overview of recent jamming incidents and status of foi ... · 6/12/2019 · examples of incidents...
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Foto: iStockPhoto
Overview of recent jamming incidents and status of FOI GNSS jamming detection systemJouni RantakokkoDeputy Research DirectorFOI
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Jamming
Threat
True positionFalse positionNoiseDeception
Where am I? I am at the red dot!
Spoofing
GNSS jamming affects GNSS users in northern Norway and Finland
GNSS spoofing in the Black Sea region (and around Kremlin)
The receiver can be fooled to provide a false PVT solution
Main reason for the sensitivitytowards jamming is the large distance
to the satellites
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Overview of recent jamming and spoofing incidents against civil GPS receivers
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Based on open media sources, see e.g. References
– www.tv2.no/a/10406767/– www.tv2.no/a/10449254/– Knut-Sverre Horn, Støy fra Russland slo ut GPS-signaler for norske fly. NRK Finnmark, 2017-10-05.
(https://www.nrk.no/finnmark/stoy-fra-russland-slo-ut-gps-signaler-for-norske-fly-1.13720305)– Knut-Sverre Horn, E-tjenesten bekrefter: Russerne jammet GPS-signaler bevisst. NRK Finnmark, 171006.
(https://www.nrk.no/finnmark/e-tjenesten-bekrefter_-russerne-jammet-gps-signaler-bevisst-1.13721504)– https://rntfnd.org/2017/10/27/russia-jamming-gps-official-norwegian-report/– Henrik Lied, GPS freaking out? Maybe you’re too close to Putin. NRKbeta, 2017-09-18.
(https://nrkbeta.no/2017/09/18/gps-freaking-out-maybe-youre-too-close-to-putin/)– GPS Spoofing Patterns Discovered. The Maritime Executive, 2017-09-26.
(https://www.maritime-executive.com/article/gps-spoofing-patterns-discovered)– Muhammad Darwish, Did Russia make this ship disappear? CNNtech, 2017-11-03.
(http://money.cnn.com/2017/11/03/technology/gps-spoofing-russia/index.html)– Michael Jones, Spoofing in the Black Sea: What really happened? GPSWorld, 2017-10-11.
(http://gpsworld.com/spoofing-in-the-black-sea-what-really-happened/)
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Examples of incidents the last years GNSS jamming in the north
– 7-15 September 2017 (Zapad)– 16-20/10 & 24/10 – 7/11 2018 (Trident Juncture)– January 2019 – March 2019
GNSS jamming close to conflict areas – Ukraine– Syria (Nicosia FIR)– Libya
Spoofing – Black Sea and inside Russian territory (e.g. Kremlin)
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GPS jamming incident Finnmarken, North of Norway
– 7-15 September• GPS-receivers on civil passenger aircraft jammed
on heights over 2000 feet– Nkom performed measurements
• 15-Sept-2017, four 360-degree measurements• Jamming detected on GPS L1 (BW ~1 MHz) and
L2 (BW ~12 MHz)• Jamming signal stronger towards east and
increased when the helicopter flew closer to the Russian border
• Jamming was turned off when the helicopter was close to the Russian border
https://www.nrk.no/finnmark/e-tjenesten-bekrefter_-russerne-jammet-gps-signaler-bevisst-1.13721504
https://rntfnd.org/2017/10/27/russia-jamming-gps-official-norwegian-report/ (Google-translated version)
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GPS jamming incident
What was the reason?– The jamming occurred prior to the
official start of Zapad 2017– Norwegian officials state that this
incident was not directed towards Norway, but rather a part of the Russian Zapad exercise
”I forbindelse med øvelse Zapad 2017 kan E-tjenesten bekrefte at vi både har registrert og varslet norske myndigheter om elektronisk jamming fra russisk side.””Vi vurderer att dette ikke var rettet mot Norge, men varmomenter i den russiske øvelsen.”Kim Gulbrandsen, E-tjenesten
https://www.nrk.no/finnmark/e-tjenesten-bekrefter_-russerne-jammet-gps-signaler-bevisst-1.13721504
Finland
Russia
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GPS jamming during Trident Juncture
Deliberately targeting the Trident Juncture exercise– Jamming “heat maps” shown by Norwegian
military intelligence– Localization of jamming source, which moved
from Luostari base to higher altitude at Sjartraining area
www.tv2.no/a/10406767/
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GPS deception incidents
Novorossijsk, Black Sea region– June 2017 ?
