obasanjo’s administration and the management of …
Post on 14-Apr-2022
1 Views
Preview:
TRANSCRIPT
OBASANJO’S ADMINISTRATION AND THE MANAGEMENT OF THE
NIGERIA-CAMEROUN DISPUTE: A CRITICAL ANALYSIS OF THE RULING
AND PROTECTION OF FUNDAMENTAL RIGHTS OF THE PEOPLE OF
BAKASSI PENINSULA
BY
OMADA CHRISTOPHER
PG/M.Sc./12/64131
A PROJECT SUBMITTED TO THE DEPARTMENT OF POLITICAL SCIENCE
UNIVERSITY OF NIGERIA, NSUKKA IN PARTIAL FULLILMENT OF THE
REQUIREMENTS FOR THE AWARD OF MASTER OF SCIENCE
DEGREE IN POLITICAL SCIENCE
SUPERVISOR: PROF. E.O. EZEANI
NOVEMBER, 2013.
i
TITLE PAGE
OBASANJO’S ADMINISTRATION AND THE MANAGEMENT OF THE
NIGERIA-CAMEROUN DISPUTE: A CRITICAL ANALYSIS OF THE RULING
AND PROTECTION OF FUNDAMENTAL RIGHTS OF THE PEOPLE OF
BAKASSI PENINSULA
ii
APPROVAL PAGE
This is to certify that this work entitled ‘Obasanjo’s Administration and the Management
of the Nigeria-Cameroun Dispute: A Critical Analysis of the Fundamental Rights of the
People of Bakassi Peninsula’ has been approved for the Department of Political Science,
University of Nigeria, Nsukka
By:
------------------------------------ ------------------------------------ PROFESSOR E.O. EZEANI PROFESSOR JONAH. ONUOHA SUPERVISOR HEAD OF DEPARTMENT
------------------------------------- ------------------------------------ PROFESSOR C.O.T. UGWU EXTERNAL EXAMINER DEAN FACULTY OF THE SOCIAL SCIENCES
iii
DEDICATION
This project is specially dedicated to God Almighty for giving me the life and
health to arrive at this end. I cannot thank him enough for His mercies.
I equally dedicate this work to my children- Nneka Omada, Ogechi, Chineye, and
K.C. - whose prayers saw me through in this academic journey.
iv
ACKNOWLEDGEMENTS
It is a common saying that while man proposes God disposes. In God’s manner of
disposing both material goods and services, He uses human person as his agents. Thus, I
could not have known the meaning and direction of academic project work without the
patient and kind attention of my supervisor, Professor E.O. Ezeani I cannot thank him
enough, but to pray that God will give him long life and blessings of prosperity in Jesus
name. Amen.
I cannot make the mistake of omission as to forget somebody whose contributions
to the entire welfare of the students of my school are so immense. I thus hail our PG
coordinator Professor Aloysius-Michaels Okolie. May the Almighty God reward him for
the selfless services to me. In like manner, I acknowledge all the lecturers in the
department particularly the HOD Professor Jonah Onuoha and Professor Ifesinachi.
I wish to finally, appreciate my God given partner for life Mrs. Ngozi Omada
whose love, endurance, understanding and contributions helped me to make the race a
success. God’s love shall always bind us in years of our lives.
v
Abstract
The Nigeria-Cameroun border conflict, which had claimed many lives and properties, was finally resolved on October 2002 following the ICJ ruling which ceded the disputed Bakassi Peninsula to the Republic of Cameroon. The rapidity with which President Obasanjo implemented the handover of Bakassi to Cameroon was seen in the average eye of a Nigerian as a diplomatic blunder considering the historical underpinnings of the people of Bakassi. This study was therefore aimed at a critical examination of the fundamental rights of the people of Bakassi Peninsula in the management of the Nigerian-Cameroun dispute by President Obasanjo. In doing this, the study was anchord on two research questions, thus: (1) Did Olusegun Obasanjo’s support for the ICJ ruling over the disputed Bakassi Peninsula undermine Nigeria’s national interest in the protection of her citizens and territorial integrity?; (2) Has the Nigerian government is inability to explore alternative policy options to ICJ ruling undermined the right to decide where to belong by the Bakassi people?. We used qualitative descriptive method to collect data from secondary sources. Qualitative descriptive method was equally used in analyzing our data. Thus, applying logically the core assumptions of Games theory, the study contended that Obasanjo’s acceptance of the ICJ ruling to cede away the disputed Bakassi Peninsula to Republic of Cameroon was against the national interest of Nigeria. Arising from this therefore, we recommended, among other things, that Nigerian foreign policy machinery should be henceforth situated and located in the hands of experts.
vi
TABLE OF CONTENTS
Title Page - - - - - - - - - - i
Approval Page - - - - - - - - - ii
Dedication - - - - - - - - - - iii
Acknowledgements - - - - - - - - - iv
Abstract - - - - - - - - - - - v
Table of Contents - - - - - - - - - vi
CHAPTER ONE: INTRODUCTION
1.1 Background of the Study - - - - - - - 1
1.2 Statement of the Problem - - - - - - - 3
1.3 Objectives of the Study - - - - - - - 5
1.4 Significance of the Study - - - - - - - 5
1.5 Hypotheses - - - - - - - - - 6
1.6 Thesis and Contributions to Knowledge - - - - - - 6
CHAPTER TWO: LITERATURE REVIEW AND THEORETICAL FRAMEWORK
2.1 Literature Review- - - - - - - - - 9
2.2 Theoretical Framework - - - - - - - - 19
CHAPTER THREE: METHOD OF RESEARCH
3.1 Method of Data Collection - - - - - - - 23
3.2 Research Design - - - - - - - - - 23
3.3 Method of Data Analysis - - - - - - - - 24
3.4 Logical Data Framework - - - - - - - 25
vii
CHAPTER FOUR: BACKGROUND TO THE BAKASSI DISPUTE
4.1 Geography of the Nigerian Cameroun Boundary - - - - - 27
4.2 Evolution of Colonial Boundaries - - - - - - 30
4.3 British/German Administration and Obfuscation of the Nigeria-Cameroun Colonial International Boundary - - - - - - - 40
4.4 The Place of General Gowon in the Bakassi Dispute - - - - 51
4.5 Abacha’s Effort - - - - - - - - - 54
4.6 The climax of the Bakassi Dispute - - - - - - 55
CHAPTER FIVE: OLUSEGUN OBASANJO’S SUPPORT OF THE ICJ RULING
OVER THE DISPUTED BAKASSI AND NIGERIA’S NATIONAL
INTEREST IN THE PROTECTION OF HER CITIZENS’ RIGHTS
AND TERRITORIAL INTEGRITY
5.1 Signing of the Green Tree Agreement Between Olusegun Obasanjo of Nigeria and Paul Biya of Cameroun - - - - - - - - 57
5.2 The World Court Judgment and Olusegun Obasanjo’s Support of the UN Mixed-Commission - - - - - - - - 62 5.3 Obasanjo’s Support of the Demarcation of Land and Maritime Boundaries Between
Nigeria and Cameroun - - - - - - - - 66 5.4 Support of Withdrawal of Nigeria’s Civilian Administration, Military and Police Forces
from Bakassi - - - - - - - - - 67 5.5 The Effects of the World Court Judgment on the Bakassi People - - 68 CHAPTER SIX: NIGERIA GOVERNMENT INABILITY TO EXPLORE
ALTERNATIVE POLICY OPTIONS TO ICJ RULING AND
THE RIGHT OF BAKASSI PEOPLE TO DECIDE WHERE
TO BELONG
6.1 Political Option - - - - - - - - - 77
6.2 Legal Option - - - - - - - - - 82
6.3 Military Options - - - - - - - - - 92
6.4 The Right of Bakassi People to Decide where to Belong - - - - 95
CHAPTER SEVEN: SUMMARY, CONCLUSION AND RECOMMENDATIONS
7.1 Summary - - - - - - - - - 99
7.2 Conclusion - - - - - - - - - 99
7.3 Recommendations - - - - - - - - - 100
BIBLIOGRAPHY - - - - - - - - - 101
Appendix i - - - - - - - - - - 104
Appendix ii - - - - - - - - - - 107
1
CHAPTER ONE
INTRODUCTION
1.1 Background of the Study
The dispute along the Nigeria-Cameroun border was a matter of historic
proportions, especially along the Cross River to the Sea section wherein the Bakassi
Peninsula (Ekpenyong, 1989) lies. The disputed Bakassi Peninsula is an area of some of
mangrove swamp and half submerged islands mostly occupied by fishermen settlers
(Anene, 1970). Remarkably, Bakassi Peninsula came under British protection on
September 10, 1884. Following the Berlin West African Conference of 1885, Britain and
Germany defined their territorial spheres of influence in Africa in November 15, 1893.
When the two installments of amalgamation were proclaimed in Nigeria in 1906 and
1914, the Bakassi Peninsula was subsumed under the frontiers of Southern Cameroon.
Then the London Treaty of March 11, 1913 established clear-cut regulations on
navigation on the Cross River. The end of World War I brought Bakassi under British
Cameroon. During the interwar years, the Franco British Declaration of July 10, 1919 on
Bakassi and what came to be known as British-Cameroon were placed under British
mandate and were administered conterminously with Nigeria. In 1946 following the end
of World War II Britain divided Cameroon into Northern Cameroon and Southern
Cameroon (Idumange, 2010). While Southern Cameroun fell under the British colony,
the Northern Cameroun was administered by France. Upon gaining political
independence by Nigeria and Cameroun as well as the discovery of oil and other natural
resources in the Bakassi Peninsula, the border conflict between the two countries began
to gather fresh momentum.
2
Successive Nigerian governments had made various efforts in settling the Bakassi
question. Specifically, after the ‘Maroon Accord reached between the Heads of state,
General Yakubu Gowon of Nigeria and Ahmadu Ahidjo of Cameroon in which Gowon
allegedly gave out the territory to Cameroon, General Murtala Mohammed that took over
from the Gowon military regime threatened that rather than accept the outrageous
agreement, Nigeria would go to war if Cameroonians refused further negotiations
(Babatola and Jadesola, 2012). On assumption of office as the military head of state after
the bloody coup d’etat that led to the assassination of General Murtala in 1976, Obasanjo
made significant efforts to re-open the border negotiations with the Cameroonian
authorities with little or no achievement recorded (Babatola and Jadesola, 2012)
Between May 15th 1981 and 1993, the Peninsula remained a subject of serious
dispute, between Cameroon and Nigeria with scores of lives lost due to military
aggressions and tribal squabbles (Olumide, 2002). As tension continued to mount and
many more lives lost as a result of the conflict, the Cameroonian government got tired
and, on March 24, 1994, filed a law suit against Nigeria at the International Court of
Justice, at Hague, seeking an injunction for the expulsion of Nigerian force, which they
said were occupying the territory and to restrain Nigeria from laying claim to sovereignty
over the peninsula.
Remarkebly, the International Court of Justice (ICJ) ruling (on Thursday 10th
October 2002) over the Bakassi conflict in favor of Cameroon (against the wish of the
Bakassi people and the majority of Nigerians) during the Obasanjo Civilian
Administration has indeed, opened a vista of debates among scholars pertains to the
3
implications of the ICJ position on the national interest and in extension, foreign policy
of Nigeria
Against this background, this study critically examines the fundamental rights of
the people of Bakassi Peninsula in the management of the Nigerian-Cameroun dispute
under President Obasanjo civilian administration.
1.2 Statement of the problem
At the core of foreign policy of any given state is its national interest. Thus,
according to Igwe (2007:157):
Foreign policy is the coordinated application of the elements of national power for the promotion of national interest as defined by the ruling class in relations between states and other international actors, a practical substantiation of grand-strategy, the external expression of domestic policy and the main object of foreign policy analysis
Since actors in the international system are numerous, interest pursuing cannot exist
without interacting with other actors in the system. It therefore behooves on them to draw
up well-defined programmes and activities coupled with certain behavioral traits or
tendencies with which it interacts with other actors so as to maximize their interest, and
possibly, even at the detriment of other actors in the system (Ofoeze, 2011)
Interestingly, at the core of Nigerian foreign policy is the advancement of her
national interest, especially as it affects the interests of the citizens. But suffice it to say
that President Obasanjo’s diplomatic approach to Nigerian-Cameroun border dispute,
which eventually led to Bakassi people being ceded away to Cameroun, had indeed,
raised serious debate as it concerns the Nigeria’s national interest.
4
The Nigerian-Cameroon border conflict gained international dimension and
prominence in March 24, 1994 following a law suit filed by Cameroonian government in
the International Court of Justice in Hague against the Nigerian government. The suit
sought an injunction for the expulsion of Nigerian force, which they claimed were
occupying the territory and to restrain Nigeria from establishing to sovereignty over
Peninsula (Tariebbea and Baroni, 2010). The 1913 Anglo-German agreement shifted the
Peninsula from its original position in Nigeria in favor of Cameroon. This was indeed,
supported by the 1975 “Maroon Declaration” between the Heads of state, General Yakubu
Gowon of Nigeria and Ahmadu Ahidjo of Cameroon in which Gowon allegedly gave out the
territory to Cameroon (Olumide, 2002)
Various steps taken by successive Nigerian leaders to retain Bakassi as part of
Nigerian federation proved abortive. This was indeed, to climax in the ICJ ruling in October
10, 2002, which placed Bakassi under the ownership of Cameroon. By this judgment,
sovereignty over Bakassi was transferred to the Republic of Cameroon. The judgment was
overwhelmingly condemned by the mass of the Nigerian people.
The swift and unilateral action that was taken by the Obasanjo civilian administration
in aiding the outright ceding of Bakassi to Cameroon had indeed, generated mixed feelings in
Nigeria pertaining to the rationale behind the ICJ judgment.
Scholars such as Asobie (2003), Baye (2010), Anene (2005), Nweke (1982), Ngan
(2010), Fombo (2006), Rose and Sama (2006), Eke (2009), among others, have written
extensively on the Nigerian-Cameroon border conflict and its management. However, none
of these scholars has critically examined the ceding away of the disputed Bakassi territotry to
Cameroon by the Obasanjo civilian administration and the fundamental human rights of the
people of Bakassi Peninsula. It is however, this noticeable and existing lacuna in the extant
5
literature that this research work is aimed at filling using the under listed research questions
as a guide:
1. Did Olusegun Obasanjo’s support for the ICJ ruling over the disputed Bakassi
Peninsula undermine Nigeria’s national interest in the protection of her citizens rights
and territorial integrity?
2. Has the Nigeria government inability to explore alternative policy options to ICJ
ruling undermined the right to decide where to belong by the Bakassi people?
1.3 Objectives of the Study
The broad objective of this study is to critically examine the ICJ ruling over the
Bakassi Peninsular and the extent to which it infringes on the fundamental human rights
of the Bakassi people. However, the specific objectives include:
1. To ascertain whether Olusegun Obasanjo’s support for the ICJ ruling over Bakassi
Peninsula undermine Nigeria’s national interest in the protection of her citizens rights
and territorial integrity
2. To determine if Nigeria government inability to explore alternative policy options to
ICJ ruling undermined the right to decide where to belong by the Bakassi people
1.4 Significance of the study
This study has both theoretical and practical significance. The theoretical
relevance of this study derives from its focus on ascertaining whether the role played by
Olusegun Obasanjo in Bakassi dispute undermined Nigeria’s national interest of protection of
her citizens and territorial integrity and if the Nigeria government inability to explore
alternative policy options to ICJ ruling undermined the right to decide where to belong by the
Bakassi people, thereby providing a new framework under which the problem could be
explained and analyzed. Furthermore, the findings of this study will add to the existing
6
stock of scholarly literature on the Nigerian-Bakassi boundary dispute. As such, it will
then serve as a reference material or data for scholars whose interest would eventually be
aroused by the findings to undertake further studies on the area.
Practically, this study will be of immense importance to the Nigerian government
and law makers at various levels, international observers, and indeed, other relevant
bodies interested in the issues pertaining to the Nigerian-Cameroon border dispute. And
as such, will provide valuable data/information that will assist them to articulate potent
policies that will help to address the issue.
1.5 Hypotheses
The understated hypotheses are put forward to guide the study:
1. Olusegun Obasanjo’s support for the ICJ ruling over the disputed Bakassi
Peninsula undermined Nigeria’s national interest in the protection of her citizens’
rights and territorial integrity
2. The Nigeria government’s inability to explore alternative policy options to ICJ ruling
undermined the right to decide where to belong by the Bakassi people
1.6 Thesis and Contribution to Knowledge
The central thesis of this study derives from our major findings arising from lacuna
that exist in the views of scholars in the area of the study. These findings are in two
different dimensions. Firstly, it was one the findings of this study that even though there
were policy options to Obasanjo’s civilian administration, the Nigeria government
support for the ICJ ruling over the disputed Bakassi Peninsula undermined Nigeria’s
national interest of protection of her citizens and territorial integrity. To this end, and in
order to ensure that this thesis has not been implicated in the views of other scholars that
have carried out research on the area, we reviewed the views of scholars such as Asobie
7
(2003), Baye (2010), Anene (2005),To Ngan (2010) and Fombo (2006), Rose and Sama
(2006),among others. Asobie (2003) and Baye (2010) admit that the existence of
authoritarian regimes in both countries and military approach equally posed difficulty in
resolving the crisis. Anene (2005) was of the view that the lingering border crisis
between Nigeria and Cameroon and its difficulty in managing it stems from the manner
under which African boundaries arbitrarily demarcated. Rose and Sama (2006) whether
President Olusegun Obasanjo’s support for the ICJ ruling over the disputed Bakassi
Peninsula undermined Nigeria’s national interest in the protection of her citizens and
territorial integrity
Secondly, it was equally the finding of this study that the Nigeria government’s
inability to explore alternative policy options to ICJ ruling undermined the right to decide
where to belong by the Bakassi people. This was derived from the lacuna that exists from
the views of scholars we reviewed on the area. For instance Ebeghulem (2008) contends
that the diplomatic impact of the Nigeria’s foreign policy over Bakassi, and the Nigeria’s
handling of the Bakassi imbroglio before, during and after the ICJ judgment, had left
nothing to desire. His argument centers on the fact that the population of Bakassi is
overwhelmingly Nigerians. Its local government, functions as part of Cross River State
since the inception of the State. The Efik Nigerians have always voted to choose their
representatives whenever the civilian governments hold sway since Nigeria’s
independence in 1960. The residents of Bakassi according to him believe themselves as
Nigerians because they have always participated in all decision-making process since the
nation was born. He recommends that Bakassi people should have therefore, been given
the privilege to determine their future instead of being partitioned into Cameroon as
implied by the ICJ’s ruling.
8
Aghemelo and Ibhasebhor (2006) noted that the arbitrary delimitation of Africa
into sovereign entities has remained the root cause of the dispute between Nigeria and
Cameroon. They opine that the African territories which have attained independence and
national sovereignty, cannot in a strict sense, be regarded as national states. They do not
embrace a common past and a common culture. They are indeed, the arbitrary creations
of colonialist. Rouke (1997) has however examined the general trend of European
colonial imposed boundaries on Africa; pointing directly at Bakassi as one of such
imposed African boundaries. He assessed at length the legacy of colonialism in Africa.
He points out that the industrialization of the North was one factor that caused the
colonization of the South in the late 1800s and early 1900s. He noted that Africa was
largely controlled by its indigenous peoples in 1878 but had, by 1914 become almost
totally subjugated and divided into colonies by the European powers.
However, these scholars, among others, have failed to examine whether the
Nigeria government inability to explore alternative policy options to ICJ ruling undermined
the right to decide where to belong by the Bakassi people. This constitutes our second thesis
and contribution to the existing knowledge.
9
CHAPTER TWO
LITERATURE REVIEW AND THEORETICAL FRAMEWORK
2.1 Literature Review
The study focuses on the examination of alternative policy options in the
management of Nigeria-Cameroun border dispute under President Olusegun Obasanjo.
Accordingly, the aim of this review is to examine pertinent literature with respect to the
following research questions in order to locate the gap in the literature:
1. Did Olusegun Obasanjo’s support for the ICJ ruling over the disputed Bakassi
Peninsula undermined Nigeria’s national interest in the protection of her citizens’
rights and territorial integrity?
