mafia, mob and shiism in iraq the rebellion of ottoman karbala 1824-1843
Post on 01-Jun-2018
240 Views
Preview:
TRANSCRIPT
8/9/2019 Mafia, Mob and Shiism in Iraq the Rebellion of Ottoman Karbala 1824-1843
http://slidepdf.com/reader/full/mafia-mob-and-shiism-in-iraq-the-rebellion-of-ottoman-karbala-1824-1843 1/33
The Past and Present Society
Mafia, Mob and Shiism in Iraq: The Rebellion of Ottoman Karbala 1824-1843Author(s): Juan R. I. Cole and Moojan MomenSource: Past and Present, No. 112 (Aug., 1986), pp. 112-143Published by: Oxford University Press on behalf of The Past and Present Society
Stable URL: http://www.jstor.org/stable/651000Accessed: 25/02/2009 17:53
Your use of the JSTOR archive indicates your acceptance of JSTOR's Terms and Conditions of Use, available at
http://www.jstor.org/page/info/about/policies/terms.jsp. JSTOR's Terms and Conditions of Use provides, in part, that unless
you have obtained prior permission, you may not download an entire issue of a journal or multiple copies of articles, and you
may use content in the JSTOR archive only for your personal, non-commercial use.
Please contact the publisher regarding any further use of this work. Publisher contact information may be obtained at
http://www.jstor.org/action/showPublisher?publisherCode=oup.
Each copy of any part of a JSTOR transmission must contain the same copyright notice that appears on the screen or printed
page of such transmission.
JSTOR is a not-for-profit organization founded in 1995 to build trusted digital archives for scholarship. We work with the
scholarly community to preserve their work and the materials they rely upon, and to build a common research platform that
promotes the discovery and use of these resources. For more information about JSTOR, please contact support@jstor.org.
Oxford University Press and The Past and Present Society are collaborating with JSTOR to digitize, preserve
and extend access to Past and Present.
http://www.jstor.org
8/9/2019 Mafia, Mob and Shiism in Iraq the Rebellion of Ottoman Karbala 1824-1843
http://slidepdf.com/reader/full/mafia-mob-and-shiism-in-iraq-the-rebellion-of-ottoman-karbala-1824-1843 2/33
MAFIA, MOB AND
SHIISMIN IRAQ:
THE REBELLIONOF OTTOMAN
KARBALA
1824-1843*
A virtualrebellionof the Iraqicity
of Karbala gainst entral overn-
ment rule broughtabout a
catastrophicnvasionby Baghdad-based
OttomanTurkishforces in January1843. Because he urbansocial
historyof the nineteenth-century ttoman mpireremains ompara-
tively little known, the formsof
socialorganization nd local culture
that led to the revoltdeservedetailed reatment.
The followinganalysis xamines he role of urbangangs n leading
the rebellion, n coalitionwith
other socialgroups. Neighbourhood
vigilantebands had long existedin Islamic cities. But in the first
decadesof the nineteenth entury,
paralleling decline n government
control, "mafia"-gangs that ran
protection acketsand actedas a
parallel overnment grewup in Karbala.Even n this "antisocial"
form, it will be shown, the urban
gangscould makeallianceswithin
the city to emergeas popular
eadersagainstan alien hreat, herefore
actingas more than mere exploiters.
The toughshad severalallies n
the fighting.They were employed
by the city's ndigenous anded
notablesas bodyguards nd hit men.
They forged inks with Shiite
Arab nomadsoutsidethe town walls.
Another group, the "mob" small artisansand shopkeepers
participatedn the revolt under
the rhetoricof (Shiite)religionand
(Iranian) thnicityversus he TurkishSunnioutsiderswho sought o
subduethem. Finally, the Muslim
religious cholars'ulama') occu-
pied a specialposition n the
shrinecity, and also allied themselves
to the urbangangs.1
* The authors re grateful or comments n earlierdraftsof this paper romHanna
Batatu,GeoffEley and HalaFattah noneof whom s in anywayresponsibleorwhat
follows).
Diacriticalmarks n Arabicand Persian ransliterationave been omitted n this
paper, which is aimed at a general
readership.Specialistswill be able mentally o
supplythese in any case.
1 The role of the Shiite religious
cholars n the rebellion s discussedbrieflyby
HamidAlgar n his
Religion and State in Iran 1785-1906: The Role of the Ulama in the
Qajar Penod
(Berkeley nd Los Angeles, 1969),pp. 114-16.See also MangolBayat,
Mysticism and Dissent: Socioreligious
Thought n QajarIran
(Syracuse,1982), p. 42;
and Denis A1. MacEoin, "FromShaykhism o Babism:A Study of Charismatic
Renewal n Shi'i Islam" Univ. of Cambridge h.D. thesis, 1979), pp. 112-13.
8/9/2019 Mafia, Mob and Shiism in Iraq the Rebellion of Ottoman Karbala 1824-1843
http://slidepdf.com/reader/full/mafia-mob-and-shiism-in-iraq-the-rebellion-of-ottoman-karbala-1824-1843 3/33
113
AFIA,
MOB
AND
SHIISM
IN
IRAQ
This
study
will
employ
several
echniques
o
evoke
the
meaning
of
gang
rule
and
popular
evolt
n
Shiite
Karbala.
First,
a
synchronic
analysisof the city'svarioussocialgroupsandtheirrelationshipso
one
another
will
be
undertaken.
Secondly,
a
diachronic
historical
narrative
f
the
processes
whereby
he
town
became
virtually
uton-
omous,
and
how
t
resisted
onquest,
will
be
presented
o
demonstrate
how
those
sociological
roups
acted
towards
one
another
over
time.
Attention
will
be
paid
to
the
mentalite
of
the
major
ocial
actors
and,
as
noted,
to
the
crucial
role
of
religion
and
the
religious
cholars.
The
cleavages
mong
he
rebellious
roups
n
Karbala
were
bridged
in
an
important
manner
by
Imami
Shiite Islam, a branchof thereligionhat
believed
he
Prophet
Muhammad's
on-in-law
Ali
and
his
eleven
lineal
descendants
termed
"Imams")
hould
have
held
power
n
the
nascent
Islamic
empire
after
his
passing.
Imamis
hold
that
until
the
supernatural
eappearance
f
the
Twelfth
Imam
(who
went
nto
occultation
n
the
ninth
century)
all
government
s
less
than
perfect.
Most
did,
however,
accept
the
interim
egitimacy
of
Shiite
monarchies
uch
as
the
Safavids
nd
Qajars
n
Iran.
Shiism
n
Karbala
encompassed
oth
the
wealthy
and
the
indigent,
both
Arab
and
Iranian.
The
ruling
elite
in
Ottoman
raq
adhered
o
Sunnism
the
majority
branch
f
Islam
except
n
post-sixteenth-century
ran
and
contempor-
ary
raq),
which
held
that
after
the
Prophet's
passing
political
ead-
ership
ell
to
an
oligarchically
lected
caliph.
After
our
early
"rightly
guided"
aliphs,
the
last
being
'Ali,
political
power
passed
to
less
revered
ereditary
monarchies,
uch
as
the
Umayyad
and
Abbasid
caliphates.
unnis
in
the
Ottoman
empire
owed
allegiance
o
the
Turkishmperor,but ShiisexecratedheOttoman ulerasa heretic
and
usurper
of
an
office
that
should
by
right
belong
only
to
the
Twelfth
mam.
SOCIAL
STRUCTURE:
RELIGION,
STATE
AND
THE
CROWD
As
anna
Batatu
has
pointed
out,
the
ethnic
and
religious
cleavages
in
raq
produced
hree
demographic
ones.
South
of
Baghdad,
Shiite
Arabs
argely
made
up
the
population.
Sunni
Arabs
populated
most
of
Baghdadnditsnorthernhinterland.Finally,north-east f Baghdad
Kurds
redominated,
dhering
o
a
form
of
Sunnism
heavily
nflu-
enced
y
Sufi
mysticism.2
Strong
ocial
and
economic
cleavages
lso
2
Hanna
Batatu,
The
Old
Social
Classes
nd
the
Revolutionary
ovements
f
Iraq
(Princeton,
978),
pp.
37-9.
8/9/2019 Mafia, Mob and Shiism in Iraq the Rebellion of Ottoman Karbala 1824-1843
http://slidepdf.com/reader/full/mafia-mob-and-shiism-in-iraq-the-rebellion-of-ottoman-karbala-1824-1843 4/33
114
NUMBER 1 12AST AND PRESENT
divided the people. Town dwellers often came into conflict with
pastoralnomads. Of an estimatedpopulation f 1,290,000 n 1850,
fully 35 per cent consistedof pastoralnomads.Another41 per cent
was ruraland only 24 per cent was urban.3Circassian nd Turkish
Sunnis illedthe upperechelonsof the government.Mostof the local
controllersof large ruralestateswere Sunni Arabs. Sunni notables
often predominated ven in the largely Shiite south, except in the
vicinity of the shrine cities.4
For nearly a century, from 1750 to 1831, the weak Ottoman
government n Istanbulallowed a corps of Mamluk slave-soldier)
vassals o rule fromBaghdad.sEven this localgovernment ftenhad
difficultyasserting ts authorityover the factiouspopulation.From
1831 he Ottomans gainruleddirectly,attemptingo imposeprogres-
sively greatercontrol hrough heir standingarmyand the bureauc-
racy in Baghdad. Mamluks and Ottomansengaged in perpetual
conflictwiththe ShiiteArabpastoral omadsof the southas refractory
taxpayersand frequentraidersof sedentary ettlements or booty.
Nestled in the territorydominatedby Shiite tribespeoplewere the
shrine cities of Karbalaand Najaf, burial sites of Imams whose
remainswere sacred o adherents f that branchof Islam.
The city of Karbala ies about45 miles south-west f Baghdad. t
owes its inceptionand continuedprosperity o its possessionof the
shrineof the ImamHusayn,a grandson f the ProphetMuhammad,
who died in a revolt againstthe Umayyadstate in 680. Religious
visits to its shrines(often combinedwith trade)and the influx into
the city of wealth in the form of pious offeringsand endowments
combined o lend it economic,religiousand political mportance. t
also served in a secularcapacityas a desert port for long-distance
3 Tom Nieuwenhuis,Politicsand Society n EarlyModern raq:MamlukPashas,
TnbalShayksandLocalRule between 802 and 1831 (The Hague, 1982),p. 10.
4 Batatu,Old SocialClasses,pp. 44-50.
S Primary ources or early modernIraq nclude Sayyid Abdu'r-Rahmans-Su-
waydi,Ta'nthhawadithBaghdada'l-Basrah186-1192/1772-1780AChronicleofthe
Events n Baghdad ndBasra1772-1780], d. 'ImadA. Ra'uf Baghdad, 978);Shaykh
Rasulal-Kirkukli,Dawhatal-wuzara'i ta'rikhwaqa'i'Baghdadz-zawra' (Family?)
Treesof the Ministers n the Historyof Occurrencesn Baghdad],Arabic rans.M.
K. Nawras Baghdad,n.d.); and SulaymanFa'iq Bey, Ta'nkhBaghdad Historyof
Baghdad],Arabic rans.M. K. Nawras Baghdad, 962).Forrecentanalyticaltudies,
see Nieuwenhuis,Politics ndSocietyn EarlyModernraq;andM. K. Nawras,Hutm
al-mamalik
i
al-'Iraq, 1750-1831 The Rule ofthe Mamluks n Iraq, 1750-1831]
(Baghdad,1975). Still useful are ClementHuart,HistoiredeBagdaddans es temps
modetnesParis, 1901); and Stephen H. Longrigg,Four Centunes f Modern raq
(Oxford,1925).
8/9/2019 Mafia, Mob and Shiism in Iraq the Rebellion of Ottoman Karbala 1824-1843
http://slidepdf.com/reader/full/mafia-mob-and-shiism-in-iraq-the-rebellion-of-ottoman-karbala-1824-1843 5/33
115
AFIA, MOB AND SHIISM IN IRAQ
trade. The shrineof the ImamHusaynparticularlyttracted ilgrims
of the Shiitebranchof Islam.After1501Iran'spopulationwas largely
converted o Shiism rom Sunnismby the Shiiterulersof the Safavid
dynasty, who bestowed avish gifts on the city's shrines. Although
the Safavidsand their Sunni Ottoman oes contestedmuch of Iraq,
Karbala emainedmostly in the handsof the Turks.
The city's population,partlydrawn romthe ShiiteArab ribesof
southern raq,oftenchafedunderOttoman ule.The political urmoil
of eighteenth-centuryran, with its Afghan nvasionsand the fall of
the Safavids,also encouraged arge numbersof Iranianrefugees o
settle in Najaf and Karbala. n the nineteenth enturyIranianmer-
chants and noblemenresided there out of a pious wish to be near
the shrines or because Iran turned politicallydangerous or them.
AlthoughIranian mmigrantsover time assimilated o Iraq, many
maintained heir distinctivenational ostume,knowledgeof Persian
and underground llegiance o Iran. Becauseof its prevailing hiism
and the large Iranian thnic element, Ottoman fficials aw Karbala
as a potential ifth column.
