoturntheJordanPoultryProcessingandMarketingCompanyovertoAbdulHadiHammoudeh,whoseHammoudehGroupoperatesamulti-sectorconglomeratestretchingfromdairyandmeattochemicalstoplasticstocleaningsuppliestogeneralizedtradingandinvestment(http://www.hammoudeh.com/SubDefault.aspx?PageId=186&MenuId=88).
473 Thoughvirtuallynoprogresshasbeenmadesincethesigningofthecontract,theAqabaRailroadCorporation
wasofficiallysoldtoaconsortiumledbyRaytheon,theWisconsinCentralTransportationCorporation,Mitsubishi,theJordanPhosphatesMiningCompany,andtheKawarGroupduringtheearlydaysofAbdullah’sreign(Knowles,2001,p.243).
228
basedoperations.474Bytheearly2010s,theBank’sconsistentproddingwassufficienttoensure
thatthecommercialization(thoughnottheprivatization)ofwatermanagementspreadtoAqaba
aswell.475Beginningin2011,USAid(throughitsInstitutionalSupportandStrengtheningProject)
joinedtheBankinpushingtheJordanianstatetomovebeyondtheselocalizedinterventionssoto
corporatizethenationalwatermanagementsystem.Workinginconjunctionwithtwoforeign
consultancies—InternationalResourcesGroupandEcoConsult—Aidhas,todate,achievedsome
moderatesuccessesonthisfront.In2012,theJordanianauthoritieswerepersuadedtosetupa
limitedliabilitycompanyatthenationallevelandtorationalizingwatertariffssothattheprices
paidbyhouseholdsmoreaccuratelyreflectedthecostofwaterprovisions.476
Inadditiontothecommercializationofwatermanagement,anumberofmoreexpansive
contractsconcerningtherehabilitationofthecountry’slargerwaterinfrastructurehavebeen
tenderedtoprivatefirmsduringAbdullah’stenureaswell.Themostsubstantialofthese—the
474 BasilMahayni,CrisisinJordan’sWaterSector?UnderstandingtheDynamicsofInstitutionalandPolitical
ConstraintsinWaterManagementandCorporatizationReforms,Doctoraldissertation,UniversityofMinnesota(2015),p.110.
This$55millioncontract,awardedin1999,wenttoaconsortiumledbyLyonnaisedeEaux,aFrenchcompany
workingincollaborationwithMontgomeryWatsonandArabtechJaradneh(LEMA).475 Ibid,pp.115-116. MuchofthisproceededunderthebanneroftheCapitalInvestmentProject.Atthetimeofwriting,water
managementinAmmanisrunbytheJordanWaterCompany-Miyahuna,whichisitselffullyownedbytheWaterAuthorityofJordan.InAqaba,theAqabaWaterCompany,whichisjointlyownedbytheWaterAuthorityofJordanandASEZA(thelatterofwhichholdsa15%stake),handlesmanagement.
476 Ibid,p.121. Whilethepriceofwaterhasnotyetbeenpassedontotheconsumerinfull,giventhenatureofwaterdistribution
inJordan—onceaweek,theaforementionedmanagementcompaniesfilltanksthatsitontopofindividualapartmentbuildings;eachtankcorrespondstoasingleapartmentwithinthatbuilding,andmustlastthathouseholdafullweek—,itishardtoenvisionanyschemeforincreasingpricesthatwouldnotberegressiveinnature.Aflatincreaseonthetariffindividualhouseholdsarepayingfortheirweeklyallotmentofwater,forinstance,wouldbedisproportionatelyinjurioustothepoor.
229
muchballyhooedDisiWaterConveyanceProject—entailedtheconstructionofa325kilometer
pipelinethatwastotransportwaterfromtheDisiaquiferinthesouthofthecountryalltheway
uptoAmman.LikewiththeairportandAqaba’sport,thiscontracthadbeenstructuredasa
build-operate-transferagreement—andjustaswasthecaseinthosepreviousinstances,the
contracthadbeenawardedtoaforeignfirm.477Unlikethosecases,however,theDisiConveyance
Projecthasbeenanunambiguous,irrefutabledisaster.Miredincorruptionandmalpracticefrom
thestart,theJordanianMinistryofWaterandIrrigationwaseventuallyforcedtotakesaidforeign
firm(namely,Diwaco)tothePermanentCourtofArbitrationafterthefirm,strugglingwitha
numberoflogisticalandtechnicalchallenges,attemptedtoextract$460millionfromthestate
withouthavingmadeanyrealprogressonthepipeline.478WhiletheMinistrywonthecase,the
ordealhascertainlylaidbaresomeofthedangersinherenttoAbdullahetal.’spreferencetowards
theprivatizationofpublicinfrastructure.
477 Diwaco,asubsidiaryoftheTurkishconglomerateGAMAEnergy,wonthecontract.478 Forthereportingofthisscandal,see:HanaRamrouqa,“WaterministrywinsDisi-relatedarbitrationcaseworth
$460m”,JordanTimes(February23,2018).
230
Whenitcomestoenergygeneration,privatizationhasalsotendedtotransferpublicassets
intoforeignhands.ThelargestoftheprivateactorsnowoperatinginthisspaceistheCentral
ElectricityGenerationCompany(CEGCO).Atthetimeofwriting,thefirmoperatesathermal
powerstationinAqaba,agaspowerstationinRisha,ahybridgas-turbinepowerstationin
Rehab,andwindpowerstationsinIbrahimyahandHofa.Inthepastsevenyearsalone,ithas
beentenderedtwelvegovernmentcontracts.OriginallyasubsidiaryofEnara—theDubai-based
energyinvestmentarmofJordanDubaiCapital—,CEGCOwasacquiredbytheSaudi-basedICWA
SellingtheQueenAliaAirport AswasthecasewiththeAqabaPort,thecontractfortherenovation,reconstruction,andoperationofAmman’smaininternationalairport—awardedtotheAirportsInternationalGroup(AIG)in2007—wasstructuredaccordingtoatwenty-fiveyearbuild-own-transferagreement.AIG’smajorityshareholderistheParis-basedADPInternationalS.A.(51%equity).MeridiamEasternEuropeInvestmentsholdsanadditional32%,theUAE-basedMENAAirportHoldingsLtd.Holds12.25%,andtheEDGOGroup,oneofthemanyentitiesownedbytheMasrifamily,holds4.75%.RegardingtheMasriconnect,MunibMasriisEDGO’sChairmanandOmarMasriishisViceChairman. AIG’soperationswerefinancedmostlybytheIFC,theIslamicDevelopmentBank,andahandfulofregionalpartners,includingtheKuwaitbasedNoorFinancialInvestmentCompanyKSCCandtheAbuDhabiInvestmentGroup(InternationalFinanceCorporation,QueenAliaInternationalAirport—theRoleofIFCinFacilitatingPrivateInvestmentinaLargeAirportProject,Report:EMCompass2017,p.2).ItsparticularB-O-TagreementwiththeJordanianstatestipulatedthatthestatewouldretainofficialownershipoftheairportforthedurationofthetwenty-fiveyearcontract,thatthestateassumesalltheproject’sdebtsintheeventofcontracttermination,andthatthestatereceivesroughly54%oftherevenuesgeneratedthereinduringthesameperiod.Importantly,however,afterthetwenty-fiveyearleasepasses,ownershipofQueenAliawillbetransferredtoAIGinfull(MadhaviGosavi,QueenAliaInternationalAirportProject,Jordan,Report:NortonRoseLLP,2009).Inviewofthosewhostandtobenefitfromsuchatransfer,theAirport’srenovation,liketherenovationofAqaba’sport,wascarriedoutinsuchamannersoastoensurethattheinterestsofanumberof(transnational)eliteprivateactorsareserved.
231
PowerInternationalin2011.479JoiningCEGCOintheJordanianenergygenerationbusinessisthe
US-basedAESCorporationandJapan-basedMitsuiandCompany,whichtogetherledtheAmman
EastPowerPlanproject.480Asforthedistributionofenergy,Abdullah’splanners(initially)opted
tolease-transferelectricitydistributionoperationsouttotwoprivateentities.TheElectricity
DistributionCompany(EDCO)wasgivenexclusivedistributionrightsacrossthegovernoratesof
Karak,Tafilah,Ma’an,andAqabaaswellasacrosstheentiretyoftheJordanValleyandthose
easternlandsborderingIraq.TheIrbidDistrictElectricityCompany(IDECO),meanwhile,won
distributionrightswiththegovernorateofIrbid.Shortlyafterthesearrangementswere
established(2009),theKingdomElectricityCompany(KEC),whichalreadyowned100%of
EDCO’sshares,purchased55.4%ofIDECO’sshares.Byconsequenceofthisacquisition,adefacto
monopolycametocontrolelectricitydistributionacrossthemajorityofJordan’sterritory.481
ThoughthepubliclymanagedJordanElectricityDistributionCompany(JEDCO)stillretains
controloverelectricitydistributionmarketinAmman,itsnearlydecadelongflirtationwith
insolvency—whichrequiredanumberofcapitalinjectionsafterpoliticalcrisisinSinaisentgas
pricesskyrocketingbetween2011and2015—,inconjunctionwiththerelentlessadvocacy
undertakenbytheIFIsinpushingforJEDCO’sprivatization,suggestsittoomaycomeunderthe
controlofKECintheneartomediumtermfuture.
479 ThegovernmentofJordanandtheSocialSecurityInvestmentFundretainroughly49%equityinCEGCO.480 FinancingforthisprojectwasprovidedbyUSOverseasPrivateInvestmentCorporation,JapanBankof
InternationalCooperation,andtheSumitomoBankingCorporation;riskwasguaranteedbytheIBRD.481 FormoreontheKEC,see:http://www.kec.jo/electricity-distribution-company-edco
232
AquicklookattheKEC’sboardofdirectorsgivesanindicationofhowtheregimehasused
privatizationasakindofconveyorbeltforusheringoldpoliticalelitesandPalaceacolytesinto
thecircuitsofrentthataresobasictoAbdullah’sneoliberalcapitalism.NadiaRawabdeh,
previouslyaDirectoroftheSocialSecurityCorporationuntilherretirementin2018sitsasKEC
ChairmanoftheBoardatthetimeofwriting.JoiningherontheboardisZiyadHomsi,Chairman
oftheAmmanChamberofIndustryandamultipletermSenator.Finally,tyingtheroyalfamily
directlyintothewiderprivatizationgrift,AlaaBatayneh—amultipletermSenator,former
MinisterofEnergyandMineralResourcesduringFayezTarawneh’sgovernment,boardmember
fortheJordanianPetroleumRefineryCompany,andtheson-in-lawofPrinceHassan—toohasa
boardseatattheKEC.
(3)PublicCreditInstitutionsandEliteEnterprises
IfdomesticelitesbenefitfromtheJIC’s/SSC’sstrategyofdivestment,itisworthnoting
thattheyalsobenefitfromthepubliccreditinstitution’sstrategyofinvestmentaswell.TheSocial
SecurityCorporationinparticularholdssignificantequityinmanyofthecountry’slargest
companiesandrealestatedevelopmentprojects.WiththeSSC’sownviabilitytiedtothe
successesandprofitsoftheseelite-ownedenterprises—andwiththePalace,bydefinition,
holdingavestedinterestintheSSC’scontinuedviability—,SSCinvestmentsaretantamounttoa
royalendorsementandadiscretionary,politicizedinterventioninthefavorofcertainactors
aboveothers.Intiltingthetableinthefavoroftheseactorsandenterprises,theSSC’s
229
233
investmentstherebyfunctionasoneoftheprincipalmechanismsundergirdingJordan’s
compromised,elite-orientedformofmarketcompetition(and,byextension,asoneofthecauses
ofthecountry’sinefficient,underperformingcapitalism).
Index1laysoutalloftheSSC’sinvestmentsontheASE.Thoughdataonitsholdingsin
privatelyoperatedventuresisunavailable,abriefsurveyoftheindexissufficienttogivethe
readerasenseoftheinstitution’seconomicfootprint.Irecommendthereaderreviewitinfullto
betterappreciatethescale(andcharacter)ofthisinvestment.Inplaceofthat,acouplepointsare
worthemphasizing.First,theSSChasmassiveequityholdingsinthebankingsector.AsofMarch
2019,theSSChelda17%stakeinArabBank,a5%stakeinJordanIslamicBank,a21%stakein
JordanKuwaitbank,a20%stakeinJordanCommercialBank,a15%stakeintheHousingBank
forTradeandFinance,a9%stakeinSafwaIslamicBank,a5.2%stakeinBankalEtihad,a7.2%
stakeinCairoAmmanBank,a10%stakeinJordanAhliBank,anda9.9%stakeinBankofJordan.
Asmentioned,theSSCalsobolstersmanyoftheenterprisesdirectlyownedbytheelite
fractionofthecountry’scapitalistclass.Inadditiontoitsinvestmentsinthebankingsector
(detailedabove),thiscanbeseeninthefactthattheinstitutionalsoholdssignificantequityin
JordanInsurance(7%),apropertyprimarilyownedbyUthmanAliUthmanBdeir;intheNuqul
family’sJordanNationalShippingLinesCompany(13.5%);intheMasrifamily’sZaraInvestment
Holdings(12.4%);intheMuasherfamily’sAl-DawliyahforHotelsandMalls(12%);inJordan
Telecom(28.9%),whereSabihMasri’sNoorTelecommunicationsalsoholdsa9.3%stake;inthe
Talhounifamily’sJordanWorstedMills(20%);aswellasholdingsignificantstakesinthebigfive
industrialfirms.
234
(3)Currentandcapitalaccountliberalization:Curatingmarketcompetition
IfAbdullah’spolicymakersmanagedprivatizationinsuchawayastogenerate
opportunitiesandprofitsforbothJordanianandnon-Jordanianeconomicelites,theymediated
thecountry’seconomicopeningsotoservetheparticularistinterestsoftheformerfirstand
foremost.Indeed,despitetheextensivenesswithwhichthecurrentandcapitalaccountshave
beenliberalizedintheaggregateduringthetwenty-firstcentury,throughmeansbothsubtleand
obvious,GenerationAbdullahpolicyplannershavestillconsistentlylimiteddomesticmerchant
capital’sexposuretoforeigncompetitionwithinthosesectorsthataremostcriticaltotheir
profits.482Insodoing,whiletheyhavefacilitatedthetransnationalizationofthecapitalclass,they
havesimultaneouslyensuredthatthedomesticfractionsofthebourgeoiselitewerenot
subsumedorreplacedintheprocess.483
482 Thisisunsurprisingwhenoneconsidersthatthesepolicyplannersarepredominantlymembersofthedomestic
bourgeoiselitethemselves.Inthisinstance,themostrelevantindividualsareSahelal-MajliandRaghdaKurdi,whomanagedinvestmentpolicyduringtheearlyyearsoftheECC.
483 IwilldiscussthisatlengthinthechapterontheexternalarticulationofthecontemporarySSA.Capitaland
currentaccountliberalizationhavecertainlyprecipitatedarapidtransformationinthestructureofdomesticfinance,astructurenowwitnessingnon-nationalsholdamajoritystakeintheaggregateequityofJordan’sbankingsector(and,thereby,anearmajorityintheaggregateequityofallpubliclytradedfirmsontheAmmanStockExchange).GiventhattheglobalneoliberalSSAhasbeencharacterizedbythefinancializationofcapitalandtheconsolidationofatransnationalfinancialcapitalclassmorethananythingelse,Jordan’sopeningofitsbankingsectoralloweditseconomytokeeppacewithglobalchanges,tosatisfythewishesofthattransnationalclass,andtofacilitateitsdomesticbourgeoisie’sintegrationintosuchaclass.Byrestrictingorconditionalizingforeigninvestmentinrealestate,manufacturing,extractiveindustries,communications,andthehospitalitysectors,however,thetransnationalizationoffinancehasnotimpliedthedemiseofJordan’sbusinesselite.Globalintegrationwastherebysteeredsotomakecertainthatthisdomesticbourgeoisiewouldnotbeswallowedanddiscardedbyexternalactorswhoseadvantagesinscalewouldhaveotherwiseledtosuchanoutcome.
235
GraphprovidedbyJordanStrategyForum,ForeignDirectInvestmentinJordan:Shouldwecare?Whyandhow?,Report:2018,p.9
Procedurally,thissubtleprotectionismhasprimarilybeeninstitutionalizedthrough
regulatorymeasuresandsector-specificrestrictionsonFDIinflows.Whilerestrictionsinthe
bankingsectorhavebeenliftedalmostentirely—amovebefittingtheinterestsofinternational
financialcapital—,substantialrestrictions(orconditionalaccess)remaininplacewhenitcomes
torealestate,communications,manufacturing,extractiveindustries,retailcommerce,wholesale
commerce,andengineering.Notonlydotheserestrictionsfunctionsotoprotectmuchoftheold
merchantquotacoterie,agroupwhosebusinessinterestsremaindisproportionallydependent
uponondomesticconsumptionandtheimport-basedcommercialeconomy.Theyalsofunctionso
toforceforeignactorstopartnerwithadomesticoneshouldtheformerwanttoinvestinthe
236
builtenvironment,anareaoftheeconomythatisnowthelifebloodofglobalcapitalism.Thereby
bindingGulfcapital,whichhasaparticularlyacutepropensityforrealestateinvestment,with
domesticdevelopmentmagnates,ahandfulofregime-connectedbuildingcontractors,an
entrepreneurialmilitaryelite(discussednext),andmorepredatiousindividualswithintheRoyal
Courtthroughmegarealestatedevelopment,thecynicaluseofFDIrestrictionshasallowedthe
Palacetodeliverprofitstoallthemembersofitstransnationalcoalition.484Whilethiscoalition-
buildingsimultaneouslyinsurestheeconomy’slong-termunderdevelopment,itisessentialtothe
stabilizationofaccumulationinthehereandnow.
(4)Industrial+InvestmentPolicy:ExportProcessingZones,MegaRealEstateProjects,andMilitary
IndustrialComplex
ThedistributiveeffectsofindustrialandinvestmentpolicyunderKingAbdullahhavebeen
elite-orientedaswell.Theseformsofstateinterventionintheeconomyhavegenerallyadopted
oneoftwoforms.ThefirstIwillconceptualizeaslaissezfaireindustrialpolicy.ThesecondIwill
refertoasmilitarizedindustrialpolicy.
LaissezFaireIndustrialPolicy:ExportProcessingZones,QualifyingIndustrialZones,SpecialEconomicZones,andSpecialDevelopmentZones
484 Whileafewdomesticactorshavebeenalienatedorexcludedfromtheseprocesses—AbuGhazzelehinnew
Abdali—thisformofstateinterventionhasalsobeenextremelyefficaciousinusingcheap,elite-distributedprofitstosolidifytheregime’stransnationalbase.OnetheprimebeneficiarieshasbeentheSaket&LoziContractingCompany.
237
Withthisconceptualization,Imorespecificallyrefertoaseriesofexportprocessingzones
(EPZs)established(orexpanded)overthecourseofthepasttwentyyears.Theorientationof
theseEPZscanbedeemedlaissez-fairetotheextentthattheyprovidefirmsoperatingwithin
theirjurisdictionswithnon-conditionalsubsidiesandinvestmentincentives.485
Laissez-faire,EPZ-basedindustrialpolicyinJordanwasspearheadedbytheEconomic
ConsultativeCouncilinconjunctionwiththeJordanInvestmentBoard(anentitylaterrenamed
theJordanInvestmentCommission).Thesepoliciesbuiltonamodelfirstarticulatedunderthe
QualifyingIndustrialZones(QIZs)initiativethatfollowedJordan’ssigningofapeacetreatywith
IsraeliatWadiArabain1996,andwereinitiallyformalizedundertheInvestmentPromotion
Lawsof2000and2003.486Introducingahistoricaluniqueformofcorporatewelfare,the
InvestmentLawsof2000and2003specificallyestablishedthatallfirmsoperatingacrossa
networkofQIZsanddesignatedindustrialestatesweretobeaffordedatwelveyearsmoratorium
ontaxpayments,fullfreedominrepatriatingcapitalandprofits,exemptionsoncustomsduties
forindustrialinputs,andtaxexemptionsforthesalariesofforeignworkers.487
485 ItshouldbeacknowledgedthattheEPZmodelwasestablishedinJordanpriortoAbdullah’scoronation.Itsfirst
iterationtookshapein1996intheafterglowofJordan’ssigningofapeacetreatywithIsraelatWadiAraba,andwasorganizedaroundaconstellationofQualifyingIndustrialZones(QIZs).
Bytheearly2000s,thirteendifferentQualifyingIndustrialZoneswereinoperation,thevastmajorityofwhichwereactuallyprivatelyownedandoperated.Ononeoccasion,asinglesinglegarmentfactory—Ez-ZayReadyWearandManufacturingCompany—wasitselfdesignatedasaQIZ.Regardlessofownership,however,thegovernmentwouldsubsidizethecostofutilities,communicationsfacilities,andtransportationinfrastructurewithinsuchzones.
See:MarwanKardooshandRiadalKhouri,QualifyingIndustrialZonesandSustainableDevelopmentinJordan,
DraftPaper(2004).486 ManyoftheseestateshadbeenestablishedunderHussein’sleadershipduringthe1980sand1990.487 Infrastructurewithinthesespecialzoneswasalsoprovidedbythestate.
238
Foranumberofreasons,theQIZmodeleventuallyfadedintoobsolescence.Some
concernedtheenduringpoliticalthorninessofthepeaceprocesswithIsrael,whichmade
JordanianfirmsreluctanttopartnerwithIsraelipartnerslesttheysufferapublicshamingor
domesticboycott.MoreimportantlythanthatinprecipitatingthewitheringoftheQIZs,however,
wasJordan’ssigningofitsownbilateralfreetradeagreementwiththeUnitedStatesin2000,a
dealthatalloweddomestic(andinternational)firmstoaccesstheUSmarketwithouthavingto
satisfythecomplexconditionsrelatedtojointproduction.Certainly,thespecialbenefitsthatQIZ
ABriefHistoryofJordan’sQualifyingIndustrialZones AninventionoftheOfficeoftheUSTradeRepresentative,theUSStateDepartment,andtheRegionalBusinessCouncil,QualifyingIndustrialZoneswereintroducedunderthethinkingthattheymightprovideamechanismforincentivizingeconomiccollaborationbetweenIsraelanditstwoArabpartnersinpeace:EgyptandJordan.ThearrangementwaslargelypremisedonthefactthatIsrael,unlikeJordanandEgypt,hadaccesstotheAmericanmarketbyvirtueofthefreetradeagreement(FTA)itsignedwiththeUnitedStatesin1985.UndertheQIZprogram,CongresswouldamendthisFTAsotoextendIsraeli-relatedfreetradestatustogoodsjointlygrown,produced,ormanufacturedbyIsraeliandJordanian-basedfirms.ThissamestatuswastobeextendedtogoodsjointlyproducedbetweenIsraelandtheWestBank/Gaza. Morespecifically,QIZstatusandthetarifffree,quotafreeentrytotheUnitedStatesmarketitimpliedwasdependentuponacomplexlocalcontentrequirement-basedformulawherebyJordan/Israelifirmswouldneedtocollectivelycontribute35%oftheappraisedvalueofagooduponitsexportationtotheUnitedStates.Sotoincentivizecollaborationinparticular,thisaggregatefigureof35%couldbereachedthroughoneofthreemethods,asdetailedbyKardooshandKhouri:(1)Thefirstmethodrequiredthat11.7%ofthelocalcontentrequirementbeprovidedbyJordan,7-8%fromIsrael,andthattheremaining15-16%couldbeprovidedbyJordan,Israel,theWestBank,Gaza,oreventheUnitedStates,(2)ThesecondmethodwouldgrantagoodQIZstatusifanIsraelifirmandaJordanianfirmeachcontributedatleast20%ofthetotalcostofproduction.Ascostsofproductionincludedthepaymentofwages,benefits,andevencostsrelatedtothedepreciationofcapital,itwasnotdifficultforanIsraelifirmtogettothat20%bar(givenitshigherinputprices)evenwereitonlyminimallyinvolvedinthebusinessprocess.(3)Thethirdmethod,finally,requiredsatisfyingsomenon-explicitcombinationofthecontentandproductioncost-basedcriteriaasdeterminedbytheOfficeoftheUSTradeRepresentative(KardooshandKhouri,12-14). Asan(ultimatelyinsufficient)attempttolegislateagainsttheQIZsbeinginstrumentalizedasamechanismforre-exportation,meanwhile,thisarrangementalsostipulatedthatgarmentsandapparelwouldonlyqualifyforQIZstatusweretheirimportedinputssubjectedtotwo“substantialtransformations.”Thoughthismightsoundsignificant,thecuttingandsewingofimportedfabricswouldqualifyastwosuchtransformations(KardooshandKhouri,p.13).
239
statusprovidedvis-a-vislocalcontentrequirements,transformationrequirements,and
productioncostsretainedtheirattractivenessforthere-exportationbusiness.Thatsaid,once
Jordanitselfacquiredindependenttarifffree,customsfree,quotafreeaccesstotheUnitedStates
market—andoncenewinvestmentlawswerepassedsotoextendQIZ-basedsubsidiesandtax
exemptionsintospecialeconomicanddevelopmentzones488—,thosebenefitswerenolonger
quitesospecial.By2012,onlyonequalifyingindustrialzone(inIrbid)wasstillinoperation.
*GraphsprovidedbyRoyalScientificSocietyofJordanandtheFriedrichEbert-StiftungAmmanOffice,TheFutureofJordan’sQualifiedIndustrialZones,Report:2013(p.11)
488 Atthetimeofwriting,therearesixPublicFreeZonesinoperations,thirty-sevenindividualfirmsthathavebeen
grantedthelegalstatus(andstatebenefitscommensuratetothatstatus)ofPrivateFreeZones,andtwogovernmentowneddevelopmentzones(TheDeadSeaDevelopmentZoneandtheAjloun-alSuwwanZone)inoperation.
240
Regardsthatnewlegislation,InvestmentLawNo.30of2014largelyreavowedand
reinstatedtheEPZ-centerednon-conditionalsystemofbenefitsandincentivesonceofferedfirms
withintheQIZs.489Theonlysignificantdifferenceintroducedbythenewlawwastheremovalof
requirementsrelatedtoIsraelipartnersandtheextensionofthesebenefitsintofreshlycoined
SpecialFreeZonesandSpecialDevelopmentZones.Forthosefirmsoperatingwithindesignated
FreeZones,thelawexemptedprofitsgeneratedfromexport-basedandintra-zoneeconomic
activitiesfromincometax;exemptedthesalariesandbonusesofnon-Jordanianstafffromincome
andsocialsservicetax;exemptedthecommoditiesimportedintoandoutofthezonesfromtaxes
andfees;exemptedthebuildingsandconstructionserectedonthelandtheFreeZonefromland
andpropertytax;andremovedallrestrictionsontherepatriationofprofitsandcapital.490Those
firmsoperatingwithintheDevelopmentZones,meanwhile,areaffordeda5%taxrate;an
exemptiononsalestaxforallinputs;exemptionsoncustomsdutiesforallinputs;exemptionson
taxesrelatedtosocialsecurityanddividends;andtheopportunitytobothsignlandleasesofup
toninetyyearsandtoacquirecriticalinfrastructurethroughbuild-operate-transferagreements
(aswasthecasewiththeAirport).491Thesebenefitswereprovidedregardlessofwhetherthe
respectivespecialordevelopmentzonewasprivatelyorpubliclyoperated.
489 BoththeFreeandDevelopmentZonesaregovernedandadministeredbytheJordanianFreeandDevelopment
ZonesBoardofDirectors.490 Inaddition,thosefirmsengagedinindustrialprojectswerealsoofferedanumberofspecialtaxexemptions.491 Forfulldetails,see:
http://www.jfdz.jo/inner/inneren.html?path=BusinessEstablishment&page=Exemptionsincentives_en
241
WhetherspeakingoftheQIZ-eraofthecontemporarySPZ/SDZ-era,theresultsbornefrom
thestate’slaissez-faire,exportprocessingzone-basedindustrialpolicieshavebeenpredictableif
neverthelesstragic.Tobegin,foralleffectsandpurposes,eachversionoftheseEPZshas
functionedprimarilysotofacilitateSouthAsianfirms’re-exportationoflow-sophistication
garments.492ThisissoeveninthecaseofthoseEPZsthathavebeenexplicitlystyledas
492 HavingfoundthemselveslockedoutoftheAmericangarmentsmarketduetoquotasandanti-dumpingrules
(especiallyfollowingthelongdelayedimplementationoftheMultifiberAgreementin2005),Jordan’sEPZswereamajorlifesaverforsuchfirms.
Laissez Faire Industrial Policy and Export Processing Zones Under Abdullah Mostgenerallyspeaking,theJordanianpolicyelitehasapproachedquestionsofindustrialpolicyinamannerlargelyinkeepingwiththemodelsandtheoriesadvocatedforattheWorldBank.LikeBankeconomists,Jordanianplannershaveconsistentlyassertedthatpolicyfailureisbothendemicandimmanenttoanystateinterventionthatisprotectionist,vertical,orpriceaffectinginnature(see:MinistryofPlanningandInternationalCooperation,TheNationalSocialandEconomicDevelopmentPlan,p.198);thisbeingthecase,theyhavealsoassumedthatpoliciesofthiskindwouldgeneratelevelsofeconomicinefficiencies,corruption,andwastethatwouldunderminetheeconomy’scapacitytosuccessfullycompetewithininternationalmarkets. FollowingfromclaimscontainedintheBank’stheoreticalconstructs,JordanianplannershavealsoassumedthatFDIinflows,incombinationwithprivatedomesticinvestment,wouldbesufficienttomakeupforthe(prioritized)declineinpublicinvestmentthatwouldbeforthcomingduetofiscalconsolidation-relatedimperatives. Finally,Jordanianpolicyplanshavegenerallytendedtoassume(asmanyBankeconomistsoncedid)thatunencumbered,unrestrictedforeigndirectinvestment(FDI)inflowswilldeliver,automaticallyandbytheirownaccord,thesortoftechnologicalupgrading,knowledgetransfer,andmodernizationofindustryneededfortheJordanianeconomytosuccessfulintegrateintoglobalcircuitsofproductionandtrade.Inotherwords,theyhaveassumedthatnoconditionsneedbeplacedonthevariousformsofstateaidthatareofferedtoforeigninvestorsacrossthecountry’sexportprocessingzonesandspecialeconomiczonesinordertoinsurethatthoseactorsdo,indeed,transfertechnologies,trainlocalworkers,andengageinotherkindsofdevelopmentallybeneficialinvestment.ThisassumptionwasfundamentallymisguidedandofdisastrousconsequencefortheJordanianeconomy.
242
technologyincubators,suchastheCyberCityITPark.Byconsequence,thecomplexityofJordan’s
exportbaskethasactuallydeclinedduetothestate’slaissezfaireindustrialpolicies,whichgoesa
longwaytowardsexplainingthecountry’sworseningtermsoftradeunderAbdullah.Whatis
more,byvirtueofthefactthatSouthAsianinvestmentintoJordan’sEPZsisfootlooseandnon-
capitalintensiveinnature—andbyvirtueofthefactthatthisinvestmentisallocatinginto
sunsettingindustriesthatoperateaccordingtotraditional,lowskillmanufacturingtechniques—,
theEPZshavealsoprovidedlittleinthewayoftechnologytransferandhumancapital
development.493
Inaddition,asthetermsoftheinvestmentlawsdescribedearlierexemptindustrialinputs
fromcustoms’duties,itisalsoworthnotingthattheforeigngarmentmanufacturerswho
populatetheEPZshavehadnoneedtobuildupwardanddownwardlinkagestodomestic
suppliersandmanufacturers.494Thisbeingthecase,theirbusinesses—andtheEPZecosystem
Someevidenceofthepreponderanceofre-exportation,atthepeakofitsoperations,theJordanDepartmentof
Statisticsestimatedthatintermediateimports(i.e.importedinputs)constituted58.5%ofthetotalvalueofgoodsbeingexportedfromtheal-DulaylQIZ.
493 RoyalScientificSocietyetal(2013),pp.23-24.494 RoyalScientificSocietyetal(2013),pp.21-22. GiventhatJordan,unlikeEgypt,isnotaproducerofanyoftheinputs(likecotton)thatthisgarmentbased-trade
reliesupon,therewasnevergoingtobemuchopportunityforbuildingverticalintegrationtothedomesticeconomy.
Whatisworse,however,byvirtueofthefactthatJordan’sendogenousresourcebase(i.e.itslackofcotton)itself
wastherebyinsufficientforattractingandretainingthiskindofinvestment,theonlywaytokeepgarmentmanufacturinginJordanwastocontinuesubsidizinginfrastructure,tocontinuegrantingtaxexemptions,andtocontinueprovisioningaccesstotheUSmarket(FutureofJordan’sQIZs,p.7).Asaresult,theQIZ-basedindustrialstrategyallowedSouthAsianfootlooseinvestmentincredibleleverage,asallthesefirmseverneededtodowastoalludetotheprospectofcapitalflight(toEgypt,perhaps)inordertoensurethattheJordaniangovernmentwouldrenewthesesubsidiesandtaxexemptions(andtoensurethatitwouldcontinuetolargelyignorethelaborabusethatwassorampantinthosefirms’factories).
243
moregenerally—havebeenallowedtoremainwhollydisarticulatedfromtherestofthedomestic
economyacrossthedurationoftheirtimeinJordan,therebygeneratingnexttonothingwhenit
cametoindirectpositiveexternalitiesaswell.Tomakemattersevenworse,thelow
sophisticationmanufacturingenterprisesthatdominatethemajorityofJordan’sEPZsalso
employexceedinglyfewJordanians—andsubjectthehandfulofJordanianstheydoemployto
extremelylowwagesandpoorworkingconditions.495Intheaggregatethen,apartfromsecuring
healthyprofitsforinternationalallies(allies,itshouldbesaid,whoimmediatelyandfreely
repatriatetheircapital),theeconomicandsocialcontributionoftheregime’sEPZ-based
industrialpoliciesiseffectivelynegligible.Whenoneconsidersopportunitycost,laissezfaire
industrialpolicylikelytakesmorefromthetablethanitadds.Todate,thesezoneshaveyielded
virtuallynothinginthewaysoftechnologicaltransfers,industrialupgrading,forwardor
backwardlinkagestootherpartsoftheeconomy,clusteringeffects,andtaxrevenues,andhave
degradedthediversityorsophisticationofthecountry’sexportbasketaswell.496
495 Indeed,despitetheMinistryofLaboritselffinancingthetrainingoflocalworkers—apolicyundertakenwiththe
hopethatJordanianswouldfillthelow-skilljobsonofferbythesegarmentmanufacturers—littleprogresswaseverultimatelymadeinthedomainofdomestically-orientedjobcreation.ThiswasbecausesimultaneoustoMoLsefforts,thestatewasexpeditingthegrantingofworkvisasforforeignworkersattherequestofthegarmentmanufacturers,whopreferredtoimporttheirworkforceasmuchastheydidtheirinputs.ForthoseJordaniansthatwereluckyenoughtosecureajob,moreover,apopulationthatwasdisproportionatelyfemale,theywouldbebeaffordedabusiveworkingconditions,negligibleopportunitiesforupwardmobility,and“non-existent”skilldevelopmentfortheirtrouble.
496 See:KardooshandalKhouri(2004),pp.4-7;RoyalScientificSocietyetal(2013),pp.12-13;JomanaAmara,
“Militaryindustrializationandeconomicdevelopment:Jordan’sdefenseindustry”,ReviewofFinancialEconomics(17),2008,pp.136-140.
244
QIZPerformance:JobCreationandExportSophistication497
Ifanunmitigateddevelopmentalfailure,oneshouldnotnecessarilygoontoassumethat
theregime’slaissez-faireindustrialpolicieshavethereforecontributednothingtothe
stabilizationofJordan’scapitalismofcrisis.Tothecontrary,Ibelievethesepolicieshavehelped
consolidatethisaccumulation(andthewiderSSAthatinstitutionalizesit)intwodistinctways.
First,Jordan’sexportprocessingzoneshaveunambiguouslyexpedited(andsubsidized)profits
foranumberofregimeallies.Ofthesematerialbeneficiaries,oneneedconsidertherent-
extractingadministratorsandboardmembersthatoverseetheconstellationofspecialeconomic
anddevelopmentzonesinoperationinthecontemporaryperiodasmuchasthegarmentfirms
usingtheEPZstore-exporttheirproductintotheUnitedStates.Regardlessofthelong-term,
developmentallydestructivenatureoftheprofitsandrentsthatalltheseactorsareclaiming,in
theshort-term,theykeeptheeconomyturningoverwhilealsointegratingnewnetworksof
497 GraphsprovidedbyRoyalScientificSocietyetal(2013),pp.12-13
245
economicactorsintoarelationshipofco-dependencyvis-a-vistheHashemiteregime.Second,
oneneedalsoacknowledgetheideologicaleffectgeneratedbythestate’slaissezfaireindustrial
policies.Notwithstandingthedeficienciesandstructuralnaivetethatareessentialtothelaissez
fairepoliciesjustdescribed,theyareneverthelessdrawndirectlyfromthecollectivecommon
senseoftheinternationaldevelopmentcommunity.Byimplementingthem,then,theregimeis
abletoperformitsideologicalproprietyfortheinternationalcommunity.Therebyhelpingensure
thatAbdullahetalstayinthegoodgracesofJordan’svariouspatronsandcreditors—actorswho
canthenbecountedontostepinwithcapitalinjectionswhenevertheeconomy’sflirtationswith
crisisdrifttoofar—,theideologicalfruitsoftheselaissezfaireindustrialpoliciesalsohelps
stabilizethewiderSSA,ifindirectlyso.
246
ANeoliberalMilitaryIndustrialComplex
Lastbuthardlyleastamongstthestate/Palace’selite-orientedinterventionsinthe
economyareitseffortsinbuildinga(neoliberal)militaryindustrialcomplex.Whileitshouldbe
acknowledgedattheoutsetthatthemilitary’sfirstforaysintocommercialpracticesactually
precededthecoronationofAbdullah,itwasthecurrentKing’sactivepromotionofmilitary
OmarRazzazandJordan’sExportProcessingZones TheissuesbasictotheseexportprocessingzoneshavenotgoneunnoticedbyallJordan’spolicyplanners.WhatIcallthecountry’sneoliberalleft—asegmentofthepolicyeliteledbyOmarRazzaz,thePrimeMinisteratthetimeofwriting—hasinfactbeenquitecriticalofEPZ-basedindustrialpolicy.Razzaz’sNationalEmploymentStrategy:2011-2020,writtenwhilehewasworkingattheMinistryofLabor,subjectsthesepoliciestoawitheringcritique. Censuringthegovernment’senclave-centeredregimeofinvestmentincentives,taxholidaysandtaxexemptionsaswhollycounterproductive,thisdocumentarguesthatthelowvalueindustriessupportedintheenclavesgeneratelittlejobcreationandTFPgains,whilealsopointingoutthefollyinherenttothisstrategy’ssupportforfirmsthatcompetenotonthebasisofproductivityandinnovationbutinsteadonthebasisofimplicitsubsidies(i.e.taxbreaksaswellassubsidiesonwater,land,andenergy),artificialcostadvantages,andthetemporaryspecialtreatmentaffordedthemincertainforeignmarkets(inthecaseofgarmentsandtheUnitedStates).DemonstratingthatthefirmssupportedintheQIZsandSEZsreceiveanotherimplicitsubsidythroughtheirabilitytoaccesscheap,unskilledforeignlabor—thegarmentindustrywasevenaffordedanexemptiontotheincreaseintheminimumwagethathadbeenlegislatedin2007(Nesheiwat,p.385)--,theauthorsalsodirectlyconnectthesemisguidedindustrialpoliciestotheenduringjobscrisisfacingJordaniancitizens.Implicatingtheenclave-basedindustrialstrategyinJordan’swiderfailuretotransitiontoaknowledgeeconomyaswell,theauthorsmakethecasethatthestate’ssupportforthesefirms,inconjunctionwithitsinabilityorunwillingnesstonurtureenterprisesthatgeneratehigh-skilljobs,hasactuallyimpliedadegradationofthecountry’shumancapitalstock:Jordan’screativeclassisforcedtoheadtotheGulfinsearchofworkwhilelowskilledlaborflowsinfromEgyptanddepressesthebottomendofthewagestructureevenfurther(seep.46-48,60-61,85).Whilethedocumentcallsforachangeinpolicy—thoughacceptingthatJordan’soptionsarerestrictedbythestate’slimitedfiscalspaceaswellasbytherestrictionsincumbentuponsmallopeneconomiesmoregenerally,followingRodrik,Chang,andmanyothers,NationalEmploymentstillcallsforstateinterventionswellbeyondwhatissanctionedbytheBank,stumpingforgovernmentmeasurestohelppushinvestmentintoR+DandmeasurestohelpJordandefyitsstaticcomparativeadvantage—andthoughitmakesreferencetocorporatist,bottom-upindustrialpolicy,itprecipitatedlittlechangeinthestate’sapproach.Indeed,despitethesecritiques—anddespiteRazzazhimselfbeingnamedPrimeMinisterin2018—thestate’sEPZbasedindustrialpolicyrunsthesameasitalwayshas.
247
entrepreneurialismthatisalmostentirelyresponsibleforthisindustrialcomplex’ssprawling
contemporaryform.498
Institutionally,Abdullah’smilitarizedindustrialpolicytookshapebeginningin1999and
upontheestablishmentoftheKingAbdullahIIDesignandDevelopmentBureau(KADDB).
Chargedwithproviding“acatalystforthecreationofanindependent,sustainable,defense
industrialbase”,theKADDBisorganizedasanautonomous,opaque,andPalace-alignedentity
operatingbothwithinandoutsideofthestate.499TheKADDB’sBoardofDirectors—ledbythe
ChairmanoftheJointChiefsofStaff—,forinstance,reportsdirectlytotheKing’sprivateoffices;it
financesitsautonomousoperations,meanwhile,bydrawinguponbothearnedincomeand
specialallocationsearmarkedfromwithintheJordanianArmedForce’sannualbudget.500
Initially,theKADDB’soperationswereseparatedacrosstwoindependentbusinessgroups.
Thefirst,theEngineeringGroup,wastaskedwithdevelopingtechnologiesandproductstobe
solddomestically(i.e.backtotheJordanianArmedforces)andinternationally.Thesecond,the
CommercialOperationsGroup,wasdelegatedthetaskofmarketingandsales.Whilethesetwo
groupsweresuccessfulinbuildingoutthefoundationsoftheKADDB’sbusiness,itwasnotuntil
theemergenceoftheKADDBInvestmentGroupafewyearslaterthatAbdullah’smilitary
498 AsAmara(2008)hasdocumented,thefoundationofthemilitaryasabusinessactorcanbetracedtothe
establishmentoftheRoyalMaintenanceCorporations(RMC)intheearly1990s.“Chargedwithmaintenance,overhaul,andlimitedupgradesofequipment”,theRMCprimarilyengagedinlowleveldesignandrepairandworkedprimarilywitharmoredvehiclesandpersonnelcarriers(p.141).
