nicholasedwards_chanceanduncertainty_wargames
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What considerations exist in the
design of the elements of chance and
uncertainty in wargames utilised for
educational and training purposes?
Nicholas Edwards
MA War Studies ‐ King’s College, London
Supervisor: Professor Philip Sabin
Submission: 27 August 2014
Word Count: 14,997
The author of this report may be contacted via either:
nicholas@nced.eu
or
nicholas.edwards@bisimulations.com
Nicholas Edwards – MA War Studies – Dissertation
1
DECLARATION:
This dissertation is the sole work of the author, and has not been accepted in any
previous application for a degree; all quotations and sources of information have been
acknowledged.
I confirm that my research [x] did or did not [ ] require ethical approval.
KCL/13/14-54 - What considerations exist in the design of the element of chance in wargames utilised for training purposes?
I am pleased to inform you that full approval for your project has been granted by the WSG Research Ethics Panel. Any specific conditions of approval are laid out at the end of this letter which should be followed in addition to the standard terms and conditions of approval, to be overseen by your Supervisor:
o Ethical approval is granted for a period of one year from 21st January 2014. You will notreceive a reminder that your approval is about to lapse so it is your responsibility to apply foran extension prior to the project lapsing if you need one (see below for instructions).
I confirm that all research records (e.g. interview data and consent records) will be held
securely for the required period of time and then destroyed in accordance with College
guidelines. (The department will assume responsibility for this if you send your research
records to the Senior Programme Officer Panagiotis Stasinopoulos.) [x] Yes
Signed: Nicholas Edwards Date: 27 August 2014
Nicholas Edwards – MA War Studies – Dissertation
2
Abstract
This study investigates the considerations for the designer of a wargame for military
education and training purposes in handling the elements of chance and uncertainty.
The nature of uncertainty as a concept in both war and games is considered, before
reviewing how these two aspects are aligned to form the decision‐making environment
required to meet training objectives. Utilising Sabin’s trinity of influences on a wargame
as a basis, the role of chance and uncertainty within the mathematical model of the game
is reviewed not in isolation, but in balance with the influence of both skill and reality. The
needs of a model of chance and uncertainty that meets training objectives in theory is
compared to the application of the wargame in practice, specially how the training
audience react to both this model and how it is presented. The central discovery of this
study has been that a large gulf exists between theory and practice for the elements of
chance and uncertainty, as the considerations for developing a mathematical model and
how players react to this model in practice can often misalign.
To bridge this gulf between theory and practice this study recommends designers provide
players with a positive skill‐chance balance, as whilst not a panacea, was proven to help
minimise this issue. Rather than leaving players passive to the influence of chance and
uncertainty, by instead offering players meaningful decision‐making opportunities, the
decision‐making purpose of the game may be emphasised, bringing chance into balance
with skill.
Nevertheless, this study ultimately accepts that the most important consideration is the
context. The designer must clearly conceptualise both training objectives and training
audiences to utilise chance and uncertainty within the model, and present in such a way,
that aligns the concerns of both theory and practice.
Nicholas Edwards – MA War Studies – Dissertation
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Contents
1. Introduction ............................................................................................................ 4
2. Chance and Uncertainty as Concepts ....................................................................... 9
2.1 Chance and Uncertainty as Concepts in War ........................................................... 9
2.2 Chance and Uncertainty as Game Mechanics........................................................ 15
3. Developing the Wargame Model ........................................................................... 21
3.1 Developing the Decision‐Making Environment ..................................................... 21
3.2 Explicit Realism and Fidelity ................................................................................... 37
4. Player Reactions to Chance and Uncertainty ......................................................... 46
4.1 Player Reactions to the Model ............................................................................... 46
4.2 Player Reactions to Presentation ........................................................................... 52
5. Conclusion ............................................................................................................. 69
6. Bibliography .......................................................................................................... 74
Nicholas Edwards – MA War Studies – Dissertation
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1. Introduction
Peter Perla defined a wargame as ‘a warfare model or simulation in which the flow of
events shapes, and is shaped by, decisions made by a human player or players during the
course of those events’.1 Perla’s definition helps expose the two constituent parts of a
wargame. First is a mathematical model that produces a simulated representation of
reality.2 This pre‐determined system quantifies elements of the battlefield, such as forces
and terrain, alongside a series of rules governing the interaction between these
components.3 The second element is the role of the player, specifically their interaction
with this model through their decision‐making inputs.4 A wargame does not simply
consist of the model and its representation of reality, but is driven by the outputs
developed through the player making iterative choices.5 Players interact with the game
system through these choices, generating game events, which they in turn respond to,
guided in pursuit of a specified goal.6 This relationship between player decisions and
game events the model generates in reaction provides the feedback loop that
differentiates wargaming from purely computer‐driven simulation.7
McHugh identified three main methods of evaluating the game results that provide the
basis of this feedback loop. The first are “Rigid” games, where all outcomes are resolved
1 Perla (2011), p.2802 Sabin (2012), p.43 McHugh (2013), pp.2‐54 Sabin (2012), p.45 Ibid6 Ibid7 Perla (2011), p.23
Nicholas Edwards – MA War Studies – Dissertation
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through the fiat of a pre‐determined rule‐set.8 Second are “Free” games, where outcomes
are instead resolved through the judgements of an umpire utilising their professional
experience.9 Finally, “Semi‐Rigid” games are a combination of Rigid and Free games,
where outcomes may be judged through Rigid means, but also modified or have new
events injected at the behest of the umpire.10
Guiding design decisions on the structure of the model, method of evaluation, and focus
of player decision‐making, is the purpose for which the wargame is being played.11 A
professional military wargame has two main objectives, providing the player either
decision‐making experience or decision‐making knowledge, often gradients of both, that
is applicable to their real‐world role.12 These objectives each form the basis of the two
main purposes wargaming is utilised for. The first are “Analytical” games, generally
focusing on providing decision‐making information to underpin real‐world decisions on
force structure, operations assistance, and so forth.13 The second type, and the focus of
this study, are “Training” and “Educational” games, providing decision‐making experience
to educate and familiarise players with the operations, concepts, and battlefield
complications, required to prepare them for real‐world command.14
8 McHugh (2013), pp.14‐59 Ibid10 Ibid
11 Ibid, p.8
12 Ibid
13 Ibid, pp.223‐4
14 Ibid
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Nicholas Edwards – MA War Studies – Dissertation
7
The aim therefore of any wargame designer is to develop a decision‐making environment
that enables the game to meet its purpose.20 When players interact with the model, the
game must ensure they encounter the dilemmas that will drive them towards gaining the
experience or knowledge required by the game objective.21 Wargame design is though
more art than science, with no formal rules for meeting certain game objectives, nor are
wargames rigorously repeatable exercises due to the active human decision element.22
Rather, a designer must utilise their own judgement in modelling their assumptions of
reality, where the player, often in ways unforeseen by the designer, dictates the path the
game proceeds.23
Sabin referred to chance as the greatest liability of wargaming, as it provides a focal point
for sceptics of the method to dismiss its validity.24 A study that investigates the impact
that introducing mechanics relating to chance and uncertainty into the wargame model
has on the ability of an educational or training game to meet its objectives is therefore
required. By investigating designer choices on how chance and uncertainty influences the
decision‐making environment, how players will interact with the game, and the decisions
made by the Control Group, a set of considerations may be produced on how to handle
this aspect of wargame design. The aim shall be to investigate the importance of
20 Perla (2011), p.218
21 Sterrett (Interview)
22 Perla (2011), p.173
23 Ibid
24 Ibid, p.118
Nicholas Edwards – MA War Studies – Dissertation
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considering chance and uncertainty, how the designer can best utilise this design
element, what pitfalls to avoid, and how the purpose of the wargame influences these
decisions.
Nicholas Edwards – MA War Studies – Dissertation
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2. Chance and Uncertainty as Concepts
2.1 Chance and Uncertainty as Concepts in War
This study must first consider how uncertainty influences decision‐makers in an actual
combat environment to understand what chance and uncertainty within a wargame is
aiming to represent.25 As the focus is the influence of the combat environment upon the
decision‐maker, aligning with the decision‐making purpose of wargaming, this review
shall revolve around the concept of Situational Awareness.26
Endsley defined Situational Awareness as ‘the perception of the elements in the
environment within a volume of time and space, the comprehension of their meaning and
the projection of their status in the near future’.27 Good Situational Awareness is
dependent on the quality of received information and when this information is
incomplete, ambiguous, or conflicting, a state of uncertainty exists.28 The cause of this
battlefield uncertainty, and the resulting effect on Situational Awareness, must be
detailed to appreciate how the decision‐making calculus of the commander is
influenced.29
In On War Clausewitz placed a particular focus on the concepts of chance and
uncertainty, terming war ‘the realm of uncertainty’ where ‘three quarters of the
25 McCloskey (1996), p.194
26 Herbig (1986), p.100
27 Endsley (1995), p.36
28 Chancey & Bliss (2012), p.582; St. John et al. (2000), p.1
29 Herbig (1986), p.100
Nicholas Edwards – MA War Studies – Dissertation
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factors…are wrapped in a fog of greater or lesser uncertainty’.30 The environment of war
becomes a dynamic interplay of shifting possibilities and probabilities, where fluctuating
levels of uncertainty expose the decision‐maker to luck both good and bad.31 The result is
that war becomes a gamble for those who take part, approximate to a game of cards.32
The source of this uncertainty is Clausewitz’s notion of general friction, a concept
grouping the diverse factors that coalesce to impede the effective use of military force at
every stage of its application.33 To Clausewitz general friction best conceptualised the gap
between war as it occurs on paper with war as it ultimately transpires, bridging abstract
theory and practice.34 It is this gap, filled by general friction, where the influence of
uncertainty in disrupting the efficient use of force can be most felt, distorting the
information upon which Situational Awareness depends.35 Whilst a diverse range of
factors collate under the heading of general friction, a few major categories still emerge.36
Luttwak defined narrow, or incidental, friction as the impediments to the smooth
implementation of military action occurring through unforeseen organisational failure,
rather than just direct contact with enemy forces.37 Any action in war is not just the
seamless result of the decision‐makers will, but enacted through the numerous
30 Herbig (1986), p.95; Clausewitz (1993), p.117
31 Watts (1996), p.96
32 Clausewitz (1993), p.97
33 Ibid, pp.138‐40; Watts (1996), p.2; Waldman (2010), pp.354‐5
34 Watts (1996), p.10
35 Waldman (2010), p.337
36 Watts (1996), p.30
37 Luttwak (2001), pp.8‐9