In the eighteenthand early nineteenthcenturies he city govern-
ment, staffedat the top by Mamluk-appointedunnis romBaghdad,
controlledmanyof Karbala's ourcesof wealth, ncluding he shrines
and rightsto tax. But this Sunni structurewas superimposed ver a
local ShiiteArabelite of property-holders. rominentArab amilies
owed their ocalpower o controlovergreateconomic esources.For
instance,one local magnate, he chief of the city's powerfulSayyid
families (asserting their descent from the Prophet Muhammad),
owned one-thirdof the cultivated ands and gardens n the vicinity
of Karbala. n the 1820sand 1830s ocalnotables,by processes o be
discussedbelow, moved nto actualrulership f the town as a virtual
city-state.Sayyid Abdu'l-Wahhab, ead of Karbala's lite families,
becamegovernor f the city in the late 1830sby orderof the Ottoman
viceroyAli Riza Pasha.7
The majority f Karbala'snhabitants onsistedof labourers, emi-
skilled tradesmen,pedlars and small-timeshopkeepers.Many of
them ethnic Iranians, hey resembled n cultureand socialsituation
theirIranian ounterparts, alledpishih-varanr tradespeople.8 he
6
E. Honigman,"Karbala",n Encyclopaediaf Islam,2nd edn.
' PublicRecordOfISce, ondon,ForeignOffice hereafter .R.O., F.O.) 195/204,
"Translation f a PersianAccountof Karbala", pring1843.
8 See MohammadReza Afshari,"The Pishivaran nd Merchantsn Precapitalist
IranianSociety",Internat. . MiddleEast Studies,xv (1983), pp. 133-55; or the
historical ote of this group n Iran,see also EvrandAbrahamian, TheCrowd n the
fcont. np. 116)
8/9/2019 Mafia, Mob and Shiism in Iraq the Rebellion of Ottoman Karbala 1824-1843
http://slidepdf.com/reader/full/mafia-mob-and-shiism-in-iraq-the-rebellion-of-ottoman-karbala-1824-1843 6/33
116
PAST
AND
PRESENT
NUMBER
1
12
equivalent
f
the
European
"little
people"
menu
peuple),
the
trades-
people
of
Karbala,
ike
the
great
merchants
nd
the
city
government,
exploitedthe pilgrimtrade.They expectedthe city's governor o
assure
them
of
a
livelihood
by
encouraging
he
pilgrims
and
by
ensuring
safety
or
Iranian
visitors
coming
to
Karbala.
Largely
Shi-
ites,
they
took
pride
in
living
in
Imam
Husayn's
city
and
in
having
easy
access
to
his
shrine.
Lavish
gifts
to
the
shrines
by
the
Iranian
monarchs
and
the
nawabs
of
Awadh
(Oudh)
n
India
lent
a
certain
splendour
o
the
shrinc
city,
in
which
the
little
people
basked.9
They
frequently
athered
n
public
assembly
o
celebrate
oly
days
associatedwith the Imams and particularlyo commemoratehe
martyrdom
f
Husayn.
The
social
networks
hey
developed
or
the
purpose
of
organizing
eligious
processions
ould
also
be
called
nto
play
at
times
of
political
crisis.
Karbala's
ittle
people
were
easily
stirred
o
defend
the
city
from
Baghdad's
ttempts
o
bring
t
under
firmer
ontrol
as
they
did
in
1824,
1835
and
1842-3.
Such
disturb-
ances
resembled
European
"church
and
king"
riots,
for
the
Shiite
tradespeople
eld
an
allegiance
o
the
shah
of
Iran
and
would
sacrifice
a
great
deal
to
exclude
alien
Sunni
troops.10
THE
KARBALA
"MAFIA"
The
1820s
and
1830s
saw a
growth
n
Karbala
f
the
power
of
local
elites
n
relation
o
the
centre.
As
will
be
shown
below,
urban
gang
leaders
running
protection
rackets
displaced
or
co-opted
the
old
landholding
nd
merchant
amilies
and
formed
links
with
nearby
Arab
tribes.
They
also
allied
themselves
with
the
city's
leading
religious
cholars.
In
this
manner
heycreateda coalitionof groups
interested
n
autonomy,
whether
for
financial
or
religious
reasons,
from
he
Ottomans.
Groups
of
young
men,
motivated
by
chivalric
deas
and
banding
(n. 8
cont.)
Persian
Revolution",
ranian
Studies,
ii
(1969),
pp.
128-50.
Cf.
E.
J.
Hobsbawm,
Primitive
Rebels:
Studies
in
Archaic
Forms
of
Social
Movement
in
the
19th
and
20th
Centu7*ies
New
York,
1965
edn.),
p.
115;
and
George
Rude,
Paris
and
London
n
the
Eighteenth
entury:
Studies
in
Popular
Protest
(New
York,
1973),
pp.
17-34.
Robere
J.
Holton,
"The
Crowd
n
History:
Some
Problems
f
Theory
and
Method",
Social
Hist.,
ii
(1978),
pp.
219-33,
points
out
that
crowds
gather
on a
continualbasis,andfor urposesotherthanprotest,suchas carnivals
nd
religious
vents.
9
For
the
huge
sums
that
lowed
nto
the
Shiite
hrine
ities
of
Iraq
rom
he
Shiite-
ruled
orth
Indian
kingdom
of
Awadh
or
Oudh,
see
Juan
R.
I.
Cole,
Roots
of
North
Indian
hi'ism
in
Iran
and
Iraq:
Religion
and
State
in
Awadh,
1722-1859
(Berkeley
nd
Los
Angeles,
forthcoming);
nd
the
same
author's
"'Indian
Money'
and
the
Shi'i
Shrine
ities
of
Iraq",
Middle
Eastern
Studies,
forthcoming.
10
Cf.
Hobsbawm,
Pnmitive
Rebels,
pp. 1
18-19.
8/9/2019 Mafia, Mob and Shiism in Iraq the Rebellion of Ottoman Karbala 1824-1843
http://slidepdf.com/reader/full/mafia-mob-and-shiism-in-iraq-the-rebellion-of-ottoman-karbala-1824-1843 7/33
117
AFIA, MOB AND SHIISM IN IRAQ
together o defend their quarterof the city, commonlyappeared n
medieval raq.These youths, called ayyarun, probably erived rom
familiesof tradespeople nd abourers, ather han romelitefamilies.
Sometimes hey gainedgreatpower n their quarterand engaged n
fights with the youths of other quarters.At the marginsof urban
society these groups sometimeselided into the genuineunderworld
of vagabondsand thieves.1l
While the gangs that cameto dominateKarbalan the firsthalf of
the nineteenth century had a similar historicalbackground, hey
becamemore than merely lower-classneighbourhood outh clubs.
The Karbala angs were often headedby outsidersand included n
their numbers ugitivesand deserters rom the military.They grew
far more powerful han medievalchivalricorganizations, omingto
rule the city in alliancewith local nobles. In short, they underwent
a peculiarlyearly modern transformation, nd, refracted n this
modern lens, begin to look familiar o the comparative istorian.
They begin to look like "mafia".
All the elements of mafia, as defined by Hobsbawm,Hess and
others, appear n Karbala.12These include avoidanceof invoking
state aw anda preference or settlinggrudges hrough oughness nd
a codeof manlyhonour;a patronageystemwithbossesandretainers;
and control of the community's ife by an officiallyunrecognized
system of gangs. Such mafia must be clearly distinguished rom
randomurban criminalson the one hand, and from ruralpeasant
bandits on the other. The mafioso acks complete egitimacy,but
erectsa quasi-governmentaltructurewith the help of notable-class
bosses. Unlike gangsters n a region with a strong state, mafiosi
existed in a vacuumof state power, and thereforeperformed real
service n providingprotection,albeit coerciveand violent.
ll See Roy P. Mottahedeh,Loyaltyand Leadershipn an Early IslamicSociety
(Princeton,1980), pp. 157-8; for overviewsof the phenomenon utside Iraq, see
ClaudeCahen,Mouvementsopulairest autonomismerbain ans 'asiemusulmaneu
moyen ge (Leiden, 1959), and C. E. Bosworth,TheMediaeval slamicUnderworld:
TheBanuSasan in ArabicSociety ndLiterature, vols. (Leiden, 1976); ra Lapidus
notes in discussing uch groups n medievalSyria hat "fundamentallyntra-urban
organization as not in their hands": ee his MuslimCities n the LaterMiddleAges
(Cambridge,Mass., 1967), pp. 105-7.
12
Hobsbawm,PrimitiveRebels, pp. 30-40; see also Henner Hess, Mafia and
Mafiosi:TheStructuref Power,trans.EwaldOsers(Lexington,1973);AntonBlok,
TheMafiaof a SicilianVillage,1860-1960:A Studyof ViolentPeasantEntrepreneurs
(New York, 1975);and Pino Arlacchi,Mafia,Peasants nd GreatEstates: ociety n
Traditional alabna, rans.J. SteinbergCambridge, 983). We aregrateful o Geoff
Eley for drawing ur attention o the last-namedwork.)Ironically, s Hess notes, the
word "mafia"may derivefrom the Arabic"Ma'afir",he name of the Arabic ribe
thatruled Palermo n medieval imes.
8/9/2019 Mafia, Mob and Shiism in Iraq the Rebellion of Ottoman Karbala 1824-1843
http://slidepdf.com/reader/full/mafia-mob-and-shiism-in-iraq-the-rebellion-of-ottoman-karbala-1824-1843 8/33
118
PAST AND PRESENT
NUMBER 1 12
Mafia-like roups, commonplacen Iraqiand Iranian ities, went
by the generic name of luti or awbash.l3 n the Levantthey were
called qabadayat.The Karbalamafiosi,though differing rom their
Sicilian ontemporariesn beingurbanrather hanvillage-based, lso
erected a parallelstructureof authoritybased on extortionrackets
and the privateuse of force,and ed by the wealthy.The main actors
in Hobsbawm's ypologyof the Sicilianmafia the need to defend
an entiresocietyfromthreats o its way of life, the aspirations f the
various lasses t encompassed ndthe personal mbitions f vigorous
leaders all playeda part n Karbala'smafiaas well.
Mafias emain omparativelyittleknown,aside rom hat n Sicily,
but Hobsbawm nd Hess havedescribed he earlymodernhistorical
conditionsunderwhich they arise. First, they come into power n a
frontiersituationof weak state authority-in rural, remoteareas
like the islandof Sicily. Karbala its this suggestion s a Shiite,partly
Iranian,enclave. Both Sicily and southernIraq had for centuries
been colonially ruled by distant and shifting centres, so that in
neitherareadid the people nvestthe formalgovernmentwith much
legitimacy.
The emergence f a new elitewhere he previously owerful lasses
have ess access o traditional ourcesof authority lso contributeso
mafia ormation. n Sicilymafias ppearedn the wakeof the abolition
of feudalism and the rise of new rural middle classes. As Hess
suggested, the mafia arose as a parallelgovernmentafter the old
feudal order broke down, but before a modernstate emergedand
pressed ts claims o Weberianmonopoly ver he use of force.When
the modernstateasserts tself the statusof the mafioso hanges rom
subcultural olk-hero o criminal.
Karbala'soreign,government-appointedunnielite was expelled
from he city as Mamluk ulegrewweak n the 1820s. The indigenous
13
The word
luti
has connotations of homosexuality, among the deviant behaviours
attributed to this group. See Willem Floor, "The Political Role of the Lutis in Iran",
in Michael E. Bonine and Nikki R. Keddie (eds.),
Modern ran: TheDialectics f
Continuitynd Change
Albany, 1981), pp. 83-95; Willem Floor, "The Lut1s A
Social Phenomenon in Qajar Persia: A Reappraisal",
Die WeltdesIslams,xiii
(1971),
pp. 103-20; Reza Arasteh, "The Character, Organization and Social Role of the Lutis
(Javanmardan) in the Traditional Iranian Society of the Nineteenth Century", Xl.
Econ.andSocialHist. of theOnent, v
(1961), pp. 47-52; H. G. Migeod, "Die Lutls:
Ein Ferment des stadtischen Lebens in Persien", 71.
Econ. and SocialHist. of the
Orient,
i (1959), pp. 82-91. Floor has demonstrated the distinction between sporting
neighbourhood organizations of the popular classes, which he calls
lutigar,
nd the
gangs or
awbash;
oth are commonly referred to as
lutis.
The Turks in Iraq referred
to the
lutis
as
yaramaz
r good-for-nothings, and as
girami.
8/9/2019 Mafia, Mob and Shiism in Iraq the Rebellion of Ottoman Karbala 1824-1843
http://slidepdf.com/reader/full/mafia-mob-and-shiism-in-iraq-the-rebellion-of-ottoman-karbala-1824-1843 9/33
119
AFIA, MOB AND SHIISM IN IRAQ
Shiite Arab notablesattempted o take their place in monopolizing
the city's resources,but lackeda disciplinedarmed orceand had no
tradition f legitimate ule. Karbala's ourcesof wealth pilgrimage
and trade requiredsecurity. The Shiite notablesthereforede-
pended on retainers ecruited rom among brigands.Unexpectedly
the neighbourhood uffiansand desperate ugitives hatthe notables
hired emerged as powers in their own right. Ibrahim Za'farani
provided protectionand gatheredtribute for the magnate Sayyid
'Abdu'l-Wahhab, rowingwealthyenoughthroughextortion, raud
and intimidation o enter the propertied lite himself. The sons of
petty shopkeepers nd minorclergybegan o rivalold landedSayyid
families n wealthand influenceby virtueof theircommand f armed
force. In the 1830s and 1840s the old Shiite elites made common
cause with the rising gang leaders o resist Ottoman eforms.