499 See:ShanaMarshall,“Jordan’smilitary-industrialcomplexandtheMiddleEast’snewmodelarmy,MiddleEast
Report(267),2013,pp.43. TheabovequotewasonegivenbyShadiMajali,formerChairmanoftheKADDB.500 Formoredetails,see:Amara(2008),p.141
248
industrialcomplexacquireditscurrentscaleanddiversityofoperations.501Swiftlyfollowingthe
InvestmentGroup’sarrivalonthescene,morethanfifteenjointventureswouldbeagreedtowith
avarietyofdomesticandforeignpartners.Amongstthemostrelevantofitsinternational
partners,theKADDBhasdevelopedparticularlycloserelationshipswiththeUAE-basedBinJabr
group,oneoftheMiddleEast’slargestarmsdealers.502
Acrossitsexpansionandconsolidation,theKADDBhasreceivedconsiderablestate
support.Beyondbenefitingfrompreferentialtreatmentinthemilitary’sprocurementprocess
andinadditiontothepublic’sfinancingofitsmarketingeffortsanditsbiannualdefense
exhibition(SOFEX),KADDBaffiliatedbusinessesarealsoaffordedthesameseriesoftax
exemptionsandsubsidiesasareprovidedinJordan’sSpecialEconomicZones.Whenitcomesto
theBureauitself,moreover,itsoperationsarelocatedinanIndustrialParkwhoseinfrastructure
hasbeenfinancedthroughthestatecoffersandwhosevariouslaboratoriesandtestingfacilities
arealsosubsidizedbythedefensebudget.503
501 Ibid502 Marshall(2013),p.43503 Marshall(2013),p.44.
250
RegardingtheeconomiceffectsofthePalace’smilitarizedindustrialpolicyefforts,one
wouldhavetoacknowledgethattheKADDBhasgeneratedconsiderabletechnologicaltransfers,
particularlyinthedomainofIT.505Thatsaid,asistypicalforallmilitary-basedeffortsofthiskind,
505 See:Amara(2008),p.143. Withthepost-ArabUprisingsperiodseeingapartialmovementfromautocrat-ledregionalconflict—andthe
heavyweaponryneededforwagingsuchconflicts—toautocrat-leddomesticrepressionoperations,thedemandforsurveillanceequipment,riotcontrolequipmentandthelikehavegrownconsiderably.Havingtransitionedtoagreaterfocusongoodsandservicesrelatedtointernalpolicinginrecentyears,KADDBhascapitalizedonthese
TheKADDBandOffsetAgreements GiventhatmuchofJordan’smilitarybudgetis,foralleffectsandpurposes,giftedbytheUnitedStates,inbuildingitsminiempire,theKADDBhashadlessopportunitiesforarrangingoffsettingagreementswithitsmilitarysuppliersthanistypical.AprinciplethatwouldbewellappliedinJordan’sotherindustrialplanningventures,offsetsconditionaprocurementcontractwithaforeignarmscorporationonsaidcorporation’sestablishmentofcollaborative,jointinvestmentswiththehostcountry.Inotherwords,inexchangeforsellingJordan’sArmedForcesF-16fighterjets,aforeignfirmwouldneedtooffsetthesecostsbyalsosettingupcollaborativemanufacturingprojectswithJordan’sfledglingmilitaryindustrialcomplex(Marshall,42). WhileithasnotbeenpossibleforJordantolegislateoffsetsasauniversalconditionfordoingbusinessinthemilitary/securitysector,andwhileestablishingsucharrangementsisnotpossibleinthecaseofcontractswithUS-basedcompanies—themoneypayingforsaidcontractshascomefromUStaxpayersinthefirstplace;itwouldbepoliticallyunfeasibletoimposeconditionsonthosefirmsasaresult—thePalacehasnonethelessbeenabletoleveragebothitshealthy,US-financedmilitarybudgetandthecountry’saccessandproximitytomanyoftheregion’sreactionarymonarchiessotoinducenon-Americanfirmsintooffsettingstyledagreements.Theseagreementshavetypicallyoperatedinthefollowingmanner:inexchangeforprocuringacontractforthesaleofF-16sorKA-226HelicopterstotheJordaniangovernment,thefirmwinningsaidcontractagreestoestablishin-country,jointlyoperatedmaintenancefacilitiesforthoseproducts(Ibid).Bythesemeans,asof2013,KADDB’sjointventureswithforeignpartnersalonehadgrowntotwenty-six(Ibid).
251
ithasfailedtodeliveranythinginthewayofbackwardorforwardlinkagesvis-a-visthecivilian
economy.Thoughthismaypartiallybeafunctionofthecountry’snarrowindustrialbase,itis
problematicallthesame,especiallygiventheconsiderablepublicinvestmentofresourcesthat
havegoneintotheKADDB.LikeisthecasewithJordan’slaissezfaireindustrialpolicies,the
KADDBhasalsohadanegligibleimpactwhenitcomestojobcreation.Thoughprovidingwell-
paidworkopportunitiesforthatsegmentofthemilitary’workforcethatishighinskilland
education,asof2005,theKADDBhadjust1300peopleonitspayroll.506Finally,oneneedalso
notethatthegovernment’soutlaysontheKADDB’sbudgethavegeneratedasmallereffecton
GDPthanhaveconsumption-orientedformsofgovernmentspending.507
TurningtotheKADDB’selite-orientedeffects,however,oneseesafardifferentpicture.
GrantedprivilegedstandingastheJordanianArmedForce’sweaponsdealerofchoice,insulated
fromoversight,andsubsidizedbytaxpayers,theBureauhasunsurprisinglyprovidedanoutlet
forrentseekingamongstthemilitary’seducated,skilled,andideologicallyneoliberal.Ithasalso
givenhosttolessobliqueformsofcorruption.AhandfulofmembersfromtheKADDBboardof
directors,forinstance,havebeenchargedwithextractingkickbacksfromthevariousjoint
venturesthattheBureauoversees.Allegationsthatrevenuesmeanttofinancemilitarypensions
shiftingtradewindsandmovedtowardstheproductionofthesekindoftechnologicallysophisticatedproductsinparticular.
506 Ibid,p.142507 Thistooiskeepingwithexpectationsofthosewhohavestudiedmilitaryindustrializationwithindeveloping
countries.Suchresearchershaveaccumulatedsignificantempiricalevidenceshowingthatdefenseexpendituresexertasignificantlysmallereffectongrowthandjobcreationthandoconsumption-orientedformsofspending,regardlessoftheshortcomingsthatarebasictothelatterformofexpendituresaswell.
See:JurgenBrauerandJohnTepperMarlin,“Convertingresourcesfrommilitarytonon-militaryuses”,JournalofEconomicPerspectives(6:4),1992,pp.145-164.
252
andwageraiseshavebeenredirectedintothepocketsofindividualofficersassociatedwiththe
KADDB’sleadershiphavealsobeenleveled.508Thissecondallegation,infact,playedasignificant
roleinprecipitatingtherevoltofthemilitaryveteransin2011.AkramAbuHamdan,acloseally
oftheKing,hasbeenimplicatedinmuchofthis,ashastheformerChairmanShadiMajali.509
Mawared
IhavealreadyintroducedthesecondwingoftheJordanianmilitaryindustrialcomplex
(andsomeofthisorganization’sdepravities)inthecontextofthepreviouschapter.Torecap,
Mawared—ortheNationalResourcesInvestmentandDevelopmentCorporation—,asister
projectcalledtheDevelopmentandInvestmentProjectsFund(DIP),andathirdplanningbody
namedtheUrbanWorkshopwerealllegallyestablishedaspartofthemassacreofprovisional
legislationthattheKingetaldictatedduringthefirstyearsofthenewmillenium.Thougheachof
theseneworganizationswasnominallyplacedunderthejurisdictionofthealreadyautonomous
KADDB,inpractice,theywerealltobepersonallydirectedbytheaforementionedAkramAbu
Hamdan,whowashimselfacloseassociateoftheKing.510MuchliketheKADDB,Mawaredwas
thereforeapetprojectoftheKingandhisRoyalCourtfromtheverystart.UnliketheKADDB,
508 Formoreonthis,see:Al-ArabNewsEditorialStaff,“BigcorruptioninMawared...whythefearthatcorruptionwill
implicatethegovernment”,January27,2012.Availableat:http://www.alarrabnews.com/newsView.php?id=34278
509 Debruyne(2013),p.247510 Ibid
253
however,thissecondautonomousentitywasconjurednotforthepurposeofarmsproductionand
distribution,butrather,forthepurposeofimplementinganumberofurbandevelopment
projectsthenbeingplannedforinAqaba,Amman,Zarqa,andattheDeadSea.Havingbeen
unilaterallyassignedthelegaltitlesforvastswathsofpubliclandpreviouslydesignatedasarmy
sites,Mawaredunsurprisinglyexertedagreatdealofinfluenceonthedirectiontheseprojects
took.
IhavealreadydiscussedthenatureofMawared’soperationsandbusinessinthecontext
ofAmman’surbanrenewalaswellasinthecontextofAqaba’sspeculativeboom.Mostsimplyput,
theorganization’sbusinessmodelhingesonitscapacitytoexchangepubliclandspreviouslyused
formilitarypurposesforastakeintheprivatedevelopmentsthataretobesubsequentlybuilton
thoselands.HowMawaredcametoholdthelegaldeedsforthesepubliclandsinthefirstplace,of
course,ishighlysuspect.Regardless,throughtheseexchanges,theorganizationhasbeenableto
insinuateitselfintotheracketandspeculationdrivingthetransformationofJordan’sbuilt
environment—andthetransformationofJordaniancapitalismaswell.511
MawaredwascapitalizedontheLuxemburgstockexchangeatavaluationof$1billionin
2007.FollowingthemanyscandalswithASEZAandNewAbdaliduringthe2008-2011period,
however,thecompanyreturnedtoprivateownership.512Itschairmanatthetimeofwritingis
BishirJardaneh,andtherestofitsboardofdirectorssimilarlyreadsasalistoftheneoliberal,
511 Ibid,p.320512 Similarly,whiletheaforementionedDIPFundhadpreviouslytradedontheLondonstockexchange,ittooisno
longerlistedthere,anditswebsiteisnolongerinoperation.
254
Palace-affiliatedmilitaryelite.513Despitebeingplaguedbycredibleandobviouschargesof
corruptionfromthestart—andthoughIhavepreviouslydetailedhowthelargerreal-estate
basedgriftbeingperpetuatedbythePalace,Mawared,andthetransnationalcapitalelitecameto
beoneoftheprincipalgrievancesdrivingtheprotestsof2011—,tothisday,Mawaredremains
oneofthelargestrealestatecompaniesinthecountry.
Conclusion
Iftheinstitutionalizationofaninsulated,elite-dominatedmodalityofpoliticsand
policymakinglaiddownthejuridicalfoundationsforcontemporaryJordaniancapitalism,the
institutionalizationofveryparticularformsofmass-orientedandelite-orientedstate
interventionintheeconomyfunctionedsotobulwarkthosefoundations.Materiallyarticulating
andsubstantiatingthemisguidedideasandstrategiesthatwereinitiallydevelopedinthepolitical
domainoftheSSA,thissystemofeconomicinterventionismconsolidatesanddeepensthecrisis
tendenciesandclassbiasesofcapitalaccumulationtoday.
AsIhopethischapterhasmadeclear,fromtax,fiscal,andwelfarepolicytoindustrialand
investmentpolicy,Abdullah’sinterventionismhasrewiredmanyofthestabilizationmechanisms
thathadpreviouslyheldsocietyandpoliticaleconomytogetherunderhisfather.Whilethe
currentsystemofinterventiondoesexhibitsomestabilizingproperties—specifically,through
generatingsuitableprofitsforatransnationaleliteand,toalesserextent,throughprovidinga
513 Fortheinstitution’sleadership,see:https://mawared.jo/Pages/viewpage.aspx?pageID=28
255
basiclevelofwelfareforcertainelementswithintheworkingclass—,theyarefarlessefficacious
thanthoseinplaceduringthe1973-1986period.Due,inparticular,totheretreat(bothin
magnitudeandreach)ofthestate’smass-orientedinterventions,millionsofJordaniansnowlead
highlyprecariouslives.Withlittlerecoursevis-a-visthestate—whetherinregardsto
employmentoraccesstoasocialsafetynet—,thisprecariousnessinturninjectsabasic,
inalienablelevelofvolatilityintothewiderSSAtoday.Whilesocialcontrolstrategiesand
ideologicalinterventionsaretypicallysufficientinensuringthatthisvolatilitydoesnottranslate
intofullyrealizedsocialupheaval,theycannotreducetheriskofexistential-typechallengestothe
politicalsystem(orthesystemofcapitalaccumulation)downtozero.Solongastheselevelsof
deprivationanduncertaintyremainashighastheyare,then,fragilitywillremaininternalto
whateverformofstabilitymighttemporarilyprevailinJordan.
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CHAPTEREIGHT
Institutionalizingoligarchy:JordanianmarketcompetitionunderAbdullah
Byvirtueoftheelite-orientedinterventionsintheeconomythatweredescribedinthe
previouschapter—inconjunction,ofcourse,withJordan’suniquehistoryofclassformation—,
thischapterwillshowhowanoligarchic,non-competitiveformofmarketcompetitionhasbeen
institutionalizedandconsolidatedunderKingAbdullah.Demonstrativeofhowthedifferent
domainsofanintegratedSSAinterpenetrateandco-imbricate,Iwilldetailhowhollowed,elite-
dominatedmarketstructuresdepriveJordaniancapitalismofdynamismandcreativeenergy—
furtherconsolidatingthecrisistendenciesoftheeconomyandfurtherundercuttinglong-term
developmentprospectsintheprocess.
MyanalysisofJordanianmarketcompetitionwillbebrokenintofoursections.Inthefirst,
Iwillreviewthemodalityofstate-capitalrelationsestablishedunderAbdullahanddiscusshow
thisrelatestotheconsolidationofJordan’soligarchicmarkets.Insectiontwo,Iwilllinkclass
historytotoday’smarketcompetition,foregroundinghowthefracturingandhierarchizingofthe
capitalistclassalsoinformssub-optimalmarketperformance.Insectionthree,Iwillbriefly
discussthefinancializationoftheeconomyandhowthehegemonyoffinancialcapitalsimilarly
contributestotheeconomy’snon-competitivemarkets.Insectionfour,finally,Iwilldisaggregate
theeconomyonasectorbysectorbasis,usingaquantitativeanalysistomapmarketstructures
anddelineatetheoligopolisticpropertiesofcontemporarycompetition.
257
(1)State-CapitalandIntracapitalRelationsunderAbdullah
Despitethebesteffortsoftheinternationalcommunity,attemptsatformalizingand
rationalizingbusiness-staterelationsinJordanhaveyettocometomuch.Thoughahostof
businessassociationsweremidwifedintoexistenceduringthe1990sand2000s—associations,it
washoped,thatmightmorefairly,efficiently,andtransparentlyrepresenttheprivatesectorinits
The World Bank and Market Competition (post-Arab Uprisings) ThedearthofcompetitionevincedbyJordan’smarketeconomyhas,ofcourse,attractedagreatdealofattentionrecently.HastenedbytherupturethatwastheArabUprisings,theWorldBankinparticularhasrediscoveredSchumpeteriananalysisandputagreatemphasisonthosevariablesandprocessesimpedingmarketdrivencreativedestructionintheMiddleEast.Inthepost-2011period,analystsattheBankhaveconsistentlyexpoundedontheimplicitsubsidies,protections,andbenefitsthathadbeenofferedtopoliticallyconnectedfirmsacrossthepasttwodecadesandarguedthattheseprivilegeshaveallowedsaidfirmstodominatemarketsbasedonartificial,cost-basedadvantages.Byemptyingmarket-basedcompetitionofthecreativedestructionitrequiresinordertogeneratejobs,growth,innovation,productivitygains,andgrowth,Bankeconomistshavepositedthatthesefirms—ratherthanthepublicsectorworkersofyesteryear—weretheprimaryspoilerunderminingeconomicliberalization(see:SyedAkhtarMahmoodandMeriemAitAliSlimane,Privilege-ResistantPoliciesintheMiddleEastandNorthAfrica:MeasurementandOperationalImplications(Washington,DC:WorldBank,2018). TheBank’sevolutiononthesemattersshouldbecelebrated,offeringanindicationthattheinstitutionisbeginningtoasksomeoftherightquestionswhenitcomestodevelopmentintheglobalsouth.Nolongermystifyingtheregion’sstagnationunderneoliberalreformandnolongerpositingthisunderperformanceasafunctionofeitherlabormarketrigiditiesorofincumbentsandtheircorruptiveinfluenceonthereformprocess,Bankeconomistshaveatlonglastturnedthefocustowardscapitalitselfandthecronyistformationsithasconsolidated.Thatsaid,theBank’swritingsoncompetitivenessleaveagreatdealtobedesired.Tobegin,discussionsofcronyismhavetendedtobeframedintheabstract.Theremightbeallusionstowardsthecorruptionsoflargefirmsandtheremightbevaguecondemnationsofunnamednetworksofprivilegethatexploitpoliticalconnectionssotosecurefavors,monopolyrights,and(implicitorexplicit)subsidies;generallyinsightfulastheseremarksare,however,theystopwellshortofanynamingofnames,firms,actors,andinstitutions.GiventhatdecadesofpriorwritingsattheBankwouldleadareadertoassumethatthebigfirmsbeingcritiquedcorrespondtotheoldstateownedenterprises(anassumptionallowingtheprivatecorruptionsofquotacoterietypestoskatebyunnoticed),thisrefusaltoimplicateJordan’swestern-leaningcompradorsinthesuffocationofmarketcompetitionemptiesthediscourseofthesubstantivecontentitneeds.
258
dealingswiththestatewhilealsomorecapablypartneringwiththestateasitliberalizedthe
economyanddirecteddevelopmentpolicy—,theseorganizationshavewounduplargely
ineffectualifnotirrelevant.514
514 Zimmerman(2017),pp.153-154.
ForeignInvolvementintheConstructionofJordanianBusinessAssociations Amongstthemanyinterventionsundertakenbytheinternationalcommunity’sinpost-1989Jordan,itseffortsinorganizingJordanianbusinessassociationshavebeenoneofthemostconsistent(Zimmerman,2017,pp.153-155).Befittingtheneoliberalstylethatmoregenerallyinveststheforeigninterferenceofthiscommunityinthepresentday,boardroomactivismhasalwaysbeenpresentedasbothapoliticalandeconomicallynecessary.Havingassertedthatarobustandcohesiveprivatesectoriscapableof(andinterestedin)guidingapolicyprocesspreviouslysulliedbytheincompetenceandcorruptionofstateplannersintodirectionsconducivenotonlytocorporateinterestsbutaggregatesocialwelfare,healthybusinessassociationsare,infact,promotedassomethingofasinequanonwhenitcomestomoderndevelopment.Asthisconnectstoapoliticism,giventhemodalityoftechnocracyjustsketched,itholdsthatmobilizingandorganizingcapitalsothatitmayactasaclassforitselfisnotconceivedofasaformofpoliticalmeddlingbutasaformofeconomicsupport.Similarly,italsoholdsthatthedenigrationoflaborunions—forinstance,byceaselesslycastingthemasincumbentspecialinterestspoisedtoundermine(universallybeneficent)structuralreformsotoservetheirparticularistinterests,astheWorldBankandUSStateDepartmenthavebeenwanttodo—bedepictedasrationalist,economisticcommentary. OfalltheforeignactorsinvolvedinthebuildingofJordanianbusinessassociationsandinthequietclassprojectdescribedabove,USAidhaslikelyplayedthebiggestrole(BlueCarroll,270).Intheearlyyearsofthe1990s,itsinterventionswereprimarilyoperationalizedthroughthePrivateEnterpriseTechnicalResourcesAssistanceProject(PETRA).OfPETRA’snumerousprogramsandinterventions,it’smidwifingoftheJordanTradeAssociationandAmmanWorldTradeCenterbestepitomizethesubjectmaterialbeingdiscussedatpresent.Asofthelate1990s,PETRAwouldbesucceededbyasecondUSAidprogramtitledtheAchievementofMarket-FriendlyInitiativesandResults,orAMIR.Dispensing$946,000totheAmmanChamberofCommerce,theAmmanChamberofIndustry,theAmmanWorldTradeCenter,theBusinessandProfessionalWomenClub,theJordanTradeAssociation,andtheYoungEntrepreneur’sAssociation,itcouldbearguedthatAMIR’sfinancialresourcesunderwrotewhatlimitedachievementswereseenintheformalizationofbusinesslobbyingduringtheseyears(BlueCarroll,2001,pp.243,270-271).InadditiontoAid’scontributions,finally,itisworthnotingthattheWorldBankhelpedfundandorganizetheJordanEconomicDevelopmentAssociation,athinktank-lobbyingfirmdesignatedtopushtheliberalizationagendaaswell.
259
Thegenealogyofthesefailuresinformalizationtracesbacktomuchearlierprocessesof
classandstateformation.Ashasbeendetailed,theseprocessesallowedanelitefractionofthe
Jordanianbourgeoisietoestablishandsubsequentlymaintainahegemonicintraclassposition
acrossthedecades.UponAbdullah’sascendancytothethrone,thispositionwasusedto
reconsolidateinformalchannelsofcommunicationandlobbying—channelsconnectingthese
individualsdirectlytothePalaceanditseconomizedpoliticaleliteandchannelswhich,ipsofacto,
renderedformalizationeffortsimmediatelyhollow.515Beyondundercuttingformalizationinthis
manner,itshouldbenotedthatJordan’soldmoneyalsomanagedtoestablishcontroloverthose
formalbusinessassociationsthatdidachieveamodicumofinfluencewithinthepolicyplanning
processduringtheliberalizationperiod.FirstamongsttheseorganizationsistheJordan
Businessmen’sAssociation(JBA).Atthetimeofwriting,HamdiTaba’a(Sr.),scionofthecountry’s
traditionaleconomicelite,isPresidentoftheJBA.TheAssociation’sboard(inclusiveofhonorary
515 Formoreonthis,see:Moore(2004),BlueCarroll(2001),Chapters5-11. BusinessmenlockedoutoftheformalandinformalnetworksandorganizationsthroughwhichtheAmmanielite
articulatetheirdemandshaveattemptedtomobilizetheircollectiveintereststhroughestablishingbothregionalchambersandsector-specificsyndicates.ThemostrelevantoftheseregionalbodiesaretheIrbidChamberofCommerce(http://www.icc.org.jo/index.php?l=en&pg=T1VSIENIQU1CRVI=),theZarqaChamberofCommerce(http://www.zarqachamber.org/index.php?lang=ar),andtheAqabaChamberofCommerce;Rusaifeh,AlSalt,Jerash,Ramtha,alKarak,Ma’an,Ajloun,Mafraq,andMadaba’srespectiveChambersofCommerceareallmorelocalinnature.
Asregardsthesyndicates—thevastmajorityofwhichparticipateintheAmmanChamberofCommerce—smaller
associationsandorganizationssuchastheGeneralAssociationforFoodstufsMerchantsandtheGeneralSyndicateofofProprietorsofGoldsmithandJewelryTradeFirmsengagemostlyinsingleissue,relativelyineffectuallobbying.ThemoresociallyconservativeandIslamist-leaningwithinthisexcludedfractionhaveoptedtomobilizetheirownlobbyingorganizationthroughtheBusinessmen’sProsperityAssociation.Similarlyhometosmallscaleindustrialistsandpetitebourgeoismerchantsofdifferentstripes,thisAssociationtoohasconsolidatedlittleinfluenceamongsteitherdomesticpolicymakersorforeigncapital.Unabletoaccessorinfluencethehallsofpowertoanysignificantextent,theseorganizationsofthenon-elitebusinessinterestsevincethestarksegmentationofJordan’scapitalistclass,andthepowerdifferentialssuchsegmentationaffords.
260
members)featuresotherlegaciesoftheMiddleEastSupplyCompanysuchasIsamBdeir,
MohammedBilbeisi,AdnanBadran,AqelBeltaji,ZaidSha’sha’a,FouadQatan,RaoufAbuJaber,
JackKayyat,TawfiqKawar,andEliaNuqulaswell.Theelitefractionofthebourgeoisclasshas
alsotraditionallydominatedtheAmmanChamberofCommerce(ACC),theAmericanChamberof
CommerceinJordan,theJordanInsuranceFederation,andtheAssociationofBanksinJordan.516
Byvirtueoftheircontroloversuchassociations,theirsuccessesinestablishinginformal
lobbyingchannels,andtheirinfiltrationofthepolicymakingprocessitself,itcouldbearguedthat
thepoliticalandeconomicpoweroftheelitefractionoftheJordanianbourgeoisieisasgreat
todayasatanytimeinthecountry’spast.517Theirenduringeconomichegemonyismosteasily
discernedthroughareviewofthesprawling,multisector,family-ownedconglomeratesthatmany
withinthisfractionownandoperateatthetimeofwriting.Havingseenthedepthandbreadthof
thesebusinesses,itismyhopethatthereaderwillbebetterabletoseethenon-competitive,
516 Forinstance,theBoardoftheACCshowsanotherTaba’a(Tareq)inapositionofinfluence(SecondVice
Chairman);BahjatHamdan,heirofanotherelitefamily,istheACCSecretaryGeneral;NourJarrar,CEOofCitigroupandlongtimeadvisortotheRoyalHashemiteCourt,alsositsontheboard.TheboardofdirectorsfortheAmericanChamberofCommerceinJordan,meanwhile,includesthesameNourJarrarandTareqTaba’aaswellasKhaledKanaan(ofMawared),andFaresHammoudeh(oftheHammoudehfamilyagriculturalempire).
WhilefinancedbyUSAidandpromotedasaninstitutionalhomeforanti-cronyistbusinessorganizing,itisworth
pointingoutthatevenYoungEntrepreneur’sAssociationhasfrequentlypushedthesonsandyoungerbrothersofthissameclassfractionintoseniorroles.
517 Sectiononeofthisdissertationdetailedtheprocessesthroughwhichanelitemerchantclassinitially
accumulatedunprecedentedamountsofcapitalduringtheyearsofWorldWarII.ThosechaptersalsodemonstratedhowthisfractionofthecapitalistclasshasuseditswealthsotoreproduceitsprivilegedpositionwithinJordanianeconomyacrosstime.
Thishistoryendowscontemporarycapital-capitalrelationswithmanyofitsmostsalientproperties.Indeedand
asmentionedintheprevioussection,thehegemonyofoldmoneyremainstheorientingprincipleoftoday’sformofmarketcompetition.ByvirtueofthefactthatAbdullah’seconomizationofthepolicyelitehasallowedtheoldmerchantclasstowieldpowerdirectly,itcouldevenbearguedthatthisclassfraction’shegemonyhasgrowninthemodernperiod.
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oligarchicnatureofJordanianmarkets.Ishouldsayattheoutsetthatitis,ofcourse,difficultto
establishtheexactscaleandinfluenceofthesebusinesses.Astheseconglomeratesaretypically
organizedthroughasingle,privatelyheldholdingcompany—acompanyundernoobligationto
disclosedataregardingitscapitalholdings,revenuesorprofits—,onecannotsimplylook
throughthebookssotodiscovertheirmarketcapitalizationorannualrevenuestreams.
Nonetheless,asthemajorityoftheseenterprisesdoprovidegeneralinformationregardingtheir
assets,investments,andcorporatestructure518,itisstillpossibletoacquireadecentsensefor
theiroperations.
TheKawarGroup
TheKawarGroup—stewardedbyformerECCmemberKarimKawar—operatesamassive,
multisectorempire.Inshipping,transportation,andlogisticsalone,theirholdingsincludethe
AminKawar&SonsShippingandTransportationCompany,theRedSeaShippingAgency,the
AqabaShippingCompany,ManaraShipping,PacificInternationalLinesJordan,GulfAgency
Company,andMaerskJordan.InthedomainofICT,itsholdingsincludeOptimiza(atech
consultancy),IrisGuard(andirisrecognitionsoftwareusedintheUAE’sairports),andD1G(a
searchengine).TheKawarGroupalsomaintainsacontrollingstakeinAlFarisNationalCompany
forInvestment&Export,thefirstpubliclytradedICTfirmontheAmmanStockExchange.
518 Regardingstructure,itisworthnotingthatmanyoftheseholdingcompaniesdemonstratebothhorizontaland
verticalintegration.Theverticaldimension—specifically,theoperationofin-housefinanceandinsurancearms—tendstofacilitatethehorizontalone,allowingaholdingcompaniestoprovidecapitalandsecureitagainstlossacrossavastarrayofindustriesstretchingfromenergy,IT,luxuryimports,logisticsandtransportationtohealthandpharmaceuticalstorealestateandtourism-relatedinvestments.
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Ontheimportsandexportsfront,KawarInternationalservesasthefamily’sorganizing
hub.TheKawarfamilyhasalsobranchedintothehealthsector.Herein,NatHealth,awebbased
healthsystemsplatform,andAdvancedMedicalEquipmentrepresenttheirmostsignificant
assets.Moremiscellaneously,itisworthnotingthattheKawarGrouphasalsopartnereddirectly
withtheroyalfamily(morespecifically,withQueenRania)throughRubicon,aneducational
entertainmentmediacompany.Thefamilyhasalsodabbledinthehospitalityindustrywith
Crumz,ahighendbakeryandrestaurantinWestAmman;majorrealestateinvestmentsinJabal
AmmanthroughAl-AsreyahRealEstate;renewableenergythroughShamsMa’an;andin
integratedbusinesscommunicationssoftwarethroughExpress.
RancoHoldings(Mu’asherfamily)
TheMu’asherfamily’sbusinessesareprincipallyorganizedthroughRancoHoldings.519
NadimMu’asherisChairmanoftheRancoboard,andShakerMu’asheristhefirm’smanaging
partner.Atthetimeofwriting,Ranco’sinvestmentsextendacrosshospitalityandtourism,
bankingandfinancialinstitutions,industry,trade,renewableenergies,realestate,agriculture,
media,anddesign.Mostprominentamongsttheseinvestments,Rancoisastrategicshareholder
inArabInternationalHotelsCompany(owneroftheAmmanMarriot),theBusinessTourism
Company(OwneroftheJordanValley,DeaSea,andPetraMarriots),andalDawliyahforHotels&
Malls(whichistheowneroftheSheratonHotelinAmman).Itisalsoamajorshareholderin(the
519 Certainly,itshouldbesaidthattheMu’asherclandoesnotoperateasasingle,unifiedactorinthebusiness
world.Itisaverylargefamily,andthereareanumberofcompetingMu’asherenterprisesintheretailspaceinparticular.
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Kuwait-backed)AhliBankandintheJordanianInvestorCentre.Finally,Rancoholdssignificant
equityintheformerQIZ-based(nowSpecialEconomicZone-based)Ez-ZayReadyWear
ManufacturingCompanyaswellasinasecond,SEZ-basedgarmentmanufacturer.520Longoneof
thecountry’slargestlandowners,theMu’asherfamilyalsoownsandoperatesexport-oriented
citrusanddatefarms.Incommercialandresidentialrealestate,finally,Ranco’sinvestmentsare
directedthroughasubsidiarycalledAlIzdihar.
TheTalhouniGroup
Anotherlegacypropertyofaquotacoteriefamily,theeponymouslynamedTalhouniGroup
ownsandoperateseightdifferentcompaniesatthetimeofwriting.Oneofthekeyplayersin
Jordanianbigagriculture,theTalhouni’sModernFeedMillsandGroundFlourMillsofZarqaare
inthebusinessofdiversifiedcerealprocessing.521Inhospitalityandresidentialrealestate,the
Groupcontrolsfourindependententities:KnightKapital,InnovativeCreationsforInvestments,
ODDIntelligentConnectivityandOussoulInvestments.Thelatterisaprojectofoneofthe
family’syoungermembers,FarisalTalhouni,anditsportfoliotendstowardscommercialreal
estateaswellastowardsthebankingandinsurancesectors.Likealltheoldguard,theTalhouni
Groupalsoretainsafootholdintheimport/exportgamethroughNajadTrading.
Inaclassicinstanceofintrafractioncollaboration,finally,thegroup’sModernFashion
DesignoperatesasauniformproviderforallofJordan’smajorinternationalhotels,inclusiveof
520 TheJordanWorstedMillsCompany.521 Priortothecessationofthestatesubsidyonbreadin2018,thesefirmshadbeenmajorbeneficiariesofthe
state’swheatinterventionism.
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theMarriot,CrownePlaza,Kempinski,Intercontinental,Sheraton,GrandHyatt,FourSeasons,
Millenium,themajorityofwhichareownedbyanothermemberofJordan’squotacoterieclass
fraction.
AbuJaberInvestments
AbujaberInvestments,establishedin1944,representsanotherclassicinstitutionofquota
coteriecapital.Thefirmcombinesdirectholdingswithstrategicinvestmentsandhasafingerin
industriesasdisparateastelecommunications,realestate,finance,pharmaceuticals,hospitality,
andinsurance.Mostimportanttoitsportfolio,AbujaberInvestmentsholdsasignificantstakein
theAqaba-based,ASEZAoverseenTalaBayResort.Inaddition,itholdssubstantialequityin
Investbank,apubliclytradedinvestmentbank;DaralDawa,oneofthecountry’slargest
pharmaceuticalcompanies;theRadissonBluAmman;themediacorporationAudioVisualMedia;
theUnitedInsuranceCompany;aswellastheJordanPaperandCardboardFactoriesCompany.
TheMangoGroup
Formedin1927,theMangoGroupcontainsaninvestmentarmwithwiderangingstrategy
holdingsaswellasfivefullyownedsubsidiarycompanies:HIMCO,HAMCO,MangoRealEstate,
EasyStorage,andMajdal.Regardingthesubsidiaries,HIMCO,anindustrialengineeringfirm
whosebusinesshasgenerallydependedupontheprocurementofgovernment-issuedservicing
contracts,representstheoriginalcogaroundwhichtherestoftheMangofamilyconglomerate
wassubsequentlybuilt.Amongstthemanylucrativepubliccontractsthathavebeenprocuredby
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HIMCO,ithasbeendelegatedtobuildtelecommunicationssystems,toservicepowergeneration
systems,andtoprovideexcavationservicesfortheJordanPetroleumRefineryCompany,Queen
AliaInternationalAirport,theJordanCementFactoriesCompany,theJordanPhosphateMines
Company,andtheArabPotashCompany.
Secondamongstthesubsidiaries,HAMCOhasstayedwithintheparametersofhousehold
appliancemanufacturing,anotheroftheMangofamiliesoriginalfieldsofbusiness.Thethird,
EasyStorage,doespreciselywhatitsnamesuggests.Thefourth,MangoRealEstate,isprincipally
investedintotheoldbaladofAmmanandontheairportroad.Thefifth,Majdal,producesorganic
oliveoilfordomesticandinternationalmarkets.Importantly,theMangogroupalsoholdsmajor
investmentsintheLebaneseInvestmentBankSocieteGeneraleBanqueLiban;ArabBuilding
MaterialsCompany—oneofthelargestimportersofsteelandtimberinJordan—;alNisral-Arabi
(oneoftheleading,publiclytradedinsurancefirmsintheJordanianmarket);aSwedishowned
solarcellmanufacturingcompanycalledMidsummer;andamediaplatformcalledMagineTV,
whichprovidesawireless,cloudbasedtelevisionplatform.522
NuqulGroup
TheNuqulGroup,yetanotherpropertywithalineagetracingbacktothequotacoterie,
controlsthirty-oneseparatecompaniesatthetimeofwriting.Itscapitalholdingslargelyderive
fromthefamily’straditionalfieldofbusiness—paperandhygienicproducts.Atthetimeof
writing,infact,FINEHygienicHolding—oneofthelargestfirminthefacialtissue,toiletpaper,
522 Formore,see:http://www.mango-grp.com/index.php/our-investments
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kitchentowel,anddiapermarketintheMiddleEast—persistsasthecentralpillaroftheNuqul
Group’swiderbusinessempire.
ByconsequenceofGhassanNuqul’sleadership—aformermembertheEconomic
ConsultativeCouncilandaformerDirectoroftheJordanBusinessmen’sAssociation—,theGroup
isnowalsoheavilyinvestedinbanking,insurance,automobiles,andrealestate.Specificto
automobiles,NuqulAutomotiveistheexclusivedistributerforthemajorityofGerman-madecars,
includingPorsche,Audi,andVolkswagen.ItalsoholdsanimportmonopolyforSkoda.Specificto
bankingandinsurance,GhassanNuqulistheChairmanofbothCapitalBankandDeltaInsurance.
TheManaseerConglomerate
AmorerecententrantintotheJordanianeconomicelite,theJordanian-born,Russian-
educatedZiyadManaseerbuiltafortuneasaconstructionmagnatewithcloserelationsto
GazpromandRosavtodor,thefederalagencydirectingroadconstructioninRussia.523Leveraging
hiscloserelationswiththeRussianenergysector,ManaseerwentontofoundtheJordan-based
ManaseerOil&Gasin2003.Operatingatleastthansixty-eightgasstationsacrossthecountryat
thetimeofwriting,Manaseerholdsaprivilegedpositionwithinoneoftheeconomy’smostnon-
competitivesectors.
Muchliketheothermembersofthiseliteclassfraction,Manaseerhasalsoestablishedan
investmentgroup(ManaseerGroup)tofacilitatecross-sectoracquisitionsandsoto
organize/consolidateabusinessempiretouchingnearlyeveryaspectofthecontemporary
523 Hehassincesoldhissharesintheconstructionfirmhefounded(Stroygazconsulting).
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economy.Inadditiontotheoilandgasfirmdiscussedabove,theManaseerGroup’scurrent
holdingsandpropertiesextendacrossinfrastructureandbuildingmaterials524,mining525,
businesssolutions526,foodandservices527,andchemicals.528
TheSabihMasriEmpire
Finally,whilenotorganizedthroughasingleintegratedholdingcompanymodel,this
sectionwouldbeincompletewithoutabriefsurveyofSabihMasri’svastbusinessempire.Within
thebankingsector,MasriisChairmanofArabBank,thelargestprivateentityintheJordanian
economyandafirmwhichheholds11%equityin.MasriisalsoamajorshareholderintheCairo-
AmmanBankwherehisson,KhalidSabihMasri,sitsontheboardofdirectors.
Regardingthefinancialsectormoregenerally,Masriownsandoperatesoperatestwo
privateinvestmenthouses.Thefirst,theSaudi-basedArabSupplyandTrainingCompany(also
knownastheAstraGroup),mostresemblestheholdingcompaniesoftheotherbigJordanian
families.ThefoundationofMasri’spersonalbusinessempire,Astraholdseithersubstantive
524 Here,thegroup’sholdingsincludeManseerReadyMix,ManaseerIron&Steel,ManaseerFirst(cementand
concrete),ManaseerCementIndustry,theTrustforConcreteIndustriesCompany,andManaseerMarble&Granite.
525 Here,thegroup’sprincipalholdingisManaseerCrushers.526 Here,thegroup’sholdingsincludeManaseerTrade(mostlyoperatinginindustrialchemicalsandfertilizers),
ManaseerInformationTechnology,ManaseerInvest(whichcontrolsmajorityequityinthepubliclytradedAfaqHoldingforInvestmentandRealEstateDevelopmentCompany),ManaseerTransport,VisionsMaintenanceandSpareParts,ManaseerMachineryTrading,andManseerImportandExport(focusedonoilandlubricants).
527 Here,thegroup’sholdingsincludeManseerFoodIndustries(primarilyfocusedinoliveoil),ManaseerDates,and
LumiMarket(anetworkofgrocerystores).528 Here,thegroup’sholdingsincludeManaseerMagnesia,ManaseerCarbonate,andManaseerFertilizersand
Chemicals.
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equityholdingsorfullownershipincompaniesoperatingacrosstheMiddleEastandacrossthe
domainsofconstructionandmining,energy,financialservicesandinvestment,foodand
agriculture,healthcareandmedicine,realestateandhospitality,media,plastics,chemicals,steel,
telecommunications,andplastics.529Astra’sfullyownedsubsidiariesincludethefollowing
enterprises:AstraConstruction,AstraMining,Al-AnmaaforConstructionMaterials,AstraEnergy,
NourEnergy,thePalestine-centricPadicoHoldingCompany,AstraFoodCompany,GoldenWheat
MillsCompany(Ramallah),VegetableOilIndustriesCompany,JordanVegetableOilIndustries
Company(makerofal-Ghazalioliveoil),SouthAgriculturalCompany,MaisIrrigation,Rum
AgriculturalCompany,TabukPharmaceuticals,AstraHealthcareSolutions,ElKendi
Pharmaceuticals,MaisMeidicalCompany,CordobaOasisVillageCompound,AlHamraOasis
VillageCompound,AylaOasisDevelopmentCompany(Aqaba),TabukInvestmentandTourism
Company,AlAyyamPress,AstraPolymers,AgriculturalPlasticIndustrialCompany,Astrachem,Al
TanmiyaSteel,InternationalBuildingSystemsFactory,CiconBuildingMaterials,Nour
Communications,PaltelGroup(oneoftheoligopolisticfirmsinPalestinianmobiletech),andVtel.
Asonehaslikelysurmised,Astrais,then,aratherstaggering,multisectormonolithwitha
hegemonicpositionwithinnearlyeverysectorandmarketintheJordanianeconomy.
ThesecondofMasri’sprivateinvestmenthousesisal-MasiraInvestmentsCompany,afar
moreboutiquey(andopaque)operation.Publictradinginformationindicatesthatital-Masira
holds31%equityinZaraInvestmentHoldingsasof2019.RecallfromchaptersixthatZarawas
529 Inaddition,AstraholdssubstantialequityintheSaudi-basedFahadbinSultanUniversityandFahadbinSultan
Hospital.
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heavilyinvolvedintheurbanrenewalsofbothAqabaandAmman.530Bymostcalculations,itis
thelargestandmostinfluentialdeveloper/realestatespeculatorinJordantoday.
TheQuotaCoterieandtheSiliconWadi
Finally,beforeclosingontheenduringhegemonyofthiselitefractionwithintheJordanian
capitalistclass,IwouldberemisswereInottomentionhowthesesamefamilieshavealso
establishedtheircollectivedominanceovertheemergentJordaniantechscene.Indeed,not
withstandingthebootstrappingmythosandthemeritocraticairsthattechnology-based
entrepreneurialismtendstocoatitselfin,inJordan,thesearelegacyfieldsthroughandthrough.
ThearistocraticpropertiesofJordan’sICTsectorhasheldsteady,moreover,acrossbothofthe
moderntechrevolutions:thedotcomboomofthe1990sandearly2000s,andtheuberization
boomoftheearly2010s.
Specifictothefirstperiod,theprincipalprotagonistsacquiringpower,influence,and
capitalinJordanwereKarimKawar,SamihToukan,andHussamKhoury.Scionsoftheoldguard,
eachmanagedtoleverageinheritedwealth,accesstothePalace,andconnectionswith
transnationalcapitalsotoArabizeinternetbusinessesinitiallypioneeredintheUnitedStatesand
Europe—earningthemselvesmassiveprofitsintheprocess.531Therepresentativesofoldmoney
530 TheAstraGroupisamajorequityholderinZaraaswell.531 ToukanandKhoury,ofcourse,famouslyearnedhundredsofmillionsthroughthesalesofmaktoob.comtoYahoo
in2000andofsouq.comtoAmazonin2017.Atthetimeofwriting,theysteertheirownventurecapitalfirm(Jabbar)inadditiontosittingontheboardsofallthevariousentrepreneurshipbodiesbeingpromotedbythePalace.BeyondservingontheECC,asanAmbassador,asaconsultanttotheKing,andasPresidentofhisfamily’sKawarGroup,meanwhile,KarimKawarisalsoDirectorofOasis500(atech-focusedventurecapitalfirm)atthetimeofwritingaswellasbeingaboardmemberfortheOptimizaconsultancydiscussedearlier.
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havealsoreapedthebenefitsderivedthroughtheuberizationofthetechnologysector.Manyof
theseindividualsoperateoutofDubai,whichisattheheartoftheregion’sspeculative,tech-
relatedventurecapitalspace.Mostprominentamongstthem,perhaps,areKhaledTalhouniand
FaresGhandour(sonofAramexfounderandconfidanttotheKing,FadiGhandour).Thetwo
youngmenaremanagingpartnersatWamdaCapital,oneoftheforwardleaninginvestmentfirms
frequentlycelebratedbyregionalandwesternpress.Leveragingtheirinheritedwealth,Wamda
hasacquiredmajorstakesinmanyoftheMiddleEast’shottesttechproducts,includingCareem.