2. Has the Nigeria government inability to explore alternative policy options to ICJ
ruling undermined the right to decide where to belong by the Bakassi people?
The ICJ ruling over the disputed Bakassi Peninsula and Nigeria’s national interest of
protection of her citizens’ rights and territorial integrity
In a study of the international conflict between two neighboring and under-
developed African States, Nigeria and Cameroon, Asobie (2003) anchored his analysis on
the principles and norms thrown up by the conflict situation, and of the domestic political
and economic contexts of international and practical policy interest. He identifies a clear
link between authoritative repressive regimes and high proclivity in resolving
international disputes such as the Bakassi question by the use of violence and the
escalation of the dispute. Thus, according to him, it was under the highly repressive
regimes of Babangida and Abacha in Nigeria and Paul Biya in Cameroon that the conflict
between the two countries arising from the dispute over boundaries and territories almost
degenerated to violent confrontations. He maintains that economic interests, especially
10
stakes in some valuable natural resources, rather than concern for human lives and
consideration for human welfare, underlie most international conflicts.
Baye (2010) examines the geopolitics of the Bakassi dispute between Nigeria and
Cameroon and outlines socio-economic implications of its peaceful settlement. He
observes that the neglect and subsequent discovery of oil deposits subjected the Bakassi
peninsula to claims and counter-claims for sovereignty, military occupation and recourse
to the international court of justice (ICJ). He maintains that the ICJ ruling in 2002 in
favor of Cameroon, although based on sound historical evidence, had faced
implementation difficulties. Thus according to him, following mediation by the United
Nations (UN) Secretary – General, the Green-tree agreement and subsequent instruments,
Nigeria completed the withdrawal of her military, policy and administration from the
Bakassi peninsula by 14 August 2008. Putting aside disruptive activities by social
movements, the entire process, he contends, could be viewed as a model in peaceful
resolution of border conflicts.
Anene (2005) takes a more thorough and holistic approach to the establishment of
Nigeria’s boundaries. He debunks the popular theory of Africa’s boundary arrangement,
and especially that of Nigeria being naturally injurious to the pre-colonial political order.
Treating with remarkable details, the ethnic composition of contiguous areas on Nigeria’s
borders, and the diplomatic negotiations that took place to establish them, he describes as
being “unhistorical” and “dangerous” the emotive phrases denouncing the existing
international boundaries in Africa. He maintains that the various tradeoffs among
European states and the ethnic considerations they took, gives us an inkling of the
11
enormous difficulties inherent in embarking on revisionisms of the present borders of
Nigeria to satisfy ethnic sentiments or claims, and by extension, the rest of Africa.
To Ngan (2010) and Fombo (2006), economic interest was the major issue that
brought Nigeria and Cameroon to the brink to war. As Ngang (2010: 20) had noted:
Socially speaking, both Cameroon and Nigeria had not carried out any reasonable development in the area in terms of communication networks, health and education as to claim ownership
Furthermore, he maintains that the security issue and national interest are closely linked
to economic interests while the political aspect was just a mere effort by politicians to
divert public attention from the real issues they had failed to address. Fombo (2006)
reiterates that invariably, economic nationalism inspired by the mineral and other natural
endowments of the disputed areas, is central to the dispute. He posits that besides
economic factor, domestic political forces in these countries and their colonial
backgrounds synergized with the basic economic element to reinforce the conflict
situation. Thus according to him, the whole legalistic considerations embodied in the
international court of justice judgment of Oct. 10 2002, had in essence, proved to be a
novel vista for renewed bilateral diplomacy to resolve the dispute.
Rose and Sama (2006) had examined the question of identity and power play in
Bakassi, which according to them, had constituted serious impediments in managing the
border question, from the level of the community to the state and external levels. For
instance, they argue that ethno-cultural forces unleashed by the political liberalization
process have always accentuated the struggle to control resources.
Eke (2009) contends that the Nigeria-Cameroon dispute over the oil-rich Bakassi
was a carryover effect of the unhealthy relationship between Nigeria and France resulting
12
from the overwhelming influence of France in the sub-region. He observes that Nigeria
got her independence in 1960 and became a Republic in 1963 with sovereign authority
over her international relations with the world at large. Nigeria, at infancy, was engaged
in a civil war with the secessionist Biafra between 1967 and 1970. He further infers that
at the end of the war after 30 months, border skirmishes erupted between the Cameroon
gendarmes and Nigeria villages in the Bakassi area.
The alternative policy options to ICJ ruling and the right to decide where to belong by
the Bakassi people
Focusing on what he calls “diplomatic blunder” in handling the Nigeria’s foreign
policy, Ebeghulem (2008) contends that the diplomatic impact of the Nigeria’s foreign
policy over Bakassi, and the Nigeria’s handling of the Bakassi imbroglio before, during
and after the ICJ judgment had left nothing to desire. His argument centers on the fact
that the population of Bakassi is overwhelmingly Nigerian. Its local government,
functions as part of Cross River State since the inception of the State. The Efik Nigerians
have always voted to choose their representatives whenever the civilian governments
hold sway since Nigeria’s independence in 1960. The residents of Bakassi according to
him, believe themselves as Nigerians because they have always participated in all
decision-making process since the nation was born. He recommends that Bakassi people
should have therefore, been given the privilege to determine their future instead of being
partitioned into Cameroon as implied by the ICJ’s ruling.
Aghemelo and Ibhasebhor (2006) noted that the arbitrary delimitation of Africa
into sovereign entities as the cause of the dispute between Nigeria and Cameroon. They
opine that the African territories which have attained independence and national
sovereignty, cannot in a strict sense, be regarded as national states. They do not embrace
13
a common past and a common culture. They are indeed, the arbitrary creations of
colonialist. The manner in which European nations descended on Africa during the
closing years of the nineteenth century in their scramble for territory was bound to leave
a heritage of artificially controlled borderlines, which now demarcate the emergent
African states. Having examined critically, the international court of justice (ICJ)
judgment on the Bakassi Peninsula, they demonstrate clearly that the international
agreements of the era of the scramble for Africa are sources of conflict among African
states, themselves, equally, they noted that several boundary disputes, have broken out
between African states and so far, there is no acceptable criteria which may afford the
best guide to a settlement of an ‘unhappy legacy of colonialism’, and they historical
research may enable African states men to borrow a leaf from their pre-colonial
ancestors, whose attitude to international frontiers between one ethnic group and the
other was much less emotional, much less rigid and much more pragmatic than that
which may African leaders are adopting today.
Rouke (1997) however examined the general trend of European colonial imposed
boundaries on Africa; pointing directly at Bakassi as one of such imposed African
boundaries. He assessed at length the legacy of colonialism in Africa. He points out that
the industrialization of the North was one factor that caused the colonization of the South
in the late 1800s and early 1900s. He showed that Africa was largely controlled by its
indigenous peoples in 1878 but had, by 1914 become almost totally subjugated and
divided into colonies by the European powers. The colonial boundaries had little
relationship to the territories occupied by the various indigenous peoples, grouping
nations together in some cases and dividing them in others. He further points out that
14
within seven decades, virtually all of the colonies regained their independence, but many
of the new countries (such as Rwanda) have been troubled by the legacy of trying to get
two or more states to live peacefully in a single state.
Akamode (2000) emphasized on the paradox of the peninsula when he maintained
that the peninsula is a community that subsists in the midst of plenty-plenty of fish and
oil deposit – but is ravaged by poverty. He further traced the dispute in the oil rich area
between Nigeria and Cameroon from 1993, leading to loss of lives from military
aggressions that have been mostly instigated by Cameroon.
Kolapo (2002) gave a critical analysis of the far-reaching political and economic
implications on the Nigerian state. He points out that the ICJ ruling would have adverse
effect on the Nigerian state as a whole. His primary emphasis was on the security
implications, the social structure, the pride of Nigerians and the economic jeopardy on
the Nigerian state amongst others.
Sanusi (2002) studied the international court of justice ruling on the Nigeria
Cameroon problems and indeed he was interested on the way of the judgment that ceded
the peninsula to Cameroon. He hopwever pointed that the judgment made no sense. His
question was “How do you cede a people with different culture, different language and
background to another nation whose background differs completely?” He insisted that
Bakassi people are Nigerians who cannot become Cameroonians overnight. He pointed
out the need for the Nigerian government to appeal to the World Court for a review of the
judgment.
Rudin (1938) traced the activities of the Germans and British traders in the areas
during her colonial days. He observes that the German administrators in the Cameroons
15
attached great importance to the Benue and its tributaries as the best, quickest and most
profitable way of gaining access to the hinterland of their colony. He further observes
that the attempts at penetrating this hinterland from the Cameroon coast failed
disastrously. Hence, the Germans through their agent Flegel pretended to regard all the
region north of the latitude of the Cross River ‘rapids’ as no man’s land. Though the book
is highly critical on the activities of the Germans and the British during the period, it
failed to highlight the consequences of their actions on the boundary areas and inter state
relations between the two African States.
To Uffot (2008), the final handover ceremony which took place in Calabar, the
Cross River state capital last Thursday, August 14 was, however, not devoid of tension
and anxiety. That even on the eve of the historic event, the mood of residents of the
peninsula was that of fear, anger and uncertainty. The uncertainty according to him was
informed by the order from a federal high court that without prejudice to the judgment of
the world court in Hague, the status quo should be maintained on the Bakassi Peninsula.
But, while some Nigerians in Bakassi were urging the federal government to obey the
order by the high court and shelve the handover, the administration of President Umar
Musa Yar’Adua insisted on obeying the judgment of the international court which ceded
the disputed Bakassi peninsula to Cameroon and the Green Tree Agreement which fixed
August 14 as handover date.
Francis (2010) examines the Article 3 of the Green Tree Agreement, which spelt
out the modalities for the transfer of Bakassi to Cameroon. To him, the section states that
Cameroon shall not force Nigerians living in the Bakassi Peninsula to have the zone or
change their nationality. Other sections of the agreement provides that Cameroon shall,
16
respect the culture, language, beliefs and rights of the Bakassi people to continue their
agricultural and fishing activities as well as protect their properties and that there shall be
no imposition of discriminatory decisions on them. He noted that the task of resettling the
displaced people of Bakassi who have chosen to move to Nigerian was enormous.
According to him, in as much as the Cross River State government and the federal
government were committed to ensuring that the people were catered for, the
international community should assist with the provision of funds to complement the
efforts of government.
Michael (2006) noted that the task of completing the implementation of the
International Court of Justice judgment by handling over Bakassi to Cameroon was
painful. He however noted that the fact that the event eventually took place was a vivid
demonstration of President Yar’Adua’s commitment to the rule of law. He infers that the
government was very much interested in the welfare of the Bakassi returnees and
enjoined the Cameroonian authorities to abide by their guarantee that they will fully
integrate all those who elect to remain in their ancestral home in Bakassi.
The climax of the ceremony was signing of the hand over instrument and
exchange of flags. While Aondoakaa, attorney-general of the federation and minister of
justice signed for Nigeria, Ahmadou Ali, Cameroonian justice minister signed on behalf
of his country. Ali held President Paul Biya of Cameroon as a man of peace who would
abide by the commitment he made under the Green Tree Agreement, GTA. Kieran
Prendergast, chairman of the follow-up committee who represented Ban Kimoon, UN
secretary-general described the event as the triumph of the rule of law. Said Djinnit,
17
Algerian diplomat and chairman of the Nigeria-Cameroon Mixed Commission
commended the Nigerian government for respecting the rule of law.
The fate of Bakassi has been a subject of controversy. While the militants and the
students under the aegis of the National Association of Nigeria Students (NANS) has
warned government on the consequences of the handover, a few other Nigerians
threatened to sue President Yar’Adua for contempt if government went ahead to disobey
the order of the Federal High Court. Henshaw (2005) Observes that the National
Assembly was not in support of the handover because it has not ratified the ICJ judgment
and the Green Tree Agreement..
Although the handover of Bakkassi has been done, many indigenes still feel that
the problem associated with the ceding of the area might still linger. Florence Ita-Giwa
who is heading the resettlement committee said Bakassi people were ready to live in the
peninsula provided the Cameroonians respect their rights. But some indigenes said this
may not be feasible if the antecedents of the gendarmes are anything to go by. Ogen
(2010) argued contrary to the positions of other scholars who have taken the historic side
of the peninsular, when he submitted that Nigeria’s claim of ownership of the peninsula
is logically indefensible and historically unsustainable. Contending further, he noted that
Effik irredentism which found its expression in Nigeria’s attempt to forcefully annex the
Bakassi peninsula is based on historical claims that are in reality largely not historical. He
is of the opinion that Nigeria’s occupation of and attempts of exercise sovereignty over
the peninsula emanated from the predictable desire of the Nigerian ruling elite to
appropriate Bakassi’s abundant natural resources and the strategic advantage that the
peninsula holds for Nigeria’s oil interest in the Gulf of Guinea. He further analyses the
18
border-cum-migration problems that prevail in the peninsula. He argues that patterns of
migrant life rooted in historic and still functioning socio-cultural and economic networks
persist in defiance equally of national and international agreement and political claims to
ethnic solidarity. He concludes that peace can only be guaranteed in the Bakassi, and
indeed in virtually and conflict prone African borderlines, if African governments
respects the old ‘Glass house rule’ (ie. The 1964 Cairo Declaration by the OAU) and
acknowledge that colonial treaties and national borders, irrespective of their arbitraries
and artificiality, constitute the foundation of all modern African state structures.
Uffot (2011) argued that until August 14, 2008, Bakassi was one of the 774 Local
Government Areas recognized by the 1999 constitution of Nigeria. That however,
following the ceding of the peninsula to Cameroon on that day, after years of legal battles
at the international court of justice (ICJ), it became constitutionally dead. But
investigations have revealed that three years after the council became defunct, statutory
monthly allocation of about N50 million is still being made to it from the federation
account even as the constitution has neither been amended to that effect nor much done
about the right of the affected people.
Gap in Literature
From the review of extant literature pertaining to Nigerian-Cameroon boundary
conflict and its management, most of the literature reviewed were of the same view that
the discovery of oil in Bakassi Peninsula at commercial quantity contributed to the
escalation of the crisis and difficulty in its management. This is because, according to the
scholars, each of the countries in question would not want to compromise its position
over the ownership of the oil-reached zone. However, Asobie (2003) and Baye (2010)
19
added further that the existence of authoritarian regimes in both countries and military
approach equally posed difficulty in resolving the crisis. Anene (2005) was of the view
that the lingering border crisis between Nigeria and Cameroon and its difficulty in
managing it stems from the manner under which African boundaries arbitrarily
demarcated. Rose and Sama (2006) examined the question of identity and power play in
Bakassi, which according to them, had constituted serious impediments in managing the
border question. But none of these scholars has critically examined whether Predient
Olusegun Obasanjo’s support for the ICJ ruling over the disputed Bakassi Peninsula
undermined Nigeria’s national interest of protection of her citizens and territorial
integrity and whether the Nigeria government inability to explore alternative policy options
to ICJ ruling undermined the right to decide where to belong by the Bakassi people. It is
therefore, this noticeable lacuna in the views of scholars that this paper seeks to fill
2.2 Theoretical Framework
This research is situated within the context of the Classical Games Theory. The
theory has become imperative in this study because of its effectiveness and merit among
other means for the study and understanding of behavioral patterns of state and non-state
actors in conflict situation across national frontiers. The theory was propounded by the
great mathematician and economists, Neumann and Oscar (1944) and in its original sense
Game theory is used to model situation where decisions must be made within certain
constraints. The idea is to reduce situations to a game where the potential of achieving
certain outcomes must be maximized. They further relate to game theory as a body of
thought dealing with the rational decision strategies in situations of conflict and
competition, when each participant or player seeks to maximize gains and minimize
losses.
20
Thus, according to Kanppi and Viotti, (1957), games theory is a decision-making
approach based on the assumption of actor rationality in a situation of competition. Each
actor tries to minimize losses under conditions of uncertainty and incomplete
information, which requires each actor to rank order preferences, estimate probabilities,
and try to discern what the other actor is going to do
Expatiating furthermore, Igwe (2007), perceives games theory as a long
anticipated by a versatile German philosopher, Gottfied Wilhem Leibniz (1646-1716),
and a multi-disciplinary, pro-quantitative, often conflict decision-making theory, using
the analogy of games, clear rules, predictable or consistent behavior, rational assumptions
and choices, equal or balance of power attributes, comprehensive information among
others, to examine and forecast outcomes in any competitive political process, and
develop strategies for the optimization of the chances of success. Hence, the multiform
application of the theory to military strategy, political contests, business and
administrative affairs, government, among others.
In analysis of political situation, Riker (1962) therefore, contends that the theory
as it affects the analysis of competition and conflict situation in politics is likened to the
many games which we play for recreation such as poker, bridge, or chess, which bear
some abstract and hunted resemblance to conflict situation in real life, such as business
competition, politics, diplomacy, and war and it is in part, for this reasons that people
have found such games interesting and attractive. Furthermore, according to Riker, such a
game, each player has a scale of utilities according to which he prefers some outcomes,
so long as he plays the game at all. He also has a range of options among different moves
21
which he can make, and he has some set of expectations as to the probable outcome of
any move he may choose.
More still, in this kind of game, especially as it concerns politics, for any player to
play well, he must know what he wants, what he knows and also what he does not know.
His knowledge of the outcome of his moves is uncertain, because in a typical game, the
result of one’s moves will depend on the move the opponent makes. So often, players
will not know completely such uncertainty; players must make their moves on the most
rational possible guess or estimate (Ricker, 1962). As long as they are playing the game,
the players play to win or at least not to lose. It is for this purpose that they choose single
moves and short sequence called “tactics” as well as longer patterns and sequence of
moves, which is called “strategy”, and in which the tactical moves are included as
components. The most rational strategy then for a player, according to Riker, is the one
most likely to produce a winning outcome or by another criterion, if the pay-off can be
expressed in quantitative terms, then the most rational strategy is the one that minimizes
net losses.
Application of Theory
Nigerian-Cameroon border dispute over the oil-rich Bakassi Peninsula had
presented a clear example of game situation whereby by each player plays to win or at
least not to lose within certain constraints. For this purpose, it is therefore expected that
the two countries involved be as much as possible, rational and strategic or indeed,
choose single moves and short/long sequences in handling the Bakassi conflict. Although
the decisions or judgments of the ICJ are binding on Nigeria as member of the United
Nations, the country’s political actors (including especially President Obasanjo) during
22
and after the ICJ judgment, which was in support of ceding oil-rich Bakassi to the
Republic of Cameroon, could not consider the available strategies and tactics that
constitutes alternative policy options in pursuing the Bakassi question given the
economic and strategic importance of area to Nigeria. It is not surprising therefore that
Nigeria lost the long established historical part of her federation to Republic of
Cameroon. To the people of Cameroon, the victory at ICJ was indeed, kudos to their
President, Paul Biya while Nigerians perceived it as eternal mistake, especially given the
alternative policy options.
23
CHAPTER THREE
RESEARCH METHOD
3.1 Method of Data Collection
We relied mainly on qualitative descriptive method of data collection. Qualitative
desciptive method represents a more or less selective type of research often used in
exploratory and normative designs, where the main objective is to gain a variety of
insights so as to discover and identify decision problems and opportunities (Biereenu-
Nnabugwu, 2006). To this end, we made use of secondary sources of data namely,
textbooks, Journals, magazines, newspapers, internet sources, and publications from the
international organizations such as ICJ and UN documents.
3.2 Research Design
Research design is like a blueprint that leads the researcher to plausible answers
to the research problems by enabling him to determine how much of the observed
variance of the dependent variable can be attributed to the independent variable and how
much can be attributed to other substantive variables (Leege and Francis 1974). To
Nwana (1981), it is used to describe a number of decisions which need to be taken
regarding the collection of data before ever the data are collected. However, two main
research designs have been identified namely, survey research design and experimental
research design; the former is further divided into descriptive research and ex-post facto
research (Obasi, 1999). In this study however, we adopted expost facto research design,
in which there were series of pre-measurement and post measurement or before and after
observation required for establishing casual relationships of cause -effect relationship.