The city'sgangssplit nto a minority ranian actionanda majority
Arab grouping. The Iranianswere led by Mirza Salih, son of an
Iranian ather romShirazandan Arabmother roma familyof Shiite
jurisprudents ased n Karbala.MirzaSalih'smajorallycommanded
his own gang of 60-150 Baluchis rom Fars province n Iran.14
Sayyid IbrahimZa'faraniheaded the far largerArab faction of
gang members.His father,an Iranian rom Baku, marriedan Arab
woman n Karbala, ettling hereto sell his saffron.Europeanndus-
trially-made tuffs-in he 1830sdevastated raqitextilemanufactur-
iug. 15
It remains unknown whether Za'farani's amily suffered
business losses because of Europeancompetition.Sayyid Ibrahim
grewup to indigence,hung aboutwith toughsand finally oined he
gangs. He came to prominenceby killing one of their leaders.He
then formed a policy of liberallydistributingbooty from criminal
activities o his followers,which made him more popularwith the
rankand file thanothergang eaders.He also exhibiteda daring hat
elicited he admiration f his men, mastering he sortof intrigue hat
could removedangerous oes and puttingtogethera loose coalition
of Arab gangs within the city. Both majorgang bosses, Za'farani
and Salih, "men of the people", derived from lower-middle-class
backgrounds.Througha code of "honour"basedon courage,cun-
14
Informationn this and succeedingparagraphss basedon P.R.O., F.O. 195/
204, "Translation f a PersianAccount";and on F.O. 248/108,Lt.-Col.Farrant o
Sir StratfordCanning,datedBaghdad,15 May 1843. The Farrantetter s a detailed
report,basedon extensive nterviews, repared y the Britishafter he Ottoman iege
of Karbala.
15Nieuwenhuis,
Politics ndSocietyn EarlyModetnraq,p. 86.
8/9/2019 Mafia, Mob and Shiism in Iraq the Rebellion of Ottoman Karbala 1824-1843
http://slidepdf.com/reader/full/mafia-mob-and-shiism-in-iraq-the-rebellion-of-ottoman-karbala-1824-1843 10/33
120
NUMBER 1 12
AST AND PRESENT
ning andviolence,theygained he respectand fearof the littlepeople
fromwhom they sprangby risingto a positionof wealthand power.
The fourteenmajorgangs, including hosegroupedaroundMirza
Salih, ranged n size from 50 or 60 men to 400. Some specialized n
particular inds of extortion; ne gang, for instance, armed he city
marketor bazaar.Many gangsterscame as fugitivesfrom outside
Karbala.In addition to the gangs, Za'farani mployed his Arab
relatives n his mother's ide to buildan alliancewith the neighbour-
ing Arab pastoralnomads. He brought he leaderof one tribe into
the city with 300 men to bolsterhis own position. Five other Arab
tribal eadersoutside the city allied themselveswith Za'farani.All
Shiites, they had frequentlycome into conflict with the Ottoman
government.
Although t lay well within Iraq's borders, Karbalahad the air
of a frontiertown. The populationshowed hostility to the Sunni
governmentn Baghdad,whichcouldseldomstation ts Sunni roops
therewithoutendlesstrouble.The city becamean idealhide-out or
all the murderers, hieves,embezzlers ndarmydesertersn Iranand
Iraq. These underworld lements (mostly Arab) mingled with the
often Iranian abourers, mall-timepedlarsand shopkeepers f Kar-
bala'smarkets,and built up protection acketsaimedat milking he
retailers,merchantsand pilgrims. The rough, desperateand well-
armed oughs organized hemselves nto largegangs, so that in the
absenceof a strongcentralgovernment ilgrimsand inhabitants ad
little choice but to pay a "godfather"or his protection.
Gangchiefs accumulated nough capital n this manner o begin
buying land, the most importantasset in the nineteenth-century
Middle East, and to live in the best houses in the city. A group of
about2,500
utis
ruledand nspireddread n the citywhosepopulation
averaged 0,000, for even though he inhabitants reasedgangmem-
bers'palmswell, they oftenstoleor rapedanyway.6 Members f the
old elite, like 'Abdu'l-Wahhab, elpedcreate he corrupt ystemby
actingas patronsof the thugs, gladlypayingoff one gang to protect
themselves rom the others.
THE SH1ITE ESTABLISHMENTAND THE MAFIA
The variousgroups within Karbalawere united by a religiouscon-
sciousnessof being Shiites and by a perceptionof the Ottomansas
16 P.R.O., F.O. 248/108, Farrant o Canning,15 May 1843. There were 3,400
houses n Karbala nd the populationluctuated etween20,000normally nd 80,000
at pilgrimage imes. Estimatesas high as 10,000 for the lutis are given, but this
probably esults romconfusing he gangswiththe owerclasses n general: ee 'Abbas
al'-Azzawi,Ta'nkh l- Iraqbayn htilalaynHistory f IraqbetweenTwoOccupations],
8 vols. (Baghdad,1955), vii, p. 65.
8/9/2019 Mafia, Mob and Shiism in Iraq the Rebellion of Ottoman Karbala 1824-1843
http://slidepdf.com/reader/full/mafia-mob-and-shiism-in-iraq-the-rebellion-of-ottoman-karbala-1824-1843 11/33
121
AFIA
MOB
AND
SHIISM
IN
IRAQ
the
same
Sunni
enemy
that
had
persecuted
he
Imams
and
all
their
partisans
down
the
ages.
The
gang
leaders
offered
these
diverse
elementsan alternativeo SunniOttomancontrolof the town.
The
Shiite
scholars
iewed
he
Hidden
Imam
as
the
only
ultimately
just
ruler,
although
most
of
them
in
this
period
accepted,
as
the
best
they
could
achieve,
a
temporal
power
that
established
order
and
allowed
them
to
enforce
their
version
of
the
holy
law.17
While
the
religious
scholars
(and
indeed
many
other
sectors
of
the
town's
population)
no
doubt
deplored
he
uglier
aspects
of
gang
rule,
they
probably
onsidered
t
no
more
evil
or
illegitimate
han
they
did
the
prospectof Sunnicontrol.
The
Shiite
religious
cholars
aw
major
advantages
n
keeping
he
city
out
of
Ottoman
ontrol.
If
the
Turks
re-established
heir
hold
on
the
town,
they
would
put
the
lucrative
shrine
endowments
and
income
under
he
charge
of
Ottoman
fficials.
They
would
refer
cases
to
the
Ottoman-appointed
eligious
court
judge
qadi)
rather
han
to
the
Shiite
jurisprudents,
nd
would
prescribe
he
mention
of
the
Ottoman
mperor's
ame
n
the
Friday
prayer
ermons.
Finally
they
would
mpose
restrictions
n
the
openperformancef theShiite orm
of
Islamic
rituals.
8
Moreover
he
Shiite
establishment
tself
suffered
deep
and
bitter
divisions
and
therefore
he
leading
scholars
hemselves
became
em-
broiled
n
the
factious
urbulence
f
Karbala's
ang-dominated
oli-
tics.
This
conflict
ranged
he
rationalist
Usuli
jurisprudents
gainst
the
more
ntuitional
Shaykhis,
ollowers
of
Shaykh
Ahmad
al-Ahsa'i
(d.
1826).19
The
struggle
between
the
two
parties,
which
led
many
Usuli
scholarso excommunicatehe Shaykhandhis followers, entredon
al-Ahsa'is
metaphorical
xplanations
f
key
doctrines
such
as
the
Resurrection,
he
ascension
of
Muhammad
nd
the
continued
ife
of
the
Twelfth
Imam.
The
Usuli
scholars
urther
eared
that
Shaykh
17
See
Said
Amir
Ariomand,
'The
Shi'ite
Hierocracy
nd
the
State
n
Pre-Modern
Iran:
785-1890?',
Archives
aropeenes
e
soeiologie,
x
(1981))
pp.
45-60;
and
Mooian
Momen,
ntroduction
o
Shi'i
Islam
New
Haven
and
Oxford,
1985)
pp.
191-6.
18
In
1803
Sunni
officials
had
been
n
control
of
many
Shiite
hrines: eeAbuTalibKhan sfahani,Masir-iTalibi TalibiTravels],ed.
Husayn
Khadivju
Tehran,
A.Hj
1352),
pp.
406-7,
418;
trans.
Charles
Stewart
as
Travels
f
Mirza
Abu
Taleb
Khan,
2nd
edn.,
3
vols.
(London,
1814),
ii,
pp.
190-1.
19
On
Shaykhism,
ee
Bayat,
Mysticism
nd
Dissent;
and
Henry
Corbin,
En
islam
iranien,
vols.
(Paris,
1972),
iv.
The
movement
developeda
millenarian
wing)
discussed
elow,
that
ed
to
the
messianic
Babi
movement
hat
shook
mid-nineteenth-
century
raq
and
Iran.
8/9/2019 Mafia, Mob and Shiism in Iraq the Rebellion of Ottoman Karbala 1824-1843
http://slidepdf.com/reader/full/mafia-mob-and-shiism-in-iraq-the-rebellion-of-ottoman-karbala-1824-1843 12/33
122
NUMBER
1
12
AST
AND
PRESENT
Ahmad's
preference
or
intuitive
knowledge
which
he
said
he
ob-
tained
by
inspiration
irectly
rom
he
Imams)
would
seriously
under-
mine the authorityof their position, based on technical legal
knowledge
derived
from
the
principle
of
reasoned
ndeavour.
In
Karbala
he
Shaykhis
were
ed
by
Sayyid
Kazim
Rashti,
Shaykh
Ahmad's
uccessor,
and
the
Usulis
by
the
jurisprudent
ayyid
Ibra-
ham
Qazvini.
This
division
of
the
Shiite
religious
establishment
played
directly
nto
the
hands
of
the
gang
leaders.
Once
one
of
the
leading
clergy
had
offered
patronage
o
a
gang
leader,
his
rival
had
to
seek
the
protection
of
one
of
the
other
gangs
or
risk
violence
and
intimidation.Majorreligiousscholars raditionallystablishedinks
with
gangs
n
most
Iranian
ities.
This
mutually
eneficial
elationship
provided
the
cleric
with
a
force
that
could
enforce
his
decisions,
collect
his
religious
axes
and
agitate
n
his
favour,
often
n
opposition
to
the
local
governor.
The
gangs,
on
the
other
hand,
had
a
protector
with
whom
they
could
take
refuge
if
the
governor
moved
against
them.
In
Karbala
Za'farani
robbed
Qazvini
of
4,000
qirans.
Qazvini
sought
the
protection
of
Mirza
Salih
and
his
faction,
andZa'faraniannouncedhimself
a
disciple
of
Rashti.
Mirza
Salih
even
appears
listed
among
Qazvini's
tudents,
showing
hat
more
than
one
sort
of
bond
linked
the
two.20
It
appears
hat
Rashti
did
not
relish
being
protected
by
Za'farani,
or
as
soon
as
the
Shaykhi
eader
sensed
the
Ottoman
determination
o
reassert
control,
he
broke
his
links
with
the
gang
leader
n
order
to
assume
a
mediatory
ole.
THE
RE-ESTABLISHMENT OF OTTOMAN RULE IN IRAQ
Now
let
us
turn
to
the
temporal
dimension.
In
the
course
of
the
eighteenth
entury
he
Ottoman
mpire
ost
control
over
many
of
its
outlying
provinces,
accepting
vassal
states
of
sometimes
dubious
loyalty.
The
most
successful
uch
states
were
headed
by
adventurous
members
f
the
Ottoman
r
Mamluk
military
lasses
as
in
Egypt,
Palestine
nd
Iraq.
The
weakened
mpire
also
faced
tribal
revolts
n
Arabia
nd
Kurdistan.
The
valley-lords
f
Anatolia,
who
had
much
more
rganic
oots
n
the
local
power
tructurehandidtheMamluks,likewise
made
a
bid
for
more
autonomy.
Karbala
n
the
1820s
was
twice-removed
rom
Istanbul's
rasp,
a
city-state
n
a
vassal
realm
of
20
P.R.O.,
F.O.
248/108,
Farrant
to
Canning,
15
May
1843.
For
Mirza
Salih
as
Qazvini's
tudent,
see
Muhammad
Tunikabuni,
Qisas
l-'ulama'
Stories
of
the
Reli-
gious
Scholars]
(Tehran,
n.d.),
p.
4,
where
an
'CAqa
Mirza
Salih
'Arab"
is
listed.
8/9/2019 Mafia, Mob and Shiism in Iraq the Rebellion of Ottoman Karbala 1824-1843
http://slidepdf.com/reader/full/mafia-mob-and-shiism-in-iraq-the-rebellion-of-ottoman-karbala-1824-1843 13/33
123
MAFIA, MOB AND SHIISM IN IRAQ
tenuousallegiance.The gang eadersof Karbala, houghurban ather
than rural,most resembled he valley-lords,who also often came as
close to banditryas to government.21
In the lateeighteenth enturyandthe firstdecadeof the nineteenth
the Mamlukskept a quite strong hold over Karbala.Relationsbe-
tweenthe town and Baghdadwere at leastcorrect.Moreover he city
desperatelyneeded the centralgovernment.In April 1801 12,000
tribesmen rom Najd in Arabia,adherents f the puritanical unni
reformist ect foundedby Ibn 'Abdu'l-Wahhab, illagedKarbalaor
booty and as an act of iconoclasm.22n 1801 the Mamlukgovernor
of the city fled before he Wahhabiadvance, aterbeing executedby
the Mamluk ruler for not having defended Karbala.This act of
retribution imed at emphasizing he solidarityof the urban-based
governmentwith the citizens. It may also have been a sop to Irann
which threatened o annex he shrinecities f the Mamluks ouldnot
protectthem.23
WhileKarbala'smerchantseft the city temporarily fter he attack,
and one Indian raveller ound t falling nto decay n 1803,no major
problemsthen existed between the Sunni Mamlukadministration
andthe Shiitepopulation.The traveller aid he considerableevenue
yielded to the state by pilgrims ed Sunniofficials o tolerateShiites
in the shrinecities, even though hey spaton themelsewhere.24With
the Egyptians'assertionof controlover much of Arabiar nd their
quelling of Wahhabirevivalism,Karbala's ecurityon its Arabian
flank improved.