https://nrkbeta.no/2017/09/18/gps-freaking-out-maybe-youre-too-close-to-putin/https://maritime-executive.com/editorials/mass-gps-spoofing-attack-in-black-sea
“GPS equipment unable to obtain GPS signal intermittently since nearing coast of Novorossiysk, Russia. Now displays HDOP 0.8 accuracy within 100m, but given location is actually 25 nautical miles off; GPS display…”
The
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Illustration: Henrik Lied/CartoDB
Post-analysis of maritime AIS-data─ Close to 450 different instances when a
ships position was falsely reported as being on different Russian airports
Henrik Lied, NRK/Marinetraffic.com
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GPS deception incidents
Why?– The theory proposed in media is that it is
performed as a protection of places where the president is located• Since the summer of 2016 there have been
numerous reports about deception of GPS-receivers near the Kremlin
• President Putin has a summer residence near Gelendzhik
• Anti-drone protection (through airport geofencing)https://nrkbeta.no/2017/09/18/gps-freaking-out-maybe-youre-too-close-to-putin/https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=PRlxSF5bwTI
Gelendzhik
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GPS deception
Threat from GPS deception has increased dramatically the last couple of years– Deception equipment used to be an expensive,
exclusive resource; the hardware is now inexpensive (e.g. HackRF One SDR)
– Software easily available on the internet; no expert knowledge is needed
https://nrkbeta.no/2017/09/18/gps-freaking-out-maybe-youre-too-close-to-putin/
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FOI RF Oculus Detection System
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Aim
Detect interference signals ─ Primarily in the GPS L1 band─ Save raw data (I/Q) and GNSS Rx data at detections
Relatively low-cost and compact mechanical enclosure Remote control and continuous monitoring (24/7)
Internet
Spectrum monitor
Remote control
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History
2013 2014
Internal development
SwedaviaCustomer X
Prototype Version 0.5 Version 1.0 Version 1.5
Swedavia Swedavia
Version 2.0
2015 2016 2017 2018 2019
H2020 - STRIKE3, 3 år
Version 2.1
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Portable detection system, v2.0
Node N
Detector
Remoteconnection
Node 1
Detector
Remoteconnection
Node 2
Detector
Remoteconnection
Server
Remote supervision and control
Detections analyzed off-line at FOI
Web-based set upContinuous monitoring
of L1 power levelsSave I/Q-samples,
Rx data and additional parameters at detections
Report created after detection and emailed Smaller size (20x30x11 cm)
New power unit (9-36 VDC), enables mobile/air/vessel use
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Software Defined Radio (SDR)
USRP B200 mini─ Standard product (ETTUS)─ The first fully integrated USRP device
with continuous RF coverage from 70 MHz – 6 GHz
─ Full duplex operation with up to 56 MHz of real time bandwidth (61.44MS/s quadrature)
─ Fast and convenient bus-powered connectivity using USB 3.0
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Visualization, web-based GUI
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RF Oculus
Use cases– Swedavia (Swedish Airport
administration)– FMV (Swedish Defense
Material administration)– Swedish Police– H2020 Project STRIKE3– Swedish Customs
The future?– Automatic classification
(intentional, jammer type)– Detection of spoofing– Localization and/or DF– Ground-based national
detection network– GNSS-receivers should have
built-in detection capability (and incident reporting)
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Summary
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Recommendations
Civil community– Important that civilian actors prepare to meet the threat against
GNSS from jamming and spoofing– Possible to achieve significantly higher robustness with relatively
simple means, but economic incentives for investments have not yet been there• By spreading information about these and similar incidents, the hope is that
such investments may gain a higher priority
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Cooperative navigation, e.g. ranging & information exchange
Robust multisensor navigation system?
Robust GNSS-receivers
Jamming and spoofing detection
& mitigationAdaptive
antennas (CRPA)
Multi-frequency, multi-constellation(e.g. GPS & Galileo)
NAVWAR-prepared (M-code & PRS)
Complementary navigation tech’s
CSAC
Magnetic & gravitational
fields
Landmarks / environmental
features
Gyro & acc
Celestial
3D-maps
Detect & exclude unreliable constellations & PR’s
Atom interferometry-based INS…?
Opportunistic use of radio signals
Air pressure
Opportunities
Velocity
Bildnummer 1Bildnummer 2Bildnummer 3Based on open media sources, see e.g.Examples of incidents the last yearsGPS jamming incidentGPS jamming incidentGPS jamming during Trident JunctureGPS deception incidentsGPS deception incidentsGPS deceptionBildnummer 12AimHistoryPortable detection system, v2.0Software Defined Radio (SDR)Visualization, web-based GUIRF OculusBildnummer 19RecommendationsOpportunities
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