Thoughtheseproductsoftendemonstrationapenchantforplagiarismmorethaninnovation—
Careem,forinstance,isaridesharingserviceappmodeledcloselyonthoseofUberandLyft—,
theirpresenceintheArabmarketstillmakesthemincrediblyvaluable.WhenCareemwas
eventuallyboughtoutfor$3.1billionbyUberinMarchof2019,Wamdawalkedawaywitha
majorpiece.532
Inadditiontotheseinvestor-types,anumberofotheryoung,quotacoterie-aligned
JordanianshavealsomovedintoseniormanagerialpositionswiththeregionalofficesofUS-
basedtechcompanies.HamdiTaba’a,forinstance,whoisthegreatgrandsonofthefirstpresident
oftheAmmanChamberofCommerce,hasmanagedtoleveragerelationshipswithinthecircuits
oftransnationalcapitalsotosecurehimselfthepostofUber’sheadmanagerofbusinessinthe
Ratherabsurdlyandaswasmentionedpreviously,itwasKawarwhousedhispositionontheECCandhis
influenceoverthee-schoolREACHinitiativetosecureapreviouscompanyofhis,IdealGroup,theexclusivecontractforcomputerizingJordan’sthousandsofclassrooms.
532 Inaway,GhandourandTalhounibenefitfromabusinessthatisnotsodifferentfromtheimport-basedeconomy
theirforefatherswontheirwealththrough:bycontrollinginternalmarketsforexternallygeneratedservicesinmuchthesamewayaspreviousgenerationscontrolledinternalmarketsforexternallyproducedautomobiles,theyextractsubstantialearnings.
271
LevantandGulf.533Throughsimilarprocesses,SamirAsfour,anotherlegacychild,haswoundup
Tesla’sRegionalDirectorfortheMiddleEast,GCC,andTurkey.
(3)Financialization
BeforeproceedingtomysectorbysectorquantitativemarketanalysisoftheJordanian
economy,thelastvariablethatneedstobeemphasizedinexplainingJordan’snon-competitive,
elite-dominatedformofmarketcompetitionconcernsthewiderfinancializationoftheeconomy.
Between2000and2018,thetotalfixedassetsofJordan’slicensedbankshasroughlyquadrupled,
increasingfromJD12,913milliontoJD50,893million.Whencomparedtopaltrygrowthrates
seenintheaggregate(asreflectedinnationalGDP)andatthelevelofindividualsector
performance,therelativeeffectofthisexpansionisevengreater.
533 MohamadJardaneh,anotherlegacychild—albeitoneofTransjordanian,politicalstock—,hasalsoacquireda
seniorpostwithUber.
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Thehegemonyofthefinancialsectorvis-a-vistherestoftheeconomytodaycanbeseen
throughanumberofdifferentmeasures.Ifoneweretolookatmarketcapitalizationsonthe
AmmanStockExchange,forinstance,onewouldseethatasofMarchof2019,thebankingsector
aloneconstituted58%ofaggregatecapitalization.Addinthefinancialservicescompaniesand
thatpercentagegrowsto63%.Withtheexceptionofenergysector(whichisgrossly
unprofitable),acomparisonofthebankingsector’saggregateannualincometotheaggregate
annualincomeoftheothersectorsoftheJordanianeconomyrevealsasimilarlyskewedpicture.
273
DataprovidedbyAmmanStockExchange
Morenotable,perhaps,thanthebankingsector’sgeneralizeddominanceofthe
economy—financialcapitalis,afterall,ascendantacrossthevastmajorityoftheworld’s
economies—istheparticulardominanceofArabBank.Atthetimeofwriting,ArabBank’smarket
capitalizationconstitutes41.6%ofthebankingsector’stotalcapitalization,andashocking24.2%
ofthestockmarket’saggregatecapitalization.Byitssheersizealone,then,thisisanentitywhose
basicexistencerendersfreecompetitionsomethingofafarce.
WhenonesurveysArabBank’smostprominentstakeholdersaswell,itseemsvery
possiblethattheBank’smagnitudeisnottheonlyvariableexertinganti-competitioneffects.The
274
Bank’sChairmanistheaforementionedSabihMasri534anditsmostsignificantequityholders
includeSaudiArabia’sMinistryofFinance;individualSaudi-basedinvestorslikeMuslimbinAli
MuslimandNasral-Rashid;institutional,state-backedinvestorsfromBahrain,theUAE,and
Qatar;theJordanianstate(asrepresentedbytheSocialSecurityCorporation’s17%equitystake);
theShomanFoundation;andahandfulofindividualsdrawnfromtheelitefractionofthe
domesticcapitalistclass.IntegratingmuchoftheHashemitecoalitionasthislistofboard
membersand/orstrategicinvestorsdoes,therearereasonsforassumingthatArabBank’s
continuedprosperitywillbeprivilegedasamatterofnationalinterest.
(4)SectoralMarketStructures
TogivesomeindicationoftheextenttowhichtheseprocesseshaveunderminedJordanian
marketcompetition,Iwillnowprovideasimple,sector-by-sectorsurveyofthecountry’smarket
structures.
Operationally,asmentionedintheintroductorypassagestothischapter,Ihavefocused
hereonpubliclytradedfirmsalone.IshouldalsomentionthatIhaveoptedtoorganizethis
analysisbydisaggregatingthevariousmarketswithintheJordanianeconomyaccordingtothe
sectorclassificationsthroughwhichtheAmmanStockExchangedividesthemarket.Asforthe
metricsusedtodetermineamarket’sstructure,Ihavemeasuredindividualfirms’annualincome
andmarketcapitalizationagainstthesector’stotalannualincomeandmarketcapitalization.By
534 Masripersonallyholdsroughly11%equityinArabBank.
275
consideringbothofthesemeasures,Ibelievethisanalysiscanaccuratelyestablishthenumberof
relevantfirmswithinanygivensectorandtherelativeweight/powerofeachfirmwithinasector.
Viewedincombination,thesefiguresshouldprovideanaccuratedescriptionofthestructureand
natureofmarketcompetitionwithineachsectoroftheeconomy.
Clearly,therearesomemethodologicalproblemswithmappingsectoralmarketstructures
inthismanner.Byonlyincludingpubliclytradedfirms,forinstance,myanalysisexcludesa
numberofmultinationalcorporationsandanumberofprivatelyowneddomesticfirms,manyof
whichhaverepresentsignificantplayersinthecontemporaryeconomy.Excludingsuchfirms
constitutesaconfoundingomission.Ultimatelyhowever,itisanomissionthatisunavoidable.As
thereisnowayofgainingaccesstorevenues,assets,orprofitsdataforprivately-ownedfirms—
andasitisextremelychallengingtoisolateandparsethissamedatawhenitcomestotheJordan-
specificbusinessofmultinationalcorporationsorthosefirmstradedonforeignstock
exchanges—thereisnowayoffeasiblyandquantitativelydeterminingwhattheseactorsmarket
sharemightbewithinagivensector.Thisbeingthecase,forreasonsofmethodological
expediencemorethananalyticalinsight,Ihavehadtoproceedwithoutthem.Inaneffortto
(partially)accountfortheeffectsderivedfromtheirexclusion,inthosesectors,likemobile
communications,whereprominentprivatelyownedfirmsareofascaleastoexertamajor
influenceonthemarket,Iwillattemptanestimationoftheirmarketsharebasedonopensource
data.
Finally,beforeproceeding,Ishouldalsoacknowledgethatmysectorbysectorbreakdown
willnotreviewthemarketstructurewithinthedomainsofeducation,media,utilitiesandenergy,
paperandcardboard,printingandpackaging,andelectricalindustries.Myreasonsforexcluding
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thesesectorsaremultifold.Forsome—suchasmedia,printingandpackaging,paperand
cardboard,andtobaccoandcigarettes—,onlyoneortwofirmsarelistedontheASE.Thisbeing
thecase,thosesector’sduopolisticormonopolisticmarketstructuresareself-evident.Forothers,
suchaseducation,thebusinessbeingdoneissosmallandthenumberofactorsbeingexcluded
fromthepicturesolarge(veryfewprivateeducationalinstitutionsarepubliclytraded)that
analysisofanASE-basedmarketstructurewilldolittletoenlightenthereader.Giventhatthe
utilitiesandenergysectorsareprimarilydominatedbyregionalmonopolies(asdiscussedinthe
sectiononprivatization)andthatthesedefactomonopoliesdonotcompetewithoneanother
(apartfromintryingtowinagovernmentlicense/contract),finally,itmakeslittlesenseto
conceptualizethemasconstitutinganintegratedmarketstructure.Asthevastmajorityof
Jordan’slargestprivateenterprisesarepubliclytraded—andasIhavealreadyaccountedforthe
marketimpactofprivatelyheldholdingcompaniesintheprevioussections—,however,itismy
hopethatintheend,myASE-centricanalysiswillstillprovidethereaderwithanaccuratepicture
ofmarketstructureatthetimeofwriting.
Banking
Aspreviouslydiscussed,ArabBankisthelargestsingleactorintheJordanianeconomy.
Mostlybyconsequenceofthisfact,themarketstructureofthebankingsectorcanbedeemedan
oligopolisticone.Asisdetailedinthegraphbelow,ArabBank’smarketcapitalizationasa
percentageoftotalmarketcapitalizationintheBankingSectorstoodat41.6%asofMarch2019;
itsrevenuesasapercentageoftotalbankingrevenues,meanwhile,reached39.5%in2017,the
lastyearforwhichannualdatawasavailable.
277
ThesecondlargestplayerinthebankingsectorisTheHousingBankforTradeand
Finance(HBTF).HBTF’smarketcapitalizationratioatthatsametimewas27.7%,andits
percentageoftotalrevenueswas13.2%for2017.Beyondthesetwofirms,ahandfulofother
actorsareworthmentioning.Intermsofmarketcapitalization,JordanIslamicBankandtheBank
ofJordaneachrepresentapproximately5%,respectively,ofthetotalmarket.Morerelevantvis-a-
visflowsthanstocks,meanwhile,JordanAhliBank,CairoAmmanBank,JordanKuwaitBank,and
BankelEtihadallgrabbedthemselvesbetween4.5-6%ofthetotalrevenuepiein2017.
FinancialServices
Themarketstructureofthefinancialservicessectorapproximatesahierarchicalduopoly.
OntopisFirstJordan,whichrepresents65.1%ofaggregatecapitalization.UnionInvestments
278
representsthejuniorpartnerinthisduopoly,constituting7.8%aggregatemarketcapitalization.
Nootheractorcontributesmorethanroughly3%.
Notwithstandingtheanti-competitiveeffectsgeneratedbythisduopoly,itisworth
recognizingthatthisunbalanceinmarketcapitalizationhasnotresultedinanunbalanced
distributioninrevenues(atleastinrecentyears).FirstJordan’srevenueswerenearlyhalved
between2016and2017,andnowcompriseamere1.5%ofthesector’sannualtotal.Makingthe
biggestmarkintermofrevenues(ifnotatallintermsofcapitalization)aretheJordanMortgage
RefinanceCompany,aquasi-SOEwhoseincomerepresented41%ofthesector’stotalfor2017.
TrailingbehinditisFirstFinance,whoseincomecontributed12.6%tothattotal.
Insurance
Themarket
structurefortheinsurancesectorisconsiderablymorebalancedandcompetitivethanwhatis
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seeninthebankingandfinancialservicessectors.Threelargefirms—JordanInsurance,AlNasir
alArabi,andMiddleEastInsurance—dooperatefromapositionofdominance,comprising
25.3%,13.4%,and10.2%ofthesector’smarketcapitalizationand14.7%,7.7%,and7.1%of
2017’saggregateannualrevenues,respectively.Theircollectivemarketshare,however,isnotso
largeastoallowpricefixingorothersimilarlynoncompetitivemaneuvers.Withanothertenorso
firmstherebyabletoholdfirmintermsofrevenuesandcapitalization,theinsurancesectoris
oneofthemorecompetitiveonesintheJordanianeconomy.
RealEstate
280
Inpreviouschapters,Ihavedetailedmanyoftheprivatelyrunfirmsintherealestate
sector.IhavealsoemphasizedthegravitythatanumberofGulf-baseddevelopershaveacquired
acrossthewidergeographyofthebuiltenvironment.Beforeproceedingtoareviewofthemarket
structuregoverningtherelationsbetweenpubliclytradedfirms,then,Ibelieveitisimportantto
emphasizethatsuchareview,primafacie,omitsmanyofthemostinfluentialenterprisesinthis
field.Wereone’smappingofthemarketstructuretoincludeMawared,al-Maabar,EagleHillsLLC,
andSaudiOger,afardifferentpicturewouldemerge.
Bethatasitmay,ifoneistodealwiththemarketstructureofdomesticallytraded
publicly-ownedfirmsalone,oneneedfirstbeginwithAFAQHoldingforInvestmentandReal
EstateDevelopment.535Thisfirmrepresents23%ofmarketcapitalizationandashocking63.4%
of2017’saggregaterevenues.FlankingthishegemonareUnionLandDevelopment(20.2%
marketcap,2.1%revenue),TajTouristCompany(8.7%marketcap,9.9%2017revenue),and
Masaken(9.3%marketcap,0.4%revenue).Inviewofthetotalrealestatesector—inclusiveof
publicandprivatecompanies—,Ibelieveitisappropriatetoclassifythemarketstructureas
oligopolistic.ShouldrestrictionsonFDIbeliftedintheyearstocome,moreover,thereare
groundsforanticipatingatotalGulf-takeoverofthesector.
535 Ahmadal-Manaseer,amagnateintheenergyfield,holdsroughly70%oftheequityinAFAQ.
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Hotels
and
Tourism
Themarketstructureinthehotelsandtourismsectorisbestclassifiedasatwo-tiered
oligopoly.InthefirsttierstandZaraInvestments(aSabihMasri-ownedventure)and
MediterraneanTourismCompany,whichrepresents30.9%and30.0%ofmarketcapitalization,
respectively,aswellas50%and14.1%,respectively,of2017’saggregaterevenues.Inthesecond
couldbegroupedJordanProjectTourismDevelopmentCompany(9.9%marketcap,13.2%2017
revenues),al-DawliyahHotels536(7.9%marketcap,8.9%2017revenues),andArabInternational
Hotels(8.6%marketcap,8.2%2017revenues),andAlSharq(9.9%marketcap,4.1%annual
revenues).
AsthereferencestotheMasriandMu’asherfamiliesintimate,itisworthemphasizingthat
thehotelsandtourismsector,liketheBankingsector,remainsapreserveofoldcapital.
536 Recallthatal-DawliyahisanassetoftheMu’asherfamily.
282
Transportation
ExcludingRoyalJordanian,afirmthatholdsadomesticmonopolyonairtravelandwhose
revenueswouldconstitute88%ofthetotalweretheytobeincluded,themarketstructurefor
transportationisfairlybalancedandcompetitive.Intermsofmarketcapitalization,Shipping
Line,JordanExpress,ComprehensiveTransports,andtheRumGroupallholdrelativelyeven
portionsofmarketshare.Whilecompetitiveasregardscapitalization,itshouldbeacknowledged
thatJordanExpress’2017revenueswereapproximately5xtherevenuesofShippingLineand
283
SalamInternational,andnearly10xthoseofRumGroup.Theirclosestrivalintermsofrevenues,
infact,wasMasafatTransport,whosemarketcapitalizationwasonlyabout20-30%oftheother
actors.
MobileCommunications
Manyofthelargestplayersinthemobilecommunicationsmarket—andUmniahMobile
andZainMobileinparticular—arenotlistedontheAmmanStockExchange.Thisbeingthecase,
mappingthemarketstructuresolelyonthebasisofpubliclytradedfirmswouldgivethereadera
highlydistortedpicture.Whileitisdifficulttocomparetherevenuesandmarketvaluationof
thosefirmsnotontheASEtotheonebehemoththatislistedthere—JordanTelecommunications
Company,underwhosechargethemobilecommunicationsfirmOrangeJordanoperates—,one
cancomparefirmsbasedontheirmobilephonesubscribersandtherebygetsomekindofsense
forthemarketstructure.Asofthefirstquarterof2016,theKuwaiti-ownedZainJordanposted
4.94millionsubscribers,OrangeJordanposted4.59million,andtheBahraini-ownedUmniah
posted4.55million.Nootherfirmcompetesinthemobiletelecommunicationsmarket.This
284
beingthecase,themarketstructureformobilecommunicationscanbeclassifiedasoligopolistic
(andaparticularlybalancedoneatthat).
CommercialServices
TheAmmanStockExchangeliststenfirmswithinthecommercialservicessector.Astheir
businessesareverydifferentinnature—rangingfromimport/exportcompaniestoAFAQ
Energy537—delineatingthemarketstructurewithinsuchasectorwillnotprovidemuchinsight
intothenatureofmarketcompetition.Thatsaid,itisworthacknowledgingthatifonewereto
accepttheASE’sclassificatorycriteriaandtherebyacceptthatthiscollectionoffirmsdoes
representacoherentsectorofthemarket,onewouldalsohavetoacknowledgethatthisasector
organizedaccordingtoaduopolisticmarketstructuredominatedbyJordanDutyFree(50.1%
marketcapitalization,6.6%2017revs)andAfaqEnergy(34.2%marketcap,71.8%2017revs).
Pharmaceuticals
Themarketstructureforpharmaceuticalsisoligopolisticthoughbalancedinnature.Four
firmsaretradedontheASE,thesmallestofwhichcomprises17.2%aggregatemarket
537 AFAQEnergyisalsoanassetoftheManaseerfamily.
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capitalizationand7%ofaggregateannualrevenues.Thelargestandmostpowerfulofthesefirms
isDaralDawa538,whichrepresents37.8%totalmarketcapitalizationandwhichgenerated52.6%
ofthesector’s2017’sannualrevenues.TheSocialSecurityCorporationretainsamajoritystakein
DaralDawaatthetimeofwriting.JordanPharmaceuticalsandHayatPharmaceuticalsrepresent
thesecondtwolargestactorsinthesector.
Chemicals
538 AkramAbdulLatifJerabistheChairmanofDaral-Dawa.HeisalsoChairmanofAl-QudsBank.Thefirm’sother
strategicinvestorsincludetheSSC,AbuJaberBrothersCompanyandtheJardanehfamily.
286
Thechemicalssectorisalsooligopolisticinnature.ArabPesticidesconstitutes35.6%of
totalmarketcapitalizationandgenerated35.8%of2017’sannualrevenues.Followingclosely
behind,theIndustrialCommercialandAgricultureCompanyrepresents26.2%ofmarket
capitalizationand34.7%ofaggregaterevenues.Beyondthosetwo,anumberofsmallerfirms
comprisebetween4and10%ofeitherofourtwomeasures,respectively.
FoodandBeverages
Themarketstructureamongstpubliclytradedfoodandbeveragefirmsisbestclassifiedas
ahierarchicaloligopoly.OntopisSiniora,whichrepresents35.1%oftotalmarketcapitalization
andwhichcontributed25.5%tothesector’saggregate2017’srevenues.Belowitarefourfirms
ofsimilarsizeandinfluence—JordanPoultry,JordanDairy,GeneralInvest,NationalPoultry,and
ArabInternationalFood—eachofwhichcomprises7-13%ofaggregatecapitalizationandeachof
whichcontributes5-16.5%ofannualrevenues.
287
Foodandbeverage,ofcourse,isoneofthesectorsmostexposedtoforeigncompetition.
GiventhelargemarketsharethatgiantMNCslikeCocaCola,Nabisco,andKrafthaveinJordan,
oneshouldnotconsiderthemarketstructureofASE-basedpubliclytradedfirmsfullyreflective
ofthelargermarketstructure.
Mining
Thefirmslistedunderthissectionoftheeconomyhavebeenappropriatelyclassified;
however,totheextentthatminingoperationsarenotnecessarilyincompetitionwithone
another—thebusinessofasteelmanufacturerhasnexttonothingdowiththebusinessofa
potashmine—,anall-inclusivereviewofmarketstructurewillnotnecessarilyaffordgreat
insightsintothenatureofcompetitioninthissector.Thisbeingthecase,IhaveexcludedtheArab
PotashCompany(APC)andJordanPhosphateMinesCompany(JPMC)frommysectoralanalysis.
Asbothfirmspossessmonopolyextractionrightsandasbothcompeteexclusivelywithin
international(ratherthandomestic)markets,Ibelievethisdecisionisjustified.539
539 ItshouldbefirstacknowledgedthattheArabPotashCompany(APC)isthelargestfirmintheminingand
constructionsector,atleastintermsofmarketcapitalization.Asof2017,theAPC’sshareofsector-widemarketcapitalizationstoodat74.2%.Duetothevagariesofinternationalcommoditymarkets,however,APCrevenuesmadeuponly6.5%ofthesector’saggregatetotalin2017.
288
ExcludingtheAPCandJPMCfromconsiderationsuggeststhatminingisalsogovernedby
anoligopolisticmarketstructure.Withinthisstructure,NorthernCement,JordanSteel,andthe
JordanCementFactoryrepresentthelargestplayersbyasignificantmargin.Therevenuesofboth
firmscomprisedbetween25and50%ofthenon-phosphate/non-potashtotal.Intermsofmarket
capitalization,however,NorthernCementsignificantlyoutpacesallotheractorsinthesector.
EngineeringandConstruction
Themarketstructureamongstthepubliclytradedengineeringandconstructionsectoris
oligopolisticandhierarchicalinnature.DominatingthemarketisReadyMix,whichrepresents
38.9%ofaggregatemarketcapitalization.Thefirm’s2017revenuesofJD44millionalso
represented56.6%ofthesector’stotal.Belowit,foursmallerfirms—JordanPipes,JordanWood,
ArabSteelandPipes,andAlQudsReadyMix—individuallycontributebetween7and22%of
aggregatemarketcapitalizationaswellasbetween2and10%ofaggregaterevenues
AsmanyofJordan’slargestconstructioncontractorsarenotpubliclytraded—andasmany
oftheseprivatefirmstypicallysecurethemegadevelopmentcontractsdoledoutacrossthe
289
country’songoingurbanrenewalefforts(aswasevincedbythefirmofthescandalized/exiled
WalidKurdi)—,itshouldbeacknowledgedthatthisreviewdoesnotperfectlycorrespondtothe
realitiesofthemarketstructureinthissector.
Textiles
Asdiscussedinthepreviouschapter,manyofthelargestfirmsoperatinginthetextiles
sectorareprivatelyowned,export-orientedSouthAsianfirms.Thesefirmsdonotcompetewith
eachothersomuchastheyjointlyexploitJordan’sFTAwiththeUnitedStatessotore-export
theirproducttotheAmericanmarketsans-restrictionsortariff.
Excludingthesefirmsfromconsideration,themarketstructureamongstpubliclylisted
textilecompaniesshouldbeclassifiedasoligopolisticinnature.TheCenturyInvestmentGroup
represents35.9%aggregatemarketcapitalization,thoughthefirmhasnotlisteditsrevenuesfor
290
anyofthepastthreeyears,makinganycalculationonthatmetricimpossible.540TheSEZ-based
JordanWorstedMillcomprises61.2%ofmarketcapitalizationand45.3%oftotalrevenues.The
similarlySEZ-basedElZay,meanwhile,earned54.7%of2017’stotalrevenuesdespite
representingjust3%ofthesector’stotalmarketcapitalization.AstheMu’asherfamily’sRanco
HoldingCompanyisheavilyinvestedinbothoftheselasttwofirms,theirincentivestocompete
againstoneanotherarenegligible.
HealthcareServices
Withinthedomainofhealthcareservices,onefindsanotheroligopolistic(albeitbalanced)
marketstructure.AlBiladMedicalServices,theConsultingGroup,andIbnAlHaythamallcontrol
between26%and35%oftotalmarketcapitalizationandbetween27%and36%of2017’s
annualrevenues.
540 Aswasmentionedearlier,theNuqulFamilyisthelargeststrategicinvestorintheCIG(45%equity,roughly).
291
Automobiles
Finally,thoughnoneofthesefirmsarepubliclytraded,Ialsowantedtodrawattentionto
theautomobilesectorasitwellepitomizeshowtheaforementionedbourgeoiselitecartelizes
anddominatesprivatemarkets.Atthetimeofwriting,theHaddadfamily’sMarkaziaCompany
holdsthesingleimportanddistributionlicenseforToyotaandallitssistercompanies.TheNuqul
family’sNuqulAutomotiveholdsexclusiveimportanddistributionrightsforthemajorityofthe
bigGermanautomobilecompanies(Audi,PorscheandVolkswagen)aswellasSkoda.TheMalhas
family’sMahmoudiaMotorsholdsexclusiveimportanddistributionrightsforJaguarandLand
Rover,andsoondowntheline.
Thoughcompeting,tosomeextent,fortheattentionsofthoseinthemarketforaluxury
automobile,thisisamarketforwhichthebrandandothervariablesexogeneoustoJordan—the
fuelefficiencyandtechnologicaladvancementofToyotav.Porsche,forexample—willultimately
determinesales.Inotherwords,totheextentthatToyotaandPorschearecompeting,itisan
arenaswhollydetachedfromJordan,inarenaswithinwhichtheirlocaldistributorshavenoeffect
orrelevance.Bynotinfringingoneachfamily’sexclusivedistributionrights,then,thedomestic
automobilemarketis,bydefinition,non-competitive.Freetopricefixtoacertainextent,then,the
Nuqul,Haddad,andMalhasliveandletlivewhileaccruingtherentdistributiongeneratedby
ToyotaandJaguar’sexternalrivalry,arivalryfromwhichtheyarethemselvesentirelyapart.
292
Conclusion
MarketsandprivateinitiativemostcertainlyprevailinJordantoday,wheretheystructure
thesocialasmuchastheeconomicorganizationofthenation.Ifresemblinganarchetypical
capitalistformationinthoseregards,however,theJordanianmodalitymostcertainlydiverges
fromstandardmodels—betheyliberalmarketandcorporatistmarketinnature—whenitcomes
totheformofcompetitionthatthesestructuresgivehostto.SectoralmarketstructuresinJordan
tendtowardsmonopolyand/oroligopoly;financialcapitaliscurrentlyconsolidatingits
dominanceoverthewidereconomy;andanarrow,legacy-derivedelite,internallygovernedby
conciliatorypractices,continuestoevinceadegreeofcross-sectorpower(andownership)that
approachescomprehensiveness.
Withmassive,family-ownedconglomeratesandholdingcompaniespresidingover
expansiveempires,youngandemergentfirms—containingthegreatestpotentialforgrowth,as
theWorldBanknowacknowledges—havelittlechanceofchallengingthisstatusquo.By
consequence,Jordaniancapitalismanimatespreciouslittlecompetitiveenergy,asisverifiedby
theconsistencyseeninitssectoralmarketstructuresandbyitsnotablylowratesofmarketexit
andentry.541Whetherthislimited,elite-dominatedformofmarketcompetitionoughtbetreated
asanaberrationalorparadigmaticoutcomeforacapitalisteconomyisaseparatequestion.
Acrossthewidespectrumofactuallyexistingcapitalisms—fromthenominallycutthroat,liberal
541 Onthislastpoint,see:NajyBenhassine,FromPrivilegetoCompetition:UnlockingPrivate-ledGrowthintheMiddle
EastandNorthAfrica,WorldBank(2009),pp.97-104.
293
standardbearers(liketheUSandUK)tothetraditionallycontrolledandregulated(likewestern
Europehastraditionallybeenimagined)tothehealthycronyistiterations(SouthKorea,Japan)to
theelite-dominatedperipheraleconomiesoftheglobalsouth—,theempiricalrealityofmarket
competition,afterall,rarelymeasuresuptothatwhichhasbeendiscursivelyimagined.
Nevertheless,theJordanianmodalityisstillnotableforitslackofdynamism,foritsrigid
intraclasshierarchies,forthesocialinterlockingoftheeliteclassfraction,fortheenduring(if
transforming)hegemonyofinheritedwealthandoldguardluminaries,andforthesubtle
protectionismthestatecontinuestoprovideitsdomesticelitesinaneraofnominaleconomic
openness.542Thoughthismodalityofcompetitionhasfacilitatedanarrowelite’srealizationof
dependableprofits—stabilizingaccumulationandfurtherinstitutionalizingthecontemporary
SSAintheprocess—,itdoessoattheexpenseoflong-termdevelopmentandintraclassharmony.
542 Iwilldevelopthispointinmuchgreaterdetailinchapterten.
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CHAPTERNINE
SocialcontrolunderAbdullah
ThesocialcontrolregimeestablishedunderAbdullahduringthepasttwentyyears
evincesgreatercomplexitythantheoneconsolidatedbyhisfatherduringthepost-1973period.
Thoughcontributingtothestabilizationofcapitalaccumulation—andwhilecontributingtothe
profitsaccruingtoanelite,transnationalizedfractionofthebusinessclassinparticular—,this
iterationofHashemitesocialcontrolhasalsoprovenfarmorevolatilethanitspredecessor.
Thisvolatilityreduces,inpart,toAbdullah’sembraceofcoerciveandrepressivesocial
controltactics.WhereHussein’sregimehadcontainedanumberofcorporatistpracticesdesigned
toameliorateclasstensions,hisson’shasbeenpremisedonthegambitthatsilencecanbewon
throughrenderingworkingpeopleconstantlyprecarious.Whiletheeconomy’sreproductionof
starvationwagesandendemicsocialanxiety—inconjunctionwiththestate’scontinued
asphyxiationofworkingclassassociationallife—have,onoccasion,createdsuchdesperationas
toproducelevelsofcollectiveexhaustionthatmightpassforsocialpeace,ithasalsocreatedthe
kindsofconditionswithinwhichantagonisticandcontentiousformsofpoliticalcontention
inevitablyfoment.LiketheotherdimensionsofJordan’scontemporarySSA,then,thissocial
controlstrategyisalsobasictothecountry’scapitalismofcrisis.
ThisanalysisofsocialcontrolunderAbdullahwillbebrokenintofoursubsections.Inthe
first,Iwilldetailthelegal-coerciveaspectsofcontemporarysocialcontrol.Inthesecond,Iwill
focusinonthe(domesticandtransnational)segmentationofthelaborforceandconnectthisto
295
thestabilizationofelite-orientedaccumulation.Inthethird,Iwillturntotheproliferationof
micro,small,andmedium-sizedenterprisesanddiscusshowtheyhaveproblematizedthe
mobilizationofworkersolidarity.Finally,inthefourthsubsection,Iwilladdresshowthe
generalizedprecarityofthepopulationmayalsocontributetosocialcontrolinthecontemporary
period.
The GFJTU in the late Hussein period Insectiononeofthisdissertation,IdelineatedhowHusseinmanagedtobringorganizedlabortoheelinthewakeofBlackSeptember(1970-1971).Inconjunctionwiththerepressionofpartisanpolitics,theregime’ssuccessesincommandeeringthemaininstitutionalforaforworkingclassorganization—theGeneralFederationofJordanianTradeUnions(GFJTU)—andininterpellatingagenerationofdocile,sociallydisconnectedlaborleadersmadecertainthatorganizedlaborwassomethingofaspentforcebythetimeAbdullaheventuallycametopower. Thatorganizedlaborwasindeedaspent(andembourgeoised)forcebythelateryearsofKingHussein’srulewasquiteclearlyevincedbytheGFJTU’sineffectualresponsetotheflexibilizationandprivatizationinitiativesthatwereintroducedsubsequenttothearrivaloftheIMFin1989.543LocatingtheiroperationsinShmisani,oneofAmman’supperclassneighborhoods—andclosingdownlocalbranchesandofficesintherestofthecountry—,theGFJTUleadershipeffectivelysatoutthefight,offeringexceedinglylittleassistancetothoseindividualunionsthatattemptedtocontestthepiecemealprivatizationinitiativesofthemid-to-late1990s.544 Thoughtheyputupsomeresistanceto1996’snewLaborLaw,theireffortslargelycametonaught.Byconsequence,Article31ofthislawwouldestablishtheemployer’srightto“terminateworkcontractsofunlimitedperiod..ifeconomicortechnicalcircumstancemandatedthistermination”,whileArticle23wouldallowforemployerstodismissworkerswithoutneedingtoarticulatecauseorjustification.545 ThehollowingoftheGFJTUleftJordan’sworkingclassesdeprivedoftheinstitutionalandorganizationalstructuresitneededsotohaveanychanceofcontestingthestructuralreformpush.Withoutanymeansofconscientizing,mobilizing,protecting,oradvancingsocialandeconomicrights,Jordanianlaborstruggledtogetitsvoiceheardpriorto2011.
543 See:Hourani(2002),p.71544 Ibid,p.23545 Ibid,p.66
296
Beforegoinganyfurther,Ishouldnotethatmanyoftheargumentsbeingmadeinthese
pagesarefunctionalistinnature.Inotherwords,Iamnotnecessarilyascribingdesigntothis
socialcontrolstrategyortothesystemoflabormarketsegmentationthathascometoprevail
overthepasttwentyyears;similarly,Iamnotassigningperfectintentionalitytotheactors
(principally,thePalaceandtheelitefractionofthecapitalistclass)implicatedinandbenefiting
fromsuchasocialcontrolstrategy.Rather,Iamattemptingtodiscernthelogicofawidersystem,
onethatemergesbyitsownaccordthroughtheinterdependentmovementsandinteractionsof
differentplayersandinstitutions,andonethat,onceemergent,shallproceedtoshapesaid
movementsandinteractionshenceforth.
(1)TheJuridicalFoundationsofSocialControl
Inordertotracethecontoursofthesocialcontrolregimeinstitutionalizedunderthe
directionofKingAbdullah(etal),oneoughttobeginwiththatregime’sjuridicalfoundations.As
willbecomeclear,manyofthesefoundationsconstituteaninheritancebestowedbytheprevious
King.Regardlessoftheirsourceofprovenance,however,thesejuridicalfoundationsstructurethe
rightsoflabortoday—andtherelationshipbetweenlaborandthestate—allthesame.
Collectivelyfunctioningsotoimpedetheorganizationofworkplaces,diminishtheleverageof
collectivebargaining,atomizetheworkingclasses,anddisruptthemobilizationofworkingclass
interests(socially,politically,andeconomically),thisframeworkoflegalizedcoercion/discipline
delineatethetermsofcontemporaryclassrelationsandthestate’sself-assignedprerogativesin
297
mediatingclassrelations.Insodoing,itwillbeshowntofurtherconsolidateelitedominated
processesofcapitalaccumulation.
Thejuridicalfoundationsofcontemporarysocialcontrolcenteronthelegislationand
regulationofthreeparticularpolicydomains:(1)thedomainof(individualandcollective)labor
rights;(2)thedomainofimmigration;and(3)thedomainofindustrialpolicy.
LaborPolicy
Whenitcomestothefirstofthesedomains,theMinistryofLabor—withanassist,of
course,fromdomesticintelligence—remainstheprimaryinstitutionalactor.Itsregulatory
powersderivefromthediscretionaryauthoritiesitretainsovermattersofunionrecognition.
AcrossAbdullah’stenure,theMinistryhasusedtheseauthoritiesforthepurposesofanexplicitly
anti-laboragenda—asisevincedbythefactthatMoLhasrefusedtoconsignlegalexistenceonto
asinglenewunionoverthelasttwentyyears.
Byconsequence,theonlytradeunionsgrantedtherighttooperateatthetimeofwriting
aretheverysame(co-opted)seventeenunionsthatsurvivedthecullingsoftheearly1970s.546As
Section119oftheLaborCodeallowsthestatetolevyfinesuptoJD1000andtoproscribeprison
sentencesofuptothreemonthsforthoseindividualsthataredeemedtobemembertoanon-
recognizedand/ordissolvedtradeunion,theconsequencesforthosewhomighttrytoorganize
546 Intheseregards,itisworthnotingthatasof2019,theJordaniangovernmentwasstillyettosignILOConvention
87,therebyfreeingthestatefromanylegalcommitmenttowardscompetitiveunionism. OntheJordanianstate’swiderinternationalcommitments,see:MelaniCammettandMarshaPripsteinPosusney,
“LabormarketstandardsandlabormarketflexibilityintheMiddleEast:freetradeandfreerunions?,StudiesinComparativeInternationalDevelopment(45),2010.
298
outsidethosespacesandinstitutionsaccreditedbytheMinistrycanalsobeextremely
significant.547Withmigrantmigrantworkersstillprohibitedfromformingaunionorholding
officeinaunion548andwiththeMinistrystillexploitinglegalgrayareassotopreventagricultural
anddomesticworkersinparticularfromeitherjoiningorformingaunionaswell,theprospects
fornewunionizationsintheyearstocome—andforinstitutionalizedmobilizationsofworking
peoplemoregenerally—looknonetoopromising.549
Inpolicingandregulatingthebusinessofthoseunionsthataregrantedlicensetooperate,
moreover,Abdullah’sMinistryofLaborremainseverybitasdomineeringaswaspreviouslythe
case.Empowered,intheseregards,byavaguelycorporatistLaborCodethatdeprivesJordanian
unionsofthevastmajorityofthenegotiatingandbargainingtacticsthathavetraditionallybeen
inthetoolkitofworkers—andthatillegalizesandcriminalizesindependent,non-sanctioned
547 Onthistopic,see:InternationalTradeUnionConfederation,LettertoPrimeMinisterOmarRazzazre:LaborCode
Reforms:(January,2019). Awad(2016),p.4 Abdullah-eragovernmentshavefrequentlyusedthesemeanstotargetboththeleadershipandmembershipof
thetwelveindependentunofficialunionsthathaveemergedinthe2000s.Thoughtheseactorsareattemptingtoself-organizethroughtheJordanianFederationofIndependentTradeUnions—aninstitutionrepresentingindustrial,agricultural,andpublicsectorworkers—,regimehasprohibitedthemfromopeningofficers,collectivelybargaining,orcollectingmembershipfees.
548 Awad(2016),p.3. Amendmentsin2010didallowmigrantworkerstojoinaunion;giventhattheytendtoworkinsectorsand
activitiesdistinctanddiscretefromorganizedJordanianlabor(sectorswithinwhichnounionsareoperating),however,theamendmentfunctionallymakeslittledifference.
549 Afterall,byexcludingmigrantandagriculturalworkersinthismanner,thestateessentiallydeprives30-45%of
thelaborforceofitsbasiclaborrights—anddeprivestheunionsof30-45%oftheworkersitmightotherwisetrytomobilize.
Whatismore,evenwhenagroupofworkersmanagestoreceiveafavorablerulingfromajudge,theirprospects
ofunionizationcanstillbestifled.Recently,theMinistryofLaborhasrefusedtocountenancepublicsectorunionizationdespitearulingfromtheConstitutionalCourthavingestablishedthatcivilservantsindeedhavethatright(Awad,2016,p.5).
299
formsoforganizingandcontention—,theMoLleavestheseventeenoutfitsunitedunderthe
banneroftheGeneralFederationofJordanianTradeUnions(GFJTU)withbutthehollowest
formsofagencyandindependence.Whenitcomestostriking,forinstance,Sections134and135
oftheLaborCodestipulatethatworkersmaynotusethistacticwhenadisputeisinarbitration,
thatworkerscannotgoonstrikewithoutprovidingtheemployeratleastfourteendaysofnotice
(28daysinthecaseofthepublicsector),andthatthestatecanfineparticipantsinillegalstrikes
50JD(and5JDforeverydaythestrikepersists).Inconjunctionwithlegislationassigningthe
stateinterestakindoflegalontologicalpriorityinthefinalinstance,thespecteroftotalizing
repressionistherebymadetohangeternallyovertheneckoforganizedlabor—assection116of
Jordan’slaborlawmakesratherominouslyclear:
TheMinistermayinstitutejudicialproceedingsbeforethecourtoffirstinstanceforthedissolutionofanytradeunion,ifit:a)violatesanyprovisionofthisCode,providedthattheMinisterhadalreadysenttheunion,beforeinstitutingtheproceedings,writtennoticetoceasetheviolationwithinadeterminedtime-limitandthatthetradeuniondidnotrespondtosuchnotice;(b)instigateswalkouts,workstoppage,stay-instrikesordemonstrationsincaseswheresuchactionsareprohibitedunderthisCodeoranyotherlegislationinforce.
WiththelowerhousehavingrecentlypassedaseriesofnewamendmentstotheLaborcode—
amendmentssubjectingunionbylawstotheoversightandapprovaloftheMinistryofLabor—,
thepolicing,surveilling,andadministeringoforganizedlaborseemspoisedtoonlyintensifyin
thefuture.550
550 See:JordanLaborWatch,“IndependentTradeUnionsrejectlaborlawamendments”,Report:PhenixCenter
EconomicandInformaticStudies(2018).Accessibleat:http://labor-watch.net/ar/read-news/151129?fbclid=IwAR1PMR-zmWqCS11O5QVLAYy3kLvO2pJ_nxbhpmvkOhpkS19IhuA-UIGZbmg
300
Incoercivelysnuffingoutnewunionsandregulating/infiltratingextantonesinto
ineffectuality,thejuridicalmaneuversinthedomainofcollectivelaborrightsjustdescribed
constituteanecessaryandhighlypotent(ifalsoinsufficient)componentofcontemporarysocial
control.Throughthecombinationofthesemeans,organizedlaborhasbeencondemnedintoa
growingirrelevance—afatethatisreflectedintheGFJTU’sdwindlingmembershiprollsandin
sharplydecliningtradeunionmembertototalemploymentrates551—,andlaboringpopulations
havebeenleftwithouttheindependentorganizationalvectorstheyneedinordertoarticulate
collectivegrievance,identity,andinterest.Suchoutcomesarehighlyconducivetothecapital-
dominatedvisionofsocialpeacethatispartandparcelofthewiderneoliberalmodalityof
capitalism.
Ifthestate’slegalandregulatoryinterventionsinthedomainofcollectivelaborrights
constitutesonepillarofthecontemporarysocialcontrolstrategy’sjuridicalfoundations,as
intimated,legalinterventionsinthedomainofindividuallaborrightsrepresentanessentialalbeit
complementarybulwarktosaidfoundations.Herein,oneneedbeginwithlegislationrelatedto
theflexibilizationofthelabormarket.552Likewithunionpolicy,flexibilization’slegislative
genealogytracesbacktobeforeAbdullah’scoronation.
551 Thoughrepresenting230,000workersasof2000,theaggregatemembershipoftheunionsorganizedunderthe
GFJTUisonly200,000asofthetimeofwriting. Wherethetradeunionmemberstototalemploymentratehadbeen20%asof2000,itnowsitsaround6%. See:DanishTradeUnionCouncilforInternationalDevelopmentCooperation,Report:JordanLabourMarket
Profile2018. 552 ItshouldbeacknowledgedthatinitiallegislationrelatedtoflexibilizationprecededAbdullah’stenureasKing
(thefirstreformwaspassedin1996).
301
1996’sLaborLawno.8—pushedthroughtheLowerHousewithanudgefromIMF
technocrats553—markedthemaidenvoyageofflexibilization.Amongstotherthings,thispieceof
legislationremovedanumberoflimitsrelatedtotemporaryworkcontracts554andprovided
employerswiththerighttosuspendorterminatecontractsofindefiniteandlimitedduration
should“economicortechnicalconditionsmandate”itso.”555Throughdefiningthelegal
conditionsunderwhichworkerscanbefiredinsuchhermeneuticallydiffuselanguage,Lawno.8
unsurprisinglyfacilitatedariseinarbitrarydismissalsuponitspassageintolaw.556
Therelationshipbetweentheinstitutionalizationofemployerfiringpowersandsocial
controlisnotdifficulttoimagine.Asthespecterofarbitrarydismissalhangs,itistobeexpected
(anditisempiricallyverified)thatworkerswillbechastenedintoeitherquiescenceorinto
553 Onthisnudge,see:CammettandPripsteinPosusney(2010),p.271.554 Italsoestablishedthatasingletemporarycontractcouldextentuptofiveyears;functionallyspeaking,then,this
lawallowedforemployerstoextendtemporaryworkcontractsindefinitely.555 Article26ofthelawcoversthedismissaloflimited-contractworkers. Article31providesemployerswiththerightto“terminateworkcontractsofunlimitedperiod,eitherfully,
partially,ortosuspendthem,ifeconomicortechnicalcircumstancesmandatedthisterminationorsuspension.”Article23ofthelawstipulatesthatanemployermaydismissaworkerwithoutneedingtoprovideareason(Hourani,65).Thoughsections32and33ofthelaborlawprovidesomemeansforseekingredressshouldaworkerbelieveher/himselftobewronglydismissed,courtshavenottypicallybeenfavorabletothesecases.