Nicholas Edwards – MA War Studies – Dissertation
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individuals within the system.38 Human and mechanical fallibility within this system of
individuals can cause minor incidents of friction, from breakdowns, miscommunication,
fatigue, fear, and other uncountable sources.39 Individually, these minor incidents create
localised difficulties, but through the nature of incidental friction, these minor incidents
accumulate and multiply in severity, turning numerous localised accidents into a major
incident.40
The multiplication of narrow friction is not though equal to the sum of these minor
incidents as unnoticeably small sources interact with other incidents and multiply in
unforeseeable directions, causing an effect out of scale with the initial sources.41 The
multiplication of incidental friction contrives to make what in theory was simple difficult,
as efficient execution is stalled, delayed, or halted entirely, through the accumulation of
small organisational failures.42 Ultimately, this limits the ability for the decision‐maker to
extrapolate fully the consequences of an action and their ability to make informed
decisions.43
Intelligence uncertainty exists when information on the current state of battlefield, such
as men and materials, locations and force levels, or weather forecasts, is missing,
38 Watts (1996), p.29
39 Waldman (2010), p.354
40 Ibid
41 Beyerchen (1992), p.70
42 Herbig (1986), p.105
43 Beyerchen (1992), p.70
Nicholas Edwards – MA War Studies – Dissertation
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unreliable, or unobtainable.44 The decision‐maker must feed information into their
Situational Awareness perception to evolve the mental image they have of the
battlefield.45 If any gaps exist then their Situational Awareness shall be inadequate and
the perception that decision‐making relies upon shall be faulty.46 Greater Intelligence
gathering capabilities can help, but ultimately the notion of a perfect Intelligence picture
is unobtainable due to the limits on how much information can be processed whilst still
allowing a timely response.47
The adversarial nature of warfare, the contest between two opposing forces attempting
to force their will upon the other and the requirement to consider possible enemy
reactions, is another source of general friction.48 Clausewitz stated that war is never an
exercise of applying intent upon an inanimate or passive object, but an interdependent
activity against a reactive opponent acting on their own intent.49 Whilst clues on the
intent of this reactive foe may be gathered from the developing Intelligence picture, the
nature of human interaction prevents exact knowledge of another’s thought process,
leaving the ways in which the combat situation shall evolve as a result to remain
inaccessible.50
44 McCloskey (1996), pp.194‐5
45 Chancey & Bliss (2012), p.582
46 Watts (1996), pp.28‐9
47 Waldman (2010), pp.344‐5
48 Gray (1999), p.10; Herbig (1986), p.103
49 Clausewitz (1993), p.86
50 Herbig (1986), p.111
Nicholas Edwards – MA War Studies – Dissertation
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These sources of general friction are not however mutually exclusive, instead coalescing
and interacting with each other, leading Watts and Beyerchen to conclude that war
follows a non‐linear logic.51 If war followed a linear logic, deterministic cause and effect
relationships could be formed and the end result of any action predictable if the initial
state of the variables known.52 General friction though compasses what Watts and
Beyerchen feel makes war non‐linear, as the different sources form small unexpected
incidents through the interaction between the adversaries and the variables shaping the
battlefield.53 The small complications caused by general friction make cause and effect
relationships impossible as the impact of each incident multiplies out of proportion to the
scale of the original source.54 Even if the initial state of the battlefield is known
completely, the ways in which the associated variables shall interact through incidents of
general friction is unpredictable and wide‐ranging, making the end state inaccessible.55
The subsequent complexities of the system results in the decision‐maker never able to
construct a perfect mental picture of the battlefield, and are instead forced to rely upon a
simplified model of reality based on abstract concepts such as probability.56 The
consequence of any decision becomes impossible to comprehend fully as the non‐
linearity of system and overwhelming complexity of information prevent a fully informed
51 Watts (1996), p.115; Beyerchen (1992), pp.60‐8
52 Watts (1996), p.106
53 Ibid, p.115; Beyerchen (1992), pp.60‐8
54 Ibid
55 Beyerchen (1992), p.72
56 St. John et al. (2000), p.1; Rowe (1994), p.747; Taleb (2010), p.133
Nicholas Edwards – MA War Studies – Dissertation
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cause and effect model being produced.57 Instead, the unperceivable results of the
interaction between the various variables of conflict are abstractly characterised as
“chance events”, where luck becomes the only term to explain a murky cause and effect
process in which interaction makes perfect prediction impossible.58 An example would be
Taleb’s concept of “Black Swans”, the abstract notion of unforeseeable events resulting
from the limits of human knowledge and inability comprehend complex systems.59
Without clear linear cause and effect relationships, the system of war becomes
impossible to comprehend as a whole and uncertainty becomes a central feature.60 The
causes of general friction have roots in the fact that war is a human activity, susceptible
to their fallibility and cognitive limits, and as long as this remains the case, war shall
remain non‐linear.61 New technologies may improve the rate at which Intelligence is
gathered, but the human element and interactive nature of warfare shall still contrive to
prevent linearity.62
If general friction is therefore an irreducible element of warfare that all parties in combat
experience than the perception of its role in warfare cannot just be negative.63 The
alternative to eliminating general friction is instead to gain a relative frictional advantage
57 Watts (1996), p.115
58 Beyerchen (1992), pp.71‐2
59 Taleb (2010), pp.213&330
60 Jobbágy (2008), p.170
61 Watts (1996), p.78
62 Ibid, p.122; Pitt (2008), p.58
63 Waldman (2010), p.354; Herbig (1986), p.106
Nicholas Edwards – MA War Studies – Dissertation
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over the opponent.64 The adversarial nature of warfare leads to opportunities to exploit
and magnify an opponent’s own failures from general friction through utilising surprise.65
Paret concluded that this was the real mark of what Clausewitz believed when he termed
“genius”, the ability to exploit chance events, and is why Clausewitz viewed chance as an
‘interplay of possibilities, probabilities, good luck and bad’.66 By exploiting those
possibilities, a decision‐maker can turn their frictional advantage into decisive effects.67
2.2 Chance and Uncertainty as Game Mechanics
Uncertainty in games constitutes the elements of game design that reduce the
predictable consequences of any action taken within the game system.68 Salen and
Zimmerman divide this uncertainty into two distinct categories, that at the “macro” level
and that at the “micro” level.69
Macro‐level uncertainty concerns any doubt that exists over the end state of the game.70
Salen and Zimmerman state that an amount of macro‐level uncertainty is vital to every
game if it is to remain engaging to players and offer the choices required to match its
64 Jobbágy (2008), p.172
65 Beyerchen (1992), p.69
66 Paret (1985), p.373; Waldman (2010), p.356
67 Watts (1996), pp.33‐4
68 Salen & Zimmerman (2004), p.174
69 Ibid
70 Ibid
Nicholas Edwards – MA War Studies – Dissertation
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decision‐making focus.71 A game in which the outcome, or path towards it, is near certain
or predetermined will have made the decision‐making element redundant, instead
reducing the game to a deterministic mathematical model.72 Micro‐Level uncertainty
instead concerns specific operations of chance and uncertainty within this game system.73
The focus at the Micro‐Level is directed towards what impact these specific operations of
chance and uncertainty mechanics shall have upon individual instances of player decision‐
making.74
Whilst macro‐level uncertainty is required, the nuanced application of micro‐level
uncertainty to achieve the desired influence on player decision‐making requires a more
complex set of considerations.75 Therefore, this study is more concerned with the
questions that surround micro‐level game mechanics and the decision‐making
environment developed by the application of individual chance and uncertainty game
mechanics.
Three broad categories constitute the methods by which micro‐level uncertainty may be
introduced. The first form of micro‐Level uncertainty is from randomness.76 By utilising
randomness, outcomes are made subject to probability, introducing an element of luck,
or chance, into player success and failure, leading to player uncertainty over the
71 Salen & Zimmerman (2004), p.174
72 Ibid; Costikyan (2013), p.16
73 Salen & Zimmerman (2004), p.174
74 Ibid
75 Ibid
76 Bjӧrk & Holopainen (2005), p.379
Nicholas Edwards – MA War Studies – Dissertation
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consequences of actions taken.77 This form of uncertainty may be either stochastic, where
previous results have no impact on later ones, for example dice, or non‐stochastic, where
each result shall influence later ones, such as cards where the remaining outcomes
depend on cards left in the deck.78 A deterministic system alternatively omits any
randomness, instead offering only one set possibility to outcomes.79
The second form of micro‐level uncertainty is informational, where players lack certainty
on the current state of the game system.80 Players may have information hidden from
them, leaving them with an incomplete picture of the game state, or faulty information
from deliberate deception or misinterpretation.81 Furthermore, this information may be
known to one player, both players, or neither and known only to the game system.82 The
effect of such uncertainty is again to negate the ability for the player to predict the
consequences of their actions and make informed decisions because of a reduced ability
to foresee and judge the value of a plan of action.83 Similarly, a game can allow players
perfect information, such as in chess, where all information on the games state is visible
77 Bjӧrk & Holopainen (2005), p.379
78 Costikyan (2013), p.83
79 Rubel (2006), p.120
80 Bjӧrk & Holopainen (2005), p.123
81 Ibid
82 Salen & Zimmerman (2004), p.205
83 Costikyan (2013), p.94
Nicholas Edwards – MA War Studies – Dissertation
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to both players at all times and available so that the entire game state can be taken into
account when decision‐making.84
The final category of micro‐level uncertainty is adversarial, the uncertainty from facing a
reactive opponent.85 Whenever an opponent is involved, a measure of uncertainty exists
over what actions they may or may not take next, in reaction to those of the player.86
Players unable to read an opponent’s intent shall again be unable to comprehend the full
consequences of their actions.87 Returning to chess, a game where outcomes are not
subject to randomness and where all information on the game state is visible, still offers
this uncertainty over an opponent’s future decisions.88 Alternatively, a solitaire game may
omit this uncertainty, where no reactive, thinking, opponent is present, just the player
completing against the game system.89
As mentioned, all games require uncertainty at the macro‐level to be a game that allows
meaningful decision‐making and not simply a pre‐determined mathematical model.90 The
challenge for the games designer then is how to utilise the three categories of micro‐level
uncertainty to ensure the game meets design objectives.91 Every decision‐making
dilemma within a game shall be formed from a mixture of these three categories, even if
84 Salen & Zimmerman (2004), p.204
85 Costikyan (2013), pp.28‐9
86 Ibid
87 Ibid, p.81
88 Sabin (2012), pp.110‐1
89 Ibid, pp.112‐5; Perla (2011), p.166
90 Salen & Zimmerman (2004), p.174
91 Ibid
Nicholas Edwards – MA War Studies – Dissertation
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some situations are left completely deterministic, have perfect information, or are one‐
sided.92 The question therefore is not whether a game includes any chance or
uncertainty, but instead what types, at what points, to what mixture, and to what
extent.93
Sabin states that a key design decision is how to balance the skill and chance aspects of
the game.94 Skill and chance are not two diametrically opposed influences, but rather a
spectrum exists between the two based on the balance between the influence of player
decision‐making and the extent their success or failure is attributable to “luck”.95 The
common theme running through the categories of micro‐level uncertainty, and the
gameplay concept that binds them, is the effect on player decision‐making and skill
caused by limiting their ability to make informed decisions.96 By limiting foresight through
unpredictable consequences and imperfect information, an element of luck will now