RelationsbetweenBaghdadand Karbaladeteriorated fter 1820,
partlybecauseof poorerpolitical elationsbetween ranand Iraq.In
1821 war broke out between the two and the Qajargovernorof
Kirmanshahed Iranian roops nto Iraqiterritory, eachingalmost
to Baghdadbeforea plagueoutbreak orcedhim to makepeaceand
withdraw.The war set the stage for Mamlukruler Da'ud Pasha's
1824 siege of Karbala.The governmentacted out of a desire to
21 BernardLewis, TheEmergencef ModernTurkey, nd edn. (Oxford,1975),pp.
37-9;A. G. Gould,"Lordsor Bandits?The Derebeys f Cilicia", nternat. 1. Middle
East Studies,vii (1976), pp. 485-506.
22
For details, see Isfahani,Masir-i Talibi, pp. 407-9 (trans. Stewart,Travels f
MirzaAbu TalebKhan, iii, pp. 162-7);and for the reaction n neighbouringNajaf,
see Ja'farAl-Mahbubahn-Najafi,Madian-Najafwa hadiruhaThePastandPresent
of Najaf] Sidon, 1934), pp. 234-6.
23 'Abdu'l-'Aziz . Nawwar,Da'udBasha WaliBaghdad Da'udPasha,Governor
of Baghdad] Baghdad,1967), p. 114 and n. 2.
24 Isfahani,Masir-iTalibi,p. 401 (trans.Stewart,Travels f MirzaAbuTalebKhan,
iii, pp. 144-5).
8/9/2019 Mafia, Mob and Shiism in Iraq the Rebellion of Ottoman Karbala 1824-1843
http://slidepdf.com/reader/full/mafia-mob-and-shiism-in-iraq-the-rebellion-of-ottoman-karbala-1824-1843 14/33
124
NUMBER 1 12
AST AND PRESENT
reassert entral ontrolover the town n the wakeof conflictwith the
city's foreignpatron,Iran. But the siege was madenecessarypartly
because Karbalahad become dangerouslyautonomous rom the
Mamluks, falling into the hands of local notablesand their hired
protectors,unruly gangs. The siege, which forced many of the
inhabitants o flee to Kazimayn,ended in stalemate ather han in
occupation.
5
From 1826the reformingSultanMahmud I determinedo reinte-
grate hese provinces nto the centralized mpire.In 1830he sent an
envoyto Baghdadwith the aim of replacing he Mamluk ulerDa'ud
Pasha, who executed Istanbul'sman. In retaliation he emperor
sent an Ottomanarmy againstBaghdad n 1831 that subduedand
destroyed he Mamluks, eplacing hemwith a Turkishgovernor Ali
Riza Pasha)responsibledirectly o the centralgovernment.26While
reformsproceeded n Turkey, weakening ax-farmers s well as the
powerof intermediary ocialgroups ike military ordsand religious
scholars, he task of centralizing ower n Iraqbegan.
3ust as the independenceof the Kurdishand Arab tribespeople
stood n the wayof this process, o did the semi-autonomyf Karbala.
OttomanviceroyAli Riza Pasha,a memberof the Shiite-influenced
Bektashi rderwho mourned orthe ImamHusaynannually, ympa-
thized with the Shiites.27But he came nto conflictwith them when
he attempted o appointa governor or Karbala, or the powerful
gangsmurdered r droveaway he government'smanwhenhe proved
a threat o their interests.Such effrontery ed the Pasha o demand
the right to perform a pilgrimage o the shrine of Husayn, thus
reasserting he prerogatives f the centre. In this period, too, some
membersof the powerfulpropertied-class roups ike Sayyidsand
the clergyweredemanding hatthe governmentntervene gainst he
gangs.8
2s Al-Kirkukli,Dawhatal-wuzara'
i
ta'rikhwaqa'i'Baghdad z-zawra',
pp.298-
301; Longrigg,Four Centunes f Modern raq,
pp. 242-7;
Murtada l-AnsariAl-
Shaykh,Zindigani a Shakhsiyyat-ihaykhAnsan TheLifeandPersonalityf Shaykh
Ansari] Ahwaz, 1960-1),p. 64. Reports romKarbalan 1843repeatedlynsist that
Da'udPashadid not actually nter he city n the 1820s,but onlybesieged t foreleven
monthsbeforeacceptinga largebribeas a compromise: ee P.R.O., F.O. 195/204,
"Translation f a PersianAccount".
26 Fa'iq Bey, Tankh Baghdad,pp. 82-116; Nawras, Hukm al-mamalik, h. 5;
Nawwar,Daad Basha, ch. 7; and MuhammadGolam drisKhan,"BritishPolicy n
Iraq, 1828-43",Xl.AsiaticSoc. Bangladesh, viii (1973), pp. 173-94.
27
Ibrahimal-Haidari,Zur Soziologie er schiitischen hiliasmus: in Beitrag ur
Erforschunges rakischen assionspielsFreiburg m Breisgau,1975),p. 24.
28 P.R.O., F.O. 248/108, Farrant o Canning,15 May 1843;al-'Azzawi,Ta'nkh
al-'Iraq,vii, p. 65.
8/9/2019 Mafia, Mob and Shiism in Iraq the Rebellion of Ottoman Karbala 1824-1843
http://slidepdf.com/reader/full/mafia-mob-and-shiism-in-iraq-the-rebellion-of-ottoman-karbala-1824-1843 15/33
MAFIA, MOB
AND SHIISM IN IRAQ
125
In the summer
f 1835a show-down
ccurred
etween he Ottoman
governorand
the people of Karbala.The
Britishpolitical
agent in
Baghdadwrotethat the Pashawas planning o attack he townwith
3,000 regulars.29
As reports
from 1843 demonstrate, he
Ottoman
viceroy ound
himself oo weakto occupy he
town and struck
a deal
with the gangs.30He considered
a long-term
occupation f the city
to be unfeasibleand aftera
show of strength
ndicateda willingness
to compromise.
The Ottoman
iceroybroke
with traditionby appointing s
gover-
nor someone
neither Sunni
nor from Baghdad, acitly recognizing
the power of the new coalitionof local gangsand their patrons.He
put 'Abdu'l-Wahhab,cion
of an Arab landed
family with
strong
links with the
Arabgangs led
by Za'farani,n chargeof the
city. In
return for this
appointment
Abdu'l-Wahhab ledged to
increase
payments o
Baghdad o 70,000
qirans. The new governor ppropri-
ateda large
portionof municipal
evenues o himselfand robbed
he
city's two
majorshrinesof
some of their treasures.He used
partof
the money o
pay Za'faraniorprotection gainst
his foe, Mirza
Salih,
and gained influence over personages ike the Iranianconsul by
lending him
large sums of
money. He cultivated
he nearbyArab
chiefs, allowing hem to store
their booty in
the city.31The
govern-
ment of Karbala
ame directly nto the hands
of the gangs,
which
encouraged
urther mmigration
f toughs into the city.
Given he
reports hat reachedBritishears
n the 1830s hat
many
of the city's
elite members
wanted he Ottomans o overthrow
ang
rule, we must
ask how the
citizens were able to muster
enough
solidarity o
face down the Ottomanviceroy.
The answer s
surely
that, in additionto the armedgangs, Karbala's radespeople lso
played a crucial
role in ensuring
he relative ndependence
f their
city. Indeed
the issue of autonomy
arousedthem more than
any
other.The famous
ncidentsof Karbalamob
actionarenot food
riots
like the market trikesof northern
ran,but
politicalones.32As with
crowds lsewhere,
he Karbala
ittlepeoplerioted o achievea
specific
29
National
Archives f India,New Delhi, Foreign
Department roceedings
here-
afterN.A.I.,
For. Dept. Proc.), PoliticalConsultations,
Oct. 1835,file nos.
16-26,
politicalagentin TurkishArabia o secretary o the government f India,27 July
1835.
30
P.R.O.,
F.O. 195/204,"Translation
f a PersianAccount".
31 P.R.O.,
F.O. 248/108,Farrant
o
Canning,15 May
1843.See E. J. Hobsbawm,
Bandits New
York, 1969),pp. 73-4:bandits, ocialor
otherwise, eedurban
middle-
men to dispose
of their goods a
role into which Sayyid Abdu'l-Wahhab
lipped.
32 For bazaar
trikes, ee SirJohnMalcolm,TheHistory
f Persia,2 vols.
(London,
1829edn.), i,
pp. 443-4.
8/9/2019 Mafia, Mob and Shiism in Iraq the Rebellion of Ottoman Karbala 1824-1843
http://slidepdf.com/reader/full/mafia-mob-and-shiism-in-iraq-the-rebellion-of-ottoman-karbala-1824-1843 16/33
126
NUMBER 1 12
AST AND PRESENT
aim:they wished o proveby theirviolence hat o take he city street
by streetwould cost government roopstoo dearly.They sought to
keep the troopsof the "foreign" entralgovernment,whetherMam-
luk or Ottoman,outside the city walls as much as possible. They
often supported ocal familiesof wealthand poweragainstgenerals
sent from Baghdad.33
The crowdsoughtto preserve heirways of life and city rights n
the face of modern Ottomancentralization.Ottomanreforms, in
turn, constituteda response o the economicand politicalpowerof
industrializingEurope. The Turkishreformersmade an assaulton
tax-farming nd otherpre-modernnstitutions nd sought o centra-
lize power.Bothat the Ottoman entre,Istanbul, nd n the peripher-
ies of the empire uchreformsprovoked esistanceromsocialgroups
whose nterests hey threatened,ncluding killedartisans, ax-farm-
ing militarymen and the religiousscholars.In the Karbala iots of
the 1830sand 1840swe witnessa crowddefending tself fromrapid
social change.34
Meanwhile he prospects f the Ottoman mpire or the reassertion
of central control were improving. The 1840 Treaty of London,
backedby fourEuropean owers,put anend to the Egyptian iceroy's
bid to takeover the empire.The Ottoman mperor,havingregained
Syria,hoped also to take directcontrolof the Hijaz. Ali Riza Pasha
watched hese events closely from Baghdad,awareof their regional
implications.35 ut just as the proclamation f reformshelpedspark
a revolt n Rumelia n 1841by Christian easants ager or improve-
ment in their situation,so the centralizing endenciesof the empire
provokeda backlash rom the Shiitesof southern raq.36
In September1842 a new viceroy of Iraq arrived n Baghdad,
MuhammadNaXib MehmetNecip) Pasha. This official former
ministerof justice, a staunchconservative nd Ottomanchauvinist
with intimate ies to the new emperor,Abdulmecid had opposed
the reforms or giving too much awayto minorities.The reformers
thereforesent him away from Istanbulto serve as viceroy of the
Damascusprovince n January1841. In SyriaNaXibPashabecame
convincedof the need for greatercentralized ontrol.He attempted
33 Cf. Hobsbawm,PrimitiveRebels,
pp.110-13.
34 Rude, Paris andLondonn theEighteenth entury, p. 18-23.
35 R. Y. Ebied and M. J. L. Young, "An UnpublishedLetter rom 'All Pasha,
OttomanGovernor f Iraq, to the Sharlfof Mecca",Die WeltdesIslams,new ser.,
xviii (1976-7),pp. 58-71.
36 H. Inalcik, "Application f the Tanzlmatand its Social Effects",Archivam
ottomanicum,(1973), pp. 97-127.
8/9/2019 Mafia, Mob and Shiism in Iraq the Rebellion of Ottoman Karbala 1824-1843
http://slidepdf.com/reader/full/mafia-mob-and-shiism-in-iraq-the-rebellion-of-ottoman-karbala-1824-1843 17/33
127
AFIA,
MOB
AND
SHIISM
IN
IRAQ
to
subdue
he
bedouins,
treated
he
Christian
minority
everely,
and
succeeded
n
excluding
British
military
advisers
rom
the
province.
Indeedhe so antagonized he westernpowerswhile in Syriathat
Istanbul
inally
ransferred
im
to
Baghdad,
hough
he
retained
he
emperor's
confidence.37
Najib
Pasha
also
wanted
trong
control
of
Iraq,
which
meant
acing
down
the
Arab
tribes
and
the
urban
gangs
n
the
Shiite
south.
Only
about
orty
days
after
his
arrival
n
Baghdad
he
Pasha
set
off
on
23
October
or
Musayyib
on
the
Euphrates,
where
Serasker
Sadullah
Pasha
had
preceded
him
with
some
troops,
and
pitched
camp.
He
gave
t
out
that
he
intended
ooverseerepairsotheHindiyyah anal,forwhich
money
had
recently
been
donated
by
the
government
f
Awadh.
The
canal
would
help
drain
marsh
and
in
which
refractory
Arab
ribes
ook
refuge,
and
would
help
get
water
o
restive
peasants
in
Hillah.38
Rumours
began
to
circulate
hat
Najib
Pasha
ntended
to
march
on
Karbala.
