learning with others - a randomized field experiment on the formation of aspirations in rural...

13/04/2023

Learning with Others - A Randomized Field Experiment on the Formation of Aspirations in

Rural Ethiopia

Tanguy Bernard1, Stefan Dercon2, Kate Orkin2, and Alemayehu Seyoum Taffesse1

1International Food Policy Research Institute, 2 University of Oxford

July 18, 2013Eleventh International Conference on the Ethiopian Economy

Ethiopian Economic Association

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Motivation Elements of the aspirations framework Aspirations project Field experiment – design and findings

Outline

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Conceptual – ‘opportunities’

Empirical – Why do the poor not ‘invest’?

Ethiopians and fatalism?

Focus 1 - ‘external circumstances’ and ‘opportunities’.

Low returns to investments; Unexploited opportunities due to lack of information or

knowledge; Social constraints;

Focus 2 - constraints associated with the manifested attributes of decision makers

Identity issues: sense of self; Psychological issues: impatience, commitment, and psychological

barriers

Aspirations failure perspective

Motivation – why aspirations

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Aspirations:

A desire or an ambition to achieve something An aim and implied effort to reach it A set of future-regarding preferences

Related concepts

Economics : Satisficing Psychology : Self-efficacy, locus of control Anthropology : Aspiration failures

Common elements

Goals and aspirations are important determinants of success; Evolution through time in response to circumstances; Role of social comparisons and learning from relevant others,

An individual-level yet culturally (collectively) determined attribute towards exploration of individual-group symbiosis

Elements of the Aspirations Perspective

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Elements of the Aspirations Perspective

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What are Aspirations?

Aspirations have two distinctive aspects:

• Future-oriented - are goals that can only be satisfied at some future time (differ from immediate gratifications);

• Motivators - are goals individuals are willing, in principle, to invest time, effort or money in to attain (different from idle daydreams and wishes)

Note: the ‘willingness to invest’ is ‘potential’, or ‘conditional’

Aspirations and expectations – preference vs. beliefs;

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Elements of the Aspirations Perspective

Why are aspirations important/useful?

Aspirations (or the capacity to aspire):

Reflect bounded rationality;

Are socially determined (social interaction);

Are distributed unevenly within communities.

Condition individual behaviour and well-being

Useful device in analysing and/or addressing poverty

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Elements of the Aspirations PerspectiveHow do aspirations condition individual behaviour?

Aspiration window:

an individual’s cognitive world, his/her zone of ‘similar’, ‘attainable’ individuals;

Reflects the information and economic opportunities of the local environment;

Multi-dimensional (‘similarity’);

Aspiration gap:

difference between the aspired ‘state’ and current ‘state’ Conditions future-oriented behaviour - inverted U relationship

between gap and effort

A possible outcome is an aspiration failure - lack of pro-active behaviour (or ‘under-investment’) towards filling the aspiration gap

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Conceptual Schema

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Elements of the Aspirations PerspectiveMeasurement Issues

• Aspirations are not directly observable

– Revealed by observed behaviour: interpretation issues (linking aspirations and behaviour)

– Elicited using subjective questions: measurement issues

• Limits to subjective assessment:

– Subjects: subjects’ willingness to report private knowledge, evaluation apprehension, and subject role playing

– Instruments (attributes of): order of questions (anchoring), the number of categories on the rating scale (odd-even), the adjectives that are used as the endpoints of the rating scale, and the adverbs that describe scale categories.

(e.g. Delavande et al. (2009), Bertrand and Mullainathan (2001) for reviews)

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Elements of the Aspirations Perspective

Identification issues

• individual characteristics affect aspirations, aspiration windows and behaviour (e.g. schooling levels, wealth, and family background),

Particularly the endogeneity of the aspiration window a key hurdle

• aspirations ‘cause’ success – a person with higher aspirations may be more successful.