define player failure or success to some extent.97
Roger Caillois describes luck as something the player becomes passive to and is unable to
influence, but Salen and Zimmerman disagree, for they feel a well‐designed game should
allot the player some amount of choice in their actions.98 Salen and Zimmerman instead
92 Salen & Zimmerman (2004), p.174
93 Costikyan (2013), p.113
94 Sabin (2012), pp.117‐8
95 Ibid
96 Bjӧrk & Holopainen (2005), p.381
97 Ibid
98 Salen & Zimmerman (2004), p.179
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Nicholas Edwards – MA War Studies – Dissertation
21
3. Developing the Wargame Model
3.1 Developing the Decision‐Making Environment
The role of chance and uncertainty, in balance with the skill element, in forming the
specific decision‐making environment required to meet game objectives must first be
analysed.102 The design of any wargame must begin with a clear conceptualisation of
what training objectives the sponsor wishes the game to meet.103 James Sterrett
identifies the “PDI Model”, the “Purpose” of what the student should learn from the
game, what “Decisions” and dilemmas the student should face, and what “Interactions”
the game model should provide to assure those dilemmas occur.104 The exact model of
chance and uncertainty used by the game is one of the central components to forcing the
player to face the dilemmas required by the training objectives.105
The first identified category of chance and uncertainty was randomness, the use of a
random number generator or a non‐stochastic method, to develop what McHugh
referred to as the “chance device”, adding uncertainty to results within the system.106
Randomness offers a top‐down method of enforcing the overall influence of general
friction’s non‐linearity upon a game event through a moderated range of potential
outcomes.107 The central motivation thus of utilising a chance device is a need to
102 Perla (2011), p.218
103 Longley‐Brown (Interview)
104 Sterrett (Interview)
105 Ibid
106 McHugh (2013), p.223
107 Heilmann (Interview)
Nicholas Edwards – MA War Studies – Dissertation
22
introduce the inherent unpredictability of warfare through an abstract unified
mechanic.108
Rather than attempting bottom‐up modelling of all the countless influences causing
general friction, randomness allows the designer to focus upon producing the overall
effect of this uncertainty upon situational awareness.109 It was discussed earlier that
decision‐makers are forced to develop simplified mental models of reality to make sense
of the non‐linear complexity of general friction by distilling the effects into concepts such
as “chance events”. Randomness does not simulate all the unknown factors that cause
these chance events, but instead directly forces players to perceive game events through
the similar abstracted notions of probability.110 Overall, randomness is a method by which
to increase the level of pressure placed upon player decisions by reducing the predictable
consequences of any action they take.111
If the designer is to utilise randomness in a way that aligns with their objectives then it is
crucial they understand the basics of distribution, as this shall greatly determine to what
extent luck shall influence results.112 The first consideration is that between individual and
compound probabilities. If a single six‐sided dice is thrown then the distribution is flat as
108 Heilmann (Interview)
109 Sabin (2012), p.25
110 Ibid
111 Longley‐Brown (Interview); Sterrett (Interview)
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Nicholas Edwards – MA War Studies – Dissertation
24
the system shall be, compared to fewer die rolls with a greater relative spread of
results.117 The spread of successful results is the other side to distributions, with luck
having a heavier influence on results if successful results are reduced to narrow odds.118
In comparison to an even spread of results, players having to roll a six to succeed will
have few opportunities to apply their skill, as any progress becomes reliant on an unlikely
die‐roll.119
Nevertheless, even with a distribution that produces the desired spread of results on
paper, in practice the designer must also consider the impact of fluke results.120 A die roll
may for example land on a six three times in a row in a game, which may accurately
represent the non‐linear processes general friction can take121, or an extreme that
overestimates this effect122. Either way, considering what influence these outliers and
having such luck shall have on gameplay and training objectives, shall be crucial.123 A
string of results that led the course of the game in a direction that avoids desired
dilemmas, or where an opponent who simply has just had good fortune has left the player
without the capabilities to react, may ruin the training experience.124 Graham Longley‐
117
Sabin (2012), p.272 118
Ibid 119
Ibid 120
Ibid (Interview) 121
Allen (1989), p.332 122
Rubel (2006), pp.119‐20 123
Longley‐Brown (Interview) 124
Brynen (Interview)
Nicholas Edwards – MA War Studies – Dissertation
25
Brown is clear that if a die roll might lead to a result that prevents meeting a training
objective, then that die roll simply has no place in the game model.125
An alternative is a deterministic system, where rather than utilising randomness for
calculating outcomes, results are decided through pre‐determined formulas for each
scenario with only one outcome.126 An example would be calculating combat results
through the ratio between the attacker’s “Attack Value” and defender’s “Defence Value”,
with the same outcome occurring whenever this ratio exists.127 The designer must instead
of sampling the immense variation in reality, find the statistical average of these events
and reflect just this average in game results.128 The benefit of such an approach is that
certain instances of chance, where results may distract or lead to training objectives being
missed, are removed and replaced by more controllable determinism.129
However, a clash emerges in deterministic systems, between the established non‐linear
nature of warfare and the certainty such a system emphasises. To some, removing this
element of randomness creates too great a disconnect between the game and the reality
the student is being prepared for.130 Without the chance that an encounter may go better
or worse than expected, a completely rational cost‐benefit form of decision‐making may
125 Longley‐Brown (Interview)
126 Rubel (2006), p.120
127 Ibid
128 Curry (2012b), p.13
129 Longley‐Brown (Interview)
130 Heilmann (Interview); Sabin (Interview)
Nicholas Edwards – MA War Studies – Dissertation
26
be encouraged, rather than the weighing of probabilities.131 Determinism does not
therefore simulate the effect on Situational Awareness that general friction was
previously demonstrated to create, the sheer unpredictability of the result of any decision
taken by the commander. The resulting experience may thus be of lesser value or even
misleading in the lessons it imbues.132
James Sterrett though stresses the importance of causality, feeling it develops a clearer
link between the quality of decision‐making and success within the game.133 His approach
ensures that player decisions only fail in situations where they would be expected to do
so because of obvious faults in their planning.134 This does result in removing part of the
inherent uncertainty of reality through reducing the influence of chance, but Sterrett feels
using this as a criticism misses the point of designing for the training objective.135 Simply
including randomness because such bouts of bad fortune may occur in reality is not
automatically a legitimate motivation.136 To Sterrett, that the reality of war is uncertain
and that friction may prevent a plan succeeding is common knowledge and thus not a
productive lesson to teach.137 Instead, by ensuring plans unfold exactly as the player
envisaged, the game shall clearly highlight the quality of their planning and the role of any
131 Sabin (Interview)
132 Ibid; Brynen (Interview)
133 Leser & Sterrett, (2010), pp.150‐1; Sterrett (Interview)
134 Leser & Sterrett, (2010), p.151
135 Ibid
136 Sterrett (Interview)
137 Ibid
Nicholas Edwards – MA War Studies – Dissertation
27
particular decision on the outcome.138 By developing a clear link between decision and
outcome, a mistake may be quickly identified and learned from.139 If randomness blurs
this link however, or leads to a bad decision coming good due to luck, then achieving the
training objective may be severely affected.140
However, as has been previously demonstrated, a game requires an element of
uncertainty to offer decision‐making opportunities, whilst randomness is not the sole
method available. Sterrett’s approach does not disregard the influence of either
informational or adversarial uncertainty and indeed now requires it.141 Through utilising
uncertainty from these sources, a similar effect may compliment, or potentially even a
substitute, for the uncertainty of randomness.142 Just as with randomness, the player
must contend with a level of uncertainty over the consequences of their individual and
cumulative actions, because of the inability to perceive either perfect clarity.143 An
element of guesswork exists in player decisions, as whilst both may permit an element of
deductive reasoning on this hidden information, or possible avenues of enemy decision‐
making, there is no guarantee their deduction was correct.144
138 Leser & Sterrett, (2010), p.151
139 Sterrett (Interview)
140 Ibid
141 Leser & Sterrett, (2010), p.151
142 Sabin (Interview)
143 Ibid
144 Ibid
Nicholas Edwards – MA War Studies – Dissertation
28
In an “Open” game, information would be available to all players, from Order of Battle,
deployments, capabilities, and so forth.145 Far more common in professional educational
environments though are “Closed” games, hiding some or all the information on game
state that each side predicate their decisions upon, to one, some, or all players.146
Graham Longley‐Brown went as far as to say that he could not conceive of a wargame
with an educational purpose that was an Open game, the impossibility of such a state of
affairs in reality limiting the use of this to any training objective.147 The player in a Closed
game must instead either earn their intelligence through their actions, or be provided it
by the system, the concern in both cases being how the training objectives require the
player utilises this information in their decision‐making.148
Adversarial uncertainty allows the designer to apply pressure to player decision‐making
through the presence of an opponent reacting to the actions they take.149 The main
benefit of adversarial wargaming are the unpredictable and creative plans that the player
must confront from an opponent who may be another student, both attempting to stress
and defeat the other.150 Also common are the use of “Red Cells”, an organised opposition
led by the Control Group.151 Rather than being truly adversarial by actively striving to
defeat the player at all cost, Red Cells are often limited to forcing certain player reactions
145 McCarry (1991), p.48
146 Ibid
147 Longley‐Brown (Interview)
148 Sterrett (Interview)
149 Mouat (Interview)
150 Ibid; Elg (Interview)
151 Sabin (Interview)
Nicholas Edwards – MA War Studies – Dissertation
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to guide the exercise towards its objectives.152 Thus the level of adversarial intent of a
Red Cell is adjusted, anywhere from a near‐passive opponent allowing the player to room
to become accustomed to their role, to an opponent thinking creatively in a genuine
attempt to defeat the player.153
Similar to the choice between stochastic and deterministic systems therefore, the
difference between a real player and Red Cells is the ability to control the games
direction.154 The use of a Red Cell allows the Control Group a far greater amount of
control over the course the game takes by following courses of action that force player
decision‐making towards situations that align with training objectives.155 Red Cells though
shall rarely reach the true level of intensity and inventiveness that another genuine player
shall offer.156 Indeed, a Red Cell trying too hard to win and doing too well may be asked to
exercise restraint if it risks derailing game progress towards meeting the training
objectives, by over‐stressing players and leaving them unable to effectively make
decisions.157
This role of the Control Group, led by the umpire or “Game Controller”, presents an
additional angle to the considerations surrounding chance and uncertainty. Umpires are
not an absolute requirement, as rigid games with a self‐contained rule‐set can be played
152 Sabin (Interview)
153 Longley‐Brown (Interview)
154 Mouat (Interview)
155 Ibid
156 Ibid
157 Ibid
Nicholas Edwards – MA War Studies – Dissertation
30
between students under less supervision.158 For semi‐rigid gaming however, the Control
Group shall play a greater, more fundamental role in guiding chance and uncertainty in
the game.159
Much of semi‐rigid wargaming is predicated on the capability to moderate randomness
through the ability for umpires to overrule fluke results.160 By controlling randomisation,
an outcome that may derail training objectives due to a disproportionate influence of luck
may be avoided by altering results or their gameplay effects.161 This may be done openly,
if the result is usually generated in front of the players.162 Alternatively, if results are