O1 O2 O3 O4 X O5 O6 O7 O8.
24
There were series of pre-measurement and post measurement, but the change
between 04 and 05 was the principal focus for measuring the effect of the quasi –
experimental treatment, that is, the effect of President Obasanjo’s approach to Bakassi
dispute on the ICJ judgment. In other words, the difference in score (i.e. the ceding away
of Bakassi to Cameroon) from 04 and 05 was attributed to the causal event (i.e. the
Obasanjo’s diplomatic approach). The design, despite its lack of control group,
overcomes for a wide variety of threat to internal validity. However, the principal threat
to the design is history. The series of before observation from 04 to 03 and after
observation from 04 to 08 was used to control for the interactive effect of history.
3.3 Method of Data Analysis
Our method of data analysis is equally anchored on qualitative descriptive
method. Qualitative method of analysis is “the interpretations study of a specified issue of
problem in which the researcher is central to the sense that is made” (Parker quoted in
Biereenu-Nnabugwu, 2006:365). Through qualitative descriptive analysis, descriptive
explanation is given to the data gathered in a research in order to establish a relationship
between the variables under study
25
3.4 Logical Data Framework
Research
questions
Hypotheses Major
variable of
the
hypotheses
Indicators of
variables
Sources of data Method of
data
collection
Method of data
analysis
(1) Did Olusegun Obasanjo’s support for the ICJ ruling over the disputed Bakassi Peninsula undermine Nigeria’s national interest in the protection of her citizens and territorial integrity?
Olusegun Obasanjo’s support for the ICJ ruling over the disputed Bakassi Peninsula undermined Nigeria’s national interest in the protection of her citizens and territorial integrity
X Olusegun Obasanjo’s support for the ICJ ruling over the disputed Bakassi Peninsula
• Signing of the Green Tree Agreement with Paul Biya of Cameroun
• Support for the UN Mix-Commission meant to facilitate the implementation of the ICJ ruling
• Support for the demarcation of land and maritime boundaries between Cameroun and Nigeria
• Withdrawal of Nigeria’s civilian administration, military and police forces from Bakassi
Books, Journals articles, Official documents, Internet materials
Qualitative descriptive method
• Qualitative descriptive methods
• Classical Games Theory
Y Undermined Nigeria’s national interest in the protection of her citizens and territorial integrity
• Protection of the territorial integrity and sovereignty of Nigeria
• Protection of the universal rights of self determination of the citizens
• Promotion of the security and economic wellbeing of the citizens
Books, Journals articles, Official documents, Internet materials
Qualitative descriptive method
• Qualitative descriptive method
• Classical Games Theory
26
(2) Has the Nigeria government inability to explore alternative policy options to ICJ ruling undermined the right to decide where to belong by the Bakassi people?
The Nigeria government inability to explore alternative policy options to ICJ ruling undermined the right to decide where to belong by the Bakassi people
X The Nigeria government inability to explore alternative policy options to ICJ ruling
• Obasanjo’s inability to explore the following alternative options:
-Legal options -Political options -Military options
Books, Journals articles, Official documents, Internet materials
Qualitative descriptive method
• Qualitative descriptive method
• Classical Games Theory
Y Undermined the right to decide where to belong by the Bakassi people?
• Right for self determination
• Right of freedom from security threat
• Right of freedom of expression
Questionnaire, Books, Journals articles, Official documents, Internet materials
Qualitative descriptive method
• Qualitative descriptive method
• Classical Games Theory
27
CHAPTER FOUR
BACKGROUND TO THE BAKASSI DISPUTE
4.1 Geography of the Nigerian Cameroun Boundary
Cameroon and Nigeria are states situated on the west coast of Africa. Their land
boundary extends from Lake Chad in the north to the Bakassi Peninsular in the south.
Their coastlines are adjacent and are washed by the waters of the Gulf of Guinea. Four
States border Lake Chad: Cameroon, Chad, Niger and Nigeria. The coastal region, where
the southern part of the land boundary ends, is the area of the Bakassi Peninsular. This
peninsular, situated in the hollow of the Gulf of Guinea, is bounded by the River
Akwayafe to the west and by the Rio del Rey to the east. It is an amphibious
environment, characterized by an abundance of water, fish stocks and mangrove
vegetation. The Gulf of Guinea, which is concave in character at the level of the
Cameroonian and the Nigerian coastlines, is bounded by other states, in particular by
Equatorial Guinea, whose Bioko Island lies opposite Nigerian/Cameroons coastlines
(Ekoko, 2004).
According to Fombo, (2006:39), “the border between Nigeria and Cameroon can
be differentiated into roughly four physical and ecological sectors”. In its northern most
part, the land boundary traverses Lake Chad and the neighboring plains at an average
altitude of about 200m above sea level. This unbroken plan during the rainy season from
June to September is inundated over large areas by waters of the Yedseram River and its
tributaries. This area, especially as one approach Lake Chad, becomes completely water
logged during the rains. During the dry season, which is longer, the soil loses the excess
water and becomes hard, providing rear water, cultivable land and pasture.
28
Beyond this, the second phase which can be characterized as the land boundary is
a near continuous chain of mountains and valleys only broken by Benue valley near Yola.
The area provides the source of headwaters for many rivers that drain into either the
Benue or Cross River basins that flow into Nigeria or the Sanaga and its tributaries that
flow into the Atlantic on the Cameroon Coast. The predominant human activity in this
sector is grazing although there are patches of cultivated grounds. This sector continues
with a gradual descend from the Savanna mountains region through more peaks and
valleys and traverses very dense equatorial forest before approaching the cost. Describing
this border, Anene (1970), gives a vivid account of its features that the region stretching
from the Bamenda Plateau to the Alantika Mountain peak south of Yola, is of fantastic
mountain formations, including Plateaux, Parallel ranges and innumerable hill-tops.
These are broken into the deep ravines which provide the river systems through which
tributaries flow north-westwards of the Benue and North-board plain, some eighty miles
by forty miles, dominated by Yola. Between the Benue and Lake Chad the geographical
configuration repeats the features of the region south of Yola. There are the same
irregular masses and a broken sea of granite peaks. The Yadseram valley, however,
provides uninterrupted access to the plains of Ornu. The irregular mountain formations,
north and south of Yola, gradually disappear as one moves Eastwards into Cameroon
Republic, to give way to a low Plateau covered with grass in the north and thick tropical
forest in the south (Anene, 1970:40).
The third geographical sector of this border is the coastal region that descends
into the area of the Bakassi peninsular and the adjoining Islands. This area is in the
trough of the Gulf of Guinea with predominantly mangrove swamp vegetation. The
29
Akpayafe assumed to be at the boundary in this area; the Rio del Rey and Ndian River to
the east, as well as the Calabar and Cross River to the west, dominate the hydrology to
this generally amphibious environment.
Fourthly and perhaps the final sector of this boundary is the maritime zone
characterized by a broken and adjacent coast. The maritime boundary between Nigeria
and Cameroon also ends in an ill-defined tripoint with Equatorial Guinea. The presence
of Eloko Island (Fermando po) belonging to equatorial Guinea, and Sao Tome and
Principe within this gulf further complicated delineation and demarcation efforts and the
fact that the latter pair was not party to the dispute at the Hague precluded a
comprehensive judicial ruing on the entire maritime boundary between these countries.
Considerable oil deposits in this area and the maritime life have impassioned commotions
and compounded efforts, and at the same time, accentuated the need for a clear
demarcation of the maritime zone (Anene, 1970:40)
To this end, the import of understanding the geography of the Nigeria-Cameroon
frontier to guide our appreciation of the border dispute cannot be overemphasized. As
noted by Aghemelo and Ibhasephor, (2006:2) “the geography of most of the zone in the
boundary, has impact or even dictated the settlement patterns along the boundary.
Besides, its direct impact on settlement patterns, equally critical is the fact that human
activities along the border are also dependent on the geography, which indeed carriers a
higher premium for developing societies that depend more heavily and directly on the
immediate environs for subsistence exploitation of hydrological resources. On one side of
the border, for instance, the flow pattern of rivers that takes their rise and flow across to
the other. (eg. Persistent wrangles over water management on the river kilia). There is the
30
significant overhand of population and human activities across the border, especially
where the same people straddle the boundary. In the maritime zone, natural resources in
the form of marine life and oil deposits lie across the border, providing opportunities for
intense competition and bickering over their control.
4.2 Evolution of Colonial Boundaries
African territories which have attained independence and national sovereignty
today, cannot in a strict sense, be regarded as nationals states. They do not embrace a
common past and a common culture, they are indeed, the arbitrary creations of the
colonialists. The manner in which European nations descended on Africa during the
closing years of the nineteenth century in their scramble for territory, was bound to leave
a heritage of artificially controlled borderlines, which now demarcates the emergent
African states. Reflecting on the emergency of many new sovereign states in
contemporary Africa, Davidson (1967) observed: “Their history begins anew”. They
reappear today in the sad evening of the world of nation-states: yet their own tradition,
one may note was seldom on the narrow nationality. Their genius was for integration-
integration by conquest is the times prescribed, but also but an every partful mongling
and migration. They were never patient of exclusive frontiers… the problem of redrawing
frontiers on a national plan. As independence widens across these coming years, will this
plan stop short with the making of nation-states aping European example?... it remains to
be seen (cited in Agbemelo and Ibahsebhor: 179). In other words, Africa was largely
controlled by indigenous people in the 1870s, but by 1914, it became almost exclusively
subjugated and divided into protectorates/colonies by the European powers (Aghmelo
and Ibhasebhor, 2006:1; Ronrke 1997:5). A clear example of this is as obtained in the
case of Nigeria state. As Chukwu (2002) writes, no doubt, Nigerian-British relations in
31
the early years of the twentieth century showed how weak the former was in relation to
the latter, militarily and technologically. To this end, Britain was able to successfully
impose her political and economic policies and practices without the consent of the
people. Among the propelling forces for territorial acquisitions in Africa was the rise of
the capitalist class in Britain following the Industrial Revolution. The capitalists, in
search of investments abroad, did demand that the British government should establish
political control over the indigenous Nigerian peoples. Such political control was
traditionally designed to be backed by military power on the part of the invading state.
Let us therefore consider how the British used their military power in an attempt to
conquer, how they equally and their military security for their economic and political
investments.
The year 1851 has always been seen as making a watershed in the annuals of
Nigerian political history. This is because it was in that year that the event that would
affect the whole of the Niger area (which eventually emerged as Nigeria) took place. As
at the time the British Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs was Lord Palmerston who
had as his policy thrust the extension of British legitimate trade to all parts of the world
and was prepared to remove any impediment on his way to actualizing the policy. It was
thus in a bid to execute his pogramme of trade expansion in West Africa that Palmerston
appointed Mr. John Beecroft a British Consul in charge of the Bights of Benin and Biafra
with a residence at Fenrnando Po.
At the time in question, the King of Dahomey had bluntly refused to give up his
alleged involvement in slave trading activities unless the King of Lagos was first forced
to stop it. It would be recalled that the international slave trade was at this time an outlaw
32
and was being replaced by the so-called legitimate trade that would benefit the European
economy. Consequent upon the controversy and statement over who should first be made
to stop the trade Beecroft was instructed by London to deal with the Lagos King Kosoko,
a man considered by some analysts as being of a strong and resolute character. It was this
air of boldness and assertiveness on the part of Kosoko that necessitated the use of force
by Consul Beecroft to attack and deport him. Although he put up some initial resistance,
when the British employed the maxim guns, Kosoko, (undermined by his local
opponents) was defeated and driven into exile.
Having gone into exile, Kosoko was quickly replaced by his uncle, Akitoye, who
had assisted the British in dethroning the former. A man of weak character Akitoye was
pro-British for fear of being deposed as had happened to Kosoko. On January 1, 1852, a
treaty was signed between him and the British representative. The following were the
principal terms of the treaty:
i. The abolition of the slave trade
ii. Provision for freedom of trade for British subjects, other Europeans not
excluded e
iii. Expulsion of European slave traders and
iv. Protection of the European missionaries giving them the right to build
churches and schools.
As can be inferred from the foregoing, the essence of the treaty was to provide
freedom and security that would facilitate the so-called legitimate trade for European
traders. It would be re-called that the slave trade at the time was becoming obsolete and
unprofitable and had therefore, become illegitimate in the eyes of the British. On the
33
whole, the essence of the treaty was guided by commercial ambition, though coated in a
religious language.
While in exile, Kosoko made some subterranean moves to re-posses his lost
throne. For instance, in 1853 he started an attack known as the “Ija Ifaseg Boja” war on
Akitoye. Amidst these inspired attacks by Kosoko, Akitoye was said to have died and
was consequently succeeded by his son, Dosumu.
A man of weaker character, Dosumu was supported to the throne with a view to
the eventual cession of Lagos to the British. At the time when the Whig government in
London was emphasizing trade expansionism everywhere in the world especially West
Africa, the British only needed a pliant king in the person of Dosumu to dominate the
trade in Lagos. A coastal enclave that had hitherto played a dominant role in the slave
trade, Lagos was badly needed by Britain in the merging legitimate trade. Besides
London needed the Lagos port at all cost to be able to ward off the French military
incursion in parts of the West Coast of Africa. According to source, however, as at June
22, 1861 when Dosumu and his people received London’s threat of bombardment, they
had refused to cede their kingdom by peaceful means. It was through the use of force that
king Dosumu was eventually forced to sign away his kingdom on board the
“Prometheus” in 1861. Thus the land which had hitherto belonged to the King of Lagos
henceforth was called a colony of the British government – a small strip costal land one
hundred and ten miles long by four to twenty miles wide in the Southern portion of the
country (Chukwu, 2002: 30-32).
34
The cession of Lagos by king Dosumu in 1861 signified a number of things in the
history of the Niger area. First, it marked the beginning of the conquest of Nigeria by
Britain. Secondly, it would cause trade expansion not only along the costal areas, but also
in the hinterland. Thirdly, it would help British focus more closely on the independent
political states of the Niger valley. This political gerrymandering of Lagos by the British
would further encourage her territorial aggrandizement in Africa. But more importantly,
this political conquest of “Nigeria” was accentuated by the Berlin Conference on West
Africa of 1884 – 5 (Chukwu, 2002: 30-32).
To this, apart the artificial demarcation or partitioning of the Africa (African
boundaries) by Europeans during the closing hours of the 19th century, to form our
modern statehoods today, African was grouped and controlled by indigenous people
along ethnical bases. Baye, (2010:10) notes that “The colonial boundaries in these
configurations were not established according to the various indigenous groupings”.
Grouping nations together in some case and dividing them in others was a common
feature as long as it was consisted with the security and economic interest of the colonial
powers. Continuing, he points out that after independence, most of Africa became and is
still troubled by the legacy of the trying to get originally different indigenous groupings
to live peacefully in a single country or to get the same ethnic group to live peacefully in
different neighboring countries. This is corroborated by Asobie (2005) when he stressed
that “the eastern part of Nigeria’s international frontier was particularly problematic. It
consisted of along stretch on land and a shorter maritime section. Extending for a
distance of about 1,500 miles (or 1,696 kilometers) between Lake Chad and the Bight of
Biafra, much of the land border was undemarcated. The entire length was never properly
35
marked on land, or even clearly delineated, throughout colonial rule. The process of
demarcation was begun on the stretch from Lake Chad to the Kombon Mountains in the
1932-1940 period, but was not completed. On land, the few border posts that existed
before the interaction of Nigeria with the former Southern Cameroon (later known as
Western Cameroon), had disappeared during the long period (1922 to 1960), when the
British administered the territory as part of Nigeria, with respect to the maritime side, the
uncertainly regarding what was the boundary was even greater. The Anglo-German
Agreement, which formed the basis of the boundary line, was based on speculation about
the nature of the territory. For instance, in one of the Agreements concerning the southern
– most section of the eastern border (dealing with the Bakassi peninsula), the Rio-Del-
Rey was assumed to be a river 80 miles (129 kilometers) long and flowing into the sea.
But subsequent explorations revealed that it was rather a maze of creeks, a network of
rivulets, linking two larger streams, namely, the Akapayafe and the Ndian. But, then,
instead of now using the Ndian river, which fairly neatly separates two ethnic groups on
either side, as the boundary, the Akpayafe was used, thus splitting the Efiks into two-
some in Nigeria, the rest of their kith and kin in Cameroon (Ede, 1981: 294-298).
It was not the Efiks alone that were divided by the eastern boundary. The Ekoi
and the Boki ethnic groups were also split by the south-eastern boundary (Anene, 1970:
285). Furthermore, many Eastern Nigerians remained in Western Cameroon after its
separation from Nigeria in 1961. Yet, the Western provincial government of Cameroon,
fearful that if the boundary did not operate as a ‘human divide’, the Igbo of south-eastern
Nigeria would flood Cameroon and dominate the economic life of the country, insisted
on strict application of state functions at the border.
36
As in most of Africa, therefore the origins of the conflict situation between
Cameroon and Nigeria over border issue can be partly, traced to the colonial ear and
some post-independence political activities. The European diplomats who have little or
no knowledge of our local realities in terms of the ethnic groupings in Africa that had
formed walls of separation, came and were merging and remerging arbitrarily the ethnic
groups on board. Hence the spread of one ethnic group, in so many international
independent territories today in Africa.
Nevertheless, there seems to be little logic in relation to the demarcation of the
boundaries of African colonies by European states. Asiwaju (1984), quoted in Ross and
Sama, (2005: 105-106) points out that “a study of European achieves supports accidental
rather than intentional making of African boundaries. This meant that the European
interest were of primary concern. The population of the frontier areas was envisaged, if at
all, only as dim and inarticulate presence in the background”. Therefore in determining
boundaries the Europeans did not take African interest into consideration. An Anglo-
French commission of diplomatic and colonial experts was formed for the purpose of
demarcating the boundaries, but the limits of its expertise soon became evident. Lord
Robert Salisbury, British prime minister at that time of partitioning, as quoted in Asiwaju,
(1984), described the partitioning process quite aptly in the following words.
We have been engaged in drawing lines upon maps where no white mans feet have ever trod; we have been giving away mountains and rivers and lakes to each other, only hindered by the small impediment that we never knew exactly where the mountains and Rivers and lakes were (Lord Salisbury, Speaking in 1890, cited in Asiwaju 1984:64).
37
Although geographers were available to advise, Europeans’ knowledge of the
physical, let alone the human, geography of Africa was still rudimentary. According to
Asiwaju (1984), a famous epigram defines geography as being about maps rather than
Chaps, but its value is always defined by the knowledge of the chaps who draw the maps.
Just like Fanso (1986), as noted before, opined that “the notion and function of the term”
boundary differed fundamentally in the European and African contexts.
In traditional Africa, the concept of a political or ethnic boundary was expressed in terms of neighbours with whom the particular state or polity shared a territory and such a boundary was conceived of in terms of a region or a narrow zone fronting the two neighbours marked off by it. In this sense, the boundary was the zone where two states were united or jointed together (Fanso, 1986:12).
In other words, African boundaries were usually rooted in ethnic and social contact.
European states, however, conceived of boundaries as liens or points of separation. In the
case of Cameroon, the Anglo-French partition of the former German colony in 1916
provided that inhabitants living in or near the border region had six months form the time
that the border was delimited to express their intention to settle in a region placed under
the jurisdiction of the other colonial power. A problem was thereby created, as Fanso
notes again “The Africans who had become frontiersmen had no immediate knowledge
that their lands and kin divided by the boundary were now “foreign”. They did not know
that the new boundaries functioned differently from the traditional ones with which they
were familiar. They thought the former were only important to the white men who made
them and were not immediately concerned about their existence until they were checked
at crossing points. It was then that they began to feel the impact on their relations with
38
their kin and neighbours and began to create new and secret routes across the frontiers
(Fanso, 1986: 72).
According to Brownlie, (1979) “the actual demarcation of the Cameroon-Nigeria
border took place over a long period of time from 12 July 1884, when the German colony
of Cameroon was established, through the plebiscite of 11 February 1961. It was the
outcome of this plebiscite that divided the British Northern and Southern Cameroons into
distinct territories, which chose independence by joining Nigeria and French Cameroon,
respectively. Brownlie provides a list of treaties and agreements that document the
changes in the Cameroon-Nigeria boundary that took place during that time.