• Success ‘causes’ aspirations – a successful person may revise his/her aspiration to a higher level, or

experiment, panel data13/04/2023 10

The “Aspirations” project

Step 1 – correlates of aspiration-related conceptsStep 2 – test and validate a measurement strategyStep 3 – assess validity of the “aspiration window” hypothesis

An experiment Exogenous shock to aspirations: Mini-documentaries of local

success stories screened to randomly selected individuals. Placebo: local TV show.

3 rounds of data• Baseline pre-treatment (Sept-Dec 2010)• Aspirations retest immediately after treatment• Follow-up (Mar-May 2011)

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Field Experiment - Aspirations Measures

•  200,000 ETB ~ value of one harvest of chat from one hectare

100,000 ETB ~ value of one harvest of chat from half a hectare

0 ETB

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Surveyed : Treatment, 6 households (12 individuals) in every villagePlacebo, 6 households (12 individuals) in every villageControl, 6 households (12 individuals) in every village

Non-Surveyed : Treatment, 18 households (36 individuals)/ intense treatment villagePlacebo, 18 households (36 individuals)/ intense placebo village

Treatment village Placebo village

16 Screening sites, 4 villages/screening site (2 Intense Treatment, 2 Intense Placebo),

36 households/village (18 households surveyed, 18 households not surveyed)

Field Experiment – Design

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On going experiment

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Field Experiment – Basic Features

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 All

villages

Intense-treatment

villages

Intense-placebo villages

# villages 64 32 32# individuals 1,942 1,011 931

of which:      

Treatment individuals 610 324 303

Control individuals 625 343 311

Placebo individuals 620 344 317

Avg # peers invited to treatment 0.83 1.23 0.39

(std.dev) (0.92) (0.96) (0.63)Avg # peers invited to placebo 0.77 0.38 1.20(std.dev) (0.89) (0.61) (0.95)

Field Experiment – Baseline Correlates of Aspirations

  Income aspiration

Wealth aspiration

Education aspiration

Social status aspiration

Aspiration index

Age -0.000 0.001 0.002 0.006 0.003

  (0.000) (0.002) (0.003) (0.003)** (0.001)**

Age² 0.000 -0.000 -0.000* -0.000* -0.000

  (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000)***

Gender (Male=1) 0.008 0.062 0.258 0.096 0.104

(0.002)*** (0.036)* (0.051)*** (0.049)** (0.021)***

Education (Read/write=1) -0.000 0.068 0.333 0.312 0.152

(0.002) (0.070) (0.051)*** (0.073)*** (0.027)***

R2 0.03 0.01 0.08 0.04 0.07

N 1,964 1,967 1,932 1,957 1,865

* p<0.1; ** p<0.05; *** p<0.01; Screening site fixed effects included but not reported; Robust standard errors in parentheses

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Balance

Sample balanced on gender, literacy, age and most outcomes

* p<0.1; ** p<0.05; *** p<0.01

  AllTreatment

(T)Placebo

(P)Control

(C)

% compliance by treatment status 95 93.8 96.2 100

Education (Read/write=

1)

Gender (% male)

Age (completed years)

Baseline Standarized ---- Aspiration

Income WealthChildren's Education

Social Status

Aggregate

Difference: T-C, p-value

0.02 0.32 0 0.84 0.15 0.86 0.1 0.14 0.03 0.35 0.05 0.43 0.09 0.08* 0.04 0.12

Difference: P-C, p-value

0.02 0.32 0 0.93 0.05 0.94 0 0.89 0.05 0.15 0.01 0.83 0.04 0.55 0.01 0.5

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Field Experiment - Compliance and Potency of Treatment

 Treatment(standard

error)

Placebo(standard

error)

Difference(p-value)

Liked a lot what I saw?0.95 0.73 0.22

(0.02) (0.01) (0.00)***

Discussed it a lot with my neighbours0.87 0.71 0.15

(0.01) (0.02) (0.00)***

Discussed it at least once with neighbours over the past two weeks

0.32 0.21 0.11

(0.02) (0.02) (0.00)***

Content generated a lot of discussion within community

0.92 0.72 0.20

(0.01) (0.02) (0.00)***

Assessment of Documentaries and Placebo

* p<0.1; ** p<0.05; *** p<0.01

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Field Experiment - Compliance and Potency of Treatment

How does his/her present condition fares compared to yours today?