generated behind the scenes, it may simply be that the information on outcomes sent
back to players is moderated in advance.163 In this case generated results will often begin
as provisional, until the Game Controller can upgrade it to a firm result with or without
moderation, once assured it shall continue game progress towards meeting training
objectives.164
Moderating the results of randomness cannot though be regarded as a panacea. If an
adversarial game where both sides are expected to strive for victory at all costs is desired,
too much intervention in moderating outcomes may be a dangerous course of action as
158 Sabin (Interview)
159 Longley‐Brown (Interview)
160 Elg (Interview)
161 Jethu & Jain (2004), pp.412‐3
162 Longley‐Brown (Interview)
163 Ibid; Elg (Interview)
164 Longley‐Brown (Interview)
Nicholas Edwards – MA War Studies – Dissertation
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the significance of victory may evaporate.165 Sabin also believes that too much umpire
inference shall eventually undermine the purpose of utilising uncertainty if doing so
evaporates the consequences of risk‐taking in an uncertain environment.166 It is essential
therefore that the umpire has the training and experience to know exactly when and how
the rules of the game are going to be disregarded to avoid undermining the purpose for
which chance and uncertainty are utilised.167
Another tool available to Control Groups are injects, explicit “chance events” that the
Control Group may force to occur within the game whilst it is in progress.168 The Control
Group are able to feed these incidents of narrow friction or new information into the
game, forcing the players to adjust their decision‐making to a new situation.169 Injects
therefore become another source of uncertainty to the players, with general friction now
applied directly into the game in way fully controllable by the Control Group.170 These
injects are also another way as well of applying pressure to the players in order to force
them to deal with situations or utilise information that is in line with the decision‐making
dilemmas required to meet training objectives.171
165 Rubel (Interview); Sabin (Interview)
166 Sabin (Interview)
167 Elg (Interview)
168 von Hilgers (2012), p.63; Allen (1989), p.35
169 Longley‐Brown (Interview)
170 Ibid
171 Ibid
Nicholas Edwards – MA War Studies – Dissertation
32
Albert Praun, active in 1930s German wargaming, saw it as ‘the main art of the director’
to utilise injects of general friction and new information, to put player decision‐making
under pressure.172 Praun envisaged injects arranged like a screenplay, a meticulously
planned arrangement for when to insert these events.173 The modern equivalents are
what NATO term MEL/MILs, similar lists of military events and incidents to inject into the
game.174 Like Praun’s screenplay a storyboard is developed, either entirely pre‐scripted
with events that must occur to achieve training objectives, or dynamic in reaction to
player decisions to change the direction of play.175 These events are injected as required
during gameplay, creating chance events of varying difficulties to fit the situation and
keep the requisite level of pressure on players.176
Overall, chance and uncertainty mechanics therefore provide the designer with a method
of introducing the decision‐making dilemmas caused by general friction into the
educational or training environment of the wargame.177 By utilising chance and
uncertainty in this manner, the designer can put player decision‐making under pressure,
forcing them to weigh the shifting possibilities and probabilities of differing courses of
action, with varying levels of uncertainty over the outcome.178 The player, now unable to
perceive an optimum course of action, may be forced into the decision‐making dilemmas
172 von Hilgers (2012), pp.63‐4
173 Ibid
174 Di Marzio (2009), p.9
175 Ibid
176 Longley‐Brown (Interview)
177 Sabin (Interview)
178 Ibid
Nicholas Edwards – MA War Studies – Dissertation
33
the training objectives require from the game.179 The other variable is control, firstly that
awarded to the umpire in assuring chance and uncertainty continue to drive the game in
the right direction. Controlling chance to meet training objectives is common,
demonstrated through the range of random probability, the moderation of results, Red
Cells, injects, and omitting certain types of chance and uncertainty.
For the player, the notion of control refers to the ability they have to manipulate the
variables comprising each instance of chance and uncertainty.180 Chess represents one
extreme, where players have high levels of control with no randomness or hidden
information, with uncertainty only through adversarial intent.181 Player skill is emphasised
because the player has full control over their progress as they can manipulate their pieces
as desired, with only opponent reaction forcing any guesswork.182 The other extreme
would be snakes and ladders where players have no control over the game as die rolls
they cannot influence determine their entire progress, with player skill utterly replaced by
pure luck.183
A wargame of pure luck, where players have no control over their progress would not
necessarily be an unrealistic experience as many aspects of warfare are more dependent
179 Longley‐Brown (Interview)
180 Salen & Zimmerman (2004), p.179
181 Sabin (2012), p.110
182 Salen & Zimmerman (2004), pp.225‐6&337
183 Ibid, p.179
Nicholas Edwards – MA War Studies – Dissertation
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upon luck than any skill on the part of the decision‐maker.184 Nevertheless, the central
purpose of an educational/training wargame is the decision‐making experience offered to
players.185 Once the player loses control over manipulating game variables through luck
they cannot influence, the ability for the game to offer this experience shall be lost.186
Even when the player does have control, if their success comes down to luck the danger
exists of teaching false lessons as the causality between decisions and results may blur.187
Frank mentions the requirement for some level of cause and effect to be present to give
the game a logical structure from which players may draw lessons.188
However, to conclude that both chance and uncertainty should be utterly minimised for
clear causality, and emphasis on pure player skill against purely adversarial uncertainty, is
problematic. Including the pressures of general friction on decision‐makers is a commonly
desired method of presenting players with the dilemmas of the real‐world battlefield.189
To advise that chance and uncertainty should be minimised may allow clearer causation,
but at the price of reducing the relevance of the game experience to the reality it is
preparing players for.
To view the element of chance and uncertainty in such negative terms is however a
fallacy that has been previously dismissed. Clausewitz saw general friction as something
184 Sabin (Interview)
185 McHugh (2013), p.224
186 Salen & Zimmerman (2004), p.174‐5
187 Sterrett (Interview)
188 Frank (Interview)
189 Sabin (Interview)
Nicholas Edwards – MA War Studies – Dissertation
35
offering possibilities that genius may exploit, whilst Salen and Zimmerman dismissed
Callois' view of chance as an element towards which the player is passive.190 It is a
positive view of chance that complements rather than opposes skill where a solution lies.
Mouat is clear that players require the ability to make decisions related to the skills the
training objectives aim to teach, as failure resulting from unforeseeable events teaches
little.191 By strategising chance and uncertainty through giving players the ability to
manipulate the associated variables, the designer may create a balance between skill and
chance.192 Rather than players remain completely passive to the influence of chance and
uncertainty, they instead may have the ability to take calculated risks.193 This may be
through overloading combat force ratios, taking step losses for greater combat odds,
exploiting opportunities to earn information, or through the ability to deceive the
opponent.194
The key point is that players are allotted meaningful decision‐making opportunities when
facing situations developed by chance and uncertainty through an ability to influence the
odds or increase their information of the state of the game.195 By allowing players to
manipulate the variables surrounding chance and uncertainty, rather than remain
completely passive to their effects, an experience offering meaningful decision‐making
190
Paret (1985), p.373 ; Salen & Zimmerman (2004), p.179 191
Mouat (Interview) 192
Salen & Zimmerman (2004), p.185‐6 193
Ibid, p.179 194
Sabin (Interview) 195
Ibid
Nicholas Edwards – MA War Studies – Dissertation
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may exist alongside the pressures of general friction.196 The designer must comprehend
just how much control to afford the player over manipulating which variables,
acknowledging where the skill‐chance balance shall lie.
The actual training objectives shall always be the final arbiter over the chance‐skill
balance, levels of pressure applied, and control afforded to the player. Games that fall
towards the training purpose will be more likely to offer greater player control and put
players under only a small amount of pressure.197 As training simply aims to imbue
procedural information and have players who follow these procedures succeed more
often than not, a prominent level of chance and uncertainty could provide problematic.198
Too much pressure and too little control, both to players in following procedures and for
the Control Group in driving the game in the direction of those procedures, may simply
blur the required clarity of the lesson.199
Similarly, the level of experience of the training audience is significant, with different
considerations existing for different stages of the curriculum.200 Sterrett states that when
he emphasises causation the key reason is that he is running wargames for students who
are fresh and not ready for the full spectrum of general friction.201 Thus, the context
under which the game takes place is central for the required chance and uncertainty
196 Salen & Zimmerman (2004), p.185‐6
197 Mouat (Interview)
198 Ibid
199 Ibid
200 Sterrett (Interview)
201 Ibid
Nicholas Edwards – MA War Studies – Dissertation
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balancing. Frank mentions how the influence of uncertainty may be slowly increased
linear to the learning curve as the player gains experience.202 A spectrum of training and
education thus exists, affording less experienced students more control with less pressure
as they learn procedural lessons, moving up to mission rehearsal where the relation of
control and pressure to reality becomes more important.203
3.2 Explicit Realism and Fidelity
These game design considerations of balancing skill and chance handle these two points
of Sabin's trinity, but balancing with the third point, the explicit “realism” of the model
developed and how vital it is generating valid knowledge and experience must now be
considered.204 Any game that represents reality requires a level of abstraction, a
simplification of the elements that constitute the model due to an inability to include
every facet of the phenomenon.205 Eddington et al., defined simulation as a model
representing the central features of reality, with Salen and Zimmerman finding the use of
‘central features’, rather than just “reality” significant as it highlights the inability for a
202 Frank (Interview)
203 Longley‐Brown (Interview)
204 Rubel (2006), p.115; Sabin (2012), p.117
205 Juul (2007), p.1; Salen & Zimmerman (2004), p.439
Nicholas Edwards – MA War Studies – Dissertation
38
model to be a comprehensive representation.206 Games represent reality metaphorically,
not literally, and cannot be both broad and deep in their modelling.207
The reasoning behind this emphasis on simplicity is twofold. The first is the role of the
player and the need to balance with playability.208 A system too convoluted may make it
hard for players to make clear decisions, potentially leading to artificial decision‐making
or prohibit meaningful decision‐making entirely.209 The second is the lack of correlation
between the complexity of a wargame and the resulting realism.210 Perla was clear that
the technical accuracy of a wargame and the realism produced are not synonymous.211
The reason returns to the notion previously presented of war being nonlinear and the
attribute of such a system where the sum of its components does not equal the whole. As
a result, bottom‐up modelling, where every quantifiable input is simply incorporated into
the system, shall not automatically guarantee a realistic model.212
Instead of focusing on bottom‐up modelling, Sabin favours a top‐down approach where,
rather than concentrating on inputs, the outputs the game system produces are
prioritised, allowing better representation of the unquantifiable elements of warfare.213
Randomness was previously demonstrated to be a common tool for the abstraction
206
Eddington et al. (1982), p.10; Salen & Zimmerman (2004), p.423 207
Salen & Zimmerman (2004), p.457 208
Sabin (2012), p.19 209
Perla (2011), p.263; Salen & Zimmerman (2004), p.425 210
Curry (2012a), p.12 211
Perla (2011), p.138 212
Sabin (2012), p.25 213
Ibid
Nicholas Edwards – MA War Studies – Dissertation
39
process, allowing the designer to represent the influence of general friction as simple
probability.