It is important to note that Northern and Southern Cameroons were British
protectorate territories administered as part of Nigeria before 1961. There was not a
separate administrative agency for the Cameroons. As a result the colonial boundaries
was not considered as an impediment to social and economic activities, thus maintaining
the ethnic-linguistic continuity of the region. In fact, at one time the leading political
party in Nigeria was the National Council of Nigeria and the Cameroons (NCNC) and
Cameroons participated fully in the Nigeria parliament. This shared colonial history
encouraged the Nigerian state to lay claim to the Bakassi peninsular as even after the
Cameroonians left, social and economic relations between the people, did not stop.
Konings (cited in Sama and Rose, 2005:107) states that “the British method of
administration led to the appearance that Nigeria rather than Britain was the colonial
master of the southern Cameroons”. As he indicated, the post-1945 nationalist struggle in
southern Cameroon was more anti-Nigeria than anti-colonial in character. Furthermore,
he mentions that this situation gave rise to the increasing peripheralization of southern
39
Cameroons, which seem to be more of a colony within a colony. As mentioned above,
being administered as an appendage of Nigeria led to a lack of socio-economic
development and little advancement in the economy from the plantation economy
established under German colonial rule. More significantly, the quasi-regional status and
limited degree of self-government gained by southern Cameroons in 1954 seemingly
undermined the existing boundaries between what had been the German Cameroon
protectorate and Nigeria. The southern Cameroons achieved full regional status within
the federation of Nigeria in 1958.
The fact of southern Cameroons autonomy led to two problems once
independence was subsequently achieved. First, the southern Cameroons entered into a
federal relationship with la-Republique du Cameroon, which proved to be unequal and
antithetical to the democratic traditions that had begun to take root there. Secondly, La
Rupublique treated the border between it and Nigeria as sacrosanct and resented the
continuing ties between Nigerian groups and that of the southern Cameroonians. Over the
forth across the border Cameroon reacted strongly and a tense, sometimes conflictual
relationship developed around the border.
In view of this background, it is not surprising that skirmishes between the two
states intensified when Cameroon field a series of pleadings with the ICJ beginning in
1994 through 1998 against Nigeria for “violently contesting Cameroon’s sovereignty
over the Bakassi peninsular and for occupying the territory with military troops (Konings,
2005). While Cameroon protested Nigeria’s impositions into the Bakassi, it did little to
develop the region. In fact, Nigeria built roads, schools and medical clines in Bakassi
further strengthening its assertions that the people living in the region were Nigerian and
40
not Cameroons. To that extent, the colonial evolution of Nigeria-Cameroon boundary
was one of the greatest colonial obfuscation as that sowed the ever continuing seed of
discord between people of similar if not the same ethnic affinities that had related
together before colonization.
4.3 British/German Administration and Obfuscation of the Nigeria-Cameroun
Colonial International Boundary
In the first place, following the industrial revolution in Europe around and during
the 19th century, it became obvious that European traders (British and German
Marchants), had long standing interest in this part of West African that later became
known as Nigeria and Cameroon. The European trading Cameroon which started
spreading their tentacles outside the shares of European did so to counter contradictions
created by capitalism in Europe. This is because the industrial revolution led to the
massive production of goods, the urgent need for market cheap raw materials and labour.
The need therefore, to satisfy the above factors necessitated the struggle for the control of
African territories among the European nations through their trading companies. The bid
to maintain monopoly by these trading companies led to them, calling on their home
countries for protection. The protection of the trading companies by the various European
nations brought about rivalry among the countries of European (Fombo, 2006)
Nevertheless, according to Fombo (2006: 41-42), “before the age of empire
creation in Africa; trade, slavery, missionary activities as well as adventure had attracted
Englishmen to this area, such that “pidgin English” for instance, was widely spoken
among the coastal people sand the business people. British Baptist missionaries had
opened stations in Douala and Bimbia since 1845. However, the British Government had
limited interest here and even turned down an offer in 1833 by natives to cede the
41
maintain from Bimbia to Rio-Del-Rey. It is doubtful though; if the kings of this area
understood exactly what their offer meant. More plausibly, they were simply manipulated
by (Europe) traders because they desired the protection of their home governments in
area where they operated. Such alleged invitations also come from kings of Douala from
annexation of Cameroon even before the Germans did”.
To this, it was not until 1884 that the British Government finally decided to annex
the area. But by then it was too late for Britain to establish a complete domination as a
genuine race had indeed begun among the European powers for colonies in the area.
Germany deceptively dispatched Dr. Sachtigal who concluded treaties with the Douala
Kings on July 2, 1884, for the annexation of the Cameroon coast for Germany a few days
ahead of the British consult-Hewitt, who was charged with this duty for Britain (Fombo,
2006:42).
Continuing, Fombo (2006) noted also that “on July 12, 1884, a German
protectorate was declared over Cameroon. This proclamation was preceded by a long
period of manicuring by German commercial interest in Africa to enlist the support of
their home government to join the race for colonies in Africa and Asia. It had been a
policy of the German imperia government with OHO Von Bismarck as chancellor to
avoid any form of colonial entanglements that could lead Germany into conflict with the
then established colonial powers, viz Britain, France, Portugal, Spain and Belgium. It was
not until 1384-85, that Bismarck changed his mind on the issue of acquisition of colonies.
As Chukwu, (2002:33) notes, “the Berlin west Africa conference of 13
November, 1884 through January 1884 was held a the instance of the German chancellor,
Otto Von Bismark. Among the circumstances surrounding the convening of the
42
conference was the issue of the Congo Free State where as at 1876 king Leopold of
Belgium had established an international association for its exploration and a possible
civilization of the interior or tropical Africa. The association was a private one with a
tinge of scientific and humanitarian objective. Thus, on the eve of the conference, the
association has laid claims overhang areas of tropical Africa with a series of treaties
concluded by H.M. Stanley.
In this light, Crowder (1968: 62) asserted that “the Berlin west Africa conference
that met from 13 November 1884 to 26 February 1885, give legal and international
recognition to the partitioning of west Africa among the European colonial powers. Also,
the conference traced its origin to the rise of Germany as a united nation after the Franco
Prussian war of 1870 through 71. At the end of the war, Germany under Bismark became
a united state and a major force to reckon within the comity of European nations. As a
result of this development, Bismark came under pressure from the German commercial
class who wanted him to secure them safe and secure markets in Africa, hence the Berlin
conference to accommodate their interests. “At around the same time or precisely on June
5, 1885, Britain declared a protectorate over the territory between the protectorate of
Lagos and the west bank of the Rio-del-Rey which was later renamed in 1893 as the
Niger coast protectorate. Discussions on the demarcation of the boundary between these
contagious protectorates were begun in 1885 and wore increasingly made clearer as
negotiations on both sides gathered more information on the claimed territories. The last
settlements on the Anglo-German boundary in Nigeria and Cameroon were arrived at by
the agreements of March 11 and April 12, 1913. In many respects, this agreement was a
formalization or refinement of the agreements preceding it, especially that of 1909 which
43
took some two years to negotiate between 1907 and 1909. Thus, the Nigeria-Cameroon
boundary was largely settled between Britain and Germany before the outbreak of the
First World War. The entire boundary had been delineated and partly demarcated with
pillars leaving little doubts as to its location (Fombo, 2006).
In this perspective, Ngang (2005:7) recounts that “in a series of agreements in
1913, Britain and Germany sought to establish an exact demarcation of the borders
between Nigeria and Cameroon, which of course did not exist as such. The first treaty
entitled: “The settlement of the frontier between Nigeria and the Cameroons, from Yola
to the sea”, put Bakassi proper under the jurisdiction of the Germans and the second:
“The Regulation of Navigation on the Cross River”, ceded the “navigable portion” of the
offshore border of the peninsular to Britain. Article 21 of the Anglo-German Treaty of
1913 quoted below states the exact position of the border.
From the centre of the navigable channel on a line joining Bakassi points and king of the navigable channel of the Akwayate River as far as the 3 mile limit of territorial jurisdiction. For the purpose of defining this boundary, the navigable channel of the Akwayafe River shall be considered to lie wholly to the east of the navigable channel of the Cross and Calabar Rivers (UN Department of peacekeeping operations map No. 4247, May 2005).
Moreso, events of the first world war completely changed the fate of Cameroon. The war
that started in Europe was quickly carried to the colonies. German forces in spite of their
dogged resistance in Cameroon, were finally overrun in 1916 by a combination of British
forces from base in west Africa, especially Nigeria, and French and Belgium forces from
bases in French equatorial Africa and Belgium Congo, respectively, Germany lost all her
colonies in Africa including Cameroon which was divided into two territories by the
44
league of nations and administered as mandate under British and France. The Franco-
British Declaration of July 1919 placed Bakassi and the rest of the “British Cameroon”
under British mandate. This territory was then administered under the British system of
“indirect rule” as part of Nigeria respecting the borders laid down by the agreements of
1913. A further agreement between both powers in 1931 was signed to further codify the
declaration of 1919. Again maps from this period clearly show Bakassi as part of
Cameroon territory.
At the end of the Second World War, the British and French League of Nations
mandates over Northern/Southern Cameroons and Cameroon respectively, were
succeeded by trusteeship agreements under the newly created United Nations
Organization. The agreements creating these trusteeship territories re-ratified the Anglo-
German and Anglo-French treaties pertaining to the borders between both countries.
Once more, maps from this period place Bakassi under the sovereignty of Cameroon
(Ngang, 2005:8).
The condominium, which was envisaged in 1914 when Britain and France first
agreed on a joint conquest of German colonies in Africa, with Cameroon inclusive, could
not be realized in practice shortly after military operations begun in German Cameroon,
mutual suspicious of future territorial calculations bedeviled relations between the two
allies over a joint and equitable administration of Cameroon. The British involving
military necessity successfully maintained an administration that was essentially British
in the very important part city of Douala, as well as its environs, right to Buea and
Vicoria. The rest of the territories was either administered by the French where their
forces captured or by British officials from Nigeria where British forces captured.
45
Meanwhile, even before the official partition as déclassé had articulated in a
correspondence to Bertie (dated June 6, 1915), a good chunk of the territory in Cameroon
had reverted to France before the campaign could be concluded in Cameroon.
On the further insight onto the administration of the Bakassi area after Germany
left, Fombo (2006: 44-45) puts it straight:
As soon as the Germans were dislodged from their entrenched position in Yaunde and ahead of their final collapse in Mora negotiations were opened between Britain and France for the final partition of Cameroon on an agreeable formula, abandoning the attempted condominium that had to serious misunderstandings between the two allies.
At the negotiations, France demanded Douala and most of the rest of Cameroon with
Cambon the French delegate initiating that the “French colonial party were excited over
Cameroon”. He argued that France coveted Douala above all as the only port that could
serve its equatorial African colonies. However, this claim is spurious given that the
French were in control of neighboring Gabon and a considerable coastline and Douala in
itself had no good harbor.
In spite of the fact that the British had contributed more militarily to the conquest
of German Kamerun and had dominated the administration of, especially, Douala and the
neighbouring coastal districts in the course of the war, they conceded as French demands
pretty easily, abandoning their long proposed boundary line that was to begin from the
mouth of the Sanaga river. Rather a boundary (Picot Line) further west from the mouth of
Mungo was agreed on. Two main reasons can be advanced for the British reluctance to
have a fair share of Cameroon. Firstly, as Simon had rightly pointed out, Britain by not
accepting French assistance in the capture of German East Africa had effectively shut off
46
the French against any claims there in any case this area was more important to the
Britain than Cameroon. So Britain was more disposed to make concessions in Cameroon.
Secondly, there was also a genuine desire in British colonial circles to make concession
to the French so as to sustain the public morale in the war effort in Europe and elsewhere.
The negotiations that ended on March 6, 1916 adopted the picot Line as the
provisional boundary between the British sphere to the west and the French to the East by
this partition Britain had about one-fifth of what was left of German Kamerun and France
and four-fifth. Despite some uneasiness in Britain, particular in the colonial officer, over
the special consideration made to France, little was changed in the subsequent post-war
negotiatons that opened in March 1919. The Milner-Simon declaration of July 10, 1919
finally settled the partition of the German colony into British and French spheres. This
declaration was mainly an endorsement of the 1916 Picot line. It was subsequently
appended to the mandate agreement in accordance with article 22 of the League of Nation
and officially became one of the most important instruments on the definition of the
Nigeria-Cameroon border.
Logically, the picot line and the Milner-Simon Declaration are the first
instruments on this boundary during the period. In consonance with the Miner-Simon
Declaration of 1919 in which it was stated thus:
The boundary commissions shall be authorized to make such minor modifications of the frontier line as may appear to them necessary in order to avoid separating villages from their agricultural lands… and deviations shall be clearly marked on special maps and submitted for the approval of the two governments [permanent mandates commission reports of the UN, sixteenth session, (Nov. 1930:84)].
47
Again, the commission report stated further that: “on 29 December 1929 and 30 January
1930 Sir Graeme Thomson, Governor of the colony and protectorate of Nigeria and Paul
Marchant, commissaire de la Republique Francaise an Cameroon signed a further very
detailed agreement hence forth known as the (Thomson-Marchant Declaration) clarifying
the alignment of this border. The Thomson-Marchant Declaration was approved and
incorporated in an Exchange of Notes dated 9 January 1930 between A. de fleuriau,
French Ambassador in London and Author Henderson, British foreign minister
(“subsequently, Heuderson-Fleuriau Exchange of Notes”). Also, it was not a significant
departure from the previous agreements between Britain and France over their boundary
Cameroon [permanent mandates commission reports of the UN, sixteenth session
(November 1930: 84)].
What turned out to be a major change (which was not evidently so at the time of
its conception) was the 1946 order in council providing for the administration of the
Nigeria protectorate and Cameroons, subsequently known as the “1946 order in council”.
The edict was enunciated in pursuant to a decision taken by Britain on August 2, 1946, to
reorganize the administration of its disjointed share of the Cameroons. The territory was
divided into two – Northern and Southern Cameroons – to be administered respectively,
as integral parts of the Northern and Eastern Regions of Nigeria. The order in council
contained the detailed description of the boundary between these administrative units
which following the diverse paths chosen by the countries in the plebiscite of 1961,
turned out to be part of the international boundary between Nigeria and Cameroon today.
“Basically, in spite of apparent British fury over the lost of Cameroon to Germany in
1884, colonial authorities in Britain were not particularly exited with the occupation of
48
Cameroon. As explained above the initial German annexation of Cameroon was thanks to
British procrastinations on doing so ahead of the German. When they again had the
opportunity of establishing a strong presence in Cameroon, following the defeat of
Germany and the forced surrender of its colonies according to the dictates of the treaty of
Versailles, Britain preferred territories elsewhere like Tanganyika. As Ronald Robinson
et al…, have shown, the Cameroon question was considered in a wider global diplomatic
context. The foreign office saved the opportunity to concede territories in West Africa to
France, Britain principally in the war and rival in the colonial race, in order to secure East
Africa, considered more vital to British interest (Fombo, 2006:46).
Terms of British Mandates in Cameroon
Britain, while agreeing to a cession of all German colonies in favor of the
principal allied power in accordance with article 119 of the Treaty of peace with
Germany signed on June 28, 1919, Articles 22 and 23 of the League of Nations made
provision for the mandate system under whose auspices the former colonies were to be
administered. Admittedly, these provisions were sufficiently vague to allow even more
elbowroom for the mandatory to carry out its will. Under Article 2 Britain became
responsible for the peace, order and good government of the territory, and for the
promotion to the utmost of the material and moral well-being as well as the social
progress of the inhabitants. With this, Britain opted to administer her disjointed share of
Cameroon as adjuncts of continuous parts of neighboring Nigeria.
According to Anene, (1970: 96-97) “Britains grand design in 1916 was to annex
its share of German Cameroon to Nigeria”. The British has acquired this elongated bi-
partite boundary and had never intended to erect a new and separate administrative unit.
49
But the terms of the mandate agreement (which was an American inclusion into the post-
war settlement) forestalled this. As such, while striving in principle to maintain the
juridical entity of the Cameroons as a mandated on an administrative integration of the
territory into Nigeria, consistent with its initial goal for acquiring the territory in 1916.
The British authorities, citing administrative convenience dismembered the territory
before joining the pieces to various administrative units of Northern and Eastern Nigeria.
Although this policy led to very serious consequences in regard to future political
developments in British Cameroons, the inconveniences cited by Britain were real. The
narrow, elongated and bisected nature of the territory, together with the formidable
geographical barrier of the manbilla escarpment, made the separate administration of the
British Cameroons practically difficult considering the parsimonious polices that inspired
empire administrators”.
The Integrative Policy of Britain
On the integrative policy of Britain, the northern part of the territory (that became
known as the British Northern Cameroons from 1946), Dikwa Emirate was reconstituted
and admitted as a division of Bornu Province. Meanwhile, the rest of Northern
Cameroons was recognized into Adamawa Emirate and placed under Adamawa province,
dominated by Yola. The entire province came under the Emire of Yola who was later
officially known as lamido of Adamawa. The Nigerian legal system also replaced
German legislation from February 28, 1924 in the Cameroons.
Generally, Asobie, (2005) stresses that this gamut of British actions, especially
the more posture ones of the mandatory between 1959 and 1961, led to the orientation of
every aspect of life in the territory to be centered on the Northern Region of Nigeria,
50
subsequent nationalism in this part tended to be inarticulate and, at the critical moment
favoured independence through integration into Nigeria, as a result of the comprehensive
administrative integration that was effected. A pan-British Cameroons nationalism never
emerged in the run up to independence. Britain even advanced the fact that there was
little or no contact between the Northern and Southern Cameroon to justify its argument
for the results of the two territories to be considered separately at the 1961 plebiscite.
This affected significantly the outcome of the February 1961, Un conducted plebiscite in
the territory and led to a fundamental change of the Anglo-German colonial boundary in
this area. While British policy of administrative interaction of the Cameroons under
British administration with the colony and protectorate of Nigeria led to the
unwholesome transformation of the northern colonial boundary, it also considerably
contributed to the current dispute between Nigeria and Cameroon on the southern border,
especially in the Bakassi area. Elements of the impending dispute were evident in the
incongruities in policies under British colonial administration on both sides of the
border”.
In the first instance, administration of southern Cameroons as an integral part of
the Eastern Region of Nigeria negated the fact of an international boundary between the
two territories. Coupled with the ethnic mix of the border area, and the seasonal fishing
occupation of most of the occupants of the hotly disputed Bakassi and associated Islands,
movement across the border was without any form of impediment. Asobie puts it thus:
The indigenous population, (the peasant famers and workers) living on both sides of the borders, some of who belong to the same ethnic stock, wish to operate and indeed were operating as if the artificial barriers, known as boundaries, never existed” (Asobie, 2005: 82).
51
To that extent, Native Authority tax office officials and law enforcement agents
from Oron (Eket Division, Calabar), purused defaulters and criminals right across the
border to areas that were opposed to be controlled from Kumba Division for the southern
Cameroons. For instance, while on tour in the fish Towns area, the Acting district officer
(D.O.) for Kumba, Mr. J.S. Smith reported he met Oron Native Court Messengers
Henshaw with two Native court warrants of imprisonment for residents (at least
temporary ones) of Ine Oriong and Ine Tayu in British Cameroons. The D.O. of Kumba
sent a memo No W.T./8/1926 of 20 June, 1926 to the D.O. of Eket, advising him to see
that the Native Authority desist from double domicile of the residents of the border areas
particularly, those of the fish Towns, that made tax collection difficult. A modus viveni
that entailed the mutual recognition of taxes paid in each other’s territory was arrived at
among local administrators of the contiguous division of southern Cameroons and
Eastern Region. This arrangement was formulized in 1928 and it was accepted that,
where taxes varied only the excess should be paid to the neighbouring administration, but
it did not clarify where the locus of power laid in this area.