Itshouldbesaidthatamendmentstothelaborlawin2017and2018havesoughttoredoundsomeofthe
benefitsofflexibilitybackontotheworkers.Provisionshavebeenestablishedwherebyanemployeewhohasworkedfull-timeforthreeconsecutiveyearsataplaceofworkmay,duetofamilyoreducationalneeds,transitionintoremotework,part-timework,orvariablescheduledworkwhilestillretainingtheirrighttoreturntofull-timeworkatalaterdate.Nonetheless,onbalance,flexibilizationhasinevitablyfunctionedsotofurtherstackthedeckinfavorofemployers,andhastherebyprovidedakeymechanismforsocialcontrol.Incombinationwithmigrationpoliciesandthenegativeexternalitiesgeneratedbyformalization,flexibilizationhasexposedallJordanianworkersbutespeciallythoseatthebottomofthewagestructuretothevagariesanddesperationofadogeatdogmarket.
556 ThoughanumberofamendmentswereintroducedtoLawno.8inAugustof2002,noneinvalidatedtheoriginal
pieceoflegislation’sintroductionofeasyfiringandflexiblelaborcontracting.
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acceptingsubstandardwagesandworkconditions.Withinthecontextofsuchpowerrelations,
thesubsequentflexibilizationofworkarrangements—whichhasresultedinavastincreaseinthe
prevalenceofpart-timeworkandfixed-timecontracts,atopicIwilldiveintoindetailina
forthcomingsubsectionongeneralizedprecarity—onlyfurtherforcesthehandoflabor.Ifless
kineticintheireffectsthanpreviouslydescribedcrackdownsonorganizedlabormightbe,by
deprivingworkersofbasicprotectionsandremovingwhatlimitedleveragetheyalreadyhadvis-
a-visemployers,thesejuridicalinterventionscertainlycontributetothediscipliningofthe
workingclassesaswellastotheprofitratesofcapital.
ImmigrationPolicy
Asmentionedattheoutset,thejuridicalfoundationsofcontemporarysocialcontrolrest
notsolelyonthestate’slegislativeandregulatoryinterventionsinthedomainoflaborpolicy,but
alsoonitsinterventions—ormorespecifically,onthestate’spurposefulneglectand
(non)regulation—inthedomainofimmigrationpolicy.Inpreviouschapters,Ihavedetailedhow
legislationinthispolicydomainwasusedtobringhundredsofthousandsoflegallyvulnerable,
sociallyprecarious,lowskill/lowwageworkersintoJordan.Morethanconstitutingakindof
subsidyforprivatefirmsoperatinginthefieldsofagriculture,construction,realestate,and
garmentmanufacturing,IhaveshownhowthesemigrantshavealsosegmentedtheJordanian
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laborforce—andfurtherunderminedtheprospectsofworkingclassmobilizationinthe
process.557
Whilethesepermitted,state-sanctionedinflowsoflabormigrantshavethemselves
contributedtotheregimeofsocialcontrolconsolidatedunderAbdullah’stenureinanumberof
ways558,atthisjuncture,Iwanttotodrawattentiontotherolethatthestate’swillfulneglectof
illegal,non-permittedlabormarketparticipantsplaysintheAbdullah-erasocialcontrolstrategy.
Atthetimeofwriting,therearemorethan500,000non-permittedmigrantsemployedinthe
Jordanianlabormarket.Themagnitudeofthisillegalsurpluslaborforce—ontop,ofcourse,of
theextantlegalsurpluslaborforce—notonlyfunctionssotodepressthewagestructurein
Jordan;italsonecessitatesthatlow-skillJordanianlaborerstooperateunderthesameextralegal
rulesofemploymentthattheprecariousstockofEgyptianandSyriansworkersdo.
Insodoing,thestate’sregulatoryneglectofmigrantworkerpopulationsinthelabor
marketforcesthemostvulnerableofJordanianworkerstoracetothebottomshouldtheyhopeto
haveanychanceofprovidingabasiclevelofsustenancefortheirfamilies.Rendereddesperate,
atomized,andpermanentlyinsecure,suchJordanianworkers—manyofwhomareforcedto
reckonwiththerealitiesofinformalityaswell—tendtoevincethesocialandpolitical
557 Thedomesticworkersamongstthesemigrantshavealsoactedasadefactosubsidyforthemiddleclasses,as
theircheapwagesandlegalprecarityallowsmanyfamiliestosecurehousekeepersandnanniesforarelativepittance.
558 Aswillbediscussedinthesubsectiononlabormarketsegmentation,themagnitudeofnon-nativeworkersinthe
labormarket—andthelegalrestrictionsimpedingtheirinclusioninunionizationefforts—makesthemobilizationofworkers’actionsandworkingclasspoliticsfarmoredifficultthanitmightotherwisebe.
304
expressionshistoricallyexpectedoflumpenproletarians.559Manifestinthisclassfraction’s
generalizeddeactivationasasocialorpoliticalforce—aclaimempiricallycorroboratedbytheir
infrequentparticipationinprotests,strikes,orothercollectiveactionsaimedatadvancing
structuralchange560asmuchasintheirlowervotingrates—,thesocialcontroleffectsofthis
immigration-powereddesperationshouldbeobviousenough.Withforeignworkersdisciplined
bylegalprecarityandnativeworkerslackingthereservesofcognitive,social,andmaterialenergy
thatarethepreconditionsofinsurgentcitizenship,themobilizationofeithersolidarityorananti-
capitalchallengeismadefraught.
IndustrialPolicy
Thelastofthejuridicalfoundationsofcontemporarysocialcontrol,finally,havebeenbuilt
andfortifiedwithinthedomainofindustrialpolicy.Specifically—andbyconsequenceofthe
state’saforementionedmodalityoflaissez-faireindustrialpolicy561—,Jordan’sphysicalspacehas
559 Formoreoninformality’srelationshiptopoliticalquiescence(ifnotright-wingpolitics),see:KennethRoberts,
“SocialinequalitieswithoutclasscleavagesinLatinAmerica’sneoliberalera”,StudiesinComparativeInternationalDevelopment(36:4),2002.
AndyBakerandVaniaXimenaVelasco-Guachalla,“Istheinformalsectorpoliticallydifferent?(Null)AnswersfromLatinAmerica”,WorldDevelopment(102),2018.
560 Thisclassfraction’snon-participationinprotestsisalsocomparativelylow(vis-a-visformal,full-timeworkers).
ThisisconfirmedindatafromtheArmedConflictLocationandEventDataprojectandinexaminationsoftherecentinstancesofmajorworkermobilizationsinJordan,whichshowthelumperproletarianstobeanon-factorforalleffectsandpurposes.
561 Includedwithinthesespaces,ofcourse,istheAqabaSpecialEconomicZonethatwasdiscussedatlengthinthe
previouschapter.Mostclearlyevincingthesocial,political,andeconomicimpactthatindustrialremappingcanhave,recallthatAqabaisnowgovernedbytheunelectedAqabaSpecialEconomicZoneAuthority(ASEZA).SubjectedtoanumberofspeciallawsandregulationsparticulartoASEZA’sdominion,thepeopleofAqabaanditssurroundingenvironsnowlack,inmanyinstances,theavenuesofbasiclegalrecoursethataretypicallyaffordedJordaniancitizens.ThoughIhavealreadydemonstratedhowfreelythestatedisregardsitsownlaws
305
cometobepartitionedintoahighlycomplexlegalgeographydefinedbyavastconstellationof
specialdevelopmentzones,specialfreezones,andindustrialestates.
Atthetimeofwriting,thirty-sevenprivately-runfreeeconomiczonesareinoperationin
Jordaninadditiontosixpublicly-runfreeeconomiczones,twospecialdevelopmentzones,and
sixindustrialestates(withanotherfiveplannerfortheyearsahead).Asthesespacesofexception
aresubjectedtotheirownspeciallaws562,astheyareoftenpopulatedbyacutelyprecarious
migrantlabor,andastheyarequiteliterallyfencedandwalledofffromtherestofJordanian
territory,thislegalremappingofJordanfunctionssotomakethelogisticalorganizationof
workersextremelydifficult.563WhenoneconsidersthatJordan’sexportprocessingzonesare
almostentirelyinsulatedfromtherestoftheeconomyaswell564,thelegalgeographydemarcated
byindustrialpolicydecisionscannothelpbuttohavehinderedthemobilizationofcross-sector,
economywideworkersolidarityaswell.
andprocesseswhenitcomestolaborissues—whetherinAmman,Ajloun,oranywhereelse—,deprivingAqaba’sworkersoftheseavenuesnonethelessrendersthemevenmorevulnerablethanisthecaseelsewhereinJordan.Inalsocomplicatingeffortstomobilizecollectivestrugglesatanationallevel,thelegalseparatenessofAqabamostcertainlycomestofunctionsotofacilitatesocialcontrol.
562 Thoughsubjectedtoslightdifferences,ingeneral,thistreatmentprovidesallfirmswithinsuchspaceswithaflat
5%corporatetaxrate,exemptionsorreductionsononsalestax,incometaxonexportedgoods,landtaxandbuildingtaxes,dividendstax,customduties,andsocialsecuritycontributions,defactoregulatoryneglectoflaborrights,unlimited,non-conditionalrightswhenitcomestoimportingandemployingforeignworkersandallowsfor100%foreignownership(See:InvestmentLawNo.30,2014).Garmentworkers—comprisingalargeportionofthelaborforceinthesezones—arealsoexemptfromthestate’sminimumwagelegislation.
563 Foreignworkersarefrequentlyhousedinspecialon-sitedormitories;asdiscussed,theyarealsonotallowedto
formunions.564 Recallfromthepreviouschapterthatthefirmsinthesezonesimporttheirindustrialinputsasmuchastheydo
theirlaborforce.
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Whatismore,thespatializationofproductionthattheseexportprocessingzones
facilitate565andgivehosttoonlyfurtherintensifiesthesocialcontroleffectshithertodescribed.
RecallfromthepreviouschapterthatJordan’shostofexportprocessingzoneshavecometobe
dominatedbySouthAsiangarmentmanufacturers.Whetherthisdominanceisintrinsicallyan
issueornot,thenon-conditionalnatureoftheincentivesandsubsidiesaffordedtofirms
operatingwithinsaidzones566concomitantlydeprivestheJordanianstate(anditsworkers)of
anymeansofpushingbackagainstthefootlooseinvestmentandoperationsthatthese
manufacturerstendtopractice.567Abletopackupandleaveatamoment’snoticeshouldworkers
ortheJordanianstateattempttonegotiateorimposeanychangetothefirms’preferredwaysof
doingbusiness—threatsmademoreconvincingbythefactthatthesefootlooseinvestorscan
easilyrelocatetoMorocco,whoseownFTAgrantsfirmsoperatingtherewiththesametariff-free
accesstotheUnitedStates—,spatialization(andlaissez-faireindustrialpolicymoregenerally)
haslicensedSouthAsiancapitaltoleverageitsunrestrictedandabsolutemobilitysotokeep
workersinlinewithremarkableeffectiveness.568Despitethesefirmsbeingnotoriousforpayroll
delinquency,highturnoverrates,andforinducinginjuriesattheworkplace—anddespitethe
565 Recall,perWallaceandBrady,thattheconceptofspatializationdescribeshowboththerelocationofproduction
andthethreatofrelocationfunctionsotodisciplinelabor.Forcedtocompeteforcapitalandmadetooperateundertherulesandlogicofsuchacompetition,thetwoarguethatspatializationnotonlyimpliesaracetothebottomforlaborbutalsoaformofcoercion,onewherethespecterofcapitalflightcanpurchasequietudeandahighlyhierarchicalformofsocialpeace.
566 Ihavediscussed2014’sInvestmentLawNo.30and2008’sDevelopmentZoneLawno.2indetailinchaptereight.567 Thenon-capitalintensivenatureofthegarmentindustrymeansthatfactoriescanbemovedrelativelyeasilyand
relativelyquickly.568 SpecifictoJordan’sQIZ-era,see:Kardooshandal-Khouri(2004),p.28.
307
AFL-CIO’sSolidarityCenterhavingpreviouslydescribedlaborconditionswithinJordan’sexport
processingzonesas“tantamounttobondedlabor”569—,theyhaveproventeflontolaboraction.
Forallthesereasons,then,itishardtoimaginethattheregime’sprolificacyinconjuringand
administeringanetworkofexportprocessingzoneshasnotalsocontributedtoalegal-
administrativearchitecturefunctioningsotomakethearticulationofworkingclassinterests
undulyburdensome.
ThePraetorianGuardsofPalaceandCapital
Finally,Iwouldberemissinclosingthissubsectiononthejuridicalstructuresofsocial
controlwereInottomentionhowthestate’slegaleffortsinenforcingclassdominationare
enhancedbytheoccasionaladoptionofextralegalmechanismsofenforcementandpunishment.
CriticalintheseregardshavebeenarecentlyestablishedPalace-alignedbranchofthemilitary
colloquiallyreferredtoasal-Derak.Thoughal-Derak’soperationsarediverseandopaque,when
itcomestosocialcontrol,Iwouldpositthattheyrepresentaspecterandinstrumentofstate-
capitalviolence—aPraetorianguardloyalandaccountabletothePalacealonethatwillact,inthe
finalinstance,atthebehestoftheKingandhistransnationalclassallies.Onthisbasis—and
despitetheirinterventionsbeingrelativelyinfrequent570—,Iwouldthereforearguethatby
569 See:MaryNazzal,EconomicReforminJordan:AnAnalysisofStructuralAdjustmentandQualifiedIndustrialZones,
p.15.570 Al-Derak’spresenceandfunctionwasmostobviouslyseenin2009,whentheyweresenttoputdowntheport
workers’strikeinAqabathatemergedfollowingthesaleofsaidporttoal-Maabar,aUAEbasedmega-developmentfirm.AshasbeendetailedatlengthbyAdely,Tell,andmanyothers,al-Derakmetthepeaceful
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remindingthosewhomightseektochallengecapitaland/orthestateofthestickthatisthe
ultimateguarantoroftheKing’sneoliberalproject,theprospectandpossibilityofal-Derak’s
morekinetic,extralegalpracticesofcoercionanddisciplineissufficientforfurtherenhancingthe
efficacyofthejuridicalfoundationspreviouslydescribed.
(2)LaborMarketSegmentation
Labormarketsegmentation,whichisbothanoutcomeoftheprocesseshithertodetailed
andanautonomous,somewhatself-containedvariableindependentlyimplicatedinthe
contemporarysocialcontrolregime571,isalsocentraltothediscipliningandcontainmentofthe
Jordanianworkingclasses.Reflectingandaugmentingtheeffectsproducedbyjuridical
institutionalization,segmentationfunctionssotodeepenpreexistingintraandinterclass
divisions—whethertheybebasedonsectoral,ethnic,national,orgenerationalcleavages.Further
complicatingthelayofthelandforthosewhomightaspiretomobilizecollectivegrievanceorto
buildnetworksofsocialsolidarity,segmentationtherebymakesasignificantcontributiontothe
stabilizationofJordan’selite-dominatedmodalityofcrisiscapitalism.
protestsoftheportworkerswithbrutalviolence.Sixty-fivepeoplewerearrested,onesentintoacoma,andahandfulofothersbadlyinjured(DeBruyne,2013,p.196).
571 Inasense,then,segmentationcontainsdescriptive(i.e.itdescribestheeffectsofjuridicalprocesses)andcausal
properties(i.e.itcontributestosocialcontrolitself).
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LabormarketsegmentationinJordanisorganizedaroundtwoprincipalcleavages.The
firstcleavageseparatesworkersinthepublicsectorfromthoseintheprivatesector.This
cleavagecontainsethnicpropertiesbyvirtueofthepost-1971dePalestinianizationofthepublic
sector,andgenerationalpropertiesbyvirtueofpost-1989fiscalconsolidationaswell.572The
secondcleavage,meanwhile,separatesworkerswhoareJordaniancitizensfromthosewhoare
not.
Thefirstofthesecleavageshaslonggeneratedagreatdealofscholarlyandpolitical
attention.Asitrelatestosocialcontrol,thesegmentationofworkersbetweenpublicandprivate
sectors—aswellastheinfrequencywithwhichanindividualmightcrossthiscleavage—notonly
partitionslargesegmentsoftheworkingclassintotwoseparateandrelativelyunbridgeable
camps;italsoallowspoliticians,policymakers,andforeigntechnocratstotheninvesteachof
thosecampswithallegedlydivergentifnotantagonisticinterests.Thiscynicalpittingofworker
againstworkerhasbeenseeninanumberoftheanti-publicsectorcampaignsthathavebeen
launchedbytheIFIsandtheircompradorassociateswithinGenerationAbdullahacrossthepast
twentyyears.Presentingthedeprivation,deficientjobcreation,andlackofsecuritythatis
structuraltoprivatesectoremploymentnotasaproductofthemarket’senduring(andintrinsic)
failuresbutasaproductofthedecentwagesandbenefitsonofferinthepublicsector,these
campaignssingularlyattributethepovertyoftheneoliberaleraontothestateandthose
incumbentswhosecuretheirfamily’swelfarethroughemploymentinit.Itisadiscourse
572 Underthepublicsectorcategory,Iincludeboththoseworkingdirectlyforthestate(agroupinclusiveofcivil
servantsandmilitarypersonnel)aswellasthoseworkingforstate-ownedenterprisesandnominallyautonomousinstitutionsliketheSSC.
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imaginingthatunemploymentwillgoawayoncethepromiseofpublicsectorwagesandbenefits
ceasedistortingtheexpectationsofjobseekers,andonethatevokesteleologicalreasoningsoto
assertthatthecollectiveinterestwillbeservedbyallworkersaccommodatingthemselvesto
prerogativesofprivatecapitalandtheaustereimperativesofglobalcompetition.
Byrefracting(publicandprivatesector)workers’resentmentsawayfromthesourceof
theircollectivediscontentandontooneanother,thecontributionthatsuchasegmentation-
deriveddiscourseofferstosocialcontrolisconsiderable.Whenthepublic-privatesectorcleavage
isanimatedbyexistential,ethnicizedcontentthroughtheassociationof(lazy)publicsectorwork
withethnicTransjordanianness,thisaspectoflabormarketsegmentationcanbecomeevenmore
destructivetotheprospectsofworkingclasspolitics/solidarity.Thesame,ofcourse,canalsobe
saidforthegenerationaldividethatisalsocontainedwithinthepublic-privatesectorcleavage.
Similarlyavailableforthosewhowouldprefertoascribetheprecarityandhopelessnessofsome
workingpeople(specifically,theyoungjobseeker)nottothefailingsofcontemporarycapitalism,
buttotheexcessandgreedofotherworkingpeople(specifically,incumbent,grandfathered-in
publicsectorworkers),theinvocationofgenerationalbeefinfactrepresentsoneofthemore
commonrefrainseeninthediscoursesofmystificationjustdescribed.Astheyounghaveindeed
beenforcedtodisproportionallyshouldertheburdenandcostsofAbdullah’sneoliberalism—and
asolder(orretired)publicsectorworkersareindeednaturallyapprehensiveatthethoughtof
thetransformationalchangetheyoungmightseektoachieveduetothestaketheyretaininthe
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statusquo573—,thegenerationaldivideonlyfurthermuddlesthebuildingofclasssolidarity,and
onlyfurtherabetssocialcontrol.
Adirectoutcomeofthestate’sjuridicalinterventionsinthedomainofimmigrationpolicy,
thesecondcleavageundergirdingthesegmentationoftheJordanianlabormarketistheone
separatingJordanianfromnon-Jordaniancitizen.Beforeaddressingthisdirectly,oneneedfirst
familiarizeoneselfwiththescopeandmagnitudeofcontemporaryJordan’snon-national
populations.
Aswasbrieflytouchedonearlierinthischapter,byconsequenceofbothexogenous
shocks574anddesignedimmigrationpolicies575,theethnicandnationalcompositionofthe
573 Aswasdetailedinthepreviouschapter,therelativefootprintofpublicemploymenthasshrunkconsiderablyin
thepost-1989period.Inbrokeringthispartialretreat,however,thestatehastendedtoprotectincumbentsattheexpenseofnewjobseekers.Inotherwords,thereducedrelativefootprintisafunctionofhiringfreezesmorethanitisofmasslayoffs.
Inadditiontoavoidinganythingresemblingmasslayoffs,protectionofincumbentshasmeantpreservingthe
extensivehealthcareandretirementbenefitsthatHussein’spolicymakershadputinplaceduringthepost-1973period.Atatimewhentheyoungaresufferingfromhistoricallyhighlevelsofunemployment,then,theyarealsoforcedtoobservemembersoftheoldergenerationsoptingforearlyretirementandexperiencingalevelofsocialsecuritywhollyunknowntothoseunderthirty-fiveyearsofage.
574 InadditiontotheSyrianrefugeecrisis,thesecondIntifadaandthesecondGulfWaralsoprecipitatedmass
migrationsoutofPalestineandIraq,respectively.575 Certainly,theSyrianinfluxwasonenotdesiredbytheJordanianstateoritsbusinessclass.However,asSyrian
refugeescontributenomorethan20%ofthetotalnumberofnon-Jordaniansworkinginthecountry,thepervasivenessofforeignlabortodaycannotbepinnedonthemoronexternaleventsmoregenerally.
Indeed,aswasearlierdiscussed,itisimportanttoemphasizethatthisparticularaspectofJordan’slabormarket
segmentationhasbeenachievedthroughthewillfulinterventionsofpolicyplannerandcapitalistelitealike,atleastinpart.Theseforeignlaborersarecritical,afterall,totheagriculturalsector,toconstructionandurbanrenewal,andtotheexport-orientedindustrialpoliciesthathavebeenundertakenoverthepasttwentyyears.Specifictothelatter,theconstellationofspecialeconomiczones,qualifyingindustrialzones,andspecialdevelopmentzonesnowexistingoutsidethelegalgeographyofthestatehavenotonlyentrenchedSouthAsiancapitalandthere-exportationoflowsophisticationtextilesattheheartofthecountry’sindustrialcore.Asthefirmsoperatinginthoseexportprocessingzonescompetebasedonimplicitsubsidiesaffordedbythestate—subsidiesinclusiveofaforeignlaborstockthatcanbepaidsub-marketwages—,theyhaverequiredthatJordaniangovernmentsinsureasteadysupplyofnon-Jordanianlabor.Theprofitsachievedinurbanrenewal—whetherthroughrealestatespeculation,construction,orvariousotherenterprisescenteredonthe
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Jordanianpopulationtodayhasbeenmadeincrediblediverse.A2015censusshowed2.9million
non-nationalsresidingaJordan,afigurerepresenting30.6%ofthetotalpopulation.Asthis
translatesintothelabormarket,priortotheArabUprisings,theMinistryofLaborhadestimated
thatsomewherebetween350,000and500,000non-nationalswereworking(legallyandillegally)
inJordan.576Thesenumberswouldsubsequentlyclimbevenhigher,however,followingthe
outbreakoftheSyriancivilwar.Fromthatresultinginflowalone,somewherebetween70,000to
100,000non-nationalworkerswereaddedtotheJordanianlaborpool.AportionoftheseSyrian
workerswoundupeventuallybeinggivenpapersbytheJordanianstate.
Incombinationwithcontinuinglegalinflowsfromotherpartsoftheregion,theranksof
Jordan’spermit-holdingforeignworkercommunitygrewto396,091asof2017accordingtothe
registriesoftheMinistryofLabor.577Asfornon-permitted,illegalforeignlaborers,theMinistry
estimatedthatfiguretohavereachedatleast500,000bythemiddleofthe2010s.Conservatively,
then,atthetimeofwriting,onecanassumethataminimumof900,000non-Jordaniansworkers
areparticipatingintheJordanianlabormarket.578Asfaraspercentagesgo,non-Jordaniansnow
transformationofthebuiltenvironment—,aresimilarlycontingentuponthepresenceofcheap,non-nationallabor.
576 See:MinistryofPlanningandInternationalCooperation,NationalEmploymentStrategy:2011-2020
(Amman:2010).577 Thisincreaseinthepermitsissuedtoforeignworkersoccurreddespitepolicymakershavingpledgedtostopthe
issuanceofnewpermitsinJuneof2016. See:KirkSowell,“ReformingJordan’sLaborMarket.”Report:Sada,CarnegieEndowmentforInternationalPeace
(2017),p.2.578 See:MinistryofLabor,TheNationalLabourMarketIndicators2013-2017(Amman,2018),p.29. TheMinistryclassifies340,995ofthisnumberas“migrantworkers.”
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constitutebetween31-40%ofthetotalemployedpopulationinJordan.579Whenitcomestotheir
contributiontothewiderworkforce—i.e.thoseindividualsthatareemployedorcurrently
searchingforwork—,non-Jordaniansnowconstituteatleast36%ofthenationaltotal(upfrom
16%in2004).
Thereaderhaslikelyanticipatedsomeoftheeffectsthatthistransnationalizationofthe
laborforce—andthecleavageitdefineswithintheworkingclass—hasvis-a-viscontemporary
socialcontrol.Aswaspreviouslydiscussed,bymakinganarmyofextralegal,non-nationalsurplus
laboreternallyavailable,theregime’simmigrationpolicieshavedraggeddownthewage
structureandaffordedemployerswiththealternativeofoptingoutfromdomesticlabor(should
itunionize,orseektocollectivelybargain)wheneveritmightbenecessary.Whatismore,the
presenceofthesesurpluspopulations—themajorityofwhicharelackinginproperlegalrights—
simultaneouslyforcesthoseJordaniansatthebottomofthelabormarkettocompeteunderthe
conditionsthatthosedesperateEgyptiansandSyriansarewillingtocompeteunder.Poor
Jordaniansinparticularmustthereforeacceptthefundamentalprecarityandlackofrecourse
thatisbasictothemigrantorrefugeelesttheyfaceajoblessfuture.580Byconsequence,the
presenceofmassivemigrantstocksinJordanallowsthecapitalistclasstopoliceandcheckthe
ambitionofthetrulydisinherited,furthermuddyinganyattemptatclass-basedmobilization.
579 See:AssaadandSalemi(2018),p.5.580 Asof2015,anestimated86%ofSyrianslivinginJordanianurbanareaswerebelowthepovertyline(Belair,
2016p.2).
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LongerTermTrendsinLaborMigration581
Nordothesocialcontroleffectsofthiscleavageendthere.Foranumberofreasons,the
largenumberofpermittedforeignlaborersincertainsectorsoftheeconomyalsocomplicate
attemptsatcollectiveactionandunionization.Tobegin,duetothevulnerabilitythatisintrinsic
totheirlegalcategory,thesepopulationsaredisincentivizedagainstparticipatinginadversarial
campaignsagainstemployers.Theyarealsodisallowedfromformingtheirownunions.Byvirtue
ofthefactthatmanyeconomicsectorsareratherneatlysegmentedalongnationallines,thislegal
provisionlargelypreventssuchpopulationsfromjoininganexistingunionaswell(asthere
wouldbenouniontojoinshouldasectorbepredominatedbyEgyptianlaborinthefirstplace).
Inadditiontoprecipitatingsomeresentmentsofthe“they’retakingourjobs”variety,then,the
581 TablesandchartsprovidedbyBelair(2016),pp.4,8
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hugepresenceofmigratorylaboralsomakestheorganizationofclasssolidarityafarmoretricky
operation.
(3)MSME-basedatomization
Asof2016,17%oftheJordanianlaborforcewasself-employed.582AcrossAbdullah’s
tenure,moreover,apluralityofJordanianwageworkershavepliedtheirtradewithina
microenterprise.583Thesefirms,employingtenemployeesorless,predominantlyoperatewithin
thecountry’soversaturatedretailsector.Theproliferationofbothmicroenterprisesandself-
employmentarenotrandomoccurencesbut,rather,thedesignedanddesiredproductofthe
stateinitiateddevelopmentandpovertyalleviationstrategies.584
Misguidedandcounterproductivethoughthesestrategiesmaybevis-a-vistheirown
explicitgoals,theyarenoteworthytotheextentthattheyhaveindirectlycontributedtosocial
control.Regardingself-employmentandreluctantentrepreneurship,itishistoricallywell
582 RehamRizkandColetteSalemi,“OwnaccountworkersinJordan:profileandcharacteristics”,EconomicResearch
ForumWorkingPaperno.1218(2018),p.14.583 Asof2016,29%ofJordanianlaborersworkedinamicroenterprise,downfrom33%in2010.Muchofthis
declineisexplainedbyatransferofworkersfrommicroenterprisestosmallenterprises(thoseemploying10-99employees):theshareofthoseemployedinsmallenterprisesgrewfrom28%in2010to37%in2016.
See:JordanLaborMarketPanelSurvey2016.584 Self-employment,ownaccountemployment,andhouseholdentrepreneurialismhasbeenconsistently
championedbytheJordanianstateandtheinternationalfinancialinstitutionsalike.Thisissodespitethereplicative,non-innovativenatureofmicroenterprisesinaneconomylikeJordan’s.Itisalsosodespitethefactthatthedemandforthesimplegoodsproducedbysuchenterpriseswillbeinevitablyboundbyinelasticity.Giventhecountry’sdistancefromtheglobaltechnologicalfrontier,afterall,thesebusinessesdon’twindupmakingmicroprocessors;theyeithermakesimpletrinketsorsellchipsandsodainadukan.Bypushingmoreandmorepeopleintothislineofwork,thecountry’sdevelopmentstrategydoesnotgrowthepie—itdividesitintosmallerandsmallerslices.
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establishedthatsuchaformofworktendstobeassociatedwiththespreadofreactionary,petite
bourgeoisideologyandpoliticaltendencies.585BypushingsomanyJordanianworkersintosucha
socialcondition,then,thestate’sdevelopmentandpovertyalleviationpoliciesnecessarilyhelpto
mitigatethepossibilityofworkingclassmobilizations.
Inaddition,theproliferationofself-employmentandmicroenterprisesalsofunctionsto
deprivelaboractivistsofthelargeshopfloorsandmass-employingindustrialworkplacesthat
arethesinequanonofunionization,workingclassbargainingpower,andlaborpolitics.586
Whetherthiswastheintentofpolicymakersornot,then,thesedevelopment/povertyalleviation
programshavesimultaneouslyservedsotoatomizethelaborforceandsotoimpedethe
conscientizationofcollectivesolidarity.Scatteringanddisorientingthelowerclasses,theireffect
onsocialcontrol(andthewiderembeddingofneoliberalcapitalism)shouldnotbediminished.
(4)GeneralizedPrecarity
Finally,Iwanttoclosebyemphasizinghowthegeneralizedprecaritythathasbeen
producedthroughallthesemechanismsofsocialcontrol—fromlegalassaultsonunionizationto
labormarketflexibilization;frommigrationpolicytoMSMEpromotion—mayitselfcontributeto
socialcontrol.RecallfromtheopeningchapterthatthevastmajorityofJordanianwageworkers
585 Formoreonthis,see:AbhijitBanerjeeandEstherDufloPoorEconomics:ARadicalRethinkingoftheWaytoRight
GlobalPoverty.PublicAffairs,2011.586 Indicativeofthedifficultylaborershaveinadvancingtheirinterestswithinsmallworkplaces,only3%ofthose
employedinMSMEsin2010wereaffordedemployer-providedhealthinsurance. See:Assaad(2014),p.30.
317
nowhoverperilouslyclosetothepovertyline.RecallthathundredsofthousandsofJordanians
arecurrentlyemployedeitherirregularlyorinformally.Recallthatmillionsofothersareeither
unemployedoroutofthelaborforcealtogetherAndrecallthatmanyofthosewhohavetriedto
organizethedisinherited—betheypoliticalparties,civilsocietygroups,ortradeunions—have
beensubjectedtotherepressivepowersofthestate.
Inthiscontext,itshouldnotstrikethereaderasshockingthatworkingpeopleoftenlack
thespacethatisneededtothinkbeyondthechallengesofthedaytoday.Withcognitiveenergies
rightlydevotedtotheexigenciesofthepresent—andwiththeemergenceofkinshipandreligion-
basedsystemsofwelfareandsocialsecurityinthepost-1989period587—,generalizedprecarity
makesthecoalescenceandorganizationofclass-basedsolidarityevenmoredifficultthanit
wouldotherwisebe.Asthemagnitudeofdeprivation(andatomization)simultaneouslyrenders
bothindividualsandgroupssusceptibletolocalizedco-optationinmomentsofcrisis—asthe
palace’ssuccessesinusingselective,opportunistichiring,investment,andrentdistribution
duringthepost-Uprisingperiodclearlyevinces—,thesocialcontroleffectsofgeneralized
precaritymaybeevenlargerthanisinitiallyapparent.Thoughthisisaspectofsocialcontrolis
farfromfoolproof,solongasthePalaceandcapitalcanbreaktheranksofcollectiveaction
throughselectivekinorgroup-basedallocationsofrentsandopportunity,theyhavelessneedto
fearanykindofseismicchangetothepoliticalorsocialorder.
587 Formoreontheemergenceofthesekinshipnetworks,see:AnneMarieBaylouny,PrivatizingWelfareinthe
MiddleEast:KinMutualAidAssociationsinJordanandLebanon.IndianaUniversityPress(2010).
318
Conclusion
Comprisedoffourprinciplecomponents—(1)juridicaldiscipline;(2)labormarket
segmentation;(3)MSME-basedatomization;and(4)generalizedprecarity,thesocialcontrol
strategyoperatingacrossAbdullah’stenurehassuccessfullyimpededthecoalescenceofclass
solidarityorlargescaleanti-systemagitation.Thoughthematerialdeprivationandsocial
dislocationthatareendemictothisstrategysimultaneouslygeneratetheconditionsforitsown
demise—andthoughJordanhaswitnessedanumberofinstancesofintraandcross-class
mobilizationduringtheneoliberalera—,thefunctionalcoherenceofthesocialcontrolstrategy
hasasyetheldsteady.Insodoing,ithasplayedacriticalroleinstabilizingcapitalaccumulation
(andinaugmentingtheprofitsoftheelitefractionofthecapitalistclass)despitetheeconomy’s
generationofsuchextremefailureswhenitcomestojobcreation,growth,productivity,andthe
generalwelfareofthemiddleandlowerclasses.NoneofthisshouldbereadsotoassignJordan’s
neoliberalcapitalismsomekindofontologicalpermanence,ofcourse.Itshould,however,chasten
oneagainstunderstatingcapital’sresilience.
319
CHAPTERTEN
Peripherality,dependencyandtheexternalarticulationofJordaniancapitalism
Inthischapter,IwilldiscusstheexternalarticulationoftheJordanianSSA,analyzinghow
ittoocontributestotheinstitutionalizationofcrisiscapitalismontheeastbankoftheriver
Jordan.DisaggregatingtheprocessesthroughwhichtheJordaniancapitalismhasbeenintegrated
intoregionalandinternationalsystemsoffinance,production,andtrade,Iwilldemonstratethat
thenatureoftheprofitswhicharegeneratedforaselect,elitefractionofthecapitalistclass
throughthisexternalarticulationimpliesandprefiguresthelong-termunderdevelopmentofthe
economy.
Myanalysiswillbebrokenintotwosubsections.Inthefirst,Iwillconsiderthepolicies
informingJordan’sglobalandregionalintegration,orwhatIcallthejuridicalinstitutionalization
ofeconomicopening.AsIhavealreadycoveredsomeaspectsofthisinstitutionalizationin
previouschapters—principally,thecountry’simmigration,investment,andindustrialpolicies—,
thisanalysiswillprimarilyemphasizetheparticulareffectsborneoftradeandbudgetpolicy.
Herein,Iwillprocesstracetheeconomicconsequencesyieldedbythecountry’saccessiontothe
WTO,byitssigningofhighlyinfluentialbilateraltradeagreements,andbythestate’senduring
dependenceonexternalbudgetarysources.588
588 Specifically,IwillbeexaminingtheJordan-UnitedStatesFreeTradeAgreement(JUSFTA)andtheEUAssociation
AgreementonJordaninconsiderabledetail.ThoughIwillalsotouchonahandfulofregionaltradeinitiativessuchastheGreaterArabFreeTradeAgreement(GAFTA),asthesehavebeenmuchlessimpactfulinpractice,theywillnotbegivenprideofplace.RegardingGAFTAforexample,thoughitwasmeanttoeliminateallimpedimentstotradeasof2005,extensivenon-tarifftradebarriersremaininplaceacrosstheregion,andintraregionaltraderemainsquitelowasaresult.
320
Insectiontwo,IwillconsidertheconsequencesproducedbyJordan’sveryparticular
modalityofeconomicopening.Herein,Iwillhighlightandexplainfoureconomicoutcomesthat
arespecificallyrelevanttocontemporaryunderdevelopment.Thefirstconcernsthecountry’s
decliningtermsoftrade.Narrowinginontheexportsideoftheledger,thesecondconcernsthe
decliningsophisticationofJordan’sexportbasket.Directlyrelatedtoinvestmentpolicydecisions,
thethirdconcernstheeffectsoftheGulf’scolonizationofJordan’sdomesticcapitalstock,
emphasizinghowGulf-basedFDI’stendencytowardsnon-productiveinvestmentundermines
industrialdevelopmentandtechnologicalconvergencealike.Bringingimmigrationpolicytothe
fore,thefourthconcernsGenerationAbdullah’sstructuralandinstitutionalproductionofbrain
drainduringthepasttwentyyears.
(1)TheJuridicalInstitutionalizationofEconomicOpening
TradePolicy
Aswasdetailedintheclosingpagesofchapterthree,Jordan’smoderneconomicopening
precededtheascensionofAbdullahtopower.Torecap,afterdebtandbankingcrisesinthemid-
late1980sforcedKingHusseintoturntotheIMFashislenderoflastresort,thecountryhad
beencoercedintoinauguratingacontrolledliberalizationprogram.Oneconsequenceofthiswas
1995’sInvestmentPromotionLaw,whichestablishedthatforeigninvestorswerenottobe
subjectedtoanydiscriminatorymeasureswithinJordan.Thatsameyear,separatepiecesof
legislationmadethedinarfullyconvertibleforcommercialtransactionandremovedrestrictions
321
onthetransferofinvestmentsabroad,respectively.589ThoughapermitfromtheCentralBankof
Jordan(CBJ)wasstillrequiredintheeventalocalbanksoughttotransferfundsabroad—and
thoughtheCBJrequiredthatitbeinformedbeforeanexternalinvestortransferredfundsinto
Jordanatthistime—,solongaspriorauthorizationhadbeenobtained,theseregulatorychanges
liftedmanyofthecheckspreviouslyhinderingtheinfloworoutflowofcapitaland/orthe
repatriationofprofits.
Notwithstanding,then,theliberalizingworkthatwasalreadydonepriortoAbdullah’s
coronation,economicopeningwouldneverthelessbeacceleratedandpushedintowholenew
domainsundertheguidanceoftheKing’sEconomicConsultativeCouncil.Regardingthecurrent
account,royaldecreeandprovisionallegislationissuedintheabsenceofparliamentwereusedin
theearly2000ssotounilaterally(andsignificantly)reducethecountry’saverageweightedtariff
rate.590Non-tarifftradebarrierswerealsoremovedtoaconsiderableextentduringthissame
period.Asimpactfulasthesetariff-relatedmeasureswere,however,theireffectsonJordan’s
largerintegrationintotheglobaleconomywouldpaleincomparisontothoseborneofJordan’s
accessiontotheWTO.
Accessionwassteeredthroughparliamentinspiteofmassivepublicoppositionduringthe
earlymonthsof2000.591Astheoppositionhadfeared,itseffectsonthepolicyspaceavailableto
589 ForeignexchangecontrolshadalreadybeeninvestedintheCentralBankofJordanasof1979’samendmentto
ForeignExchangeControlLawno.95.590 35%inthemid-1980s,Jordan’smost-favorednationweightedtariffratewasbroughtdownto13.5%asofearly
2000.591 See:FerrisNesheiwat,“TheadoptionofintellectualpropertystandardsbeyondTRIPS–isitamisguidedlegal
andeconomicobsessionbydevelopingcountries”,LoyolaofLosAngelesInternationalandComparativeLawReview(2010),p.361.
322
elected(andunelected)governmentofficialswouldbesignificantanddeleteriousfroma
developmentalperspective.ByconsequenceofJordanagreeingtoabidebytheWTO’sGeneral
AgreementonTariffsandTrade,forinstance,policymakerswereimmediatelyrequiredtoreduce
thecountry’stariffratesevenlowerthanthe13.5%alreadyestablishedbyAbdullahandhis
proverbialChicagoBoys.592ByconsequenceofJordanagreeingtotheWTO’sGeneralAgreement
onTradeinServices,meanwhile,policymakerswereforcedtorewritelawsofStandardsand
Metrology,Agriculture,NationalProductionsProtection,GeneralSalesTax,Customs,Importand
Export,aswellasthecountry’sinvestmentregulations.Fromthejump,then,thelegislative
impactofaccessionwastoextendwellbeyondquestionsofcustomsandtariffalone.
592 By2010,thecountry’smaximumimporttariffratewouldtherebybereducedby33%ascomparedto2000levels
(decliningfrom30%to20%);Jordan’sweightedaverage,meanwhile,woulddeclineallthewaydownto8.1%forthosetradingpartnerswithMostFavoriteNationstatus.
Formoreonthis,see:MatthiasBusseandSteffenGroning,“Assessingtheimpactoftradeliberalization:thecaseofJordan”,JournalofEconomicIntegration(2012),p.470.
TheGlobalFinancialCrisisandtheReturnof(some)CapitalControls Thoughthecapitalaccountwassimilarlyliberalizedduringtheearlyyearsofthenewmillenium,itshouldbeacknowledgedthatsomerestrictionsoncapitalmovementswerereintroducedfollowingtheruptureofthe2007-2008globalfinancialcrisis.Ofnotehere,2017’sRegulatingDealingswithForeignStockExchangesLawno.1wouldstipulatethattradinginforeignstockexchanges—aswellasmediatingsuchtradesonbehalfofthirdparties—wastobedisallowedforallexceptlicensedcommercialbanksandthosefinancialservicescompaniesthatwereoverseenbytheJordanSecuritiesCommission.Interestingly,thoughanearlier,provisionalversionofthislawhadpassedin2008andthoughthatversionofthelawhadexplicitlyexemptedforeignbanksfromthetermsofthislegislation,thecontemporaryversiondoesnotdelineateanysuchexemptionsnewiterationdidnot.Inadditiontotheseregulations,aswasdiscussedinchapterseven,restrictionsarealsostillinplacewhenitcomestoFDIintherealestate,construction,wholesale,andretailtradesectors.Inviewofthefactthatforeignexchangelawstillinsuresthefreeandrestrictedrepatriationofcapitalandprofits,however,theburdensomenatureoftheserestrictionsandregulationsshouldnotbeoverstated.
323
Ofcourse,nowherewasthelegislativeinvasiveness—orthedevelopmentalimpact—of
WTOaccessionmorepronouncedthaninthecaseoftheorganization’sTrade-RelatedAspectsof
IntellectualPropertyRightsAgreement(TRIPs).Theseimpactsfirstmanifestedwhenthespecter
ofWTOaccessiondroveJordanianpolicymakerstopre-emptivelypassanew,moresuitable
PatentLaw.Whereas1973’sPatentLawhadonlylegislatedforprocesspatents,Article2of
1999’sTRIPs-informededitionextendedpatentprotectiontothefinalproductaswell.593As
wouldlaterbecomeclear,thisslightchangefunctionedtoinvalidateandillegalizetheentire
businessmodeluponwhichtheJordanianpharmaceuticalindustryhadbeenfounded—namely,
theproductionanddisseminationofgenericdrugs.Whatismore,asAbdullah’sreformerswere
particularlykeenonusingIPpolicy—afavoritebugaboooftheinternationalcommunity—asa
provinggroundfortheirliberalbonafides,theywouldpartnerthispatentlegislationwith
aggressiveenforcementandregulationoperations.594
Clearly,then,accessiontotheWTOhadmeantfarmorethantheliftingoftradebarriers:it
hadalsoprecipitatedsignificantreformstolegislativeandregulatorypraxes.Andyet,impactful
asjoiningtheWTOwasbothintheseregardsandwhenitcametoshapingtheexternal
articulationofJordan’ssocialstructureofaccumulationmoregenerally,itseffectonthecountry’s
593 See:Hamedel-SaidandMohammedel-Said,“TRIPS-Plusimplicationsforaccesstomedicinesindeveloping
countries:lessonsfromJordan-UnitedStatesFreeTradeAgreement”,TheJournalofWorldIntellectualProperty(10:6),2007,p.446.