Whilst chance mechanics may be utilised to represent the notion of the uncertain non‐
linear dynamics that shape the undercurrent of war, there is one significant limitation to
their ability to do so. Games are environments are structured around a limited rule‐set,
restraining the number of outcomes and interactions, only representing chance and
uncertainty within a narrow cross‐section.214 Taleb termed the “Ludic Fallacy” to highlight
this limitation of game‐like modelling, specifically dice, as methods of modelling the
uncertainty that exists in reality.215 Taleb felt that such approaches domesticated the
effects of uncertainty in reality as the “bounded” nature of games leaves open only a
certain number of possibilities and sterilises any risk faced.216 The RAND study “Surprise!”
also highlighted this when talking of “contrived” environments, where a specific set of
rules govern and limit the possible interactions between participants, reducing the level
of chaos in the environment.217 The study contrasts the difference between a military
professional, in a non‐linear environment, with a sports coach, who can effectively
visualise all possible scenarios that can occur due to the bounded nature of a game
system.218
214
Perla (2011), p.251 215
Taleb (2010), pp.128‐30 216
Ibid 217
Baiocchi & Fox (2013), pp.46‐8 218
Ibid, p.15
Nicholas Edwards – MA War Studies – Dissertation
40
The use of randomness as a valid abstraction for the uncertainty of warfare shall thus
require justification. One method to justify this abstraction is through explicit references
to military history of similar scenarios to the exercise as a basis.219 Graham Longley‐
Brown, in order to prove that data on chance mechanics is valid and accurate, mentions
utilising historical analysis developed by an official source, for him Dstl.220 Whilst not
predictive, such data provides a odds average for cases under certain force‐ratios or
stances.221 By deriving combat result data and the degree of random variation from this
data, which importantly shall undergo further verification and validation scrutiny before
being judged fit for purpose, Longley‐Brown feels random generation can be proven
valid.222
Robert Rubel however is less convinced that randomness can justifiably portray
unmodelled factors of reality.223 This is not to say that Rubel feels all uses of randomness
are invalid, accepting technical applications, like radar detection or weapon reliability,
that are probabilistic in nature having odds that he feels are more easily validated.224 To
aggregate wide ranges of unmodelled variables, such as the complex interaction of large
forces, or factors dependant on human performance such as morale, logistics, and
219
Elg (Interview) 220
Longley‐Brown (Interview) 221
Ibid 222
Ibid 223
Rubel (2006), p.117 224
Ibid; Ibid (Interview)
Nicholas Edwards – MA War Studies – Dissertation
41
training, into die rolls, though, is far more strenuous to Rubel.225 To him the fact that dice
are unpredictable does not make them synonymous with the inability to perceive the full
complexities underlining general friction on the real battlefield.226 Notions of luck and
chance are a special phenomenon unto the dice themselves, which can cause a greater
correlation of unmodelled factors than how likely they will align in reality, casting doubt
on their validity.227
Rubel still recognises necessity of the abstraction process and feels to conclude that
wargaming must have unsparing fidelity in the number of variables simulated, rather than
any abstraction of chance, would be untenable.228 Ultimately, the notion that war follows
a non‐linear process prevents all relevant factors being included and can only therefore
be an imperfect copy of warfare directed towards a purpose.229 To attempt to include
every variable would not only be impractical, but the increased fidelity would become
increasingly expensive, preventing the benefits to costs games aim to achieve.230 Rubel
accepts the need to distillate factors seen as extraneous, and that in fact this process may
cover for the damage caused by lowering the level of fidelity by helping highlight the
factors central to the purpose, demonstrating to the player causation and cause‐effect
225
Rubel (2006), p.117; Rubel (Interview) 226
Ibid 227
Rubel (Interview) 228
Ibid (2006), p.114 229
Frank (2011), p.3 230
Sabin (Interview); Sterrett (Interview)
Nicholas Edwards – MA War Studies – Dissertation
42
relationships where desired.231 For random methods within this, Rubel concludes that
chance only provides the appearance of fidelity, acceptable for specific aspects of the
model, but never a shortcut for actually injecting fidelity or realism.232
Longley‐Brown and others though underline that the absolute level of realism is of
secondary importance to developing an environment that achieves training objectives,
meaning the ability of a wargame to achieve its purpose will not depend on the absolute
levels of fidelity.233 The mathematical representation of reality may in reality be stretched
to one that ensures players are given a specific decision‐making experience and
confronted with particular dilemmas.234 Nevertheless, the abstraction of reality into
distilled game mechanics can also lead to “game artefacts” if the relation between the
decision‐making experience and reality is stretched too far.235 The risk of teaching false
lessons exists if player decision‐making is grounded on the artificialities of the game,
rather than the considerations of a real combat situation.236 The difficulty for chance and
uncertainty is developing the connection between the unquantifiable nature of general
friction and the concrete forms of game mechanics.237
231
Rubel (2006), p.114 232
Ibid (Interview) 233
Sterrett (Interview) & Fox (1985), p.48 234
Rubel (2001), p.62 235
Ibid (2006), p.115 236
Perla (2011), p.237 237
Elg (Interview)
Nicholas Edwards – MA War Studies – Dissertation
43
If realistic decision‐making can be achieved however, some feel that wargaming may be
used to prepare students to handle the influence of general friction on operations as a
credible training objective in of itself.238 This concept is predicated upon the notion that
by forcing players to experience general friction directly they may develop new
perspectives on its influence, intentionally stressing players to the point of inoculation.239
Evidence exists that the key element to dealing with unpredicted events is experience of
dealing with uncertainty, reducing the size of the “surprise space” as decision‐makers can
more readily recognise consequences and best courses of action in response.240 Perla
feels that having this intellectual and emotional preparation to respond to the
unexpected is the best way to deal with the inherent unpredictability of war itself.241
Wargaming has a role therefore in developing the synthetic experience required to
prepare player mind‐sets to respond to uncertainty in reality through exposure to it in
games.242 This logic dictates that to deal with the unpredictability of non‐linear processes,
preparedness is a better solution than prediction, and that someone unacquainted with
the stressors of chance events will not survive when they encounter them for real.243 This
feeling is not mutual however, as discussed previously, Sterrett feeling the notion that
chance events occur is common knowledge and thus not a particularly useful lesson or a
238
Frank (2011), p.15 239
Perla & McGrady (2011), p.122; Beaumont (1984), p.16 240
Baiocchi & Fox (2013), pp.35‐7 241
Perla (2011), p.285 242
Ibid 243
Taleb (2010), pp.208&326
Nicholas Edwards – MA War Studies – Dissertation
44
productive use of student time.244 Nor it is a widespread training objective currently
within educational wargaming to make such explicit references to general friction.245
One method of applying such pressure is through the system of injects.246 Praun centred
his concept of a screenplay of injected frictions upon a methodology aimed to stress‐test
battalions as preparation for the real battlefield.247 Another who advocated this approach
was Lieutenant General Raymond Furlong, who saw it an explicit purpose of educational
wargaming to prepare the ‘intuition and determination’ required to develop the presence
of mind to deal with uncertainty.248 Furlong felt that a well‐developed wargame must
always immerse the players ‘in a sea of poor information and faulty or inadequate
intelligence’.249
The ultimate aim of Furlong’s method was for the influence of chance and uncertainty to
be so overbearing, put players under such pressure, and leave them with such little
control, that defeat was far more common than victory.250 The events would be unfair on
players, resulting in them finding the game frustrating, unpleasant, with Furlong stating,
‘a properly developed war game may well be not only an unpleasant experience for most
244
Sterrett (Interview) 245
Elg (Interview) 246
von Hilgers (2012), pp.63‐4 247
Ibid 248
Furlong (1984), pp.5‐6 249
Ibid 250
Ibid
Nicholas Edwards – MA War Studies – Dissertation
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participants but also an unpopular feature of one's military career’.251 Player enjoyment
was to be secondary to this goal of inoculating them to uncertainty.252
Furlong’s goals may have been an extreme example, but it does raise questions over the
utilisation of chance and uncertainty. Firstly, by leaving the player in such a state of
passiveness the designer shall struggle to emphasise the games decision‐making purpose
or offer meaningful decision‐making dilemmas. Secondly, returning to Perla’s definition,
wargames are not just a model of warfare with definite expectations of what players will
learn, rather the actual interaction of the players plays an equally dominant role.
Furlong’s notion of deliberately causing negative player reactions through unfair
applications of chance and uncertainty has clearly conceptualised the link between the
model and training objectives. However, players are a reactive, not passive, part of any
wargame and Furlong’s concept spurs a requirement to appreciate the importance of
player reactions to chance and uncertainty.