4.4 The Place of General Gowon in the Bakassi Dispute
The history of the crisis between Nigeria and Cameroun over ownership of
Bakassi Peninsula cannot be complete without a mention of Gen. Yakubu Gowon. On
assumption of office in 1966, Gowon lacked the necessary experience, exposure and
intellectual wit a head of state should possess. He was young, energetic and fearless but
without brains to coordinate the affairs of a nation in disarray. The pogrom of 1966 that
resulted into the civil war that lasted for thirty (30) months was the theatre that presented
Gowon as inexperienced and sectional leader whose interest in the entire process was to
52
safe guard the interest of northern Nigeria. His quest for a united Nigeria when his
maiden broadcast script contained the message secession for an Arewa nation but which
was edited some few hours before delivery expunging the paragraph on secession and
spreading the message of a more united entity called Nigeria, is indeed a matter shrouded
in confusion. (See Ademoyega, 1981)
The civil war that engulfed Nigeria between 1967 and 1970 saw the brutality and
crudity in a young soldier who swore to protect citizen and preserve the territorial
integrity of Nigeria. Gowon used every thing at his disposal to make sure Biafra
succumbs. In one of the peace meetings held in Addis Ababa, Ethiopia to broker peace
between the warring factions, Gowon had stated that “starvation is a legitimate weapon of
war and we have every intention of using it” (Forsyth; 1982:105). The accord between
Gowon and Ahmadu Ahidjo of Cameroun began when the aircraft carrying arms and
ammunition to the Ojukwu government crashed in Cameroun. Aluko (1977:164) noted
that:
… not only did the Nigerian leaders immediately ask the Ahidjo Government for detailed information about the identity of the aircraft, its crew, and the origin of arms and ammunition found in but also contacted other neighbouring countries…
This singular contact manifested itself in so many forms and degrees resulting into the
emergence of Cameroun as a claimer of the ownership and sovereignty of the Bakassi
peninsula. Tell magazine (2006:31) had observed:
Nigeria may have lost Bakassi to an alleged deal Yakubu Gowon, a general and former head of state, did with Cameroun during the civil war-ceding Bakassi to Cameroun for Cameroun to blockade Biafra from the sea.
53
The Tell magazine went further to state that:
During the civil war, Nigeria troops were stationed at Bakassi and fought Biafran soldiers. They were stationed in a place called Isaac Boro camp and the ijaw hero himself who was forcibly recruited into the Nigeria Army from prison during the war commanded the troops at Bakassi… with his Knowledge about maritime warfare, Boro defeated the Biafran troops up to a point called Ekondo Titi, known as small Biafra. As at then, Ekondo Titi was the accepted boundary between Nigeria and Cameroun. The Biafran troops held Ekondo Titi as their life artery to the sea while Nigeria soldiers were stationed at Abana and Atabong. It is highly believed that Nigeria sought and got the assistance of Cameroun, at a price, to get the Biafrans out of Ekondo, 2006:31)
Nyong eta, a chief of Bakassi people told Tell Magazine in an interview that:
It was after the war that I saw some people coming around that they were Camerounians. I was surprised because my father never told me that this land belongs to the Camerounians… (See Tell, July 3, 2006:12)
In an attempt to win Nigeria-Biafran war, Gowon gave out 1000km2 of a number
of low lying Mangrove Island. One then wonders how Gowon and Ahidjo had to institute
the Ngoh/Coker declaration panel just few months after the civil war, to mark the
maritime boundary between the two countries, a matter last discussed in 1913, 58 years
after and which had never generated any argument, controversy, ill-will or ill-feelings
within the said period, Gowon was once again beaten by Almadu Ahidjo in this game of
statesmanship. The heinousness of Gowon’s role in the Bakassi crisis was best captured
by Uchenna (2011:20) when he noted that:
… it is not about what Nigeria wants or what Cameroun received for its shameful role during the Nigeria-Biafra war… ICJ must prepare to receive another former dictator. The ICJ clearly has that jurisdiction to summon Gowon to the war crimes tribunal. He traded land for the blood of innocent
54
women and children… Ahidjo not only got Bakassi he also received a paycheck (Blood money).
4.5 Abacha’s Effort
Late Gen. Sani Abacha assumed office in November 1993 after Ibrahim
Babangida descended form office following the annulment of June 12, 1993 elections,
which was acclaimed as the fairest and freest election ever held in Nigeria. The political
situation of the country when Abacha took over Aso Rock was so chaotic that Nigeria
was heading for total collapse. Due to character and geopolitical policies of the western
world especially France, Cameroun was mandated to start violent operations within the
Bakassi region. Certain Skirmishes were carried out be the Camerounian gendarmes
against the Bakassi people of Nigeria. Abacha as a true general in the army saw the
action by Cameroun as a slight on Nigeria as he could not stand to watch Cameroun point
her dirty fingers on Nigeria. Not perturbed by whose authority or backing Cameroun was
acting, Abacha marshalled out his arsenal against Cameroun. Abacha initiated some
Diplomatic moves that saw the foreign Affairs minister, Anthony Ani delivering special
messages from Abacha to the presidents of Uganda, Kenya, Zimbabwe and Gabon.
Uchenna (2011)
Besides, Abacha was prepared to make Bakassi de facto and de jure Nigeria. By
1996, there was clamour for the creation of more states and local government councils.
By this time Bakassi was being administered as part of Akpabuyo council in Cross River
State. In the creation of the local government council, Abacha gave two slots to Cross
River State – Etug Local Government Council and Bakassi Local Government Council.
Thus, Bakassi Local Government was created and the council by law was part of
Nigeria’s constitution (Uchenna, 2011)
55
4.6 The climax of the Bakassi Dispute
Camerounian aggression against Nigeria in Bakassi intensified in 1994 and in
response to this, the government of Gen. Sanni Abacha ordered Nigerian troops into
Bakassi to repel the Camerounian aggression and restore peace and stability in the area. It
should be noted that Cameroun has been a belligerent, intrusive and capricious
neighbour. It has attempted over the years to impose its sovereignty over Bakassi, in spite
of stiff resistance from the Bakassi inhabitants. Having maintained long, effective and
peaceful control over Bakassi, Nigeria has under internationally recognized criteria for
acquisition and recognition fulfilled the essentials conditions under which it can
legitimately claim ownership of the Bakassi peninsula (Egbo, 2003)
Nigeria’s action to restore peace and stability in the peninsula with the use of her
troops was in consonance with international law as expressed in the United Nations
charter, chapter vii, Article 51 which states that,
…nothing in the present charter shall impair the inherent right of individual in collective self-defence if an armed attack occurs against a member state of the United Nations (Egbo, 2003:10)
Reasoning the seriousness of the government of the period not to toy with any
action by any individual or group of states to balkanize the territorial integrity of Nigeria,
and the preparedness of the troops sent to the Bakassi peninsula, coupled with the
aggressiveness and willingness with which the Bakassi people themselves were prepared
to dies for their own inheritance, the government of Paul Biya of Cameroun decided to
retrace and retreat their aggression in favour of an arbitrative option (Egbo, 2003)
On March 29, 1994, after several and persistent violations of the sovereignty of
Nigeria, Cameroun instituted a legal action at the international court of Justice at the
56
Hague, Netherlands against Nigeria claiming among others, that the Bakassi peninsula
was under the sovereignty of Cameroun. Specifically, the Cameroonian government
requested the International Court of Justice (ICJ) to determine the course of the maritime
frontier between the two states in so far as the frontier had not already being established
by the Maroua Declaration. (see Guardian September 18, 2002).
In its final submissions to the International Court of Justice (ICJ), Cameroun had
asked the court to adjudge and declare:
1. That the land boundary between Cameroun and Nigeria was determined by the
Anglo-German Agreement of March 11, 1913.
2. That in consequence, sovereignty over the Bakassi peninsula is Cameroun.
Nigeria responded and in its final submissions requested the International court of
justice (ICJ) to adjudge and declare:
1. That sovereignty over the peninsula is vested in the Federal Republic of Nigeria.
2. The Nigeria’s sovereignty over Bakassi extends up to the boundary with
Cameroun.
From 1994 to 2002 legal icons from both sides argued their case presenting facts
and figures, to buttress their various claims. On October 10, 2002, the International
Court of Justice delivered its judgment on the matter declaring a victor and a
vanquished. (see Guardian September 18, 2002).
57
CHAPTER FIVE
OLUSEGUN OBASANJO’S SUPPORT OF THE ICJ RULING OVER THE
DISPUTED BAKASSI AND NIGERIA’S NATIONAL INTEREST IN THE
PROTECTION OF HER CITIZEN AND TERRITORIAL INTEGRITY
Introduction
This main objective of this chapter is to examine President Olusegun Obasanjo’s
support of the International Court of Justice ruling over the Disputed Bakassi Peninsula
and the Nigeria’s national interest in the protection of her citizens and territorial
integrity. Specifically, the chapter is aimed at testing and validating or otherwise of our
hypothesis (1), which states that: Olusegun Obasanjo’s support for the ICJ ruling over
the disputed Bakassi Peninsula undermined Nigeria’s national interest in the protection
of her citizens and territorial integrity
5.1 Signing of the Green Tree Agreement Between Olusegun Obasanjo of Nigeria
and Paul Biya of Cameroun
On June 12, 2006, when Nigerian democrats were ruminating on the June 12,
1993 election and electoral victory in the history of Nigeria, Obasanjo who assumed
office on the platform of electoral irregularities was in far away in USA at the Green Tree
in New York with his cohorts under fanfare and jubilation signing away a Nigerian
territory. While Nigerians were in sober reflecting on Abiola and his lost mandate,
Bakassi, one of the territories that gave Abiola his mandate was being handed over to
Cameroon under the watchful eyes of Germany, France, USA, and Great Britain, by
Nigeria’s President, Chief Olusegun Obasanjo.
Following intense negotiations and regular meetings by the mixed commission
under the aegis of the Secretary General of the United Nations, the Presidents of Nigeria
and Cameroon signed the Agreement of Green Tree establishing the methods of
58
withdrawal and transfer of authority of the Bakassi Peninsula to Cameroun. The terms of
the agreement stipulate that Nigeria will continue to manage a small definite part as a
specific zone for a period of two years. A non-renewable five year period of special
transition regime will then apply (www.kwenu.com). Obasanjo agreed and signed that
Nigeria shall;
(i) Not conduct or allow the conduct of any activities in the zone (Bakassi peninsula)
which would prejudice Cameroon’s peace or security;
(ii) Take every necessary measure, under the supervision of the United Nations
observes of the Cameroon – Nigeria Mixed Commission, to stop any transfer or
influx of its nationals into the zone;
(iii) Not engage in any activity in the zone which would complicate or hinder the
transfer of authority to Cameroon;
(iv) Equip its police force in the zone with only the light equipment strictly necessary
for the maintenance of law and order and for personal defence;
(v) Guarantee the Cameroonian nationals wishing to return to their village in the zone
the exercise of their rights;
(vi) Not conduct or continue the exploitation of natural resources in the sub-soil of the
zone, or to engage in any other activity harmful to the environment.
(vii) Take every necessary measure to prevent any change in land property rights; and
(viii) Not position any armed forces in the zone. (See appendix 1 for details of the
Green Tree Agreement between Nigeria and Cameroun) (www.kwenu.com)
The issue of the treaty is whether Obasanjo is right in signing the treaty which
gave away the Nigerian territory of Bakassi before obtaining necessary approvals as
59
specified in the constitution. The Nigerian constitution places responsibility on the
parliament when it comes to treaty implementation which is a process by which a treaty
validly entered into by a state is enacted or domesticated as legislation so that it can have
effect within the domestic plane. Treaty ratification according to the article 1 of the
Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties 1969 is the process by which a state
establishes in the international plane its consent to be bound by a treaty. Notwithstanding
the above explanation, if Obasanjo had the interest of Nigeria as the barometer for his
actions, and being fully aware of the fact that the implementation of the ICJ judgment
involves the amendment of the Nigerian constitution, the involvement of the National
Assembly becomes unquestionable. Available records show that President Obasanjo after
signing the Green Tree Agreement (GTA) on June 12, 2006, notified the National
Assembly on June 14, 2006, two days after the actual agreement was signed. Gbanite
(2006:11) noted that:
If the ex-president respected the views of Nigerians and that of the National Assembly, he would have written earlier and allowed them to debate the matter on behalf of Nigerians, after which the National Assembly will issue a statement indicating their position before signing takes place …
Also stressing the place of the National Assembly in the implementation of the
ICJ judgement, Victor Ndome Egba (SAN) stated thus,
Bakassi is mentioned in the first schedule of the constitution of Nigeria and for us, full implementation of the ICJ Judgement cannot be considered until during the constitutional amendment (cited in Gbanite, 2006:12)
60
Supporting Ndoma Egba’s position, Senator Olorunimbe Mamora queried Obasanjo for
not involving the National Assembly in the implementation of ICJ ruling on Bakassi, and
further maintained that,
Everything that was done was supposed to have involved the parliament because that is what divides democracy form autocracy. If you leave out the parliament, what you have is autocracy. Just like the European shared out Africa as an international cake, Bakassi was shared out as a national cake (www.kwenu.com)
Obasanjo did not take steps akin to a leader who has the interest of his nation at heart. He
sole handedly mismanaged the entire Bakassi issue to his own personal advantage of
securing international award as a peaceful leader, as a payback for the Biafran people
whose two strong men in the senate, Senators Ken Nnamani and Uche Chukwumerije
thwarted his ambition for a third term presidency.
On August 14, 2006, two months after the signing of the Green Tree Agreement,
Archibong community, a village in Bakassi witnessed a unique ceremony. That was the
day the Nigerian government handed the Bakassi region over to Cameroon. The event
was in keeping with the federal government’s decision to abide by the ruling of the world
court on the disputed region. Thus the event of August 14, 2006 is seen as an anti-climax,
signaling the end of a protracted battle by the two neighboring countries over a region
that has been variously described as oil rich. It is believed that the battle is not yet over as
potentials of a lingering conflict still exist. The hordes of the Nigeria population in the
Bakassi and their welfare and well-being, the maritime boundary of the Coast of
Equatorial Guinea and the increasing international involvement in the dispute for
economic interests, are all issues to watch (Newswatch, October 2, 2006:56).
61
The Obasanjo’s administration equally mismanaged the Bakassi crisis is in the
area of information. The case was shrouded in secrecy as at the time it was going on. The
Nigerian Television Authority had only snippet of video clips and news reports on the
issue. The news reports emanating from the Federal Radio Corporation of Nigeria
(FRCN) was very short. If Obasanjo had handled the case more transparently, the case
would not have ended the way it did. It was only when the judgement was delivered that
people started getting details of what transpired at The Hague. All the intellectual inputs
as it concerns the case that is now pouring in would have been better utilized if people
had made these inputs while the case was going on (Newswatch, October 2, 2006:56).
Besides, there was this issue of the deliberate leaving out of the Aborigines of
Bakassi in the case. It cannot be understood why Bakassi indigenes were not invited as
defense witnesses. Adeniyi (2002:20) noted that:
One of the community leaders of Bakassi Chief Okpo Eyo, said during the week that officials who provided legal defence did not seek adequate proofs of the ownership of the peninsula from the aborigines and real owners. Rather, what we saw was the flying abroad to testify of strangers who know nothing about the peninsula to the detriment of the country when the real owners and inhabitants of the areas are there …
He went on to ask pertinent questions whether the people especially those living in the
peninsula were involved in the representation, and why the Obong of Calabar, who is an
internationally renowned professor or medicine and who could have helped Nigeria in the
course of the case, was at no point involved in the matter? Obasanjo and his men in their
uncanny manner of handling legal matters clumsily but deliberately bungled this matter.
To cap it all, Emeka (2002) asserted thus,
62
Bakassi can be likened to Obasanjo as June 12 is to Babangida. June 12 however became more prominent because the Bakassi are minorities with almost nobody to advocate or fight their cause … It remains the biggest injustice Obasanjo perpetuated on Nigeria. Obasanjo swore to the oath of allegiance to protect the territory of Federal Republic of Nigeria thereby upholding the constitution of the country, but he would readily and weakly fail in this. Obasanjo and Bola Ajibola provided the platform under which the territory of our nation was given out to France and Cameroon, an act only as good as condemnably obnoxious because it led to the denial of Nigerian citizens. The whole drama was set out to please Britain, France and Cameroon by Obasanjo and Ajibola for the reasons not ye disclosed to Nigerians … (see www.articlebaselcom)
5.2 The World Court Judgment and Olusegun Obasanjo’s Support of the UN
Mixed-Commission
The crisis between Nigeria and Cameroon over ownership of the Bakassi Peninsula
came to its climax on October 10, 2002 when the ICJ delivered its judgment on the case
which was brought to it by the Republic of Cameroon in 1994. The lingering crisis was
brought to an adjudication end following the judgment. In the judgment, which is binding,
final and without appeal, the ICJ determined the course of the boundary from north to south
between Nigeria and Cameroon, thus, in the Lake Chad area, the court decides that the
boundary is delimited by the Thomson-Marchand Declaration of 1929-1930, as incorporated
in the Henderson-Fleuriau Exchange of Notes of 1931 (Between Great Britain and France); it
finds that the boundary starts in the Lake from the Cameroon-Nigeria-Chad tripoint and
follows a straight line to the point where the river divides into two branches (www.icj.org).
Figure 1 below is the territorial boundary between Nigeria and Cameroun showing the
disputed Bakassi Peninsula
63
Source: United Nations Office for West Africa (UNOWA) ( unowa.unmissions.org)
Suffice the foregoing however to observe that following the Nigeria’s Federal
Executive Council meeting on the 23rd of October, 2002 about a week after the ICJ judgment,
the Federal Government through the then Minister of Transport, Ojo Maduekwe, rejected the
ruling of the court. While addressing the media shortly after the meeting, he stated that:
… There will not be any requirement for Nigeria nationals to move from where they are living at present… The judgment will have no effect on Nigeria’s oil and gas reserves. On no account will Nigeria abandon her people and their interests. For Nigeria, it is not a matter of oil or natural resources on land or in coastal waters, it is a matter of the welfare and well being of her people on their land (FRCN News, 7am, 24/10/2002)
64
Although this pronouncement did not come from the Attorney General of the
Federation (AGF), nor did it originate from the office of the Minister of Information and
National Orientation, yet, it is discernible that Ojo Maduekwe would not have said that
without the mandate of the Federal Executive Council (FEC). Based on this, it is
worrisome to see the official statement of the Nigerian Government on the Bakassi being
a mere call or appeal on Nigerians both at home and in diaspora to remain calm as the
government was yet to find a peaceful solution to the matter, notwithstanding the fact that
reasons and arguments presented in the entire report were so incisive, inciting and touchy
that Nigerian citizens were willing and prepared to do anything to protect and preserve
the territorial integrity of the country. Thus, according to Gbanite:
Based on the conclusion submitted by Obasanjo’s government, affirming its commitment to Nigeria’s constitution to protect its citizenry, the reasons and arguments presented in the entire report, it is easy to adduce that Obasanjo made a monumental mistake to cede Bakassi to Cameroon (see http//www.kwenu.com)
While Obasanjo was officially solidarizing with the Bakassi people over the unfortunate
judgment, and looking out for harmony and good neighborliness between Nigeria and
Cameroon, Cameroon on the other hand was Balkanizing and permeating the territorial
integrity of the Nigeria.
More so, the tripartite meeting involving President Olusegun Obasanjo of Nigeria,
Paul Biya of Cameroon and the French President, Jacque Chirac on September 5, 2002
which was held in France in which the African leaders pledged to abide by the outcome
of the case, indeed calls to question, the patriotism and sincerity of purpose of Obasanjo,
as Nigerian president. The Guardian Newspaper Editorial incisively commented:
65
Very recently, it transpired that the French President, Monsieur Jacques Chirac, had invited President Olusegun Obasanjo and his Cameroonian counterpart, Mr. Paul Biya, to France in connection with the Bakassi palaver, which is subjudice in International Court of Justice (ICJ) at Hague. In all probabilities, the French President’s aim in arranging the tripartite meeting was to discuss the likely outcome of the judgment of the ICJ, which, as must be well known to Chirac, is imminent. France has copious investments, particularly in the oil sector, in the disputed area (Guardian September 18, 2002:25)
Given this situation, it is discernable that Bakassi was indeed sold by Obasanjo,
because, it is inexplicable that a president should pledge to abide by a decision of a court
which is not yet known to him because a super power was mediating. This is outright
cowardice. Undoubtedly, Obasanjo owes Nigerians explanations on what actually
transpired in that meeting when it only remained about a month for the judgment of the
ICJ to be released (see Guardian September 18, 2002).