The
Shaykhi
eader
Rashti
wrote
to
the
Iranian
onsul
in
Karbala
"that
many
Persians
were
daily
coming
o
him
for
advice,
and
begged
him
to
go
to
the
Pacha's
camp,
or
to
write
him
to
knowhisntentions".39 he consulwroteto the
Pasha
during
his
period,
but
is
letters
concerned
njuries
done
to
Iranian
itizens
by
the
gangs
rather
han
any
possible
advance
on
the
shrine
city.
Iranian
amilies
panicked
nd
began
leaving
for
Baghdad.
THE
DECISION
TO
INVADE
l\&eanwhile
ajib
Pasha
sent
to
Karbala
or
provisions
nd
sent
word
that
e
intended
to
visit
the
shrine
of
Imam
Husayn.Municipalauthoritieseplied coldly, offering
him
only
a
token
amount
of
provisions
nd
telling
him
that
he
could
come
into
the
city
for
the
visit
nly
if
he
left
his
main
force
outside
and
retained
only
four
or
five
odyguards.
The
Pasha,
ivid
on
receiving
his
reply,
threatened
to
ake
the
city
by
force.
Before
he
began
his
advance,
on
18
Novem-
ber,
e
wrote
to
the
embassies
of
Britain,
France
and
Iran,
detailing
his
easons
or
contemplating
military
action.
The
previous
year
Ali
Riza
Pasha
had
made
the
same
request
and
alsoeceiveda replyfromcity leaders hattheywouldallowhimin
37
C.
E.
Farah,
"Necip
Pa,sa
and
the
British
in
Syria
1841-1842",
Archivam
ttoman-
cum,
i
(1970),
pp.
115-53.
38
P.R.O.,
F.O.
248/108,
NaXib
Pasha
to
political
agent
in
Turkish
Arabia
(n.d.)
autumn
842].
39
Ibid.,
Farrant
to
Canning,
15
May
1843.
8/9/2019 Mafia, Mob and Shiism in Iraq the Rebellion of Ottoman Karbala 1824-1843
http://slidepdf.com/reader/full/mafia-mob-and-shiism-in-iraq-the-rebellion-of-ottoman-karbala-1824-1843 18/33
128
NUMBER
1
12
AST
AND
PRESENT
with
only
ten
or
fifteen
persons
as
a
retinue.
He
finally
returned
o
Baghdad
without
performing
he
visit.
NaXib
Pasha
considered
his
predecessor o have erred in appointingcitizensof Karbala ax-
farmers
and
allowing
the
city
to
become
a
refuge
for
criminal
ele-
ments.
He
believed
that
excluding
he
Pasha
rom
his
own
territory
constituted
"a
final
demonstration
f
the
revolt
of
the
town".40
The
omission
of
the
Ottoman
mperor's
name
from
the
concluding
sermons
at
Friday
congregational
rayers
a
mention
made
else-
where
n
Iraq
further
ymbolized
Karbala's
ndependence.41
ere
the
city's
religious
scholars
again
demonstrated
heir
opposition
o
SunniOttomanrule.
Najib
Pasha
aid
that
the
violence
of
the
gangs
n
Karbala
larmed
him,
accusing
Za'farani
nd
his
men
of
murdering
nd
robbing
at
will.
The
Pasha
reported
hat
he
gang
chief
had
robbed
ven
eminent
Shiite
scholars
and
had
raped
and
murdered
lady
of
reputation.42
But
the
strategic
mplications
f
Karbala's
tatus
disturbed
him
even
more.
He
saw
it
as
an
Iranian-dominated
tronghold,
complaining
that
en
thousand
ranian
ub
ects
had
congregated
n
the
shrine
city,
but
no
such
concentration
f
Turks
existed
n
Iran.
He
insistedthatallMuslims
revered
he
shrines
n
Karbala,
hat
the
place
belonged
to
the
Ottoman
empire
and
that
Iranians
nly
had
the
right
to
visit
there
once
a
year.43
Such
an
Iranian
population
entre,
controlled
y
gangs,
lying
in
his
rear
with
powerful
Arab
tribes
in
the
vicinity,
represented
Troian
horse
for
his
government
were
hostilities
with
Iran
to
break
out.44
The
city
responded
o
the
Pasha's
threats
n
mid-November
by
holding
meetings
and
closing
ranks.
The
elite
at
first
reached
a
consensushattheyshouldrefuseentryto NaiibPasha's roopsand
defend
the
town,
proposing
o
buy
him
off
with
a
sum
of
money.
Gang
eaders
howed
particular
etermination
o
keep
the
Turks
out,
because
hey
would
threaten
heir
control
over
the
city.
The
flight
of
wealthy
and
influential
Iranian
families
to
Baghdad
alarmed
the
toughs,
who
put
pressure
on
them
to
stay,
with
all
their
extensive
resources.
5
The
gangs
argued
that
the
former
governor's
iege
of
1824
had
provedunsuccessful.Moreoverheyemphasizedheneedof Shiites
4o
Ibid.
41
Ibid.
42
Ibid.n
Naiib
Pasha
o
political
agent
(n.d.).
43
P.R.O.,
F.O.
60/96,
NaXib
asha
o
Lt.-Col.
Sheil
(n.d.).
44
P.R.O.,
F.O.
248/108,
Naiib
Pasha
o
political
agent
(n.d.).
45
P.R.O.,
F.O.
60/96,
Naiib
Pasha
o
French
consul
(n.d.).
8/9/2019 Mafia, Mob and Shiism in Iraq the Rebellion of Ottoman Karbala 1824-1843
http://slidepdf.com/reader/full/mafia-mob-and-shiism-in-iraq-the-rebellion-of-ottoman-karbala-1824-1843 19/33
hlAFIA, MOB
AND SHIISM IN
IRAQ
129
to defendthe
holy city from SunniTurkish ncursions.
Artisans
nd
shopkeepers
ad no choicebut to staybecause
heyfeared hey
would
lose what (largely immovable)propertythey owned should they
depart. That
eminent members
of the Qajarroyal family,
like the
Zillus-Sultan
then n political
exile), elected
o remaingaveheart o
the poor and
middle-class ranians.46
The Iranian
onsul in Baghdadattempted
o negotiatewith
Naiib
Pasha,requesting ix months
of graceto allow
Iranians o leave the
town. He later
said he wrote the Shaykhi eader
Rashti two
letters
warningthat
the new Ottomanviceroy was
deadly serious
in his
threat to occupy the city, but Rashti said he never receivedthe
missives.47Najib Pasha rejected
any suggestion
that he delay six
months n entering
he town.
Severalcity
leaders,not including he gang
leaders,attempted
o
negotiate irectly
withthe Ottoman
iceroy.
The exiledIranian rince
Zillu's-Sultan,Rashti, 'Abdu'l-Wahhab
nd
other membersof the
elitewenttogether
o the Pasha's
ampat Musayyib.NaXib emanded
the right to
station300-500troops nside the
city, insisting
hat the
gangsstopoperating heir racketsand thatZa'faraniometo him for
an audience. 'Abdu'l-Wahhab
eplied that
some troopsmight be
stationed n
Karbala,but that
the gangs wouldnever agree
to the
other erms.
The city's governor
offered o
have Za'faranimurdered
if only he were
given enough
time, and Rashtialso showeda
willing-
ness to abandon
Za'farani.
In the alliance
of nobles and bosses
that underpins
any mafia,the
nobles generally onsider he
mafiosi
expendable.
This and several urtherattempts
at negotiation
oun-
deredon the
intransigence f the gangsand
of Najib Pasha,
though
Rashtiand
Zillu's-Sultan ought
hardfor a compromise hat
would
allow Turkishtroops nto the
city.48
On 11 December 1842
Najib Pasha wrote
to Zillu's-Sultan nd
Rashti,asking
hem to warn he Iranians o separate
hemselves
rom
the gangs and
to leave the
town or take refuge in the shrines
of
Husaynor 'Abbas.
He cautioned
he two leaders hathe intended
o
use force against
the gangs
should they oppose him, but
offered
protection o
neutral ivilians.
He said, "whoever f all the people
of
46 Ibid.,
Farrant
to Canning, 22 Apr. 1843; F. O. 248/108,
Farrant to Canning,
15
May 1843.
47
P.R.O.,
F.O. 248/108, Farrant to Canning, 15
May 1843; F.O. 60/95,
Persian
agent at Baghdad
to Hajji Mirza
Aqasi (n.d.) [Jan. 1843].
48
The autumn negotiations are reported
in detail in
P.R.O., F.O. 248/106, Farrant
to Canning, 15 May 1843.
8/9/2019 Mafia, Mob and Shiism in Iraq the Rebellion of Ottoman Karbala 1824-1843
http://slidepdf.com/reader/full/mafia-mob-and-shiism-in-iraq-the-rebellion-of-ottoman-karbala-1824-1843 20/33
130
NUMBER 1 12
AST AND PRESENT
the Town takesrefugewith you, assureand satisfyhim of safety".49
Najib Pasha hus recognized hat they had negotiated n good faith,
but he also attemptedby safetypledges o drivea wedgebetween he
membersof the Karbala oalition.He failed to separate he Iranian
tradespeopleromthe gangs, however,because hey couldnot afford
the suddenlyastronomical rice of carriage ut of the city for their
familiesand so had to stay and make a stand.
THE ADVANCE ON KARBALA
Gang eadersmade everishpreparationso defend he city, arranging
for their allies from the Arab tribes to come there in force. The
Ottoman iceroy,alarmed,dispatchedSerasker adullahPashawith
three regimentsof infantry,one of cavalryand twentyguns. About
19 December1842he arrived t Imam-Nuk,a mile and a half south-
eastof Karbala.They received poradic niper irebut did not return
it. Their arrivalprovokedanotherattemptat negotiation,again ed
by Rashti and Zillu's-Sultan,which involved the giving of gang
hostages n exchange or the Turkishwithdrawal f all but 500 men.
This effortmet failurewhen NajibPasharejected ts termseven after
SadullahPashahad accepted t.50
The day after the viceroy'snegativemessagearrived,around22
December, SadullahPasha sent his soldiers out to occupy some
favourablepositions. Observerson the city walls informedArab
tribespeople nd Karbala's abourersand artisansof these strategic
troop movements.Fearingan attack,a mob gatheredand went out
to assault he soldiers,whom they droveback. The crowdcaptured
several artillerypieces and overturnedothers, retiring at sunset.
While the attackby the crowd appears o have had an element of
spontaneityn it, the peoplehad hardlyactedrandomly. t servedas
a further ndicationof the militanceof the little people and their
distrustof the Ottomans.51
The unyieldingmood of the crowd may have been reinforcedby
religious ivalries.Had Rashtisucceeded n his negotiationswith the
Ottomans,his positionwithin he city wouldhavebeen muchstreng-
49
P.R.O., F.O. 60/97, NajibPasha to Zillu's-Sultan r SayyidKazimRashti],11
Dec. 1842. Cf. Muhammad Nabil"Zarandi,TheDawnbreakersMatali'-i nvar],
partial rans. ShoghiEffendiRabbani Wilmette,1974), p. 36.
50 N.A.I., For. Dept. Proc., SecretConsultations, 0 May 1843, file nos. 5-10,
Persian onsul-general, aghdad, o Mirza Abdu'l-Husayn han,Dec. 1842;P.R.O.,
F.O. 248/10, Farrant o Canning, 15 May 1843; F.O. 195/204,"Translation f a
PersianAccount";Zarandi,Dawnbreakers,. 35.
51 P.R.O., F.O. 248/108,Farrant o Canning,15 May 1843.
8/9/2019 Mafia, Mob and Shiism in Iraq the Rebellion of Ottoman Karbala 1824-1843
http://slidepdf.com/reader/full/mafia-mob-and-shiism-in-iraq-the-rebellion-of-ottoman-karbala-1824-1843 21/33
MAFIA,
MOB AND
SHIISM IN
IRAQ
131
thened.
Rivals
ike thegang
eader
MirzaSalih
andthe Usuli
scholars
did
not wish
to see thishappen.
One
of Rashti's
disciples ater
wrote:
"Howevermuch the noble Sayyidendeavoured o dampen he fire
of this
rebellion hrough
conciliation
nd forbearance,
is opponents
declared
hat heywould
rather
eetheirwomen
andchildren
prisoners
in the
handsof the Turks
han
to havethis dispute
ettled
byhim".52
A pro-Shaykhi
ource
written n 1888
ndicates
hatUsuli
scholars
helped incite
tradespeople
o attack
the Ottoman
orces,partly
to
thwart
Rashti.
A rumourspread
that
one
of the clergy had
seen a
dream
of 'Abbas,the
brother
of Imam
Husayn, who
asked
him to
promulgateholy war against he Turksand promisedhim ultimate
success.53
n
a shrine
city such rumours
of
supernatural id
contri-
buted
to a feeling
hat
the holy places
were mpregnable,
nd
shaped
the militant
popular
mentalityof the
citizens.
But on the
practical
plane
the labourers
nd tradespeople
ad no choice
but to
stay and
fight.
Their action
without
doubt helped dishearten
he Ottomans,
as it aimedto
do. It
also demonstrated
hat
"the crowd"acted
n the
revolt ndependently
f the gangs.
THE SIEGE
OF KARBALA
After
the mob riot
against
the Turkish troops,
the
gangs made
extensivepreparations
o withstand
a siege,
drawingon the
military
and
technological
nowledge
f the army
deserters mong
heir
ranks.
They
preventedanyone
from
leavingthe city,
though
carriagewas
anyway
unavailable
by then.
For the
rest of December
he
Turks
fired
on or
over the town to
frighten
he inhabitants.