He/she is worse off

We’re about the same

He/she is better off

How did his/her initial condition fared compared

to yours five years ago?

He/she was worse off 9.35 1.40 40.19

We were about the same 4.83 2.49 12.15

He/she was better off 6.70 1.71 21.18

Table 5 – Relevance of documentaries

Cell proportions are reported. The totals of all cells add up to 100. N=642

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Impact on Aspirations - Estimation strategy

•  

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Treatment and Placebo Effects on Aspirations

  (1) (2) (3) (4)

Treatment0.027   0.026  

(0.018)   (0.018)  

Placebo  0.016   0.015  (0.018)   (0.018)

# peers w/treatment0.026     0.021

(0.010)***     (0.009)**

# peers w/placebo  0.001 -0.022  

  (0.010) (0.012)*  

Baseline aspiration0.132 0.157 0.132 0.157

(0.062)** (0.050)*** (0.062)** (0.050)***

Constant 0.053 0.038 0.095 0.018

(0.035) (0.036) (0.037)*** (0.037)R2 0.06 0.07 0.06 0.08N 1,210 1,258 1,210 1,258

* p<0.1; ** p<0.05; *** p<0.01; Screening site fixed effects not reported; Robust standard errors in parenthesis13/04/2023 21

Treatment and Placebo Effects on Expectations

* p<0.1; ** p<0.05; *** p<0.01; Screening site fixed effects not reported; Robust standard errors in parenthesis

  (1) (2) (3) (4)

Treatment0.051   0.049  

(0.023)**   (0.023)*  

Placebo  0.021   0.018

  (0.021)   (0.021)

# peers w/treatment0.024     0.032

(0.010)**     (0.010)***

# peers w/placebo  0.015 0.007  

  (0.011) (0.014)  

Baseline expectations0.401 0.074 0.402 0.075

(0.056)*** (0.032)** (0.057)*** (0.032)**

Constant-0.047 -0.070 -0.028 -0.093

(0.046) (0.048) (0.048) (0.047)

R2 0.16 0.06 0.16 0.06

N 1,093 1,141 1,093 1,141

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Treatment and Placebo Effects on Future-Oriented Behaviour

* p<0.1; ** p<0.05; *** p<0.01; Screening site fixed effects not reported; Robust standard errors in parenthesis

  (1) (2) (3) (4)

Treatment-3.33   -3.83  

(12.61) (12.67)

Placebo-8.46 -8.85

(16.91) (16.865)

# peers w/treatment18.48 24.91

(7.97)** (10.6)**

# peers w/placebo-9.63 -9.47

(8.49) (6.73)

Baseline time allocation - Work

0.69 0.61 0.70 0.60

(0.02)*** (0.03)*** (0.02)*** (0.03)***

Constant138.1 167.7 156.0 141.7

(79.4)* (81.8)** (87.2)* (74.9)*

R2 0.3 0.18 0.3 0.18

N 1,280 1,317 1,280 1,317

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Treatment effects on time allocation - work

Treatment and Placebo Effects on Future-Oriented Behaviour

* p<0.1; ** p<0.05; *** p<0.01; Screening site fixed effects not reported; Robust standard errors in parenthesis

  (1) (2) (3) (4)

Treatment19.97   19.84  

(12.93) (13.04)

Placebo26.39 26.83

(12.79)** (13.01)**

# peers w/treatment-0.74 -10.87

(6.60) (6.28)*

# peers w/placebo1.79 3.35

(6.52) (5.71)

Baseline time allocation - Work

0.31 0.31 0.31 0.31

(0.03)*** (0.03)*** (0.03)*** (0.03)***

Constant522.6 549.2 519.8 560.2

(34.2)*** (33.3)*** (34.9)*** (33.8)***

R2 0.07 0.07 0.07 0.07

N 1,284 1,322 1,284 1,322

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Treatment effects on time allocation - leisure