594 Thoughdisadvantageousfromadevelopmentalperspective,thiszealoustargetingofIPcrimewouldleadtoa
significantdropintheratesofsoftwarepiracyandwinAbdullah’sregimesomefavoramongstitswesternpatrons(Nesheiwat,2010,p.370).
324
contemporaryformofcapitalismwouldactuallypaleincomparisontothoseborneofthe
country’sbilateralfreetradeagreements.595
TheJordan-UnitedStatesFreeTradeAgreement(JUSFTA)
2001’sJordan-UnitedStatesFreeTradeAgreement(JUSFTA)hasproventhemost
impactfulofthecountry’sforaysintotradebiliateralism.596Thattheseimpactshavealsoproven
unambiguouslynegativemighthavebeenanticipatedwereonetohavehadtheoccasionto
observethecompositionoftherespectivenegotiationteamsrepresentingthetwopartiestothe
agreement.
Ontheonehand,theJordanianteamwasledbyMuhammedHalayqa,athenthirtyyear-
oldmanwhoarrivedathisroyallyappointedpostwithlittleinthewayoftradeknwoledgeor
bargainingexperience.WithJordaniancapitalandlaborequallydisorganized,moreover—and
therebyequallyirrelevantwhenitcametolobbyingandadvocacy—,Halayqawouldbedoinghis
jobwhilereceivinglittleguidancefromtheactorsmostlikelytobeaffectedbyhisdecision-
making.597Astheentirenegotiationprocesshadalsobeendesignedinsuchamannerasto
insulateitfromanyoversight,publicdebate,orcivilsocietyparticipation,itwouldonlyaslight
exaggerationtosaythattheKinghad,foralleffectsandpurposes,managedtoplacefateofthe
595 See:MohammedEl-Said,“TheEuropeanTRIPS-PlusmodelandtheArabworld:fromco-operationto
association—aneweraintheglobalIPRSregime?”,LiverpoolLawReview(28),2007,p.144.596 ThefirstiterationofJordan’sAssociationAgreementwiththeEU,signedin1997,actuallyprecededAbdullah’s
ascensiontothethrone.Thatsaid,thearrangementwaslargelynominalinnature(ElSaid,2007,p.149).597 Mohammedel-Said,“Themorningafter:TRIPS-Plus,FTAs,andWikileaks:freshinsightsontheimplementation
andenforcementofIPprotectionindevelopingcountries,AmericanUniversityInternationalLawReview(28:1),2012,p.81.
325
entireJordanianeconomyinthegrosslyunpreparedhandsofHalayqaandco.alone.Making
mattersworsewasthefactthatHalayqawastobeopposedbythewell-resourcedandhighly
competentOfficeoftheUSTradeRepresentativeaswellasbythecoalitionofwell-financed
lobbyinggroupsthatweretohoverintheshadowsofthenegotiationsthroughout.598Most
prominentamongstthisconstellationoflobbyistswerethePharmaceuticalResearchand
ManufacturersofAmerica(PhRMA),theBusinessSoftwareAlliance,andtheInternational
IntellectualPropertyAlliance.599
Unsurprisinginviewoftheimbalanceofpowerandknowhowamongstthenegotiating
teams,thefinalproductofthesetradetalkswoundupanchoringJordantoamodeofglobal
integrationthatwashighlydisadvantageoustothecountry’slong-termdevelopment.600Central
tothiswereanotherseriesofIP-relatedprovisions—provisionsthatactuallywentwellbeyond
whattheWTOhadrequiredofJordan.
598 ThesespecialinterestsprovedequallyeffectiveinpushingrepresentativesofUSAid,theAmericanEmbassy,and
theUSPatentandTrademarkOfficetodotheirbiddingaswell(el-Said,2012,p.79). USAidwouldalsolatercontributetotheAmericansqueezeofJordanianpolicymakers.Inthemonthsfollowing
thenegotiations,AidmadeitseconomicandfinancialassistanceconditionaluponJordan’simplementationofthelegislativereformmandatedbyJUSFTAanduponJordanianregulators’earnestnessinrespondingtoAmericancomplaintsre:IPviolations(el-Said,2012,pp.98-99).
599 ElSaid,2012,pp.78,89. EvenprecedingtheJUSFTAnegotiations,PhRMAhadbeenextensivelyengagedinlobbyingtheEmbassyand
otherrepresentativesoftheAmericanstatetocrackdownontheIPclimateinJordan.Insodoing,theywereoftenrathershameless;ononeoccasion,PhRMAeventriedtosecureitselfaseatontheboardofJordan’sFoodandDrugAdministrationsothatitmightmoredirectlyoverseetheadministrationofIPregulations.
600 ItisworthnotingthatJUSFTAestablishedaprototypeforwhatwouldbecometheUnitedStates’preferred
strategywheninteractingwiththedevelopingworldinthe21stcentury.SubsequentbilateralfreetradeagreementswithMoroccoandBahraincloselyfollowedthetemplate.
326
Tobegin,JUSFTAforcedJordantowaivethetenyeartransitionperiodthattheWTO’s
TRIPsAgreementalloweddevelopingnationswhenitcametoIPpolicycompliance.Next,it
institutedanumberofreformsregardingpatentprotectionandregulation,themostimpactfulof
whichrelatedtodataexclusivity.Inanutshell,JUSFTA’simpositionofdataexclusivitymeantthat
patentrightsweretobeextendednotonlytoaproductproper,butalsototheresearchdataand
theexperimentaltrialsthatneededtobepresentedinorderforthatproducttobesanctionedby
Americanregulatorybodies.Throughtheestablishmentoftheseprovisions,Jordanianbusinesses
werepreventedfromusingorreferencingpubliclyavailableexperimentaltrialsand/ordatafor
thepurposeofdevelopingcommercialproductsforuptoeightyears.601
601 ThekindsofR+Doperationsnecessarytorunsuchtrialsanddevelopone’sowndataareincrediblycapital
intensiveandwellbeyondthecapacityofJordanianindustry.Foralleffectsandpurposes,then,dataexclusivityhasmeantthatdomesticfirmsarenolongerlegallyabletoproducegenericversionsofproductsanywhereneartheglobaltechnologicalfrontier.
See:El-Said,2012,p.82
327
FortheJordanianpharmaceuticalindustry—oneoftheeconomy’spreviouslyrising
stars—,dataexclusivityprovedcataclysmic.Asmentioned,priortoJUSFTA,thebusinesses
operatinginthissectorhadrelieduponaunique,localizedkindofsecondmover’sadvantage.
Morespecifically,theyhadreliedontheirtheircapacitytotobringagenericversionofanew
product(oncetheinitialpatentexpired)toregionalmarketsbeforeanyoneelse.602Whilenot
doingtheinnovationthemselves,thisstrategywasaneffectiveintermediatestepthatallowed
602 Intheseyears,thecountry’spharmaceuticalfirmsconsistentlymanagedtodeliver(andexport)agenericversion
ofanewdrugdevelopedinthewestwithinsixmonthsofthelatterhittingtheshelf.
The WTO, TRIPS, and Jordan Ascomparestothecountry’sbilateralFTAs,theimpactthatWTOaccessionwouldhaveontheJordanianeconomywasfarlessdestructiveinnature.Firstly,themultilateralnatureoftheWTOinsuredthatthenegotiationsdeterminingthecontentofitsagreementswerenotwhollybiasedagainsttheinterestsofthedevelopingglobalsouth(ElSaid,2007,p.144).Infact,itwasthisverymultilateralismthatmadetheWTOattractivetodevelopingcountriesinthefirstplace,allowingthemtopooltheirresourcesandtoleveragethenegotiatingpowerthattheirmarkets,intheaggregate,affordedsotocollectivelybargainagainsttheUSandEU.Tonosmallextent,theWTOallowedtheglobalsouthtostaveoffthe“competitiveliberalization”thatisinherenttobilateralism,tosavethemselvesfrombeingindividuallysteamrolledthroughone-on-onedealingswitheconomicmegapowers(Ibid,p167). Collectiveactiononthepartofthedevelopingworldyieldedanumberofpositiveresults.Forinstance,whilethe1989-1990UruguayroundofWTOnegotiationsdidbringTRIPSintoeffect,italsoprovidedforanumberofexemptionsandtransitionalconditionsthateasedtheburdenfordevelopingcountries.Specifically,Article65ofTRIPShadlitigatedagraceperiodoffiveyearsbeforeacountrywouldneedtocomeintocompliancewiththerequisiteIPregulations(agraceperiodextendingtotenyearsinthecaseofproductpatents).Inaddition,theWTOaffordeddevelopingcountriessomewhatfairhearingswithintheWTO’smultilateraldisputesettlementsystem(Ibid,p.159).OfgreatimportancefromtheperspectiveofJordanianpharmaceuticalcorporations,theTRIPSagreementdidnotincludedataexclusivitywithinitspatentregulations.Inpractice,dataexclusivityisa“procedurewhereinoriginativepharmaceuticalcompaniesaregrantedaperiodoftimeduringwhichwould-begenericproducersofexistingdrugsareprohibitedfromobtainingregulatoryapprovalforacompetingdrugiftheyrelyontheresultsoftheoriginator’sclinicaltrials”(el-Said,2012,p.85).HavingalsoprovidedanumberofotherexemptionsmeanttoinsurethatIPregulationsdidnotimperilpublichealthornutritionintheglobalsouth—specifically,TRIPSprovidedforcompulsorylicensing,parallelimports,tieredpricingordifferentialpricingsystems,andforthestate’sregulationofnationaldrugpriceparticulardiseasesinthecaseofnationalemergency(elSaid,TRIPSinJordan,445)--multilateralismmostcertainlyeasedthepainofglobalintegration,atleastcomparativelyspeaking.
328
Jordanianindustrytocarveoutanichepositionwithinglobalandregionalsupplychainsandto
engagewithandlearnfromcuttingedgeproducts.Profitableasthestrategywas,moreover,it
alsofacilitatedcapitalaccumulationinamountsthatwouldhaveallowedlocalfirmsto
(eventually)investinlucrativethoughexpensiveR+Doperations.Subsequenttothe
establishmentofJUSFTA—andtheinstallmentofdataexclusivity—,however,whereitoncetook
aJordanianfirmsixmonthstobringagenericversionofanewdrugtomarket,itwouldnowtake
nineyears.603Byconsequence,theexportsofJordanianpharmaceuticalfirmswouldstagnate,and
theirdomesticsaleswoulddropprecipitouslyaswell.604
Movingbeyonddataexclusivity,JUSFTAalsoprovided“newuse”patentprotectionsfor
chemicalentities,aprovisionthathasenabledevergreeningstrategiesofahighlycynical
nature.605AgainincontrasttotheWTO’sTRIPSagreement,JUSFTA’sTRIPsPLUSdelineated
603 See:El-SaidandEl-Said(2007),p.463.604 Abriefsurveyofgrowthandprofitratesamongstthosepharmaceuticalcompaniesthatarepubliclytradedon
theAmmanStockExchangeoverthepastthreeyearsgivessomeindicationofthiscrisis.605 See:El-Said,2012,pp.82-91. Asthishasplayedoutinpractice,wheneveranAmericanfirmhasseenthepatentonanoldchemicalproduct
approachitsexpiration,ithassimplydiscoveredanddefinedanewuseforthatproductandtherebyearneditselfanadditionalthreeyearsofpatentprotections.Whentimedappropriately,Americancorporationscanevenstaggerthediscoveryof“newapplications”sotobuildonethreeyearextensionafteranother.
TherehavebeenanumberofexamplesofthisintheJordanianmarket.Inoneinstance,anAmerican
pharmaceuticalcompanyintroduceda(patented)medicinethathadbeenexplicitlydesignatedforadults;upontheexpirationofthispatent,however,theyintroduceda“newuse”throughrepurposingandrecalibratingthedosageofthismedicine,firstforchildren(therebyextendingthepatent)andthenagainfornewbornsthreeyearsfollowingthat.Anotherfamouscasefromthemid-2000ssawPhRMAanditsagentsintheUSEmbassyadvocateforapatentextensiononananti-asthmamedicineafteritwasdiscoveredthatthedrugcouldtreatasthmaandallergicrhinitis;onthisoccasion,atleast,theJordanianFDAmanagedtoshutthemdown.
Generallyspeaking,however,knowingfullwellthatJordaniancompaniesdon’thavethelegalbudgettocontest
thesemachinationsthroughthevariousdisputeresolutionmechanismsestablishedunderJUSFTA,theseploysoftengouncontested(onthislastpoint,see:El-SaidandEl-Said,2007,p.458).
329
ratheraustererestrictionsoncompulsorylicensing.Specifically,wheretheWTOhadassigned
memberstatessignificantdiscretionarypowerwhenitcametodefiningthoseconditionsunder
whichlicensingcouldbebroughtintoeffect—andtherebyprovideddevelopingstateswitha
mechanismfordealingwithpotentialhealthcrises—,JUSFTAstipulatedthatafirmcouldonlybe
forcedtolicenseitsproductafteran(American-dominated)arbitrationprocessdeterminedthat
theanarrowsetofcriteriahadindeedbeensatisfied.606Inpractice,duetothefactthatPhRMA
hasprovenunsurprisinglydexterousinnavigatingthesearbitrationproceedings,American
pharmaceuticalcompanieshaverarelyhadtoabidebytheJordanianMinistryofHealth’sappeals
foremergency-basedcompulsorylicensing.
Finally,itworthnotingthatJUSFTAalsoreversedprevailing(andWTO-sanctioned)
practicesasconcernstheenforcementofIPregulations.Wheremuchofthelegaland
administrativeburdenhadoncebeenplacedonthepatentholder,JUSFTArequiredthatthe
Jordanianstateadoptasortofpre-emptive,Panopticon-styledrole.Specifically,Article4.26of
JUSFTAobligatestheJordanianstateto“initiatecriminalproceedingsandbordermeasures
againstinfringementsoftrademarks,whicharedirectlyrelatedtopharmaceuticalproducts,even
intheabsenceofaformalcomplaintbyaprivateparty.”607Foralleffectsandpurposes,JUSFTA
606 See:El-Said2012,p.88. Specifically,thesecriteriadictatethatlicensingmayproceedinorder“toremedyapracticedeterminedafter
judicialoradministrativeprocesstobeanti-competitive,incasesofpublicnon-commercialuseorinthecaseofanationalemergencyorothercircumstanceofextremeurgencyprovidedthatsuchuseislimitedtousebygovernmententitiesorlegalentitiesactingundertheauthorityofagovernment.”
607 El-SaidandEl-Said,2007,p.449.
330
thuslyrenderedtheJordanianDrugInspectionAgencyanditsMinistryofIndustryandTradeinto
asortofpatentpoliceforAmericanpharmaceuticalcompanies.608
ThetradepoliciesadoptedbyGenerationAbdullah—policiesenshriningadevelopment
strategybasedonstaticcomparativeadvantageandrespectforinternationalintellectual
propertylaw—have,atoneandthesametime,managedtolockJordanintocommodity
extractionandlowvaluemanufacturingwhilealsoundercuttingthosetechnologically
sophisticatedindustries(suchaspharmaceuticals)thathademergedacrossthe1970s,1980s,
and1990s.Contrarytothepromisesmadebytheirevangelists,saidpolicieshavealsoimpeded
therealizationoftechnologicaltransfersanddeliverednegligiblegainsintermsofinvestment
intoresearchanddevelopment(seeboxbelow).CentraltotheexternalarticulationofJordan’s
contemporarySSA,suchpoliciesarethereforefundamentaltothecrisiscapitalismthathas
prevailedacrossthemajorityofAbdullah’stenure.
608 Jordan’sAssociationAgreementwiththeEuropeanUnion—whichwasamendedandreinstatedin2002—,also
contributedtoanemergentmodeofglobalintegrationthatwouldprovehighlyunconducivetoJordan’slong-termdevelopment.Tobegin,thisagreementwouldlargelyreinforcetheTRIPS-PlusregulationsthathadalreadybeenimposeduponJordanthroughJUSFTA.Inonesense,theAssociationAgreementevenwentbeyondtheAmericaniteration.Specifically,theAgreementwiththeEUstipulatesthatJordanharmonizeitsIPLawtothe“highestglobalstandards.”Insodoing,theEUdelineatedadynamicandopenhermeneuticalframework,onethatcouldbereinterpretedacrosstimesotopushJordanintocompliancewithwhatevernewregulationsmightemergeinthosepartsoftheworld(thecore)whereIPlawactuallyisquiteimportant(Nesheiwat,365).Inaddition,itisalsoworthnotingthatboththeAssociationAgreementandtheEU’sBarcelonaInitiative—whichrepresentedtheUnion’seffortstoestablishafreetradeareawithinthegreaterMediterranean(inclusiveofJordan)—excludedagriculturalproductsfromtheremitoffreetrade.TherebyexcludingtheonesectorwhereArabcountrieslikeJordanactuallyheldastaticcomparativeadvantagevis-a-vistheirEuropeancounterparts,thecynicismanddisingenuousnessoftheEU’seconomicengagementwiththeMiddleEastwouldbeonlyfurthercompounded(ElSaid,148).
WhiletheJordanCompactandsimilarEU-ledresponsestotheSyrianrefugeecrisishavehintedatthepossibility
ofEuropeopeningitsmarketstoJordanianexportstoalargerextent,suchhintshaveyettotranslateintomaterialchangeatthetimeofwriting.
331
Trade,IPCompliance,andUnderdevelopmentinJordanandtheGlobalSouth
CompliancewithTRIPSPlusinJordanhasprecipitatedneitheranincreaseinFDI,anincreaseinFDIallocationsintoR+D,noranincreaseintechnologicaltransfers.609TheFDIthecountrydoesreceive,moreover,continuestohailalmostexclusivelyfromtheGulfandcontinuestobeallocatedalmostexclusivelyintospeculative,lowsophisticationspacessuchasthebuiltenvironment,commodities,andlowcomplexitymanufactures.610Intheaggregate,then,tradepolicyhasfunctionedsotostuntJordan’stransitiontowardsaknowledgeeconomywhilealsounderminingthecountry’smovementmovingtowardsahigh-sophistication,high-complexityexportbasket.Whatismore,itisimportanttoemphasizethatsuchoutcomesarenotaberrational;rather,theyarethenecessaryoutcomeofamodeofglobalintegrationthathasbeenpremisedona(wittingorunwitting)misunderstandingofIPcostsandbenefitsintheglobalsouth. Sowhy,then,doesn’tIPprotectiondowhatitsideologicalsponsorsclaimitwilldo?Toanswer,this,oneneedfirstrememberthathistoricallyspeaking,theftandtheexploitationofforeigntechnologieshasbeenanecessary(ifnotsufficient)precedentconditionforeconomiccatch-up.Priortoreachingtheglobaltechnologicalfrontier—anduntilone’sendogenoushumancapitalreachesalevelwhereitcaninnovateandoperatenewtechnologiesonitsown—,borrowingandstealingfromabroadarethereforeessentialfortheadvancementofadevelopingeconomy.Thisbeingthecase,themilitantenforcementofIPregulationsthatisinstitutionalizedthrougharrangementslikeJUSFTAhavefunctionedsotodelayJordan’stechnologicalconvergence—sotokickawaytheverylatterthattheUnitedStatesamongstothershasusedinbuildingitselfintoaneconomicsuperpower. Inaddition,thoughwesterntraderepresentativeshavelegitimatedaggressiveIPregimesontheclaimthattheyfacilitateFDI-inflowsandtechnologicaltransfersintothedevelopingworld,thispropositionhasbeenfalsifiedbyanumberofdifferentstudies(inadditiontobeingrefutedbytheJordanianexample).Empirically,thecorrelationbetweenstrongIPregulationsandFDIinflowsinthedevelopingworldisstatisticallyinsignificant;therelationshipbetweenIPregulationsandtechnologicaltransfers,moreover,isalsonegligible. Logically,thesenon-relationshipscanbeexplainedbythefactthatforeigninvestmentisonlysensitivetoIPrightstotheextentthatthereceivingeconomyissensitivetoIPrights.ArecipienteconomycanbedeemedinsensitivetoIPrightsifitislackingtheendogenouscapacitynecessarytoengagewithfrontiertechnologiesandproductiontechniques.Incircumstancesuchasthese(andsuchasJordan’s),technologicallysophisticatedfirms(rightly)perceivethatthereisnobenefittobegainedfrommovingtheirinvestmentandoperationsintoarecipienteconomy611;thisbeingthecase,theimpositionof
609 ElSaidandElSaid(2007),pp.455-456.610 WesternoriginatingFDI,whichonecanassumeismorelikelytobeaccompaniedbytechnologicaltransfers,
comprisesatinyfractionofJordan’stotalFDI.See:Nesheiwat,p.388611 Anexamplemayhelpdemonstratethis.Regardlessofthequalityoftheinvestmentenvironment,whywould
AppleinvestR+Doperationsin,say,Kazakhstan,iftheeconomyisincapableofprovidingtherequisitepersonnel?Insuchacontext,promisesmadebytheOfficeoftheUSTradeRepresentative(andbyitscourtintellectuals)regardingthepositiveexternalitiesofIPregulationareunlikelytoberealized.Thebestthatcanbehopedforisthatamultinationalcorporation—seekingtoexploitwagedifferentials—decidestomovelow-skilled,technologicallynon-intensiveaspectsofitsproductionintotheaspiringhostcountrywhileretaininginnovative,technologicallyintensiveaspectsbackhome,wherethehumancapitalstockisalreadysufficientlyhigh.
332
stringentIPregulationswillhavenoeffectonFDIinflows,assaidinflowswereneverforthcominginthefirstplace.612GiventhatimpositionofJUSFTA-styledpatentprotectionswerealreadycertaintoincreasethecostsbeingbornebyJordanianconsumersofpharmaceuticalgoods613,thatthesesameprotectionsfailtooffsetthesecostsbyfacilitatingincreasesinproductiveinvestmentrendersthemevenmoreproblematicfromadevelopmentperspective. Finally,itisalsoimportanttonotethatdevelopingmarketslikeJordan’sconstituteatinyfractionoftheconsumerbaseforIP-intensiveindustries.Thisbeingthecase,thenotionthatprospectiveviolationsofintellectualpropertyrightsintheglobalsouthmightconstituteadisincentivizeforinnovationbackinthewestiswhollynonsensical.Takingwesternbasedmultinationalpharmaceuticalcompaniesasanexample,theiraggregatesalesacrosstheentireArabworldcomprisedamere2%oftheirtotalsalesasof2007(443).614Duetothelowincomelevelsthatarewitnessedintheregion,moreover,thosenumbersdropdowntonearzerowhenitcomestothemoreexpensive,innovative,patent-protectedproductsthatthoseMNCsdevelop.ToevokeutilitarianargumentsandtosuggestthattheliberalizationofmarketslikeJordanandtheaustereenforcementofIPrightsthereinaresomehownecessaryfordrivinginnovation,then,istoengageinwillfulmisdirection.615
612 See:Nesheiwat,p.364 Thecorporatestructuresofcontemporarymultinationalcorporations(MNCs)alsocontributingtothenon-
correlationbetweenIPregulationsandtechnologicaltransfers.InplaceslikeJordan,totheextentthatMNC’sinvestatall,theystructuretheirinvestmentinsuchamannerastoprecludetechnologicaltransfer.AswaslongagotheorizedbyHymerthroughhisworksontheinternationalizationofthefirm,thisfollowsfromthefactthat“technologyconstitutestheprimaryfirm-specificadvantageofthemultinationalfirm,andnosuchfirmwilltransfersuchtechnologyevenwhenpropertyrightsarewelldefined”(TRIPSinJordan,454).Thespatializationofcontemporaryproduction,afterall,notonlyallowsandencouragescorporationsintheglobalcoretooutsourcesomepartsofitsoperations—assembly,forexample—toperipherallocationswherethepriceoflaborischeaper.Italsoallowsandencouragesthosesamecorporationstoretaintheinnovativepartsoftheoperationbackhome,wheretheendogenoushumancapitalstockisalreadyhighandwheretheyneednotfearthattheirIPwillbeexposedinanundesirablefashion.
InJordan,thiskindoftechnologicalprotectionismhasoftentakentheformofjointventures.Byarrangingjoint
venturesratherthanlicensingorfranchisingagreements,MNCsareabletoretainalltheirIP(ifnottheirproduction,too)athomewhileusinglocalactorsasdefactosalespartners.TheproductremainsthatoftheMNC’s,whilethelocalactorsprovideknowledgeofandaccesstoregionalmarketsthattheMNClackstherequisiteexpertiseon(ElSaid,InstitutionsandJointventures,p.68,76).
613 AsamassiveOxfamStudyfirstestablished,by2007,TRIPSPlusrulesandtheabsenceofgenericalternatives
resultedina20.5-47.9%increaseinpricesfornewdrugs(461).Asthesepriceincreasesoccurredwithinthewidercontextofhighpovertyratesandlowratesofhealthinsurance,theyresultedinpeoplerationingtheiruseofmedicine.Ratherthantakethethreedailytabletsthathadbeenprescribedbyadoctor,patientsmighttakeoneandhopeforthebest,asa2004HumanDevelopmentReportharrowinglydocumented(462).
614 See:El-SaidandEl-Said(2007),p.443. Thisissodespitethefactthatimportedmedicinesrepresent90%oftotalmedicineconsumptionintheMiddle
East.615 Inthesecontexts,marketrationalitiesinsure—andempiricalevidenceverifies—,thatthelivesofpeoplethere
arenotvaluableenoughtoinvestR+Dtowardssaving;profitseekingwillleadfirmstowardsinvestinginmedicinesforerectiledysfunction,plagueofthewealthy,beforeitdoesthemedicinesthatcanbeaffordedinaplacelikeJordan.
333
BudgetPolicy
BeforeturningtomyanalysisoftheconsequencesyieldedbyJordaniantradepolicy,I
wanttoclosethissectiononthejuridicalinstitutionalizationofthecountry’seconomicopening
bybrieflyconsideringthestate’sexternalbudgetarydependenceandhowthismayrelatetothe
externalarticulationofthecountry’sSSAaswell.
Intermsofscope,asthechartsonsubsequentpagesdemonstrate,thebasicsolvencyof
theJordanianstatestillverymuchdependsonitsabilitytoaccessexternalbudgetsupport.At
thetimeofwriting,Jordanisoneofthelargestrecipientsofofficialdevelopmentaid(ODA)inthe
world.AccordingtoOECDdata,in2017,thiscountryofroughlytenmillionpeopleactually
managedtorankseventhintheworldingrossODAreceived.Unsurprisinggiventhecountry’s
relativelydiminutivesize,thelocalimpactoftheseinflowsisratherstaggering:in2017,NetODA
constituted7.32%ofthecountry’sGrossNationalIncome.Whilethesefiguresrepresentaslight
increaseascomparestoAbdullah’sfirstdecadeasKing,theyarenotoutsidetheboundsof
normal.
DataprovidedbyOECDdatabase
334
SourcesofJordanianODA,2015-2016(Unit:MillionsUSD)
DataprovidedbyOECDDatabase
Asthesetablesevince,GulfmonarchiescontributeasizablechunkofJordan’sannual
ODA.616TheaggregatetransfersprovidedbytheArabCoordinationGroup—whichrepresentsthe
616 GivingsomeindicationofhowessentialGulfaidistotheHashemitesurvivalstrategy,itisworthnotingthat
Abdullah’sfirstactasKingsawhimtraveltoSaudiArabiainhopesofhealingtheriftsthathadopenedduringthelatteryearsofhisfather’srule(Anani,p.186).WhilerelationsremainedsomewhatcoolwithKuwaitpriorto2012,hewaslargelysuccessfulintheseregards.Thoughinconsistent,externalofficialaid,budgetarysupport,
335
combinedeffortsoftheKuwaitFundforArabDevelopment,theSaudiFundforDevelopment,and
theAbuDhabiFundforDevelopmentaswellasregional,Gulf-basedfinancialinstitutionssuchas
theArabFundforEconomicandSocialDevelopment,theIslamicdevelopmentBank,theOPEC
FundforInternationalDevelopment,theArabBankforEconomicDevelopmentinAfrica,the
ArabGulfProgramfortheUnitedNationsDevelopmentOrganizationsandtheArabMonetary
Fund—areratherastounding.InadditiontoODA,moreover,theGulfmonarchieshavealso
suppliedmorediscretionaryformsofdirectbudgetsupporttoJordan,particularlyintimesof
heightenedpoliticaltensions.Forinstance,between2011-2016alone,thetriumvirateofSaudi
Arabia,theUAE,andKuwaitprovidedtheJordanianstatewith$3.75billioninannualtransfers,
loans,andgrantsofdifferentkinds.Markingtheendofalongperiodofnon-engagement,
Kuwait’sparticipationintheseinitiativeswasespeciallywelcomeinAmman.617Inaddition,
thoughthedeliveryofthesepledgescannotyetbeverified,itisworthacknowledgingthatSaudi
Arabia,Kuwait,andtheUAEalsopromisedanadditional$2.5billioninaidinJune2018after
protestsoveraproposedincometaxlawshooktheKingdom’sfragilesocialecosystem.618
ComplementingifnotexceedingtheGulf-basedODAandbudgetarysupporthasbeenthe
financialcommitmentsoftheUnitedStatesgovernment.Rampedupduringthemanyescalations
andoff-the-bookstransfersfromtheGulfhavehelpedsolidifyhisbudgetsecurity—and,insodoing,furtherconsolidatedtheregime’spolarized,inequitablefiscalsociology—acrossthepasttwentyyears,particularlyinmomentsofpoliticalcrisis.Withouttheseinjectionsofcapital,theKing’sstrategyindealingwiththeArabUprisings—wherehecombinedareintroductionofsubsidieswithincreasesinpublicsectorhiring—wouldhavebeenimpossible.
617 KuwaitiaidtoJordanhadceasedfollowingthefirstGulfWar.Forthishistory,see:Coestier(2015),p.16.618 Ontheseevents,see:AliYounes,“WillGulfaidpackagehelpresolveJordan’seconomiccrisis”,AlJazeera(June12,
2018).
336
inthewaronterror—firstfollowingZarqawi’s2005attacksinAmman,laterfollowingthe
emergenceoftheDa’esh—,itcouldbearguedthatAmericaninflowsevenconstitutethemost
dependablecomponentofthePalace’spost-2001budgetstrategy.Goingforward—andas
establishedunderthetermsofaMemorandumofUnderstandingsignedinFebruaryof2018—,
upandthrough2022,theUnitedStateswillbeproviding$1.275billioninannualbilateralforeign
assistancetoJordan.Thisrepresentsa27%increaseascomparestotheUS’spreviousannual
commitmentstoJordan.$910.8millionofthispackagewillbedevotedtoanEconomicSupport
Fundwhile$350millionforForeignMilitaryFunding.Seethegraphbelowforadetailed
breakdownofhowUSODAwillbeallocatedin2019.
BudgetRequests,2019;Chartand
dataprovidedbyDepartmentofState
(foreignassistance.gov).
IDAandbudgetsupportdisbursedbyEUinstitutionsandEUmemberstateshasalso
helpedmakeupbudgetshortcomings.TheaggregatereceiptsdisbursedfromEUmemberstates
in2017totaledroughly$775million,withanother$240millionwasprovidedthroughEU
institutions.
337
Turningtomoreindirectformsofbudgetsupport,oneneedbeginwiththecontributions
ofUNRWA.In2017,theorganizationdevoted$175.8millionofitstotalbudgettoJordan-based
operations.619Designatedforthecountry’smanyPalestinianrefugeecamps,thisallotment
financedtheeducationof121,368elementaryandsecondaryschoolagedstudents,1.5million
annualpatientvisits,basicwelfareservicesfor58,915,andprovidedfor$14millioninloansto
smallbusinesses.620UNHCR—thechiefUNagencyresponsibleforhandlingtheSyrianrefugee
crisiswithinJordan(aswellasforhandlingsmallerrefugeepopulationsfromYemen,Iraq,Sudan,
andSomalia)—runsanevenbiggeroperation.Withover550staffandalegalmandatetoprovide
healthservices,educationservices,cashassistance,jobtraining,housing,andothersupportsfor
762,420people,theUNHCR’sspendinginJordanhasroutinelyexceeded$300millionduringthe
post-2012period.In2019,itsproposedbudgethasclimbedallthewayto$371.8million.621As
eachoftheseinstitutionsfunctionasexternallyfinancedparallelstates—statesthatare
fundamentaltothesocialsecurityoflargesegmentsofJordan’sterritorialresidents—,they
representcritical,externalmechanismsbasictothestabilizationofcontemporaryJordanian
capitalism.622
Finally,onewouldberemissinconsideringthebudgetaryaspectofjuridical
institutionalizationifonedidnotalsoaccountfortheconcessionaryloansdisseminatedtoJordan
619 Sharp(2018),p.10.620 FiguresdrawnfromUnitedNationsReliefandWorksAgencyforPalestineRefugeesintheNearEast,UNRWAIn
Figures,June2017.621 Byconsequenceofthefactthatthecamp-basedpopulationofnon-Palestinianrefugeesisonly17%,farfewer
thanthisnumberarelikelytobeactuallyreceivingUNHCR’sservices.622 FiguresdrawnfromUnitedNationsHighCommissionerforRefugees,FactSheet:Jordan,February2019.
338
throughtheIMF’svariouslendingdevices.Accompaniedbymorestringsthanaretheinflows
fromtheGulf,theUS,andtheEU—atleastasregardseconomicpolicymaking—,thesecapital
injectionsareperhapsthemostimpactfulwhenitcomestotheorientationofJordan’sinvestment
andindustrialpolicies.
Jordan’sArrangementswiththeIMF
FigureslistedareinthousandsofSpecialDrawingRights(SDRs)
ThoughsurelymorehaphazardthanthePalacewouldprefer623,thebudgetsupport
arrangementsthathavebeenarrangedbythestateoverthepasttwentyyearshave
unambiguouslyaffectedtheexternal(andtheinternal)articulationoftheJordanianSSAina
numberofways.Asthetablebelowevinces—atablethatisonlyinclusiveofbilateralformsof
ODA—,thesearearrangementsthatcontinuetounderwritesubstantialportionsofthestate’s
current,capital,andsocialexpenditures.624Totheextentthatsuchexpenditureshelpsustain
623 Itshouldbeacknowledgedthatpledgesofaidfrequentlygopartiallyfulfilled(iffulfilledatall).Thishascertainly
beenthecasewiththeinternationalcommunity’sresponsetotheSyrianrefugeecrisis.624 AstheexamplesofUNRWAandUNHCRevince,foreignpartnersandinternationalinstitutionsarealsodepended
uponwhenitcomestotheimplementationofsocialinterventions.
339
lowerclasslifeinparticularthroughensuringthatbasiclevelsofpubliceducation,health,and
welfarearemaintained,ODAallowsthestatetobothmanageenduringhumanitariancrisesand
staveoffmassdeprivation.Therebypre-emptingthesocialdisruptionsthatmightotherwise
emerge,ODAtoocontributestothestabilizationofcapitalaccumulationinJordan(ifalsotothe
state/economy’sdependentcondition).
AllocationsofBilateralOfficialDevelopmentAssistance(USDmillion)
AnnualAverage:2015-2016
Subsection2
(1)ExpandingTradeDeficits
AnyauditingofJordan’sintegrationwithregionalandglobaleconomieswouldneedto
startwiththecountry’sexpandingtradedeficit.Byconsequenceofpoorlyconsideredtrade,
investment,andindustrialpolicies,bothtermsoftradeandcurrentaccountdeficitshave
worsened(andconsiderablyatthat)acrossthetenureofAbdullah.
341
DataforgraphsprovidedbyCentralBankofJordan
(2)Decliningcomplexityinthenationalexportbasket
Partandparcelofthisexpandingtradedeficit—andperhapsevenmorereflectiveofthe
flawsinherenttothestate’strade,investment,andindustrialpolicies—isthedeclining
complexityofJordan’sexportbasket.Thisdeclinehasbeenquitethoroughlydocumentedbythe
ObservatoryofEconomicComplexity.Afterclimbingallthewaytonumbertwentyinthe
EconomicComplexityIndex’srankingsofexportbasketsasof1980,Jordanhenceforthwitnessed
asteady(andoccasionallyprecipitous)decline.DuringAbdullah’stenureinparticular,whatearly
progresswasachievedvis-a-visexportcomplexityinhisinitialyearsinpower(2000-2009)were
summarilyunwoundintheeightyearsthatfollowed.Ineachyearsince2012,infact,the
complexityofJordan’sexportbaskethaddeclinedbynon-insignificantmargins.Byconsequence,
342
asof2017,thecomplexityofJordan’sexportbaskethadplummetedtoarankingofsixty-fiveout
oftheonehundredandtwenty-nineincludedintheindex.
TheEconomicComplexityIndex
TheEconomicComplexityIndex(ECI),aprojectjointlyhostedbyMIT’sMediaLabandtheGrowthLabatHarvard’sCenterforInternationalDevelopment,wasprimarilydevelopedbyRicardoHausmanandCesarHidalgo.Designedtohelpresearchersandpolicymakersidentifyhowaneconomycanmovebeyonditsstaticcomparativeadvantagethroughexploitingopportunitiesfordiversificationandforcomplexification,theECIismeanttofunctionasaroadmapofsorts,oneindicatinghowacountrycangetmoreoutofinternationaltradethroughgraduallymovingintotheproductionofhighersophisticationexports. ThisECIroadmapisfoundedonanumberofpremisesandtheoreticalassumptions.ThefirstisgroundedinaDurkheimianunderstandingofthedivisionoflabor.Specifically,HausmanandHidalgopositthatthe“complexityofaneconomyisrelatedtothemultiplicityofusefulknowledgeembeddedinit”andthat“foracomplexsocietytoexist,andtosustainitself,peoplewhoknowaboutdesign,marketing,finance,technology,humanresourcemanagement,operations,andtradelawmustbeabletointeractandcombinetheirknowledgetomakeproducts”(p.18).Fromthispointofdeparture,thescholarsassertasecondpremise,onepositingthatacountry’sendogenousknowledgebasewillbeexpressedandrevealedinthe“compositionofacountry’sproductiveoutput.” Critically,however,HidalgoandHausmanarealsokeentoemphasizethatthistranslationofknowledgeintoproductswillnotbeautomatic.Integratingtheoreticalinsightsfrominstitutionalistschoolsofeconomicdevelopment,theyassertthatthistranslationprocesswillalwaysbemediatedandaffectedbymattersofgovernance,law,regulation,andthelike.Ifappropriateinstitutionalconditionsareinplace,acountry’sproductiveoutputwillrathercloselyreflecttheknowledge(oraggregatehumancapital)embeddedinthissociety.Likewise,ifinstitutionalconditionsareinappropriate,thecomplexityofacountry’sproductiveoutputmaybeincommensuratewiththatcountry’sendogenous,knowledgebase. Suchadivergence—andsuchinstitutionalfailure—canbedeterminedbycomparingthecomplexityofacountry’scurrent(orpast)productiveoutputagainstaprojectionofwhatthatcomplexitycouldbeincircumstanceofidealgovernance.ThisprojectioncanbefoundintheECI’sGrowthProjectionIndex,whichattemptstomodelwhereacountry’sexportbasketshouldbebasedonthecontemporaryhumancapitalstock. AsforhowthecomplexityofproductiveoutputisactuallydeterminedontheECI,HidalgoandHausman’sformulalargelyreducestotwomeasures:diversityandubiquity.Therelationofdiversitytocomplexityisbasedontheassumptionthatgreaterlevelsofhumancapital(andamoreprecisedivisionoflabor)willresultinagreaternumberofdistinctproductsbeingdevelopedatanygiventime.Thisbeingsaid,thescholarsalsorecognizethatdiversityaloneisinsufficientforcapturingthemultifacetednatureofcomplexity.Afterall,itismorethanpossiblethatarelativelysimpleeconomywitharelativelylowlevelofembeddedknowledgemightstillprovecapableofexportinghundredsofdifferentkindsoflowsophisticationwidgets,agriculturalgoods,orcommodities. (CONTINUEDONNEXTPAGE)
343
The Economic Complexity Index (Continued) Sotocontrolagainstsuchamisleadingoutcome,asmentioned,ubiquityisinsertedasasecondmeasure.Mostsimplyput,theubiquityofaproductisdeterminedbymeasuringthenumberofcountriesthatproduceagivengoodatagiventime.Followingfromtheassumptionthatastheknowledgeintensityofaproductincreases,thenumberofcountriescapableofproducingsuchaproductwilldecrease,ubiquityprovidesaneffectivehedgeagainstdiversity’sincompleterelationtocomplexity.Itshouldalsobeacknowledgedthatthediversitymeasurefunctionsasthesamehedgeforubiquity,justintheinverse.Afterall,itisequallyeasytoenvisionascenariowhereanationaleconomymightbehometoanextremelyrarecommodity;whilethisnaturalinheritanceimpliesalowlevelofubiquityfortheproduct,therarityofcoltan,forinstance,haslittletodowiththecomplexityofthegood,orwiththehumancapitalstockinvolvedinitsproduction.Byaccountingfortheextenttowhichsuchcommodityisrefinedintodifferentproducts—i.e.thediversityofproductiveoutput—,onecancontrolfortheeffectthattherandomdistributionofcommoditiesmighthaveoncomplexitycalculations.Onlybytriangulatingubiquityagainstdiversityandviceversa,then,canareliableproxyforcomplexitybeestablished. Fortheactualmathematicsinvolvedinthecalculationofproductcomplexity,seethetechnicalboxonthenextpage.Mostgenerallyput,productcomplexityisdeterminedbymeasuringtheweightedaverageofGDPpercapitaforeachcountryexportingacertainproduct—wherebyeachcountryisweightedaccordingtoitsshareoftotalworldexports.Thisweightedaveragegivesanindicationofthecompanyoneiskeepingwithinparticularexportmarkets,locatingacountry’smostrelevantcomparatorsandreverseengineeringtheendogenouscapacityofthenationaleconomyinsodoing.
344
*Technicalboxprovidedby:RicardoHausmann,CesarHidalgo,SebastianBuston,MicheleCoscia,SarahChung,JuanJimenez,AlexanderSimoes,MuhammaedYildirim,TheAtlasofEconomicComplexity:MappingPathstoProsperity,MITPress(2014),p.24
345
RankingJordan’sEconomicComplexityAcrossTime
GraphprovidedbyEconomicComplexityIndex,MITMediaLab/HarvardCenterofInternationalDevelopment
346
Whenoneactuallydisaggregatesthecountry’sexportbasketintoitscomponentparts,the
logicbehindsuchadeclinerevealsitself.Ihavealreadydiscussedhowtheexportprocessing
zonesthatareattheheartofcontemporaryindustrial,investment,andtradepolicygeneratelittle
beyondlowskill,lowsophisticationgarmentexports.Combinethoselowcomplexityproducts
withthoseofanagriculturalsectorreliantupontheexportofnon-processed,water-intensive
produceandanindustrialsectorstilldependentonvolatilecommoditieslikephosphatesand
potash625andonecanseehowthecountry’swiderexportbasketcomestocontainlittleinthe
wayoftechnologicallysophisticated,capital-intensiveoutputs.