Towards
he
end of DecemberZillu's-Sultanwrotefromthe Serasker's amp to
Qazvini,
hen
in Baghdad,
hat the
thousands f shots
fired
nto the
city
had damaged ens
of buildings,
ncluding hrines.
He estimated
forty
inhabitantsof
Karbala
dead in the shelling
and put Turkish
casualties t
a thousand.
He saidof the
Ottomans,
whowerecomman-
deeringmuleteers
or
their ogistics,
hat: 4Their
amp oo is
in great
distress
almost
approaching
o a
famine, but in
Karbala
ood is
abundant
and cheap".54
On about
1 January 843
Qazvini
and he Iranian
onsul,represent-
52 Muhammad
KarimKhan Kirmani,
Hidayat
at-talibinGuide
to the
Seekers]
(Kirman,
A.H. 1380), p.
153.
53
Zarandi,Dawnbreakers,
p.
35-6.
54 N.A.I.,
For. Dept.
Proc., SecretConsultations,
0 May 1843, file
nos. 5-10,
Zillu's-Sultan
o Aqa Sayyid
Ibrahim,
Dhu'l-Qaidah
258/December
842;P.R.O.,
F.O.
248/108,Farrant o
Canning,
15 May 1843.
8/9/2019 Mafia, Mob and Shiism in Iraq the Rebellion of Ottoman Karbala 1824-1843
http://slidepdf.com/reader/full/mafia-mob-and-shiism-in-iraq-the-rebellion-of-ottoman-karbala-1824-1843 22/33
132
NUMBER 1 12AST AND PRESENT
ing the Iranian actionwithinthe city, left Baghdad o beginanother
round of negotiationswith Najib Pasha.But, out of touch with the
determinedmoodof Karbala, heyreached erms e ectedby city ead-
ers. Rashtiwrote o the Iranian onsulurginghim to come o Karbala,
buthe retired nstead o the safetyof Baghdad.Tragically,hosewithin
the besieged own took his actionas a sign that no attackwas immi-
nent.55
Karbala's itizenryduring he siegeshoweda die-hard ommitment
acrossa rangeof social classes to maintainingocal autonomy.The
rootsof this stance ay in the popularmentality hatprevailed uring
the revolt. Although quixotic given the fire-power angedagainst
them, their underlyingattitudehad some basis in local experience.
First, the coalitionof urbangangs, mob and tribesmenhad already
averted wo occupationsn the previous wentyyears,one as recently
as 1835. The inhabitants f Karbalahad grownused to a weak and
corrupt overnmentn Baghdadwhich heycouldbribeor facedown.
They remained gnorantof the sea change he reformshad wrought
in Ottomanands,andas yet unreconciledo thegreater entralization
these entailed. Secondly,poor communications mongthe Karbala
leaders n andoutside he city ed to an underestimationf the danger.
Thirdly,rumourswere planted hatthe shahof Iranwoulddispatch
an armyof 20,000 men to aid the beleaguered ity, and Arab tribal
leaderspromisedanother 12,000 reinforcements.56 he myth that
outside assistancewas on the way shoredup moraleand made the
people less willing to compromise.
Finally,religious eelingsaffected he judgment f the crowd,with
gang and other city leadersstirringup hate for Sunnis. Tradesmen
and abourersinedthe city wallsto hurldown nvectiveon the Turks
and on Sunni holy figures. The clergy contributed o the sectarian
rancour,and though hey did not join n actual ighting heydid help
repairdamagedwalls. The religiousofficial n chargeof the shrine
of 'Abbas who therefore tood to lose a greatdeal shouldthe Turks
come in) thwartedone set of talks by standingup in the assembly,
dashinghis turban o the groundand excommunicatingnyonewho
spoke of giving up the town and theirwives to the "infidel"Turks.
Somepreachers oldlyproclaimedhat he city wasengaged n a holy
war. While classical Shiite thought held that during the Twelfth
Imam's absence believers could wage no holy war against Sunni
55 P.R.O., F.O. 60/95, Persian gentat Baghdad o HajjiMirzaAqasi n.d.) [Jan.
1843];F.O. 248/108,Farrant o Canning,15 May 1843.
56 P.R.O., F.O. 248/108, Farrant o Canning,15 May 1843.
8/9/2019 Mafia, Mob and Shiism in Iraq the Rebellion of Ottoman Karbala 1824-1843
http://slidepdf.com/reader/full/mafia-mob-and-shiism-in-iraq-the-rebellion-of-ottoman-karbala-1824-1843 23/33
MAFIA, MOB AND SHIISM IN IRAQ 133
Muslims, the clericsput such legal nicetiesaside during he siege.57
Classicaldoctrinewas one thing, the impassioned hetoric f desper-
ate clergymenanother.
The majordissentingview from the popularmentality ust des-
cribed originatedwith the Shaykhi eaderRashti. Lt.-Col. Farrant
reported that he "did all in his power to prevent hostilities, he
preachedagainst heir proceedings,he was abusedand threatened,
they would not listen to him".58AlthoughZa'farani ad announced
himself Rashti'sfollower, the Shaykhi eader'sactionsdemonstrate
that he much preferred conventional overnment f the Sunnisto
the semi-anarchy f even pro-Shaykhi ang rule.
The gang-led oalition n Karbala ased tselfprimarily n violence
and coercion, houghyearning or regionalautonomyplayeda part.
It therefore xhibitedweaknessesand could fall apart n the face of
strongerforces. The old landed elite also demonstrated certain
ambivalencen choosingbetween hegangsand he Ottomans, hough
they had not the courage o speakout as had Rashti.
The Shaykhis'minorityview of events also involvedmillennialist
ideas. Rashtitraditionally evoted he fastingmonthof Ramadan o
discussing the characteristics f the promisedMahdi, who would
restore ustice o the world. The fastingmonthfell in October1842,
when it increasingly ooked as if Naiib Pasha might invade. An
eyewitnesswritingsix or sevenyears atersaidthatRashtielucidated
the comingof this messianic igurewith particular etail hatyear.59
The siege took place in the closing months of A.H. 1258, and the
Shiiteworld in the nineteenthcenturywas pervadedby apocalyptic
speculations hat the promisedone (Mahdi)would appear n 1260/
1844, a little over a year later.60 n Shaykhicircles, where these
57 Ibid.;see NormanCalder,"TheStructuresf Authorityn ImamiShi'iJurisprud-
ence"(Schoolof Oriental ndAfricanStudies,Univ. of LondonPh.D. thesis, 1980),
pp. 147-51. This is a differentquestionfrom whether t was permissible o wage
defensiveholy war againstnon-Muslimsn the time of the Occultation f the Imam.
In the firstquarter f the nineteenth enturymilitantUsuli ulamarepeatedly rgued
that t waspermissible,withreferenceo Russia.SeeA. K. S. Lambton, ANineteenth
CenturyView of ihad", StudiaIslamica, xxii (1970), pp. 179-92;Algar,Religion
andState, pp. 79-80;Ariomand,"Shi'iteHierocracy", p. 52 ff.
58
P.R.O., F.O. 248/108,Farrant o Canning,15 May 1843.
59
Al-Qatil bn al-Karbala'i, Risalah",printed n Asadu'llahFadil Mazandarini,
Ta7ith-i uhural-haqq Historyof the Manifestationf Truth], ii (Tehran,n.d., c.
1944), pp. 506-7; AbbasAmanat,"The EarlyYearsof the Babl Movement:Back-
groundand Development" Univ. of OxfordD.Phil. thesis, 1981), pp. 44-5.
60
See, for example,Mrs. Meer HassanAli, Observationsn the Mussulmaunsf
India,firstpubl. 1832 Karachi,1978edn.), p. 76; Amanat,"EarlyYearsof the Bab
Movement",pp. 78 ff.
8/9/2019 Mafia, Mob and Shiism in Iraq the Rebellion of Ottoman Karbala 1824-1843
http://slidepdf.com/reader/full/mafia-mob-and-shiism-in-iraq-the-rebellion-of-ottoman-karbala-1824-1843 24/33
134
NUMBER 1 12AST AND PRESENT
speculationsreceived particularemphasis, political quietism and
eschewingof holy war against he Sunnismayhavebeen linkedwith
expectations f the imminentadventof a supernatural eliverer.
The five days after he breakdown f the fourth et of negotiations
witnessedfrantic activity on both sides of the struggle.The gang
leaders n Karbala aced increasingdifficulties n provisioning nd
garrisoning he 5,000 Arabtribesmen hat had assembledwithin its
walls o aid the defenceeffort.Ammunition rewso scarce hatpeople
toreout the railsaround he shrineof 'Abbasand melted hemdown
for shot.61The Turkish troops also faced great hardship,because
the high Euphratespreventedprovisions rom reaching hem from
Baghdad,and they suffered rom the cold. Using Arab abourand
artilleryblasts, they cut through he date grove protecting he city
walls and finallyhad to fight a fiercebattlewith gangforces n order
to take up a new positionat a tomb just outsidethe city.62
THE OCCUPATION
Logisticalproblemsand a high desertion ateforcedSadullahPasha
to decide whether to act or withdrawaltogether,and around 10
January meetingof the officersdecided to take the city by force.
On 12 JanuaryTurkishartilleryblasteda breach n the wall between
the Najafand Khangates argeenough o allowan assault.One more
round of peace talks opened at this point and city leaderswere on
the verge of acceptingthe Serasker's erms when the chief of the
Iranian angs,MirzaSalih,madean impassioned leathatthey trust
in God and the Prophetand defy the Turksto the end. The Iranians
had emergedas the hard-liners, erhapsbecause hey most fervently
believedthe shah'sforceswere on the way to aid them.
The Ottomanenvoy returnedempty-handedo this camp, from
which artillerybarragesbegan againand went on till sunset, when
both sides settled down for a freezingnight. The Arab tribesmen,
now 8,000 strong, hreatenedo leavebecauseof poormealsandcold
nightswatching he city gates. The gangsthereforebilleted hem on
the civilian population, with whom they celebrated he Muslim
festivalof sacrificeuntil late. As all Muslimsobserved his holy day,
they assumed he Turkswould do the same, and remainedn homes
61
P.R.O., F.O. 195/204, "Translation f a PersianAccount";F.O. 248/108,
Farrant o Canning,15 May 1843.
62 P.R.O., F.O. 248/108,Farranto Canning,15 May 1843;F.O. 60/97, Dr. John
Ross to Lt.-Col.Taylor,22 Jan. 1843.
8/9/2019 Mafia, Mob and Shiism in Iraq the Rebellion of Ottoman Karbala 1824-1843
http://slidepdf.com/reader/full/mafia-mob-and-shiism-in-iraq-the-rebellion-of-ottoman-karbala-1824-1843 25/33
MAFIA,
MOB
AND SHIISM IN
IRAQ
135
rather
han
returning o their
posts.
The gangsters,
distrusting
he
Arabs'
steadfastness,
ailed
the gatesshut.63
The Ottomanofficersplannedout theirassault. Three divisions
commanded
by the
leaderof the lMosul
brigade
were to lead the
attack.
The
firstwouldhold
the breach,
he
secondwould enter
the
town and open
the
Najafgate and the
third
would commandeer
he
bastions
nearest them,
turning
the big guns
on the
city. As an
incentiveto
the disheartened
roops,
one officer
promised
o allow
them
o do
whatever hey pleased
once
nsideandpledged
150
iasters
for
every uti
head.64
Beforedawnon 13 January1843the advancedivisionsset out,
with
heavy
covering
irefrom he Ottoman
rtillery.
They had
almost
reachedthe
breach
unopposedwhen
the alarm
went out
that the
Turks were
approaching.
Both Arabs
and
citizens rushed
to the
defence,
commanded
by an
Arab
gang leader, but
they could
not
prevent
he Ottomans
rom
gainingthe breach.
The
Turks lost 200
men
in the
assault. The gang
forces
ran low on powder
and
were
forced
to retreat
o the cover
of neighbouring
houses,
where
they
keptup fire. One Ottomandivision sneakedalong the insideof the
wall
to the Najaf gate,
killing
the
sentinels and swinging
t open.
SadullahPasha
immediately
moved
the main
force
into the town,
while
another
officer
dispatcheddivisions
along
the walls to
secure
other
gates,
and one through
the centre
of the town
that
attracted
sniper
ire from
roof-tops.
Manymen
detached hemselves
rom
the
main
body
to raid houses for
booty.
The
forceadvancing
long
he walldrovea
crowdof
mixedcivilians
and
Arab tribesmen
before
t as they
frantically ought
egress
from
thesealedor jammed ity gates.At one partially pengatetheTurks
63 P.R.O.,
F.O. 248/108,
Farrant
o Canning,15May
1843;F.O.
195/201,"Trans-
lation
of a PersianAccount".
64 The substantive
ources
or the account
hat follows
of the occupation
nclude
P.R.O.,
F.O. 248/108,Farrant
o
Canning,15May 1843;
F.O. 195/201,
"Translation
of a
PersianAccount";F.O.
60/97,
Ross to Taylor,22
Jan. 1843;
N.A.I., For. Dept.
Proc.,
Secret
Consultations,
2 July1843, no.
41, deposition
madeby Mulla
Aqa of
Darband March
1843);
and Yusuf Astarabadi
o Sayyid
HusaynNasirabadi,
afar
1259/Mar. 843,
n Sayyid
MuhammadAbbas
Shushtari
ed.), "az-Zill l-mamdud"
[TheOutspread hadow],LucknowArabicMS in the ibraryf theRaja fMahmuda-
bad,
fos. 44a-Sla
(a collection f letters
between
he ulama n Iraq
and n north
ndia
compiled
n 1848).