In November, 2002, barely one month after the ICJ ruling, Obasanjo, in
conjunction with his Cameroonian counterpart requested the UN Secretary General to
establish the Cameroon-Nigeria Mixed Commission, which was meant to facilitate the
implementation of the ruling of the ICJ on the land and maritime boundary between the
two countries. The mandate of the UN-Mix Commission covers the following fields:
• Demarcation of the land border and delimitation of the maritime boundaries
between the two countries
• Withdrawals of the civil administration, the military forces and police force, and
transfer of authority in the zones concerned located along the border in Peninsula
of Bakassi.
66
• Demilitarization of the Peninsula of Bakassi
• Protection of the rights of the populations concerned
• Development of projects aiming at promoting the economic joint ventures
between the two countries and cross border cooperation
• Reactivation of the commission of the Basin of Lake Chad (see www.kwenu.com)
Since December 2002, the Mixed Commission has held regular meetings
alternatively in Yaounde and Abuja. Between 2003 and 2006, it was involved in
withdrawals of the civil administration, of military forces and of police force, as well as
transfers of authority. On June 12, 2006, following intense negotiations under the aegis of
the Secretary-General, the Presidents of Cameroon and Nigeria signed the Agreement of
Green Tree establishing the methods of withdrawal and transfer of authority of the
peninsula of Bakassi. The terms of the agreement stipulate that Nigeria will continue to
manage a small definite part as a specific zone for a period of two years. A non
renewable five year period of special transition regime will then apply
(www.kwenu.com)
5.3 Obasanjo’s Support of the Demarcation of Land and Maritime Boundaries
Between Nigeria and Cameroun
At its ninth meeting in Yaounde in April 2004, the Mixed Commission, in
support of the Nigeria’s President Obasanjo and Paul Biya of Cameroun decided that
the process for withdrawal and transfer of authority in the land and maritime boundaries
will start on 15 June and end on 15 July 2004. It also decided that the process of
withdrawal and transfer of authority on the Bakassi Peninsula will start on 15 July and
end on 15 September 2004. In order to assist the two countries in the peaceful
67
implementation of the ICJ’s judgment, a budget of about $12 million for the
demarcation was approved by the Mix-Commission. Cameroon and Nigeria have each
contributed $3 million to the UN Trust Fund for initial financing; the European
Commission approved a grant of 400,000 euro for the demarcation. The United
Kingdom in the other hand offered a contribution of one million pounds sterling in
addition to other donors. From 5 to 13 March 2004, a tripartite delegation from
Cameroon, Nigeria, and the United Nations conducted a series of visits to several
countries to mobilize further diplomatic and financial support for the demarcation.
Official meetings were conducted in Paris, Brussels, Washington and New York.
(https://www.mtholyoke.edu/acad/intrel/selfdete.htm)
5.4 Support of Withdrawal of Nigeria’s Civilian Administration, Military and Police
Forces from Bakassi
On 18 December 2003, the withdrawal of civil administration, military and
police forces and transfer of authority in the Lake Chad area was completed. The
process took place in phases with some 33 villages surrounding Naga’a, Tchika, Doron
Liman, and Darack handed over to Cameroon, and Damboré to Nigeria. Chairman
Ould-Abdallah presided formal ceremonies on 16th December in Tchika and Damboré
in which the heads of the Cameroonian and Nigerian delegations participated. The
Mixed Commission decided to deploy observer personnel immediately to the Lake
Chad area for one year and to make regular reports for the year following the handover.
To strengthen confidence between the parties, the Mixed Commission has also
identified possible projects to promote cross-border cooperation and joint economic
ventures to benefit the population in the area. These include reactivating the Lake Chad
Basin Commission-- formed in 1964 among neighboring countries--and upgrading,
68
with the assistance of the African Development Bank, one of the main roads between
the two countries. A draft Protocol for the protection of the rights of the affected
population was submitted. At its nine meeting in Yaounde in April 2004, the Mixed
Commission decided to refer it to the bilateral Cameroon-Nigeria Joint Commission
(https://www.mtholyoke.edu/acad/intrel/selfdete.htm)
At its meeting in Abuja on 29-30 October 2003, the Mixed Commission
reaffirmed its commitment to guarantee the rights of all people affected by the Court’s
decision, both Cameroonian and Nigerian. In this context, the Sub-commission on
affected populations visited the Lake Chad, the affected areas in the Land Boundary
(November 2003, January-February 2004) and the Bakassi Peninsula in February 2004.
(https://www.mtholyoke.edu/acad/intrel/selfdete.htm)
5.5 The Effects of the World Court Judgment on the Bakassi People
The socio-economic and cultural effects of resettlement on the Bakassi people are
unavoidably high. Farming, which has been the mainstay of the Bakassi people, was
destroyed and social support networks dismantled. Consequently, most small and
medium families are adversely affected and impoverished. Domestic economic activities
were disrupted and occupations lost. The cordial ethnic, tribal and religious relations
among the people were dashed. Individual life dignities were lost because of lack of
privacy necessitated by inadequate accommodation for affected persons. Families were
rooted out of their traditional and ancestral domain, practice and way of life. The
situation at the resettlement site in Ekpiri Ikang, Cross River State perhaps explains more
and elicits urgent attention of all the stakeholders to address the humanitarian crisis that
69
have engulfed the relocated Bakassi people. Umahi (2012) captures the plights of the
affected Bakassi people when he noted that:
The harsh reality of the handover of Bakassi to Cameroun is striking. It was not just the oil embedded underneath; several thousands of indigenes of the area were driven forcefully out of their ancestral lands. As it said, north or south, east or west, home is the best. But for them, there is no longer a place to call home. It was indeed, a precarious situation (Daily Sun, October 3, 2011: 24)
President Obasanjo equally acknowledged the devastating effects of relocation of the
Bakassi people when he noted that “The Federal Government would set in motion an
elaborate stress-free process for the relocation/resettlement of the Bakassi indigenes from
their ancestral lands to a suitable location of their choice” (Daily Sun, October 12, 2011:
12)
Specifically, and as it pertains to the socio-cultural effects of resettlement of the
Bakassi people, before the resettlement, the people of Bakassi worshipped “Akwa Abasi
Ibom”, the Almighty God in their traditional way. They were rich in cultural heritage as
seen in their mode of dressing, bead making, masquerades, traditional wrestling, among
others. The masquerades in Bakassi were similar to that of the Efiks of Calabar, which
ranges from Nnabo, Agaba, Edem Obon, Ekiri Akata, among others. Most of these
masquerades entertain people during festival periods, marriages/wedding ceremonies and
burials. However, the relocation has had negative consequences on these cultural heritage
of the Bakassi people and has created a problem of mixed culture and religion in their
new settlements (Ushie, 2010)
To the economy of the Bakassi people, the people had obviously lived not as
beggars, which the relocation has disposed them to, but as people who worked hard to
70
meet their various economic needs. Their lands are rich in oil and maritime resources
such as fishes and shrimps, which the people depended on for their livelihood. Thus
according to Mbaga and Njo (2007), the Bakassi Peninsula had often been compared to
new found land in North American and Scandinayia in Europe. The relocation of the
Bakassi people to strange lands has however had negative effects on their means of
livelihood and raised the question on their economic wellbeing. For according to Fombo
(2006:23):
Fishing and animal husbandry constitute the mainstay of the economy of this region and the lake offers great potentials for fishing as well as grazing in its immediate environs. Its numerous islands are permanent while others are exposed only at low water tide opportunities. The lake is constantly retreating as a result of the encroaching Sahara Desert and the diversion of waters of rivers that empty into it from irrigation. During the long and very harsh dry season of which they roam in quest for these with their cattle and sheep, having no regard for boundaries
Again, Aghemelo and Ibhasebhor (2006) have noted that relocation of Bakassi
people means that Nigerians who had lived in Bakassi all their lives will have to face the sad
reality of having to evacuate a region that is part and parcel of them immediately. Most people
living in that area have business located there and so, living the area will mean detaching them
from their sources of income. Moreover, all the infrastructural facilities, including hospitals,
schools, recreational centers, that were originally put in place by the country stand the risk of
being forfeited resulting in a fruitless effort and loss of income.
The judgment of the World Court has equally far reaching consequences on the
territorial integrity of Nigeria, fundamental among which are briefly enumerated below:
71
(i) The judgement of the World Court recognized Bakassi peninsula as territory
within the sovereignty of Cameroon while the native population are not merely
Nigerians, but Nigerians who are indigenous to Bakassi and owners of the land of
Bakassi. The court ceded the ancestral home of these populations to the
Cameroonians government while these people at the same time are expected to
maintain cultural, trade and religious affiliations with their kith and kin in Nigeria.
What this implies is that the judgement created an irreconcilable admixture of
factors where it grants sovereignty of a territory to one country and the nationality
of its native population to another, while at the same time recognizing the land to
be the ancestral homes of the population.
(ii) Though the International Court of Justice deals with suits brought before it on a
case-by-case basis and is not bound by its previous decisions, it usually maintains
a certain consistency in its decisions. Such an absolute departure from its previous
interpretation in this Bakassi case is inexplicable, especially when it serves
colonial policies at the expense of traditional African linkages and civilization.
(iii) The judgment is the legitimization of the scramble and partitioning of Africa by
the colonialists through the Bismarck-inspired 1884 Berlin Colonial Conference.
(iv) The judgment has created a time bomb within the Bakassi area and also within the
legitimate territories of the two parties warring over Bakassi. The relocation of the
Bakassi local council to Ikang which superimposes Bakassi people on an already
existing land owned and occupied by the Ikang people is a time bomb, which is
likely to explode anytime. Nigeria is creating a refuge problem for its own
citizens in their own land. To Cameroon, the stability of the country is standing on
72
the threshold of threat as the Anglophone secessionist movement, the Ambazonia
are re-strategizing for an independent oil rich state which they claim, Bakassi
peninsula is its heart.
(v) The judgment ceded part of Cross river estuary to Cameroon which means that no
ship can enter into Calabar without the permission of Cameroon.
(vi) The judgment of the ICJ on the Bakassi issue has re-drawn the geographical map
of Nigeria and, which requires constitutional amendment to effect change
occasioned by the ruling.
(vii) The judgment created a burden of loss of an oil and gas soaked region reputed to
contain 10 percent of the world’s oil and gas reserve. It has deprived the totality
of the Nigerian people the oil wealth of that community.
(viii) Because the ICJ ruling did not solve the problem of the inhabitants of the
Peninsula, but only addressed the issue of who has control over the territory, the
judgment only opens the door of war more widely.
(ix) The judgment recognizes Bakassi as the only area allegedly covered by the 1913
Anglo-German Treaty whose population was not proven to have participated in
the plebiscite for the purpose of self-determination. The judgement assumed that a
plebiscite must have taken place in Bakassi. This assumption is a violation of the
stated primordial role of the principal of self-determination.
(x) Enforcement of the judgment was a severe violation of the inalienable rights of
the people of Bakassi to self-determination and a threat to their socio-cultural
stability.
73
The effects of the World Court judgement on the Bakassi Peninsular were equally
implicated on the overall national interest of Nigeria. In fact, the existence of many states
in the international system portends a form of permanent struggle for the maintenance of
political independence, territorial integrity, economic interest and national prestige, as
well as promotion of world peace. States, like individuals, appear naturally selfish
because of their inherent desire to pursue their parochial interests in fervid competition
with other states. With over 200 nations, the world in the midst of scarce resources and
means of survival, calls for the entrenchment of national interests in all countries. The
efforts towards the achievement of national interests have over the years proved a
herculean task. This has called for concerted efforts by the leadership of the various
nations in making decisions that would enhance the interests of the countries. National
interest therefore, becomes a conflicting issue because some interests are not actually for
the nation but personal or self-centered. However, and in spite of the embedded conflict
surrounding the concept of national interest, the fact still remains that all nations,
irrespective of its geographical location, size or population, economic status, ideological
orientation or culture, have some form of interests or the other defined as national
interests (Robert, 2010)
National interest is seen by Mongenthau (1989) as an aim to promote a nation’s
image, prestige and respect both at home and abroad. Chandra (cite in Ake, 1982) has
identified what constitutes the core of national interest to include: national security,
political independence, territorial integrity, promotion of economic interests of the nation
and world peace. Inherent in the above perception is the ardent desire by nations to secure
and maintain political independence, secure its territory and project its economic interest
74
to enhance the standard of living of its citizens and the maintenance of national integrity,
territorial integrity and self-respect. National interest can therefore be viewed as the ideal
goals upon which the domestic and foreign policies of a state are hinged (Amoda, 1988).
The concept of national interest therefore, has continued to play a significant role in the
foreign policies of sovereign state. A state foreign policy is not operated in a vacuum.
The main policy instrument in the conduct of foreign policy is invariably the promotion
and pursuit of national interest. Thus, national interest can further be illustrated to mean
the totality or the aggregate of interests of individuals and groups within a given nation
state (Amoda, 1988). Viewed from its classical perspective, national interest therefore
encompasses the various strategies employed in the international interactions of states in
order to ensure the preservation of the stated goals of society. Broadly conceived,
national interest is a guide to the formulation of foreign policy. It is not an end in itself
but a means to an end.
The Fundamental Objectives and Directive Principles of State Policy as enshrined
in chapter 2 of the 1999 Constitution of Nigeria encompass the national interest of the
country. Section 14 and sub-section 2(a) states that sovereignty belongs to the people of
Nigeria from whom government through the constitution derives all its powers and
authority. Section 14, sub- section 2(b) states that the security and welfare of the people
are the primary purpose of government. Thus, Nigeria’s national interests are summed up
in the following words: sovereignty, welfare, unity, faith, peace and progress. In a
nutshell, Nigeria’s national interest is anything that concerns and affects all Nigerians. It
is the common aspirations of the various ethnic nationalities that constitute the Nigerian
State.
75
According to Olukoshi (1992), since independence in 1960, the daunting task of
self-determination was placed on Nigerians. Like every other sovereign country of the
world, Nigerian national interests have been largely determined and defined by the
leadership. The following broadly spells out what constitutes Nigerian national interests
as he further observed:
(i) The defence of her sovereignty, independence and territorial integrity.
(ii) The creation of the necessary political and economic condition in the country,
Africa and the rest of the world, which will facilitate the defence of the
independence and territorial integrity of all African countries while at the
same foster national self-reliance and rapid economic development.
(iii) The promotion of equality and self-reliance in Africa and the rest of the
developing world.
(iv) The promotion and defense of justice and respect for human dignity especially
the dignity of the black man.
(v) The defence and promotion of international peace and security.
In achieving these national interests, Nigeria employs several strategies ranging
from diplomacy to military actions, from cultural exchange to subversion from economic
cooperation to propaganda. In discussing the conduct of Nigerian strategies towards the
attainment of its national interest, he stressed two broad categorizations. These are; the
internal and the external strategic conduct (Olukoshi1992). Suffice this to say that the
Nigeria’s national interests since political independence in 1960 has suffered serious
setbacks; with successive government officials (whether military or civilian) in Nigeria
76
being usually driven by self-interest instead of national interest as implicated in the case
of Bakassi Peninsula
77
CHAPTER SIX
NIGERIA GOVERNMENT INABILITY TO EXPLORE ALTERNATIVE
POLICY OPTIONS TO ICJ RULING AND THE RIGHT OF BAKASSI PEOPLE
TO DECIDE WHERE TO BELONG
Introduction
The main objective of this chapter is to examine the Nigeria government inability
to explore alternative policy options to ICJ ruling and the right of Bakassi people to
decide where to belong. Specifically, the chapter is aimed at testing and validating or
otherwise our hypothesis (2), which states that: “The Nigeria government inability to
explore alternative policy options to ICJ ruling undermined the right to decide where to
belong by the Bakassi people”
6.1 Political Options
These are policy options which bother on politics and diplomatic maneuvering.
They do not have recourse to the law courts but derive their weight from the wits and
intelligence of the policy makers. Some of these options are highlighted and discussed
below:
(1) Self Determination
Demonstrating the importance of self-determination, the United Nations
International Conventions on Political and Civil Rights and Economic, Social and
Cultural Rights (1966:50) states in its first and third paragraphs that;
(i) All peoples have the right of self determination. By virtue of that right they freely
determine that political status and freely pursue their economic, social and
cultural development.
78
(ii) The state parties to the present covenant, including those having responsibility for
the administration of non-self-governing and Trust Territories shall promote the
realization of the right of self-determination and shall respect that right, in
conformity with the provisions of the charter of the United Nations.
Self-determination is the principle that entails people controlling their political
destiny. It is a right recognized in many antique and modern political treaties, protocols
and conventions. Obasi (2007:396) notes that the underlying principle of self-
determination is that,
… no one has the right to impose himself on others, or to decide for or dictate to other groups how to live their lives and that the freedoms and liberties which everyone desires for himself or the group he belongs to, he should also be able to concede or extend to others …
It is regrettable that the judgment of the ICJ did not take this provision which is enshrined
in the charter of the UN into consideration before ceding sovereignty of the Peninsula
from Nigeria to Cameroon. The assumption that the Bakassi people who are indigenous
to the territory can be transferred willy-nilly to another sovereign without their consent or
even their being consulted is wrong. Even before the development of the current norm of
self-determination, notes Sagay (2002), it was recognized that as the object of cession
was sovereignty over territory, the population domiciled in the affected territory who
were citizens of the ceding state were usually given the option of deciding whether they
wanted to retain their citizenship of the ceding state or consented to their citizenship
being transferred to a new sovereign. The problems and hardship involved by the
inhabitants of the territory who remain and lose their old citizenship and are handed over
to a new sovereign whether they like it or not, necessitated the formation of movements
79
that favored the claim that no cession should be valid until the inhabitants had by a
plebiscite given their consent to the cession.
According to Sagay (2002:10) in 1954, the United Nations General Assembly
expressed the opinion, regarding non-self-governing territories that:
… a mission, if the General Assembly deems it desirable, should in agreement with the Administering member, visit the non-self-Governing Territory before or during the time when the population is called upon to decide on their future status …
In line with this, the UN supervised elections or plebiscites in British Togoland territory
in 1956, French Togoland in 1958, Northern Cameroons in 1959, Southern Cameroons in
1961, Western Samoa in 1962, Rwanda-Burundi, in 1961 and the Papua-New Guinea in
1972 (Sagay,2002)
In 1993, the people of Eritrea were given the opportunity to decide whether to
remain in Ethiopia or to endorse the independent state of Eritrea. So was the case in East
Timor as they recently exercised their right of self-determination to disentangle
themselves from Indonesia and establish their own independent state. South Sudan also
held a referendum to gain independence from Sudan very recently. All these exercises are
in line with the UN charter and were supervised by the global body. This goes to
underscore the fact that self-determination is an inalienable right of all peoples of the
world to determine their political status.
In Bakassi, the various treaties that originated either within or outside, and which
were either ratified or not, never took the doctrine of self determination into
consideration. As a result, these treaties and declarations which transferred this territory
to another sovereign cannot but be invalid. To this end, the people of Bakassi, Nigeria
80
and Black race have a duty to appeal to the conscience of the world to afford the
indigenous population of Bakassi the opportunity to exercise their inalienable right of
self-determination through the mechanism of plebiscite.
As a member and signatory to African Charter on Human and Peoples Rights,
Nigeria should use the African Union and the African Human and Peoples Rights
Commission to press for the conduct of a plebiscite in Bakassi, even without waiting
from the UN. The result of such plebiscite would definitely put the UN on its toes and
morally pressure her to facilitate a formal and universally acceptable exercise in the
territory.