251
Furlong (1984), pp.5‐6 252
Ibid
Nicholas Edwards – MA War Studies – Dissertation
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4. Player Reactions to Chance and Uncertainty
4.1 Player Reactions to the Model
Considering how players react to chance and uncertainty within the model shall be a vital
requirement as the formal system of rules shall never exclusively determine, nor can be
separated, from the way players interact with the model in practice.253 Whilst therefore
the previous section reviewed the theoretical design considerations of the model on
paper, this study must now analyse the effect of design decisions concerning chance and
uncertainty on how players shall actually react to this model.254 This study must
understand the risk of when and how players may react to the game model in ways
unanticipated by the game designer and what the consequences may be.255
An important factor is ensuring players are motivated to engage the exercise with the
positive mind‐set required to achieve training objectives.256 Motivation will not guarantee
this alone, but absent, ensuring players are receptive and buy into the learning process
will become arduous.257 The player must accept that the game is a credible model of
reality, suspend their disbelief, and understand the relationship between reality and the
abstractions of the rule‐set.258
253
Salen & Zimmerman (2004), p.187; Perla (2011), pp.23&241 254
Jones (1998), p.315 255
Frank (2011), p.2 256
Perla (2011), p.21; Ozcelik et. al. (2013), p.13 257
Caspian Learning (2008), p.80; Rubel (Interview) 258
Salen & Zimmerman (2004), pp.94‐9; Frank (2012), p.120
Nicholas Edwards – MA War Studies – Dissertation
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Anders Frank identifies that players must adopt two coexisting attitudes towards the
game.259 The first is a “lusory” attitude, a commitment to playing the game in accordance
with the boundaries and restrictions of the rule‐set.260 In a professional wargame, this
must be balanced with the second, a “professional” attitude, where players accept the
representation of reality as legitimate and when interacting with the game make
decisions as if it were reality.261 Any mismatch in player attitudes may instead spawn
what Frank terms “Gamer Mode” where players treat the wargame not as an exercise to
be taken seriously, but as just a frivolous game.262 When this occurs, and players no
longer see the wargame as legitimate exercise or a proper representation of reality, the
risk of disengagement exists.263 Johan Elg is clear that if player involvement is lost because
they stop taking the game seriously, then the exercise is effectively over.264
The first consideration must be the range of player reactions to the role chance and
uncertainty have within the model. A major reason for players to lose their professional
attitude is for them to dismiss the exercise as just a “dice game”, or one dominated by
luck.265 With randomness especially, players may have a tendency to dismiss a bad result
and blame the system for their failure, whilst simultaneously accepting successes as their
259
Frank (2012), p.120 260
Ibid 261
Ibid 262
Ibid 263
Longley‐Brown (Interview) 264
Elg (Interview) 265
Ibid
Nicholas Edwards – MA War Studies – Dissertation
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own.266 Many may as a result see any element of randomness as unacceptable because,
rather than representing general friction, it is seen as simply turning the game into one of
all luck and no skill.267 The player, rejecting the mechanic as just a die roll, does not make
the connection between the instance of randomness and the notion of unpredictability,
even if they understand well the uncertainty of war in reality.268
The use of randomness to generate outcomes can be particularly problematic if it causes
players to reject the internal logic of the game as a true abstraction of reality.269 One
reason may be that the result was simply unexpected and outside what the player
perceived as a plausible range of outcomes in reality, rather than simply just being
surprising.270 An unanticipated event may break the legitimacy of the wargame to the
player and develop the attitude that it is just a game, not an accurate simulation of
warfare.271 An alternative scenario can exist according to Frank if unexpected results
occur to players with the right attitude who instead see a gap in their knowledge and
actively challenge their own assumptions and faults in their decision‐making.272 Despite
266
Sterrett (Interview); Allen (1989), pp.200‐1 267
Sabin (Interview) 268
Longley‐Brown (Interview); Heilmann (Interview) 269
Frank (2011), p.2 270
Ibid, pp.2‐3 271
Ibid, pp.7&13 272
Ibid, p.14
Nicholas Edwards – MA War Studies – Dissertation
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this, the danger of a complete rejection of the model with the resulting loss of
professional attitudes can make unexpected results a risky occurrence.273
Expanding on this rejection of the models legitimacy is another concern where
occurrences of chance become scapegoats for player failure.274 Results are not necessarily
unforeseen, but it is another breakdown in player perception of the connection between
the mechanic and the reality it ostensibly represents.275 This again has roots in the fact
that many players have an asymmetrical view of randomness, attributing success to skill
and failure to factors that they feel they have little control over.276 The player, under such
circumstances, may attribute their failure to a system they deem unfair, rather than
themselves, again slipping from a professional attitude.277 If randomness gives the player
an excuse, by allowing them to shift blame, achieving training objectives will become
difficult as player decision‐making becomes artificial.278
Rubel demonstrates this issue vividly with his example of a student reacting to a die roll in
frustration by saying, ‘this is a dice game, not a capabilities game!’279 The issue the player
was referring to was one discussed previously, that of fluke results from randomness.280
Players may potentially see fluke results as proof that the logic underpinning the game
273
Frank (2011), p.13 274
Perla (2011), p.230 275
Longley‐Brown (Interview) 276
Taleb (2010), p.152 277
Perla (2011), p.230 278
Longley‐Brown (Interview); Sterrett (Interview) 279
Rubel (2006), pp.119‐20 280
Ibid
Nicholas Edwards – MA War Studies – Dissertation
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system is flawed and use it as an easy target to hook any failure upon.281 A negative
player attitude is thus at risk if the quality of their decision‐making is perceived by the
player as being secondary to such flukes of luck.282
This issue of flukes is exacerbated if the value placed upon the use of wargaming within
the student curriculum is tenuous with little time for more than one exercise to occur.283
As previously noted, the nature of stochastic randomness is its tendency to fall back to
the mean the more results that are generated.284 Elg previously mentioned that a reason
he never runs a game fewer than twice is for the reason that players cannot be left to
form their experience from just one case with the risk of fluke results.285 However, for
Longley‐Brown within the British army, any previous suggestions for even a second run
have been dismissed as subordinate to other concerns.286 Available time for multiple
plays does not always exist, even if it may have a major effect on player attitudes.287
This issue of players developing a non‐professional attitude that rejects the reality of the
wargame as just a game will though be hardest felt when it actively interferes with player
decision‐making. There is a risk to training objectives if players no longer enquire to why
their plan has failed in a manner akin to reality, especially if their decision‐making was at
281
Rubel (2006), pp.119‐20; Frank (2011), pp.3‐4 282
Rubel (2006), p.119; Perla (2011), p.236 283
Frank (2012), p.129 284
Rubel (2006), .120 285
Elg (Interview) 286
Longley‐Brown (Interview) 287
Frank (2012), p.129
Nicholas Edwards – MA War Studies – Dissertation
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fault.288 If a player maintains that that their plan or decision‐making was not at fault and
instead feel that the only liability was an unlucky die roll, then they may stand to learn
little.289 A player who rejects the role of chance and uncertainty in game outcomes may
simply contend that their failure was not due to mediocre decision‐making, but that the
game itself is simply just a pointless dice‐rolling game.290 Longley‐Brown feels most
military players he has worked with are not particularly aware of the element of chance
within a training environment and as such will blame failure on it, often the computer
that generates the outcomes.291 Seldom though will their natural reaction be to revisit
their plan or consider any decision‐making mistakes.292
In theory, player failure due to an unforeseen event may teach a good lesson on how to
deal with the influence of uncertain outcomes in reality, and that an unfair game is simply
the reflection of an often unfair reality.293 In practice however, the potential apparently
exists for players to lose their professional attitude in reaction.294 Dismissing the system
as unrealistic or unfair is unfortunately a seemingly more natural reaction for many,
casting doubt on the ability for players to consider the aspect of such uncertainty
realistically in their decision‐making or learn from its occurrence.295 In reality, luck is both
288
Perla (2011), p.223 289
Sabin (Interview) 290
Ibid 291
Longley‐Brown (Interview) 292
Ibid 293
Furlong (1984), pp.5‐6 294
Elg (Interview) 295
Longley‐Brown (Interview)
Nicholas Edwards – MA War Studies – Dissertation
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undeniable and happened; it cannot be changed and must be accepted as what
transpired.296 A game however is deniable, as it is a single outcome of a repeatable
experience, differing if the exercise started again, an imbalance leaving sufficient room
for dismissal.297
The balance, between a mathematically plausible simplified model of reality and player
acceptance, becomes important if players are to hold the professional attitude required
to treat the game seriously and make decisions realistically.298 The rejection of the games
internal logic due to the elements of chance and uncertainty thus is an important issue to
consider. If players do not feel chance events could have occurred, view them as unfair,
the product of luck, do not link to their perception of what might occur in reality, or reject
them simply to save face, then elements of chance and uncertainty may become a liability
that prevents a professional attitude.299
4.2 Player Reactions to Presentation
Player reactions to chance and uncertainty however may not always be congruent with
the actual mathematical model.300 The overlapping components of chance and
uncertainty provide one reason. Informational and adversarial influences for example
296
Sabin (Interview) 297
Ibid 298
Perla (2011), pp.263‐4 299
Sterrett (Interview); Elg (Interview); Longley‐Brown (Interview); Sabin (Interview) 300
Salen & Zimmerman (2004), p.174
Nicholas Edwards – MA War Studies – Dissertation
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may increase the complexity of the system and alter the predictability of any randomness,
leading players to perceive the model is more random than it may actually be.301
However, more importantly, and what now must be considered, is the second major
consideration of player reactions, the influence of how chance and uncertainty is framed
and presented to the player.302
The first concern surrounding presentation is the actual method by which chance and
uncertainty have been modelled. This study has previously considered player reactions to
randomness, whether from unexpected or fluke outcomes, but the specific use of physical
dice presents an important case study. Indeed, much of the impression of a wargame as
an exercise dominated by luck comes from a decision to utilise dice to represent
chance.303 Many military audiences have an instinctively negative reaction to any
introduction of dice into a wargame used for educational or training purposes.304
The stigma surrounding the use of dice is one encountered to varying degrees globally,
but Longley‐Brown and Mouat see the British army as having an aversion to dice at an
intensity unrivalled elsewhere, failing any test of credibility.305 Players may accept the
notion of wargaming as an exercise but when presented with dice they often disengage,
Longley‐Brown reporting an incident endured by another instructor where after first
301
Salen & Zimmerman (2004), p.189 302
Ibid, p.175 303
Sabin (2012), p.118 304
Brynen (Interview) 305
Longley‐Brown (Interview); Mouat (Interview)
Nicholas Edwards – MA War Studies – Dissertation
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displaying dice some players simply walked out of the game.306 An entire event with a
British army audience, or any with the same issues, may be derailed simply by the
introduction of a physical dice.307
The issue of rejecting dice returns to the requirement for players to maintain a
professional attitude towards the game, as the connotations surrounding dice may cause
the loss of this attitude.308 For many players their reaction is coloured by prior association
developed before the exercise between the use of dice in popular games seen as
dominated by luck or a frivolous children’s pastime, such as Ludo, Snakes and Ladders,
and Monopoly.309 Alternatively, dice also have connotations to stereotypically “geeky”
games such as Dungeons and Dragons and Warhammer, which for some shall also trigger
a negative reaction.310 Neither of these outlooks are correlative to a professional attitude,
both inspiring a juvenile perception of the game, due to a pre‐existing notion of what dice
represent.311 Nevertheless, the stigma of dice is a problem dependent on the particular
training audience, with Johan Elg able to openly using large quantities of dice with his
own wargames for a Swedish Army audience with few of the same problems Longley‐
Brown and Mouat have encountered.312 The designer must identify the training audience
306
Longley‐Brown (Interview) 307
Ibid 308
Brynen (Interview) 309
Ibid; Sabin (Interview) 310
Longley‐Brown (Interview); Mouat (Interview) 311
Ibid 312
Elg (Interview)
Nicholas Edwards – MA War Studies – Dissertation
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and their likely reaction to certain methods like dice to gauge whether such issues of
perception may dominate how the players shall approach the game.
Another issue is signalling what randomness represents. Whilst the designer may have a
clear concept of how the mechanic relates to the non‐linearity of general friction,
whether the player recognises this is a separate matter.313 Perla considered wargaming an
act of communication and a challenge for abstract methods like dice is the lack of
inherent narrative or connection between result and reality, as rolling a one just
communicates a numeric.314 An independent dice roll will be just that, it may tell players
whether things went right or wrong, but does not communicate the details or the trail of
logic behind why it happened or what actually occurred.315 Without giving players a clear
understanding of how the roll of a dice, or other method of randomisation, relates to
their conception of reality, an unprofessional attitude is at danger of occurring.316
An alternative solution is to utilise other methods of generating randomness.317 Longley‐
Brown remarks that, curiously, utilising computer‐generated randomness, on an Excel
spreadsheet or even a smartphone die roller, will produce different reactions from those
who react negatively to dice.318 The underlying probabilities may be equal to if a dice was
utilised, but the likelihood of positive attitudes being developed has increased
313
Brynen (Inteview) 314
Perla (2011), p.173; Brynen (Interview) 315
Brynen (Interview); Sabin (Interview) 316
Ibid 317
Salen & Zimmerman (2004), pp.205‐6 318
Longley‐Brown (Interview)
Nicholas Edwards – MA War Studies – Dissertation
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dramatically.319 The reason is again presentational; a computer‐generated outcome has
the appearance of something far less frivolous and far more scientific.320
Similarly, a deck of cards may be utilised to produce some form of randomness, at the
expense of reverting to a non‐stochastic system.321 The non‐stochastic nature of cards
draws may lead players to perceive the result differently to randomness, justified or not,
as the order seems pre‐determined and more akin to chancing upon an event.322 The
cards may also overcome the explanation issue through simply stating what has occurred,
providing players with context.323 The inject system also offers this benefit of ready‐made
explanations, though both require greater amounts of care and preparation compared to
an easily reusable stochastic system.324 In any of these cases, a way of presenting
concepts that helps prove the method of randomness as valid shall be vital to having a
better chance of ensuring a professional attitude.