Secondary ources
that
provide mportant
material
r insights
include
J. G.
Lorimer,
Gazetteerf the Persian
Gulf,
'Oman, ndCentral
Arabia,2
vols. (Calcutta,
1908-15,
reproducedLondon,
1970),
i, pp. 1348-58;al-'Azzawi,
Tanrzkhl- Iraq,
vii, pp.
66-8; and'Ali al-Wardi,
Lamahat
Ftima'iyyahin
a'rikh l-
'Iraqal-hadith
SocialGlimpses
rom
he Historyof Modern
raq],
2 vols. (Baghdad,
1969),
ii, pp. 116-24.
8/9/2019 Mafia, Mob and Shiism in Iraq the Rebellion of Ottoman Karbala 1824-1843
http://slidepdf.com/reader/full/mafia-mob-and-shiism-in-iraq-the-rebellion-of-ottoman-karbala-1824-1843 26/33
136
NUMBER
1
12
AST
AND
PRESENT
fired
nto
the
crowd
with
devastating
ffect.
Za'farani
nd
200
of
his
gangsters
led
from
the
al-Hurr
gate,
to
which
they
had
the
key.
The
Iranian angs,led by MirzaSalih,remainedorthefight,asdid the
governor,
Abdu'l-Wahhab.
Most
of
the
gang
leaders
had
already
sent
away
their
families.
Several
housand
Arabs
ollowed
Za'farani
in
his
flight
through
he
al-Hurr
gate.
A
Turkish
officer
sent
3,000
troops
in
pursuit
of
them
and
the
fleeing
Arabs
were
attacked
on
another
lank
by
the
Turkish
cavalry
amped
outside
he
city.
Arab
casualties
an
extremely
high.
The
crush
at
the
narrow
l-Hurr
ate
and
the
troops'
ndiscriminate
firingonthepeoplemassed here mpelledhundreds fcitizens oflee
back
nto
the
town
to
seek
shelter
n
the
shrines
or
in
the
houses
of
Zillu's-Sultan
nd
Rashti,
he
refuges
designated
y
Najib
Pasha.
Ra-
shti's
home
was
so
full
that
people
spilled
nto
his
courtyard,
where
some
sixty-six
persons
were
crushed
by
the
panicky
crowd.
By
this
time
the
greater
body
of
tribesmen
nd
gangs
had
fled
the
city.
Never-
theless,
he
Turkish
division
advancing
hrough
he
centre
of
the
town
suffered
heavy
sniper
ire,
the
intensity
of
which
ndicates
hat
many
tradespeople
oined
he
fray
on
their
own.
Manyoftheseweresightedintheir
ethnic
Iranian
ress
n
the
opposition
orces.
When
he
power
elite
had
fled,
the
little
people
remained
o
defend
heir
bazaar,
heir
holy
city.
This
opposition
rom
he
crowd
nfuriated
he
Turkish
old-
iers.
5
Turkish
troops
chased
retreating
Arabs
to
the
shrine
of
'Abbas,
where
nipers
ired
upon
them
rom
a
minaret.
The
berserk
Ottomans
let
oose
a
fearful
olley
nto
the
crowd
eeking
anctuary
here,
which
panicked,
causing
more
deaths
by
trampling.
The
Turks
took
the
offensive,robbingwomenof jewellery,sometimeschoppingoff a
limb
o
get
it.
Fighting
even
reached
he
precincts
f
the
holy
tomb,
where
he
Turks
killed
several
persons
hey
declared
were
utis.
The
streets
adjoining
Abbas's
shrine
were
filled
with
cadavers
hat
the
Ottomans
et
ablaze
with
naphtha
and
covered
with
blankets
o
help
them
burn.
Nearly
250
persons
probably
perished
n
the
incident.
Nearly
200
more
civilians
were
slaughtered
t
the
shrine
of
Imam
Husayn
before
Sadullah
Pasha
entered
he
city
at
about
10.30
a.m.
and orbade urtherbutchery.
The
troops
hen
fanned
out
to
plunder
he
city's
residences,
aping
and
killing.
Often
the
troops
pressed
the
owners
into
service
as
bearers
o
transport
he
stolen
goods
o
camp.
Mulla
Yusuf
Astarabadi
65
For
the
last
point,
see
P.R.O.,
F.O.
248/111,
Taylor
to
Sheil,
16
Feb.
1843;
and
F.O.
248/111,
letter
of
Ross
to
Baghdad,
17
Feb.
1843.
8/9/2019 Mafia, Mob and Shiism in Iraq the Rebellion of Ottoman Karbala 1824-1843
http://slidepdf.com/reader/full/mafia-mob-and-shiism-in-iraq-the-rebellion-of-ottoman-karbala-1824-1843 27/33
137
AFIA, MOB AND SHIISM IN IRAQ
reported hat althoughhe suffereda head wound he was made to
carry oot to the camp. He wote:
The deadwere lying on top of one another o the extent hat I could not crossthe
streetexceptby walkingover the corpses.It was as if I walkedabout nvisibly,so
manyhadperished . . At the foundation f the mausoleum f our ordAbu'l-Fadl
'Abbas . . I descriedall about he illumined epulchremurdered oulsclinging o
it, beseeching, eekingshelterand refugewithin t. I saw most of the dead n the
lanes and bazaars.66
Only towards sunset did the Ottoman commander,who had
stoppedpaying or lutiears, beginreining n his plunderingminions.
After carefulenquiriesFarrant stimated he loss of life inside the
city at some 3,000 dead that day, with another2,000 Arabskilled
outsidethe walls.67The numberof deadwithin the city represented
15 per cent of its normalpopulation.The Turks lost 400 men.
THE REPRESSIONOF SHIISM
The religious lement n the struggle gain urfacedwhentheTurkish
troopsturnedthe courtof the shrineof 'Abbas nto a barrack ard,
where animalswere stabledand uncouthsoldierssang loose songs,
horrifying he dispiritedShiites.On 15Januaryhe Serasker eceived
wordthat Najib Pashawould shortlyvisit the conquered ity. Shiite
jurisprudentsndothernotableswereput in chargeof overseeing he
burial fthe oftenburnt,dog-eaten adaversn massgraves.On 16and
17 Januaryurtherplundering ccurred s troops earched omes or
arms.
On 18 JanuaryNajib Pashaarrived n the city and was greetedby
a partyof notables hat ncludedRashti.The viceroy aidhis prayers
at the shrine of Imam Husayn and paid respect o the holy tombs,
but he soon revealeda new administrative rder that ended Shiite
autonomy n the town. Najib Pashaappointeda Sunni governorof
Karbala, nd announced hatwith the concurrence f the Sunniqadi
in Baghdad, n assistantSunnijudgewouldbe appointedn Karbala.
Sunni judgeswould hear all court cases, even where they involved
two Shiiteparties romKarbala.Likewise, he government ppointed
a Sunni preacher o deliver sermons after Friday prayersand to
66 Astarabadio Nasirabadi,Safar1259/Mar. 843, n Shushtaried.), "az-Zillal-
mamdud".
67
P.R.O., F.O. 248/111, etterof Ross to Baghdad,17 Feb. 1843;F.O. 248/108,
Farranto Canning,15 May 1843.Cf. al-'Azzawi,Ta'rikh l-'Iraq, ii, pp. 66-7, who
gives 4,000. Iranians loated iguresas high as 22,000. According o Farrant,Sayyid
'Abdu'l-Wahhabstimated he city's populationat the time of the siege at about
20,000, including8,000 tribesmen nd 6,000 ethnic Iranians.
8/9/2019 Mafia, Mob and Shiism in Iraq the Rebellion of Ottoman Karbala 1824-1843
http://slidepdf.com/reader/full/mafia-mob-and-shiism-in-iraq-the-rebellion-of-ottoman-karbala-1824-1843 28/33
138
NUMBER
1
12
AST
AND
PRESENT
pronounce
lessings
on
the
Ottoman
mperor.
8
Thousands
f
Shiites
fled
Iraq
for
Iran.
The Shiiteclergy,alarmedby the disasterandthe new, hardline
Ottoman
government,
began
practising
dissimulation
taqiyyah)
f
their
aith
and
cancelled
urther
performance
f
Friday
ongregational
prayers.
Shiites
ceased
to
pray
with
their
arms
held
straight
down,
pretending
o
be
Sunnis
from
the
ritual
point
of
view.
Observances
of
the
month
of
mourning,
Muharram,
which
began
on
1
February,
were
extremely
ubdued
and
private,
and
news
of
the
attack
disheart-
ened
other
Shiites
n
Iraq.69
REACTIONSTO THE
DISASTER
Reactions
o
the
calamity
within
Karbala
aried
greatly.
By
late
April
a
semblance
of
normality
had
returned
to
the
town
and
Farrant
reported
hat
respectable
esidents
rejoiced
hat
the
gangs
had
been
expelled,
complaining
hat
"no
place
could
have
exceeded
Karbellah
in
debauchery
f
every
sort".
He
noted
that
many
religious
officials
considered
he
calamity
a
judgement
n
the
place.70
Wealthy
survi-
vors
of
the
occupation
were
happier
with
strong
state
control.
Theleadersoftherevolt romoldlanded amilies, uchas'Abdu'l-
Wahhab,
led
to
sanctuary
with
friendly
ribes
and
Najib
Pasha
ubse-
quently
pardoned
hem.
Mirza
Salih
uffered
mprisonment
n
Kirkuk
until
pardoned.
The
Arab
gangs
sought
refuge
n
the
Hindiyyah,
but
their
eader
Za'farani
was
apprehended
nd
taken
o
Baghdad,
where
he
fell
ill
with
hectic
fever
(tuberculosis)
nd
died.
The
major
Arab
tribal
eaders
scaped
afely
with
their
men.
Najib
Pasha's
ostly
mili-
tary
adventure
made
ittle
long-term
hange
n
the
social
structure
f
Karbala ndthegangorganizations,lthoughweakened, ontinued.
Better
dministration
eturned
rosperity
o
the
city
within
hree
years,
though
ranian
merchants
were
thenceforth
ubject
o
heavy
customs
duties
n
the
city
and
within
Turkish
erritory.7l
The
minor
Usuli
scholar
YusufAstarabadi
eacted
with
rage
against
the
ruling
classes.
2
In
a
candid
etter
Astarabadi
ave
full
vent
to
his
68
P.R.O.,
F.O.
60/96,
Naiib
Pasha
o
Persian
onsul,
22
Jan.
1843.
69
P.R.O.,
F.O.
195/201,
"Translation
f a
Persian
Account";
F.O.
60/95,
Persian
agent
t
Baghdad
o
Hajji
Mirza
Aqasi,
20
Dhu'l-Hijjah/22
an.
1843.
70
P.R.O., F.O. 60/70, Farranto Canning,Baghdad, 2 Apr.
1843.
71
N.A.I.,
For.
Dept.
Proc.,
Secret
Consultations,
8
Nov.
1846,
file
nos.
87-96,
H.
C.
Rawlinson
o
Canning,
29
Apr.
1846.
72
Astarabadi
ent
on
to
become
a
student
of
the
leading
urisprudent
Murtada
l-
Ansari
n
Najaf.
For
a
brief
biographical
otice,
see
Muhammad
Mihdi
Lakhnavi
Kashmiri,
udum
s-sama'.
ahmilah
Supplement
o
"Stars
f
the
Heavens"],
vols.
(Qumm,
.
1977),
,
p.
395.
8/9/2019 Mafia, Mob and Shiism in Iraq the Rebellion of Ottoman Karbala 1824-1843
http://slidepdf.com/reader/full/mafia-mob-and-shiism-in-iraq-the-rebellion-of-ottoman-karbala-1824-1843 29/33
139
AFIA, MOB AND SHIISM IN IRAQ
griefandoutrage,angrily xclaiming,"Would hat herewereno king
(sultan) rulingoverus, andnoneoverIran
3
Astarabadilearlybla-
med the Ottoman mperorAbdulmecid or ordering he attack,and
Muhammad hahof Iran or ailing o come o theaidof thebeleagured
Shiites.He wenton to say that f therehadto be a monarch,he should
at least uphold the Qur'anand defend the Imam 'Ali. Astarabadi's
antipathyowardsmonarchy nddesire orthe enthronementf Shiite
valuesrepresent rudimentaryepublicanism, roviding videnceof
strong, if vague, anti-monarchicaleelings among some religious
scholars n the shrinecities in the mid-nineteenth entury.Solidevi-
dencefor such views is otherwise are.74
The Shaykhi eaderRashti nterpretedhe cataclysm s divineretri-
bution orthe failureof the inliabitantso accepthis millenarianeach-
ings. The following year, September-October 843, he refused to
expandon the sub ectof the comingpromised ne. He feared hatwere
he to repeathis discoursea similardisasterwould befall the town,
as the people were still unprepared o embracehis views about the
Mahdi.
5
Iranmet the news of the bloodycaptureof Karbalawith griefand
rage,thenwith clamour orwar. The leading urisprudentf Isfahan,
SayyidMuhammadBaqirShafti,attempted o pressureMuhammad
Shah nto declaringwar on the Ottomansby threatening o lead an
independentarmy of 20,000 men into Iraq.76MuhammadShah
mobilizedi is troops, but in the end took no belligerent teps.77
73
Astarabadio Nasirabadi, afar1259/March 843, n Shushtaried.), "az-Zill l-
mamdud", o. 49b.