(2) Lobbying
The Longman Dictionary of Contemporary English defined lobby as to try to
persuade the government or someone with political power that a law or a situation should
be changed. In this case, the situation that needs change is the ICJ judgment, which as a
matter of fact was against the collective interest of the people of Nigeria. There is a
decisive need for Nigeria to articulate her interest and work out formidable modalities of
actualizing these interests through a well co-ordinated mechanism of persuasion which
are centered on currying the support and sympathy of the international community for her
course.
Interaction in the international environment is a matter of politics. The ICJ
judgment is also political. Hence, lobbying is a political means of achieving goals,
Nigeria should learn if she does not know. The ICJ can be much politicized in its ruling.
The case brought by Ethiopia and Liberia before the ICJ complaining about the
inefficient discharge of duties of South Africa, as the mandatory power for the territory of
81
South West Africa, now Namibia exemplifies this. In its rulling, the court noted that
Ethiopia and Liberia had not established any legal interest in the claim they had brought
against South Africa. The ruling is not the issue here but how the ruling came about,
seven judges agreed with the claims of Ethiopia while seven judges were against. It was
the casting vote of the president that had to decide the matter. It took the president of the
court some time in determining how to cast his vote. After much politicking, the
president supported the claim against Ethiopia and Liberia thereby aggravating the
wicked activities of South Africa in South West Africa. Just like this case, the Bakassi
issue and its judgement cannot but have its political “magouille” and “coloration”.
In the face of this, Nigeria should move to lobby the permanent members of the
Security Council. Since oil is the issue, Nigeria should use it as a veritable instrument of
foreign policy. With the exception of France, other permanent member of the security
council especially our new found friends China and Russia, including US should be
approached with our own side of the story and persuade them to work towards the
revision of the judgment in favor of Nigeria.
(3) Propaganda
The work of propaganda is to promote the point of view of a nation with a view to
persuading the audience to imbibe its utility, necessity or its superiority over other
competing ideas in an intensive, extensive and sustained manner. The utility of
propaganda increases the awareness on a particular issue or notion bringing it closer to
the hearts of the audience. In certain cases, propaganda may not contain the actual facts
about a situation, but it must be objective in reporting and analysis. The importance of
propaganda lies very largely on its ability to recruiting, enlarging and sustaining support
82
and alliance. (Obasi, 2007). The place of propaganda comes to bear when the Nigerian
civil war is mentioned. The Biafran propaganda machinery was so effective that not only
did the people of Biafra fight with every determination and zeal, but the entire world saw
the resilience of a people faced with extermination and genocide. This led to the support
garnered by the Biafran side from many countries of the world. The racist regime of
South Africa was brought to its knees in 1994 following mounted propaganda all over the
world portraying the ills of the system. The United States used the instrument of
propaganda to paint Saddam black before the international community in order to get the
support of the UN approved allied forces for the forceful eviction of Iraq out of Kuwait.
Propaganda also played a prominent role in the coalition of the willing, which US
unilaterally with the help of her friends and allies affected its foreign policy goal of
regime change in Iraq in 1998.
Nigeria must sustain moral pressure on the world’s conscience by capturing the
attention and sympathy of the world. Nigeria must as a matter of necessity, articulate and
serialize an intensive awareness campaign using both foreign and local media to bring to
the fore the plight of the people of Bakassi and the injustice brought about by the
judgment of the International Court of Justice.
6.2 Legal options
These options are those actions whose weight lays so much on law and its
technicalities. They are legal issues that require legal instruments of the court of law for
realization. They include:
83
(1) Instituting legal action against the trio of the Great Britain, Germany and
France
Nigeria should filed a fresh suit against Britain, Germany and France on behalf of
the Niger Delta Treaty kings seeking declarations as to the interpretation and legality of
the colonial era treaties of protection, and other treaties following and based upon such
treaties. The separate/dissenting opinion or reviews of the court’s judgement against
Nigeria becomes a veritable instrument. In his dissenting opinion Judge Al-Khasawneh
provided a solid ground-based scientific analysis making references to various
internationally recognized instruments such as the principle of inter temporal law; the
failure of the court to distinguish between protectorate and colonies leading to the
erroneous conclusion that Great Britain had acquired sovereignty over Bakassi peninsula
through a derivative title.
The question here should be on the interpretation of the 1884 Treaty of protection
between the Great Britain and the King and chiefs of the old Calabar which never gave
Britain sovereignty over the Bakassi. Subsequently, all other treaties including the Anglo-
German Agreement of 1913 which purportedly handed Bakassi from Great Britain to
Germany should be regarded as a nullity and an exercise in futility.
Judge Al-Khasawneh lamented that the International Court of Justice hopes to
find the basis for ceding Bakassi, to Germany form a misplaced and truncated
conception, adding that the 1884 Treaty entered into between the king and chiefs of old
Calabar with Great Britain had International legal standing, as it concerned protection
and not colonial title and the kings and chiefs of the old Calabar had capacity to enter into
treaty relations. Accoridn to him, the plain words of the treaty suggest that there was no
intent to transfer territorial sovereignty, which situation was not altered till 1913, when
84
Great Britain ceded Bakassi to Germany which implied power association with territorial
sovereignty that Great Britain did not posses. (ICJ Judgement of October 10, 2002).
On this basis, Nigeria should seek interpretation from the ICJ whether the treaty
of protection extended rights of sovereignty to Great Britain vis-à-vis the transfer of same
to Germany. The impact the filling of the new suit against Great Britain, France and
Germany will have upon the present composition of the ICJ cannot be lost on
practitioners of international law. Of course, the effect which a proper interpretation of
treaties of protection would have on subsequent colonial treaties cannot also be lost on
practitioners of the law.
(2) Boycott/Non-Appearance
Accepting to appear before the International Court of Justice on the matter
between Cameroon was an error judging by the prevailing political situation in the
country at the time. What does a pariah state expect from the ICJ? Justice? Far from that.
The ICJ in many instances has experienced the phenomenon of non-appearing defendant.
This situation creates the problem of finding all the necessary evidence needed in order to
decide a case. Iceland boycotted the proceedings in the fisheries jurisdiction cases and, in
five cases since then, the defendants had not appeared (ICJ Reports, 1984). This is a
weakness in international legal proceedings and indeed international law, which Nigeria
should have very well embraced before the commencement of proceedings.
It should be noted that the international court cannot be divorced from
international politics and diplomacy. The judges at the ICJ were appointed on the
recommendation of their home governments and these governments must naturally have
a way of reaching out the judges recommended by them. To this end, judges from France,
85
Germany, and Britain cannot support Nigeria in the case based on the fact that they have
interest in the matter. France is the colonial master of Cameroon. It has vested interest in
Cameroon and also a beneficiary of the oil and gas reserves in the region under dispute.
Germany and Britain will always make sure that the Angle-German Treaties must be
operative and supersedes any other treaty or declaration. The United States on its own
part will not support Nigeria based on the political situation in Nigeria then. Because
Nigeria was a Pariah state, America was certain to oppose anything that Nigeria stood
for.
Knowing full well that international court was headed by a French national and
there were judges from Britain and Germany, logic demands that Nigeria must thread
with caution. With the configuration, Nigeria should have received justice
notwithstanding the weight of evidence marshaled by her defense counsels. Based on this
fact, Nigeria should have honorably boycotted the proceedings of the ICJ.
(3) Non-Acceptance of Jurisdiction
The jurisdiction of the court is based on the consent of the parties coming before
it. This consent may manifest itself either in the form of a compromise (special
agreement) relating to a specific dispute, or a state may accept the “compulsory
jurisdiction” of the court more generally under Article 36 of the statute in one of two
ways. First, under Article 36, paragraph 1, of the statute, states may express their consent
to the court’s jurisdiction by entering into a conventional agreement that contains a
compromissory clause to the effect that disputes as to the interpretation and application of
that agreement are to be adjudicated by the court. Secondly, under Article 36, paragraph
2 – commonly known as the “optional clause of the statute’’ – states may make a
86
unilateral declaration that they recognize as compulsory ipso facto the jurisdiction of the
court in all legal disputes concerning certain categories of questions mentioned therein.
There is also exceptionally the third means of conferring jurisdiction upon the court,
namely through the institution of forum prorogatum.
States may accept the optional clause declaration with conditions or reservations.
The ICJ stated in military and paramilitary activities in and against Nicaragua:
Declarations of acceptance of the compulsory jurisdiction of the court are facultative, unilateral engagements, which states are absolutely free to make or not to make. In making the Declaration, a state is equally free either to do so unconditionally and without limit of time for its duration, or to qualify it with conditions or reservations … (ICJ Reports, 1984:418).
In this regard, states condition their optional clause declaration in many ways.
Some of the most typical ones according to ICJ Year Book (1987-88:36) include:
(a) States explicitly refer to reciprocity, i.e. that they accept the jurisdiction of the
court only in relation to other states accepting the same obligation.
(b) States limit their consent to jurisdiction such as specifying that the declaration
covers only disputes which arose after it was made or only dispute in relation to
situations which arose after the date.
(c) States have qualified their optional clause declarations by excluding matters
within their domestic jurisdiction.
(d) States have included a condition in their declaration that the court may not have
jurisdiction unless all parties to any treaty affected by the decisions are also
parties to the case before the court.
87
(e) States have limited their optional clause declaration by stipulating that any other
mechanisms of dispute settlement as agreed between the parties will prevail over
the general jurisdiction of the court.
(f) States exclude some specific issues or categories of issues from the jurisdiction
they grant the court in their declarations, such as territorial disputes, maritime
disputes, disputes concerning their armed forces, or disputes between members of
the British Commonwealth of Nations.
Based on the foregoing, it was an error for Nigeria to have accepted the
jurisdiction of the court. States are entitled to declare in advance that they accept the
compulsory jurisdiction of the court, but only in respect of the other states that accept
such jurisdiction in advance. Sagay (2002) noted that Nigeria signed the optional clause
long before the case, but Cameroon did not. However, Cameroon rushed to obtain
acceptance to the court’s jurisdiction opportunistically only in order to bring its claim
against Nigeria. Sagay (2002:10) stated thus: “At that state we could have walked away
freely by declining the courts’ jurisdiction in relation to Cameroon, which was not a party
to the optional clause’’
Andem-Ewu (2002) draws attention to the fact that as at 1996 only 59 member
states of the UN were signatories to the declaration of acceptance of the compulsory
jurisdiction of the ICJ, of the number, 41 member states have included reservations which
limit the scope of their acceptance of compulsory jurisdiction. She pointed out that,
…12 other member states which had previously declared their acceptance of the compulsory jurisdiction have withdrawn such acceptance. Of the 12, 7 member states withdrew their acceptance after suits had been commenced
88
against them as respondents before the ICJ (Andem-Ewu, 2000:12)
The question is, why did Nigeria not withdraw her acceptance to the compulsory
jurisdiction of the ICJ, when it had every opportunity to have done so? Was it that our
leaders were not abreast with the provisions of the statute of the ICJ or that they
deliberately wanted to give away Bakassi as they did? These are pertinent questions
whose answers will aid policy making and policy implementation in Nigeria, at least in
the future.
(4) Revision of Judgment
When a part to a case is dissatisfied over the outcome of a judgment within the
court, there is room for the revision of the judgment, but this is not without stringent
conditions. Article 61 of the ICJ statute provides that an application for revision of
judgment may be made only when it is based upon the discovery of some fact of such
nature as to be a decisive factor, which fact was, when the judgment was given, unknown
to the court and also to the party claiming revision, always provided that such party’s
ignorance was not due to negligence. (ICJ Year Book 1987-1988:53--57). According to
the former Attorney General of Cross River State, the home state of Bakassi, Nigeria:
May seek a revision of the present judgement based on the availability of new facts such as are being made available to us by various persons, and groups both within and outside Nigeria, which facts cannot be made public at this time … (Guardian October 15, 2002:4)
Following from this, Femi Falana advised the government to institute a suit.
… for a stay of execution of the ICJ ruling ruling, pending the determination of the plea for a review of judgment … (Guardian Newspaper, 15/10/2002:4).
89
The option for the revision of judgment through application is a viable one because as
Odje puts it: “It adjuncts the parties to maintain the status quo until a determination of
application for review which can take another either years as the case itself…”
(5) Recourse to the Security Council of the UN
The security council of the United Nations Organization is the appellate court on
cases emanating from the pronouncement of ICJ. Enforcement of any law or obligation as
made by the ICJ lies solely in the hands of the Security Council. The charter of the UN
gives the Security Council the power to judge the rationality, fairness, correctness and
justice of the judgment before taking any power, Nigeria has a duty to use the good
offices of the Security Council to appeal the ceding of Bakassi to Cameroon by the ICJ.
In a policy paper presented to the Management of Nigeria Institute of
International Affairs (NIIA) by Mallam Abdulahi Uthman Maiyaki titled, “Bakassi
Peninsula: Alternative Options Available to Nigeria”, the road map to this recourse to the
Security Council was elaborately discussed and presented. For technical reasons, that
presentation shall be truly reproduced in the coming analysis.
There are already areas or contention with the statute of the United Nations
International Court of Justice which requires a review to meet elementary requirements
for social justice where provisions are to be made for appeal against judgment of the
International Court of Justice in particular, in relation to the case between Nigeria and
Cameroon over the Bakassi Peninsula.
Consequently, below are Nigeria’s proposed positions for consideration by the
UN Security Council over the case at hand. These are:
90
(1) That Nigeria accepts the jurisdiction of the Court under Article 36, paragraph 2,
of the statute of the court; but that Nigeria rejects vehemently the previsions of
Article 60 of the statute of the ICJ which states that “its judgment is final without
appeal”, consequently, Nigeria is challenging the courts’ judgment of June 11,
1998 where it rejected seven of its preliminary objections (ICJ Proceedings of
June 11, 1998).
(2) Nigeria rejects in totality, the courts’ judgment of 25 March, 1999 where it
declared that Nigeria’s request for interpretation of the court’s judgment of 11th
June, 1998 was inadmissible despite intellectually, legally and logically sound
analytical presentations of some dissenting judges of the court as presented below.
(ICJ Judgment of 25th March, 1999).
In the dissenting opinion of vice president Weeramantry, he expressed agreement
with the court that “the application of Nigeria met the conditions laid down in Article 60
of the statute given the court jurisdiction to entertaining Nigeria’s request for
interpretation of the court’s judgment of 11th June, 1998,” but disagreed with the courts
conclusion that Nigeria’s request for interpretation was inadmissible, pointing out that
there is a distinction between subsequent facts and subsequent incidents. Subsequent facts
relating to an incident already pleaded would be admissible, but not subsequent facts in
the sense of subsequent incident. Nigeria was therefore entitled to seek clarification of
this aspect.
Judge Koroma in his dissenting opinion could not support the judgment because
the court should have acceded to the request and find it admissible since it met all the
criteria and conditions necessary for the interpretation of a judgement, asserting that the
91
courts’ judgement of June 11, 1998 had laid itself open to possible misconstruction by the
parties leading to confusion, which if not clarified, could be at variance with the
provisions of the statute of the court. He believed further that the real purpose of an
interpretation is for the court to give precision and clarification of the meaning and scope
of the judgement in question and when the court stated that it had not distinguished
between “incidents” and “facts” in its judgement of June 11, 1998 and had found that
“additional incidents” constituted “additional facts” there was room for clarification. He
maintained that,
… the request should have been declared admissible, as the applicant had established its interest, both in law and in fact, which were worthy of legal protection and would ensure that other party observed the obligation imposed by the statute and rules of the court … (ICJ Judgment of March 25, 1999).
Justice Ajibola believed that the court should have allowed Nigeria a second
round of pleading, stating his agreement with the courts’ judgments in questions relating
to jurisdiction and cost, but that the court should have considered Nigeria’s application
admissible, arguing that:
… the court should have interpreted its judgment of 11th June, 1998 because in the two paragraphs that Nigeria is requesting the court to interpret, the court has decided on the issue of the procedural right of Cameroon to: Develop what is “said” in its application and (b) present “additional facts:.. (ICJ Judgment, March 25, 1999).
Further, Judge Ajibola observed that the court had not quite clearly determined
the issue of additional incidents of new incidents, arguing that the court should have
clarified the category of incidents alleged by Cameroon to be relevant, whether they were
92
pre – 1994 incidents only, or pre- and post- 1994 incidents. He pointed out that the word
“dispute” in Article 36 paragraph 2, of the courts’ statute relates only to pre-existing
disputes or incidents that occurred before filing of an application, but definitely not a
future dispute.
These legal options, especially bordering on the revision of judgment and
recourse to the ICJ are still open for Nigeria to harness, even as Cameroon has taken
possession of the Peninsula.
6.3 Military Options
Military option to the Bakassi disaster centers on the use of military strategy in
achieving Nigeria’s control of sovereignty of the Bakkasi peninsula. Because mankind
has refused to give Justice its natural way, war must continue to ravage and devastate
mankind. Any serious intention to end war must first of all start with the question of
addressing injustice and exploitation in the world. The world from the beginning has been
characterize by rivalries and competition for survival and supremacy; whether peaceful or
not which results into an unequal relations among nations. This inequality brings about
struggles which manifests into wars.
From the Marxist to the classical, the ideology that economic motives force
nations into frequent antagonism against one another cannot be over-emphasized.
Peoples’ realization that world’s resources which they hitherto thought were limitless,
were indeed limited in supply created the tendency and propensity for the struggle for
control of the resources on the basis of which the material well-being of nations will be
determined (Obasi, 1989:28).
93
Just like the pre-twentieth century national interest which were expressed by
territorial ambition of states, in which ambitious rulers sought to enlarge their territories,
the Bakassi imbroglios is centered on ambition of territorial aggrandizement on the part
of Cameroun. History has it that no nation, no matter how small or vulnerable will just
fold her hands and allow other nations balkanize its territory. Idealists would prefer a
“Jaw-Jaw” approach to the resolution of the dispute but realist would believe that the
“Jaw” this time cannot hold the “nozzle”.
Plato would always say that “laws are made for fear of the unjust” (see Aja,
2000:6). The International Court of Justice was created as an army of organ of the United
Nations with the cardinal mandate to settle international disputes submitted to it with a
duty to employ preventive diplomacy and maintain international peace and security. By
international peace and security, it is mean redressing an observed injustice. The question
is, did the ruling of the ICJ actually redress the injustice regarding ownership and
sovereignty of Bakassi peninsula? If it has not, then its duty to employ preventive
diplomacy in maintaining international peace and security has opened up gun-boat
diplomacy as a lee way to peace and security in the region.
With the empowerment of the United Nations, Nigeria has a duty to defend
herself. Article 51 of the UN charter provides thus,
Nothing in the present charter shall impair the inherent right of individual or collective self-defense of an armed attack occurs against a member of the United Nations … (UN charter)
Since the ICJ has denied Nigeria justice, there is need for self help in order to defend
itself against Cameroonian aggression and attack. The benefit of the military option to the
Bakassi question is not only to maintain our sovereignty over Bakassi, it will also provide
94
a welcome refreshment as Nigeria probably needs another war to really reunite the
country into a nation. The civil war dislodged the unity of the nation, and Obaanjo’s eight
years of brigandage disjointed it the more.
If the iron dice must roll, certain issues are taken into consideration because war
as an instrument of foreign policy is not a measure undertaken in a light hearted manner.
(Egbo, 2003:24). Certain questions need to be asked, if Nigeria must embark on this
adventure. They include:
� What is Nigeria’s actual military strength and potential?
� What is Cameroun’s actual strength and potentials?
� To what extent can Nigeria’s political will back-up and sustain her in a short or
long term military campaign?
� What amount of resources can be committed into the war at the expense of other
socio-economic needs of the populace?
� Who are Nigeria’s friend and allies, and what are their dispositions?
� Who are Cameroun’s friends and allies and what are their dispositions?
� What is the direction of international public opinion (IPO) regarding the issue in
contention?
In giving due consideration to these variables, Nigeria’s military might
notwithstanding that has not been tested for some time now is not comparable to that of
Cameroun. The size of Nigeria in terms of human inhabitants will consume the
population of Cameroun by six times. Economically, Nigeria is more viable than
Cameroun and can withstand a long term military campaign longer than her rival. In
considering the direction of international public opinion (IPO), Nigeria should focus her
95
propaganda machinery towards sensitizing the world that her position on the matter is not
the territory and the resources there in, but the welfare of the human population. While
Cameroun is interested in the Bakassi territory rich in oil and gas reserves including
shrimps, Nigeria will be appealing to the sense of the world on the need to save the
human population form degrading conditions. In the world today, it is all about human
dignity and not the dignity of the territory.