Furthermore, the source of the underlying data was mentioned as having an important
role in ensuring the validity of the model, but it may be equally significant in developing
player respect for the model of chance and uncertainty.325 The example of utilising
analysis by Dstl is a good illustration as the players may be less likely to question the
319
Longley‐Brown (Interview) 320
Sabin (Interview) 321
Salen & Zimmerman (2004), pp.205‐6 322
Brynen (Interview) 323
Ibid 324
Longley‐Brown (Interview) 325
Sabin (Interview)
Nicholas Edwards – MA War Studies – Dissertation
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integrity of the model if it is from what they consider a respectable source.326 This
compared to if their complaints were against a “finger‐in‐the‐wind” guess by the
designer, with a perception of randomness being introduced for the sake of
randomness.327 If players feel assured of the validity of the model of chance and
uncertainty, through both reputation and lack of designer guesswork, the games
presentation may help produce a professional attitude.328
A related issue to the source of the data is the terminology used to describe game events
and mechanics, specifically any lapse into gaming terms like “step losses”.329 It is often
imperative that terminology relating to the players real‐world role is utilised as an
important prerequisite to ensuring professional attitudes.330 It will be relatively easy for
players to slip into game‐playing attitude if something like dice, already seen as a sign of
frivolity, is described in such terms as well.331
Player perceptions of informational uncertainty is less contested and may compliment, or
as previously discussed, even replace the role of randomisation, and in either case is
usually seen as more acceptable.332 The notion of Fog of War is a more easily envisaged
condition of warfare, which more importantly generates a feeling of personal
326
Longley‐Brown (Interview) 327
Sabin (Interview) 328
Longley‐Brown (Interview) 329
Perla (2011), pp.265‐6 330
Longley‐Brown (Interview) 331
Ibid 332
Sabin (Interview)
Nicholas Edwards – MA War Studies – Dissertation
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responsibility over outcomes.333 If the player guesses wrong, then the fault of this mistake
lies firmly in their hands from a decision they have made, rather than having an easy
scapegoat, creating a strong perceived link with skill element of the game.334
Adversarial uncertainty may at first glance seem to draw the same conclusion, maybe
even greater for the direct focus on player skill, thus leaving fewer opportunities for
scapegoating. The complication though is again cultural.335 In a direct player versus player
adversarial wargame one must lose, and thus the risk of a player losing face may lead to
possible rejection of the exercise.336 Tom Mouat went as far to call this type of direct
adversarial gaming as culturally inconceivable in the British army due to dangers of losing
face.337 Again, exceptions exist and Johan Elg with a Swedish army audience encounters
fewer issues, with Elg himself seeing directly adversarial gaming as vital.338
Player reactions to chance and uncertainty thus have a decisive influence over achieving
the desired training objectives, increasing the importance of the umpire in managing
player reactions.339 Similar to the reputation of the source of the underlying data, military
and operational experience provides credibility to the judgement of this figure.340 The
major benefit of an umpire is the linkage they can develop between the abstractions of
333
Sabin (Interview) 334
Ibid 335
Mouat (Interview) 336
Ibid 337
Ibid 338
Elg (Interview) 339
Sabin (Interview) 340
Mouat (Interview)
Nicholas Edwards – MA War Studies – Dissertation
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the exercise and the reality it portrays, within the minds of the player.341 Central shall be
handling situations when players take exception to the model of chance and uncertainty
and explaining to them what exactly the model represents, whilst maintaining their
professional attitude.342
By building a dialogue, communicating what chance and uncertainty represents, the
umpire may develop a narrative that connects the dry result of a dice roll with player
perceptions of reality.343 Rather than simply informing students that they failed or
succeeded due to randomness through game‐like terms, an umpire can instead explain
the result in professional terms relating to the military experience of the player.344 If
chance and uncertainty causes events outside player expectations, from a fluke, or from
new information, that lies outside their perception of reality, the umpire may present an
adequate explanation, before players dismiss the exercise as just a “game”.345 Umpires
may discuss player experiences surrounding chance and uncertainty as a game
mechanism, and translate this gaming viewpoint into one the player perceives in the
relation to their real‐world role.346
This communication expands the role of the umpire past their previously defined position
in free and semi‐rigid gaming, tasked now with guiding player reactions towards the
341
Sabin (Interview) 342
Frank (2011), p.14 343
Brynen (Interview) 344
Ibid 345
Perla (2011), p.372; Brynen (Interview) 346
Elg (Interview); Sabin (Interview)
Nicholas Edwards – MA War Studies – Dissertation
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required professional attitude, partially by overcoming the presentational flaws of chance
and uncertainty.347 For the umpire to achieve this however they must have a clear
understanding of how cause and effect led to certain outcomes if students are to benefit
from the decision‐making experience a wargame is ostensibly designed to develop.348
Another part of reason James Sterrett favours causation is the ease of which it allows the
umpire to demonstrate the link between a player mistake and the result.349
These reasons underlie why Johan Elg feels umpires are a vital component of any
educational or training wargame.350 Elg states that he could not imagine having two sides
with dice playing through an exercise unsupervised, as he feels arguments would quickly
occur over rules and representations, making a professional attitude impossible.351 Philip
Sabin though, whilst appreciating the importance of umpires, states they are not an
absolute requirement as a well‐designed self‐contained wargame can still teach relevant
lessons.352
Indeed, caveats do exist on the use of an umpire. Firstly, umpires are an expensive
commodity for limited budgets and not all situations will garner the resources required
for an optimum number of umpires.353 As was earlier demonstrated with the number of
347
Elg (Interview) 348
Sterrett (Interview) 349
Ibid 350
Elg (Interview) 351
Ibid 352
Sabin (Interview) 353
Frank (2011), p.14
Nicholas Edwards – MA War Studies – Dissertation
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times a game will be played, wargaming is often currently seen as a complementary, not
vital, part of a student’s education.354 Budgets are often constrained, leading to common
use of self‐contained wargames, frequently those based on computer games, which
multiple students can play simultaneously with fewer instructors required.355
Nevertheless, as Frank demonstrated in his study on player attitudes, negative player
reactions to chance and uncertainty often occurred because no instructors were
nearby.356 This prevented them detecting these reactions, explaining the underlying logic
of chance and uncertainty in the model, and redirecting players towards the purpose,
resulting in numerous occasions where players dropped their professional attitude.357
Secondly, whilst in theory semi‐rigid methods afford the umpire greater control over the
direction of chance and uncertainty, they potentially may just transfer the target of
negative player reactions.358 Rather than the dice or the computer acting the scapegoat, it
is instead the umpire and their judgement who take the blame.359 Heilmann highlights a
particular issue in directly adversarial wargames where one side shall inevitably see the
umpire as biased against them if they perceive any moderation is in their opponents
favour.360 Unless the umpire has significant experience and is able to develop a clear
354
Frank (2012), p.129 355
Ibid 356
Ibid (2011), p.14 357
Ibid 358
Rubel (Interview) 359
Ibid 360
Heilmann (Interview)
Nicholas Edwards – MA War Studies – Dissertation
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dialogue with players, semi‐rigid methods have the potential to simply shift the source of
the problem.361
Many of the issues surrounding player reactions are however outside the confounds of
the wargame. The framing of the player experience of the game shall often be
determined by pre‐existing attitudes developed prior to playing, which may dominate the
mind‐set they bring to the game.362 It is an unfortunate fact that some chance devices,
such as dice, have a pre‐existing association with childishness and frivolity, leading to the
need to seek alternatives if a professional attitude is to be maintained.363 Similarly, an
earlier reason for potentially avoiding directly adversarial wargaming was the fear of how
players would react to losing face, and is a symptom of a culture if does not allow safe
failure.364 If wargaming does not take place within an environment that allows safe failure
then the search for a scapegoat will become instinctive, amplifying the potential of
negative player reactions to chance and uncertainty.365
The player’s approach will also be drawn from their professional understating of concepts
such as risk and probability, which if lacking shall increase the likelihood of rejected those
elements of the model.366 It will be difficult to explain to players the link between bad
decision‐making and a bad result if chance and uncertainty had an influence if an officer’s
361
Brynen (Interview); Elg (Interview) 362
Sabin (Interview) 363
Ibid 364
Caspian Learning (2008), p.65 365
Ibid; Howard‐Jones (2011) pp.34‐5 366
Mouat (Interview)
Nicholas Edwards – MA War Studies – Dissertation
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previous training had developed little comprehension of this element of warfare.367
Whilst the model may be adapted to chosen training objectives, and presentation
modified to fit the training audience, the cultural background of that audience will shape
much of their perceptions and the requirements of ensuring they hold a professional
attitude.
If an environment is produced that ensures professional attitudes, despite the
considerable hindrances that exist, some educational advantages can occur. If players
accept dice, their physical presence may be utilised to engage players with the risk they
are taking and the role of luck in their performance, this being the reason Elg has his
players roll their own dice.368 Heilmann also finds that having players physically hold and
roll the dice can far greatly immerse them with the risk they are taking.369
Another potential benefit of chance and uncertainty exists in growing research on their
neurological influence upon motivation and future recall of experiences, a benefit as
providing that experience is an aim of educational wargaming.370 As previously discussed,
learning potential is not just down to motivation but it is still a vital component.371 The
potential for chance and uncertainty to increase this motivation and future recall, if a
367
Mouat (Interview) 368
Elg (Interview); Heilmann (Interview) 369
Heilmann (Interview) 370
Howard‐Jones (2011), pp.36&29 371
Caspian Learning (2008), p.80
Nicholas Edwards – MA War Studies – Dissertation
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professional attitude exists, has potential for future investigation.372 Professor Paul
Howard‐Jones has conducted a number of studies on the neurological benefits of chance
and uncertainty in enhancing the educational utility of games, though for traditional
educational audiences where professional attitudes provided a lesser challenge.373
Howard‐Jones builds upon existing evidence on the processes of mid‐brain dopamine,
where the discrepancy between an expected result and what occurred will lead to
dopamine release in scale with the prediction error.374 Dopamine release itself plays a
critical role in deep learning, where the learner makes sense of new information rather
than simply memorising facts, as its release heightens the brain’s attention to the
stimulus and promotes greater memory formation.375
Howard‐Jones demonstrated that the level of dopamine release during a gaming activity
was in correlation with the ability of players to later recall and utilise their experiences
gathered from playing the game.376 Howard‐Jones concludes that by making player
reward subject to chance and uncertainty the learning potential of the game shall
increase alongside the vividness of the experience.377 Whether this applies to the
decision‐making experience driving educational wargaming provides a rich source for
372
Caspian Learning (2008), pp.74‐5 373
Howard‐Jones (2011), p.36; Howard‐Jones & Demetriou (2009), p.519 374
Fiorillo et. al. (2003), pp.1898‐9; Shizgal & Arvanitogiannis (2003), p.1857 375
van der Spek (2013), p.158 376
Howard‐Jones (2011), p.36 377
Ibid
Nicholas Edwards – MA War Studies – Dissertation
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future study, but still a potential benefit that cannot be realised until player attitudes are
consistently professional in response to chance and uncertainty.