Jordan’sExportBasketin2017
625 Aswellasthelowsophisticationsecondaryproductsthatcanbederivedfromsuchcommodities(suchas
fertilizer).
348
JordaninComparativeContext:Manufacturing626
626 DataforthesetwographsprovidedbyUnitedNationsIndustrialDevelopmentOrganization.
349
SiliconWadi?JordaninICTTrade627
627 DatafortwographsprovidedbyUnitedNationsConferenceonTradeandDevelopment
350
Tomakemattersworse,methodologicalchoicesattheObservatoryofEconomic
ComplexityhaveactuallyinflatedthecomplexityofJordan’scontemporaryexportbasket.
Specifically,theObservatory’scalculationsdonotappraisethecontributionsthatre-exports(i.e.
goodsnotappreciablytransformedwithinanationaleconomy)aremakingtothecomplexityofa
givencountry’sexportbasket.Giventhattheindexhadbeendesignedontheassumptionthata
country’sexportsoffersanexpressionoftheaggregateknowledgeendogenoustothatcountryat
agivenperiodoftime,theObservatory’sfailuretocontrolforre-exportspresentsapotentially
confoundingmethodologicalerror.Havingdiscernedthismethodologicalshortcoming,Ibrahim
SaifandtheJordanianStrategyForum(JSF)amendedtheObservatory’sformulasotocontrolfor
re-exports.Astheirresearchhasshown,bydiscardingre-exportsfromthecalculationof
economiccomplexity,thecomplexityoftheJordanianexportbasketdeclinesevenfurtherfrom
whathadbeenreportedattheObservatory.Basedonexportdatafrom2014providedbythe
DepartmentofStatistics,theiranalysisshowstheaveragecomplexityofaproductinthe
Jordanianexportbaskettoberoughly50%thenationalaverageofGermanandJapan.Thisislow
evenrelativetoregionalcomparatorslikeEgypt,whoseexportcomplexityexceedsJordan’sby
roughly20%.628
628 See:JordanStrategyForum,Jordan’sProductSpace:PartOne.Report,Amman(January2017),p.27. AccordingtotheECI’smetrics(thecalculationofwhichisdetailedextensivelyinAnnex1),theaverage
complexityofaJordanianexportwas9610.ThisfigurewasdepressedconsiderablybytheaveragecomplexityofJordan’sgarmentexports,whichhadavalueof4945.Forcomparison’ssake,theaveragesophisticationofaJapaneseexportinthissameperiodwas18,117;foraGermanexport,itwas17,781;foranEgyptianexport,itwas11,164;andforaMoroccanexport,itwas8704.
351
Sadly,littleprogressbeenmadesinceSaifetalconductedtheiranalysis—despitethe
author’sconsiderablepoliticalconnectionsanddespitetheJSFhavingmadewide-rangingpolicy
recommendationsdesignedtohelpincreasethecomplexityofJordan’sexports.629Asthetables
onthefollowingpagesevince,Jordan’sexportbasketin2018remainswhollydominatedbylow
sophisticationgarments,chemicals,andagriculturalproducts.Structuringtheeconomytowards
adependenceonvolatilecommodities,foodstuffs,andlowvalue/lowsophistication
manufactures,Jordan’strade,investment,andindustrialpolicieshavecondemnedthecountryto
decadesofperditioninthelower-middleincometrap.
629 RegardingJSF’sefforts,theirstrategicdocumentdetailedandtargetedfivegoodswithineachexportsectoron
thebasisthat(1)thetargetsarebothproximate,orconnectedenough,toagoodcurrentlybeingproducedsoastobewithintheendogenouscapacityofthecurrenteconomyand(2)thatthetargetswouldofferanopportunityforaddingsophisticationtotheexportbasket.Forexample,thestudymightidentifytheproductionandexportationofcannedtomatoesasasimplewaytoaddcomplexitytoagood(rawtomatoes)alreadybeingexported.Inotherwords,theypresentedacomplexificationstrategywhollygroundedintheprinciplesofrelativecomparativeadvantage.FarfrommappingsomecoursewherebyJordanmightsomehowtransformintoafrontiertechnologicalhubwithinafewyears,theylayoutapragmatic,incrementalisttrack,onenotbasedonhugeleapsforwardbutsmallstepswhollywithinthecapacityofthecurrenteconomy,bethesestepssideward(diversification)orupward(sophistication)innature.Despitethehumilityoftheirrecommendations,theyhavestillbeenignored.
355
TablesprovidedbyJordanianDepartmentofStatistics
(3)Gulf-basedinvestorsacquiringofincreasingsharesofthedomesticcapitalstock-->FDI’s
allocationintonon-productivesectors
TheliberalizationofJordan’scapitalaccount,aswellasthevariousinitiativesthrough
whichthecountry’spolicymakershaveattemptedtorecruitforeigndirectinvestment(FDI),have
notyieldedinvestmentinflowsconducivetolong-termdevelopment.Ratherthanfacilitatethe
kindsofinvestmentthatarepropitioustotechnologicaltransfers—andratherthanconditionalize
theincentivesofferedtoforeigncapitalsotopushinvestmentintoproductivesectorsandhigh
complexityactivities—,thisdimensionofJordan’seconomicopeninghasprimarilyfunctionedso
toexpeditetherecyclingofGulf-originatingpetrodollars.Ashasbeenmentionedthroughoutthis
356
text,suchpetrodollarsaretypicallyfunneledintoeitherspeculativeprojectsinthebuilt
environmentand/orcommodityextraction.630Evidenceofthis,datafromtheFinancialTimes
establishesthatafull40.7%ofaggregateFDIinthe2003-2015periodendedupallocatedtothe
Jordanianrealestatesector;another29.6%flowedintotheoilandgassector,while9.1%was
directedintochemical-basedcommodities.631
Suchdevelopmentallyspuriousallocationarypatternsareevenmorepronouncedinthe
domainofgreenfieldinvestment.AsdeterminedbytheUnitedNationsConferenceonTradeand
Development,thefirmsleadinginboundgreenfieldinvestmentinJordanarealmostexclusively
operatinginthefieldsofluxurytourism(namely,hotels)andcommercialandresidentialreal
estate.Whileinflatingmarketsforspeculativenon-tradablesandlendingfurthervolatilitytothe
marketsofextractiveindustries,then,empiricallyspeaking,FDI’simpactonjobcreation632,
industrialupgrading,exportdiversification,andtechnologicaltransfershasproven
unsurprisinglynegligible.
*TableprovidedbyUnitedNations
ConferenceonTradeandDevelopment.
630 FormoredetailsonthisphenomenonacrosstheMiddleEast,seeHanieh(2016).631 DatadrawnfromTheFinancialTimes’FDIMarketsdatabase.632 Thevastmajorityoftheworkersemployedintheconstructionsectorarenon-Jordanian.Accordingly,the
buildingofrealestateprojects,etc.,doeslittlefordomesticjobcreation.
358
BeforeclosingonFDIinparticular,itisalsoworthemphasizingthatsuchinflowshave
neverbeenofthemagnitudenecessarytomakeupfordeclinesinpublicinvestment(seetableon
nextpage)—declinesthathavebeenpartandparcelofGenerationAbdullah’sneoliberally-
orientedfiscalconsolidationinitiatives.Byconsequence,thestate’sFDI-dependentinvestment
strategyisalsoimplicatedinthedepreciationofthecontemporaryeconomy’scapitalstock.
MovingbeyondFDIandintoquestionsrelatedtoGulfcapital/Gulfinvestment’smore
generaleffectsontheJordanianeconomy,anumberofpointsareworthmaking.Regardingthe
magnitudeofGulfcapitalinJordan,ananalysisoftheAmmanStockExchangerevealsthatGulf
investorsnowcontrolroughly40%ofthetotalequityheldinJordan’spubliclytradedfirms.633
Disaggregatingthisdatafurther,oneseesthatthis40%isitselfcontrolledbyanexceedingly
smallgroupofindividuals.PertheSecuritiesDepositoryCenter,asofMarch2019,amere377
Qatariswereholding5.8%ofthetotalequityontheASE;3,000Kuwaitishelda5.7%aggregate
equityshare;134Bahrainishelda4.24%aggregateequityshare;andacomparativelynumerous
2,500Saudishelda6.2%aggregateequityshare.Inaddition,itisworthnotingthatthirty-three
“residents”oftheCaymanIslandshold3.9%ofthetotalequityvalue,afigureratherstarkly
suggestthemagnitudeofJordan’sinvolvementwiththekindsoftaxevasionrevealedbythe
PanamaPapersanddiscussedinchaptereight.
633 Non-Jordanianinvestorsmoregenerallyhavecontrolledbetween48%and51.7%ofthetotalequityintheASE.
See:https://www.ase.com.jo/en/Quotes-Market/Market-Performance/Foreign-Investment-Activityformoredetails
359
Country Shareholders Securities Total Value (JD) Saudi Arabia 2503 387667360 987,253,927
Kuwait 2875 223358573 840,771,002 Qatar 383 183039961 786,706,464
Bahrain 129 339646400 658,390,147 Lebanon 1165 210388137 397,181,640
UAE 389 109725324 241,859,065
DataprovidedbySecuritiesDepositoryCenter;Figuresaccurateasof8/31/2019
TheseGulfinvestorsareheavilyleveragedwithintheJordanianbankingsector—more
specifically,withinthesector’slargestinstitutions,namelyArabBank,JordanKuwaitBank,the
HousingBankforTradeandFinance,AhliBank,BankofJordan,andCairoAmmanBank—,asthe
tablesonthefollowingpagesdetail.Allowingsuchactorstoimbueifnotsubsume/reconstitute
360
Jordanianfinancialcapital’sfundamentalorientation,interests,andrelationalitytoregionaland
globalsystemsofproduction,distribution,andinvestment,theGulf’spositioninginthebanking
sectorisacentralmechanismwithinthelargerengineeringofJordan’sclass-biased,crisis-
orientedcapitalism.
366
Thedevelopmental,political,andsocialrisksintroducedbytheGulf’scolonizationofthe
Jordanianeconomyareprofoundandmultifaceted.Oneneedbegin,ofcourse,withfundamental
mattersofsovereignty.ByvirtueofthehegemonicpositionsestablishedbyGulfinvestorswithin
thebankingsectorandothercriticalsectorsoftheeconomy634,theyhaveacquireddefactoveto
powerwithinthedevelopmentpolicymakingprocess.Withthespecteroftheircapitalflight
sufficienttothreatenatotalizingeconomiccollapse,thispowerallowssaidactorsto(tacitlyor
explicitly)disciplineJordanianofficialsandtherebyheminthealternativefuturesthoseofficials
mightotherwiseimagine.Asanypolicydesignneednowbeevaluatedaccordingtohowitmay
affecttheinterestsofforeigncapital,thislossofsovereigntymeansthat eventhosepolicymakers
whomightotherwisebeinclinedtobuckJordan’sneoliberaltrajectorieswillfindpreciouslittle
opportunityfordoingso.
Thenthereisthematterofwhat,precisely,constitutestheinterestsofGulfcapital.
Ultimately,thisisaclassofactorsacutelypredisposedtowardsinvestmentsinthebuilt
environmentandotherspeculativenon-tradables(includingfinancialassets).635Byconsequence,
theGulf’swideninghegemonyinJordannecessarilydeprivesthedomesticeconomyofthe
productiveandtechnologicallysophisticatedinvestmentsitneedstopowerlong-term
634 ForeigninvestmentsinJordannowconstituteroughly84%ofnationalGDP.635 Thereasonsforthelackoftechnologicaltransfersorknowledgeupgradesaremany.Tobegin,asHaniehhas
theorizedanddocumented,Gulfcapitalissuigenerisinthatitspreponderancehasnothingtodowiththeregion’sproximitytotheglobaltechnologicalfrontier.Wheresimilarlywealthycountrieshaveaccumulatedtheircapitalstockthroughproductiveactivitiesandinnovation(inaddition,ofcourse,totheextractionofresourcesfromtheglobalsouth),theGulfhasacquireditsalmostexclusivelythroughtheexportationofgasandoil.Thisbeingthecase,Gulfinvestorsofferlittleexpertiseandhavelittleexperiencewithmoresophisticatedindustries.Inaddition,aspetrodollarsderivedfromthesaleofoilandgastendtoberecycledintorealestateandfinancialmarkets—ratherthaninmarketsbasedinproductiveactivities—,thereceiptofGulfinvestmentalsocontributeslittletoacountry’sindustrialupgrading.
367
developmentaswell.636WithGulfinflowsalmostexclusivelyparkedinfinancialassetsorinquick
hittingrealestateprojects—andwiththeseinflowscertaintotransferlittleinthewayof
knowledgeortechnology—,theirarrivalultimatelyadvanceslittlebeyondthevacationing
interestsofwealthyKhalijisheikhsandthegeopoliticalinterestsofreactionarydespots(inthe
caseoftheAqabaPort).
(6)BrainDrain+Remittances
Finally,nosurveyoftheexternalarticulationofJordan’sSSAwouldbecompletewithout
consideringitsmigratorydimensions.Aswaspreviouslydiscussed,Jordan’spositionwithinthe
migratorynetworksofarelativelyintegratedregionallabormarkethashistoricallyimplieda
two-sidedexchangeof(low-skill)inflowsand(high-skill)outflows.Thoughmarkedbysome
minorchanges,thissystemofexchangecontinuestofunctiontoday.
Ontheinflowsside,Jordanstillwelcomeshundredsofthousands(ifnotmillions)oflow
skilledlaborersfromEgypt.Constitutinganimplicitsubsidyfortheconstruction,realestate,
agricultural,andEPZ-basedmanufacturingsectors,theseforeignlaborerspropupprofitsfor
636 Someofthesetendencies(andtheirdevelopmentaleffects)areevincedinJordan’sratesofgrossfixedcapital
formation(GFCF)underAbdullah—ameasurethathashistoricallybeenpredictiveof(andcausallyimplicatedin)longwavetrendsinGDPgrowth.WhereasFDIflowshadprovidedfor42%ofJordan’sGFCFbetween2000and2008—afigurethatincreasedto65.8%duringthepeakoftheGulf ’sspeculationintheJordanianbuiltenvironment(2005-2007)—,by2017,foreigninvestmentwascontributingamere19.4%toGFCF.Withdomesticcapitalunabletomakeupthedifference,thesereductionshaveprovendeeplyimpactfulforthelong-termprospectsofJordaniancapitalism.
See:UnitedNationsConferenceonTradeandDevelopment,WorldInvestmentReport2018:InvestmentandNewIndustrialPolicies.
Coester(2015),p.7
368
privilegedfractionsofthecountry’stransnationalcapitalclass.Ontheoutflowsside,meanwhile,
Jordansendsaslightlylessernumber—roughly600,000intotal—comprisedofhigh-skilled,
high-educatedworkerstoSaudiArabia637,theUAE,Qatar,andKuwait.638
EducationLevelsoftheJordanianWorkforce:Homev.theDiaspora639
637 ItshouldbesaidthatSaudiArabia’simmigrationpolicieshavetightenedinrecentyearsasthestatehasmovedto
nationalizeitslaborforce.Thatsaid,morethan300,000JordanianscontinuetoworkinSaudiArabiaasof2017.638 Asof2017,therewasanestimated558,846JordaniansworkingintheGulf,withroughly61%basedinSaudi
Arabia,14.1%intheUAE,12.5%inQatar,6.1%inOman,and3.7%inKuwait(JordanStrategyForum,JordanianExpatriatesintheGulf:WhoRemits,HowMuch,andWhy?Report:July2018,pp.10,12).
62%ofJordan’semigreworkersholdcollegedegrees,afigurewellinexcessoftherespectiveportionfor
Jordanianworkerslaboringinthedomesticmarket(Wahba(2014,p.174).JordanianemigrestotheGulfareevenmorehighlyeducated.Asof2014—andasdocumentedbytheJordanStrategyForum—,66%ofJordanianworkersintheGulfheldanundergraduatedegree,14.5%heldaMasters,and3.9%aPhD(JordanianExpatriates…,p.4).
639 TableandgraphprovidedbyJacklineWahba,“Immigration,Emigration,andtheLaborMarketinJordan”in
RaguibAssaad(ed.)TheJordanianLaborMarketintheNewMillenium,OxfordUniversityPress(2014),p.180
369
Theeffectsoftheseinflowsandoutflowsonthecountry’shumancapitalstock—andon
theeconomy’sprospectsofmovingtowardsaknowledgeeconomy—shouldbeobviousenough.In
anutshell,Jordanisexportingahighpercentageofitshighskilledlaborforcewhileimporting
largemagnitudesoflowskilledworkers.Whatmakesthis(state-backed)braindrainevensadder
isthefactthatitalsofunctionsasadefactopublicsubsidyforGulfcapital.Afterall,
approximately50%ofJordan’sGulf-boundemigresreceivetheircollegedegreesfromJordanian
publicuniversities.640Totheextentthatpublicfinancesandtaxpayerreceiptsarefootingthebill
thatcoversthetrainingoftheseindividuals(atleastinpart)onlytoseethebenefitsderivedfrom
suchtrainingaccruetofirmsinDubai,Riyadh,andDoha,theillogicofthestate’simmigration
policiesarerenderedevenmorepronounced.641
Ofcourse,theeffectsofJordan’sbraindrainarepartiallyoffsetbyreceiptofGulf-
originatingremittances,whichhelpsustaindomesticconsumptionandpropupaggregate
demand.642Thetableonthenextpagegivessomeindicationoftheirmagnitude.Ifsomewhat
usefulintheimmediate,however,onemustnotethatthedevelopmentaleffectsofthese
remittancesareratherdubious.Theyaredirectlyproblematicinthattheyfunctionbothsoto
inflatethehousingmarketandsotoincreasedemandforimportedconsumergoods(while
640 JordanianExpatriates…,p.11641 FromthepointofviewoftheJordanianlaborer,thereasonsforemigrationareobviousenough.Themean
incomeofJordanianexpatriotsworkingintheGulfwas38,734JDasof2014.Thoughthisfigureispartiallyinflatedbythemassiveearningsnearthetopofthedistribution,amedianfigureof24,000JDindicatesthatthetypicalGulf-basedemigreisstillearningsomewhereintherangeof8-10timesthemedianearnerinJordan.
See:JordanianExpatriates(2018),p.4;Wabha(2014),p.187.642 PertheJSF,themedianamountremittedbyemigresintheGulfis10,000JD/annum(p.4),andover68%ofthe
emigrepopulationregularlyremitsmoneybacktoJordan.
370
almostneverwindingupinproductiveinvestment).643Theyareindirectlyproblematic,
meanwhile,intermsoftheiropportunitycostthatisinherenttotheirreceipt(i.e.theexportation
ofhigh-skilledlabortotheGulf).
DataProvided
byCentralBankofJordan
ShouldtheJordanianeconomyhaveanychanceofmovingintothehighersophisticationproducts
andservicesconstitutingtheglobalizedknowledgeeconomy,itwillneedhighskilledworkers.To
theextentitislosingtheseworkersbythehundredsofthousands,immigrationpoliciesare
functioningsotoreproducetheeconomy’sstagnationandunderdevelopment.
643 Indirectly,moreover,byproppinguptherealestatemarket,remittancesalsosupport(inpart)speculationinthe
builtenvironment.Astheprofitsofinvestorsinthesesectorsdependuponafirm’scapacitytoemploy(poorlypaid)non-Jordanians,remittancesindirectlycontributetotheEgyptianizationoftheJordanianlabormarketaswell.
371
Conclusion
AsIhopethisreviewmakesclear,theexternalarticulationoftheJordanianSSAisnotonly
imbricatedintheotherinstitutionaldomainsofthewidersocialstructureofaccumulation—from
itsmigratorydimension’sconnectionstothesocialcontrolregimetoitsinvestmentandtrade
dimension’sconnectionstotoday’sprevailingformofmarketcompetition—,itisalso
fundamentaltothestabilizationoftoday’scapitalismofcrisisaswell.Indeed,ifdoinglittlefor
sustainabledevelopment,thecountry’ssystemofFTAs,budgetaryaid,exportprocessingzones,
immigrationpolicies,andinvestmentpolicieshelpssustainboththeregimeitselfandthat
regime’scoalitionofforeignanddomesticallies.Inasense,thesamemodalityofregionaland
globalintegrationbothbolstersthePalaceandtheelitefractionofthecapitalismclasswhile
simultaneouslydoomingthelong-termsocialandeconomicprospectsofthecountry.
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CHAPTERELEVEN
Legitimatingneoliberalism:inward/outwardfacingideologyandtheJordanianSSA
ByconsequenceoftheJordanianstateandeconomy’sexternaldependence,theideological
legitimationstrategiesoneseesdisseminatedtodayaredirectedattwoseparate(ifnotentirely
mutuallyexclusive)audiences:(1)thenationaldemos/workingpopulationand(2)the
internationalcommunity/transnationalcapitalistclass.Instudyinghowcapital(andits
Hashemitesponsor)sellstheproprietyandnormativemeasureofthecontemporary
economy644—andinevaluatingtheirsuccessesorfailuresinthisventure—,then,onemust
appraiseboththeinwardandtheoutwarddimensionsoftheseappeals.Analytically,Iwill
attempttoaccountforthetwo-sidednessofthisideologicalapparatusthroughaddressingfour
masterscriptsmostcentraltothelegitimizationoftoday’swiderpoliticaleconomy—andthe
extenttowhicheachorientstowardsdomesticorinternationalaudiences.
Thefetishizationofglobalizationconstitutesthefirstofthesemasterscripts.Myanalysis
herewilldetailhowthePalaceinparticularworkstodepictthecurrentinternationaleconomic
orderasanatural,climatelikephenomenon.Directingtheseappealstowardsbothdomesticand
transnationalears,IwillthendemonstratehowthisframingisusedtovalidateGeneration
Abdullah’sneoliberally-styledeconomicopeningasinevitable,necessary,appropriate,andnearly
involuntary.Fromhere,IwillturntoasecondmasterscriptIentitlethedepoliticizationof
644 Iwillbeusingamixedmethodsapproachheresotoincorporatefindingsderivedfromacomprehensivereview
ofthescholarlyliteraturealongsidethoseproducedbyadiscourseanalysiscenteredonthespeechmakingandofficialpublicationsoftheKing.
373
governance.Herein,Iwillfirstfocusonthediscursiveandinstitutionalmaneuversdesignedto
sullythepoliticalthroughinvestingpoliticalparties,democraticinstitutions,andthestatewith
chargesofendemiccorruption,traditionalism,andparticularism.Castinthislight,Iwilltrace
howsuchideologicalcampaignsallowthestatetosubsequentlycastandveneratetechnocratic,
non-democratic,Palace-dominatedformsofgovernanceastheantithesisofthepolitical.Withthe
thirdmasterscript—oneIentitleLionizingthePrivateSector;ChampioningtheEntrepreneur—I
willdelineatehowthePalaceandthecapitalistclasshaveattemptedtoascribegoodness,
deservingness,andsocialimportancetoJordan’seconomicelite.Framedasthecentral
protagonistsinthemoderndevelopmentprocess,Iwilldemonstratewhythefigureofthe
entrepreneurisespeciallycriticaltothisideologicalcampaign—andtothenormativityof
prevailingclassrelationsmoregenerally.Finally,withthefourthmasterscript,Iwilldetailhow
thepersonofthesocialentrepreneuralsotiesintotheregime’ssiegeonthepolitical.Evincing
howthePalace(andtheinternationalcommunity)promoteinnovative,youthful,civil-society
basedinterventionsasthesolutiontopervasivesocialills,Iwillarguethatthemythosofsocial
entrepreneurshipservesanexpresslyideological(andanti-welfarist)project.Expeditingthe
state’sabdicationofitsbasicsocialobligationsinthefinalinstance,socialentrepreneurshipwill
belocatedasanideologicalcognatetophilanthropyandcorporatesocialresponsibility—praxes
which,regardlessoftheirimmediatemerits,areindeliblyimplicatedinalargerneoliberal
project.
374
(1)FetishizingGlobalization
Ofalltheideologicalmasterscriptsevokedduringtheeraofcontemporaryglobalization,
thefetishization(ornaturalizing)ofthecurrentinternationaleconomicsystemisperhapsthe
mostpervasive.Ithasbeenceaselesslyinvokedbythirdway-styledliberalreformersin
particular,atonceconstitutingtheircentraldescription,explanation,andexcuseforthe
neoliberalproject.Mystifyingthepolicymakersandpoliciesthathaveexplicitlyredesigned
systemsoftrade,capitalmovements,production,anddistribution,fetishizationrendersasunny
inevitability645outofthefundamentaltransformationsthathavereshapedsocietiesand
economiesacrosstheworld.646
Whilehavingplayedafamouslylargeroleinwesternliberalizationsofthe1990s,
fetishizationhasmadeitsmarkinJordanaswell.Ithas,infact,beenattheveryheartofKing
Abdullah’sreformistprojectfromtheverystart,anchoringthepictureoftheworldthat
GenerationAbdullahpresentedtothedemos—anddemarcatingtheperimetersofwhatpolicy
alternativesmighthenceforthbeimagined.Jordan’saccessiontotheWTO,itssigningsofFTAs,
anditslaissezfaireindustrialpolicy,forinstance,haveallbeenconceptualizedandrationalized
645 RecallthatAbdullah’spolicyeliteverymuchpresentedthecountry’saccessiontotheWTOasafaitaccomplisfor
whichtherewasnoalternative.ThiswassodespitetheobjectionsofmanymembersoftheLowerHouseandinspiteofconsiderableoppositionwithinthemediaandthewiderpublicsphere.
See:Anani(2001),p.186.646 InthecaseofJordan,onecouldarguethattheinternationaleconomicsystemdoesfunctionassomethingofan
exogenous,climate-styledevent.Byvirtueofthecountry’smarginality—whethervis-a-visthedecision-makingprocessesoccurringattheBrettonWoodsInstitutionsorvis-a-vistheinterestsofglobalcapital—,Jordanissomethingofatakerofglobalizationmorethanitisamakerofglobalization.
375
withintheframeoffetishization,renderingvoluntaristpoliticalchoiceintothereisnoalternative
exculpation.
Signalinghisintentfromdayone,theKing’sarticulationanddisseminationofthe
fetishizationmasterscriptisperhapsbestreflectedinaseriesofspeecheshedeliveredto
Americanaudiencesshortlyaftercomingtopower.Thefirstofthesespeecheswasgivenat
HarvardUniversityinOctoberof1999.FortheyoungKing—whohadonlymonthsearlierrather
surprisinglyjumpedthelineofsuccessionsotoascendtothethrone—,theoccasionatHarvard
allowedhimtoannouncehisreformistintentionsandperformhismodernistbonafidesforthe
internationalcommunitywhileatthesametimesketchinganontologyofglobalizationfor
observersbackhome.Definingtheworldasitisthroughtheassertionofanumberofself-
sufficientfacts647,thespeechtacitlyjustifiesthereformagendaAbdullahetalalreadyhadin
mind.IntheKing’swords(italicsaremine):
Theglobalisationofinternationaleconomicaffairs,rangingfromtrademattersto investmentissuestotheprotectionofintellectualpropertyrights,hasleftnoroomfor narrowdifferencesamongnationstoobstructtheprocessofestablishinganewmodeof regionaleconomiccooperationanddevelopmentanylonger.Certainrequirementsare essentialfortheestablishmentofthisnewframework,includingastrongpoliticalwillto positivelyandconstructivelyaddressissuesofasymmetryinthesocialandeconomic conditionsofneighbouringstates.
Equallyimportantisthedeterminationofstatesintheregiontopursuethepathofeconomic reform,and toadoptandpursue liberalpolicies regarding trade, investmentsand the free movementofcapital.Jordanhasbeenaleadingpioneerinthisregard.Ourcommitmentand pursuitofeconomicreform,asevidencedbythecontinuedeffortstoachievemonetaryand fiscal stability, the successful privatisation of government-owned companies, and the
647 Suchself-sufficientfactsareperhapsbestrepresentedinaninterviewthattheaforementionedleadingtrade
negotiatorMuhammedHalayqagavetotheNewYorkTimes,whereheasserted“theworldisrunbythebigcorporations,whetherwelikeitornot.”
See:WilliamOrmeJr.,“Jordan’slongroadtothefree-tradeclub”,NewYorkTimes(May21,2000).
376
determination to improve the investment climate in the Kingdom, have placed us at the forefront of those countries intent on helping themselves before seeking the assistance of others.
Jordan'sentryintoanassociationagreementwiththeEuropeanUnion,andourimpending accessiontotheWorldTradeOrganisation,havepavedthegroundforaneffectiveand meaningfulparticipationintheglobaleconomy.Despiteafourthconsecutiveyearof negativegrowthinpercapitaincome,ourwilltocontinuewiththereformofour economyhasnotwavered.Onthecontrary,werealisethatthemoreattractiveour economybecomestoforeigndirectinvestment,theeasierandquickerforittoemergefrom itsrecessionarymode.Itisthisrealisationthathasplacedthegoalofattaining economicstabilityatthetopofouragenda.648
Inthesebriefremarksasmuchasinthedecadesofplanningdocumentsthatwouldsubsequently
beissued,oneseesthefetishizationofglobalizationinfuseaveryparticularkindofeconomic
changewithbothoptimismandinevitability.Regardingoptimism,thisisadiscoursethatbegins
bydrawingonmanyofthetropesandaxiomsfoundinneoliberalism’sarchivesotopromisethat
fiscalconsolidationandtheattractionofforeigndirectinvestmentwillbesufficienttodrive
prosperity.Innextassertingthatliberalpoliciesontrade,investment,andcapitalmovementsare
notonlythesinequanonofdevelopmentbutalsosociallyequitableintheirdistributiveeffects,it
isonethatalsoobscurestheclassbiasesthatarecontainedinthislargertransformational
project—thatpresentsstructuralreformasbountifulandgoodforallJordanians.Throughthen
consistentlyandincessantlyrepeatingtheseclaimsacrosspolicydocumentsandpublic
statements,themessagedissolvesintoakindofdiffusecommonsense—anunthinking
professionoffaiththateachpolicymakermustincant(whetherthepublicbuysthelieornot).
648 KingAbullahII,SpeechofhisMajestyKingAbdullahIIatHarvardUniversity.Cambridge,Masschusetts(October
15,1999).
377
Asforinevitability,thecolddosesofrealismthatareprojectedinthe“certain
requirements”Abdullah’sspeechlistssimultaneouslyallowAbdullahetaltoerasetheir
discretionaryagencywithinthepolicyprocess.Oldwayssimplyhavetogo649;theworldis
movingon,globalizationishere,andJordanneedgetonboard.Inthiscontext,itisasifthose
writingandsigninglegislationarenothingmorethanthecustodiansofaself-propellingprocess.
Withboilerplateliberalizationconstructedasapragmaticaprioriforallpolicymaking,afterall,
therecanbe“noroomfornarrowdifferences”whenitcomestotrade,IP,orinvestmentpolicy.
Throughsuchasleightofhand,Jordan’spolicymakersareabletobothpromisetheworldand
abdicateresponsibilityforwhatmayfollow.
WhilenotespeciallyeffectiveinpersuadingtheeverydayJordanianofstructuralreforms’
merits(orofthemeritsofJordaniancapitalismmoregenerally650),thepropagationofthe
fetishizationmasterscripthasservedtheKingwellvis-a-vishisforeignaudiences.Byalso
pervadinganddefiningthecollectivecommonsenseguidingJordan’spolicyeliteoverthepast
twentyyears,itseffectsontoday’scapitalismofcrisishavebeenmultifacetedandprofound.651
649 Forexample,BaseemAwadallah,oneofthecentralfiguresontheECC,wouldpresentJordan’sneedtoreform
IntellectualPropertylawinlinewithTRIPSPlus—reformsthatproveddeeplyinjurioustoJordan’spharmaceuticalcorporations—asfollows:“the(Jordanian)pharmaceuticalcompaniesherewerelivingincuckoo-land,thinkingthatyoucouldkeeponstealingandstayinbusiness.”
See:OrmeJr.(2000).650 Evidenceofthesefailuresinpersuasionareabundantacrosspublicopinionsurveys.TheArabBarometer’sFifth
Wave(carriedoutin2018)shows71%ofJordanianslisttheeconomicsituationasthemostimportantchallengefacingthecountry(andanother17%listfinancialandadministrativecorruption).
651 See:ColinPowers,“Policyconvergence,(under)development,andJordanianeconomicsunderKingAbdullah,
MiddleEastLawandGovernance(forthcoming).
378
(2)DepoliticizingGovernance
Thesecondideologicalfrontopenedintheregime’seffortstolegitimateandadvance
economicliberalizationcentersinthedomainofgovernance.Herein,theregime’stacticshave
primarilybeenorientedaroundacynicalcampaigndesignedtorenderpolitics(andthosewhodo
it)asdirty,corrupt,andinadequate.Havingdoneso,thePalaceconjuresitsfavoredtechnocrats
throughnegation,presentingtheRoyalCourtandpolicybodiesliketheECC,ASEZA,andthe
AmmanInstituteastheantithesisofthepositivetermsfirstascribedtothepolitical.
Mythologizedassitesofanti-politicsandpositionedastheideal(andnecessary)forafor
policymaking,thismasterscriptisthereforemeanttolegitimateinsulatedandanti-democratic
policymaking—tolegitimatetheprocess,inotherwords,throughwhicheconomicliberalization
hasbeenrealized.
Workingsequentially,onemustfirstbeginwithwhat(orwho),exactly,thisdiscourseis
referencingwhenitevokesthesignifierofpolitics.Inthehermeneuticsoftheregime,politicsis
meanttoconceptualizeanddescribethebusinessofparliamentarians,politicalparties,andstate
bureaucrats.Implicitly,then,oneismeanttoconcludefromthislistthatneithertheRoyalCourt
norJordan’sauthoritarianmonarch—whosepersonretainsnearlyuncheckedexecutiveand
legislativepowers—arepoliticalinnature.652Byextension,thesameapoliticalcharactercanbe
assumedoftheautonomous,Palace-alignedpolicyinstitutions(thinkASEZAortheECC)that
652 Rathercynically,theKingisfrequentlystyledasbeingabovepolitics,astranscendingspecialinterests,andasan
anthopormorphofthenationitself.
379
haveacquiredsuchgravityduringthetenureofAbdullah.Ifthatanswersthewhoofpolitics,what
aboutthewhat?Howhaveofficial,state-backeddiscoursespresentedthesedoersofpolitics,
thesepartisans,parliamentarians,andbureaucrats?
Asmentionedattheoutset,eachofthesepoliticalactorshasbeeninvestedwithitsown
specialkindofontologicaldirtiness.Forthepoliticalparties(and,byextension,the
parliamentarians),theregime’sdiscourseborrowsfromtropesdevelopedinpublicchoicetheory
toascribethemwithirrationalism,traditionalism,tribalism,immaturity,short-termism,
ineffectualityandgeneralizedincompetence.653Omitting,ofcourse,howhisRoyalCourtand
GeneralIntelligenceDirectoratehaveactivelyunderminedtheconsolidationofhealthypartisan
organizations—or,forthatmatter,howthemanysuspensionsofparliament,manipulationsofthe
electoralsystem,yearsofexecutivelawmaking,andmonarchicalcontrolofthepurseand
governmentmayhaveunderminedthestandingofpoliticalpartiesinJordan—,theKinguses
speeches,publishedstatements,andplanningdocumentstochargethatthereissomething
endemicallywrongwiththosewhowould,bydefinition,needtoleadanyprospectivetransition
todemocracy.
Twoexamplesmighthelpilluminatehowthiscampaigntoideologicallydelegitimize
politicalparties(and,byextension,populargovernment)hasoperatedinpractice.Speaking
653 ThisideologicalcampaignwasessentialtotheentireNationalAgendaproject,whichconsistentlybemoanedthe
immaturityofJordan’spoliticalparties.ItwouldalsobeevincedintheaftermathoftheArabUprisings,atwhichpointtheKingsaidthefollowingtotheparliament(italicsaremine):“UntilthepoliticalpartysystemmaturesandcanplayitsrightfulroleinParliament,weneedtoadoptaninclusiveconsultativeapproachtogovernmentformation,sothatcitizenscantrustthat,throughtheirelectedrepresentatives,theyaretrulyparticipatingintheprocessofforminggovernments,monitoringthem,andholdingthemaccountable.”
See:KingAbdullahII,SpeechfromtheThrone:OpeningtheSecondOrdinarySessionofthe16thParliament.Amman,Jordan(October26,2011).
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beforetheJordanianYouthForuminJuneof2011—justmonthsfollowingtheeruptionofthe
ArabUprisings,mindyou—,Abdullahusedrhetoricalquestioningtogreateffectsotointimate
thatJordan’spartisanactorsarefundamentallylacking.Inhiswords(italicsaremine):
Speakingofpoliticalparties,thequestionyouhavetocontemplateis:Whatkindof politicalpartiesyouseek?Doyouwanttoseemajorpartiesrepresentingthecentrist, rightistandleftistorientations,competinginparliamentaryelectionsand,subsequently, participatingingovernmentonthebasisofplatformsandthesizeoftheirrepresentation attheLowerHouse?Ordoyouwantmultipleparties,smallandmedium-sized,asthecase isinourcountrycurrently,bearinginmindthatsuchpartieshavesofarfailedtohavea strongfootholdandsotheyenjoynowidepopularbase? Theotherquestion:Whatisthenatureofthesepoliticalparties?Doyouneedpartiesthat aresolelyconcernedwithpolitics?Ordoyouwanttoseepartieswithprogrammes promotingbetterservicesanddevelopmentandaclearvisionofhowtoaddressthe problemsofpoverty andunemployment,improveservicesinthehealth,educationand transportationfields,protectlabourrights,increasethepercapitaincome,reviewthe taxationsystemandensurejusticeinthedistributionofdevelopmentgains,amongother issues?Weallneedtohaveclearanswerstothesequestions.654
Eachquestionposedinthisspeechishighlyloadedandpurposefullyahistorical.Throughself-
servingactsofdiscursiveerasure,Abdullah’sframingofthecurrentimpasseisaconstructthat
beginsbyfirstmystifyinghispersonalcomplicityintheshortcomingsheattributestothenation’s
parties.Forinstance,theextenttowhichtwelveyearsofinsulatedpolicymaking,twelveyearsof
gerrymandering,twelveyearsofhollowingouttheparliament,andtwelveyearsofempowering
non-democraticinstitutionsliketheECCmighthaveaffectedtheprogrammingofpoliticalparties
inJordanisfullyobscured.Similarly,theextenttowhichtheexternalizationofpolicy
654 KingAbdullahII,SpeechofhisMajestyKingAbdullahIIattheJordanYouthForum2011.DeadSea,Jordan(June
14,2011).
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commitments—whetherthroughagreementssignedwiththeWTO,UnitedStatesgovernment,or
theIMF—hasplacedveryhardlimitsonthekindsofpoliciesanyrulingpartymightbeallowedto
implement,especiallywhenitcomestodistributivejustice,isalsomeanttovanishfromview.
HermeticallysealingtheenduringflawsofJordan’spoliticalparties,theonlytakeawayAbdullah
seekstoinspirethroughthisdiscourseisthatsuchpartiesareneitherseriousnorgroundedin
popularconstituencies.Byvirtueofthisfact,oneoughtconclude(andmosthaveconcluded655)
thatitistheKingwhoisthenecessaryandessentialstewardofthenation’spoliticalfuture.
ThesameideologicaltrickisalsoevincedinahighlystagedpublicationAbdullahlater
arrangedwithTheAtlantic’sJeffGoldberg.Herein,thoughthestyleisdifferent,thetextand
subtextarenearperfectfacsimiles.Obscuringthelegaciesofhistory,thepublicationbeginsby
assertingaseriesofself-sufficientfactssotodefineJordan’spartiesandpoliticiansas
endogenouslybackward,tribal,andselfish.Withthecontextsetthusly,thetextcannextposition
itsprotagonist,KingAbdullah,asareluctanthero—areformistautocratfrustratatedlyretaining
hispowersnotbecausehewantsthembutbecausethereisnobodytoturnthemoverto.Per
Goldberg:
InhisprivateofficeinAlHummar,whichoverlooksthewealthyneighborhoodsofWest Amman,thekinghadexplainedtomethereasonforthetriptoKarak:hewastrying,in advanceofparliamentaryelectionsinJanuary,toinstructthesetriballeadersonthe importance ofrepresentativedemocracy.Hewanted,hesaid,toseeJordaniansbuild politicalpartiesthatwouldnotsimplyfunctionaspatronagemillsbutwouldadvance ideasfromacrossabroadideologicalspectrum,andthusestablishforJordanamature politicalculture.Hesaidhewould liketoseePalestiniansmoreproportionately 655 TheefficacyoftheKing’sideologicalcampaignagainstpoliticalpartiesandtheparliamentcanbeevaluatedina
viewofanumberofinterestingfindingsrevealedthroughpublicopinionresearch.Mosttellingly,morethan84%ofJordaniansexpressedeithernotrustatall(68.5%)ornotverymuchtrust(15.7%)whenqueriedabouttheparliament.Whenqueriedaboutpoliticalparties,70%expressednotrustatalland9.2%expressednotverymuchtrust(ArabBarometerWaveFive).
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representedinparliament.Andhewouldliketodoallthis,heexplained,without allowingtheMuslimBrotherhood—a“Masoniccult”(ashedescribesit)thattoday controlsthemostformidablepoliticalorganizationinJordan,theIslamicActionFront —tohijackthecauseofdemocraticreforminthenameofIslam.Inotherwords,theking wantstobringpoliticalreformtoJordan,andtocedesomeofhispowertothepeople— butonlytotherightpeople. Themenhewouldbemeeting—aformerprimeministeramongthem—wereleadersof theNationalCurrentParty,whichhadthesupportofmanyEastBankersofthesouth, andwhichwouldalmostcertainlycontrolasubstantialblocofseatsinthenext parliament.Whatthepartystoodfor,however,beyondpatronageandthestatusquo,was notentirelyclear,eventotheking.ShortlyaftertheeruptionoftheArabSpring,theking toldme,hemetwithAbdulHadial-Majali,theleaderoftheparty.“Ireadyour economicandsocialmanifesto,anditscaredthecrapoutofme,”thekingsaidhetold Majali.“Thismakesnosensewhatsoever.Ifyou’regoingtoreachouttothe70percentof thepopulationthatisyoungerthanme,you’vegottoworkonthis.”Thepartymanifesto, thekingtoldme,“didn’thaveanything.Itwasslogans.Therewasnoprogram. Nothing.”Hewenton,“It’sallabout‘I’llvoteforthisguybecauseI’minhistribe.’Iwant thisguytodevelopaprogramthatatleastpeoplewillbegintounderstand.”656
BeyondsmearingtheBrotherhoodandpositingafundamentalillogicasconcernsdemocracy—
namely,thatsomethingcuratedsoastobefilledwithonlytherightactorscanstillbeconsidered
democracy—,thistextismeanttoleaditsreadertoonesimpleconclusion:asthepolitician
remainsgrosslyunfit657,theMonarchmustselflesslytakeonhisduties.
Ofcourse,ifonepartofAbdullah’sneoliberalrevolutionrequiredhekeeppoweraway
fromthepeople(andthepartisans),theotherrequiredthathewageideologicalwaronthestate
656 JeffreyGoldberg,“ThemodernkingintheArabspring”,TheAtlantic(April2013).657 Thereare,ofcourse,anumberofinstancesofabsurdityintheKing’sstatementshere.Oneofthemostobvious—
whichofcoursepassesbyunremarkeduponbyGoldberg,yetagainevincinghiscapacitytoderelictthebasicdutiesofajournalist—concernsAbdullah’sdenigrationofMajali’seconomicandsocialpoliciesassloganeering.GivenhowAbdullah’seconomizedelitehad,bythispoint,spentmorethanadecadeimplementingdisastrousinvestmentandindustrialpolicieswhilepromising(throughtheslogansofliberalization)thattheutopiaofaprosperousknowledgeeconomywasjustaroundthecorner,itisdifficulttoparsewhyMajali’sproposals,regardlessoftheircontents,mightbedeservingofderisionwhiletheKing’soughttobeviewedasseriousandprogrammatic.