6.4 The Right of Bakassi People to Decide Where to Belong
On October 10, 2008, the International Court of Justice delivered judgment in
favor of Cameroon in the dispute with Nigeria over the oil-rich Bakassi Peninsula, a
1,600 kilometers border stretching from Lake Chad in the north to Bakassi in the south.
The Bakassi peninsula is a series of low lying islands at the eastern most extreme of the
Gulf of Guinea. The area has drawn attention as a potential source of commercially
exploitable oil reserves. The World Court, which is the United Nations Court of first
instance in its judgment in the Cameroun vs Nigerian, (Bakassi matter); decided that the
Bakassi boundary is delimited by the Anglo-German Agreement of March 11, 1913 so
that the sovereignty over the peninsula lies with Cameroon (Okosun, 2012)
Prior to the World Court's expected judgment, both Nigeria and Cameroon have
been pugnacious and belligerent to one another. Both nations promised before the
decision to abide by the court decision. At stake were major oil reserves believed to be in
the border area, as well as rich fish stocks in nearby waters. In pursuit of the World
Court’s judgment, on 12, June 2006, the presidents of Nigeria and Cameroon signed an
agreement settling the decades-old border dispute, following intensive mediation by
United Nations Secretary-General Kofi Annan, at Green Tree New York, USA. The
96
Green Tree Estate, Manhasset, New York City Concordia, executed by President
Olusegun Obasanjo of Nigeria and President Paul Biya of Cameroon and witnessed by
and the United Nations, Secretary General provides for the withdrawal of Nigerian troops
within 60 days, with a possible 30 day extension, from Bakassi, which the International
Court of Justice (ICJ), the United Nations awarded to Cameroon in 2002. Under the
agreement, transitional arrangements were to be completed in two years for the
Peninsula, which was the last of four areas to be demarcated in accordance with the
World Court’s decision. On August 14th, 2008, Nigeria completed handing over control
of the oil-rich Bakassi peninsula to its neighbour Cameroon. The legal paperwork thereof,
covered the tenure of two Nigerian Justice Ministers, Bayo Ojo and Michael Aondoakaa.
On the Cameroonian side, the country’s Justice Minister, Maurice Kanto, represented his
country (Okosun, 2012)
A very worrisome perspective in the World Court’s Judgment is the total neglect
of the true intentions and wishes of the indigenous people of Bakassi to remain with their
extended kith and kin in Nigeria. Thus, raising such questions as: was it fair for the
World Court to have relied on a document that was written and executed by foreign
powers, with only their selfish economic exploitation interests at heart?; was it fair for the
World Court to have relied on a document that was written and executed by foreign
powers, to the utter neglect and detriment of the indigenous people, whose individual and
corporate destinies were severely affected but not considered?; would it be wrong to call
the execution of the original document and the recent judgment that gave the Bakassi
Peninsula to Cameroun, an obnoxious exercise in pseudo and neo slavery?; is it too late
to fix these monumental travesties of justice?. The World court delivered its judgment
97
and abandoned the Bakassi people to wail and lament in the cocoon of their own worries,
fears and suffering. The Bakassi people have overwhelmingly decided to remain as
Nigerians in Nigerian territory. One of the problems begging to be resolved is that of the
resettlement of Bakassians returning from their former homeland.
The Bakassi people ought to have been given the opportunity to decide their fate
and legal right for self determination (as enshrined in the UN Charter for Universal
Declaration of Rights of 1948) through a referendum. A referendum sometimes called
plebiscite means a decree of the ballot question, in other words a direct vote in which an
entire electorate is asked to either accept or reject a particular proposal. The referendum
or plebiscite is a form of majority agenda driven, direct democracy. There are several
instances, where the U.N Security Council has conducted referendum in the past. These
include; United Nations Security Council Mission for Referendum in Western Sahara;
United Nations Security Council referendum in Myanmar; UN Security Council
referendum in which the East Timorese voted for independence; U.N. Security Council
on the complaint of Government of India concerning the dispute over the State of Jammu
and Kashmir passed resolution 47 (1948) that both India and Pakistan desire that the
question of the accession of Jammu and Kashmir to India or Pakistan should be decided
through the democratic method of a free and impartial plebiscite (Okosun, 2012). In
contrast however, the United Nations Security Council, the World Court, Cameroon, and
Nigeria have never given the Bakassi natives, who are expected to leave their ancestral
homeland, after so many years of abode there an opportunity to contribute to the
determination of their individual and corporate destinies.
98
Furthermore, by virtue of section 14 and sub-section 2 (a) of the Nigerian 1999
Constitution, which states that the security and welfare of the people are the primary
purpose of government, the people of the Bakassi have the legal right of fair hearing to
decide whether to be part of Cameroon or Nigeria. Besides, the Nigerian government is
obligated under the Nigerian constitution to protect the lives and properties of Nigerians.
The inability of the Nigerian government to honor this obligation is a fundamental and a
material breach of its responsibility to the Nigerian people and Bakassi in particular.
Therefore, the Nigeria government inability to explore the alternative policy
options to ICJ ruling really undermined the right to decide where to belong by the
Bakassi people
99
CHAPTER SEVEN
SUMMARY, CONCLUSION AND RECOMMENDATIONS
7.1 Summary
In this study, we have been able to critically examine the fundamental rights of
the people of Bakassi Peninsula in management of the Nigerian-Cameroun dispute by
President Obasanjo. Specifically, the broad objective of this study was to critically examine
the ICJ ruling over the Bakassi Peninsular and the extent to which it infringes on the
fundamental human rights of the Bakassi people. However, the specific objectives include:
(1)To ascertain whether Olusegun Obasanjo’s support for the ICJ ruling over Bakassi
Peninsula undermine Nigeria’s national interest in the protection of her citizens and territorial
integrity; (2)To determine if Nigeria government inability to explore alternative policy
options to ICJ ruling undermined the right to decide where to belong by the Bakassi people
The study was equally guided by two research questions, thus: (1) Did Olusegun
Obasanjo’s support for the ICJ ruling over the disputed Bakassi Peninsula undermined
Nigeria’s national interest?; (2) Did the Nigeria government inability to explore alternative
policy options to ICJ ruling undermine the right to decide where to belong by the Bakassi
people.The objectives and hypotheses were drawn from the two research questions. We made
use of qualitative descriptive method of data collection and analysis. Core assumptions of the
Games theory formed the bases of our analysis. And on the basis of the findings, the
understated conclusions and recommendations were put forward.
7.2 Conclusion
The findings of the study are as follows: (1) The rapidity under which President
Obasanjo implemented the handover of the Bakassi territory to the Republic of Cameron,
amidst numerous and alternative policy options, had indeed, undermined the national
100
interest of Nigeria in Bakassi Peninsula; (2) That Nigeria government inability to explore
alternative policy options to ICJ ruling undermined the right to decide where to belong by the
Bakassi people
7.3 Recommendations
Arising from the findings of this study, we therefore put forward the following
recommendations:
• That Nigeria’s foreign policy should henceforth be national interest-centered. This
is to say that national interest should form the basis of Nigeria’s foreign policy
• Nigeria should avail herself the opportunity provided by the Security Council of
the United Nations to seek for revision of the judgment citing human factor which
was deliberately left unattended to by the ICJ, and which, as a matter of fact, is
the nucleus for the formation of the UN, as the basis,
• Nigerian foreign policy machinery should be henceforth situated and located in
the hands of experts.
• As the Nigeria plans to amend her 1999 Constitution, it becomes appropriate to
incorporate into the constitution clear provision on which organ of government
has competence in treaty-making
• Related to the above is the need for a clear role in the constitution for National
Assembly in treaty-making, similar to what obtains in the U.S.A., from where
Nigeria borrowed the presidential system of government.
101
BIBLIOGRAPHY Books
Anene, J.C. (1970) The International Boundaries of Nigeria: The Francoork of an
Emergent African Nation. London: Longman Asiwaju, A.I. (1984) Partitioned Africans: Ethnic Relations Across Africa’s International
Boundaries. London: Hurst and Co. Biereenn-Nnabugwu, M. (2006) Methodology of Political Inquiry: Issues and Techniques
of Research Methods in Political Science. Enugu: Quintagon. Chukwu, D.O. (2000) Introduction to Nigeria Political History. Enugu: Rhema
International Affairs Davidson, B. (1967) African Boundaries. London: Hurst and Co. Eboh, E.C. (1998) Social and Economic Research: Principles and Method. Lagos:
Academic Publishers Eke, O.A. (2009) Globalization Challenges and Nigerian Foreign Policy. Abakaliki:
Willyrose and Appleseed Publication Company Leege, D. and Francis, W. (1974) Political Research: Design, Measurement and
Analysis. New York: Basic Books Incorporated Publishers. Morgenthau, H, (1989) Politics Among Nations: The Struggle for Power and Peace. New
York: Alfred A. Knopf). Nweke, G.A. (1982) Policy Response. Zaria: ABU Press Obasi, I. (2007) Politics and Globe Dictionary. Enugu: Kenny and Brothers Enterprises Obasi, I.N. (1999) Research Methodology in Political Science. Enugu: Academic
Publishing Company. Olukoshi, A. (1992) Nigerian National Interest and National Security Objectives. In
Geopolitical studies of African States. Lagos: Nigerian Institute of International Affairs.
Owen, G. (1995), Game Theory, 3rd edition. New York: Academic Press
Riker, W.H. (1962) Handbook of Political Science. Addison: Wesley Press Rouke, J.J. (1997) International Politics on the World Stage. New York: McGraw Hills
102
Book Chapter
Ekpenyong, J. L. O. (1989) “Potentials of Nigerian Boundary Corridors as Sources of International Economic Conflict,” in A. Asiwaji and P.O. Adeniyi eds, Borderlands in Africa. Lagos: Longman Press
Journal Articles
Asobie, H.A. (2003) ‘The Conflict between Nigeria and Cameroon over land, sea border and territories’ University of Nigeria Journal of Political Economy, 1(1) pg 12-20
Babatola and Jadesola, E.T. (2012) ‘Nigeria-Cameroon Boundary Dispute: The Quest for
Bakassi Peninsular’ International Affairs and Global Strategy 574X
Ebeghulem, J.C. (2008) ‘Nigerian Foreign Policy under President Olusegun Obasanjo: Bakassi Peninsula in focus’ Journal of Politics and Administration iv (1) pg 28-36
Fanso, V.G. (1986) “Traditional and African Boundaries: Concepts and Functions in
Inter-group Relations. Presence Africaine, 139(3)
Konings, P. (2005) “The Anglophone Cameroun-Nigeria Boundary: Opportunities and Conflicts”. African Affairs, 4, 45
Nicholas, K. T. and Sam, B. (2010) ‘The Cameroon and Nigeria Negotiation Process over
the Contested Oil rich Bakassi Peninsula ‘ Journal of Alternative Perspectives in
the Social Sciences ( 2010) Vol 2, No 1, 198-210
Ogen, O. (2011) “Uses and Misuses of History: Bakassi Peninsula in Focus” Journal of
Historical Society of Nigeria
Newspapers and Magazines
Daily Sun, October 12, 2011
Date”. Washington Post, October 15 Eboh, E. and Camillius, S. (2005) “Nigeria-Cameroon Fail To Set New Bakassi Pullout Olumide, I. ( 2002) “Letter from Attorney General of the Federation to the Ministry of
External Affairs.” Punch, November 23 Sagay (2002) ‘The Ruling of International Court of Justice on Cameroon-Nigeria Border
Conflict’ Vanguard November 12
Internet Materials
Baye, F.M. (2010) ‘Implications of the Bakassi Conflict Resolution for Cameroon.
Retrieved from http//www.hugobesemer.net on March 8, 2013
103
Gbanite, N. (2002) ‘The Nigeria-Cameroon Boundary Conflict’ Retrieved from http//www.kwenu.com on April 20, 2013
Ngang, K. (2005) ‘Understanding the Bakassi Conflict: A showcase of Conflict
Prevention in nPractice’ Retrieved from http//www.rand.org/pubs/monograph on March 11, 2013
Rose, D.J. and Sama, M.C. (2006) ‘Reclaiming the Bakassi Kingdom: the Anglophone
Cameroon-Nigeria Border. Retrieved from http//www.nytime.com on March 18, 2013
(https://www.mtholyoke.edu/acad/intrel/selfdete.htm)
www.icj.org Official Documents
International Court of Justice Report on Cameroon-Nigeria Border Conflict, 1984 International Court of Justice Year Book, 1987 International Court of Justice Judgment on Cameroon-Nigeria Border Conflict, October 10, 2002 International Court of Justice Proceedings, June 11, 1998 International Court of Justice Judgment, March 25, 1999 Conference Papers
Amoda, J. (1988) “Nigeria’s National Interest and Values. A Conference Paper Presented at the Second Armed Forces Seminar in Lagos, 11-15 April
Unpublished Works
Fombo, G.F. (2006) ‘International Politics of Border Conflict: Nigeria vs Cameroon. Unpublished Doctoral Thesis, University of Nigeria, Nsukka
Ofoeze, H.G.A. (2011) ‘Comparative Foreign Policy. Unpublished lecture note,
Department of Political Science, Abia State University, Uturu Radio News
Federal Radio Corporation of Nigeria News, 7am 24/10/2002
104
Appendix 1
AGREEMENT BETWEEN THE REPUBLIC OF CAMEROON AND
THE FEDERAL REPUBLIC OF NIGERIA CONCERNING THE
MODALITIES OF WITHDRAWAL AND TRANSFER OF
AUTHORITY IN THE BAKASSI PENINSULA, June 12, 2006
The Republic of Cameroon (hereinafter referred to as “Cameroon”) and the Federal Republic of Nigeria (hereinafter referred to as “Nigeria”), Reaffirming their willingness to peacefully implement the judgment of the International Court of Justice, Commending the Secretary-General of the United Nations for his efforts made in this respect in organizing the tripartite summits and establishing the Cameroon-Nigeria Mixed Commission, Considering that the question of the withdrawal from and transfer of authority over the Bakassi Peninsula should be treated in a forward-looking spirit of goodwill in order to open new prospects for cooperation between the two countries after decades of difficult bilateral relations, Determined to encourage the consolidation of confidence and peace between their two countries for the well-being of their peoples and for stability in the subregion, Have decided to conclude the present Agreement.
Article 1
Nigeria recognizes the sovereignty of Cameroon over the Bakassi Peninsula in accordance with the judgment of the International Court of Justice of 10 October 2002 in the matter of the Land and Maritime Boundary between Cameroon and Nigeria. Cameroon and Nigeria recognize the land and maritime boundary between the two countries as delineated by the Court and commit themselves to continuing the process of implementation already begun.
Article 2
Nigeria agrees to withdraw all its armed forces from the Bakassi Peninsula within sixty days of the date of the signing of this Agreement. If exceptional circumstances so require, the Secretary-General of the United Nations may extend the period, as necessary, for a further period not exceeding a total of thirty days. This withdrawal shall be conducted in accordance with the modalities envisaged in Annex I to this Agreement.
Article 3
1. Cameroon, after the transfer of authority to it by Nigeria, guarantees to Nigerian nationals living in the Bakassi Peninsula the exercise of the fundamental rights and freedoms enshrined in international human rights law and in other relevant provisions of international law.
105
2. In particular, Cameroon shall: (a) not force Nigerian nationals living in the Bakassi Peninsula to leave the Zone or to change their nationality; (b) respect their culture, language and beliefs; (c) respect their right to continue their agricultural and fishing activities; (d) protect their property and their customary land rights; (e) not levy in any discriminatory manner any taxes and other dues on Nigerian nationals living in the Zone; and (f) take every necessary measure to protect Nigerian nationals living in the Zone from any harassment or harm.
Article 4 Annex I and the map contained in Annex II to this Agreement shall constitute an integral part thereof. No part of this Agreement shall be interpreted as a renunciation by Cameroon of its sovereignty over any part of its territory.
Article 5
This Agreement shall be implemented in good faith by the Parties, with the good offices of the Secretary-General of the United Nations, if necessary, and shall be witnessed by the United Nations, the Federal Republic of Germany, the French Republic, the United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland and the United States of America.
Article 6
1. A Follow-up Committee to monitor the implementation of this Agreement is hereby established. It shall be composed of representatives of Cameroon, Nigeria, the United Nations and the witness States. The Committee shall monitor the implementation of the Agreement by the Parties with the assistance of the United Nations observers of the Mixed Commission. 2. The Follow-up Committee shall settle any dispute regarding the interpretation and implementation of this Agreement. 3. The activities of the Follow-up Committee shall cease at the end of the period of the special transitional regime provided for in paragraph 4 of Annex I to this Agreement.
Article 7 This Agreement shall in no way be construed as an interpretation or modification of the judgment of the International Court of Justice of 10 October 2002, for which the Agreement only sets out the modalities of implementation.
Article 8
This Agreement is concluded in English and French, both texts being equally authentic. Done at Greentree, New York, on 12 June 2006. For the Republic of Cameroon: Paul Biya, President For the Federal Republic of Nigeria: Olusegun Obasanjo, President
106
Witnesses
For the United Nations: For the Federal Republic of Germany: For the United States of America: For the French Republic: For the United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland:
107
Appendix 2
Zone in question of the Bakassi Peninsula
1. In order to prepare the Nigerian nationals living in the zone in question of the Bakassi Peninsula (hereinafter “the Zone”) for the transfer of authority to Cameroon, the Zone shall temporarily be subject to a special status as laid down in this appendix. 2. (a) Cameroon shall allow Nigeria to keep its civil administration and a police force necessary for the maintenance of law and order in the Zone for a non-renewable period of two years from the time of the withdrawal of the Nigerian forces. At the end of this period, Nigeria shall withdraw its administration and its police force and Cameroon shall take over the administration of the Zone. (b) The United Nations and the witness States shall be invited to attend the ceremony of the transfer of authority. 3. For the duration of this period, Nigeria shall: (a) not conduct or allow the conduct of any activities in the Zone which would prejudice Cameroon’s peace or security; (b) take every necessary measure, under the supervision of the United Nations observers of the Cameroon-Nigeria Mixed Commission, to stop any transfer or influx of its nationals into the Zone; (c) not engage in any activity in the Zone which would complicate or hinder the transfer of authority to Cameroon; (d) equip its police force in the Zone with only the light equipment strictly necessary for the maintenance of law and order and for personal defence; (e) guarantee to Cameroonian nationals wishing to return to their village in the Zone the exercise of their rights; (f) not conduct or continue the exploitation of natural resources in the sub-soil of the Zone, or to engage in any other activity harmful to the environment; (g) take every necessary measure to prevent any change in land-property rights; and (h) not position any armed forces in the Zone. 4. Following the transfer of authority over the Zone to Cameroon, the latter shall apply to the Zone a special transitional regime for a non-renewable period of five years. In the application of the special transitional regime, Cameroon shall: (a) facilitate the exercise of the rights of Nigerian nationals living in the Zone and access by Nigerian civil authorities to the Nigerian population living in the Zone; (b) not apply its customs or immigration laws to Nigerian nationals living in the Zone on their direct return from Nigeria for the purpose of exercising their activities;
108
(c) allow officers and uniformed personnel of the Nigerian police access to the Zone, in cooperation with the Cameroonian police, with the minimum of formalities when dealing with inquiries into crimes and offences or other incidents exclusively concerning Nigerian nationals; and (d) allow innocent passage in the territorial waters of the Zone to civilian ships sailing under the Nigerian flag, consistent with the provisions of this Agreement, to the exclusion of Nigerian warships. 5. At the end of the special transitional regime, Cameroon shall fully exercise its rights of sovereignty over the Zone. 6. In accordance with paragraph 4 of this Annex, any acquisition of land in the Zone by Nigerian nationals not resident in the Zone at the time of the signature of this Agreement shall be perfected only in accordance with the laws and regulations of Cameroon.
top related