74 But see J. Chardin,Voyages e monsieure chevalier hardinnPerse t autresieux
de l'onent,3 vols. (Amsterdam, 709), ii, pp. 207-8, 337; and A. K. S. Lambton,
StateandGovernmentnMediezal slam:An Introductiono theStudyofIslamic olitical
Theory:The3runstsOxford, 1981 , ch 15
75 Al-Qatil bn al-Karbala'i, Risalah", . 507. Astarabadiikewisereferredo the
apocalyptic ature f theoccupation,writing,"GreatGod,whata momentousalamity
We saw the realityof the Day on whicha manwill flee fromhis brother,his friend,
his son and the very clan that gives him shelter":Astarabadio Nasirabadi,Safar
1259/Mar.1843; cf. Qur'an 80:34-36. Later Shaykhis ike KarimKhan Kirmani
pointedout that SayyidKazim'shouse was respected s a sanctuary ven when the
shrineof Husaynwas desecrated, mphasizing he sanctityof the Shaykhi eader's
residence:Kirmani,Hidayat t-talabin, p. 153-4; f. Zarandi,Dawnbreakers,p. 36-
7; al-'Azzawi,Ta'nEh l-'Iraq,vii, p. 68.
76
AlphonseDenis, "Questionde Perse:affairedu Kerbela",Re7)ue e L'Onent,
(1843), p. 139.
77
The Iranianwar chest was depletedas a result of Muhammad hah'srecent
unsuccessfulampaigns gainstHerat; heanti-clericalirstminister eared he ncident
wouldallowa resurgencen the powerof the religious cholars; nd the Britishand
Russian governments xerted their considerable nfluenceagainstany hostilities:
P.R.O., F.O. 60/95, Sheil to earl of Aberdeen,14 Feb. 1843;N.A.I., For. Dept.
(cont. on p. 140)
8/9/2019 Mafia, Mob and Shiism in Iraq the Rebellion of Ottoman Karbala 1824-1843
http://slidepdf.com/reader/full/mafia-mob-and-shiism-in-iraq-the-rebellion-of-ottoman-karbala-1824-1843 30/33
140
PAST
AND
PRESENT
NUMBER
1
12
Given
he
widespread
millennial
peculations
bout
he
coming
of
the
promised
Mahdi
in
1260/1844,
he
Sunni
enemy's
unavenged
sackingof so holya Shiiteshrinesurelyheightened xpectationshat
the
Hidden
Imam
would
soon
appear
o
succour
he
Shiites.
In
May
1844
Sayyid
Ali
Muhammad,
young
merchant
f
Shiraz,
whe
had
associated
riefly
with
the
Shaykhis
n
Karbala,
ut
forward
is
claim
to
be
the
Bab
or
gate
of
the
Twelfth
Imam
and
caused
a
considerable
stir
in
the
shrine
cities
of
Iraq.78
A
large
number
of
Shaykhis
responded
avourably
o
the
Bab.
They
had
been
strengthened
n
their
millenarian
ervour,
as
we
notedabove,by the teachingsof SayyidKazimRashti.The initial
excitement
caused
by
the
Bab
and
the
following
he
gained
n
both
Iran
and
Iraq
derived,
at
least
n
part,
rom
he
millennial
xpectations
caused
by
the
anger
and
frustration
he
Karbala
pisode
provoked
among
devout
Shiites.
The
Babi
movement
spread
with
lightning
swiftness
in
Iran,
especially
attracting
lower-ranking
religious
scholars,
urban
merchants
nd
the
bazaar
lasses.
The
Bab's
message,
aside
from
his
own
messianic
laims,
included
he
abrogation
f
the
Islamic
prohibition
of
interest
on
loans
and
the
amelioration
f theconditionofwomen.The
opposition
he
new
religion
provoked
rom
the
government
nd
the
Usuli
religious
cholars
ed
to
its
persecution
and
n
turn
sparked
lashes
and
uprisings
n
several
ranian
owns
n
1
848-52
9
CONCLUSION
The
data
gleaned
rom
archival
nd
manuscript
ources
nd
presented
abovenot only give us a detailedpictureof gangorganizationnd
activities
n
Karbala,
hey
also
help
clarify
the
general
role
of
the
urban
angs
active
n
many
cities
in
south
Iraq
and
throughout
ran
during
he
nineteenth
entury.
Although
tronger
overnments
ould
suppress
he
toughs,
when
state
power
waned
n
the
first
half
of
the
nineteenth
entury
he
gangs
took
control
of
entire
owns.
Wars
with
modernizing
uropean
tates
ike
the
Russian
empire
enervated
he
Ottomans
nd
the
Qajars
n
the
late
eighteenth
nd
early
nineteenth
(n.
77cont.)
Proc., Secret Consultations, 22 July 1843, no. 41,
Justin
Sheil
to
secretary
to
the
government
of
India,
29
Mar.
1843;
R.
G.
Wilson,
A
Histowy
f
Persia
rom
the
Beginning
f
the
Nineteenth
entury
o
the
Year
1858
(London,
1866),
p.
341.
78
Moojan
Momen
(ed.
),
The
Babi
and
Baha'i
Religions,
844-1944:
ome
Contempor-
ary
Western
ccounts
Oxford,
198
1
,
pp.
87-8
79
See
Mooian
Momen,
"The
Social
Bases
of
the
Babi
Upheavals
in
Iran
(1848-53):
A
Preliminary
Analysis",
Internat.
.
Middle
East
Studies,
xv
(1983),
pp.
157-83.
8/9/2019 Mafia, Mob and Shiism in Iraq the Rebellion of Ottoman Karbala 1824-1843
http://slidepdf.com/reader/full/mafia-mob-and-shiism-in-iraq-the-rebellion-of-ottoman-karbala-1824-1843 31/33
141
AFIA, MOB AND SHI1SMIN IRAQ
centuries,andat first heyhadfewerresources o devote o controlling
.
their own remoterprovlnces.
In response, he Ottomans rom 1826sought o increase esources
throughthe abolitionof tax-farming nd privilegesand througha
rationalized nd centralizedbureaucracy. he manner n which the
governmentnitiallygrewweaker, hen attempted o imposegreater
centralizationhroughnew, European-influencedechniques,helped
provokeregionalclashes n Iraq, with urbanviolenceand gang-led
revoltsgrowingcommon. OutsideKarbala he strugglebetween he
Shumurdand Zuqurtfactions n Najaf, representingwealthierand
poorerquarters f the city, racked hat ownwithviolence hroughout
the nineteenthcentury.80
In Iran, as well, the Haydari and Ni'mati quarters originally
named or mysticalSufi brotherhoods)nto which many ownswere
dividedoften stagedstreet battles.GangsdominatedYazd for most
of the 1840sand for a time a gang leadereffectively uledthe city.81
Shirazwas, for much of the 1830sand early 1840s,torn by factional
rivalries n which allied groupsof notablesand gang bosses clashed
with such ferocity hat the local governoroften lost control.82
From he Euphrateso the Oxusnineteenth-centuryangsemerged
briefly as popular eaders with great power in a town for several
reasons.First, both the Mamlukand Qajar tates ackedthe ability
to project orce quickly and effectively hroughout heir territories,
owing in part to their small standingarmies.These statestherefore
hadto dependheavilyon appointed ocalgovernors, hemselves ften
weak or lacking full central governmentsupport. Large pastoral
nomadicpopulations,relatively arge urbanconcentrations, ugged
terrainand lack of maderoadsand transportationechnology,made
the provincesmoredifficult o control hanwasthe case n contempor-
ary Europe.
Secondly,the local notables,artisans, hopkeepers nd labourers
in Iraqi and Iranian owns had little or no allegiance o the central
government, nd so they sometimesperceivedgang rule as no more
illegitimate han rule by the state. This especiallyheld true for the
Shiite towns in Iraq, and often applied n Iran as well. Where the
government axed the tradespeoplewithout providingservices ike
80 Longrigg,Modernraq,p. 288;Nieuwenhuis, olitics ndSocietynEarlyModern
Iraq, pp. 31-2
81
Momen,Babi and Baha'iReligions, p. 106-7.
82 For the situation n Shiraz, ee HasanFasa'i,Histotyof PersiaunderQajarRule
[Farsnamih-'iasiri], rans.HeribertBusse New York, 1972),pp. 235-8,262-7,285-
7, 350-1;and Amanat,"EarlyYearsof the Babl Movement",pp. 382-7.
8/9/2019 Mafia, Mob and Shiism in Iraq the Rebellion of Ottoman Karbala 1824-1843
http://slidepdf.com/reader/full/mafia-mob-and-shiism-in-iraq-the-rebellion-of-ottoman-karbala-1824-1843 32/33
142
PAST AND PRESENT
NUMBER 1 12
security, t often drovethem to an alliancewith their ocalextortion-
ists. In short,nineteenth-centuryrbangangshada common nterest
with local elites and the local tradespeoplen keeping the central
government ut. Finally, factionaldivisionsamong ocal elites such
as landednotablesand religiousscholars,and amongcity quarters,
often so detracted rom urban corporate olidarityas to allow the
gangs to divide and rule.
Underthese circumstances, angs n mid-nineteenth-centuryraq
and Iran used their armed force in the service of revolts by local
notablesor by tradespeople gainst he centrally ppointed overnor.
They often becamepopular ocal eaders, ranscendingat leastfor a
time) their extortionistbackground.
In Karbala heir provisionof makeshift nd arbitraryecurityhad
the virtue,at least, of allowingmorewealth o remain n the city than
the Ottomanswould have, while assuring he uninterruptedlow of
pilgrimsand merchants.The city's inhabitantspaid the price of a
stateof roughsemi-anarchy. evertheless, he evidence ndicates hat
the little people and many Shiite religiousscholarspreferred ven
gangruleandprotection ackets o imperialOttoman ontrol. Indeed
the Ottoman attack served only to fuel anti-monarchicaleelings
amongsome Shiiteclerics.)Without he activesupportof the crowd,
Karbala ouldnot havewardedoff central overnmentroops or two
decades.The tradespeople, aughtbetween wo unpleasant lterna-
tives, chose to be exploitedby their local leadership.The prospect
of more centralized,bureaucraticOttomanrule in the 1830s and
1840s, tselfa response o the riseof Europeanndustrial ndpolitical
might, provoked he little people to defend their local autonomy.
The roleof"mafias" n defending provincial reaagainst distant
governmenthas long been recognized.But the specificallyurban
character f the Karbala
utis
does raisequestions.The urbangang
leadershipof these popularuprisingsmust strike anyone familiar
with the historiography f earlymodernEuropeas anomalous.The
gangsters n Paris, it has often been observed, saw the French
Revolutionas no morethanan opportunityor plunder.Hobsbawm
argued hat althoughpeasantbanditsare "social", n tune with the
needs and aspirations f the oppressedpeasantry rom which they
spring, urbanbanditsare asocial.83The widespreadnvolvement f
83
Hobsbawm,Bandits,pp. 84-5. Hobsbawm eserves ull credit or drawing ur
attention o these phenomena,and this criticism s meant to be constructive.For
anothercriticalview of Hobsbawm's pproach o ruralbandits, see P. O'Malley,
"SocialBandits,ModernCapitalism, nd the Traditional easantry:A Critiqueof
(cont. on p. 143)
8/9/2019 Mafia, Mob and Shiism in Iraq the Rebellion of Ottoman Karbala 1824-1843
http://slidepdf.com/reader/full/mafia-mob-and-shiism-in-iraq-the-rebellion-of-ottoman-karbala-1824-1843 33/33
MAFIA,
MOB
AND SHIISM IN
IRAQ
143
gangs
in urban movements
of social protest
in nineteenth-century
Iraq
and Iran challenges
his
paradigm.Indeed
it
should provoke
thoughtas to whether thereis reallyany such thing as an asocial
gang,urban
or otherwise.
As Anton
Blokhas
pointedout, all
banditry
is "social"
n
so far as it occurs
n a
socialcontext.84
Bandits
emerge rom
particular
lassesand,
when
successful,
heir
wealth
and means
of procuring
t
give them broader
nterests
and
alliances.
Bandits, rural
or
urban, engage in
anti-social
behaviour,
exploiting he
poor
as well as the rich,
and
will join in social
revolts
when they
perceive
t in their interests
o do.
Butluti rule,basedon a tenuouscoalitionof anarchicalangsand
upon
a vacuumof
more legitimate
power,
exhibited
nstabilityand
proveda transitional
henomenon.
t burgeoned
whenthe
old tax-
farming
Mamluk
government
declined
n the firstthird
of the
nine-
teenth
century,but
before
modern,centralized
tates
arose o
impose
strict ecurity.
Naiib
Pasha's
attackwasa harbinger
f
things o come;
but
they would come
very
gradually ver the
succeeding
entury.
XuanR.
I. Cole
MooVanMomen
(n. 83 cont.)
Hobsbawm",
Tl. PeasantStudies,
vi (1979),
pp. 489-502. For
other studies
and
conceptual
efinements
f
ruralbanditry,ee
L. Lewin,"TheOligarchicalimitations
of Social
Banditry n Brazil",
Past
andPresent,no. 82
(Feb. 1979),
pp. 116-47;
and
HenkDriessen,
"The 'Noble
Bandit'and the
Bandits
of the Nobles:Brigandage
nd
Local
Community
n Nineteenth
CenturyAndalusia",
rchivesuropeenese
sociologie,
xxiv
(1983) pp. 96-114.
84 Anton Blok,
"The
Peasantand the Brigand:
Social
BanditryReconsidered",
top related