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itself.Partofthiscampaignwouldincludethedebasingofthoseassociatedwith(andvalorized
during)thecountry’setatisteperiod,namely,themodernizingbureaucrat.Attheopeningof
parliamentin1999,heattemptedtodojustthat:
TheJordaniancivilserviceisrenownedforitsefficiency.However,latelyithassuffered fromnegativequalitiessuchasapathy,slacknessandcliquism,theuseofofficialstatusfor personalgainand,attimes,theexploitationofpublicfunds.Thereforemygovernmentwill continuethemeasuresithasinitiatedtoputanendtoallthesehatefulandnegative qualities.
Wewillnotbelenientindealingwithallthosewhotransgressinpublicservice,ormisuse it,orattempttogainwealthillegally,orwhoareinvolvedinanykingofcorruption, regardlessofitskindorsize.Ourjustjudiciarywillalwayshavethefinalsayinanysuch case.Mygovernmentwillcontinuetorestructureitsadministration,modernizeit,(and) eliminatebureaucracy.658
Hisopeningspeechtoparliamentthefollowingyearwouldtouchonmanyofthesame
McKinseyanlamentsregardingthegovernmentoverreachandpoliticalcronyism,onlyadding
that“thegovernmentwillmodernizetheadministrationandfightcorruption,nepotism,and
favoritismaswellasabuseofpublicoffice.”659IfAbdullahhadreliedonchargesofineptitudeand
tribalisminsullyingthepartisans,then,hewoulduseallusionstoinefficiencyandcorruptionin
658 KingAbdullahII,SpeechfromtheThronebyhisMajestyKingAbdullahII:OpeningtheThirdOrdinarySessionofthe
13thParliament.Amman,Jordan(November1,1999).659 KingAbdullahII,SpeechfromtheThronebyhisMajestyKingAbdullahII:OpeningtheFourthOrdinarySessionof
the13thParliament.Amman,Jordan(November25,2000).
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degradinganddelegitimizingthebureaucrat.Overtime,theseaccusationsofcorruptionwere
frequentlyfoldedintotheregime’sdiscoursearoundwastaaswell.660
WithoutdiminishingtheextenttowhichelementswithintheJordanianstatehaveindeed
practicedcorruptionandwithoutdismissingtheextenttowhichwastahascompromisedthe
buildingofahealthypublicsector,thereis,ofcourse,somethingbaldlyabsurdaboutthenotion
thatcorruptioninJordanmightbethescourgeofthestatealone.Aspreviouschaptersattest,
afterall,corruptionpervadesnearlyeverysinewofJordan’scontemporarypoliticaleconomy.Itis
constitutiveofthecountry’sformofmarketcompetition,ithaspathologicallyinfestedthework
ofAbdullah’sfavoredtechnocrats661,andithasevenbroughtprominentmembersoftheroyal
660 WastaisoneoftheKing’smostfrequenttalkingpoints.Whilemanyofhisspeechesandpublicstatementstouch
onthetopic,hisoutwardfacingpositionsaremostclearlydelineatedina2016discussionpaperentitled“RuleofLawandCivilState”.
661 Cronyismandcorruptionwas,ofcourse,endemictotheprivatizationinitiativesoftheearly2000s.Whilemany
skatedbywithoutfacinglegalconsequences,AkramAbuHamdan,akeymemberofGenerationAbdullahfromthisperiod,waseventuallyfingeredforcorruptdealingsrelatedtotheDisi-AmmanConveyorprojectdescribedearlier.
Followingthepopularuprisingsof2011,moreover,manymoremembersofAbdullah’seconomizedelitewould
alsobeexposedforfraud,thoughverylittleinthewayoflegalactionwouldeverbetakenagainstsaidindividuals.Forinstance,thoughbriefly(andappropriately)facingchargesofcorruption,mismanagement,negligence,bribery,andabuseofpublicofficeduringtheheighteneddaysoftheArabUprisings,OmaarMa’ani—MayorofAmmanandboardmemberofMawaredduringtheeraofthecapital’surbanrenewal—waslaterappointedtotheSenateforhistroubles.Atthetimeofwriting,healsositsontheboardoftheCrownPrince’sFoundationwhilerunningthehighlylucrativeMa’aniVenturesaswell.
TheleakofthePanamapapersandthelegalbusinessofthenowinfamousMossackFonsecalawfirmwould
revealthatAliAbuRagheb,PrimeMinisterduringthepeakoftheECC’spowersandacentralfigureintheestablishmentofASEZA’sstatewithinthestate,operatedmorethansixbusinessesacrosstheSeychellesandtheBritishVirginIslands.Hetoohasfacedneitherchargesnoraseriousinvestigationasrelatestosuchanobviousinstanceoftaxevasionand/orfraud(https://offshoreleaks.icij.org/stories/ali-abu-al-ragheb).
SahelMajali,meanwhile,chiefarchitectofinvestmentpolicyduringtheECCera,amulti-timeminister,andamanhighlyinvolvedwithASEZAandthenewAbdaliprojectinAmman,wouldbeforcedtoresignwhenmassivecorruptionemergedinregardstothepublichousingprojecthewasoverseeing.ThoughunabletofailforwardascavalierlyasMa’anihas,hetoohasfacednorealconsequences,andtodayactsasChairmanoftheMidGroup,aconstructioncompanybasedintheUK.JoininghiminthatdefactoLondonexileis,BassemAwadallah,whosenamewouldbeatthecenterofthecorruptiondiscourseafterheenteredintoahigh-levelbeefwithMuhammadandNaderDahabi,twohighlyinfluentialpoliticalelitesofEastbankstock.Thoughtheobviouspoliticalnatureof
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familyinforpublicinquisition.662Inthiscontext,toweaponizecorruptionanduseitagainstthe
stateisalmostgratuitouslycynical.663Nevertheless,totheextentthatthisweaponizationhas
allowedtheregimetoprotectthoseindividualsandintereststhatconstituteitslargercoalition
thissquabblebetweenAwadallahandtheDahabibrothersmuddiesthewaters,Awadallah’scentralroleinthehighlycronyist(ifnotlegallycorrupt)privatizationprojectgivessomebasiccredencetotheallegationspushedagainsthim.GiventhefactthatmanyofhiscolleaguesontheECCandwithinAbdullah’swidernetworkofneoliberalpolicyeliteswouldthemselvesbeimplicatedincorruption,moreover,itwouldhardlyseemastretchthathewouldbeaswell.
Finally,AdelQudah(aformerfinanceminister),MohammedRawashdeh(asenioradvisortoformerPrime
MinisterAhmadRifai),andKhaledShaheen(oneoftherichestbusinessmeninJordanatthetime)alsoconspiredtodefraudtheJordanPetroleumRefineryCompanyoutofmillionsthroughseeingtoitthatafrontcompanyunderthelatter’snameprocuredamassivepubliccontractrelatedtotherefurbishingoftherefinery.Inadditiontobeingoneofthecountry’smoregratuitoustaxevaders—morethantwenty-sixdifferentcompaniesconnectedtoShaheen’snameturnedupinthePanamapapers—onewouldbenaivetothinkthiswasShaheen’sfirstinstanceofmanipulatingcorruptprocurementprocesses.Thoughtiming(therecencyoftheArabUprisings)andtheabsurdityofhisgriftforcedtheregime’shandwhenticametopunishment,Shaheenservedoutathreeyearsentenceataratherluxuriousprivateprisonand,asof2013,hasfacednofurtherrestrictionsonhisdealings.
662 BeyondagreatdealofimproprietyregardingthefinancingandsubsidizationoftheroyalNGOs,themostobvious
examplehereis,ofcourse,WalidKurdi’s.UncleoftheKing,KurdiwasconvictedbyacriminalcourtinAmmanforembezzlingmorethan40$millionfromtheJordanPhosphatesMinesCompanyduringhisChairmanship,thoughhetoomanagedtosecurehimselfacomfortableexileinLondonwhileofficialsbackinAmmanhalfheartedlypleadforhisextradition.QueenRania’sbrotherMajdial-Yassen,whohashimselfmarriedintotheal-Saketfamily,hasalsobeentargetedbymanywithinthedomesticoppositionunderaccusationsthathehasamassedalandandpropertyempirethroughpurchaseofunderpricedpreviouslypubliclands.Todate,nolegalprobehaslookedintothesecharges.
OntheroyalNGOs,see:AssociationforProgressiveCommunicationsandHumanistInstituteforCooperation
withDevelopingCountries,Report:GlobalInformationSocietyWatch2012:TheInternetandCorruption,TransparencyandAccountabilityOnline(2012).pp.153-154
663 Thiscynicalweaponizationofcorruption—aswellasthecynicalinstrumentalizationofanti-corruptionprobes—
predatesAbdullahandhasinfactbeenafixtureofpolicymakingacrosstheeraofstructuralreform.ThiswasmostbaldlyevincedfollowingtheelectionofJordan’sfirstpost-IMFparliament(1989-1993).Atthistime,twoIslamistmembersofthelowerhouse,LaythShubaylatandYaqubQarrash,tookthethenliberalizingPalaceatitswordandattemptedtopursueanearnestinvestigationexaminingthecorruptionoftheSamiralRifa’igovernmentaswellasthemoregeneralprevalenceandmagnitudeofkickbackstravelingfromtheaccountsofprivatesectorelite’sandintothepocketsoflawmakersandgovernmentministers.Shortlythereafter,bothrepresentativeswerearrestedondemonstrablyabsurdcharges,sentencedtodeath,andthenpardonedunderthedefactoconditionthattheinvestigationscease.
Formoreonthis,see:BlueCarroll(2001),p.223.
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whilestillperformingJordan’sliberalproprietyfortheinternationalcommunity,ithasproved
ideologicalefficaciousallthesame.664
TechnocraticAnti-Politics
Asmentionedintheintroduction,thedirtyingofthepolitical—whetherbyrenderingthe
bureaucracythesingulartotemofcorruptionandinefficiencyorbydenigratingJordan’spolitical
partiesasimmatureandinept—wasnotanendintoitself.Itwasalsoessentialtotheregime’s
ideologicalstyling(andpromotion)oftechnocraticanti-politics.
OneobservesthisstylingacrossAbdullah’stenureandacrossallthetechnocratic
policymakingbodiesdiscussedinchapterfour.TheEconomicConsultativeCouncil,AqabaSpecial
EconomicZoneAuthority,andtheMunicipalGovernmentofGreaterAmmanunderMa’ani’s
leadershipeachdefinedthemselvesthroughthisactofnegation—positingthemselvesasakind
ofinversetoallthathadbeenascribedtoparliament,thepoliticalparties,andthebureaucracy.
Wherepoliticswereparticularist,then,thesepolicyinstitutionswereuniversalistinmission.665
Wherepoliticianswereirrational,shorttermist,andtraditionalist,thesetechnocratswere
664 Onthewideruseofanti-corruptionasanideologicaldeviceinJordan,see:AndreBank,“Rents,cooptation,and
economizeddiscourse:threedimensionsofpoliticalruleinJordan,Morocco,andSyria,JournalofMediterraneanStudies(14:2),2004.
665 Thissortoflogicisself-evidentinstatementsarticulatedbyImadFakhouri,oneofAbdullah’smosttrustedlieutenantsandtheformerChiefCommissionerofASEZA.FakhourijustifiedASEZA’sauthoritarianstatewithinastateonthegroundsthatitserved“thecommonandpublicinterestinsteadoftheprivateandsmallerscaleinterest.”
See:Debruyne(2013),p.172
387
rational,pragmatic666,long-termist,anddistinctlymodern.667Wherebureaucratsandpoliticians
animatedandbenefitedfromthesystemofwasta,theKing’spolicyelitewereworkingtowipeit
out.Perhapsmostabsurdlyofall,thisstrategyofantitheticallegitimationevenattemptedto
positionwhatwasanobviousweaknessofthetechnocrats—theirtotaldisjuncturefromany
meaningfulsocialbase—asastrength.Havingtarnishedthepoliticianswiththechargeof
endemicclientelism668andhavingmadeclearthatarelationshipwithaconstituencycouldonly
implyclientelism,corruption,andpatronage,thetechnocrats’wholesaleinsulationfromthe
demoswaspresentedasasingularasset.Positionedthusly,theyaremadethebest(andonly)
optionforgoverningJordanandforleadingthecountry’sdevelopmenteffortsinparticular.
Publicopiniondatasuggeststhisideologicalcampaignhaslargelyfailedtogarner
credenceamongstdomesticaudiences.669Ifevaluatedasanexternally-orientedperformance—
666 Thisself-styledpragmatismisquiteclearlyevincedinthewordsofBilalal-Bashir,whojustifiedASEZA’smassive
discretionarypowerandnon-democraticpolicymakingonthebasisthat“peopleinAqabaarenotinterestedinempowerment–theyjustwantthingsdone”(Ibid,p.173).
667 Thistraditionalismv.modernismpairingisperhapsmostclearlydistilledinthewordsofGerryPost.While
workingwithOmarMa’aniontheMasterPlanforAmman’surbanrenewal,hewouldclaimthatthemunicipalgovernmenthadbeencompromisedby“localpowersandtribalelites...(who)don’tcareaboutlevelofpublicservice(butrather)aboutliningtheirownpocketsandthoseoftheirfriends”(Ibid,p.306).Theimplicationcontainedinthischarge,ofcourse,isthatPost,Ma’anietalwerenotinterestedinliningtheirownpockets,butinthepublicservicetheywereprovidingthecity.Asfootnotesonthepreviouspagesmakeclear,thissortofimplicitclaimispatentlyabsurd.
668 Andtotheextent,ofcourse,thatclientelismwaspresentedastheonlypossiblewaythatarepresentativemight
interactwithher/hisconstituents.669 PublicopiniondataonASEZA,theECC,andMa’ani’stenureasMayorarerelativelyscarce.Nevertheless,a
numberofproxymeasuresaffordinsightsintothedemos’viewofthegeneralautocratic-technocratictendenciesevincedbyAbdullah’spolicymakers.Onecanbeginwiththepublic’sviewsofthecabinetandnationalgovernment,whichisofcourseappointedbytheKing.Asof2018,60%ofJordaniansexpressedeithernotrustatallornotmuchtrustwhenaskedtheirviewsoftheCabinet(ArabBarometerWaveFive).
Onecanalsoexaminepublicopinionasrelatestotheperformanceofregionalandmunicipalgovernments.
Specifictoregionalgovernments(underwhosecategorypeoplewouldbelikelytolocateASEZA),66%expressednotrustatallornotmuchtrust.Formunicipalgovernments,thefigurewas61%(ArabBarometerWaveFive).
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onemeanttoembedJordan’sautocratic-technocraticgovernancewithininternationalnorms—,
however,itsefficacyseemsdifficulttodispute.
IdeologizingDemocracy Complementarytothetacitpromotionoftechnocracythatisimpliedinthedenigrationofthoseactorsandinstitutionsthatareessentialtodemocracywasasecondideologicalcampaigntoreconceptualizewhat,infact,democracyanddemocracypromotionconsistsof.ThoughmoresubtlethanthePalace’sideologicalmaneuversagainstthepartiesandthestate,thehermeneuticshereindelineatedinthesecampaignsarejustasconducivetotechnocraticgovernanceandinsulatedpolicymakingashadthePalace’sunderminingofpartyandparliamentarylife. MorespecificallyandasinstitutionalizedthroughDemoqrati,aDemocracyEmpowermentprogramfinancedbytheKingAbdullahIIFundforDevelopmentandlaunchedin2013,suchhermeneuticsfollowPutnaminenvisagingdemocracyasakindofculturalphenomenoninthefirstandlastinstance.Basedononeofthetacitteleologiesinherenttotheliberalimaginary—onthepremisethatbackwardspeoplesandimmatureculturescan’tdothevotingandgoverningpartofdemocracyproperly—Demoqraticonceivesofdemocracypromotionnotasthematerialistbusinessofinstitutionalizingvoting,representativegovernance,participatorypolicymaking,andpopularaccountability,butasamorediffuseremitcenteredonsupportingtheactivitiesof(liberal)civilsociety.Allocatingbetween5,000-40,000JDforhelpingindividuals,youthgroups,andcivilsocietyorganizationsaimingtoprovide“toolsfortheyouthtohelpthemexpressthemselvesandhighlightissuesofconcernintheirlocalcommunities”,“raiseawarenessamongtheyouthonissuesofcultureandarts”,“contributetothedevelopmentofgovernorates(as)hubsforcultureandarts,andto“produceinnovativeworksinthevariousfieldsofarts”,Demoqrati’sisavisionofdemocracypromotion,infact,thatiswhollydisjointedfromanythingtodowithgovernance,government,orpolicy.Inthisframework,democracyisafilm,apoem,ortheimmaterialnothingnessofaconversationthatissosacralizedintheliberaldiscourse.Noresourcesaretobedevotedtosupportingpoliticalparties.NomentionismadeofthekindsofconstitutionalchangesthatarenecessarytomakedemocracymeaningfulinJordan,nordoestheselectioncriteriaofDemoqratistipulatethattheinitiativewilllooktotargetgroupsseekingtoaddressthosekindsofquestions. Workingtopromote“newkinds”ofcivilsocietyorganizations“whosegoalistohelpbuildcivicandpoliticalengagementacrosssociety”theresultofwhichwillbetheconsolidationofa“democraticculturethatguaranteesatangiblebottom-upchange”,thisisaneffortindemocratizationthatconspirestoreproducethestatusquoantewhilecoatingitselfingoodintentionsandliberalsensibilities(Coestier,2015,p.29).NotespeciallydifferentthanthemodalityofdemocracypromotionadoptedbytheEUandUnitedStates,theseeffortstherebyconstituteakindofbaitandswitchwherebythebasicprinciplesofapeople’sgovernmentareforegoneinexchangeforsomemodicumoffreedomofexpressionandapowerlesspublicsphere.Thisallbeingthecase,Demoqrati’sdemocratizationtooservestoreproducetechnocratic,popularlyinsulatedgovernance,whetherfromaninstitutionaloranideologicalperspective.
389
(3)LionizingthePrivateSector;ChampioningtheEntrepreneur
Aswasjustdiscussed,upontakingpower,Abdullah,hiseconomizedelite,andhispartners
intheIFIswerekeentopushtheclaimthatthedevelopmentaliststateandthepost-colonial
compromisemoregenerallywereanachronismsunsuitableandunfeasibleintheageof
globalization.Therebyannouncingthatthestate’sabdicationofitsroleasthecentralagentin
Jordan’smodernizationwasimminent,theyalsoclearedthespaceforanewnationalprotagonist.
Calledupontotakeonthishistoricresponsibility—ideologicallyatleast—wastheprivatesector
andtheJordanianentrepreneurmorespecifically.
Ascribedwithvision,artistry,andacommitmenttothepublicinterest,theentrepreneur
hasbeenconjuredasanaspirationalideal,asthestewardofprogressandprosperity,andas
corporealevidenceofcapitalism’s(andglobalization’s)meritocraticnatureandunderlying
goodness.670Iconsshowingthepathforwardaswellastherewardsawaitingthetalentedandthe
ambitious,theentrepreneur’swealthandexampleisconsistentlyreferencedsotoestablishthe
normativityanddesirabilityofJordan’sneoliberalcapitalism.671
670 Likemanyothers,thisideologicalregimehasneithermaterialistcontentnorahistoricalmemory.Itisonethat
erasesquestionsofclassandcapitalandpositspurevoluntarism,thattakesinheritedwealthandreimaginesasthefruitofbootstrappingingenues.
671 WhethertheJordanianpeopleareactuallybuyingthesemythsiscertainlyopentoquestioning. Tobegin,publicopiniondatashowstheJordanianpublictobehighlydubiousonthemeritsofaustere
individualism,capitalism,andthedomesticbusinessclass.Specifictocapitalism,thisdataisunambiguousinestablishingthatthepublic’sstrongsupportforbothdemocracyandshariahreducestothefactthatpeopleinterpreteachpoliticalsysteminstrumentally—asmeansforensuringamoreequitable,sociallysecureeconomy(see:ArabBarometerWaveFive).
Regardingthepublic’sregardforJordan’sdomesticbusinesselite,thedataisfairlydamning.Morethan67%of
Jordaniansexpressnotrustornotverymuchtrustregardingdomesticbusinesspeople(ArabBarometerWaveFive).
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Afewparticularpointsareworthmentioningasregardsthiswidermasterscript.Tobegin,
unliketheprivatesectorrentseekersofyore,themodernJordanianentrepreneurhasbeen
presentedasaninnovative,dynamickindofindividual—asapersonwhocreatesvaluerather
thanextractsit.672Styledasself-made,techsavvy,profitseeking,riskrevelingfrontiersmenand
women,theentrepreneur“represent(s)Jordanianeconomic‘successstories’,symbolizingyoung,
ThewonderfulethnographicresearchofMayssounSukareih,meanwhile,suggestseverydayJordaniansmaybe
equallydubiousasregardsthemeritsofentrepreneurialism.Sukareih’sresearchwasconductedatSavetheChildren’smicrofinancebasedNajahTrainingCenter.Herworkdetailsanumberofduallytragicandhilariousscenes.OnefeaturestheSavetheChildrentrainerbringingSorayaSalti(laternamedaregionaldirectorforQueenRania’sINJ@Zinitiative,currentlythedirectoroftheShomanFoundation)andNourKabariti,eachascionofJordan,toofferanentrepreneurshiphowtobeforeagroupofstudentsuniversallyhailingfromrefugeestock.Evokingmanyoftheideologicalscriptsdescribedinthischapter,SukareihdetailshowKabariti’sattemptsatinvestingentrepreneurialismwithmeritocratic,ideational,andbootstrappingpropertieswereratherboisterouslyrejectedbyherpupils.Havingattemptedtoexplainherhersuccessasanentrepreneurasafunctionofhermentality,inventiveness,andwillpower,forinstance,Kabaritiwaseventuallyforcedhertoadmititmayhavealsohadsomethingtodowiththe100,000JDtrustfundshewasgivenuponleavingcollege.
AnotherratherabsurdscenefromSukareih’sarticlesawaSavetheChildrentrainerreprimandstudentsduringaroleplayingexercisewheretheywereaskedtoimaginewhattheywoulddoif,simultaneoustogettingtheirbusinessplanfinanced,theirneighbors’homewastoburndown.Aftertheclass,comprisedmostlyofunemployedindividualsfromBaqaacamp,thelargestofthePalestinianrefugeecampsinJordan,wasscoldedforunanimouslyagreeingthattheywouldgivethemoneytothehomelessfamily,onestudentofferedaparticularlypoignantresponseworthquotingatlarge,asitoffersawindowintohoweverydayJordanianpeopleinteractwiththeideologicalprojectsbeingpromotedbyboththeKingandtheinternationalcommunity.Asthisindividualputit:
IamthesonofBaqa’andmyneighbor’shouseburnsdownandyouaretellingmeIshouldignorethatandfocus
ongettingmybusinessstarted!TohellwithyouandSMEs,Idonotwanttobeanentrepreneur...Ifhavingmyownbusinessisgoingtoleadmetoforgetmyneighbors...Ifitisgoingtoleadmetoignorethepainofmyneighbors,Idonotwantto“bemyownboss.”Doyouknowwhomyneighborsare?Theyareeithermycousins,myuncles,orevenbrothersandsistersandyouareaskingmetoforgetaboutthemandfocus onmybusiness...Idonotneedyourtraining.Wepoorpeoplesurvivebyhelpingeachother,welivealltogether,notlikeyouinWestAmman.
See:MayssounSukareih,“Onclass,culture,andthecreationoftheneoliberalsubject:thecaseofJordan”,
AnthropologyQuarterly(89:4),2016,pp.1202,1212672 ThesesentimentsaboundinthespeechesofKingAbdullah,mostemblematically,perhaps,duringremarkshe
deliveredatUniversityofCaliforniaBerkeley,wherehesaidthefollowing:“Ihavealwaysbeenfascinatedbytheabilityofentrepreneurstotakeabrick,seeinitahouse,andbuildawholecity.”
KingAbdullahII,RemarksbyhisMajestyKingAbdullahIIat“innovativeJordanConference.Berkeley,California(May13,2014).
391
self-confident‘winners’inglobalizationand(thosethat)haveinternalizedthecurrently
fashionableneoliberaljargon.”673
Ofcourse,themythologizingoftheentrepreneurobscuresagreatmanycontinuities(and
familygenealogies)bridgingthecroniesofyesteryearwiththeheroesoftoday.674Amongstthe
mostcelebratedofJordan’sentrepreneurs—SamihToukan,GhassanNuqul,FawazZu’bi,Imad
Malhas,MohammedAsfour,OmarTaba’a,LamiaTaba’a,MohammedJaber,andKarimKawar—,
forinstance,onefindsnosmallnumberofquotacoterielegacychildren.Onealsofindsanumber
ofbusinessmenthathavedemonstratednocompunctionwhenitcomestoexploitingpolitical
influenceforthepurposesofpersonalenrichment.675Nevertheless,asideologicalfigures,their
exampleandtheirpositioningasthepioneersofJordan’sSiliconWadihavebeenaggressively
promotedbytheregimeinacampaignfunctioningbothsotoobscuretheill-begottennatureof
many-a-entrepreneur’sgainswhilealsosellingprivatebusiness—ratherthanindustrialplanning
orpubliceducation—asthekeyto21stcenturyprogress.
ItisalsoimportanttoemphasizethatJordan’sentrepreneursarenotonlyproductsofa
regime-leddiscoursedesignedtolegitimateneoliberalcapitalism—theyarealsoproducersof
673 AndreBankandOliverSchlumberger,“Jordan:betweenregimesurvivalandeconomicreform”inVolkerPerthes
(ed.)ArabElitesNegotiatingthePoliticsofChange.LynneReinner(2004),p.41.674 InChaptereight,Idiscussedtheextenttowhichtechandotherforwardthinking,entrepreneurialsectorshave
beendominatedbytheoldguardelite.675 NowherewasthismoreobviouslyseenthaninthecaseofKarimKawar,wholeveragedhispoliticalinfluenceso
tolaunchamassivee-schoolinitiative,onethatwouldnaturallyrequirethegovernmentpurchasethousandsofCompaqandApplecomputers,computersKarimKawar’sIdealGroupjustsohappenedtobetheexclusivedomesticsupplierof(Schlumberger,2005,p.143).
Moregenerallyspeaking,asthelistofnamesonthepreviouspageindicates,manyofJordan’sleading
entrepreneurshavealsoservedaspolicymakers(whetherwiththeECCorlaterattheministeriallevel).Thesepositionsallowedthemtoleveragedomesticandinternationalrelationshipsintobusinesssuccesses.
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thisdiscourse.Theentrepreneur’sactiveparticipationinthedisseminationofself-serving,self-
aggrandizingideologyisperhapsmostbestepitomizedbyFadiGhandour.AformerECCmember
andlong-timeallyoftheKing,GhandourisJordan’sgreatestpublicchampionfor
entrepreneurialism.Materiallyspeaking,hefoundedWamdain2010,aplatformandcapital
investmentfirmmeanttoconnectandfundentrepreneursfromacrosstheMiddleEast.
Ideationally,Ghandourhasperpetuatedtheentrepreneurialmythoshithertodescribedby
consistentlymakingthecasethatbusinesshastheanswerforalltheregion’spervasivesocialand
economicills.ThefollowingtwoquotationsareinstructiveasregardsGhandour’sworldview:
(1)“Intoday’sworld,youdon’tneedtobeapoliticiantomakeadifference...Infact,it’sthe otherwayaround:ifyouareinpoliticsyouarelimitedinwhatyouaregoingtobeableto do.”676 (2)“Ithinkentrepreneurship,andhavingagenerationthatcreatescompanies,a generationthatemploysratherthanlooksforemploymentisprobablyoneofthebiggest waysofsolvingproductivityintheArabworld.That’swhyIthinkentrepreneurshipis essential.”677
Inthisonestatementalone,Ghandourmanagestosullypoliticsanditscapacitytoeffectchange;
mystifylabordemandissuesandtheprivatesector’sstructuralfailurestogenerateemployment
opportunities;implythatjobseekingisdevelopmentallyinefficientascomparestoself-
employment;anddivorceentrepreneurialismandlaborproductivityalikefrommaterial
questions(i.e.capital).Abetterspokemanforneoliberalcapitalismtherecouldnotbe.
676 MichaelPeel,“TeawithFTMiddleEast:FadiGhandour”,TheFinancialTimes(May28,2012).677 See:Kreitmeyr(2016),p.124.
393
MovingbeyondGhandour’sperson,thebusinesselite’smoregeneralizedinstitutional
investmentinthepropagationoftheentrepreneurialmasterscriptisevincedintheirinvolvement
withanumberofhighlypublicizedorganizationsestablishedoverthepastfifteenyears.The
mostfamousoftheseinitiativesisEndeavorJordan678,aPalace-backedorganizationdesignedto
nurture,incubateandfinanceentrepreneursandonwhoseboardsitsaveritablewho’swhoof
theJordaniancapitalistelite.Oasis500679,aUSAidfoundedtechincubatorwhoseboardand
beneficiariesaresimilarlyandwhollydominatedbythesamesliceofthesameclassfraction,
representsasecond,slightlymoreinternationaleffortofthesametype.Fromthese
organizationalperches,suchindividualsperformJordan’smodernityforexternalaudiences680
whilepledgingakindofsocialcommitmenttotheyoungbusinessman/womanchasing
prosperityintheirownimpossibleimage.
(4)SocialEntrepreneurship
678 SaadMuasher,ChairmanofAhliBank,Alial-Husri(DirectorofHikmaPharmaceuticals),SaidDarwazah
(ChairmanofHikmaPharmaceuticals),MaherKaddoura(AngelInvestor),FahadAl-Jasem(CEOofZainJordan),WalidTahabshem(CEOIntegratedTechnologyGroup)allsitontheEndeavorboard.Theorganization’smentors(i.e.thosemeanttoworkwithaspiringentrepreneurs)includesImadMalhas,GhassanNuqul,FerasKilani,theaforementionedFadiGhandour,KarimKawar,HussamKhouri,NashatMasri,andSamihToukan.
679 TheOasis500boardincludesKarimKawar,FawazZu’bi,MarwanJuma,UsamaYayyad,andWalidTahabashem.In
thepast,italsocountedIhadHinnawiandAhmadal-Hanendeh,theCEOsofJordan’stwolargestmobilecommunicationscompanies(UmniahandZain).
680 TheEnglish-languageorientationandtheforeignpartnershipsundergirdingOasis500—whichhasclaimedto
havetrainedover2,500Entrepreneurs(despitedispatchingjustover$8millioninseedfunding,afigureleadingonetoquestionhowusefulthistraininghasbeen)—hasmadethisinstitutioninparticularintoacriticalpillarintheexternallydirectedperformanceofJordan’sneoliberalmodernity.
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Liketheothermasterscriptsdiscussedinthischapter,thediscourseandpraxesofsocial
entrepreneurshipprimarilyseekstonormalizethedepoliticizationoftheeconomy.Premisedon
thenotionthatthesocialoughttobeturnedinto“aspaceofcompetition,individual
responsibilityandself-organizationbydemandingentrepreneurialvirtuesandbehaviorsfrom
peoplewhountilrecentlywerenotenvisionedasentrepreneurs”,thisisanideologicalcampaign
specificallyseekingtoerasethecausal(andconstitutive)relationshipsconnectingsociological
andpoliticalvariablestooutcomeslikepoverty,inequality,andsocialwelfare.681Oncesuchissues
arerelocatedoutsidetherealmofpublicpolicy(oroutsidetherealmofpolitics),governments
suchasAbdullah’sarefreetosubjectthemtothecircumscribed,non-transformational
rationalitiesoftechnical,technological,andcivilsociety-ledproblemsolving.682Questionsof
capital,class,andpower—aswellasinterventionscenteredontaxation,redistribution,property,
681 See:PascalDey,“Governingthesocialthroughentrepreneurship:aFoucauldianviewof‘theartofgoverning’in
advancedliberalism”inHeatherDouglasandSuzanneGrant(eds.)SocialEntrepreneurshipandEnterprise:ConceptsinContext,TildeUniversityPress(2014),p.55
Jordan’ssocialentrepreneurshipeffortsoughttobeconsideredprimarilyideologicalforanumberofreasons.
First,giventheobviousmismatchbetweenthescaleoftheissuesbeingtargetedviatheinterventionsofsocialentrepreneurs—frompovertyalleviationtofemaleeconomicparticipationtocivilsocietyactivation—andthematerialcapacitiesoftheinstitutionallysponsoredsocialentrepreneur,itseemsludicrousthateithertheregimeoritspartnersintheinternationalcommunitywouldperceivetheseinitiativesasgenuine,effectualpublicpolicymeasures.
Second,thoughKreitmeyrhasarguedthattheinstitutionalizationofsocialentrepreneurshiphasfunctionedasa
meansforco-optingandsocializingJordan’sliberalmiddleclass,IbelievethisthesisinflatesthematerialimpactthatthePalaceandtheinternationalcommunity’sinterventionshavehad.Intheaggregate,afterall,onlyafewhundredindividuals(atmost)arefinancedeachyearthroughthevariousinstitutionsinvolvedinpromotingsocialentrepreneurshipinJordan.Ifsocialentrepreneurshiprepresentsaneffortinpatronagedistribution,then,thisisaformofpatronagethatisofanextremelylimitedscale.
Totheextent,then,thatsocialentrepreneurshipco-optsfewwhilealsogeneratinglittleinthewayofmaterial
socialwelfare,Ibelievethereisagoodcaseforconcludingthatitbebestconceptualizedasanideologicalstrategy.
682 See:Kreitmeyr(2016),pp.34-36.
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andproduction—areremovedfromtheagendaasbiometrics,smartphoneapps,andSMS-driven
jobalertsaremadethemagicbulletfordeprivation,wealthpolarization,andunemployment.
InJordan’scase,theembraceandinstitutionalizationofsocialentrepreneurshiphas
proceededacrossthreeidentifiablewaves.Thefirstwave—whichKreitmeyrhasidentifiedas
occurringbetween2006and2008—wasledbyinternationalsupportorganizationssuchasthe
SchwabFoundation,Endeavor,Synergos,theEgypt-basedAshoka,andtheUS-basedEducation
forEmployment.683Thesecondwave,extendingfromroughly2009to2011,sawthePalacetake
thelead,withtheKingandQueenofferingsubstantialpersonalinvestments—bothmaterially
andideationally—tothecauseofsocialentrepreneurship.684ThoughtheKingAbdullahIIFund
forDevelopmenthadtechnicallylauncheditsKingAbdullahIIAwardforYouthInnovationand
Achievement(orKAAIYA)asof2008,itwasduringtheseyearsthatitKAAIYA’sinstitutional
footprinttrulyexpanded.685Finally,followingtheruptureoftheArabUprisings,theinstitutional
andideologicalprominenceofsocialentrepreneurship’swouldbescaledupyetagain.Pushedby
domesticandinternationalelitesalikeasaviableanswertothegrievances,anger,andambition
whichhadmetastasizedinthemonthsprior,socialentrepreneurshipwaspromotedbyJordan’s
683 ThisfirstwavewastypicallypromotedduringtheannualWorldEconomicForum-MENAConferencethatis
hostedattheDeadSeaeachyear.684 Inaddition,theaforementionedinternationalinstitutions(Schwab,Synergos,andAshoka)alsodeepenedtheir
involvementinthecountrythroughappointingandfundinglargernumbersofJordaniansocialentrepreneurs,effortstheywouldbejoinedinbyonenewinstitutionalentrantfromtheinternationalspace:theSkollFoundation.
Formoreonthisperiod,seeKreitmeyr(2016),pp.112-115.685 Duringthisperiod,KAFDvastlyincreasedthenumberoffellowsitwasfundingperyearwhilealsogrowingits
regionalpresencethroughawardinggrantstonon-Jordanians.
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royalsanditspartnersontheINGOcircuitwithrenewedenergy—ahopeful(andintellectually
lazy)fixforthestructuralproblemsbeinggeneratedbyfailedeconomicmodels.686
Contributingtoeachoftheinstitutionsjustmentioned—fromAshoka,Synergos,and
EndeavortotheroyallysponsoredNGOs687—hasbeenthesamecastofJordanianbourgeoiselite
thatwerejustdiscussed.688Theydosoforavarietyofreasons.Mostobviously,thisclassfraction
retainsamaterialinterestinpersuadingthedemosthatsocialentrepreneurship’s
microinterventionsarethemostappropriatemeansforaddressingJordan’senduringsocialills.
Addedtothisincentiveistheprospectthatone’sinvolvementintheseinitiativesmightalso
provideaforumforthedisplayofpublicpiety,civicconscientiousness,andphilanthropic
morality.Asisthecasewiththecountry’schampionsofcorporatesocialresponsibility—another
686 The“boom”yearsthatresultedforsocialentrepreneurshipwouldseethePalaceagaingrowitsinvestmentinthe
projectthroughexpansionofKAAYIA,INJAZ(aninitiativelaunchedin1999withUSAidsupportandunderthemanagementofSavetheChildren),aswellasviathelaunchoftheQueenRaniaCenterforEntrepreneurship.
FinancingmuchofthisexpansionwastheUSStateDepartment,whichwoulduseUSAidandMEPItodirectly
fundthePalace’sinitiatives.USAIDandMEPImoneywasalsousedtofinanceQuestscopeandtheaforementionedEducationforEmployment’ssocialentrepreneurshipinterventions.Inaddition,theseyearsalsowitnessedtheInternationalYouthFoundation(inpartnershipwithStarbucks)enterthesocialentrepreneurshipspaceforthefirsttimethroughtheestablishmentoftheBADIRinitiative(116-117).Directingtheireffortstowardspromotingyounger,lesspolishedentrepreneursfromthemoremarginalizedspacesofJordan’sgeography,BADIRbrokesocialentrepreneurship’selitebiasandAmman-centrism.
687 OntheBoardofTrusteesforINJAZ—anorganizationforwhichQueenRaniahasservedasprimarypatron—sits
SahlDudinoftheAylaOasisDevelopmentCompany(andmanyotherMasriventures);DinaHaddad,scionofoneofthecountry’sautomobileimportmonopolies;bothThierryMarignyofJordanTelecomGroupandSamaanSammanofLafarge;representativesfromallofJordan’smajorcommercialbanks;andrepresentativesfromUmniah,Ernst&Young,Aramex,theKawarGroup,andtheManaseerGroup,amongstothers.
ThelistofpartnersfortheKingAbdullahFundforDevelopmentincludesasimilarcoterieofdomesticand
internationalallies:notably,thisincludestheWorldBank,Microsoft,USAid,InspirationalDevelopmentGroup(anappendageoftheBritishRoyalMilitaryAcademyatSandhurst),theInternationalYouthFoundation,andtheTalalAbu-GhazalehOrganization.ThejudgesawardingthegrantsdistributedbytheQueenRaniaCenterforEntrepreneurship,finally,includeMohammadAsfourandOmarHamarneh.
688 Kreitmeyr(2016)hasdoneafullsocialnetworkanalysisoftheseorganizations.See:pp.123-125
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highlyideologicalinitiativewhereFadiGhandourandSabihMasriarefeaturedquite
prominently689—,thesevirtuesignalingdisplaysareundertakenwiththehopethattheymight
accruemoraldecencyandgoodintentionsnotonlytotheparticipatingindividualbutalsotothe
modalityofcapitalismtheyhaveestablishedandbenefitedfrom.690
Publicopiniondatasuggeststhatthecommonsenseembeddedinthisdiscoursehas
proliferatedacrosswideswathsofJordaniansociety,particularlywhenitcomestothe
depoliticizationofpoverty.691
Conclusion
Throughreviewofthefourmasterscriptsdiscussedinthischapter,Ihavesoughtto
elucidatehowtheideologicaldomaincontributestothestabilizationofJordan’scapitalismof
crisis.Thefirstoftheideologicalcampaignsdiscussedwasshowntopresentneoliberal
globalizationasaforceofnature.InpositioningtheglobaleconomyandJordan’sinteractions
689 Fullyinlinewiththestylesofneoliberalphilanthropy,Ghandour’sAramexandMasri’sArabBankhavepledged
1.5-3.2%oftheirpretaxprofitstovarioussocialinvestments(Kreitmeyr,2016,p.149).690 Theyalso,ofcourse,allowtheJordanianelitetoperformitsmodernitybypubliclyaligningitselfwiththe
internationalbourgeoisie’sprevailingethics.691 ItisundeniablethatamajorityofJordaniansbelievethestateoughtadoptafarbiggerroleintheeconomy,and
thatitoughttosecurethebasicwelfareofitspeople.Thereareotherfindingswithinpublicopiniondata,however,tosuggestthatincreasingnumbersofpeoplearecomingtoperceivepovertyasbeingsomehowoutsidepolitics—asanissuemostappropriatelydealtwiththroughcharitableand/orcivilsocietyinitiatives.
Thisismostclearlyevincedinthefollowingdatapoint:Whenaskedofthebestwaytoreducepoverty,only5.9%backedanincreasetotaxeswhile58.3%backedanincreaseinalmsgiving.ThoughJordanianscertainlyhaveanumberofreasonstoberesistanttotaxincreases—governmentcorruption,generalizedpoverty,etc.—,thefindingisworrisomeallthesameinthatitsuggestspeopleeither(a)don’tseepovertyasamatterofpublicpolicyor(b)don’tconsidertheJordanianpoliticalsystemcapableofhandlingsuchpublicpolicies.
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withitasexogeneoustothepolitical,thisdiscourseimpliedthattheeconomicopeningdesigned
andimplementedbyAbdullahetalwastheonlyalternativeavailabletopolicymakers.Morethan
that,italsomadeclearthegovernmentwouldmoregenerallyneedtochangegoingforwardwere
Jordantosuccessfullyaccommodatetheexigenciesinherenttothenewglobaleconomy.
Thesenecessarychangeswouldbemorefullyarticulatedinthesecondcampaign—
DepoliticizingGovernance—featuredinthischapter.Herein,Jordan’spoliticalandeconomicelites
soughttodirtythepoliticalanddiscreditthebureaucracy.Havingdoneso,theycouldmakethe
ideationalsellthattechnocraticgovernance—regardlessofthegrotesquecorruptionsitlater
allowed—representstheappropriatecorrectionfortheendemicfailuresoftheparties,the
parliamentarians,andthestate.Wherethefirstideologicalcampaignmadeeconomic
liberalizationunavoidable,then,thesecondoneworkstomakesurepolicymakingpowers
remainedoutsidetherealmofpublicdeliberationgoingforward.
Theideologicalcampaignsbuiltaroundthemasterscriptsofentrepreneurialismand
socialentrepreneurialismhavesoughttofurtherconsolidatethenormalcyandproprietyof
Abdullahetal.’sneoliberalproject.Throughpubliclymythologizingtheentrepreneur,political
andeconomiceliteshavesoughttoobscurethematerialrealitiesofJordaniancapitalism—a
capitalismmarkedbysocialimmobility,workingpoverty,elitedomination,andbarriersto
competition.Attributingmeritocraticandaspirationalpropertiestoaneconomyincrisis,such
ideologicaleffortshopetonormativizewhatfetishizationhasalreadyreified.Withthepublic
initiativeslaunchedaroundsocialentrepreneurship,thesameactorshaveworkedtotacitly
legitimatethestate’sretreatfromthedomainofsocialresponsibilitywhilealsoofferinguphighly
public(andindividualistic)displaysofmoraldecency.Ofnote,theJordaniancapitalistelite’s
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participationintheideologicalinitiativesbuiltaroundentrepreneurshipandsocial
entrepreneurshipdemonstratestheextenttowhichidentifiablepersons—nevermindthesocial
forcesandclassfractionsthattheyrepresent—integratethedifferentdomainsoftheJordanian
socialstructureofaccumulation.Asareviewofpreviouschaptersshouldmakeabundantlyclear,
peoplelikeFadiGhandour,KarimKawar,SabihalMasri,MaherKaddoura692,HazemMalhas,and
GhassanNuqulhavebeenside-by-sidetheirneoliberalKingashehasinstitutionalizedeconomic
policymakinginahostofnocturnalcouncils,implementeddiversesocialcontrolstrategies,
consolidatedoligopolisticformsofmarketcompetition,andashehasdisseminatednormalizing
ideologies.Oneneedlittlesociologicalimagination,then,tograsptheparticularsinews
stabilizingJordan’scapitalismofcrisis.