To ensure positive, professional player attitudes a return is required to the comment of
Rubel's student, ‘This is a dice game, not a capabilities game!’378 This point on ensuring
player skill is not overwhelmed by chance has already been discussed for a model that
achieves training objectives, but is a further consideration for player reactions. This is
especially important in the relation to the notion of games stressing for reality, where the
players view of the skill‐chance balance may be crucial to achieving a professional
attitude.379 The question of levels of pressure applied and control given, that players will
accept, requires a return to the decision‐making purpose of wargaming.380 A game where
players have little control, but under a lot of pressure from chance and uncertainty, has
the potential to develop a sense of hopelessness and unfairness in players leading to a
rejection of the exercise.381
The notion of strategising chance through the ability manipulate related variables was
also previously discussed as a method of creating a skill‐chance balance which emphasises
the games decision‐making purpose. Sabin, Heilmann, and Frank all feel that this also is
an important part of making chance and uncertainty acceptable to players.382 If players
378
Rubel (2006), p.119 379
Salen & Zimmerman (2004), p.183 380
Sabin (Interview) 381
Schell (2008), p.169 382 Sabin (Interview); Heilmann (Interview); Frank (Interview)
Nicholas Edwards – MA War Studies – Dissertation
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feel they have an influence over their progress within the game, rather than a sense of
passiveness, the danger that the player perceives the exercise as a dice game, rather than
one focused on capabilities, diminishes.383
The inject system has a potentially important role in ensuring professional attitudes if
utilised. As discussed, injects endow the Control Group with greater control over chance
and uncertainty, allowing them to develop situations based more upon risk‐taking than
pure uncertainty. Longley‐Brown states that MEL/MIL lists must be must be carefully
considered, conceived, and injected, if they are to help develop positive player
reactions.384 Events are usually grouped into easy, medium, and hard categories, each
applying different levels of pressure upon players to garner certain reactions and force
particular dilemmas.385 Whilst easy events can quickly inspire certain reactions, medium
and hard events are scheduled in advance to inspire long‐term planning and planning
from the player.386
These injects require careful planning so that players can react and make a decision, as an
event appearing suddenly and unexpectedly will offer players little decision‐making
experience without this time to react.387 Whilst Longley‐Brown accepts such a sudden
turn of events may occur, from weather or losing communication, if the player feels
383
Sabin (Interview) 384
Longley‐Brown (Interview) 385
Ibid 386
Ibid 387
Ibid
Nicholas Edwards – MA War Studies – Dissertation
67
ambushed with little time to react they commonly complain the inject is random and
unrealistic, causing disengagement.388 Instead, information signalling the events future
possibility is bread‐crumbed, with players given time to notice signs of the possibility an
event may occur, so that they may choose to react or take a risk, engaging with the games
decision‐making purpose in a professional manner.389 Through use of selectively feeding
information in preparation for the inject, a player may both be faced with the desired
dilemmas whilst maintaining their perception of having a level of control over their own
failure or success.390
A delicate balance therefore exists between the needs of developing a model as a simple
simulation of reality to fit the training objective, against that of player psychology.391
Players must engage with the purpose of the exercise and be motivated to approach the
game with the professional attitude required to make decisions as they would in
reality.392 The theoretical requirements of developing an abstract model for the purpose
must align with the practical, psychological, requirements that the training audience
force. However, the particular training audience shall define the considerations required
388
Longley‐Brown (Interview) 389
Ibid; Mouat (Interview) 390
Longley‐Brown (Interview) 391
Sabin (Interview) 392
Ibid
Nicholas Edwards – MA War Studies – Dissertation
68
for this balance.393 Indeed, the particular training audience is what allows Elg’s
experiences to contrast many others.394
The balance between skill and chance, as well as control and pressure, is required for not
only what dilemmas and decisions it is desired players will make, but that they shall
inspire positive reactions.395 No single set solution exists for finding this balance other
than a clear understanding of the training objective and identifying the training audience
with their varied views of acceptability, often differing between different members of
that audience.396 Designers, umpires, and Control Groups, must identify the nuances of
the training audience, whether sceptical of concepts associated with games, or having a
narrow perception of possibilities due to inexperience, each requiring a unique set of
priorities in design considerations.397 Brynen feels the differing subcultures between
groups, often within the same training audience, are a major variable to consider over
reactions to chance and uncertainty.398 If present, a major role of the umpire is to oversee
the differing considerations of these groups to produce an experience that is acceptable
to all players, a difficult challenge for much associated with chance and uncertainty.399
393
Schell (2008), p.183 394
Longley‐Brown (Interview) 395
Schell (2008), p.183 396
Bloom (1985), p.105; Fox (1985), p.59 397
Elg (Interview) 398
Brynen (Interview) 399
Ibid
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Nicholas Edwards – MA War Studies – Dissertation
70
Luck and chance in reality are simply mental abstractions for the complex, interactive,
underlying processes that lead to unforeseeable events. Rather than an unfeasibly high
level of fidelity, chance and uncertainty mechanics are in themselves abstractions,
offering top‐down methods of applying the overall effect of this uncertainty on decision‐
makers. The greater issue for chance and uncertainty therefore has proven to be the how
it may be utilised to create a balance with skill that produces the decision‐making
environment that meets training objectives.
The use of chance and uncertainty allows the designer to force the player to face the
same pressure on decision‐making caused by the impact of general friction. The pressure
of having to juggle the conflicting possibilities and probabilities is a key method of putting
players into the decision‐making dilemmas required by the training objectives. A clear
conceptualisation of these training objectives is thus a vital first step to ensuring chance
and uncertainty are utilised through the right combination of elements, to the right
distribution, to the develop the desired pressures on player decision‐making.
Complementing pressure is the level of control the player has over the variables that
comprise any individual chance event or bout of uncertainty, and is where the balance
between the aspects of skill and chance exists. The higher the level of control the player
has, the greater the influence of their skill has in relation to chance, and vice‐versa.
Despite the ability for chance and uncertainty to develop an abstracted environment to
meet training objectives, questions do still exist on whether “contrived”, rule‐based,
Nicholas Edwards – MA War Studies – Dissertation
71
environments can expose players to the real‐world influence of general friction on
decision‐making. A major disconnect was demonstrated between the bounded, abstract,
representations of uncertainty in games and the non‐linear nature of warfare caused by
general friction. Whether Taleb’s notion of the ludic fallacy is a relevant concern for
wargaming, and whether the “domesticated” version of uncertainty represented in games
provides a valid decision‐making environment that inspires realistic decision‐making from
players, may require further study.
Nevertheless, alongside these theoretical concerns of utilising chance and mechanics, has
been the frequent disconnect with how players react to this element in practice. Players
are required to hold a professional attitude if they are to make decisions in a realistic
manner. Anecdotal evidence however has demonstrated that the elements of chance and
uncertainty, in particular randomness, may instead cause player reactions that dismiss
the exercise as just a frivolous game, however much it may align with training objectives.
The model, especially the perceived skill‐chance balance, was one source of disagreement
as players may term the exercise a game of luck or unfair, however valid the
representation of uncertainty may be. More curiously however is the revelation that the
way chance and uncertainty are framed and presented to the player shall have a decisive
effect on their attitude towards the game. That simply producing dice may cause certain
training audiences to dismiss the exercise as dominated by luck, or just a game of fun,
demonstrates the extent to which presentation shall be a major complicating factor.
Nicholas Edwards – MA War Studies – Dissertation
72
The gulf between theory and practice therefore presents many challenges for the
designer in aligning the chance and uncertainty considerations of both. To overcome
these considerations, this study proposes three main recommendations.
The first is the importance of maintaining a positive skill‐chance balance. The ability for
players to strategise chance and uncertainty can allow the decision‐making element of
the wargame to be emphasised by giving players the opportunity to exercise their skill.
This also extends to ensuring positive player attitudes, as a game where the player
perceives they have the ability to influence chance and uncertainty through meaningful
decision‐making choices has some, though not total, protection against rejection and
scapegoating.
This study also cautiously recommends a prominent role for umpires. The direction in
which chance and uncertainty drive the wargame may be moderated through semi‐rigid
moderation, or crafted entirely through a system of injects following a methodology.
Furthermore, the presence of an umpire can help ensure players maintain a professional
attitude towards the exercise through discussion of how the model of chance and
uncertainty relates to reality and training objectives. Whilst not a panacea, umpires
provide a reactive solution to the many of the challenges of chance and uncertainty
highlighted by this study.
Umpires are not mandatory and a self‐contained wargame may still effectively manage
the design considerations of chance and uncertainty. Nevertheless, without the active
Nicholas Edwards – MA War Studies – Dissertation
73
presence of this figure, a more cautious approach to chance and uncertainty may be
required. Self‐contained wargames produce a rigid, unchanging model, rather than a
semi‐rigid one model with the flexibility of adapting to the circumstances and the
challenges of chance and uncertainty as they occur. Caution must though still be taken.
Firstly, the target of player scapegoating may just transfer from the mechanic to the
umpire, as perceptions of bias or unfairness develop. Secondly, risk‐taking dilemmas may
be undermined if moderation simply leads to the removal of any consequences. When
and how results are moderated or injects introduced shall require careful consideration
and experience to avoid these downsides.
Any design decisions on chance and uncertainty though shall always be ultimately subject
to the context under the exercise takes place. A spectrum of training and education
exists, which along with specific training objectives, determine the required skill‐chance
balance, the pressure to put the player under, and what dilemmas they shall face.
Differing training audiences shall then react to the model produced for this purpose and
the presentation, based on perceptions of fairness, relation to reality, and pre‐existing
associations with methods like dice. Any one‐size solutions to this shall be impossible, as
wargaming is more art than science. Instead, clearly understanding the training
objectives, the training audience, and the considerations for both, shall allow the designer
to adapt chance and uncertainty to a model that fits the concerns of both theory and
practice.
Nicholas Edwards – MA War Studies – Dissertation
74
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Sterrett, James [Deputy Director of the US Army Command and General Staff College’s
Digital Leader Development Center’s Simulations & Exercises Division]. Interview by
author. Email. March 26, 2014 ‐ May 12, 2014.
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