Treatment and Placebo Effects on Future-Oriented Behaviour

  Savings Savings Deposits Deposits Withdrawals Withdrawals

  (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)

Treatment186.9   63.5   33.7  

(106.4)*   (22.3)***   (17.2)*  

Placebo  126.1   17.9   4.6

  (95.1)   (20.6)   (9.3)

# peers with treatment34.3   -37.1   -5.4  

(85.9)   (11.9)***   (6.7)  

# peers with placebo  -28.2   -7.0   7.7

  (46.9)   (10.5)   (6.2)

Baseline savings0.741 0.658 -0.011 0.137 0.004 0.016

(0.578) (0.513) (0.011) (0.198) (0.017) (0.019)

Constant-105.3 -24.9 80.9 24.1 55.2 32.7

(314.9) (271.4) (47.9)* (21.8) (108.1) (16.4)**

R2 0.16 0.29 0.05 0.04 0.03 0.02

N 1,258 1,288 1,258 1,288 1,258 1,288

* p<0.1; ** p<0.05; *** p<0.01; Screening site fixed effects and controls for age, age², gender and education not reported; Robust standard errors in parenthesis

Table 10 – Treatment effects on savings behaviour

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Treatment and Placebo Effects on Future-Oriented Behaviour

Table A1 - Direct and indirect treatment effect on Locus of Control  LOC

othersLOC others LOC internal LOC

internalLOC chance LOC

chance

Treatment-0.027   0.083   -0.030  

(0.051)   (0.038)**   (0.044)  

Placebo 

  -0.015   -0.027   -0.028

  (0.050)   (0.039)   (0.043)

# peers w/treatment-0.056   -0.016   -0.059  

(0.028)**   (0.020)   (0.023)**  

# peers w/placebo  -0.002   -0.018   0.023

  (0.028)   (0.023)   (0.025)

Baseline LOC0.196 0.212 0.089 0.098 0.166 0.144

(0.031)*** (0.030)*** (0.030)*** (0.030)*** (0.027)*** (0.025)***

Constant1.720 1.736 2.726 2.684 1.900 1.911

(0.120)*** (0.127)*** (0.124)*** (0.123)*** (0.105)*** (0.104)***

R2 0.05 0.06 0.03 0.02 0.05 0.05

N 1,341 1,372 1,342 1,373 1,341 1,374

* p<0.1; ** p<0.05; *** p<0.01; Screening site fixed effects not reported; Robust standard errors in parenthesis13/04/2023 26

Treatment and Placebo Effects on Future-Oriented Behaviour

Table A2 - Direct and indirect treatment effect on Perception of Poverty

* p<0.1; ** p<0.05; *** p<0.01; Screening site fixed effects not reported; Robust standard errors in parenthesis

  Poverty due to Fate Poverty Structural Poverty Individual

Treatment-0.108   0.033   0.088  

(0.048)**   (0.038)   (0.042)**  

Placebo  -0.005   0.058   0.072  (0.048)   (0.037)   (0.042)*

# peers w/treatment

-0.048   -0.046   -0.011  

(0.027)*   (0.021)**   (0.024)  

# peers w/placebo

  0.008   -0.012   -0.005  (0.029)   (0.023)   (0.025)

Baseline percept poverty

0.060 0.028 0.111 0.052 0.058 0.083

(0.031)* (0.031) (0.033)*** (0.030) (0.032)* (0.030)***

Constant2.397 2.506 2.465 2.723 2.907 2.869

(0.116)*** (0.120)*** (0.120)*** (0.114)*** (0.124)*** (0.119)***R2 0.02 0.02 0.02 0.03 0.03 0.03N 1,339 1,368 1,337 1,368 1,339 1,370

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Observations

"Weak" treatment, but:

Documentaries affected aspirations, expectations, time allocation, savings behaviour, and perceptions more than the placebo even 6 months after treatment;

Direct and, even more visible, indirect (group) effects are detected – more of an aspiration window story rather than a role model one;

It is not obvious why some effects are direct (savings) while others are indirect (time allocation);

Further analysis; Expanding coverage – Malawi, Pakistan via IFPRI;

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