WhetherthesedisplayshavebeensufficienttoaccruesignificantsocialesteemtoJordan’s
capitalisteliteonthedomesticfrontisofcoursesubjecttoquestion.Lessambiguous,however,is
theeffectthatsuchdisplaysofneoliberalproprietyhavehadvis-a-visexternalaudiences.
ExhibitingJordan’ssharedcommitmenttowardsthenorms,values,andpolicychangesthatare
embeddedinsocialentrepreneurship,GenerationAbdullah’ssingingfromtheinternational
community’sfavoredhymnalsimprovestheoddsthattheywillremainthatcommunity’s
preferredcompradorsformanyyearstocome.
692 Amongstotherthings,KaddourabroughtTEDxTalkstoJordan(Kreitmeyr,2016,p.129)
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CHAPTERTWELVE
Conclusions
Thisdissertationsetouttoresolveatwo-partproblematique:(1)whyisitthatJordanian
capitalismcontinuouslyengendersdevelopmentalandsocialfailureand(2)howisitthatthis
capitalismenduresinspiteofsuchfailures.
Inansweringthefirstofthesequestions,Ihaveemphasizedstructuralproperties
endowedbybothhistoryandJordan’sglobalperipherality/externaldependencybefore
unwindingthemoreimmediatecausalandconstitutiveeffectsengenderedbythreedeeply
interconnectedvariables:contemporaryeconomicgovernance,theprofitseekingbehaviorofan
elitefractionofthecapitalistclass,andauthoritarianrenewal.Ihaveattributedtheenduranceof
thiscapitalism,meanwhile,toaconstellationofintegratedinstitutionalbulwarksthatIwillrefer
toasJordan’ssocialstructureofaccumulation.Consolidatinganelite-dominatedformof
accumulationandcontrol,Ihaveshownhowthemeansandendsofthestabilityproducedby
theseinstitutionalbulwarksbothrequiresandimplieslong-termunderdevelopmentandhigh
levelsofsocialtension.HavingdemonstratedhowthisJanus-facedphenomenonfunctionsto
generatecrisisconditionswithoutultimatelyprecipitatingeitherthecollapseorevolutionofthe
widerpoliticaleconomy,itismyhopethattheparadoxofJordaniancapitalism—aformationat
onceresilientandontologicallyboundforcrisis—hasbeenatleastpartiallyresolved.
Italsomyhope,ofcourse,thatthereaderhasfoundmerigorousinmyclaim-makingand
honestinmyintentions.Evenwerethatthecase—andallthemoresowereitnot—,however,I
recognizethatsuchareadingexperiencewouldnotrenderthisworkbeyondlegitimatecritique
401
andcensure.Beforeproceedingtomattersofgeneralizabilityandtherefinementorgenerationof
theoreticalknowledge,then,IwouldliketoaddresssomeofthechargesthatIanticipatemightbe
(rightly)leveledagainstthiswork,andtoexplainwhyIbelievethosecritiquesarenotas
damningastheymightfirstseem.
Herein,Ishouldbeginherewiththepotentialchargeofelitebias.Infocusingontheelite
fractionofthecapitalistclassandtheelitepolicymakersconstitutingGenerationAbdullahtothe
extentthatIdo,isn’tthisyetanotherworkonanArabpoliticaleconomythatmanagestovacate
allbutthegamesmanshipofaselectgroupofhistoricprotagonistsinitsexplanations?
Ontheonehand,Iwouldhavetoacceptthischargeandtoacknowledgethatyes,thiswork
onJordaniancapitalismhasmostcertainlyattributedagreatdealofexplanatorypowertothe
actsanddecisionsofanidentifiable(iftransnational)coterieofeliteactorsandinstitutions.On
theother,however,Iwouldhedgethisacceptancebyalsoassertingthat:(a)Ibelievesuch
attributionsareappropriate;(b)thisanalyticalprivilegingofeliteactorsandinstitutionshasnot
impliedahermeticsealingofsuchactors/institutions;and(c)thisanalyticalprivileginghas
thereforenotcomeattheexpenseofsociologicalandstructuralexplanation.
Specifictothefirstofthesepropositions,elitedominanceisanunambiguousand
empiricallyvalidatedfactofJordaniancapitalism.Thisisacapitalism,afterall,whosepolitical
andjuridicalauthorshipcanbe(andhasbeen)tracedbacktoasmallnumberofgildedhands.It
isacapitalism,moreover,whereasmallfractionofthebusinessclass—amongstwhomonewould
findmanyofthosegildedhandsjustdiscussed—definesthecharacterofmarketsasmuchasthe
formofcompetitionthatorientstheeconomy.Totheextentthatpolicyandjuridicalprocesses
arealsowhollyinsulatedfrompopularforcesordemocraticoversight,itwouldthereforeseem
402
appropriatetoassigntheeliteactors(andautocratic-technocraticinstitutions)identifiedinthis
textwithananalyticalprideofplace.
Asformysecondandthirdpropositions,Ifeelobligedtopointoutthatanysuch
privilegingofeliteactorshasnotimpliedamoregeneralsociologicalnaiveteonmypart.
Regressingintoneitherpersonalismnorintosomeundueobsessionwithpalaceintrigue,I
believeIhaveconsistentlylocatedtheeliteprotagonistsforegroundedinthismonographwithin
thedomesticandtransnationalclassgroupingstowhichtheyarememberandwithinthelarger
systemsofpowerandprofit-makingthattheyareobligedtonavigate.Iexplainbusiness
behaviors,then,notthroughreferencetoindividualwhimsybutthroughreferencetothematerial
intereststhatareborneofsocialpositioningandthroughdeconstructingwhathappenswhenone
pursuessaidinterestswithinthecontextofperipheralityandlatedevelopment.Similarly,in
addressingpolicydecisions,Ihaveemphasizednotindividualshortcomingsbutthecoalescing
imperativesof(peripheral/dependent)authoritarianrenewalandautocratic-technocratic
governance—cognizantthatthelattervariableisitselfinfluencedbyAbdullah’seconomizationof
thepoliticalclassaswell.IfeliteswereindeedselectedasthechannelthroughwhichIwouldtell
thehistoryoftheeconomicpresentinJordan,then,thiswasnotonlybecauseoftheirunique
historicalagency,butalsobecauseofhowtheirbehaviorsencapsulatestructuralandinstitutional
logicsaswell.
ThenextcritiqueIanticipaterelatestowhatmightbeconsideredabiastowardsstasis.
Here,mydefensewouldnecessarilybeginbyremindingthereaderthatsuchabiaswas
somewhatunavoidablegiventheanalyticalpuzzleIhavetaskedmyselfwithsolving:afterall,as
myproblematiquecentersupontheoddstabilityofJordan’scrisiscapitalism,itwouldseemabit
403
harshtoreprovemeforspendingmoretimeexplainingstasisthanchange.Thatsaid,thisanalysis
isanchoredtosocialstructureofaccumulationtheory,atheorythatconceivesofrupture,
resistance,andchangeasimmanenttoanycapitalistformation.693Thisbeingthecase,mycase
studyneedalsoreckon,tosomeextent,withtheprospectsofchange,lestitdevolveintoan
apologiaforcrisiscapitalism’seternallyextendinghorizon.
Inthisvein,IneedtoreiteratethatIascribenoontologicalpermanencetothisiterationof
Jordaniancapitalism.Ifullyrecognize,moreover,thattheconditionsallowingJordan’sactually
existingneoliberalismtoreproduceitselfsimultaneouslyandinevitablycreatetheconditionsfor
resistance.
Ialsoacceptthattheconditionsforresistancehavetranslatedandwillcontinueto
translateintoresistanceproper.Empiricallyspeaking,protest,strikes,andcollectiveactions—
whetherlegallysanctionedornot—have,afterall,pervadedtheentiredurationofAbdullah’s
tenure.Followingglobaltrends,itisalsoworthnotingthatthemobilizationofcontentious
politicsonlyintensifiedfollowingthefinancialcrisisof2008andtheArabUprisingsof2011as
well.694Lestonethink,moreover,thatthehalcyondaysofoccupyhavefullygivenway,Iwould
pointyoutothepopularmovementthatmobilizedinresponsetoaproposedrevisiontothe
incometaxlawin2018—achallengethatultimatelybroughtaboutthedemiseofHanial-Mulki’s
government—andthefourweekteacher’sstrikethatcametoavictoriousend(fromlabor’s
perspective)inOctoberof2019.
693 Evenifitcouchesthesepresuppositionswithinanappreciationforhistory’slongwaves.694 See:theArmedConflictLocation&EventData(ACLED)Project.
404
SolongastheJordanianpoliticaleconomyfunctionssotostrainmiddleandlower-middle
classhouseholdbudgetstothepointofbreaking,solongasitguaranteesthattheexpectationsof
agenerationofuniversity-educatedstudentswillgounmet,andsolongasitthreatensmillions
withdownwardmobilityandeternalprecarity,onecananticipatethatuprisingsofthesort
describedabovewillbeconstantandubiquitous.Whethertheyshouldemanatefromthenon-
recognizedunionmovement,theyouthfulandtransformationallymindedpartisansofal-hirak,
theinsiderpolicyelitesincreasinglyfrustratedbyaspuriousdevelopmentplan,theetatiste
militaryveterans,ortheconservativealbeitembourgeoisedIslamistmovement,ofcourse,
remainstobeseen.Whatiscertain,however,isthattherearemanybattlesyettocomeinJordan,
andthatthestruggleoverthespoilsofwealthandpowerwillbelongandcomplex.
InviewofbothempiricaldataandthetheoreticalpresuppositionsofSSAtheoryitself,I
wouldthereforefullyagreethatchallengeandresistanceareinternaltotheverylogicthrough
whichstabilityisachievedinJordan.695Ifacceptingtheseasinternalpropertiesofthissystemof
capitalaccumulation,Ionlywanttopushbackagainstthosewhoassumeonthisbasisthat
changeisthereforesomethingofaninevitability.Makingsuchanassumption,afterall,would
requireonetoignoretheintegrated,mulitlevelinstitutionalconstructthatattheheartofthis
dissertation,asocialstructureofaccumulationthatisbuiltnotonlytodeactivatesocialand
politicalchallengesthroughselectiveabsorptionand/orrepressionbutalsotofacilitatetheelite
captureofprofits/rents(therebybuoyingtheHashemiteregimeinequalmeasure).Itwould
695 Formoreonthisgeneralphenomenon,see:DavidFeathersone,KendraStrauss,andDannyMacKinnon,“In,
against,andbeyondneoliberalism”,SpaceandPolity(19:11)2015,pp.1-11.
405
requireonetoignorethemanyfirewallsthisSSAputsinplacesotoensurethatcrisisconditions
andpopularchallengescaneachbeanimatedwithouteverbringingaboutsystematicchange.
Allofwhichisnottosaythatchangeisimpossible,orthatJordan’sneoliberalcapitalism
mayindeedaspireforeternity.Rather,itistoarguethattherelationshipbetweentheconditions
ofdemiseanddemiseitselfoughtalwaysbeconceivedasprobabilistic.Itistoarguethatthefinal
outcome(i.e.stasisorchange)willbedeterminedbybothhistoricalcontingencyandpower
relations.Anditistowarnagainsteitherdeterministicpronouncementsofcoming
transformationorthediminutionofthefactsontheground.Asinanyplace,thebalanceofpower
inJordancannotbewishedaway.Andhavingreviewedthosefacts,Idetermineditwas
appropriatetofocusthemajorityofmyenergiestowardsexplainingthatwhichisratherthan
seekingoutkernelsofthatwhichmaycometobe.
…………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………
Ontomattersofgeneralizability.
Foracasethatappearstoconfound(ifnotinvalidate)muchofwhatpassesfor
conventionalknowledgeinthefieldsofcomparativecapitalismanddevelopmenteconomics,how
mightJordan’sexampleilluminatetruthsregardingactuallyexistingneoliberalismsintheglobal
south?WhatchallengedoestheJordanianvarietyofcapitalismposetotheclassificatoryschema
andtheoreticalclaimmakinggeneratedbySoskice,Hall,andtheirmanyintellectualprogeny
workingoncontemporaryvarietiesofcapitalism?
406
Letusstartwiththecontributionthiscasestudy(andsocialstructureofaccumulation
theorymoregenerally)canoffertothefieldofcomparativecapitalism.Firstandforemost,I
believethiscasestudycanfurthercorroboratethewholesaleinadequacyofmethodological
nationalismwhenitcomestothestudyofcontemporaryeconomies(whethertheybeperipheral
ornot).AsJordan’sexampleattests,extranationalforcesandprocessespervadetheentiretyof
thenationaleconomy,affectingifnotconstitutingthecountry’spolicymaking(fromwelfareand
socialpolicytotrade,investment,andfiscalpolicy),regulatorypraxes,capital-laborrelations,
intracapitalrelations,aswellasthecompositionofthecountry’scapitalstockandtheoperations
ofitsfinancialsystem.Toanalyzeanyaspectofsuchaneconomyasifitwashermeticallysealed
attheborder,then,wouldbetoobscuremanyofthiseconomy’smostsalientproperties.
ThesepointshavealreadybeenwellarguedandimplementedintheworksofBohleand
Greskovitz696,WolfgangStreeck697,andArinci,EbenauandPessina698,allofwhomemphasized
thedialecticalinterdependenceandcoco-constitutionbindinginternalandexternaldomainsin
contemporarycapitalisms.Morespecifically,Arinci,Ebenau,andPessina’s2015publication
contendsthatscholarsofactuallyexistingcapitalismsoughtconsidersevenanalyticaldimensions
(inaddition,ofcourse,tothetraditionalmattersofindustrialrelations,state-capitalrelations,
financialsystems,etc.)sotoaccountforthemyriadofwaysthroughwhichtheexternalmightact
696 See:DorothyBohleandBelaGreskovits,CapitalistDiversityonEurope’sPeriphery(2012).CornellUniversity
Press.697 See:WolfgangStreeck,“Epluribusunum?Varietiesandcommonalitiesofcapitalism”,TheSociologyofEconomic
Life(11:3),2011,pp.419-455.698 See:LuciaArinci,NadiaPessina,andMatthiasEbenau,“Allvarietiesareequal...contributionsfromdependency
approachestocriticalcomparativecapitalismsresearch”,inMatthiasEbenau,IanBruff,andChristianMay(eds.)NewDirectionsinComparativeCapitalismResearch:CriticalandGlobalPerspectives.
407
internally.Thosedimensionsareasfollows:(1)thelocalproductivestructureandthe
compositionofthelocalbusinesssector;(2)thenatureoftheintegrationofexternaleconomic
actors;(3)thenatureoftheinsertionoftrans-localproductionandtradenetworks;(4)the
natureoftheinsertionintotrans-localpolitical-regulatoryregimes;(5)thestate’sregulatory
capacities;(6)theformsandconditionsofuse/appropriationofhumanlaborpower;and(7)the
formsandconditionsofuse/appropriationofnaturalresourcesandthedistributionofecological
costs.
Focusedlessonthedimensionsofanalysisandmoreonthemetricsscholarsought
considerindeterminingtheexternal’seffectoninternalmatters,meanwhile,Bohleand
Greskovits(2012)andJoachimBecker(2010)eachcalledforscholarstoincludeevaluationsof
thefollowingcriteriainordertotrackhowperipheralityandsimilarlyspatialvariablesinformed
anationalcapitalism’sperformance:(1)outputandemploymentofcomplexindustriesasashare
oftotalmanufacturingperformance;(2)exportsofcomplexgoodsrelativetototalexportsgoods;
(3)FDIstockaccumulatingincomplexindustriesasapercentageoftotalFDIstock;(4)unitlabor
cost699;(5)currentaccountdeficit/surplusand(6)externaldebt.700
Asshouldbeobvious,thisanalysisisindebtedtotherecommendations(bethey
methodologicaloranalytical)offeredbyallthesescholarsinmanyways.Whetherspeakingofmy
datagatheringandtheevaluativemetricsIemphasizeorthewideranalyticaldimensionsthat
haveanchoredmyinquiries,Ihaveborrowedfruitfullyfromtheroadmapstheyhaveeach
699 Ibid44700 Beckerpp.231
408
provided.Thatsaid,inproducingaworkthatuniquelyresolveshowtheexternal-internalrelation
(amongstotherrelations)actswithintheJordanianpoliticaleconomy,Ihavefrequentlygone
beyondtheroadsEbenauetalhavemarked.Thisbeingthecase,Ibelievethisdissertationmay
offerahandfulofnovelmetrics,conceptualrefinements,andanalytical/methodologicalinsights
thatcanfurtherenhancehowwestudyandunderstandcomparativecapitalisms,especiallyon
theglobalperiphery.
RegardingthosemetricsthatIfoundmostilluminatingintheJordanianinstance—metrics
Ibelievemightalsoreflectamoregeneralpropertyofperipheralcapitalisms—werethose
discussedinthecontextofmyanalysesofthelabormarket,thebuiltenvironment,thestate’s
fiscalsociology,andeconomicopenness.InconjunctionwiththelistofmetricsthatBohle,
Greskovits,andBeckerdevelopedfortheexplicitpurposesofdealingwiththeexternal
environmentofcontemporarycapitalisms,then,Iwouldsuggestthatresearchersalsoinclude
evaluationsofthefollowingmeasures,groupedbycategory,aspartofanycasestudy
(particularlyshouldtheeconomyunderexaminationbepositionedwithintheglobalsouth’s
expansivegeography):
Labormarket
(a)ratesoflaborforceparticipation,informality,unemployment(b)ratesofworkingpoverty(c)ratesoflaborersemployedinsmallandmicroenterprises(d)non-nationalcompositionoflaborforce(e)sectoraldistributionofnon-nationallaborers
BuiltEnvironment
(a)shareofFDIreceiptsallocatedtoconstructionandrealestate(b)constructionandrealestate’scontributiontogrosscapitalformationandgrossfixedcapitalformation(c)constructionandrealestate’scontributiontoGDP(d)constructionandrealestate’saggregatecontributionto
409
jobcreation(e)averagesectoralwagesintheconstructionandrealestatesector(f)compositionofthelaborforceworkinginconstructionandrealestate(i.e.nationality).
FiscalSociology
(a)magnitudeandcompositionofgovernmentrevenues(inclusiveofexternalaidandbondissuances)(b)identificationoffirms/individualswithlargestholdingsofgovernmentdebt(domesticandinternational)(c)magnitudeandcompositionofgovernmentspending(withparticularattentionpaidtoeducationexpenditures)and(d)householdexpendituresonpublicgoods(specificallyeducationandhealth).
EconomicOpenness
(a)commoditiesaspercentageofexports(b)lowsophisticationmanufacturesaspercentageoftotalmanufactures(c)manufacturingvalueadd(MVA)(d)longitudinalperformanceondomesticissuanceofpatentsandtrademarks(e)foreignequityholdingsindomesticbankingsector.Iwouldalsoincludetwobinaryevaluations:(i)isthecountrymembertotheWTO?(ii)doesthecountryhaveanFTAwiththeUnitedStatesorEuropeanUnion?
Byintegratingeachofthesemeasuresintoone’sstatisticaldescriptionsofanational
economy,Ibelievestudentsofcomparativecapitalismwillbeabletodevelopaclearer
conceptualizationofthatwhichseparatesaperipheralcapitalismfromother,betterresearched
modalities.Inaddition,inclusionofthesemetricswilldomorethaneaseclassificatoryanalysis.
First,bydrawingattentiontounderstudiedaspectsoftheseeconomies—aspectsdeeply
implicatedintheirpersistentunderdevelopment—,theywillfacilitateimproveddevelopment-
relatedtheorization.Second,byforegroundingsomeoftheseeconomy’smostsalientsocial
consequences(workingpoverty,stressedmiddleclasses,largesurpluspopulations),inclusionof
thesemetricswillalsoforcescholarstodealwiththeessentialsociologicalprinciplesofa
capitalistformation.
410
AsfortherevisionsImightoffertoArinci,Ebenau,andPessina’sanalyticaldimensions,I
oughtbeginbymakingthecasefortheadditionofahistoricaldimension.Iamconfidentthatthis
casestudywasgreatlyimprovedthroughitscommitmenttohistoricalprocesstracing.
Explanationsregardingthecontemporarynatureofstate-capitalrelations,intracapitalrelations,
theformofmarketcompetition,thestate’sfiscalsociology,andthedevelopmentaleffectsderived
fromtherent/profitseekingtendenciesofanelitefractionofthecapitalistclasswereall
enhancedinthismanner.AsJordaniancapitalismisnotuniqueinbeingshapedbythelegacies
historybestows(whetherthroughpathdependenceorothermeans)—asthetrialsoflate
developmentare,infact,documentedtohaveexertedageneralizableeffectonclassandstate
formationacrosstheglobalsouth—,Icontenditisthereforeessentialthatscholarsof
contemporarycapitalismsnotsealthemselvesofffromthepastinstudyingthepresent.Asfor
howtooperationalizethisanalytically,Iencouragescholarstointegratehistoricalanalysiswhen
evaluatingmarketstructures,intracapitalrelations,andtheformofmarketcompetitionaswell
aswhenexplainingthetendenciesoftheprivatesectormoregenerally(i.e.thesector’srelative
proclivityforproductivev.non-productiveactivities,itsrisktolerance,anditsrecordofrentierist
v.entrepreneurialprofitseekingbehaviors).
Inaddition,Iwouldencouragefuturescholarsofcomparativecapitalismstoreviseand
widenhowtheyconceptualizeandevaluateindustrialrelations.Herein,Ibelievetheframeworks,
concepts,andtheoreticalinsightsprovidedbySSAtheory’sapproachtosocialcontrolwillbeof
greatutility.Allowinganalyststoappraisehowmattersoflabormarketsegmentation,
informality,atomization,andspatializationdelineatetheparametersoflabor-state-capital
411
relationsasmuchastraditionalquestionsofunionizationdo,anembraceofsocialcontrolbetter
equipsascholarforwrestlingwiththerealitiesofmoderneconomies.
Finally,asspecificallyrelatestodealingwiththeexternaldimensionsofnational
capitalisms,Imightalsopetitionfuturescholarstoforegroundthepolicymakingprocessitself,
especiallyifengagingwiththeglobalperiphery.Byevaluatingtherelativeinsulationofthis
processandtheextenttowhichthisprocessispervadedby(a)thetechnocratsofinternational
organizations/foreigngovernments(b)privateinternationalconsultantsand/or(c)adomestic
politicalelitewithidentifiabletiestoprivateinterestsand/ortransnationalcapital,onewillbe
moreabletotracehowthetransnationalshapesthejuridicalfoundationsofanycapitalism—and
theconsequencesthatfollow.
Ifthiscasestudycancertainlycontributetothemethodological,conceptual,andanalytical
refinementofcomparativecapitalismresearchinthemannerjustdelineated,Ibelieveitcanalso
beusedtoderiveaseriesofcausalandconstitutiveclaimsspecifictolifeontheglobalperiphery.
Herein,oneneedfirstrecognizethatmanyofthemaladiesandpathologiesevincedinJordan—
fromitsprematuredeindustrialization,pervasiveinformality,decliningtermsoftrade,sizable
surpluspopulations,andhighworkingpovertyratestoitstechnocraticstatecapture—are
unfortunatelycommonamongstmodernperipheralcapitalisms.Asrelatestotheorygeneration,
totheextentthatthesemaladiesandpathologiescanbeshowntoderive(inpartorinwhole)
fromacommonexogenoussource,itwouldholdthatoneoughtbeabletouseinductive
reasoninginconjunctionwiththethickdescriptionofferedinthiscasestudysotoestablishthe
ceterisparibuseffectsthatsuchanexogenoussourceexertsonsoutherneconomieswritlarge.To
theextentthatthesemaladiesandpathologiescanbeshowntomanifestwithauniqueintensity
412
inJordandespiteJordanhavingbeingsubjecttoanexternalenvironmentthatissimilarto
comparatorcountries,itwouldsimilarlyholdthatthisintensitycanthereforebeattributedto
variablesandprocessesendogenoustoJordan.Werethisthecase,onewouldthereforebeableto
discerntheceterisparibuseffectsthattheseendogenousvariablesexert,andtoinductively
anticipatetheeffectssuchvariablesarelikelytogenerateshouldtheybeextantelsewhereinthe
globalsouth.
Alas,toestablishanyoftheceterisparibuseffectsdiscussedabovewiththeappropriate
levelofconfidencewouldrequireakindofcomparativeanalysisthatisunfortunatelybeyondthe
scopeofthischapterandthismonograph.Cognizant,then,thatwewillbeunabletohold
variablesfixedacrosstheentiretyoftheglobalsouthinthemannerthatrequiredforestablishing
ceterisparibuscausality—cognizant,moreover,thatwelackthecontrolsneededtouseinductive
reasoningsafely—,inwhatfollows,Iwillinsteadbeusingabductivereasoningtoinferthebest
explanationfortheoutcomes(underdevelopmentintheglobalsouthandtheuniqueintensityof
Jordan’sunderdevelopment,respectively)underexamination.
Specifictotheglobalsouth’ssharedunderdevelopmentandthecommonexogenous
sourcestowhichthisunderdevelopmentcanbeattributed,atleastinpart,acursorycomparative
analysisislikelytoleadonetoinferinthedirectionoftheinstitutionschargedregulating
internationaltrade.Morethanremovingbarrierstotrade,recallthatthecontemporarysystemof
globaltraderegulation—articulatedthroughmultilateralagreements(likethoseoftheWTO),
bilateralnorth-southagreements(liketheJordan-UnitedStatesFreeTradeAgreementdiscussed
inthemonograph),andthroughthelendingarrangementsofmultilateralinstitutionsliketheIMF
andWorldBank—consolidatesinvasivesupranationalregulatoryandmediationregimes
413
empoweredwithwideauthoritiesandjurisdictions.Coveringeverythingfromintellectual
propertyregulation,standardsandprocedures,andindustrialpolicytomattersofcapital
controlsandtrade,theseareregimesfunctiontoextractmanyessentialareasofeconomic
policymakingfromtheremitofdomesticofficialsandlawmakers,especiallyintheglobalsouth.
Asthevastmajorityofdevelopingnationsarenowsubjecttosuchregulatoryand
mediationregimeandasthevastmajorityofdevelopingnationsevincesimilardevelopmental
maladiestothoseevincedinJordan,Ibelieveitispossibletoderivethefollowing,onthebasisof
thethickdescriptionprovidedinthistext,asgeneralizablepropertiesoftheseregulatoryand
mediationregimes:(a)thattheyarelikelytopushsoutherneconomiesintocommodity
dependenceand/orlowvaluemanufactures;(b)thattheyarelikelytoimpedetechnological
convergence;(c)thattheyarelikelytodamagetheprospectsofdomesticfirms(intheglobal
south)operatinginhighvalue-add,hightechnologicalsophisticationsectors;and(d)thatthey
arelikelytoreducetheefficacyofhumancapitalinvestmentintheglobalsouth.701
AsforwhatmightbetentativelyderivedfromJordan’suniquelyintense
underdevelopment(andtheendogenousvariablesimplicatedtherein),Ibelieveoneneedbegin
withoneindependentvariableabovealltherest:themodalityofeconomicpolicymakingadopted
701 Jordan’sexamplequiteclearlyatteststothislastpotentiality,wherehumancapitalinvestmentscanbesaidto
haveonlyincreasedtheeducationalprofileoftheunemployed.Thismaybeafunctionoftheglobaldivisionoflaborinstitutionalizedundertheseregulatory/mediationregimes—adivisionoflaborthatultimatelycastsperipheralcountriessuchasJordanassurplustorequirements.Withoutanyobviousroletoplayinglobalsystemsofproductionandtrade(particularlywithinhighervalue-addsectors),theJordanianprivatesectorrespondsbycreatingveryhighsophisticationjobs.Byconsequence,labordemandisnotcommensuratewiththeincreasesrealizedinthehumancapitallevelsofthelaborsupply.Theunemploymentrateofthecollegeeducatedtherebygoesup,andtheefficacyofinvestmentsintoeducationistherebyreduced.
414
byGenerationAbdullah.702Asattestedtobythethickdescriptioncontainedinthiscasestudy,the
particularcausalandconstitutiveeffectsofthisvariablearebothsubstantialandidentifiable.
HavingdeterminedceterisparibuseffectsinthecaseofJordanwithaconsiderabledegreeof
confidence,thefollowingpropositionsregardingthismodalityofpolicymaking’slikelyeffects
withinwithinthecontextoftheglobalsouthcanthereforebeposited:
(a)thatthenon-conditionalextensionofinvestmentincentivesshallresultinFDIinflows whosearrivalshallprecipitatenegligibletransfersoftechnologyand/orknowledge. (b)thatthenon-conditionalextensionofinvestmentincentivesshallresultinFDIinflows thatallocateintonon-complexindustriesandspeculativenon-tradables,respectively(in thecaseofthelatter,Irefertofinancialassetsandassetsinthebuiltenvironment, specifically). (c)thattheadoptionandadministrationofintensiveintellectualpropertyregulations shallhaveanegligibleeffectontechnologicaltransfers(perhapsevenanegativeeffect doingthetransfers foregonethroughtherepressionofpiracy). (d)thattheestablishmentofhighlyderegulatedexportprocessingzoneswillresultin(i) footlooseinvestmentwithinlow-valuesectors(ii)firmsorientingtheirbusinessmodels aroundcost-basedadvantages(andtherebyrequiringcheapinputs)(iii)limitedupstream ordownstreamlinkageswiththerestoftheeconomyand(iv)pervasivelaborabuse. (e)thateffortstoformalizethelabormarket,inthecontextoflargesurpluspopulations and/orlargepopulationsoflegallyprecariousforeignworkers,shallresultinincreased ratesofirregularworkinghoursandunemploymentamongstlowskillcitizenworkers. (f)thatsponsorshipofmicroenterprisesshallcreateduplicative,economicallynon-viable businessesoperatinginretailand/orhouseholdmanufacturing. (g)thattargetedwelfarismshallleavelargepercentagesofthepoor/nearpoorwithout anystateassistance.
702 WhileJordan’srent-seekingcapitalistelitealsocontributetothecountry’sunderdevelopment,theirbehaviors
arenotabnormalvis-a-viscomparatorsintheglobalsouth.Asmostoftheglobalsouthwassubjecttosimilarprocessesofclassformationandlatedevelopment,wecanholdthebusinessclass’seffectsrelativelyfixedforthepurposesofthisexercise.
415
(h)thatthedeclineinpublicgoodprovisioning(particularlyinthedomainsofeducation andhealth)shallstrainmiddleclassbudgetsacutely. (i)thattheimplementationofneoliberaleconomicandsocialpoliciesshallnotprecipitate theretreatofthestate,butrather,itsrepurposingforeliteends.703
……………………………………..………………………………………………………………………...……....…..…..…..……………
Noscholarlyworkisevercomplete,nevermindonecenteredonaslargeaproblematique
asthatofJordaniancapitalism.Beforeclosing,then,Iwouldliketoturntoadeliberationon
futureresearch—tosomeofthequestionsandareasofanalysisneedingfurtherexploration
withinthecontextofJordan’ssocialstructureofaccumulationandtosomeoftheplacesscholars
oftheJordanianeconomymightconsiderjumpingtomoregenerallyintheyearstocome.
Oneoftheareasinmostobviousneedoffurtherresearchconcernsideology’srelationship
tocontemporarycapitalism.Thisneedishardlyuniquetothisstudy:conceptualizing,
operationalizing,anddeterminingthecausalandconstitutiveeffectsofideology,afterall,isone
ofsocialscience’smostenduringandcomplicatedchallenges.Nevertheless,Irecognizethatthis
workcouldbeconsiderablyenhancedwereittoestablishtheprecisemechanismsthroughwhich
ideologyactsandwereittoassemblethehardempiricalevidencenecessarytoshowideology’s
livedefficacyinJordan.Bybetterspecifyingandtestinghowthemythosofentrepreneurialism
andthefetishizationofthemarketcausepoliticaldemobilizationandtheconsolidationofpetite
bourgeoissensibilities,forinstance,orbyconstructingbettermeasuresinordertodetermine
howthediscursivereinventionofpovertyasanissueofcharityratherthanoneofpolitics,class,
703 Onthispoint,Ishouldnotethatthenon-retreatoftheneoliberalstateappearstoholduniversallytrue.
416
andcapitalismweakenscollectiveresistance,Iknowmyclaimmakingwouldbeonfarmoresolid
ground.
Todate,Ihavereviewedpublicopiniondataandidentified,detailed,anddocumenteda
numberofoutcomes(generalizeddisaffection,quietism,andthenon-animationofclasspolitics)
beforeputtingforwardwhatIbelievetobecompelling,logicallycoherent,andempirically
groundedhypothesesregardinghowideologycontributestothoseoutcomes.Goingforward,a
numberofresearchprojectscouldbeimplementedsotofalsifyorverifythesehypotheses.
Ethnography,semi-structuredinterviewing,andfocusgroupsamongstrelevantpopulations704
providethreemethodologicalapproachessuitableforthistask,andareparticularlywell-
equippedforthoseinterestedindetermininghowmattersofidentity,worldview,risktolerance,
individualinterest,andsocialinterestsactualizeinpeople’slives.Theseresearchmethodologies
wouldalsohelpscholarsbetterunderstandthemotivations(oratleasttheself-explanations)
behindactionan/orinactionbyprobinghowJordanianpeopleperceivetheireconomy,their
placeinit,andtheefficacyofresistance.Morepublicopinionandsurveyresearchwouldalsobe
ofgreatutility.Intheyearsahead,Ipersonallyintendtoadministersurveyinstrumentsbuiltin
thefieldofsocialpsychology—andbyscholarsworkingwithintheschoolofsystemjustification
theorymorespecifically—tofurtherfleshoutmanyessentialquestionsrelatedtoboth
capitalism’sperceived(il)legitimacyinJordanandtothebehavioraleffectstherebyrendered.
Togetherwiththekindsofresearchdiscussedabove,Ithinksuchasurveypromisestolenda
greatdealofclarityandprecisiontotheclaim-makingputforthinthistext.
704 Ofthosepopulationsthatimmediatelyjumpout,Iwouldtargetworkersintheinformalsector,proprietorsof
microenterprises,workersinunofficialunions,andtheunemployedforthiskindofresearch.
417
Inaddition,IbelieveourunderstandingofintracapitalrelationsandtheJordanianformof
marketcompetitioncouldbegreatlyimprovedthroughtheaccumulationofmorefirmleveldata.
Ontheonehand,theaccumulationofquantitativedataspecifictotherevenues,profits,assets,
andcapitalizationofprivately-ownedfirmscouldimmediatelybeintegratedintomymapping
andevaluationsofsectoralmarketstructures.Asthispartofmyanalysishas,outofnecessity,
excludedprivatefirmstodate,thisdataintegrationcouldbegreatlybeneficial.Inaddition,I
believeethnographicobservationatenterprisesfromacrossthevarioussegmentsofthe
Jordanianbusinessclasscouldnotonlyilluminatetherealitiesandmechanicsofcompetition
itself,butthemotivations,interests,calculations,self-concepts,andworldviewsinformingtheir
behaviors.
Theapplicationofsimilarresearchmethodologies—thoughthistimeamongst
policymakersinsteadofbusinessleaders—couldbeveryfruitfulaswell.Whilewemaywell
knowwhatthispoliticalclasshasdone—whilewemayalsohaveastrongunderstandingofthe
motivations,material/classinterests,andprocessesofsocializationthatinformwhytheyhave
actedinthismanner—,itwouldneverthelessbeilluminatingtoexplorehowitisthatthiscoterie
ofactorsperceivestheiragency,duties,loyalties,andrecord.Whetherthewordstheyarticulate
aretruthfulontheirfaceornot,theywouldneverthelessgiveawindowintohowGeneration
Abdullahthinksofthepoliciestheyhavewrittenandimplemented,andofthecapitalismthey
havelargelyauthored.That,inandofitself,mightprovewonderfullyilluminating.
Finally,Ishouldcloseonfutureresearchbyreiteratingjusthowusefulacomparative
analysiscouldbe.Whetherregionallyorganizedororientedbyeconomies’sharedperipherality,
prospectivecomparisonsofanysortwouldallowfortheeasierisolationofcausality(whether
418
historicallyorcontemporarily)andofferacontrolledforumwithinwhichonemightfalsify,
validate,orrefineclaimsmadeinthissinglecasestudy.Checkingthework,sotospeak,ofthe
inductiveandabductivegeneralizationsIhavederivedfromthisdissertation’sthickdescription,
suchananalysispromisestofurtherimproveourknowledgenotonlyofJordaniancapitalism,but
ofeconomicdevelopmentandauthoritarianrenewalalongtheglobalperipheryaswell.Amongst
manyotherresearchprojectsalreadylaidout,suchacomparativeanalysisisoneIabsolutely
intendtoconductintheyearsahead.
Iwanttothankallofyouforreading.Iprayyouhavefoundthismonographinsightful,
thoughtprovoking,rigorous,andengaging.
Ifthisiswherewedepart,Ionlyaskthatyoucontinuetoconsiderthehumanimpactof
thiscapitalismofcrisis.WhileIhavedonemybesttocapturetheseimpacts,thestatistical
measuresIhaveleaneduponcanonlyevergiveapartialpictureofreality.Thepoverty,
unemployment,precarityandday-to-daystressengenderedbytheJordanianvarietyof
capitalismareprofoundanddevastating.Howweaddresstheseissuesinanageofgrowing
ecologicalvolatilitywillbethechallengeofourage.InandJordanasintheUnitedStates,maywe
demonstratetherequisitefortitude,moralclarity,andintellectualforbearance.
421
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COLINP.POWERSEmail:colin.powers11@gmail.com Phone:(914)400-5906SUMMARYOFQUALIFICATIONSInternationalexperienceinpost-conflictmediationandprogramming•Robustpedagogicalandmentoringexperience•Internationalexperienceinyouth-orientedpsychosocialeducation•Strongquantitativeandqualitativedataanalysisskills•Excellentwritingandoratoryskills•ReadingandoralproficiencyinArabic•Stronganalyticalandproblem-solvingskills•AbilitytoworkautonomouslyandcollaborativelyEDUCATIONDOCTOROFPHILOSOPHY,INTERNATIONALRELATIONS(WithDistinction)January2020JohnsHopkinsSAIS Washington,DCMASTERSOFARTS,INTERNATIONALRELATIONSANDINTERNATIONALECONOMICS(WithHonors) 2014JohnsHopkinsSAISWashington,DC
BACHELOROFARTS,HISTORY(MagnaCumLaude) 2008BostonCollege ChestnutHill,MAWORKEXPERIENCEJohnsHopkinsSAIS Washington,DCResearchandTeachingAssistantDecember2013-Present• Researcher,editor,andconsultantforAssociateProfessorandActingDepartmentDirectorCamillePecastaing• AdvisoroncurriculadesignforMiddleEastDepartmentcourses• ResponsibleforgradingandthesisevaluationsTomorrow’sYouthOrganization Washington,DCConsultant June2019-Present • Advisoronexpansionplanning,curricularevisions,communicationsstrategy,andfundraisingJohnsHopkinsSAIS Washington,DCLecturerJune2018-August2018• Co-instructorinMaster’sProgram(Course:“TheBehavioralSociologyofConflict”)
FulbrightProgram Amman,JordanResearchGranteeAugust2015-August2016• ConducteddissertationfieldworkcenteredontheeconomicpoliciesoftheIslamicActionFront(IAF)andeconomic
developmentinJordanmoregenerally• Conductedstructured,open-endedinterviewswithroughly25officialsandleadersfromtheIslamicActionFront,
MuslimBrotherhood,andIslamicCenterCharitySociety• ConductedethnographicresearchinWeihdatRefugeeCampinregardstothedepoliticizationofethnicPalestinians
FullCourtPeaceBelfast,CiudadJarez,HavanaProgramManager,ConsultantSeptember2008-July2016• Designedandimplementedpsychosocialeducationcurriculafocusedonleadershipdevelopment,conflict
management,andcross-communalintegration• ConsultantonCiudadJuarezandHavanaprojects,focusedonrevitalizingcommunitycentersandsafesocialspaces,
reestablishingcommunalfraternity,andprovidingEnglishlanguageinstructionTomorrow’sYouthOrganization Nablus,Palestine
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ProjectCoordinatorFebruary2013-July2013;January2011-July2011• Designedandimplementedcurriculumforsummeroutreachinitiative,providingeducationalandrecreational
activitiesforlocalrefugeecommunities• Designed,administered,andevaluated“MidnightSoccerLeague,”arecreationalprogramforlocalteenagers• Designed,implemented,andevaluated“BigBrother”program,amentorshipprogramforteenagersfromthelocal
refugeecommunitiesFulbrightProgram Kardzhali,BulgariaTeachingAssistantshipGranteeAugust2011-August2012• ResearchedstatediscriminationagainstthelocalRomapopulation• ResearchedthenegotiationofethnicandtransnationalidentitiesamongBulgarianteenagers• DesignedandimplementedEnglishlanguagecurriculumforOtetsPaiciiHighSchoolPRESENTATIONSMiddleEastStudiesAssociationAnnualConference(November2019)NewOrleans,LA
Presentation:ThePoliticalEconomyofaLowerMiddleIncomeTrap:Jordan’sDevelopmentPolicyinthe21stCentury
MiddleEastStudiesAssociationAnnualConference(November2018)SanAntonio,TXPresentation:PolicyConvergence:Economic(Under)developmentinJordanunderKingAbdullah
InternationalStudiesAssociationAnnualConference(April2018)SanFrancisco,CA Presentation:IslamandDevelopment:CreepingNeoliberalismandtheMuslimBrotherhoodinJordan CenterfortheStudyofIslam&DemocracyAnnualConference(April2018)Washington,DC
Presentation:DemocratizationImperiled?StubbornNeoliberalisminTunisiaandtheDangersThereinAssociationfortheSociologyofReligionAnnualConference(August2017)Montreal,Canada
Presentation:PiousNeoliberalismanditsDiscontents:TheEconomicsofTunisia’sEnnahdaandJordan’sIslamicActionFront
InternationalStudiesAssociationAnnualConference(March2017)Baltimore,MDPresentation:IslamandEconomyintheAgeofNeoliberalism:TheEconomicDiscourseandPraxisoftheMuslimBrotherhoodinJordan
PUBLICATIONS
• Powers,C.(2019).Cartelization,neoliberalism,andtheforeclosureoftheJasmineRevolution:Democracy’stroublesinTunisia.MiddleEastLawandGovernance,11(1),1-37.
• Powers,C.(2019).Runningthecountrylikeabusiness?TheeconomicsofJordan’sIslamicActionFront.CriticalResearchonReligion,7(1),38-57.
• Powers,C.Howneoliberalismcomestotown:policyconvergence,(under)development,andJordanianeconomicsunderKingAbdullah[Publicationpending:MiddleEastLawandGovernance].
• Powers,C.TheEconomicProspectsoftheWhiteHouse’sNewPlanforPeace.PolicyAnalysis:ArabCenterWashingtonDC.
• Powers,C.TheWorldBankandInternationalMonetaryFundinthepost-uprisingMiddleEast:ContinuitiesandChange[Indraft]
• Powers,C.ComparativecapitalismsintheMiddleEast:Lessonsfromtheglobalsouth[Indraft]• Powers,C.ProducingCrisis/SurvivingCrisis:Power,Capital,andtheSocialStructureofAccumulationintheHashemite
KingdomofJordan[Bookindraft]LANGUAGESANDSKILLS
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